i m i, education and identity formation in contemporary Vietnam

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i mi, education and identity formationin contemporary VietnamMatthieu Salomon a & Vu Doan Kêt ba Center for International Studies and Research (CERI/Sciences‐Po)Paris , Franceb Institute for International Relations (IIR) , Hanoi, VietnamPublished online: 10 Jul 2007.

To cite this article: Matthieu Salomon & Vu Doan Kêt (2007) i mi, education and identity formationin contemporary Vietnam, Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 37:3,345-363, DOI: 10.1080/03057920701330222

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Ð i m i, education and identity

formation in contemporary Vietnam

Matthieu Salomona* and Vu Doan KetbaCenter for International Studies and Research (CERI/Sciences-Po) Paris, France;

bInstitute for International Relations (IIR), Hanoi, Vietnam

In 2006 Vietnam had experienced more than two decades of reform. However, while the reforms

have transformed the entire Vietnamese economy and opened the country to globalization, the

education system is still very much under the Vietnamese Communist Party’s control. The

schoolbooks are published under close supervision of the authorities. The national autobiography

in which children are instructed has not changed much since the first conceptions of the

Vietnamese revolutionaries and nationalists: as in many young nations, myths and legends have a

fundamental place in the national history. Moreover the historical narrative youngsters are

educated in serves the purpose of justifying communist rule and the leading role of the VCP in this

process: the VCP is pictured as the midwife of the Vietnamese modern nation. Since the start of

the reform process, the pressures and challenges on this system of history education have been

growing. However, even if some voices have now started to call for a more subdued national

autobiography, the national story is clearly not to be ‘de-nationalized’ any time soon.

Keywords: History education; National identity; Political system; Sino-Vietnamese relations; Vietnam

The triumph of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) in 1975 can be seen as

an extraordinarily nationalist achievement and may be said to symbolize the birth of

modern Vietnam as a nation-state.1 In Vietnam, as in many communist and former

communist states, the theoretical dichotomy that may be supposed to exist between

communism and nationalism is not reflected in practice (see also the article on

China in this special issue). Communism and nationalism in VCP ideology are two

sides of the same coin—even if the balance between these different elements has

changed over time. The VCP derives its legitimacy first and foremost from its central

role in the struggle for independence and for the reunification of North and South

Vietnam, which are portrayed in official historiography as the culmination of

centuries of heroic struggle.2 Alongside this nationalist discourse, we find the official

* Corresponding author. Institute of Political Studies, 27, rue Saint-Guillaume, 75337, Paris,

France. Email: [email protected]

The views in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of CERI

and IIR.

Compare

Vol. 37, No. 3, June 2007, pp. 345–363

ISSN 0305-7925 (print)/ISSN 1469-3623 (online)/07/030345-19

# 2007 British Association for International and Comparative Education

DOI: 10.1080/03057920701330222

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communist ideology of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), one of the last

members of the communist club. The idea that nationalism and communism are not

necessarily at odds with one another is central to understanding the issue of

education and identity formation in Ð i mo,´ i (Renovation) Vietnam.

Vietnam is a young country in two different ways: on the one hand, Vietnamese

political autonomy and unification within the borders of the national territory are

new; on the other, the majority of citizens today have been born since 1975.

However, Vietnam and ‘Vietnamese-ness’ are also old ideas and realities. According

to official and popular conceptions, Vietnam and its inhabitants have a quasi-eternal

history. The history of external influences on this unaltered 4000-year-old

Vietnamese civilisation is systematically downplayed. The definition of the

Vietnamese identity mainly relies on primordial/eternal ethnic characteristics and

is defined in opposition to neighbouring China.3 Education is, in this context,

perhaps the main challenge for the Vietnamese authorities in their efforts to build—

and control—the future of the country: economically, politically, but also culturally.

The ability to shape and influence popular perceptions of national identity and

national history are crucial to maintaining the VCP’s monopoly of power.

Along with a very strong national culture which glorifies the notion of resistance,

and the realities of a one-party state and a relatively youthful population, the

strength of nationalism and national identity are among the most significant

parameters of Vietnamese politics and society. A strong nationalist discourse is a

feature of many societies, but arguably takes on particular significance for regime

legitimacy and political stability in a country where the political system is closed and

a party-state claims a monopoly on the truth of the national autobiography. What is

Vietnam? What does being Vietnamese mean? Whence does the regime derive its

legitimacy? From a political and social point of view, these questions must receive

clear and unquestionable answers. The Vietnamese regime therefore closely controls

the definition of national identity formation through different channels of political

socialisation, of which education (i.e. schooling) is only one, albeit a key one.4 The

function performed by the school as a site for ‘political dressage’ (or ‘ideological

grooming’) is one reason why Communist regimes have typically attached such

importance to provision of basic education; some 90% of Vietnamese children

become literate. This analysis of the state’s efforts to shape national consciousness

through control of historiography will therefore focus on the study of schoolbooks

(primary, secondary and high-school levels where the mass of the people is

educated). It will also consider how the historical narrative approved by the state has

evolved in new directions since the advent of Ð i m i (Renovation), the programme

of reforms officially launched in 1986 by the sixth Congress of the VCP.

However, the Vietnamese case study has to be considered within a broader

perspective, both geographically and theoretically. One might for instance postulate

that the Vietnamese identity project is the perfect example of the unrestrained kind

of nationalism found in contexts where interstate forms of cooperation are weakly

developed or absent. According to Hein and Selden, this lack of regional integration

helps to explain why nationalisms in East Asia are much more vigorous than in

346 M. Salomon & D. K. Vu

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Europe.5 As in China and Japan, the Vietnamese politicization of history education

is part of the long East-Asian history of conflicts and competitions among

neighbours. This international dimension, which in the Vietnamese case relates

particularly to the tortuous history of relations with China, needs to be considered

alongside the domestic concerns of regime legitimacy, and adaptations to party

ideology to accommodate shifts in what Communists are fond of calling ‘objective

conditions’. The cases of the Chinese Communist Party and the Japanese Liberal

Democrat Party have been extensively analysed.6 Given its importance in defining

the history of relations with and images of ‘others’, this analysis of history education

will focus particularly on Vietnam’s regional environment and relations with its

neighbours, while also incorporating a comparative perspective. Vietnam, as we shall

see, is in many respects typical of new states which tend to prioritize nation-

building.7

In order to question the issue of how and on what national identity is built in Ð i

m i Vietnam, this paper will be divided into three sections. First, the contemporary

structure and the traditional conception of education will be described to cover the

necessary background. In the second part we will discuss in more detail the history of

the Vietnamese nation as narrated in official textbooks and embodied in the main

regime symbols. Finally, the third part will address the question of the changes that

Ð i m i has brought about, and the successes, limits and challenges to this official

construction of the Vietnamese mindset.

