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УДК 316.61

Jolanta Kociuba, Maria Curie-Sklodowska University,

Poland

CONTEMPORARY IDENTITY – NATIONAL, TRANS-CULTURAL,

GLOBAL OR INDIVIDUALISTIC?

The category “identity” is a factor describing different levels of the

organization of social life and the phenomena of various ranges, as identity is not

reserved for an individual but is also a feature of other systems: social groups,

institutions and any other whole of certain “systemic” property or function.

Bokszański (2005) indicates that with relation to the dynamics of change in

traditional forms of social life and the creation of new communities, social

movements, political, economic or cultural groups, a new definition of collective

identity was formed. The notion refers to the category of individual identity, the

category that emphasizes the subjectivity of a social actor and the significance of

self-definition in his/her actions (ibid. p. 62). Sociological publications note the

whole range of identity terms referring to the community (ibid. p. 59). These terms

are the following: ethnic identity, social identity, cultural identity, religious

identity, national identity, gender identity, European identity, the identity of a

social movement and after-modern identity.

In sociology, the term identity appeared not only as a new category that

serves the purpose of explaining the phenomena related to new worldviews,

lifestyles, political orientations or social movements. It proved necessary to

implement the term identity of an individual and the research of the sociology of

ego (Kaufmann, 2004) as a new notional instrument in an over-sociologized

conception of a human. Consequently, the identity of a social actor becomes an

indispensible supplement to the notional instrumentarium of sociology

(Bokszański, op. cit., p. 9).

The conception of collective identities in sociology also emphasises the

subjectivity of the community, therefore it employs the idea of subjectivity to the

community and underlines the activities and attitudes undertaken by the

community. Classic sociological theory used demographic, economic and

geopolitical categories, not the categories of subjectivity. Currently, the altered

psychosocial situation of an individual, i.e. increasing significance of its

subjectivity as a social change factor “exerted” noticing the subjectivity of the

collective actor (ibid. p. 50). In the present society, the determination / “creaton” of

a social actor, both individual and group, became an important process.

The notion of identity –conceptualization of dynamism

f contemporary social phenomena The notion of identity allows for comprehensive analysis of contemporary

dynamism of social phenomena (Bokszański, op. cit.). It introduces the perspective

of subjectivity which takes the self-awareness of contemporary society into

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consideration. One of its elements is the conviction that contemporary society is

not subjected to “meta-social guarantees of social order” (religion, history, law and

economy) to such an extend as it used to. The social order is constituted by the

main network of relations and social movements which an individual social actor

contributed to with his/her identity i.e. self-definitions that generate their actions

(comp. ibid, p. 29).

The source of interest in the problem of identity is the processes of

transformations of contemporary societies: individualization, globalization,

multiculturalism, etc. A new category of describing the phenomena appeared to be

necessary because such categories of describing psychosocial reality that concern

mainly individual and collective identifications as: “social roles”, “cultural role

models” or “social structure” are no longer sufficient. The mechanisms of social

change result in the valorisation of autonomy, subjectivity and individual freedom.

The process of ideologisation of individualism, which appeared particularly in the

doctrines of liberalism and neoliberalism, causes an individual subject to become

increasingly real in social ontology in this way (ibid, p. 9). The autonomy and

independence to construct individual identity projects and to select the constituents

of his/her identity increase. Burszta (2004) calls this danger - looking for your

identity at your own cost and the individualization of life strategies.

Globalization and individualization

Some people associate the process of creating their own identity by

individuals and new patterns of group affiliations (Misztal, 2000) with

globalization (with no relation to institutions and social structure). Globalization, I

believe, has changed the nature of “identity”, uncovered it, shelled it out from the

context of a social role, liberated from the determining influence and stripped off

the uncertainty (ibid. p. 144). Neither the social role, nor the professional group, or

the local territory determines the identity to such an extend as 20 years ago (comp.

Bokszański, op. cit., p. 25). Today the boundaries of categorization are fuzzy,

structural changes and the change of people’s social situations are quick, the

strength of class, strata and sometimes even national affiliations deteriorate among

the members of contemporary societies. The social universum has become more

individualized and atomized and the believes and norms of social and community

life whittle away together with the institution , therefore the reference of an

individual to the community alone is outdated and insufficient.

Paradoxically, the differentiation takes place as a result of globalization. The

renaissance of localism and regionalism, ethnic revival i.e. the turn to local identity

appears as a reaction to centralism and cultural-economic uniformity (Synak, 2003,

p. 246). The source and indicator of a contemporary man in the globalizing world

are local societies, local motherlands, family environment and different community

groups. The tendency to globalize is contrasted with the tendency to maintain the

identity.

Globalization is a tool for transforming identity; it extracts the identity from

its previous, local context (Misztal, 2000). Individuals are defined between what is

local and what is global. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate new individual

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identity within the framework of wider identity, i.e. within new, wider entirety. An

individual must rebuild a new sense as an individual within a new entirety and

within local identity (Synak, op. cit., p. 251). This new identity may be defined as

glocalisational and be understood as a resultant of two processes. The revival of

identity-based cultures (local, i.e. ethnic, regional, national and family-wide) is

observed. These cultures adapt to the realities of social environment which is

formed by the processes of globalization.

In the field of identity (also in Poland?), there is certain dialectics that is

based, among other factors, on the existence of two contradictory trends: along

with globalization and broadening the identity (as a result of making contacts with

different cultures and civilizations, e.g. the appearance of supranational identity in

Europe), its differentiation and limiting to local context can be observed (e.g. Scots

consider themselves Scottish, rather than British by nationality). Huntington

writes: The issue seems to look similar in Poland. Joining the European Union

strengthened, not weakened, national identity among Poles (Huntington 2007, p.

26). The similarity seems only apparent. In Poland, the reinforcement of national

identity resulted from satisfying the ambition to join united Europe, while in

Scotland, for instance (Lombardy, Catalonia or the Basque country), Scottish

identity has been rooted in European identity. Scots are certain of their

Europeanism, therefore, they can afford “the luxury” of Scottish identity, while

Poles have a feeling of being “inferior” or “younger” Europeans, that is why the

foundations of their identity is being Polish, rather than being European. In other

words: in Poland, European identity arises from Polish identity, and in Scotland,

Scottish identity arises from European one.

