Fundamental Principles of the Met a Physic of Morals

8/2/2019 Fundamental Principles of the Met a Physic of Morals

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FUNDAMENTALPRINCIPLESOFTHEMETAPHYSICOFMORALS1785

byImmanuelKant

translatedbyThomasKingsmillAbbott

PREFACE

AncientGree

philosophywasdividedintothreesciences:physics,ethics,andlogic.Thisdivisionisperfectlysuitabletothenatureofthething;andtheonlyimprovementthatcanbemadeinitistoaddtheprincipleonwhichitisbased,sothatwemaybothsatisfyourselvesofitscompleteness,andalsobeabletodeterminecorrectlythenecessarysubdivisions.

Allrational

nowledgeiseithermaterialorformal:theformerconsiderssomeobject,thelatterisconcernedonlywiththeformoftheunderstandingandofthereasonitself,andwiththeuniversal

lawsofthoughtingeneralwithoutdistinctionofitsobjects.Formalphilosophyiscalledlogic.Materialphilosophy,however,hastodowithdeterminateobjectsandthelawstowhichtheyaresubject,isagaintwofold;fortheselawsareeitherlawsofnatureoroffreedom.Thescienceoftheformerisphysics,thatofthelatter,ethics;theyarealsocallednaturalphilosophyandmoralphilosophyrespectively.

Logiccannothaveanyempiricalpart;thatis,apartinwhichtheuniversalandnecessarylawsofthoughtshouldrestongroundsta

enfromexperience;otherwiseitwouldnotbelogic,i.e.,acanonfortheunderstandingorthereason,validforallthought,andcapableofdemonstration.Naturalandmoralphilosophy,onthecontrary,caneach

havetheirempiricalpart,sincetheformerhastodeterminethelawsofnatureasanobjectofexperience;thelatterthelawsofthehumanwill,sofarasitisaffectedbynature:theformer,however,beinglawsaccordingtowhicheverythingdoeshappen;thelatter,lawsaccordingtowhicheverythingoughttohappen.Ethics,however,mustalsoconsidertheconditionsunderwhichwhatoughttohappenfrequentlydoesnot.

Wemaycallallphilosophyempirical,sofarasitisbasedongroundsofexperience:ontheotherband,thatwhichdeliversitsdoctrinesfromaprioriprinciplesalonewemaycallpurephilosophy.Whenthelatterismerelyformalitislogic;ifitisrestrictedtodefiniteobjectsoftheunderstandingitismetaphysic.

Inthiswaytherearisestheideaofatwofoldmetaphysic-ametaphysicofnatureandametaphysicofmorals.Physicswillthushaveanempiricalandalsoarationalpart.ItisthesamewithEthics;butheretheempiricalpartmighthavethespecialnameofpracticalanthropology,thenamemoralitybeingappropriatedtotherationalpart.

Alltrades,arts,andhandiwor

shavegainedbydivisionoflabour,namely,when,insteadofonemandoingeverything,each



confineshimselftoacertain

indofwor

distinctfromothersinthetreatmentitrequires,soastobeabletoperformitwithgreaterfacilityandinthegreatestperfection.Wherethedifferent

indsofwor

arenotdistinguishedanddivided,whereeveryoneisajac

-of-all-trades,theremanufacturesremainstillinthegreatestbarbarism.Itmightdeservetobeconsideredwhetherpurephilosophyinallitspartsdoesnotrequireamanspeciallydevotedtoit,andwhetheritwouldnotbebetterforthewholebusinessofscienceifthosewho,topleasethetastesofthepublic,arewonttoblendtherationalandempiricalelementstogether,mixedinallsortsofproportionsun

nowntothemselves,andwhocallthemselvesindependentthin

ers,givingthenameofminutephilosopherstothosewhoapplythemselvestotherationalpartonly-ifthese,Isay,werewarnednottocarryontwoemploymentstogetherwhichdifferwidelyinthetreatmenttheydemand,foreachofwhichperhapsaspecialtalentisrequired,andthecombinationofwhichinonepersononlyproducesbunglers.ButIonlyas