I. Education in contemporary Vietnam

Today, in Vietnam, the teaching of national identity is conducted through various

channels: schools, but also mass organizations, media, oral transmission via adults

and so on. However, school remains the first and most fundamental site for

ideological education/indoctrination. Before the institutionalization of the commu-

nist universal school, the transmission of national identity took place primarily orally

via legends, even if the small literate mandarin class were already producing official

histories (modeled on those of dynastic China) written to glorify the reigning

dynasty.

In order to understand the reality of the power of education in the process of

teaching national identity, we have to emphasize the power of the tradition of

education. Vietnamese society, influenced both by Confucian traditions and

communist ideology, greatly values academic success. These traditions share an

insistence on the importance of assimilating a body received knowledge contained

in a few reference books. However, historically, it is only with the diffusion of quoc

ngu,˜ during the huge mass literacy campaigns championed by the communists

during the twentieth century that the school has gained the enormous power it

currently possesses in the teaching of the national autobiography.8 The

communist political system is based on a very strong control over schooling in

general and over national identity construction in particular. This very rigid

system aims to mould students spiritually through mass propaganda, for which the

Education and identity in contemporary Vietnam 347

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school curriculum is a key vehicle. In school textbooks, the VCP is presented as

the midwife of the modern Vietnamese nation. Learning their national history

lessons by heart is seen as a very important part of the process of becoming a ‘good

Vietnamese’.

The Vietnamese education structure consists of primary school (grade 1–5),

secondary school (grade 6–9) and high school (grade 10–12).9 The teaching of

national identity is mainly conducted through four different school subjects: history

(Li.ch s ), geography (Ði.a ly), civic education (Giao du. c cong dan) and literature

and Vietnamese language (Ng van). These subjects are only taught in secondary

school, though the latter two are foreshadowed in the primary school curriculum for

Vietnamese (Tieng Vie.t) and morals (Ða.o Ku,´ c). In primary school there are also

‘nature and society’ (Tu,

. nhien va Xa ho.i) classes and a supplementary class named

‘historical accounts’ (Truye.n k Li.ch s ).

The VCP maintains total control over the process of textbook production.10

Although debate over the state’s monopoly has begun in recent years, Vietnam has

yet to introduce the kinds of reforms implemented since the late 1990s in China,

where responsibility for designing curricula and vetting textbooks, and for actually

writing and publishing them, has been divided, thus undermining the monopoly

previously enjoyed by the People’s Education Press (PEP) in Beijing. All school-

books in Vietnam are still published by the Education Publishing House (Nha Xuat

B n Giao Du. c—NXBGD), under the control of the Ministry of Education and

Training—MOET (Bo. Giao Du. c va Ðao Ta.o—BGDÐT)—the NXBGD thus

enjoying a status identical to that of China’s PEP up to the 1990s. The NXBGD’s

books are obligatory in all schools, public or semi-public ones, from first to twelfth

grades. At university level, there are different books, but there are still official ones

which are used for reference;11 and, moreover, alternative books are also controlled

or vetted by the authorities through a University Committee and published by the

University publishing houses or the NXBCTQG.12 The same holds true for

Marxist-Leninist philosophy and Ho Chı Minh Thought.13 With respect to

textbooks for use in schools, during the 2005 debates on the Education Law, some

deputies questioned the maintenance of the official monopoly over the production of

schoolbooks. However, even if it had been adopted, this reform would merely have

allowed schools to choose between two different textbooks, both published by

MOET. In the end, the National Assembly adopted a Law that confirms the

monopoly over production of textbooks (one main series for each school subject)

under the leadership of MOET. In 2006 there were more calls for an end to this

monopoly,14 but these have not challenged the substance of curriculum content and

are motivated by a desire to promote better textbook quality through competition, or

to cater better for diverse student needs (or perceived abilities), rather than by any

recognition of the value of acknowledging a diversity of historical or ideological

viewpoints.

Who writes these history schoolbooks? As with textbooks for all school subjects,

the MOET officially establishes a Drafting board including specialists from the

Ministry, from institutions affiliated with the Ministry such as the NXBGD and


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from academics. There have been many debates on the selection of the members of

these successive Committees, and these have intensified lately. There have also been

debates in the media over the editing of the schoolbooks themselves.15 However, the

subject being particularly sensitive, behind MOET and other institutions who take

part in the process, the direct influence of the highest spheres within the VCP is

predominent. As an official from MOET says: ‘… the political orientation line,

overall organisation and policy in the education field are under the responsibility of

the VCP’s Central Committee. On these issues, MOET is only one of the

institutions which play a consultative role’.16

Since 2001, in accordance with the Government ‘Strategy for Educational

Development, 2001–2010’, MOET has been leading a programme of re-writing

all schoolbooks. The aim is to overhaul all school textbooks by 2008.17 MOET

has benefited from foreign loans to aid in this project, but this has emphatically

not meant any foreign interference in the writing process. Nevertheless, during the

debates about the principles to be followed in the compilation and editing of the

new books, the authors have referred to the universal recommendations of

UNESCO.18

The resulting history curriculum, totally controlled by the authorities, aims to

transmit a Vietnamese national identity consisting of three cultural substrata: local

Vietnamese culture (civilisation) prior to the Chinese invasions, external Chinese-

Indian cultural influences and modern western-socialist culture. Officially, this

contemporary Vietnamese national identity is seen as the result of a hybridizing

process of ‘cultural dialogue’.19 Before considering the accuracy of this character-

ization, however, we need examine the history schoolbooks and analyse the nature of

the national autobiography that is really taught to the Vietnamese youth.

II. National history as it is taught in public schools

The most striking point in official and popular national identity education in

Vietnam is the fact that ‘Vietnamese-ness’ is always presented in essentialized and

eternal terms, and portrayed as based on a specific and homogenous ethnic

identity.20 Myths and legends have a fundamental place in the national

autobiography, and the picture of the Chinese ‘Other’ is repeatedly drawn through

use of explicitly antagonistic terminology. Vietnamese national autobiography

contains in fact a series of myths typical of young nations.21

According to primary and secondary schoolbooks, the first evidence of

‘Vietnamese’ life is much as 3000–4000 years old. These Vietnamese lived in the

northern part of the country, which is the so called cradle of ‘Vietnamese-ness’. The

History of the country really started around 800 BC with the Van Lang kingship.

