高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度對自願性資訊發佈之影響jacg.rd.fcu.edu.tw/dl/4103.pdf · 會計與公司治理第四卷第一期 2007 年6 月 57-84 頁 57 高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度對自願性資訊發佈之影響

2007 6 57-84

57

*

*

Journal of Accounting and Corporate Governance Volume 4 Number 1, Jan 2007 pp.57-84

58

The Effects of CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity on

Voluntary Disclosures

Ruey-Dang Chang National Sun Yat-sen University

Kuo-Chin Lin Tainan University of Technology

Wen-Hua Shen National Sun Yat-sen University

Pei-Hsiu Hou Tainan University of Technology

Abstract

The purpose of the study is to investigate the effects of CEO pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) on the companys voluntary disclosures. Executive salaries and operating performances of the companies were first computed to derive the PPS of the CEO. The voluntary disclosure items on the companys annual reports were divided into five categories and the content analysis method was then conducted to measure the level of the companys disclosure. In addition, the effects of the voluntary financial forecasts on the companys stock price were measured to determine the information contents of the voluntary financial forecasts. The empirical results indicate that companies with high PPS have a higher level of voluntary disclosure as well as higher information contents of the voluntary financial forecasts.

KeywordsPay-Performance SensitivityVoluntary DisclosureVoluntary Financial ForecastsInformation Content

59

1997 2001 (Enron) 2004

(agency theory) 1960 (principal) (agent) ()

Carpenter and Sanders (2002) 2004

(pay-performance sensitivity, PPS) PPS

(information asymmetry)

PPS

60 Journal of Accounting and Corporate Governance

()

25%

(Pownall et al. 1993

( 2000)

2003 PPS PPS

PPS

PPS

(Berle and Means 1932Jensen and Meckling1976

61

Jensen and Meckling (1976) (1)

(2)

(3)

(Myers and Majluf 1984(4)

(Watts and Zimmerman 1978) (incentive) (outcome)

(Holmstorm 1979; Fama and Jensen 1983)

(Coughlan and Schmidt 1985)

(Lambert and Larcker 1987; Murphy 1999; 2002 2003 2005 2006 )


(Spence 1974; Verrecchia 1983)(1) (signaling hypothesis)

(Penman 1980; Trueman 1986)(2) (expectation adjustment hypothesis)

(Ajinkya and Gift 1984 Ruland et al. (1990) (3) (litigation hypothesis)

(Skinner 1994)

(4) (mitigating agency hypothesis)

(Jensen and Meckling 1976)Bryan and Hwang (1997)

(2003) PPS

(Trueman 1986) (Ajinkya and Gift 1984)Hossain et al. (1995)

63

( 1991) ( 2000 2007)

Meek et al. (1995)

Firth (1979)

(Choi 1973; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Botosan 1997; Sengupta 1998)

PPS

H1

(Lev 1989Ball and Brown (1968)

Beaver (1968)

Patell (1976)

(Nichols and Tsay 1979


(1997)

(2004)

Watts and Zimmerman (1986)

PPS

H2

2000 2004 (Taiwan Economic Journal , TEJ) (1)(2) (3)(4) 2000 2004 (5)(6) 2000 2004

65

1.

content analysisAbbott and Monsen (1979)

Botosan (1997) (2004)

()

Botosan1997(1) 1 0 (2) 1 (3) 1 3 0 ()

2.

TEJ (event study)

7 ( 15 ) 7 100

(abnormal return, AR)2000

PPS PPS Ajinky and Gift1984

MFE = (AE-ME) / AE

MFE


ME

AE

MFE MFE

1

2 7 7 15 3 7 100

t1 t2 t3 t4

i

t

Wi i Wi = t4- t3 +1

Ti i Ti = t2- t1+1

(mean-adjusted returns model) AR (2000)

E( R iE)=(1/Ti)=

2

1

t

ttitR , EW

i

t

E ()EW

Wi i Wi = t4- t3 +1

Ti i Ti = t2- t1+1

Rit i t

E(RiE) i E

Ti Wi

67

WERERAR iEiEiE = ),( iEAR i E

iER i E )( iERE i E

AR

(average abnormal return, AAR)

=

=N

1i

iEE WE,N/)AR(AAR

EAAR W E

EAARi i W E

(cumulative average abnormal return, CAR )

[ ] WU,U,N/])AR1([)AR()U,U(CAR 21U

UE

iE

N

1i

U

1EE21

2

1

2

T

+== ===

),( 21 UUCAR U1 U2 U1 U2

3.