The stage at which Western European countries are might be defined as

post-identification stage (Jan Paweł II, 2005, p. 91). This means that such countries

are at the stage “after” being shaped by the culture of identity and have reached the

unity of internal elements (languages, tribes). While defining their own identity,

gradual come-out beyond national categories takes place (this type may be called

supranational identity). The nations of Western Europe are not afraid of losing

their identity (e.g. by the fact of joining European Union). However, the history of

Polish national identity is much more complex and shows how “Piast Polishness”

which was a unifying force that bounded the multiplicity of tribes was substituted

by Jagiellonian framework of Polishness. Its multiplicity and pluralism allowed for

“the formation of the republic of many nations, cultures and religions (ibid. p. 92)

Differentiation of identities

Globalization tendencies in a world-wide range overlap with destabilization

of social, economic and political situation and generate difficulties in self-

identification of individuals and groups. Presently, the transformation of mentality

takes place in Poland (Grotowska, 2007, p. 120). National, family, religious or

gender identities are regarded much higher than European or global identity.

Certain changes are visible within cultural identity. For example, young people

distance themselves from cultural self-identification that is measured by weak

attachment to national traditions only. On the other hand, the tendencies appear to

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seek the forms of distinction at all costs in order to preserve and develop one’s

own tradition, language, culture and music.

Dariusz Niedźwiedzki (2007, p. 79) writes on social identity created as a

result of political transformation in Poland. Due to the shift of political, economic

and cultural system, specific identity schemes are created. They are based on

forming heterogeneous self-contradictory identity that is suspended between the

old and the new system, based on contradictory axiological and structural

elements of the old and the new order (ibidem, p. 87). Such self-identification,

which is called liminal, i.e. border or transitory, does not concern all Poles. It uses

dual system of values, perceives the world in a dichotomous way (rich and poor,

society and power) and is dominated by the orientation for the presence.

The crisis of national identity

Contemporary identity seems to be built on the basis of the nation and

culture, rather than the state and its institutions. According to Huntington, the

discussions on national identity have become an omnipresent sign of the times

(Huntington, op. cit., p. 25). The author considers the crises of national identity,

present in many European, Asian, African and American countries to be a

worldwide phenomenon. Huntington lists neither Poland nor the majority of

European countries. (Apart from the United States, he lists Japan, Iran, South

Africa, China, Taiwan, Syria, Brazil. Canada, Denmark, Turkey, Russia, Mexico,

Germany and Great Britain). According to Huntington, universality and

simultaneousness of the appearance of these crises in many countries imply

common factors such as global economy, communication, transport, migration,

expansion of democracy, the end of cold war and communism, modernization

(modernity, pluralism, multiculturalism, globalization of cultures), economic

development and urbanization. The presence of these factors in Poland is beyond

discussion, yet they did not impair national identity in our country. Therefore,

other factors responsible for strong national identity need to be searched for, or our

national identity is explainable on the basis of the conglomeration or proportion of

factors. National identity is a “derivative identity” whose strength origins from

other sources and includes a number of components: territorial, attributive (race,

ethnic group), cultural (religion, language), political (state, ideology) and

sometimes also economic (agriculture) or social (networks) (ibidem, p. 38). With

reference to two types of national identity: civic (political, revolutionary, rational

and liberal) and ethnic (cultural, tribal and mystical) based upon peasant cultures

and blood relationship (Brubaker, 1998) reminded by Huntington (op. cit., p. 38) it

should be accepted that Poland refers mainly to the latter, ethnic/cultural, type of

identity. According to Anthony D. Smith, ethnic identity (Smith, 1996, p. 98,

Burszta, 2004, p. 149) is a group of people whose members share a common myth

of origin (blood relationship), historic memory, language, cultural role models,

norms, values, behavior and thinking, historic territory which the member of a

community identifies with and which they belong to and the group solidarity based

on common origin, local language, customs and traditions. However, it is

collective memory, sense of belonging and the awareness of values that bind the

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group, the sense of national dignity and uniqueness that have a key meaning for the

group identity. The thesis refers to the criteria of the typology of nations and

national states and analogous criteria of the topology involving the origin and the

existence of individual and group identities. Such a country as Poland is an

example of cultural, rather than ethnic type of nations which derives its existence

and identity from natural factors that are at the foundations of their origin. Identity

is here a function of primary, inherent, biological properties (blood, consanguinity)

and/or socio-cultural (personality, culture, religion, language, tradition), not a

function of collective will of the citizens whose cohesion results from consciously

shared by citizens rules and political institutions (comp. Szwed, 2005, p. 314).

European identity? The basic and predominant form of the identity of European countries is

national identity. It concerns the countries of both the “old” and the “new” Europe.

The sense of relation to one’s own country is even twice as strong as the relation to

Europe; moreover, it stays at a constant level. The surveys by Eurobarometer from

2002 and 2003 confirm this thesis . Therefore, the category of Europeaness has not

gained significance, even in the countries in which strong identification with

Europe exists, such as Germany and France. It turns out that identification with

Europe does not imply the decrease of the level of national or local identity in the

society. On the contrary, higher sense of local identity implies higher sense of

belonging to Europe.

Therefore, national identity has not finished. It was substituted by

cosmopolitan or civic identity. Despite the efforts of euro-enthusiasts, as a result of

objective processes of reorganizations in the socio-political sphere, the drift

towards “European identity” has not occurred. The so called “European identity”

seems to be an idea generated by European elites (comp. ibidem, p. 314). Despite

the existence of the „policy of identity”, whose aim was to redefine the sphere of

individual and group identifications, there has not been a dramatic slump of

national identity in favour of a form of supranational identity. It seems that the

process of the transformation of group identities in Europe does follow the

scenario proposed by Gerard Delanty (1999 and 2000). Delanty constructed three

models of European identity, which may become a basis for building a new group

identity in Europe. The first model of “European heritage” is based on universal

values, philosophical and legislative achievements and culture. The second one is a

model of identification with European institutions, norms, public and legal order.

The third one is a model of pragmatic identity, concentrated around the practical

way of life. None of these theoretical models of new European identity has gained

appreciation and significance. After transformation processes in Eastern Europe

and changes in Western Europe, around 40% of Europeans have still been

declaring “national” type as the only kind of their identity.

European, cosmopolitan identity, as an exceptional category of social

identifications is a rarely recognized type of identity (comp. ibidem, p. 336).

Therefore, even the observers of social life draw attention to the occurring

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phenomenon of “the revival of national identities” which is rooted in culture and

ethnicity.

Cultural or multicultural identity

Universal transcultural identity

Modern identity is mostly the cultural identity composed of multiple

elements. The observation of social trends at the end of 20st century and the

beginning of the new one shows the power of cultural identity, especially the role

of national identity in the social life of modern world. Manuel Castells (2008)

defines the role of cultural identity, including national identity, in the categories of

“the authorisation” of the societies in the global world: cultural identity in its

various manifestations is one of the major authorisations of the opposition against

the values and interests that lie at the basis of global web of wealth, information

and knowledge (ibidem, p. 9). It is, therefore, justified to accept Castellas’ view

that the increase of the importance of national identity associated with the increase

of the opposition against the phenomena of global web society.