Children learn about the legends of the nation’s birth, which feature heroic figures

such as Kinh Du,o,ng Vu,o,ng, Au Co,—La. c Long Quan, So,n Tinh—Th y Tinh,

Thanh Giong…22 The distinction between what is legend and what is scientific

history is unclear. In official rhetoric, as in schoolbooks, references to a 4000-year-

old ‘Vietnamese’ civilisation predominate. As in many young nations, these legends


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occupy a huge place in thinking about Vietnamese nationhood, and are still widely

diffused. They encompass an essentialized vision of the links between geography,

climate, ethnic groups, the birth of the nation and the spirit of eternal resistance

against the northern ‘Big Brother’, China.

To take one example that is a hot topic in contemporary Vietnam: brotherhood

between Kinh—the ethnic majority—and ethnic minorities is explained by one of

these primordial creation legends: the tale of the 100 ‘eggs’ of the extraordinary

couple Au Co,—La. c Long Quan, which show the foetal link between the Vietnamese

brothers. All Vietnamese are described as ‘Kong bao’ (from the same fœtus). The

official terminology used for overseas Vietnamese (‘Vie.t Kieu’) is telling: ‘Kong bao

ta Ki.nh cu, va lam vie.c nu,o,´ c ngoai’ [compatriots who live and work abroad]. It is

worth noting, though that the expression ‘Kong bao’ is an example of unacknow-

ledged borrowing from Chinese terminology—the Mandarin is tong bao. Likewise,

‘Vie.t Kieu’ is identical to (and doubtless derived from) the term used in China for

‘overseas Chinese’ (hua qiao in Mandarin—or Wah Kiu in Cantonese);23 both the

Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Kuomintang have held a similarly

ambivalent attitude to the status of ‘overseas Chinese’, seeing them as essentially

forever ‘Chinese’ because of their biological link with the ‘motherland’. The strong

tradition of veneration for ancestors that Chinese and Vietnamese share is a key

element in this biological/familial metaphor of nationhood.24 In Vietnam, national

legends draw the image of an elected/chosen people, incarnated in a specific

territory. ‘Minority’ histories are unified and incorporated into the central narrative

of Kinh history in various chapters.25 Reading between the lines, however, the past

history, culture and ‘blood-line’ of Vietnamese-ness are implicitly identified as

Kinh;26 which leads to a double standard citizenship. In reality the relations with the

minorities have been and are based on domination and inequality (Vickers notes an

identical contradiction in official conceptions of Chinese national identity, and the

place of ethnic minorities within this—see the China chapter in this special issue).

The official history clearly demonstrates that someone is Vietnamese because he

or she is born Vietnamese—the idea that anyone could become Vietnamese would

seem outlandish. De facto, Vietnam is not a country of immigration. Moreover,

reflecting deeply-ingrained Vietnamese conceptions of nationhood is the belief that it

is impossible to lose one’s ‘Vietnamese-ness’, and, legally speaking, one’s

Vietnamese citizenship. Vie.t Kieu, who are foreign citizens, are considered and

treated as Vietnamese when they come back to Vietnam, and national law applies to

them in a way it does not to ‘bona fide’ foreigners.27 Vie.t Kieu have also been given

rights under the constitution which are denied to ‘foreigners’.28 A 1993 VCP

resolution officially considers Vie.t Kieu as an ‘inextricable part of the Vietnamese

nationhood’ [mo.t bo. pha. n khong tach ro,` i c a co.ng Kong dan to.c Vie.t Nam].29

Again, a very similar ambivalence (both conceptual and legal) is evident in Chinese

attitudes towards hua qiao, both in mainland China and on Taiwan.

Returning to the official national autobiography, the legends relating to the origins

of the nation are complemented by other legends of heroes in order to constitute the

Vietnamese nation’s pantheon: Hai Ba Tru,ng, Ly Thu,o,` ng Kie.t, Tran Hu,ng Ða.o, etc.


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Among these heroes the great majority won their reputation through victories against

the Chinese. All these legends are published in popular collections, including comics

for children. The main objective is to stress the independence of ‘Vietnamese-ness’

vis-a-vis the Chinese civilization: underlining the idea that Vietnamese culture did

exist before any contacts with its dangerous northern neighbour.

Accounts of the more distant past, inextricably intertwined with legends and

myths, are fundamental to contemporary Vietnamese official histories of the nation,

and are referred to frequently in official speeches: Ho Chı Minh himself explained:

‘The Hung kings have created the country. We must, all together, defend it’.30 The

Vietnamese nation is considered as an everlasting organism conceived in the distant

past during the kingships of Van Lang and Au La.c:

To sum up, the Van Lang—Au La. c period has given us:

N motherhood; (…);

N specific traditions, customs;

N the first experience of fighting for our country’31

This eternal/primordial ethnic dimension of Vietnamese national identity has

nourished an ethnic or racial and mythical nationalism which can be found in nearly

all Vietnamese official speeches during the modern era, including those by

dissidents. The contemporary anti-Communist Vie.t Kieu groups based abroad

follow the official line as much if not more than the regime. Any counter-history will

have to be achieved through a process of denationalization and critical re-evaluation

of these ancient periods. It will have to take contacts with outsiders—the ‘impure’—

more seriously. The school-books that are currently used are not so different from

those written by the first nationalists from Ðong Kinh Nghı,a Thu. c [ÐKNT—

Tonkin Free School],32 in 1907, which defined national pride like this:

National pride,

(…) Our country was established as a nation more than 4000 years ago and its

inhabitants are deeply grateful for their nationhood. They had respect for each other,

loved each other, and so they managed to survive till now (…). The strongest solidarity

is the solidarity which comes from blood relations (…). At the bottom is the family, at

the top, is the nation: this solidarity, defined this way, is really totally natural (…). Here

stands the national pride of our Vietnam, and this explains how it has managed to

survive through time…33

The communist label of the regime should not hide us from the reality: nationalist

references based on eternal/primordial ethnic dimensions and a mythical account of

national history have always been at the heart of the VCP’s political didacticism—

excepting some intellectual ICP members in the 1930s who clearly rejected such

traditions. For example: during the war against the French colonialists, the Vie.t

Minh sought to mobilize peasants by using nationalist slogans referring to legendary

heroes from the pantheon of Vietnamese history (and even more often referring to

local or regional heroes and legends).