: ()

Abowd (1990) (2003) PPS () (ROA) 2000 2004 ROA ROA


ROA ROA PPS ROA PPS ROA () ROA () PPS 1

1

PPS 1.ROA > ROA 2. >

176

PPS 1. ROA > < ROA 2. > <

230

()

PPS 1.ROA < ROA 2. <

176

582 2 2 45.02 % 2 7.56%

69

2

11 8 7 1.20 12 21 19 3.26 13 22 20 3.44 14 50 44 7.56 15 35 35 6.01 16 14 14 2.40 17 34 31 5.33 18 7 6 1.03 19 7 7 1.20 20 24 24 4.12 21 9 9 1.55 22 5 4 0.69 23 300 262 45.02 25 33 28 4.81 26 17 17 2.92 27 6 6 1.03 28 45 -- -- 29 11 10 1.72 98 1 1 0.17 99 48 38 6.53

697 582 100

3 3 2004 2,358 2000 2004 2000 56 2001 41,174.51

3 -

2000 2,033 2,244 1,482 56 27,978 960 2,345

2001 1,847 3,026 1,194 72 41,175 693 1,976

2002 2,273 2,782 1,641 98 39,046 1,107 2,481

2003 2,222 2,438 1,631 103 22,940 1,066 2,559

2004 2,358 2,396 1,854 90 36,183 1,215 2,819

4 4 3,096 3,031


2,838 43,886 24,390 237 249

4 -

1,359 779 1,248 488 2,796 841 1,948 1,520 1,049 1,191 463 4,426 932 1,705 1,320 809 1,039 380 3,354 712 1,894 1,154 683 1,020 237 3,821 695 1,348 1,796 1,153 1,454 249 5,464 1,068 2,275 1,590 1,099 1,143 657 4,190 800 2,056 1,575 841 1,423 432 3,668 1,047 1,654 1,474 574 1,437 888 2,423 982 1,676 1,306 773 1,013 441 2,655 655 1,904 1,528 1,284 1,127 456 5,951 800 1,654 1,641 863 1,630 715 3,700 1,169 1,739 3,031 680 2,976 2,258 3,912 2,583 3,478 2,838 2,946 1,968 446 24,390 1,398 3,179 3,096 8,343 1,340 772 43,886 1,142 1,780 1,898 1,286 1,479 392 4,792 852 3,147 1,055 418 969 604 1,619 712 1,458 2,272 1,513 2,268 552 5,555 796 2,931 1,288 -- 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,288 1,851 1,233 1,494 423 6,064 1,095 2,280

5 5 2001 2002 2004 6 7.15 % 6.24% 6.00%

5 - %

2000 6.40 9.22 4.68 -82.69 67.06 1.52 9.66 2001 4.85 9.03 3.66 -129.58 78.98 0.98 8.16 2002 5.60 8.21 4.16 -44.39 69.41 1.29 8.79 2003 5.86 8.14 4.31 -53.15 76.60 1.34 9.28 2004 6.41 8.84 4.95 -74.12 92.17 1.85 10.20

71

6 - %

2.34 0.85 2.33 1.17 3.89 1.73 2.67 3.51 2.63 2.89 -0.22 8.91 1.73 5.21 4.17 2.78 3.21 0.68 9.14 1.68 7.00 2.88 3.20 2.66 -2.84 12.07 0.84 4.07 5.75 4.36 5.38 -2.15 19.97 2.46 8.33 2.32 1.95 2.62 -1.12 5.26 0.75 3.51 5.40 4.49 4.74 1.18 19.02 2.55 8.53 1.34 4.04 1.33 -2.90 8.26 -2.47 2.53 2.62 2.89 4.10 -1.15 5.31 -0.87 5.05 6.00 3.28 4.99 0.69 12.04 3.12 6.74 4.35 2.38 3.67 1.16 8.97 3.02 5.60 7.15 2.32 7.81 3.83 9.16 5.71 8.59 3.64 63.98 6.90 -4.34 43.52 3.97 9.96 0.66 1.96 0.59 -3.97 4.77 -0.30 1.56 4.66 4.26 4.01 4.30 12.52 2.49 6.41 3.98 4.17 2.50 0.93 12.26 1.87 3.87 4.16 3.62 3.38 -1.26 11.34 1.91 6.51 6.24 -- 6.78 -1.48 22.03 3.65 10.46 -1.41 5.42 -1.41 -1.42 -1.41 -1.41 -1.41

7 7 46.85 %

42.11%

7

% 9.00 5.69 3.95 4.00 1.00 7.00 30.08 6.00 3.38 0.07 2.00 1.00 4.00 39.00 27.00 17.65 3.39 17.00 0.00 23.00 46.85 18.00 7.59 2.65 7.00 3.00 15.00 42.11 12.00 5.71 1.62 4.00 1.00 10.00 39.25

