Governance in CAS: Perspective of a Governance Specialist

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Supporting Decentralization as an Entry Point for Governance Reform in

Sierra Leone

Yongmei Zhou (AFTPR)Governance and Anti-corruption Core Course (Apr 23,

2007)

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Governance in CAS: Perspective of a Governance Specialist Why and how did we choose a few entry points

when governance shortcomings were pervasive?

What’s the role of a governance specialist in the Country Team? How to generate support among country team colleagues and development partners for a multi-sectoral agenda?

This presentation focuses on the accountability and empowerment story, not the growth story

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Sierra Leone: a poor post-conflict country 5 million population Civil war (1991-2002) displaced half of population,

caused 20,000 death, and destroyed infrastructure and social capital

176th out of 177 in UN HDI ranking Infant mortality: 166 out of 1000; SSA average: 101;

world average 57. Under-5 mortality: 284 out of 1000; SSA average: 171;

world average 86. Life expectancy 37; SSA average: 46; world average: 67. Adult literacy: 36%; SSA average: 71%; world average

80%

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Extreme poverty and regional inequality

Sierra Leone Poverty Headcount (%)Absolute Poverty Line: Le 786,204; Extreme Poverty Line: Le 365,835

Source of data: SLIHS 2002-3

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Freetown Other urban Rural

Absolute poverty headcount (individuals), %Absolute poverty headcount (individuals), %

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Causes of conflict

Post-independence deterioration in governance

Local councils dissolved in 1972Centralization of power, resources and corruption in Freetown

Rural population deprived of economic opportunities, education, political participation

Marginalization of youth from decision-making

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Numerous studies identified pervasive governance shortcomings Studies: Governance and Anti-Corruption

Survey (2003), ESW “Strategic Options for Public Sector Reform” (2004), CFAA (2002), HIPC AAP (2004), Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment (2003)

Findings Overly centralized control of resources and lack of

checks and balance Rampant informality and corruption in public sector Very limited capacity in public sector Lack of citizen/business confidence in state

institutions

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Political Accountability• Political competition, broad-based political

parties• Transparency & regulation of party

financing• Disclosure of parliamentary votes

Formal Oversight

Institutions• Independent,

effective judiciary• Legislative

oversight (PACs, PECs)

• Independent oversight institutions (SAI)

• Global initiatives: UN, OECD Convention, anti-money laundering

Citizens/Firm

s

Citizens/Firms

Cit

izen

s/Fi

rms

Citizens/Firms

Decentralization and Local Participation• Decentralization with accountability• Community Driven Development (CDD)• Oversight by parent-teacher associations & user

groups• Beneficiary participation in projects

Civil Society & Media• Freedom of press, FOI• Civil society watchdogs• Report cards, client

surveysPrivate Sector

Interface• Streamlined regulation• Public-private dialogue• Extractive Industry

Transparency• Corporate governance• Collective business

associations

Effective Public Sector

Management•Ethical leadership:

asset declaration, conflict of interest rules

•Cross-cutting public management systems: meritocracy, public finance, procurement

•Service delivery and regulatory agencies in sectors

Good Governance has many entry points – the broad view today

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What to bet on – back in 2003?Decentralization and Empowerment?

Human Resource Management

Reform?Public Financial

Management Reform?

Judicial Reform?

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IDA made a high-stake bet on devolution and empowerment 2004, IDA $25m Institutional Reform and Capacity Building

Project 2005, JSDF $2m for strengthening community collective

action & engagement with local councils 2005, PHRD grant $900,000 for strengthening leadership of

the decentralization process Existing social action project (NSAP, 2003-2008, $35m)

adopts a strategy to support decentralization and strengthen local council capacity

2006, DfID and EU gave a $25m trust fund to the World Bank to top up IRCBP

2006: JSDF $900,000 for an NGO providing primary justice service to rural people

2007: Accelerated Child Survival Project ($35m) to strengthen gov health grant system and LGs capacity to deliver

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Citizen and business engagement

open and accountable local political process, civil society and media oversight, public-

private partnership

Local government capacity and

governance practice

Central government enabling conditions allowing fiscal and administrative autonomy,

adequate & predictable transfers, refrain from political interference, domestic

accountability mechanisms

Community collective action

Create enabling conditions for effective local governance

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IDA also supports sustained PFM reform PFM reform history (attached) IRCBP and Budget Support operations

supports Legal and regulatory reform IFMIS Procurement reform Local government financial management

capacity building Budget reform

This new phase of PFM reform is driven by the decentralization process

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What did we choose NOT to invest in? Civil service reform: no champion Legal and judicial reform: proposal too

expensive and not convincing

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Why betting on a decentralization-driven

governance reform program?