herewhetherthenatureofsciencedoesnotrequirethatweshouldalwayscarefullyseparatetheempiricalfromtherationalpart,andprefixtoPhysicsproper(orempiricalphysics)ametaphysicofnature,andtopracticalanthropologyametaphysicofmorals,whichmustbecarefullyclearedofeverythingempirical,sothatwemay

nowhowmuchcanbeaccomplishedbypurereasoninbothcases,andfromwhatsourcesitdrawsthisitsaprioriteaching,andthatwhetherthelatterinquiryisconductedbyallmoralists

(whosenameislegion),oronlybysomewhofeelacallingthereto.

Asmyconcernhereiswithmoralphilosophy,Ilimitthequestionsuggestedtothis:Whetheritisnotoftheutmostnecessitytoconstructapurethingwhichisonlyempiricalandwhichbelongstoanthropology?forthatsuchaphilosophymustbepossibleisevidentfromthecommonideaofdutyandofthemorallaws.Everyonemustadmitthatifalawistohavemoralforce,i.e.,tobethebasisofanobligation,itmustcarrywithitabsolutenecessity;that,forexample,theprecept,"Thoushaltnotlie,"isnotvalidformenalone,asifotherrationalbeingshadnoneedtoobserveit;andsowithalltheothermorallawsproperlysocalled;that,therefore,thebasisofobligationmustnotbesoughtinthenatureofman,orinthe

circumstancesintheworldinwhichheisplaced,butapriorisimplyintheconceptionofpurereason;andalthoughanyotherpreceptwhichisfoundedonprinciplesofmereexperiencemaybeincertainrespectsuniversal,yetinasfarasitrestsevenintheleastdegreeonanempiricalbasis,perhapsonlyastoamotive,suchaprecept,whileitmaybeapracticalrule,canneverbecalledamorallaw.

Thusnotonlyaremorallawswiththeirprinciplesessentiallydistinguishedfromeveryother

indofpractical

nowledgeinwhichthereisanythingempirical,butallmoralphilosophyrestswhollyonitspurepart.Whenappliedtoman,itdoesnotborrowtheleastthingfromthe

nowledgeofmanhimself(anthropology),butgiveslaws

aprioritohimasarationalbeing.Nodoubttheselawsrequireajudgementsharpenedbyexperience,inorderontheonehandtodistinguishinwhatcasestheyareapplicable,andontheothertoprocureforthemaccesstothewillofthemanandeffectualinfluenceonconduct;sincemanisactedonbysomanyinclinationsthat,thoughcapableoftheideaofapracticalpurereason,heisnotsoeasilyabletoma

eiteffectiveinconcretoinhislife.

Ametaphysicofmoralsisthereforeindispensablynecessary,notmerelyforspeculativereasons,inordertoinvestigatethesourcesof



thepracticalprincipleswhicharetobefoundaprioriinourreason,butalsobecausemoralsthemselvesareliabletoallsortsofcorruption,aslongaswearewithoutthatclueandsupremecanonbywhichtoestimatethemcorrectly.Forinorderthatanactionshouldbemorallygood,itisnotenoughthatitconformtothemorallaw,butitmustalsobedoneforthesa

eofthelaw,otherwisethatconformityisonlyverycontingentanduncertain;sinceaprinciplewhichisnotmoral,althoughitmaynowandthenproduceactionsconformabletothelaw,willalsooftenproduceactionswhichcontradictit.Nowitisonlyapurephilosophythatwecanloo

forthemorallawinitspurityandgenuineness(and,inapracticalmatter,thisisoftheutmostconsequence):wemust,therefore,beginwithpurephilosophy(metaphysic),andwithoutittherecannotbeanymoralphilosophyatall.Thatwhichminglesthesepureprincipleswiththeempiricaldoesnotdeservethenameofphilosophy(forwhatdistinguishesphilosophyfromcommonrational

nowledgeisthatittreatsinseparatescienceswhatthelatteronlycomprehendsconfusedly);muchlessdoesitdeservethatofmoralphilosophy,sincebythisconfusionitevenspoilsthepurityofmoralsthemselves,andcounteractsitsownend.