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The eternal and ethnic nation that is depicted in the school history books also has

a geographic dimension. The Vietnamese ‘dragon’ territory has indeed been

idealized by the official history as the achievement of the Nam Tien (the Southern

Advance). The dragon form is proof of the natural and unquestionable character of

the contemporary territory. The Dragon (‘Long’—a term borrowed from the

Cantonese pronunciation of the Chinese term for ‘dragon’) has a very important

place in the national imagination; it is associated with ancestors and nationhood, and

all the Vietnamese are its children (Con rong chau tien!). Again, however, the

derivative nature of this symbolism (in relation to China) hardly needs to be pointed

out—although, for example, tour guides in the old imperial city of Hue (whose old

imperial palace was closely modelled on that in Beijing) take pains to underline the

‘Vietnamese’ variants on dragons and other originally Chinese decorative motifs.

Indeed, it cannot be sufficiently emphasized that the vision of the unquestion-

able and unchanging nature of the Vietnamese nation is intimately linked with

that fundamental parameter of the Vietnamese identity: the Chinese presence.

‘Vietnamese-ness’ is defined in opposition to China. The national history is deeply

influenced by the Chinese Empire’s recurrent attempts to dominate Vietnam: the

country was occupied, if not colonized, by the Chinese for more than ten centuries

(from 111 BC to 939 AD); later it became semi-independent and remained under

China’s suzerainty as a vassal State (offering tribute to the Chinese emperor) until

the arrival of the French.34 In schoolbooks, chapters on these ten centuries of

Chinese domination are mainly characterized by blanket condemnations of

Chinese rule. It is argued, for instance, that the tax burden was such that the

Vietnamese people nearly died from starvation. The Chinese cultural influences

(Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism…!) are said not to have altered primordial

‘Vietnamese-ness’. The evolution of the Vietnamese language and the Chinese

elements it absorbed are clearly downplayed. In fact, the official story focusses on

Vietnamese resistance movements against the invaders; and the pantheon of

heroes already mentioned: Hai Ba Tru,ng, Ba Trie.u, Mai Thuc Loan…35 Among

the terms most often used in these textbooks are ‘to resist’, ‘to revolt’: ‘kh i

nghı,a’.36 Ten centuries of domination by the Chinese are thus presented

essentially as a mere ‘parenthesis’ (and the contacts afterwards with the Cham

and Khmer civilisations—associated with modern Cambodia—during the

Southern Advance are almost ignored):

During 1000 years under Northern [i.e. Chinese] domination, the national characters

and traditions of this civilisation (Van Lang—Au La. c) had been hidden or concealed,

but absolutely not assimilated or erased. After the 10th century (…) the traditional

civilisational values managed to be restored and were able to develop again…37

The crucial date for symbolizing the renaissance of the Vietnamese nation is 939.

From this date on, the main issue is seen as being unity and modernization.

However, the basic conception of Vietnamese national identity is that of an eternal

culture of a homogenous chosen people fighting against the Northern enemy. All the

ingredients of essentialist and xenophobic ethno-cultural nationalism are here. The

origins of the nation are found in legends and tales of mythical heroes and no


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attempt is made to separate these from more factual accounts of history. In this mix

the crucial theme is the eternal struggle against the Chinese. Meanwhile, overlaying

this fundamental reference to ethnic nationalism, is the second dimension of

Vietnamese national identity: contemporary socialism.

Indeed, the official narrative seeks to demonstrate that the ‘Red dimension’ of the

Vietnamese national identity is the natural end of the Vietnamese history. It clearly

wants to reconcile national history with a teleology that justifies and celebrates the

leadership and legitimacy of the VCP. The VCP is thus pictured as the midwife of

the Vietnamese modern nation.

Returning to primary-secondary schoolbooks, the national autobiography conse-

quently honours the famous founding dynasties (Ðinh, Le, Ly, Tran, Ho…) who

built Vietnam as an independent nation after 939. It relies largely, through

numerous quotes, on the books written by official dynastic historians of those times

who were appointed by the Kings to witness their reigns, in imitation of the practices

of Chinese dynastic chroniclers (the Ða. i Vie.t S Ky toan thu, [The Complete History

of the Ða. i Vie.t] from 1697, which repeat comments from the Ða. i Vie.t s kı [The

History of Ða. i Vie.t] from 1272, is the most famous of these). The textbooks

particularly emphasize these dynasties’ military victories against all invaders:

principally the Chinese, but also the Mongols (Ba. ch Ðang’s famous victory in

1288). They also underline the importance of the South’s conquest of Champa and

the Khmer empire, the Southern Advance (eleventh to seventeenth/eighteenth

centuries—the use of the term ‘Advance’ rather than ‘invasion’ or ‘colonization’

implicitly lends legitimacy to this process). New heroes enter the national pantheon,

first of all King Le Lo,

. i and the cultured Nguyen Trai who defeated the Chinese in

1427. Apart from the military battles which litter the national autobiography, the

cultural achievements and monuments of these dynasties also have a very important

place in the story. The best symbol of Vietnam is now, without doubt, the Temple of

Literature, Van Mieu, whose construction was begun in 1070. These dynasties have

an unquestionable importance in the official history of the nation.

What is more interesting about the ‘red dimension’ of identity formation is the

way those reigns are ideologically instrumentalized, by drawing on an image of a

Golden Age of the Vietnamese village community, and its famous communal lands.

If these dynasties are condemned for exploitation of peasants it is because they ‘sold’

this natural tradition of the Vietnamese people.38 The aim is to give an image of a

traditional Vietnam which was close to the idealistic vision of ‘primitive

communism’; and which was betrayed by the ‘old regime’. The influence of

Marxist theory is clear, and the idea is also to portray contemporary communist rule

as in some sense an effort to restore this lost Golden Age.39

Apart from the economic aspect, the way Vietnamese national history is taught

also stresses the division of the country, especially during the 1627–1788 period

when the territory was cut into two, the North under the Tri.nh family’s authority

and the South under the Nguyen’s. The danger of a divided nation is illustrated

by the terrible consequences of this disunity: famines, exploitation of the peasants

by the Princes, cultural decadence… The fight for unity is thus portrayed as a


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fundamental responsibility of leaders. The VCP is explicitly presented as the

rightful heir, the last and the most successful exponent of this longstanding

national struggle.