72.00 30.70 9.66 33.00 6.00 56.00 41.75


8 8 36.84

8

3.01 2.67 13.83 8.51 4.65 32.67 3.04 2.40 12.13 7.96 4.04 29.57 3.95 3.45 13.27 7.24 5.65 33.56 2.14 2.11 12.83 8.39 5.36 30.83 3.05 1.86 14.57 8.31 5.30 33.09 3.75 2.39 11.67 6.74 3.80 28.35 3.11 2.10 13.06 8.21 5.41 31.89 2.85 1.80 12.20 6.83 5.25 28.93 4.10 2.40 14.63 4.82 4.93 30.88 2.64 2.33 13.93 8.09 5.49 32.48 3.13 2.16 12.94 4.65 5.05 27.93 3.24 2.41 14.30 6.89 5.45 32.29 4.59 3.13 14.97 9.30 4.85 36.84 1.10 1.66 10.63 13.28 4.78 31.45 2.51 2.44 13.31 7.81 4.76 30.83 2.64 2.06 9.17 6.36 4.71 24.94 0.30 2.42 10.50 8.50 3.54 25.26 0.96 2.40 9.68 5.65 3.81 22.50

PPS PPS t PPS 9

73

9 PPS t

PPS t

PPS(n=176) 32.74 1.42

PPS(n=176) 28.42 3.65 14.64***

PPS(n=176) 2.96 0.57

PPS(n=176) 2.81 0.95 1.77

PPS(n=176) 2.22 0.42

PPS(n=176) 2.67 0.99 -5.53***

PPS(n=176) 13.37 0.72

PPS(n=176) 11.29 2.19 11.99***

PPS(n=176) 9.06 0.61

PPS(n=176) 7.13 2.04 12.04***

PPS(n=176) 5.13 0.60 PPS(n=176) 4.52 1.57

4.84***

* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p


10

n=1960 n=1091

n=869

-7 -0.1001 -0.0676 -0.1402 -6 0.1293** 0.0863 0.1822 -5 0.0516 0.0025 0.1184 -4 0.0098 0.1217 -0.1280 -3 -0.0244 0.0134 -0.0710 -2 0.0296 0.0579 -0.0052 -1 -0.0004 0.1118 -0.1388 0 0.1963** 0.5580*** -0.2503* 1 -0.2508*** -0.0020 -0.5581*** 2 -0.4865*** -0.2974*** -0.7195*** 3 -0.3180*** -0.3256*** -0.3086** 4 -0.3009*** -0.2421** -0.3733*** 5 -0.2635*** -0.3023*** -0.2157 6 -0.2249*** -0.3888*** -0.0227 7 -0.2047** -0.3369*** -0.0417

* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p

75

6 7

6 -3 7 7

3

PPS PPS 12 13

12 PPS PPS 7

PPS

n=457

PPS

n= 287

PPS

n=274

PPS

n=314 -7 0.0283 -0.1228 -0.1402 0.1689 -6 0.1182 -0.0705 0.1822 0.0985 -5 0.0277 0.0715 0.1184 -0.0768 -4 0.1485 0.0766 -0.1280 -0.1937 -3 0.0303 0.0093 -0.0710 -0.1120 -2 0.1335 0.2100 -0.0052 0.3352 -1 0.0236 0.0806 -0.1388 -0.0002 0 0.3996** 0.6298*** -0.2503* 0.0514 1 -0.1444 0.0543 -0.5581*** -0.3047 2 -0.4318*** -0.4852** -0.7195*** -0.3500 3 -0.3627** -0.6918*** -0.3086** -0.5582*** 4 -0.5096*** -0.0188 -0.3733*** -0.2822 5 -0.3968** -0.1902 -0.2157* -0.1094 6 -0.4617*** -0.4309* -0.0227 0.2592 7 -0.2130 -0.3888* -0.0417 0.0548

*P


7 1 -18.25 %-43.85 % PPS PPS 5.14% 1 27.14 % 1 6 PPS PPS PPS

13 PPS PPS 7

PPS

n=457

PPS

n= 287

PPS

n=274

PPS

n=314 -7 0.0283 -0.1228 -0.1402 0.1689 -6 0.1465 -0.1933 0.0421 0.2674 -5 0.1743 -0.1218 0.1605 0.1906 -4 0.3228 -0.0452 0.0324 -0.0031 -3 0.3530 -0.0359 -0.0386 -0.1151 -2 0.4866 0.1741 -0.0438 0.2201 -1 0.5102 0.2547 -0.1825 0.2200 0 0.9098 0.8845 -0.4385 0.2714 1 0.7653 0.9388 -0.9966 -0.0333 2 0.3335 0.4536 -1.7093 -0.3832 3 -0.0292 -0.2382 -2.0179 -0.9415 4 -0.5387 -0.2570 -2.3912 -1.2237 5 -0.9356 -0.4472 -2.6069 -1.3331 6 -1.3972 -0.8781 -2.6296 -1.0740 7 -1.6102 -1.2669 -2.6713 -1.0192