The power of cultural identity is then a response to the technical and

economic transformation of the society that took place in the 1990’s and, to put it

briefly, is a reaction to globalization, an opposition to the disorder of globalization.

Identity is a trend that is contradictory to globalization. Castells writes: Our world

and our life are shaped by two opposing trends of globalization and identity

(ibidem, p. 17). Universal and sudden increase of the expression of national

identity challenges globalization and cosmopolitanism in the name of cultural

uniqueness and in the name of taking control by people over their own lives and

the environment (ibid). Diversified forms of the expression of identity are the

profile of a given culture and the historic sources and realities of the creation of a

given identity. Various manifestations of cultural identity and identity challenges

may be listed. Castells discusses the power of religious, national, ethnic, territorial,

gender and socio-biological identities. Some movements aim at transforming

human relationships at their most fundamental level, e.g. feminism and

environment protection movements; other movements are – according to Castells –

reverse movements which build the resistance entrenchment in the names of god,

nation, ethnicity, family, local community i.e. the basic categories of a thousand-

year-old existence.

Identity is a process of constructing sense on the basis of certain cultural

attribute which is considered prior to other sources of sense and experience. An

individual or a group actor may have numerous identities. Such multiplicity is a

source of not only sense but also stress, contradictions in both self-presentation and

social activities. Identities are the source of sense for actors themselves, they are

also the source of sense on their own, constructed through the process of

individualization (ibidem, p. 22). This is their characteristic feature which makes

them different from what is called the role and the set of roles in sociology. Roles

are defined by the norm structured by institutions and social organizations and

their influence on human behaviour depends on the negotiations between these

institutions and organizations. Self-knowledge is, on the other hand, a construction,

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a process of individuation, the construction of one’s own sense. The roles (being a

mother, daughter, worker, believer and a smoker at the same time) are defined

from outside, and the identities – from the inside, from the subject. Some

definitions may coincide with social roles, e.g. if being a mother is the most

important form of self-definition, from a point of view of a given person, however

identities are stronger sources of sense than roles because they cover the processes

of defining the self and individualization. In short, identities organize the sense,

while roles organize functions. The sense is understood as a symbolic

identification of the objectives of a social actor, organized around the basic

identity, which is the identity that constitutes the framework for other identities

and which sustains itself in time and space (comp. ibidem, p. 23). Castells’

approach makes reference to the understanding of identity by Erik Erikson,

although it is concentrated on a group, rather than an individual identity.

According to Castells from the sociological perspective, all identities are

constructed (ibid. 23). To construct identities, the materials from history,

geography, biology, production and reproduction facilities, group and individual

memories, the apparatus of power and religious revelations are used as building

blocks (ibid).

The types of identity construction process Castells lists three types of the process of identity construction. The first

type – legitimizing identity forms a civic society and rationalizes the sources of

structural domination. It is implemented by dominating institutions. The second

type of identity is the identity of resistance, which leads to the creation of the

communities (or community societies). This may be the most important type of

identity formation in our society (ibidem, p. 24). This identity is formed by those

who are in an inferior position, who are stigmatized and devaluated, who are

excluded by the dominant social actors. This is building a defensive identity in the

categories of dominant institution/ideology by reversing the apprising judgement

and strengthening the boundaries, at the same time (ibidem, p. 25). It seems that in

the present times, societies are getting divided and they collapse into societies-

tribes, constituted by a number of resistance identities. Castells calls this type of

identity formation, quite rightly, the exclusion of the excluding by the excluded.

The expressions of this phenomenon are – according to Castells – religious

fundamentalism, territorial societies, nationalistic movements or self-slandering in

certain gay movements. Social change is politicized in this way and the policy if

identity that Calhoun writes about emerges (ibidem, p. 23).

The third type of identity formation called a project identity is a further

chain of resistance and appears when individuals and communities build a new

identity on the basis of the available cultural materials, redefine their position in

the society and transform the whole social structure as an extension of their own

project of identity. Building the identity is thus a project of a different life, based

on the oppressed identity (e.g. the identity of women). Castells gives an example of

a post-patriarchal society in which feminism leaves the entrenchment of resistance

created by female identity and questions patriarchal family but also sexuality,

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personality, the structure of production on which the society was based so far.

Project identity in a web society (unlike in a civic society) derives from the group

resistance, if it appears at all (ibidem, p. 26). Castells points out earlier that ...web-

based society is grounded on a systemic separation of what is local from what is

global for most of individuals (ibid.). In new conditions, civic societies shrink and

collapse because there is no continuum between the logic of executing power and

the logic of affiliation and representation in particular societies and cultures. The

quest for sense happens in the situation of rebuilding defensive identities around

shared rules.

Castells analyses social movements of various social and cultural

backgrounds which, in the name of their constituted identities, question

contemporary processes of globalization and object social, economic, cultural and

environmental effects of globalization. These social movements are based on an

identity and started as resistance movements. Even though, each of the movements

discussed by Castells is based on different rule of identity (comp. ibidem, p. 151).

Hybrid and mosaic identity type

A new type of identity in contemporary society (apart from national and

European), which appeared in the last few years, is a hybrid identity (“bricolage

identity”). This identity is formed as a result of hybridizing different cultural

content and mixing them in the cultural melting pot (Kempny, 2000, p. 16). It is

developed as a result of the flow of new cultural models, foreign norms and values

that origin from different cultures and systems. This identity is created in post-

civic societies (Marody, 2005) or in the types of communes where “us” means a

group of people who share common features or objectives, not formed on the basis

of objective belonging to a given category or defined social groups. This type of

identity is also called the type of multi-level identity and has been present since

1993. It assumes that people simultaneously identify themselves with their national

society and European one. However, interesting individual and group differences

may be observed here; they are illustrated by the phrase: “We the Polish people but

me European”.

Another type of identity is a mosaic identity which has been present in the

communications of Euronet since 2003. It is an identity of choice, non-

comprehensive, impermanent that is a creation of reaction on the present situation

and an interaction resulting from an internal dialog. This type of identity seems to

be the product of globalization, universality and the result of free of strict norms

flow of people and goods, a consequence of individual choices, finally it

transcends local and national conditions.

Within this type if identity one may talk about professional (occupational)

identity. However, it is not a durable prototype of identity and it “loses” with

cultural programming of an individual reared in a given national culture. Cultural

identity is increasingly strong and persistent than the identity of role, function,

profession or even occupation (Magala, 2005, p. 209). Within the framework of

professional identity, two other identities appear: double and multiple (e.g. a

sociologist, economist and therapist) and along with an institutional identity (e.g. a

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dean of many years’ standing) there are partial and temporary identities (e.g. for a

period of project implementation) (Magala, 2005, p. 191). This evokes an ability to

manoeuvre among identities (Melucci, 1996, p. 53) or the necessity to “chisel”

identities. Mosaic identity is therefore an identity “under construction”, rather than

a durable structure identification with oneself and the world.

