Institut Français d’Oslo

Climate change:from security concerns

to defense issues

Bastien ALEX

Researcher at IRIS

Tuesday September the 3rd

Plan

Preliminary remarks and reminders

What are the links between climate

change and security?

Can we already observe them?

It is a security issue, is that a defense

one?

Preliminary remarks

Climate change: two phenomenons

Anthropogenic CC which make us enter the

Anthropocene (with other disruptions like soil sealing,

pollutions, dams, invasive species introduction, etc.

Natural variations of earth climate (slower)

Climate change is a doubly global issue

Geographically speaking (GHG emissions recognize no

borders)

In the literal sense: transversal problem (economy,

energy, health, environment, transportation, and above

all a political one that we need to negotiate

Climate change effects

TemperatureRise

Rising sealevels

Changes in precipitation

patterns

Increase in hurricanes

and cyclones

Melting icecaps and

permafrost

Oceanacidification

A horizon 2030 = +0,7°C en moyenne

I) Quelles sont les manifestations du changement

climatique ?

Mean 2100 : between 0,25 and 0,6 m (RCP2,6) and between 0,5 and 1 m (RCP8,5)

Significant disparities according to the relief of the coasts (beach, cliff)Accordingto climate scientist and geomorphologist, a one meter rise of the sea level on a one percent slope beach will provoke a 100 meters coastline retreat/reduction

Europe underwater with the

melt of Artic ice

I. Climate change, security and conflictsHypothesis and examples

Climate and security

Climate and security

Links between climate and

security1. Human Security

a) Food and Water Security

b) Migrations (livelihoods degradation)

c) Health problems

2. National, regional and international security

a) Political use of population migrations or displacements

b) Tensions on water resources

c) Radicalization, terrorism and crime

d) Habitability

e) Tensions in newly reachable areas (Arctic)

f) Energy security

g) Tipping Points

3. Climate policies associated risks

a) Geoengineering

b) Landgrabbing

c) Maladaptation

=> Questionable because a crisis counts several drivers

Two African examples:

Innerstate conflict:

herders and farmers

in the Sahel

Interstate conflict:

water sharing

between Egypt and

Ethiopia

The Sahel: a vulnerable area

Location between the southern Saharan desert (20° N) and the more

humid and coastal Sudano-Sahelian belt (between the 20th and

12th North Parallel),

very high climatic variability and irregular precipitation

arid north (200 mm of precipitation per year),

south tropical (600 mm) Rainfed agriculture needs at least 350 mm.

Pastoralism is the main source of income in the North (ECOWAS-

SWAC/OCDE, 2006).

A small area of arable land is irrigated

Two seasons dry season (September-May) and a short rain season

(June-August)

Alternating dry and wet years since the droughts of the 1970s and

1980s => huge interannual variability

The Sahel: a vulnerable area

T°C rise faster in the Sahel than the world average

More pronounced inland (+4°C in Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger) than on the coast (+3°C in Mauritania, Senegal).

More visible on minimum temperatures than on maximums

significant disparities between the Centre and East, more humid and the West where drought persists.

Climatic Trends in the Sahel

Social & economic indicators

Population

2015 (millions)

Rural

Population

(% of total)

GDP/cap.

($/year/cap.)

Part of

primary

sector (% of GDP)

Population

in

2030/2050 (millions)

BurkinaFaso

17,6 71 713,11 35 25,3 / 33,3

Mali 12 60,1 706,66 40 25,3 / 34

Mauritania 4 40,1 1274,93 20 5,4 / 6,7

Niger 19 21,3 427,39 40 33,5 / 53,6

Chad 13,6 77,5 1024,65 55 20,2 / 26,9

Nigeria177,5 52,2 3203,3 20

246,6 / 313,3

Côted’Ivoire

22,1 45,8 1546,96 20 30,3 / 40,6

Senegal 14,7 56,3 1061,78 15 21,6 / 30,7

Conflicts between herders/pastoralists

and farmers/peasants

Old regional issue : pastoralists migration throught south

(transhumance), meet the farmers

human drivers are very important:

land degradation caused by the passage of animals,

Expansion of cultivated areas, construction of fences

lack of updating/maintenance of transhumance corridors

Bankruptcy of local authorities (non-existent state authorities,

overwhelmed traditional authorities)

Political choice of countries to support the development of one or other of the activities

Can climate change exacerbate

those conflict dynamics? How?