The Tay So,n brothers’ revolt has, for all these reasons, a specific place in the

national autobiography.40 Indeed, in the national imaginary, this movement,

launched in 1788, managed to reunify the country—although in reality separate

domains were maintained. Moreover this revolt is portrayed as the first so-called

‘peasant’s revolt’: kh i nghı,a nong dan; the word is used here to show the entry of

the Vietnamese people onto the stage of modern politics. This prelude to communist

revolution is a nationalist revolution; which demonstrates, once again, the

Vietnamese syncretism of nationalism and communism:

If this victory was made possible, it is, above all, because the will to fight against

oppression and exploitation and the extraordinary patriotism of our people were so

strong41

In line with this idea, the idealized image of the Tay So,n’s short reign is very

positive: the regime was popular because, after defeated foreign invaders, it

promoted reform policies, and reunified the country. The message is clear: the

Vietnamese nation had to be freed twice, from foreigners’ invasions and from the

‘old regime’. In order to achieve real liberation, the nation has to be guided by a real

chief; the VCP’s historical role.

Returning to the chronology, the Tay So,n’s fall ushered in a very dark time for

Vietnam. The Nguyen dynasty, which defeated the Tay So,n, is presented as an

usurpation. As the schoolbooks say, during this reign: ‘Quan coi dan nhu, k thu, dan

so,

. quan nhu, co.p…’ [The mandarin was looking at the people as at an enemy, the

people was as afraid of the mandarin as of the tiger]. The official history stresses the

numerous popular revolts against this dynasty during the nineteenth century: Phan

Ba Vanh, Cao Ba Quat… The attitude of the Nguyen towards Western powers is

roundly condemned. Because of their weakness, they are held responsible for the

colonization of the country by the French. Moreover, the fact that the Nguyen asked

for foreign counsellors and mercenaries to help defeat the Tay So,n is presented as

the original sin of the dynasty. Colonization is seen as nothing more than the natural

conclusion of the decadence of the ‘old regime’: the authorities had lost their

‘heavenly mandate’.

In the pages of the schoolbooks dedicated to the colonial period, which is

unsurprisingly condemned in all its aspects, the official national autobiography

focuses on the history of the VCP. The destiny of other forces which fought the

imperialists is very quickly recalled (nationalists, democrats, trotskyists). The

contemporary history is presented in a completely teleological way which ends (but

this end is also the beginning of a new stage) with the triumph of 1975. The

communist power, after having defeated the French and the Americans, reunified

the nation and fought China once again in 1979. Moreover, since Ð i mo,´ i

(Renovation), the VCP have succeeded in developing the economy of the country.

In order to support the VCP’s legitimacy, the history of the communist camp—the

USSR and its allies—is still the subject of numerous chapters.


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Moreover, the fall of USSR is interpreted, with reference to the Vietnamese policy

of Ð i mo,´ i, as a failure triggered by a socialist model that ignored reality, and was too

slow to adapt to global transformations and unable to respond to the challenging

‘peaceful evolution’ [Dien bien hoa bınh] strategy of the capitalist camp.42 But the

disappearance of the USSR does not represent the defeat of (real) socialism. These

events are used to justify Renovation, which is not presented as a rupture, but as a

continuity. The figure of Ho Chı Minh, extensively popularized since the 1980s, is

presented as the role model, the key actor symbolizing the mix of nationalism and

reformed socialism. Uncle Ho is the glue of the official ideology and of the teaching

of national identity. Ho Chı Minh’s life and action incarnates the history of eternal

resistance against foreigners, and the strength of the alliance of a traditional culture

and a modern thought. ‘Ho Chı Minh thought’ [Tu, tu, ng Ho Chı Minh] has been

officially promoted since the 1980s as the supreme exposition of the national

ideology.

To conclude, the Vietnamese authorities are still referring to socialism as a

fundamental part of the national identity they are building in schools. They are still

affirming the idea of promoting a Vietnamese, socialist and modern, ‘new man’ [con

ngu,o,` i mo,´ i]; who will represent the accomplishment of the primordial-ethnic

national identity. Slogans of the communist regime have always been a mix of

nationalist and communist references. However, even if it is perhaps not as clear as

in China’s case because communist Vietnam’s history has been shorter and

influenced by more recent wars of liberation, nationalist references seem to have

been more and more highly valued since the 1980s and Renovation.

If we go back to the three official components mentioned at the beginning of this

section, we can see that two of them are clearly over-played in the textbooks: the

‘purity’ of native Vietnamese culture and the socialist dimension. Diversity, cultural

dialogue and hybridization are systematically neglected, if not negated.

III. The limits of Renovation

If there is clearly a division between ‘before’ and ‘after’ 1986 in Vietnamese

economic and social life, in terms of politics and culture, Renovation offered

generally only a veneer of change, not a change of substance. There have been two

new editions of schoolbooks for primary and secondary schools since Renovation

(the first one completed during the 1982–1994 period; and the second to be

accomplished during the 2002–2007 period): and even if there have been changes in

some aspects of the teaching of national history, the fundamental conception of

national identity has not been overtly questioned. Moreover the main changes we

will mention are above all tactical and diplomatic ones, whose sincerity is doubtful.

The portrayal of China is without doubt the best example. After 1979, China was

explicitly named as the ‘enemy of the Vietnamese people and nation’. After 1954,

with a new generation of modern Vietnamese historians (Tran Quoc Vu,o,

. ng, Phan

Huy Le…), ‘Vietnamese-ness’ was clearly considered as having no relation with

Chinese influences. The vocabulary used was extremely harsh. Even during the


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happy days of the strategic alliance against the American imperialists, the vision of

China was very negative. This was a real political issue between the two countries.

Nowadays, in historical texts, the Chinese are referred to as northern feudalists

(phong kien phu,o,ng Bac), northern dynasty (Bac Trieu) or other terms; but rarely

as China. Official statements have been significantly softened, and not only in

schoolbooks. A de facto alliance has been re-built with China after the fall of USSR,

and bilateral relations have been normalized. However, this new official political line

towards the eternal enemy (the Other) is not as clear as it is supposed to be,43 and is

questioned by a lot of Vietnamese scholars such as Professor Tran Ngo.c Them.44

Another example: before Renovation, the schoolbooks spoke very little of the

Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the rare mentions this

received were very negative (as Vietnam was then in the opposing camp). After

1989, Vietnam had to change its world vision and its partnerships. Vietnam joined

ASEAN in 1995 and since the 1990s ASEAN has therefore been presented much

more positively. Now the official statements define Vietnam as part of Southeast

Asian culture, and ASEAN members are considered to share the same cultural

base.45 The fact that the teaching of national history and identity now insists on a

Southeast Asian cultural reference (though not a political one), is also linked to the

desire to downplay Chinese power and influence, or at least balance it out.