The question concerning one’s own identity is raised by macro-structural

changes, the frequency of changes in social processes and the complexity of new

forms of social life. These processes provoke people to ask themselves continually

about their own identity and form it (Magala, 2005, p. 209). The fiasco o forming

one’s own identity, global or even European, forces to accept cultural theory of the

identity by G. Hofstede. (As Magala vividly presents it: Projecting and forming

new identity for whole societies and nations got stuck in the sands of Iraq).

However, cultural identity seems to undergo changes due to the necessity to

compare our identities with other and due to intercultural confrontations.

Moreover, life in the time of late modernity broadens the limits of cultural

identity through the possibility of contact with other lifestyles, new myths and

symbols. It knocks down the borders of group identity (class or national) and

reduces binds to a place. In the society of choice there is not much place left for

strangeness and otherness (comp. Burszta, 2004, p. 88). The temptation to liberate

from group identity is becoming a threat, a particular escape to freedom for the

cost of impairing group identity (Burszta, 2004, p. 176).

The category of complex identities seems adequate to describe the identities

of contemporary people (after Burszta, 2004, p. 176). There is no singular identity

or identity in singular mode, but identities in plural, i.e. complex identities, not the

identity. Thus, a question arises if the lack of a single identity (with the presence of

complex and multiple identities) does not imply the lack of identity at all? Is

complex and impermanent identity that is “under construction” still an identity or

is it lack of identity? After all, identity is, by definition, something relatively

persistent, defined, what is a condition of similarity to itself and a condition of

distinction from others.

It may be assumed that in contemporary society there are a few levels of

identity (analogous to the levels of culture distinguished by Hofstede (2007, p.

24)). The first level is the level of national identity, the second – a level of regional

and religious identity, the third one – the level of gender identity, another one is

the level of generation identity, then – a level of social class identity related to the

profession and occupation, and the last level of organizational or corporation

identity that is related to the position in their work place.

There are no external, objective points of reference to identity today. The

importance of such attitudes and markers as community, territory, tradition, origin,

race and social class is lower and lower. This new socio-cultural situation resulted

in the increase of the importance of internal, subjective and individual factors in

identity forming. The role of individuals in forming their own identity is presently

higher. The existence of contemporary identities is sustained by individual acts

and self-identification (Appadurai, 2000, p. 237), created and supported by the

media and culture industry.

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Identity is not a subject of continuum and tradition (comp. Kapralski, p. 39),

however, it is expressed in currently available, and even fashionable, frequently

coincidental and heterogeneous cultural codes. Kapralski writes: it is easy to form

identity; there is a variety of options, instructions, encouragements and

prefabricated elements around (ibid).

Towards global identity? The most frequently mentioned negative result of cultural globalization is,

however, the loss of individual identity for global identity (Synak, p. 246).

Modernization processes, globalization tendencies and liberalization of social life

may pose a danger to national and personal identity, which may presently be the

freely chosen by not only the elites but also young unemployed in their own

country. On the contrary, these processes may facilitate the sense of national

identity (Scots, Flemish, Quebecers). It is noticeable that national identity whose

element is common culture allows an individual for self-identification in a simple

and safe way, without one’s own activity. The context of national identity gives a

sense of community, satisfies the need of belonging and defines axiological

horizon. Globalization does not facilitate maintaining the sense of national identity.

This concerns two aspects of identity: being the same (sameness) and being

different from other subjects of individual or collective identity (distinctiveness).

Contemporary man must face at least four dilemmas concerning identity.

They are the condition maintaining coherent identity narration (Giddens, 2004,

2006). They are the conflicts between: unification and fragmentation, impotence

and control, authority and uncertainty, personal and marketed experience.

Even if it is assumed that global culture is material, has superficial character

and does not penetrate deeper layers of cultural identity, it still modifies the

identity of an individual. Even though global culture is not a spiritual one because

it fails to have a unified system of meanings for all societies, it corrupts the

cultures of identity. Global culture is first and foremost the culture of

consumptionism: it imposes the models of consumption and drills people into their

social roles. It cures an individual from nationalism or takes him/her out from a

family and transforms young people into consumers for whom consumption is a

common cultural code of conduct, according to the idea: progress is consumption

(Krzysztofek, 1998). Market and consumption, also the consumption of culture,

become the regulators of identity. Multinational corporations are said to be

demanding a homo mundialis – a man of global mentality who aimed at the

motivation of achievements, cured from collective identity, depoliticised and

unified in a role of a consumer.

Globalization in culture may lead to the decrease of diversity in culture and

to cultural chaos which are demonstrated in homogenization, standardization and

the creation of unified mass identity. An individual loses his/her own identity and

is also deprived of his/her collective identity (people are separated from their

family, homeland, village or nation). Such out-rooting causes disorientation in

people’s own “self”, difficulties in defining who they are as an individual and a

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person. A sense of thread appears because they cannot define themselves – a

particular fear of the identity loss. At the same time, (possibly because of this

reason) a strong identity motivation appears in a form of the need for identification

and belonging to a group (national, ethnic), i.e. the search for social identity by an

individual (national, ethnic, sub-cultural, communal – sects, clubs, pseudo-

fanclubs, companies). Such a community, a group defines my “self”. It is group

identity that gives me the sense of individual identity.

Global control over the patterns of culture promotes the externally imposed

identity and personality pattern, depriving the individual of the sense of

distinctiveness. Top-down resemblance, deprivation of individualism, emphasizing

external similarity breeds pseudo-identity. The loss of the sense of distinctiveness

and the thread of becoming similar are the result of escaping from the impact of

micro-systems and increasing the influence of macro-systems. Consequently, there

are more and more human copies who are increasingly similar to one another in

terms of behaviour, preferences and attitudes (Hirszowicz, 1998, p. 179).

Two types of cultural identities: collective and individualistic

Two types of identity are related to psycho-cultural dimension of

individualism-collectivism. Tadeusz Paleczny distinguishes collectivistic type of

cultural identity (Paleczny, 2007, p. 63) and individualistic identity. Collectivistic

identity takes a form of nationalistic or patriotic orientation. Nationalistic type of

identity excludes any type of heterogeneous, complex or dual identity, while

patriotic type of identity notices the attractiveness of other cultures (with positively

valued fact of belonging to one’s own cultural group). Collectivistic identity bases

on collective treatment of the members of one’s own group and other cultures. It

does not account for individualism of individuals. The well-being of the cultural

group is superior to the interests of its members (ibid. p. 61). This type of identity

leads to the standardization of attitudes, closing the individuals within precisely

defined borders, in the area of contacts and communication with the people from

outside their own culture. This type of identity leads to restrictions of intercultural

contacts and succumbing to their control (ibid. p. 63). Direct contacts with the

representatives of other cultures are considered a threat to the “purity” of their own

culture, “sullying” in terms of religion, morally “tarnishing”, culturally

humiliating, e.g touching a pariah by a Brahmin, uncovering a face by a Muslim

woman before an infidel, sitting at one table with goy in Sabbath (ibid. p. 63).