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Some criteria for a good entry point for governance reform A good thing to do A good time to do it Some influential people lose sleep over it Can lead to visible and quick enough

improvement in something that people care about

Can generate further momentum and expand constituency for longer-term governance transformation

Q: Was devolution a good entry point in the Sierra Leone context?

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A good thing to do, at least in theory Addressing a root cause of the civil war –

centralization of power and resources and resultant inequality and rampant corruption.

Opening space for political participation More transparent and equitable resource

allocation across districts Bringing resource closer to frontline providers

and hopefully better delivery Bringing the state closer to citizens and

hopefully building state legitimacy Risk of local capture and corruption to be

explicitly addressed

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Window of opportunity & just-in-time support IRCBP preparation phase coincided

with GoSL preparation for LG legislation and elections

Immediate engagement with newly elected LGs

Start a virtuous cycle

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MoF counting on fiscal decentralization to improve effectiveness of public spending Sustained efforts to improve effectiveness of public

spending in the past decade (see PFM reform history)

MoF frustrated with pervasive leakages of resources PETS 2002: less than 10% of all essential drugs could be accounted

for by District Medical Officers; less than 5% of all essential drugs were accounted for by periphery health units.

PETS 2002: only 72% teaching and learning materials reached the intended schools from District Edu Offices, arriving 170 days later than contracted.

PETS 2003: Receipt of seed rice: 8% before planting season; 35% during planting season; 57% after planting season

Establish Local Gov Finance Department to focus on fiscal decentralization

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Early results and effective communication are the key to expand constituency and open more doors for reform

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Building constituency for decentralization through LC Rapid Results Initiatives Immediately after LC elections, central

government challenged and supported each LC to identify, design, and implement one Rapid Result Initiative that was Urgent and compelling Visible – people will notice the difference Can be translated into real impact in 100 days

MLGCD Decentralization Secretariat provided coaches

MoF disbursed Local Government Development Grant four months after elections

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LCs did not disappoint LCs RRIs tackled diverse development issues:

water, sanitation, feeder roads, bridges, traffic, rice production, post-harvest loss. Examples of results: Travel time between Sewafe and Peya of Nimiyama Chiefdom of

Kono District reduced from 1hr to 15 minutes and transportation cost reduced from Le 5,000 ($1.75) to Le 2,000 (70 cents).

Increase the availability of high-yield quick-harvest Inner Valley Swamp Rice seeds in Pujehun District by 4,000 bushels within 90 days

Ensure the availability of safe and portable drinking water in the mains and laterals and 25 public taps in the Moyamba township within 90 days.

Total volume of Garbage in two lorry parks and two markets in Kenema Township reduced by 90% within 95 days.

Cheaper and faster than MDA projects

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LCs RRIs to generate a virtuous cycle

Central Government and donors

willing to transfer resources to LGs with

good track record.

Given opportunity to learn-by-doing, Progressive LGs establish track

record, develop capacity and motivate other LGs to catch up.

LGs exercise authority and accumulate capacity. LGs adopt inclusive accountable practices.

Citizens and firms perceive relevance ofLGs and engage in collective action(express demand for public service,

participate in co-production,hold LGs accountable,

pay taxes).

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And preventing a vicious cycle of deteriorating local governance Inadequate and/or

unpredictabletransfers; limited

autonomy & authority; Weak monitoring

LGs: capacity low, Some corrupt

Citizens and firms discountLGs relevance and

do not participate in LGs decision process

and do not pressure forperformance.

Low impact of LG spending

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Sector RRIs to give credibility to sector devolution Sector staff performing functions related to

primary health, crops/livestock, DEC schools received orientation of the Rapid Results Approach.