Finally, regarding the changes Renovation brought about in the teaching of the

national autobiography, we can look at the references to the reform policies of the ‘old

regime’ and non-communist historical figures. It is here that we can argue that the

Vietnamese regime is re-evaluating nationalist references in order to bridge the

legitimacy gap triggered by the failure of communist policy. For example, even if

reforms had always had a positive image in official account of the ‘golden age’, the

reforms initiated under the Nguyen dynasty had been ignored because it was more

important to show the negative sides of the ‘old regime’ that allowed colonization.

However, communist orthodoxy has been softened by Renovation. The official

historians’ conception of history has also ‘improved’. Reform proposals launched

under the Nguyen have been re-evaluated, such as those of Nguyen Tru,o,` ng To.,

Nguyen Lo. Tra.ch. However, the official narrative continues to focus primarily on the

peasant revolts and nationalist rebellions during this period. As for ‘old’ nationalist

figures, the VCP has always considered itself as the only heir of all the nationalist

movements. Nguyen Thai Ho.c and Pha.m Hong Thai for example have in fact always

been praised. However, taboos still exist: to take the most obvious example, the

authorities are clearly not willing to reevaluate Ngo Ðınh Die.m’s place, though the

leader of the former Republic of South Vietnam was considered as a real nationalist by

Ho Chı Minh himself. It is also possible to find some newspaper or magazine articles

about the positive role of the patriotic bourgeoisie during the wars of the twentieth

century, but official schoolbooks are still far from incorporating these ideas.

The objective is to demonstrate that without the modern communist organization

and ideology, independence and liberation could not be won. In the end,

transformations can seem marginal because nationalism has always been so strong

in Vietnam. If we compare the changes brought by Renovation in Vietnam and


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similar changes in China which have been analysed by Vickers,46 the process in

Vietnam appears less clear and radical. In Vietnam, it is perhaps more

‘traditionalism’ which has been re-evaluated. Following the path of Uncle Ho, the

leaders of the VCP now officially attend famous traditional festivals or commem-

orations which glorify popular heroes (Nong Ðu,´ c Ma.nh to Hung’s temple, Nguyen

Van An to Tran’s Temple in Nam Ði.nh…). Before the 1990s, the communist

leaders rarely appeared in public in these kinds of (religious and traditional) festivals.

Vietnam is a small country whose independence and reunification in 1975 are more

like a second birth than anything else. This is why Renovation—once again not

speaking of its economic dimensions!—arguably represents a less radical change

than it is sometimes held to be: an essentializing nationalism remains the key

constant in official representations of the nation.

The official national identity, which has been very much confirmed by

Renovation, is concretely very strong. The school system, as a vehicle for mass

propaganda, plays its role in a very efficient way. The two dimensions of national

identity appear to have been broadly accepted by the Vietnamese people, although

the first nationalist/cultural dimension based on primordial/ethnic references is

stronger than the socialist one, to the point of being accepted as the unquestionable

truth.

The cultural dimension is the result of what is claimed to be an eternal popular

vision of national culture and identity, even if it is in fact derived more from a

modern Vietnamese nationalism born at the end of the nineteenth century. The

communist authorities have confirmed and strengthened the popular images and

legends about the birth of Vietnamese nation. The contemporary schoolbooks are

not so different from the pre-communist or contemporary nationalist literature. The

national autobiography is, in a way, pure and hagiographic, as is the case in many

young nations. This is also why the place of ethnic minorities is such an issue in

contemporary history and in portrayals of the ‘Vietnamese national family’.

If the authorities focus on this nationalist dimension in their teaching of nation,

they also do everything they can to control it. They are clearly afraid that these

feelings on which they are playing may become uncontrollable or disrespectful (on

the international scene) (similar concerns exercise the Chinese Communist regime

in relation to portrayals of Japan). That is why the condemnation of China has been

notably softened in schoolbooks. Despite what has been said above, schoolbooks

clearly take a softer line than popular literature and certain branches of the media in

expressions of Vietnamese nationalist sentiment. They try to moderate and ‘civilize’

them, while many changes are due, above all, to strategic considerations related to

the end of the Cold War. If the Chinese remain the eternal cultural ‘other’ and the

main threat, China is also now the last communist ally of Hanoi. This represents the

main tension in Vietnam’s contemporary foreign policy.

As for the second dimension (socialism), its main success and strength comes

from the fact that it has served as a vehicle for realizing nationalist aspirations. These

are linked together by the historical figure of Ho Chı Minh. This symbol is

omnipresent: Ho is really the key figure of the modern pantheon and the sine qua


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non of regime coherence, not only politically but also culturally. At the beginning of

the twenty-first century, the Vietnamese official national autobiography can be

summed up by the following equation: Hung Vu,o,ng + Nguyen Trai + Ho Chı Minh

(identity/culture+resistance/State building+independance/socialism). In the current

context, in a nation where about 80% of the population is still living in the

countryside, schools and mass organizations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

appear to be very efficient in the building of the official national identity.

Nationalism is vibrant and socialism, understood as the VCP’s monopoly of power,

has not yet been seriously questioned.

However, the official teaching of national identity also encounters some strong

challenges. The first one is a consequence of the proliferation of the mass media.

Television and newspapers are under strict state control. However, critics are

emerging who write (or speak) in the name of nationalism, as well as (less frequently)

communism. The Tu i Tr popular newspaper is an excellent example of this

phenomenon. This is one of the main reasons why the control of the internet is a

huge challenge for the authorities. Stirring up nationalism is a classic and efficient

political strategy but it is also a dangerous one. The authorities have been criticized

for not being ‘strong’ enough towards external enemies. Some spontaneous

nationalist demonstrations have occurred in the country. If the authorities appear

to be aware of this risk, they have also recently been extensively playing on these

feelings (especially since 2004). In January 2005, after a fishing dispute, the

Vietnamese press mobilized the youth in the streets to demonstrate against the

Chinese. In this case, the authorities managed to control the movement—but what

of the future?

