43
India’s Trade Policy Choices MANAGING DIVERSE CHALLENGES SANDRA POLASKI A. GANESH-KUMAR SCOTT MCDONALD MANOJ PANDA SHERMAN ROBINSON February 2008

India’s Trade Policy Choices

  • Upload
    derick

  • View
    40

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

India’s Trade Policy Choices. SANDRA POLASKI A. GANESH-KUMAR SCOTT MCDONALD MANOJ PANDA SHERMAN ROBINSON. MANAGING DIVERSE CHALLENGES. February 2008. India’s Exports, Imports, and GDP. TRADE VALUE (BILLIONS, CONSTANT 2000 DOLLARS). Source: United Nations, UN COMTRADE database. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Citation preview

Page 1: India’s Trade Policy Choices

India’s Trade Policy ChoicesMANAGING DIVERSE CHALLENGES

SANDRA POLASKIA. GANESH-KUMARSCOTT MCDONALD

MANOJ PANDASHERMAN ROBINSON

February 2008

Page 2: India’s Trade Policy Choices

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Imports Exports GDP

TRADE VALUE (BILLIONS, CONSTANT 2000 DOLLARS)

Source: United Nations, UN COMTRADE database.

India’s Exports, Imports, and GDP

Page 3: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Key Domestic Challenges ThatAffect India’s Trade Policy Choices

• Poverty

• Agriculture and rural development

• Employment creation

To illustrate . . .

Page 4: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Poverty in India, 2004-2005

World Bank $1/day

World Bank $1/day *

World Bank $2/day

World Bank $2/day *

National poverty line

* Using revised PPP estimates (forthcoming)

Number of persons (millions) Percentage of population

Page 5: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Analytical Tools and Simulations

• Computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global trade

• Computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Indian economy

• Social accounting matrix with considerable detail on sources of household income

• Simulated Doha agreement and bilateral free trade with EU, US and China

Page 6: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Simulation of a Doha Agreement

Page 7: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Doha Simulation

• Tariff reductions for agriculture, NAMA:– 36% by developed countries– 24% by developing countries

• Agricultural subsidy reductions– Domestic subsidies reduced by 1/3– Export subsidies eliminated

• Reductions taken from applied rates

• Services trade liberalization not simulated

Page 8: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Macroeconomic Results for India of a Doha Agreement

Page 9: India’s Trade Policy Choices

0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60

Wearing apparel

Other manufacturing

Textiles

Chemicals

Minerals and metals

Trade and transportation

Services

Major Changes in Indian Exports under a Doha Agreement

CHANGE FROM BASE SIMULATION (BILLION DOLLARS)

Page 10: India’s Trade Policy Choices

0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70

Other manufacturing

Minerals and metals

Chemicals

Vegetable oils and fats

Oil and gas

Vehicles

Major Changes in Indian Imports under a Doha Agreement

CHANGE FROM BASE SIMULATION (BILLION DOLLARS)

Page 11: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Other Doha-related Simulations

• Impact of volatility of world agricultural prices– Rice – Wheat

• Simulations: +/- 25%, +/- 50% change in world price

• World price shocks would affect India differently after it reduces tariffs toward the rest of the world

• Distributional effects of agricultural price shocks among households reveal strong risk of increased poverty

Page 12: India’s Trade Policy Choices

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

The World Price of Rice, 1980-2006

$/TON (CONSTANT 1990 DOLLARS)

Note: Figures given are for Thai 5% broken milled rice.Source: World Bank, “Commodity Markets Briefs: Rice.”