RRIs developed by sector teams Local council sector committees would monitor

the progress of the sector RRIs: accountability and partnership between politicians and professionals.

Each RRI team would include members from beneficiary communities

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good track record.




Citizens perceive relevance ofLGs and engage in collective action(express demand for public service,


pay taxes).

Are purse-holders

aware of LG achievemen

t and willing to further

empower progressive

LGs?

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Negotiation with MoF: improving LG budget predictability and autonomy Increasing share of budget as grants to

LGs: 4.4% non-salary non-interest recurrent budget in 2005; 8.7% in 2006; 13.2% budgeted in 2007.

Treating grants to LGs as priority budget items

Reduce cumbersome bureaucracy in grant transfer process 237 signatures per grant per quarter * 14

grants * 4 quarterly payments/grant = 13,272 signatures a year!

Recently consolidated grants and forms

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Field trips to build understanding and confidence in LGs and communicate management support Field trip in every supervision mission

(joint with DfID/EC/UNDP): make both progress and challenges transparent

Feb 2006 Country Program Portfolio Retreat: participation by sector colleagues and sector managers

2005 MD/CD visit; Jul 2006 PW visit Mid-term review: invite sector

colleagues

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Set standards for accessing LGDG: results from 1st Comprehensive LG Assessment Source: Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment (Nov 2006)Legend

5 minimum conditions




0-1 minimum conditions

7 Minimum conditions1. Financial management2. Development planning3. Budgeting and accounting4. Procurement5. Transparency and

accountability6. Project implementation7. Functional capacity of LG

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LCs adopting good governance practices, many not yet adopted by ministries Source: Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment (Nov 2006)Legend

70 - 88 points

60 - 69 points

50 - 59 points

30 - 49 points

Performance measures1. Management, organization and institutional

structures2. Transparency, openness, participation and

accountability3. Planning systems and project

implementation, M&E4. Human resource management5. Financial management, budgeting and

accounting6. Fiscal capacity and local revenue mobilization7. Procurement and contract management

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Expanded support for LGs and investment in grant system GoSL & IDA/DfID/EC co-finance

discretionary Local Gov Dev Grant: allow LCs discretions and build in incentive in grant allocation formula.

IDA social fund (NSAP) Feeder road component has been

adjusted to provide direct financing to LGs and strengthen LGs capacity to manage public works projects

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District Medical Officers embraced decentralization Primary health service delivery responsibilities

devolved to LCs in 2005, along with tried grants DMO is part of LC Management Team and a co-

signatory of LC health grant account DMO enjoys operational autonomy

“Decentralization has stopped the tide of brain drain among medical professionals because we now have

interesting work to do.”“Decentralization allows us to quickly respond to disease

outbreaks. We don’t have to wait for the ministry.” “Decentralization means if I have a problem I can knock

on the doors of our council rather than sitting on a long bench in Youyi Building for a week and waiting

for an audience with a ministry official.”

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Health Care Services at PHUs did not deteriorate after devolution in 2005Source: IRCBP Health Clinics Surveys 2005-2006

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1

with a latrine

with a working fridge

with an improved water source

in a good-quality building

with patients present

open at arrival

fraction of clinics...

2005 2006

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Health Care Services at PHUs did not deteriorate after devolution in 2005 (continued)Source: IRCBP Health Clinics Surveys 2005-2006

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1

important supplies in stock

important drugs in-stock

required staff posted

average fraction of...

2005 2006

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IDA & DfID to transfer sector investment funds to LGs through grants system World Bank and DfID health sector

support: provide financing through GoSL LC grants system, improving M&E, supporting district health management teams to implement their sector plans and budget

DfID water sector support to follow similar approach

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Need to continue expanding constituency for decentralization: scope for more CT synergyPerception of agency commitment to decentralization by 110 participants in the 2nd National Decentralization

Dialogue (Dec 2006)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

World Bank

IRCBP team

Min Health and Sanitation

Min Food and Agric

MoF

MLGCD

National Commission for Social Action

Sierra Leone Water Company

Min Education

Sierra Leone Road Authority

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Stimulating citizen demand for good governance is an area that greatly benefits from collaboration with development partners

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good track record.