There are also very strong and recurrent criticisms of the Vietnamese education

system. Many observers have vigorously criticized the Ministry of Education and

Training. The quality of teaching and its relevance to the current environment are

the main issues. The contents of many classes are questioned. Teaching methods are

also strongly criticized, and in particular the method of learning ‘by heart’ is often

condemned (through the term: ho.c ve.t, to learn like a parrot). However, these critics

gain great support from arguments regarding the ‘economic efficiency’ of education.

It is argued that globalization requires young, well-educated people who can think by

themselves, and this is why the education system has to encourage critical thinking

and independent judgement.47 The criticisms are not directly addressed to the

teaching of history or national identity, and especially not to the cultural dimension

of it. On this point the nationalist consensus remains overwhelming. Critics tend

instead to target the link between the two dimensions of the official national identity.

The hot question is not ‘What being Vietnamese is/means’? but ‘which policies can

best further Vietnam’s interests’. These criticicisms are, once again, made in the

name of a homogenizing and totalizing nationalism.48

Meanwhile, another fundamental challenge for the regime is emerging: the

generation gap between those who lived through the Vietnam War, and the younger

generation who did not. More than half of Vietnamese have been born since 1975

and do not remember the hard times. This youth has been extensively fed with very


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strong nationalist sentiments, but appears also to be tired of this propaganda, and

especially the omnipresent military-historical commemorations linked with the

independence wars. This youth, and especially the urban elite, also wants to ‘belong

to the world’ via the internet. To take just one example: in March 2005, during an

exam, a grade 11 student, Miss Nguyen Phi Thanh, triggered a mini-controversy in

public opinion by rejecting the proposed dissertation subject. This subject was very

classical: ‘Present the beauty of the work Van te nghı,a sı

,Can Giuo.c», a funeral oration

written in nom—old Vietnamese—by a famous nationalist blind poet at the end of

the 19th century in memorial of the Can Vu,o,ng [Fidelity to the King] resistance

movement against the French. She explained that she could not speak about the

beauty of the book because this book ‘does not talk to her’, ‘because I did not live

during the war…’. Newspapers and public opinion were divided on the mark she

should have received.49 This story symbolized a clear (though often silent)

generation gap. The famous historian Du,o,ng Trung Quoc has written: ‘The history

that we are teaching to our children is a non-personalized history which mainly

consists of symbols and concepts but not of human beings’;50 and Professor Nguyen

Van Ðang has said: ‘They (the students) don’t like history because we are not telling

them the truth. The way history is taught and explained has to be questioned’.51

People regularly complain that the young generation is not passionate about the

history of their country (according to Du,o,ng Trung Quoc, a survey showed at the

end of the 1990s that only 39% of the students had a good knowledge of the origins

of Hung Vu,o,ng…). The affair of Miss Nguyen Phi Thanh was taken up by critics of

the predominant teaching methods: shouldn’t the school teach the children to think

by themselves? In this affair it is once again much more these technical methods of

teaching which have been questioned and not the substance of national identity and

its ‘glorious history’. However, one may wonder whether it is possible to question or

reform the former without undermining belief in the latter.

Conclusion

The strength of Vietnamese nationalism, as reflected not only in schoolbooks but

also in contemporary popular culture, makes it unlikely that the official history of

periods prior to the twentieth century (Braudel’s ‘longue duree’ perspective) would

change significantly, even if the Vietnamese communist regime were to radically

change or crumble. What would notably change is the twentieth century national

autobiography and the identities of the latter figures in the Pantheon of national

heroes. To put it clearly: Vietnamese nationalism is not dependent on any political

regime. The views of the Vie.t Kieu anticommunist groups and the ideology of the

late Republic of South Vietnam are perfect proofs of that. According to the historian

Bui Thiet, the basic rule in writing history school-books in Vietnam is the rule of

‘du,

. ng nu,o,´ c va giu,˜ nu,o,´ c’ [build and defend the nation]. Vietnamese national

identity is built on the history of the battles against the invaders (particularly the

Chinese, but also the French, Americans and others).


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If the approach to teaching national identity, and the contents of history

schoolbooks, are political products generated by political regimes, their ideology and

a specific context, they are also (and perhaps firstly) historical products. And

Vietnam is first of all an archetype of a young Asian country. Vietnam may still be a

member of the declining ‘communist club’, but Vietnamese see themselves first and

foremost in primordialist, ethno-cultural terms, as descendants of the Dragon and

the Fairy. Even if some marginal historians and intellectuals have now started to

argue for a more detached and ‘objective’ approach to constructing the national

autobiography, the national story is clearly unlikely to be ‘de-nationalized’ any time

soon.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Germ Janmaat and Ed Vickers for their help,

comments and editing.

Notes

1. cf. Nguyen Duy Trinh (1975).

2. cf. Nguyen The Anh (2001), Benichou (1990) and Mus (1952). A more recent work which

shows the concrete nationalist dimension of Vietnamese communism is Treglode (2001).

3. cf. Tran Tro.ng Kim (1940), p. 11.

4. cf. Ferro (2004). cf. Lua. t Giao du. c [Education Law], 1998, article 3 and Lua. t Giao du. c

[Education Law], 2005, article 2.

5. cf. Hein and Selden (2000). See also Vickers (2005a).

6. cf. Jones (2002) and Nosaki (2002).

7. cf. Coulby (1997).

8. Quoc ngu,˜ (the term literally means ‘national language’) is the transliteration of spoken

Vietnamese using the Roman alphabet. It was created by the Catholic missionary Alexander

of Rhodes in the 17th century. Quoc ngu,˜ was really adopted at the beginning of the 20th

century under the shared will of French colonizers and Vietnamese nationalist opponents

who wanted to modernize their country through mass literacy campaigns and, at the same

time, to diminish Chinese influence. Before that Vietnamese mandarins wrote in Chinese and

Chinese characters to translate the Vietnamese (chu,˜ Nom).

9. Lua. t Giao du. c [Education law], 2005, ch. II.

10. Lua. t Giao du. c [Education law], 2005, ch. VII, article 99.

11. cf. Phan Huy Le, Tran Quoc Vu,o,

. ng. Li.ch s Vie. t Nam [Vietnam history]. The first edition was

published in 1971; Phan Huy Le, Tran Quoc Vu,o,

. ng, Ha Van Tan, Lu,o,ng Ninh, Li.ch s Vie. t

Nam [Vietnam History], 4 volumes, the first edition was published in 1983.