Collective, ideological, religious rules are predominant in this type of identity.

Collectivistic identity is most frequently shaped on the basis of “objective” criteria

of identification with the group, such as: place of birth, mother tongue, origin,

blood relationships.

Individualistic identity

Postmodern or even post-modernistic identity forces to search for the

foundation of identity in subjectivity and individualism or in the group of choice.

In the postmodern world identity is no longer given once for the whole life and is

not given because of birth and given “in advance” but it is the subject of choice,

12

subjective task of an individual. Identity is chosen, constructed, negotiated upon.

Contemporary man does not inherit identity. Traditional markers of identity, such

as race, culture, nation, region, history, religion or even gender are losing

significance and are suppressed. Identity is not a matter of fate but a matter of

choice, individual sense, self-deterministic structure of meaning. Identity is formed

“on your own” today, without the reference to social structures or the systems of

values. If it is formed with reference to a group, the choice of the group is an

individual decision, from the offers of plenty groups. It is not given from the top,

yet it does not struggle to anchor. It is “flowing” and “drifting”. Creating the

foundations of one’s own identity, a contemporary individual avails oneself of

internal determinants, makes more or less rational or emotional decisions. What is

emotionally or illuminatingly moving becomes a forming factor for the identity.

An individual in a culture of individualism is allowed to self-construct their own

identity, to search for it, to change it, to choose it, but also is allowed for

eclecticism and crisis. The crisis of contemporary identity seems to reflect the

crisis in political, economic and cultural spheres. The manifestation of the crisis in

the sphere of identity may be the lack of it, underachievement or its collapse,

atrophy. The diffusion or disintegration of post modernistic identity leads to the

extinction of identity, to inability to obtain it. The dynamism of contemporary

socio-cultural changes induces to accept the thesis concerning the impossibility to

form a coherent and continuous identity.

Individualistic identity (ibid, p. 64) is a type of cultural identity,

characteristic for modern societies which ore democratic civic societies, composed

of various racial, ethnic and religious groups. This type of identity is a unitary

identity, a type of “individual identity” (ibid, p. 64). Individualistic identity is

developed by an individual, not received by a group. It is constructed in the

process of cultural universalization (assimilation, integration, and globalization). It

is not a cultural ethnocentric and homogeneous identity. This type of identity is

characteristic for the individuals of liberal, open orientation who are ready to

develop their own identity, frequently against the expectations of their group. This

identification is based on the sense of citizenship, shared symbols, place of

residence and class position (ibid, p. 64).

The changes of contemporary identity The changes in the field of post modern identity concern two types of

reactions and strategies of identity: the former are based on individualism and

universalism (cosmopolitism), the latter are characterised by the preference to

community and particularism, conservatism and mythologization of the past.

Presently, the process of identity formation is influence by individual, rather than

collective factors. It is dependable on its own personal connections, not communal

belonging. For instance, an individual who migrates may drift for a long time

between the two collective systems (Budakowska, 2005, p. 68).

Individualistic ideology is believed in by quite a significant group of people

in industrialized countries who shape their identities on the basis of the access to

global networks of information and values and the, so called, hyper-class – a group

13

of migrating specialist who are influenced by global and local systems. The

presence of these people in virtual reality influences the identification with people

who spend time in a similar way (Bellah, 2007) and weakens the bonds with the

real local community. Nevertheless, in the countries of poor south, identity is still

formed by traditions and people live beyond the network of services in the

cyberspace (comp. Rifkin, 2003, p. 236). Unidentified cultural position of a

contemporary nomad – an employee of a multinational corporation, makes him

loosen his bonds with his own cultural pattern and obtains a broader context of

identity references by participation in systems: global, which he works in, and

local, which he origins from.

Broadened context of cultural and identification (identity) references results

in the formation of flexible individual identities. They are adjustable to the

situation and the complexity of the external environment. Identity is no longer

treated as constant and unified but is a variable. In post-modernity, the process of

transition beyond group, national, local and regional identities occurs. Presently,

individual, not collective criteria of identity assessment are predominant. Identity

is not assessed on the basis of group membership but from the perspective of

individual actions of a person.

Postmodern changeability of the world, cultural pluralism and the variety of

social contexts make an individual redefine him/herself and answer the question:

“who am I?” and “who do I want to be? (Budakowska, 2005, p. 62). This is how a

reflexive „I” emerges. An individual is bound to continuous reconstruction of its

own being (ibid, p. 53) and to giving sense to it. Moreover, an identity makes

choices concerning its identity on the basis of intercultural contacts. It oscillates

between what it inherited and where it is now. Identity formation does not happen

by means of imitation. Social mobility causes a broach in the model of cultural

duplication (ibid, p. 63).

Qualitative changes in identity process are based on breaching and erasing

the identity borders (e.g. in having black skin or being an Indian on the territory of

contemporary metropolis). An individual may have a few cultural affiliations that

characterise him or her as a member of one or another group (ibid, p. 51) or prove

various group identities of immigrants (ibid, p. 52)

It is a serious problem for a citizen of a global village to reconcile

individual, regional and local identity that is based on tradition, territory,

topographic features of the region, its industrial, social and cultural specificity with

global identity in post modern conditions of time and space compression in the

situation of the migration of symbols and people, modern economy and different

systems of values.

Creating a new form of group (collective) identity faces obstacles or is

simply impossible. Unsuccessful, 74-year long attempt to form a new soviet

identity among the citizens of the former USSR or an attempt to form an extra-

national European identity may be examples. The former seems to be built upon

individualism of particular people and groups, rather than on the basis of universal

values of European culture, such as justice, democracy and freedom. Bauman

(2005, p. 188) claimed that these values, professed by Europeans, define their

14

identity. Pomian (2009) posed a thesis on the universality of European culture and

that it is culture to unite the identity of European societies and countries. In our

opinion, this culture and its universal values did not prove to be durable cement of

the integration of Europe and European identification because it was the ideology

of individualism to have won. It is the culture of individualism that is the winner.

What is more, in some countries (presumably, as a result of the increase in the

significance of individualization processes), traditional construction of national

identities strengthened, what is manifested in emergence of nations in such

countries as Great Britain, Belgium, Spain or Canada. National identity, in spite of

unfavourable processes demonstrates its persistence, although there are frequent

examples of cultural identities that contain identification with two national groups.

The specificity of American (national) identity

The awakening after September 11, 2001 caused an increase of the

importance of national identity for Americans, in comparison to other identities (p.