Letitnotbethought,however,thatwhatisheredemandedisalreadyextantinthepropaedeuticprefixedbythecelebratedWolftohismoralphilosophy,namely,hisso-calledgeneralpractical

philosophy,andthat,therefore,wehavenottostri

eintoanentirelynewfield.justbecauseitwastobeageneralpracticalphilosophy,ithasnotta

enintoconsiderationawillofanyparticular ind-sayonewhichshouldbedeterminedsolelyfromaprioriprincipleswithoutanyempiricalmotives,andwhichwemightcallapurewill,butvolitioningeneral,withalltheactionsandconditionswhichbelongtoitinthisgeneralsignification.Bythisitisdistinguishedfromametaphysicofmorals,justasgenerallogic,whichtreatsoftheactsandcanonsofthoughtingeneral,isdistinguishedfromtranscendentalphilosophy,whichtreatsoftheparticularactsandcanonsofpurethought,i.e.,thatwhosecognitionsarealtogetherapriori.Forthemetaphysicofmoralshastoexaminetheideaandtheprinciplesofapossiblepurewill,and

nottheactsandconditionsofhumanvolitiongenerally,whichforthemostpartaredrawnfrompsychology.Itistruethatmorallawsanddutyarespo

enofinthegeneralmoralphilosophy(contraryindeedtoallfitness).Butthisisnoobjection,forinthisrespectalsotheauthorsofthatscienceremaintruetotheirideaofit;theydonotdistinguishthemotiveswhichareprescribedassuchbyreasonalonealtogetherapriori,andwhichareproperlymoral,fromtheempiricalmotiveswhichtheunderstandingraisestogeneralconceptionsmerelybycomparisonofexperiences;but,withoutnoticingthedifferenceoftheirsources,andloo

ingonthemallashomogeneous,theyconsideronlytheirgreaterorlessamount.Itisinthiswaytheyframetheirnotionofobligation,which,thoughanythingbutmoral,isallthatcanbeattainedinaphilosophywhichpassesno

judgementatallontheoriginofallpossiblepracticalconcepts,whethertheyareapriori,oronlyaposteriori.

Intendingtopublishhereafterametaphysicofmorals,Iissueinthefirstinstancethesefundamentalprinciples.IndeedthereisproperlynootherfoundationforitthanthecriticalexaminationofapurepracticalReason;justasthatofmetaphysicsisthecriticalexaminationofthepurespeculativereason,alreadypublished.Butinthefirstplacetheformerisnotsoabsolutelynecessaryasthelatter,becauseinmoralconcernshumanreasoncaneasilybebrought



toahighdegreeofcorrectnessandcompleteness,eveninthecommonestunderstanding,whileonthecontraryinitstheoreticbutpureuseitiswhollydialectical;andinthesecondplaceifthecritiqueofapurepracticalreasonistobecomplete,itmustbepossibleatthesametimetoshowitsidentitywiththespeculativereasoninacommonprinciple,foritcanultimatelybeonlyoneandthesamereasonwhichhastobedistinguishedmerelyinitsapplication.Icouldnot,however,bringittosuchcompletenesshere,withoutintroducingconsiderationsofawhollydifferent

ind,whichwouldbeperplexingtothereader.OnthisaccountIhaveadoptedthetitleofFundamentalPrinciplesoftheMetaphysicofMoralsinsteadofthatofaCriticalExaminationofthepurepracticalreason.

Butinthethirdplace,sinceametaphysicofmorals,inspiteofthediscouragingtitle,isyetcapableofbeingpresentedinpopularform,andoneadaptedtothecommonunderstanding,Ifinditusefultoseparatefromitthispreliminarytreatiseonitsfundamentalprinciples,inorderthatImaynothereafterhaveneedtointroducethesenecessarilysubtlediscussionsintoaboo ofamoresimplecharacter.