PPS H2 PPS PPS

-

45.02 262 PPS 117 PPS 31 14

77

14

PPS (n=117) 3.00 2.23 13.49 9.08 5.17 32.97

PPS (n=31) 2.35 2.77 10.90 6.58 4.90 27.50

t PPS PPS

15

15 PPS PPS t

t PPS(n=117) 32.97 1.25

PPS(n=31) 27.52 3.60 13.66***

PPS(n=117) 3.00 0.54

PPS(n=31) 2.35 0.61 3.75***

PPS(n=117) 2.23 0.42

PPS(n=31) 2.77 1.06 -4.42***

PPS(n=117) 13.49 0.65

PPS(n=31) 10.90 2.24 10.93***

PPS(n=117) 9.08 0.54

PPS(n=31) 6.58 1.17 13.53***

PPS(n=117) 5.17 0.62

PPS(n=31) 4.90 1.42 1.56 * P


16

n=885

n=487

n=398

-7 0.0368 -0.0655 0.1819 -6 0.1596 0.0492 0.2122 -5 0.0438 0.1572 -0.1402 -4 0.0109 0.0294 -0.1643 -3 0.2027 0.1666 0.0176 -2 0.2361 0.0858 0.1838 -1 -0.0860 -0.1308 -0.2923 0 0.1952 0.3587 -0.4549 1 -0.4095 -0.3520 -0.9531 2 -0.5508 -0.4978 -0.8668 3 -0.4212 -0.4267 -0.5668 4 -0.5438 -0.6227 -0.7295 5 -0.3543 -0.5356 -0.3552 6 -0.2655 -0.4083 -0.1026 7 -0.2353 -0.3417 -0.1502

17

n=885

n=487

n=398

-7 0.0368 -0.0655 0.1819 -6 0.1964 -0.0164 0.3942 -5 0.2402 0.1408 0.2540 -4 0.2512 0.1703 0.0897 -3 0.4539 0.3368 0.1073 -2 0.6900 0.4226 0.2910 -1 0.6040 0.2919 -0.0013 0 0.7991 0.6505 -0.4562 1 0.3897 0.2985 -1.4093 2 -0.1611 -0.1993 -2.2762 3 -0.5823 -0.6260 -2.8443 4 -1.1261 -1.2486 -3.5739 5 -1.4804 -1.7843 -3.9291 6 -1.7459 -2.1925 -4.0317 7 -1.9812 -2.5342 -4.1819

PPS PPS

PPS

79

PPS

PPS PPS

PPS PPS PPS PPS

(1)

(2) ()() (3)

(4)

0


1.

2.

3.

1.

2.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8. ()

9. ()

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

1.

2.

3.

4.

81

93

1. 1 0 2. 1 0

3. 1 1

3 1 1. 1 0 2. 1 0 2 0 1. 0 0

2. 1 0

3. 1 0

4. 1 2

5. 1 1 6. 1 0 7. 1 0

8. () 1 2

9. () 1 1 8 6 1. 1 0 2. 0 0

3. 1 1

4. 1 0 5. 1 0 6. 1 1 5 2 1. 1 0 2. 1 0 3. 1 0 4. 1 0 4 0 22 9


1997

30 253-269

1991 25 1-24

2000 3249 - 79

2000

2004 5 2 175-206

2003 20 2 365-395

2005 17 2 35-100

20052005

2007forthcoming

2002 19 6 1073-1096

2003 36 56 - 87

2006 25 1 69-94

2004 6 1 119-154

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83

Ball, R., and P. Brown. 1968. An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers. Journal of Accounting Research 6(2): 159-178.

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Documents

高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度對自願性資訊發佈之影響jacg.rd.fcu.edu.tw/dl/4103.pdf · 會計與公司治理 第四卷 第一期 2007 年6 月 57-84 頁 57 高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度對自願性資訊發佈之影響

高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度對自願性資訊發佈之影響jacg.rd.fcu.edu.tw/dl/4103.pdf · 會計與公司治理第四卷第一期 2007 年6 月 57-84 頁 57 高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度對自願性資訊發佈之影響