17). The crisis of identity however, became a worldwide phenomenon covering not

only America (Huntington lists as many as 15 nations that found themselves in the

identity crisis) (p. 25). This indicated common factors determining the

phenomenon, such as modernization, economic development globalization,

urbanization and communication progress. There are dialectic processes of

narrowing and broadening identity, fragmentation and globalization, integration

and separation as well as mixing identities (Asians and Latinos in USA, Arabs and

Turks in Western Europe).

The fact that had a decisive and lasting impact on the shape of the American

culture, institution, history and also on American identity was that America is an

Anglo-protestant society, established in 17th and 18

th century by settlers from the

British Isles. The settler initially defined America in terms of race, ethnicity,

culture and – most importantly – religion (Huntington, p. 45). In 18 c. they had to

define America in terms of ideology, in order to justify their independence form

other citizens of their former homeland. These four factors remained a part of

American identity in 19 c. At the end of the century, ethnic ingredient increased by

Germans, the Irish and Scandinavians. Then, up to the ban on mass immigration in

1924, American society assimilated large mass of immigrants from southern and

eastern Europe. Due to this, by the outbreak of World War II, ethnic affiliation had

no longer been a basic ingredient of American national identity. Ethnic affiliation

also lost its significance as an element of identity after the successes of human

rights movement and the enactment of the bill on immigration in 1965. Since

1970’s it has been culture and credo that define American identity.

Evolution of American identity At the end of 20 c. separate elements of this culture/identity began to

change. White English-speaking protestants neighboured with immigrants from

South American and Asia and the manifestation of group identities: ethnic, racial

and sexual was accompanied by the popularity of the doctrines of multiculturalism

and diversity (raised to the rank of a dogma). The erosion of American national

15

identity in 1980’s and 1990’s of 20 c. is also linked to exalting different sub-

national identities over the national identity and the relation of part of the elites

and interest groups to cosmopolitan and supranational identities. Some elite groups

in America – business, financial, intellectual, professional and even governmental

ones – were deprived of their national identity (comp., p. 21). The phenomena of

patriotism extinction and devaluation of American citizenship are described.

Higher ethnic and religious awareness, the increase of Hispanic influences has

been slowly transforming America into a bilingual and bicultural society and

facilitates double identity retention (Huntington, op. cit., p. 128 and 129). Will it

be successful to defend American unity as a society based on Christianity and

religious dedication, freedom, equality, the riles of law and the rights of an

individual, on protestant values such as individualism and ethics at workplace?

These are the questions that bother not only the author of the book entitled: “Who

are we?” In the perspective of Huntington’s analyses, one might put forward a

thesis that possibly it was the ideology of individualism to be the last cement that

bounded the elements of American society if all other elements American identity

no longer exist. Race and ethnic American does not exist any more. Cultural

America is in the stage of siege (ibidem, p. 24). In the future America may be a

mix of four types of identity: ideological, i.e. the America deprived of cultural

historic foundations and unified by the attachment to American rules, the identity

split into two cultures: Anglo-protestant and Hispanic and two languages,

exclusivist identity - redefined by race and ethnic affiliation, excluding any

coloured people from outside Europe and finally cultural identity – revitalized

which proves its cultural Anglo-protestant and European cultural roots,

involvement and religious values in the confrontation with the hostile world

(ibidem, p. 12 and 30).

September 11, 2001 Anglo-protestant American culture was attacked, what

brought by the perspective of settling the perspective of American identity on

ideological and political attachment to credo exclusively (comp. ibid, p. 46).

Huntington polemicizes with Robert Bellaha’s opinion who repeated

Franklin Roosevelt’s words that all Americans except Indians are immigrants or

immigrants’ descendants (comp. Ibid, p. 46) maintaining that there is a

fundamental difference between immigrants and settlers. The first communities of

settlers came to America in 1607, 1620 and 1630 because “America was a tabula

rasa”, i.e. except for Indians there was no other society. Settlers had a common

(not individual as was the case of later immigrants) attitude to the old and the new

homeland. Actually, the term “immigrant” came into being in the English language

in America in 1790’s to distinguish new-comers from the first settlers.

Fundamental culture and American identity is in its core still colonial and is still

the culture of the first settlers whose basic elements are: “Christian religion,

Protestant values and morality, the ethics of work, the English language, British

traditions of law and justice, the limitations of the government as well as the

heritage of art, literature, philosophy and music (ibidem, p. 48). The settlers added

the, so called, American credo with its rules of freedom, equality, individualism

representative government and private property. By the end of 20th century it was

16

the following values that attracted immigrants: Anglo-protestant culture, political

freedom and economic possibilities.

In 1790 the population of United States was 3.929 million people, including

698 thousand slaves. In terms of ethnicity 60% of white population was English,

80% British (the rest was German and Dutch). 98% of the population was of

Protestant denomination. America was, therefore, a homogenous society in terms

of race, nationality and religion. In the period between 1820 and 2000, about 66

million of immigrants came to America what made the American nation more

heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity and religion. However, demographic influence

of immigrants was just minimally higher than the influence of 17th and 18

th century

settlers and their slaves. At the end of 18 century, America experienced a

demographic boom. The birth rate was as high as 7.7 children per woman in 1790,

what constituted 55 children per 1000 people, in comparison to 35 births per 1000

people in European countries (ibidem, p. 51). At the end of 20th century (in 1990)

America was, in terms of demography, the creature of the first settlers and slaves

in half (49% of population came from settlers and African American population

from 1790) and in half immigrants (51% of the American people descended from

immigrants who came later). In the population of America in the period of 1820

and 2000, average ratio of people who were born outside America was as little as

10%, what proves the thesis that America is not “a nation of immigrants”.

American national identity is defined by the rules, not by attribution, it is a

civic and national not ethnic and cultural identity what results in the perception of

America as a universal nation because its rules are applicable to all human

societies. It is based on the ideology of credo, expressed in the Declaration of

Independence. The definition of American identity was formed with reference to

political conception, not to race, culture, language and ethnic affiliation:

Americans and British were one nation after all. The conflicts with Great Britain

related to trade, taxes, military safety and the scope of the power of parliament

over the colonies made Americans defend traditional English values from the

British government whose aim was to undermine them. Americans demanded

observing traditional English rules, freedoms and the governance mandated by the

subjects. Americans referred to more universal, values of the Enlightenment

concerning freedom, equality and the rights of individuals. These two sources

established the American credo, present in various documents, sermons, writings

and speeches from 1770’s and 1780’s. “The credo legitimizes the use of

“Americanism” as a political ideology or the set of views analogical to socialism

or communism in such a way that had never been referred to “Romanism”,

“Anglicanism” and “Germanism” (ibid, p. 54). Americanism has certain features

of religion, what makes America “a nation of the soul of a church” and implements

ideology not ethnic affiliation, language or religion as basic criteria of national

identity, moreover it considers its enemies in terms of credo. Americans identify

their enemies with tyranny, monarchy, aristocracy and stifling freedom and the

rights of an individual. “In 20th

century, Americans identified themselves as world

advocates of democracy and freedom against German and Japanese militarism and

Nazism as well as Soviet communism (ibid, p. 55). Despite these declarations,

17

Americans massacred and marginalised Indians, subjugated and excluded African

Americans, excluded Asians, discriminated Catholics, expelled loyalists and

hindered immigration of people from outside North West Europe.