Citizens perceive relevance ofLGs and engage in collective action(express demand for public service,


pay taxes).

Do citizens know what

LGs are doing? Do they care?

Does consent translate

into voluntary tax compliance

and civic activism?

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Does performance comparison lead to political competition? Hypothesis: with a good communication

program, comparative performance data can serve as Stimulant for peer learning and performance

improvement Trigger for political competition and civic activism

Whether disseminating comparative performance information among electorates will affect political fortune of councilors remain to be seen.

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Good-practice LCs get award from MLGCD and bonus grants from MoF, but are people asking their laggard LCs tough questions?

Legend

70 - 88 points

60 - 69 points

50 - 59 points

30 - 49 points

Performance measures1. Management, organization and institutional

structures2. Transparency, openness, participation and

accountability3. Planning systems and project

implementation, M&E4. Human resource management5. Financial management, budgeting and

accounting6. Fiscal capacity and local revenue mobilization7. Procurement and contract management

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Are people wondering why councils are paying such different prices for similar furniture? Cost of an average set of office furniture (56 conference chairs, 4 computer workstations, 7 office desks, 2 small conference tables, 1 large

conference table , 4 executive desks), using actual unit prices paid by LCs

0

5,000,000

10,000,000

15,000,000

20,000,000

25,000,000

30,000,000

35,000,000

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Rural people start knowing their councilors but they are far more familiar with their chiefsKnowing the authorities

Source: GoBifo/ IRCBP/ ENCISS Joint Household Survey in Bonthe and Bombali Districts (Dec 2005)

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

Bombali District Bonthe District

Percent of respondents able to correctly name the Chairperson of their Local CouncilPercent of respondents able to correctly name the Local Councillor from their wardPercent of respondents able to correctly name their Section ChiefPercent of respondents able to correctly name their Paramount Chief

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Gender and age gaps in political awareness, activism and confidenceSource: GoBifo/IRCBP/ENCISS joint household survey in Bombali District and Bonthe District (Dec 2005)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

% who attended a meeting inthe last year and spoke at thelast meeting they attended

% able to correctly name LocalCouncillor or Local Council

Chairperson

% reported voting in lastgeneral election (2002)

% reported voting in last localgovernment election (2004)

% believing they have some orlittle chance (rather than nochance) in changing unjust

chiefdom law

% believing they have some orlittle chance (rather than nochance) in changing unjust

local council law

Female (8-24) Female (25-35) Female (>=36) Male (8-24) Male (25-35) Male (>=36)

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Collaborating with other projects to stimulate demand for good governance DfID-sponsored Enhancing Civil Society and State

Interface Project: “Meet the LG” Program UN: weekly radio programs on LGs USAID: strengthen sub-district Ward Development

Committees and citizen engagement with LGs JSDF project GoBifo: strengthen community

participation in LGs and ward development planning process

JSDF grant for Timap for Justice: help rural population seek justice and change expectation of authorities

DfID/USAID/EC: voter education for 2008 LG Elections

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How will we know whether devolution process is a good entry point for governance reform?

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The goodness test Is devolution bringing the state closer to people? Are LGs more responsive and accountable than

central government? Does devolution improve access to and quality of

services? Does improvement in public services increase

citizens’ trust in government? Will high-performing councilors have more

promising political career? Will more competent and committed people stand

for LG elections in 2008?

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The sustainability test Will the project momentum be maintained?

(tension between civil servants and contract staff) Will local politicians fight against recentralization

attempts? Will competition among local governments give

pressure for performance improvement? Will local political markets allow for more credible

alternatives to emerge for future national elections?

Can culture of inclusion and accountability be built from below?

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The Role of Governance Specialists in CAS Process Help CT identify development outcomes that

can benefit from governance improvement Assess likelihood of success of each proposed

intervention and advise a bet Continuously reassess the bet and add wager or

diversify bets as appropriate If you want sector colleagues to make

governance their business, you have to make their work your business: cross support, peer review, QER, keep them updated

Make sure you have CD/CM support! They will encourage sector colleagues to work with you

Documents

Governance in CAS: Perspective of a Governance Specialist