Thepresenttreatiseis,however,nothingmorethantheinvestigationandestablishmentofthesupremeprincipleof

morality,andthisaloneconstitutesastudycompleteinitselfandonewhichoughttobe

eptapartfromeveryothermoralinvestigation.Nodoubtmyconclusionsonthisweightyquestion,whichhashithertobeenveryunsatisfactorilyexamined,wouldreceivemuchlightfromtheapplicationofthesameprincipletothewholesystem,andwouldbegreatlyconfirmedbytheadequacywhichitexhibitsthroughout;butImustforegothisadvantage,whichindeedwouldbeafterallmoregratifyingthanuseful,sincetheeasyapplicabilityofaprincipleanditsapparentadequacygivenoverycertainproofofitssoundness,butratherinspireacertainpartiality,whichpreventsusfromexaminingandestimatingitstrictlyinitselfandwithoutregardtoconsequences.

Ihaveadoptedinthiswor

themethodwhichIthin

mostsuitable,proceedinganalyticallyfromcommon

nowledgetothedeterminationofitsultimateprinciple,andagaindescendingsyntheticallyfromtheexaminationofthisprincipleanditssourcestothecommon

nowledgeinwhichwefinditemployed.Thedivisionwill,therefore,beasfollows:

1FIRSTSECTION.Transitionfromthecommonrational

nowledgeofmoralitytothephilosophical.

2SECONDSECTION.Transitionfrompopularmoralphilosophytothemetaphysicofmorals.

3THIRDSECTION.Finalstepfromthemetaphysicofmoralstothecritiqueofthepurepracticalreason.

SEC_1



FIRSTSECTION

TRANSITIONFROMTHECOMMONRATIONALKNOWLEDGE

OFMORALITYTOTHEPHILOSOPHICAL

Nothingcanpossiblybeconceivedintheworld,orevenoutofit,whichcanbecalledgood,withoutqualification,exceptagoodwill.Intelligence,wit,judgement,andtheothertalentsofthemind,howevertheymaybenamed,orcourage,resolution,perseverance,asqualitiesoftemperament,areundoubtedlygoodanddesirableinmanyrespects;butthesegiftsofnaturemayalsobecomeextremelybadandmischievousifthewillwhichistoma

euseofthem,andwhich,therefore,constituteswhatiscalledcharacter,isnotgood.Itisthesamewiththegiftsoffortune.Power,riches,honour,evenhealth,andthegeneralwell-beingandcontentmentwithone'sconditionwhichiscalledhappiness,inspirepride,andoftenpresumption,ifthereisnotagoodwilltocorrecttheinfluenceoftheseonthemind,andwiththisalsotorectifythewholeprinciple

ofactingandadaptittoitsend.Thesightofabeingwhoisnotadornedwithasinglefeatureofapureandgoodwill,enjoyingunbro

enprosperity,cannevergivepleasuretoanimpartialrationalspectator.Thusagoodwillappearstoconstitutetheindispensableconditionevenofbeingworthyofhappiness.

Thereareevensomequalitieswhichareofservicetothisgoodwillitselfandmayfacilitateitsaction,yetwhichhavenointrinsicunconditionalvalue,butalwayspresupposeagoodwill,andthisqualifiestheesteemthatwejustlyhaveforthemanddoesnotpermitustoregardthemasabsolutelygood.Moderationintheaffectionsandpassions,self-control,andcalmdeliberationarenotonlygoodinmanyrespects,butevenseemtoconstitutepartofthe

intrinsicworthoftheperson;buttheyarefarfromdeservingtobecalledgoodwithoutqualification,althoughtheyhavebeensounconditionallypraisedbytheancients.Forwithouttheprinciplesofagoodwill,theymaybecomeextremelybad,andthecoolnessofavillainnotonlyma

eshimfarmoredangerous,butalsodirectlyma

eshimmoreabominableinoureyesthanhewouldhavebeenwithoutit.