American identity is not linked to any particular territory, the symbolic heart

of the nation, holy land of the ancestors or geographic and physical properties of

the land. Up to this day, they exhibit a high degree of mobility, they are in constant

movement and do not identify themselves with any particular place of residence.

Towards the end of the 20th century, 16% of Americans were changing houses.

Only in one year, from march 1999 to march 2000, 43 million Americans changed

their house. The majority of Americans do not treat New York City, Los Angeles

or Washington DC as the embodiment of the American spirit. They also do not

identify themselves with the American territory as a whole. The relationship with

land is expressed in terms of possession and not identity. They do not call the USA

their home country. They think of their land in abstract, not particular, terms. They

do not express local bonds with a particular territory. Americans epitomise their

country neither with a place nor with natural characteristics but with ideas or

political and government institutions.

For 400 years, Protestant culture and its values, which greatly influenced

Catholicism and other religions in America, have been the foundation of the

American identity. In the year 2000, Protestants constituted 60% of the American

population. Protestant values shaped the American attitude towards public and

private morality, economic activities, government's public policies. “America- the

child of the reformation” (ibid, p. 66). Later, the Enlightenment Age, secular,

liberal and bourgeois ethos stemmed from the protestant values. American

Protestantism differed from its European counterpart in its spirit of freedom, its

aversion to subjecting the mind and its religious zeal. The colonists regarded

themselves as the chosen people and defined their mission in the New World in

biblical categories. Various types of Protestantism, in the form of Baptist Church,

Methodism, Fundamentalism, Evangelicalism or Pentecostalism, place great

influence on the direct contact between an individual and God, the Bible's

superiority as the true source of the word of God, deliverance through faith,

transforming experience of re-birth, personal responsibility for spreading the word

of God, living in faith, democratic, with lesser degree of hierarchy, organisation of

the Church, presupposing general participation and the superior position of

emotional element over the intellectual. Modern Evangelicalism is the most

popular religion among Americans.

The fundamental, and very often the sole indicator of the American identity

of the so-called American Credo, i.e. common “social ethos and political faith,

consisting of the concepts of equality, dignity of an individual, the right to

freedom, justice, fair opportunities and search for happiness. The political beliefs

of Americans encompass the sacred right of and individual, the nation as the

source of political authority, government limited by law and the nation, superiority

of the local government over the central government, power of the majority and the

belief in “the less government the better (ibid, p. 69). This unique secular credo is

the offspring of the dissident Protestant culture. Its basis consists of 5 principles:

18

freedom, egalitarianism, individualism, populism and the principle of laissez-faire

(comp. Ibid, p. 70).

Americans brought up in the Protestant culture, more often than Europeans,

Canadians or the Japanese, express the belief that there exist absolute moral norms,

independent from circumstances which ought to direct their individual behaviour

(ibid, p. 71). Protestantism stresses the role of the individual in experiencing God

directly through the Bible without the mediation of the Church and emphasises the

possibility of salvation or re-birth by means of the Holy Grace, also without the

mediation. The Protestant Culture made Americans the most individualistic nation

of the world (ibid), and the fundamental element of the culture- work ethics, made

the religion of work and the gospel of success the American religion. American

society exhibits the belief of moral value of work and work glorification.

Furthermore, employment is the source of self- confidence and independence

whereas idleness is a sin. Americans, more strongly than other nations, identify

with work. Work is the source of satisfaction and they are proud of it. In 1997

Americans worked 350 hours on average more than Europeans (ibid, p. 73). One

ought to be active and useful, make decisions and do one's work. Individual

success depends on talent and character. Americans divide people into those who

are productive and those who are not. As early as the first half of the 19th century,

observers notice work addiction in this type of behaviour. The concept of a self-

made man i.e. a person who owes everything him/ herself is the product of the

American culture.

America – the Christian nation Americans are one of the most religious nations in the world, especially in

comparison with other, highly industrialised democratic societies. Over 80% of the

population describe themselves as Christians. America is predominantly a

Christian nation with a secular government (ibid, p. 82). The Founding Fathers of

the American Constitution forbade the creation of the national church in order to

limit the power of the government and to defend and strengthen religion.

Consequently, this lead to the identification of religion with the society and

ensured the freedom of religion (and not the freedom from religion). With the lack

of the national religion, Americans gained not only the freedom of religion but also

the freedom to create any religious communities and organisations (ibid, p. 84).

This lead to an unusual expansion of various religions, religious movements and

sects and also religious schools, biblical associations and missionary movements,

which embody mostly a form of Protestantism. Americans succeeded in joining the

spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom (while in France these two are in

opposition)- which was observed by Tocqueville. At the threshold of the 21st

century, Americans were not less attached to their Christian identity- maybe they

were attached to it the most in their history (ibid, p. 99). They are a religious

nation. Non-religious and secular, if not antireligious, is only a part of American

intellectual, academic and media elites.

19

American national identity is built on the foundation of civil religion. The

religion consists of 4 elements. The first, American government and lifestyle

presupposes the existence of a Higher Being and is based on the religious basis.

The second, Americans are sure, that they are the chosen nation, and the USA is

“the new Israel” with the God-given mission of doing good in the world. The third

element of the American civil religion is the omnipresence of religious symbols in

ceremonies, rituals and public rhetoric. Finally, national ceremonies possess a

religious function. The holy texts defining the identity of the USA are the

following political documents: Declaration of Independence, Constitution of the

United States of America, Bill of Rights, Getysburg Address, Lincoln's second

inaugural speech, Kennedy's inaugural speech, Martin Luther King's speech (“I

have a dream”) (ibid, p. 101).

American civil religion is of national and extra-religious character (it

encompasses Protestants, Catholics, Jews, other non-Christians and even

agnostics). However, the religion is deeply Christian in its spirit, substance,

principles and stipulations regarding human nature. Behind each aspect of civil

religion stand Biblical archetypes: the Exodus, the Chosen Nation, the Promised

Land, the New Jerusalem, sacrificial death and re-birth- claims Bellah (ibid, p.

102). Although each American banknote and coin bears the words: The United

States of America” and “In God We Trust”, Americans do not swear allegiance to

one God, but to “a nation under one God's care”. American civil religion is

Christianity without Christ and does not mention two words: “Jesus Christ”.