12. National Politics Editions, the official editions of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

13. See, for example, National Committee for Redaction of Textbooks on Marxist-Leninist and

Ho Chi Minh’s Thought (1999).

14. cf. ‘T ng Giam Koc NXBGD Ngo Tran Ai…’ [Education Publishing House Director Ngo

Tran Ai…], 31 March 2006. Available online at: http://sggp.org.vn/thoisu/nam2006/thang3/

113249/.

15. cf. historian Bui Thiet (2000). See also the file ‘Li.ch s : Theo trang sach ho.c tro’

[History through students textbooks], available online at: http://www.laodong.com.vn/pls/

bld/display$.htnoidung(39,140833) (accessed 25 October 2005).

16. cf. Giao du. c va Tho,` i Ka. i, [Education and Contemporary newspaper] (2006).


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17. According to Nguyen Xuan Han, the real budget for this programme would be around

US$2 billion just for the period 2002–2007, quoted in ‘Van Ke toi neu, Bo. tru, ng khong

quyet Ku,o,

. c…’ [The Ministry is not competent to answer the question I raised…]. Available

online at: http://vietnamnet.vn/giaoduc/2006/04/565415 (accessed 28 April 2006).

18. Since renovation, UNESCO, UNDP and other UN institutions have produced many reports

on the situation of Vietnamese education system and suggested reforms. cf. MOET, UNDP

and UNESCO (1989, 1992).

19. cf. Hu,˜ u Ngo.c (2003).

20. Even Prof. Nguyen Khac Vie.n (1993) encouraged these images and ideas.

21. For a broader perspective on political mythology see the fundamental Girardet (1986). For a

more precise typology of myths in national historiography see Wilson (1998). Many of the

myths Wilson identified can also be found in the Vietnamese autobiography.

22. cf. Bo. Giao Du. c va Ðao Ta. o [Ministry of Education and Formation] (2004a), pp. 35–36.

23. Indeed, even the name of the country, Vietnam, is borrowed from Chinese—Yuenan in

Mandarin or Yuetnam in Cantonese, meaning ‘Southern Yue’. The Cantonese were the

‘Northern Yue’ (or ‘Yuet’) and the term ‘Yue’ is still used as shorthand for the culture of

China’s Guangdong Province.

24. See Vickers (2005a) and also the China article in this special issue.

25. cf. Bo. Giao Du. c va Ðao Ta. o [Ministry of Education and Formation] (2004b).

26. Historically, remote areas and ethnic minorities have been incorporated into the Vietnamese

nation only during the 20th century. cf. Papin (2003).

27. In Vietnam any person who has two Vietnamese parents (even adopted children) is

considered de facto Vietnamese. This situation has triggered a number of diplomatic

situations between the Vietnamese authorities and foreign embassies.

28. Economic rights, but the authorities have proposed that the Vie.t Kieu elect MPs to represent

them and have invited them to send their comments on the VCP 10th Congress political

report and so on.

29. Definition confirmed in resolution no. 36 of the Politburo (26 March 2004).

30. cf. Bo. Giao Du. c va Ðao Ta. o [Ministry of Education and Formation] (2004a), p. 37.


32. Phan Bo.i Chau took the name from Keio University (Keio Gijuku) in Japan because he was

deeply inspired by Keio’s mission. This school is also called: the Free School of Eastern

Capital or the Eastern Capital School for the Just Cause.

33. cf. Papin, Vu Van Sach and Vu Thi Minh Huong (1997), p. 181.

34. Between 1407 and 1427 there was a second, violent Chinese military occupation. The French

signed a treaty with the Chinese in 1885 (Tien-tsin) to transfer Chinese authority over

Vietnam to the French Republic.


36. For instance, Patricia Pelley (2002) has analysed this tradition of resistance to foreign

aggression, but also the hierarchical relationship between ethnic Vietnamese and ethnic

minorities, the ‘cult of antiquity’, attempts to ‘de-Chinese’ the Vietnamese past and so on.

37. cf. Bo. Giao Du. c va Ðao Ta. o [Ministry of Education and Formation] (2004b), p. 99.

38. cf. Bo. Giao Du. c va Ðao Ta. o [Ministry of Education and Formation] (2004c), p. 32.

39. The same idea can be noted for China. cf. Jones (2005).

40. Patricia Pelley (2002) has analysed the conversion of the Tay So,n rebellion into an archetype

of revolution.

41. cf. Bo. Giao Du. c va Ðao Ta. o [Ministry of Education and Formation] (2004c), p. 131.

42. Nguyen Phu Tro.ng (2005).

43. cf. Matthieu Salomon and Vu Doan Ket (2006). This pervasive fear of the northern

neighbour seems a permanent fixture in Hanoi’s ideology.

44. See Tran Ngo.c Them’s polemic book (2001). This book is used as a texbook in many

universities in Vietnam to teach Vietnamese culture.


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45. cf. Tran Ngo.c Them op. cit.

46. Edward Vickers showed that since the late 1970s, when China launched its reform policy,

and particularly after the 1989 Tienanmen events, the patriotism dimension has been more

and more valorized. cf. Vickers (2005b).

47. See the files on education issues from the two revues Chung ta (www.chungta.com.vn) and

Tia sang (www.tiasang.com.vn); (accessed March 2006).

48. See the articles on education issues on the Internet forum created by Vie.t Kieu, available

online at: www.talawas.org (accessed March 2006).

49. On this story, see the Tu i Tr [The Youth] articles (www.tuoitre.com.vn), 13–15 May 2005.

50. cf. Lao Ðo.ng [Labour], 22 January 2005.

51. cf. «Trao K i nhan cac bai viet c a ong Ha Van Thi.nh ve sach giao khoa li.ch s ph thong…»

[Discussions of Ha Van Thi.nh’s articles on the secondary school history textbooks], Giao du. c

va tho,` i Ka. i, available online at: www.gdtd.com.vn/gdtdroot/2005-141/bai10.htm (accessed

26 July 2005).

References

Bo. Giao Du. c va Ðao Ta. o [Ministry of Education and Formation] (2004a) Li.ch s 6 [History 6].

Bo. Giao Du. c va Ðao Ta. o [Ministry of Education and Formation] (2004b) Li.ch s 11 [History 11].

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Documents

i m i, education and identity formation in contemporary Vietnam