-61%

+39%

-31%+43% -42%

+56%

Page 13: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Rice, 50% decrease, urbanImpact of a Decrease in the World Price of Rice on Indian Households

-----------------------------------Urban-----------------------------------------------------------------------Rural------------------------------------

25% decrease

50% decrease

Scheduled Tribes Others

Other Backward Classes

Scheduled Castes

Scheduled Tribes Others

Other Backward Classes

Scheduled Castes

CHANGE IN REAL INCOME

(PERCENT CHANGE RELATIVE TO BASELINE NOMINAL INCOME TO HOUSEHOLDS)

Page 14: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Rice, 50% decrease, urbanImpact of a Decrease in the World Price of Rice on the Demand for

Indian Labor 25% decrease

50% decrease

CHANGE IN DEMAND FOR LABOR (PERCENT CHANGE FROM BASELINE)

-14.00

-12.00

-10.00

-8.00

-6.00

-4.00

-2.00

0.00

2.00

Rice sector Agriculturalsector

Manufacturingsector

Services sector

Page 15: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Impact of a Doha Agreement compared to Impact of a Decrease

in the World Price of Rice

(PERCENT CHANGE FROM BASELINE)

Page 16: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Rice, 50% decrease, urbanImpact of an Increase in the World Price of Rice on Indian Households

CHANGE IN REAL INCOME

(PERCENT CHANGE RELATIVE TO BASELINE NOMINAL INCOME TO HOUSEHOLDS)

-----------------------------------Urban-----------------------------------------------------------------------Rural------------------------------------

25% increase

50% increase

Scheduled Tribes Others

Other Backward Classes

Scheduled Castes

Scheduled Tribes Others

Other Backward Classes

Scheduled Castes

Page 17: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Impact of a Doha Agreement on Aggregate World Prices

CHANGE IN PRICES (PERCENT)

-1.00

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

Whe

at

Dai

ry p

rodu

cts

Cat

tle,

shee

p, g

oats

Mea

t pr

oduc

ts

Pro

cess

ed r

ice

Oth

er f

ood

prod

ucts

Oil

seed

s

Oth

er c

rops

Ric

e

Tra

de a

nd t

rans

port

atio

n

Veg

etab

le o

ils a

nd f

ats

Pla

nt b

ased

fib

res

Min

eral

s an

d m

etal

s

Tex

tiles

Coa

l

Che

mic

als

Oth

er m

anuf

actu

ring

Veh

icle

s an

d tr

ansp

ort

equi

pmen

t

Pet

role

um p

rodu

cts

Con

stru

ctio

n

Ser

vice

s

Woo

d an

d pa

per

prod

ucts

Oil

and

gas

Raw

milk

Util

ities

Oth

er a

nim

al p

rodu

cts

Wea

ring

appa

rel

Page 18: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Impact of a Doha Agreement on the Rest of the World

CHANGE IN REAL INCOME (BILLION DOLLARS)

-2.00-1.000.001.002.003.004.005.006.007.008.009.00

Australia,New

Zealand,Oceania

China Japan Rest ofEast Asia

Rest ofSouthAisa

Rest ofNAFTA

UnitedStates

Mercosur Rest ofthe

Americas

EU SouthAfrica

Rest ofSub-

SaharanAfrica

MiddleEast,NorthAfrica

Rest ofworld

Page 19: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Simulation of an India-EU Free Trade Agreement

Page 20: India’s Trade Policy Choices

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Exports (from India to EU) Imports (from EU to India)

TRADE VALUE (BILLIONS, CONSTANT 2000 DOLLARS)

Note: In 2004, the EU expanded from fifteen to twenty-five countries. Earlier data are for EU-15; post-2004 data are for EU-25.

Source: United Nations, UN COMTRADE database.

The Evolution of India-EU Trade

Page 21: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Macroeconomic Results for India of an India-EU FTA

Page 22: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Macroeconomic Results for the EU of an India-EU FTA

Page 23: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Simulation of an India-U.S. Free Trade Agreement

Page 24: India’s Trade Policy Choices

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Exports (from India to U.S.) Imports (from U.S. to India)

TRADE VALUE (BILLIONS, CONSTANT 2000 DOLLARS)

Source: United Nations, UN COMTRADE database.

The Evolution of India-U.S. Trade

Page 25: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Macroeconomic Results for India of an India-U.S. FTA

Page 26: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Macroeconomic Results for the U.S. of an India-U.S. FTA

Page 27: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Simulation of an India-China Free Trade

Agreement

Page 28: India’s Trade Policy Choices

0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

14.00

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Exports (from India to China) Imports (from China to India)

TRADE VALUE (BILLIONS, CONSTANT 2000 DOLLARS)

Source: United Nations, UN COMTRADE database.