1. Declining water level

« Lower water levels were partly caused by a decrease in rainfall during

the 1970s and 1980s, which left large areas of the floodplain dry. The

construction of the upstream hydropower dam at Se´lingue´ in 1982 also

contributed to the declining water levels (Turner, 1992). As burgu grows

on deeper water than rice, the declining water level led to a massive

expansion of rice fields into burgu areas on the floodplain, which directly

confronted farmers and herders and pushed out the latter and their

livestock.» (Benjaminsen et al., Journal of Peace Research, 2012).

Can climate change exacerbate

those conflict dynamics? How?

2. Interannual rainfall fluctuations impacts on vegetation

Biomass production trend between 1998 and 2016 in Sahel (% Average)

Herders and farmers

conflicts in the SahelConcluding remarks :

These are hybrid issues, where climate and environmental changes play a role, but where risks depend greatly on the management policies implemented (or not).

Uncertainties about the future:

Forecasts predict a whole increase in interannual variability and therefore probable dry years in the northern Sahel

Demographic growth

Agricultural development in the South Sahel

Early descent of herders

Increase in the number of weapons in circulation

State, administrations and chiefdoms unable to manage the increase in conflicts

= DANGER

Example of maladaptation

Great Ethiopian

Renaissance Dam

(GERD) underconstruction in

Ethiopia on the Blue

Nile (main tributary

of the Nile (85% of

the total water; 95%

during the rain

season)

Water security: the Nile case

GERD in

figures

Biggest dam in Africa: 175m high, 1800 wide

Project costbetween 4 and 6 billion dollars

6450 MW power generation capacity

74 billion cubedmeters reservoir

required period of time for initial reservoir fillingestimatedbetween 2 and 12 years !!

Water security: the Nile case

The Nile is crucial for Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia. Historically, the Nile Basin is

dominated by Egypt. The Dam construction begins in 2011, a very

important year.

On June the 3rd, 2013, a video of a meeting between Egyptian

President Morsi and his generals revealed the army’s position on this

subject:

some oppenly support destroying the dam

others suggest bribing Ethiopian authorities

or even to support separatist groups.

Agreement concluded in March 2015: Egypt recognizes Ethiopia's right

to build this dam on condition that it does not contravene its water

supply

January 2017: announcement of the reinforcement of electricity

production capacity (increased to 6450 MW). Protests from Egypt

March 2017: attack on the construction site by an Eritrean group

How is ti related to climate change?

April 2017 : article in Nature Climate Change « the standard deviation describing interannual variability of total Nile flow could increase by 50% (±35%) “

This is attributed to “the relatively large change in interannual variability of the Nile flow to projected increases in future occurrences of El Niño and La Niña events” increase of the flow during El Nino/ increase during la Nina.

Authors coclude that “Adequacy of current water storage capacity and plans for additional storage capacity in the basin will need to be re-evaluated given the projected enhancement of interannual variability in the future flow of the Nile river”. (Mohamed S. Siam & Elfatih A. B. Eltahir, “Climate change enhances interannualvariability of the Nile river flow”, Nature Climate Change, 24 avril 2017)

...but some studies say the opposite... and predict the increase in precipitations in the Gilgel Abbay and Gumara basins that feed the Blue Nile.« The projected runoff in both watersheds implies increased potential for promoting agricultural irrigation in the dry season. Furthermore, it would allow greater inflow to Lake Tana, the largest contributor to the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. Therefore, concerned local, state, and federal government organizations shall be prepared to harness opportunities from the projected increase in runoff. (Ayele, H. S., M. H. Li, C. P. Tung, and T. M. Liu, 2016: Assessing climate change impact on Gilgel Abbay and Gumara watershed hydrology, the upper Blue Nile basin, Ethiopia. Terr. Atmos. Ocean. Sci., 27, 1005-1018)

March –September 2015 rainfall anomaly

(% of the 1981-2014 average) for East

Africa

Water security: the Nile case

Agreement 23rd March 2015 includes principles on dispute settlement, fair and appropriate use, regional integration and sustainability, and cooperation among others.

“Egypt is worried about the failure of the technical negotiations because it jeopardizes the future of cooperation between Sudan and Ethiopia and their ability to agree on the Renaissance Dam and to avoid its potential risks while preserving Egypt’s water security.” Egypt’s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Mohamed Abdel Ati, nov 2017.

The remaining problematic point between Egypt and Ethiopia is a technical one related to the period of filling the dam’s reservoir with water. Ethiopia has asked for 5-6 years to fill the reservoir, while Egypt has asked Ethiopia to abide by the Nile water quantity flow in filling the reservoir to “avoid any significant damage on the downstream countries,” Meetings are frequently postponed…

Egypt and Ethiopia have two objectives: water security and development. The question is: are they conciliable?