Muslim Identit – an example of cultural identity New Islamic identity as a cultural/ religious identity emerged as a

consequence of negating the cultural exclusion where the exclusion from

modernity obtains religious sense and the method of combating the exclusion

consists of self-sacrifice (compare Castells, op. cit., p. 35). Constructing the

modern Islamic identity occurs as a reaction against unattainable in the 70's and

80's and failed modernisation (be it capitalist or socialist, negative effects of

globalisation and the collapse of post-colonial, nationalist project (ibid, p. 33).

The rapid emergence of Islamic movements seems to be linked with the

interference in the functioning of the traditional societies. Islamic countries'

economies were not able to adapt to new conditions of global competition and the

technological revolution in the 70's and 80's. Young, highly educated city-dwellers

were frustrated with their expectations aroused in the 50's and 60's. In 1980's,

nationalist projects in the most westernised countries of Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia

collapsed. This marked the beginning of social tensions which were seized mostly

by moderate Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood) but also by radicals (Jemaah

Islamiyah). In Indonesia and Malaysia, the crisis of nationalism brought about

Islamism as well.

Fundamentalist Islamic identity spread into the socially excluded areas of

the developed capitalist societies. In this way, the emergence of a new Islamic

identity not only among the disappointed French youth originating from Maghreb,

20

but also among young Turks born in Germany or among the Pakistanis in the UK

occurred. At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union enabled the

emergence of Islamic movements in the Caucasus and in the Central Asia. A new

identity is formed not only by the return to tradition, communal world where

lacking means of existence masses and disappointed intellectuals can rebuild the

sense in a global alternative against the excluding global order (ibid, p. 35).

Islamic fundamentalism is not a traditionalist movement. Despite all the

exegetical efforts of rooting the Islamic identity in history and holy texts, Islamists

continue to reconstruct the cultural identity which is hypermodern in reality.

Politicisation of the sacred, the sacralisation of politics and conversion of pseudo-

legal Islamic institutes into “social religious rites” are all the means of the

implementation of authentic ego policy, the policy of identity, thus the means of

formulation and in essence discovering the identity (ibid, p. 31). The Islamic

identity is, therefore, (re)constructed by fundamentalists in the opposition to

capitalism, socialism and nationalism (Arabic or otherwise), which constitute in

their perception the collapsing ideologies of the postcolonial order (ibid).

Religious fundamentalism (Islamic or Christian) according to Castell's

analyses, in the new millennium, proved to be surprisingly strong and influential as

an identity source. Islamic fundamentalism as a reconstructed identity and a

political project is in the centre of the most crucial process, by and large

conditioning the future of the world (ibid, p. 28). In cultural/ religious/ political;

framework the Islamic identity is built on the principle of double deconstruction:

by public actors and by public institutions. The actors must deconstruct themselves

as subjects, be it an individual or as a part of an ethnic group or as citizens of a

nation. In addition, women must subordinate themselves to their male carers for

they are encouraged to fulfil themselves in the family life. Habermas' principle of

subjectivity constitutes a heresy for Islamic fundamentalists. Only ummah provides

an individual with the ability of being oneself, as a part of a brotherhood of the

true, which is a basic equalising mechanism providing mutual support, solidarity

and shared sense. At the same time, the nation state must negate its identity: an

Islamic state based on Sharia receives precedence over the nation state. Islamic

fundamentalism is a cultural construction based on the propagated priority of the

religious identity (ibid, p. 108).

Religious identity of resistance – Al-Kaida

The movement symbolically represented by al-Qaeda is a movement of

other kind- namely, in Castells' opinion- a global movement built around the

definition of an opponent and not around the definition of own identity principles.

The Soviets in Afghanistan, Americans in the Saudi Arabia or Jews in the Palestine

are all opponents. Al-Qaeda is a global terrorist network leading global jihad

against the USA's and its allies' global authority. Castells invokes Kepel from

2003, who having examined several processes concluded that Islamism as a

political power, in fact, failed in the majority of Muslim countries. Kepel argues

that it is due to this fact that radical and terrorist groups emerged, who constitute a

21

desperate attempt at forcing their own utopia by means of violent revolutionary

avant-garde and who echo the history of early communist era (ibid, p. 35).

Al-Qaeda was built on the principle of identity based on territorial

expression of the religious identity which is the identity of resistance and not the

identity of the project. Although it exhibits offensive, global projection due to the

nature of its opponent consisting of secular regimes (the USA and Zionism), it

does not put forward a programme for the society or mankind. Western powers

marginalise Muslims evoking in them deep injustice and humiliation (compare

ibid, p. 111). Al-Qaeda is a multiethnic and multinational global network. It is not

a class, an ethnic group, a national or regional group. Finally, it is not an

expression of rebellion against economic exploitation (ibid, p. 117). Castells writes

further: It is definitely a group based on religious identity, but lacking particular

social anchor, apart from common experience of the first religious war in

Afghanistan (ibid, p. 133). It is rather a commune of practices, and the practice is

jihad, whereas the power if identity is the power of God (ibid).

Conclusion

Research on Muslim radicalism find its causes in the micro-social, mezzo-

social and macro-social levels. On the micro level, individuals are examined by

means of qualitative methods e.g. on the basis of personal documents analysis.

Researchers concluded that, before becoming part of extremist organisations,

people undergo deep identity crisis of life between two cultures, which disappears

after their immersion in the structures of the organisation (“finding oneself”, “one's

own manhood”).

Such state may be explained by the theory of culture clash, presupposing

that the identity crisis must occur as a result of attempt at reconciliation of two

conflicting world-views and systems of values.

A different attempt at explaining the identity crisis was put forward by

Bryan Turner who sees the source of the crisis in atomised Western- European

societies, where the commercialisation and privatisation of the majority of life

spheres does not allow for the assimilation of social roles or for developing one's

own identity on the basis of e.g. work. Identity function can be fulfilled, however,

by religious or “alterreligious” institutions. Owing to great social solidarity, radical

religious organisations attract their members suffering from the identity crisis, the

members usually being the representatives of the well-educated middle class,

especially science graduates.

The third explanation of the identity crisis may be globalisation processes.

The disintegration of identity on the social and personal level can be regarded as

the effect of global universalisation and relativisation. However, these processes

bring about the revitalisation of the Muslim identity, regeneration of identities, but

those limited to particular groups, e.g. religious, racial or ethnic. This is the effect

of particularisation, a phenomenon which is a paradox of globalisation-

universalisation and revitaliation. This is illustrated by the Rushdie scandal. His

book and ideas which revitalised the Muslim religion were supposed to enable

22

participation in the global culture, thus universalisation in return. However, the

book incited religious radicalism among the European Muslims.

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