The Evolution of India-China Trade

Page 29: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Macroeconomic Results for India of an India-China FTA

Page 30: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Macroeconomic Results for China of an India-China FTA

Page 31: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Comparison of the Impact on India of

Different Trade Policy Choices

Page 32: India’s Trade Policy Choices

-0.40

-0.20

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1.20

1.40

Doha India-EU FTA India-U.S. FTA India-China FTA

Change in Real Income for India under Different Trade Agreements

CHANGE IN REAL INCOME (BILLION DOLLARS)

Page 33: India’s Trade Policy Choices

-1.50

-1.00

-0.50

0.00

0.50

1.00

Doha India-EU FTA India-U.S. FTA India-China FTA

CHANGE IN REAL INCOME (BILLION DOLLARS)

Change in Real Income for Indian Households under Different Trade

Agreements

Page 34: India’s Trade Policy Choices

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

Doha India-EU FTA India-U.S. FTA India-China FTA

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1Change in production (billion dollars)

Change in production (percent)

Change in Domestic Production in India under Different Trade

Agreements CHANGE IN PRODUCTION (BILLION DOLLARS) CHANGE IN PRODUCTION (PERCENT)

Page 35: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Change in Indian Imports and Exports under Different Trade

Agreements

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

Doha India-EU FTA India-U.S. FTA India-China FTA

Imports

Exports

CHANGE (BILLION DOLLARS)

Page 36: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Change in Demand for Unskilled Labor under Different Trade

AgreementsCHANGE IN DEMAND FOR UNSKILLED LABOR (PERCENT)

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

0.80

0.90

1.00

Doha India-EU FTA India-U.S. FTA India-China FTA

Page 37: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Conclusions

• Multilateral liberalization through the WTO’s Doha Round would produce larger gains for India than bilateral agreements with any of its major trading partners.

• Gains (losses) in real income to the Indian economy from either multilateral or bilateral trade agreements are modest, ranging from a gain of $1.2 billion under the Doha simulation to a loss of $250 million under the India-EU FTA.

Page 38: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Conclusions, continued

• Indian exports and imports increase under all simulated agreements, with the strongest increases under an India-EU FTA, followed by a Doha pact.

• However total domestic production increases very modestly, ranging from an increase of 0.52% under a Doha agreement to 0.34% under an India-EU FTA to 0.14% under an India-China FTA.

• The three bilateral agreements result in losses for Indian households as a group, while Doha produces small gains ($530 million, 0.17%) for households.

Page 39: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Conclusions, continued

• Volatility in world agricultural prices would affect India more strongly after a reduction in tariffs toward trading partners.

• Decreases in the world price of rice have a negative effect on Indian households similar in magnitude to the positive impact of the entire Doha agreement.

• Agricultural price decreases would worsen income distribution and could significantly increase rural poverty.

Page 40: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Conclusions, continued

• In the Doha Round, India’s attention to its defensive agricultural interests is warranted.

• “Special products” designations and a special safeguard mechanism would be needed tools to shield poor households from world agricultural price volatility until other sectors grow sufficiently to absorb their labor.

• Employment creation will receive only a mild boost from trade liberalization. Domestic demand and labor policy will continue to be the main determinants of job creation.

Page 41: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Conclusions, continued

• Services liberalization could add to India’s potential gains; however few offers on services of interest to India have been tabled in the Doha Round.

• In negotiations with the EU, significant services liberalization would be required for India to experience net gains in real income to the overall economy, as well as to offset losses to households.

Page 42: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Conclusions, continued

• Given the low incomes of most Indian households and high levels of poverty, even short-term welfare losses are not to be taken lightly.

• Both Doha and bilateral pacts require careful negotiation if India is to realize the modest gains on offer and avoid risking large negative effects on the households of the poor.

Page 43: India’s Trade Policy Choices

Thank you for your attention