Conclusion on climate change and

security links

The study of existing cases don’t give us clear evidence of acausality link, it is more a correlation link (and this observationdivides quantitative/qualitative researchers and neo-Malthusianists/politists)...

...But there is no way to say that what is true today will be true in 2050

Forecasts seem to indicate more negative than positive impacts

The challenge is not to rank climate change in the hierarchy of conflict factors but to understand how it could influence them.

The weight that climate and environmental factors will have in conflicts will depend greatly on the choices we are making

The former Military Chief of Staff, General Pierre de Viliers, said that "the military shares with environmentalists this concern of long time". Let’s check if it is true regarding climate change!

II. What are the consequences of climate change for Armed Forces?

What kind of issues for the

Armed Forces?

1. Security issues: monitoring and foresight on conflicts and

tensions areas

2. Defense issues

Changes on the operation fields and needed adaptation

(equipment and soldiers)

Vulnerability of military installations and infrastructures (national

territory and abroad)

Civilian security missions (what, where and how?)

Carbon footprint of Armed forces

Changes on the operation fields

and needed adaptation

(equipment and soldiers)Soldiers

Are the basic equipment « climate change » proof? (shoes)

How to maintain military efficiency in hotter/wetter conditions? (health issues) “despite acknowledging the risks of climate change, the military continues to wrestle with finding a sustainable, comprehensive strategy for how to train in sweltering conditions.” InsideClimateNews/NBC

Equipment and materials

Are military vehicles « climate change » proof?

• heat = lower air density = troubles for take off;

• Rise of water salinity could make harder the communication with submarine (radio waves do not travel well through good electrical conductors like salt water)

• Need for an assessment of the component fatigue and global performance of an equipment (like an aircraft) for the identification of the aircraft usage spectrum flight regimes

Vulnerability of military

installations and infrastructures Military installations must remain operational

whatever happens. To what kind of climate change impacts are they vulnerable? To what extent?

US Army is currently conducting an assessment of military installations to :• Flooding due to storm surge • Flooding due to non-storm surge events (e.g.,

rain, snow, sleet, ice, river overflow) • Extreme temperatures (both hot and cold) • Wind • Drought• Wildfire

Ideas is to assess the adaptation needs(works, cost, insurance, operationalcapabilities in case of extreme events, dependency to vulnerable power generators, etc.)

We are doing the same for France with the MoAF

Civilian security missionsArmed forces are in charge of security: to fight enemies but also

to protect civilian from natural disasters.

BPC Tonnerre was deployed after Hurricane Irma which

stroke Saint Martin Island (more than 500 people and 1200

tons of fret) in September 2017

Hephaistos operation = forest surveillance to fight against

wildfires

Needs for adaptation/anticipation (more hurricanes, longer

wildfires season on a biggest area) = training, equipment

Carbon footprint of Armed forces

Difficult topic (can be seen as an opponent Army Gasoline Service)

In France, the Army is the first landowner in the country = buildings must be renovated and thermally insulated

Renewable solutions must be developed

• on national territory to reduce GHG emissions but also to improve the installations electricity autonomy in case of disruption

• During military operations in foreign countries (the USA during wars in Irak and Afghanistan and supply convoys which accounted for most of the casualties)

Development of biofuels : Gripencompletes test flights with 100% biofuel in April 2017

Conclusion

How is it useful to the Ministry of Armed forces?

Improve the understanding of a changing global

strategic environment

Rise awareness on specific issues

Developing French expertise on these issues

Planning and anticipating operational constraints

International cooperation (Australia, New Zealand,

(participating to seminars/conferences, working

groups, 5+5)

Reach some partners usually less close

Conclusion

All this must be done avoiding militarization of climate

change and focus only on consequences rather than

root causes : “when your only tool is a hammer

everything looks like a nail”

To go further, must military forces get more involved in

tackling climate change and what does this mean in

a modern democracy?

Does this mean that armed forces should take a look

at the way the world economy is (dis)functioning?

Not imperatively. Act with more consistency is the only

transformational pathway

Thank you for your attention!

http://www.iris-france.org/observatoires/observatoire-

defense-et-climat/

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/recherche-et-prospective/observatoires/observatoire-geopolitique-des-

enjeux-des-changements-climatiques

my email: alex@iris-france.org

my twitter: https://twitter.com/BAlexIRIS

The Observatory twitter: https://twitter.com/ObsDefClim1

The IMCCS website: https://imccs.org/