Agoodwillisgoodnotbecauseofwhatitperformsoreffects,notbyitsaptnessfortheattainmentofsomeproposedend,butsimplybyvirtueofthevolition;thatis,itisgoodinitself,andconsideredbyitselfistobeesteemedmuchhigherthanallthatcanbebroughtaboutbyitinfavourofanyinclination,nayevenofthesumtotalofallinclinations.Evenifitshouldhappenthat,owingto

specialdisfavouroffortune,ortheniggardlyprovisionofastep-motherlynature,thiswillshouldwhollylac

powertoaccomplishitspurpose,ifwithitsgreatesteffortsitshouldyetachievenothing,andthereshouldremainonlythegoodwill(not,tobesure,amerewish,butthesummoningofallmeansinourpower),then,li

eajewel,itwouldstillshinebyitsownlight,asathingwhichhasitswholevalueinitself.Itsusefulnessorfruitfulnesscanneitheraddnorta

eawayanythingfromthisvalue.Itwouldbe,asitwere,onlythesettingtoenableustohandleitthemoreconvenientlyincommoncommerce,ortoattracttoittheattention



ofthosewhoarenotyetconnoisseurs,butnottorecommendittotrueconnoisseurs,ortodetermineitsvalue.

Thereis,however,somethingsostrangeinthisideaoftheabsolutevalueofthemerewill,inwhichnoaccountista

enofitsutility,thatnotwithstandingthethoroughassentofevencommonreasontotheidea,yetasuspicionmustarisethatitmayperhapsreallybetheproductofmerehigh-flownfancy,andthatwemayhavemisunderstoodthepurposeofnatureinassigningreasonasthegovernorofourwill.Thereforewewillexaminethisideafromthispointofview.

Inthephysicalconstitutionofanorganizedbeing,thatis,abeingadaptedsuitablytothepurposesoflife,weassumeitasafundamentalprinciplethatnoorganforanypurposewillbefoundbutwhatisalsothefittestandbestadaptedforthatpurpose.Nowinabeingwhichhasreasonandawill,iftheproperobjectofnaturewereitsconservation,itswelfare,inaword,itshappiness,thennaturewouldhavehituponaverybadarrangementinselectingthereasonofthecreaturetocarryoutthispurpose.Foralltheactionswhichthecreaturehastoperformwithaviewtothispurpose,andthewholeruleofitsconduct,wouldbefarmoresurelyprescribedtoitbyinstinct,andthatendwouldhavebeenattainedtherebymuchmorecertainlythanitevercanbebyreason.Shouldreasonhavebeencommunicatedtothisfavouredcreatureoverandabove,it

mustonlyhaveservedittocontemplatethehappyconstitutionofitsnature,toadmireit,tocongratulateitselfthereon,andtofeelthan

fulforittothebeneficentcause,butnotthatitshouldsubjectitsdesirestothatwea anddelusiveguidanceandmeddlebunglinglywiththepurposeofnature.Inaword,naturewouldhaveta

encarethatreasonshouldnotbrea

forthintopracticalexercise,norhavethepresumption,withitswea

insight,tothin

outforitselftheplanofhappiness,andofthemeansofattainingit.Naturewouldnotonlyhaveta

enonherselfthechoiceoftheends,butalsoofthemeans,andwithwiseforesightwouldhaveentrustedbothtoinstinct.

And,infact,wefindthatthemoreacultivatedreasonapplies

itselfwithdeliberatepurposetotheenjoymentoflifeandhappiness,somuchthemoredoesthemanfailoftruesatisfaction.Andfromthiscircumstancetherearisesinmany,iftheyarecandidenoughtoconfessit,acertaindegreeofmisology,thatis,hatredofreason,especiallyinthecaseofthosewhoaremostexperiencedintheuseofit,becauseaftercalculatingalltheadvantagestheyderive,Idonotsayfromtheinventionofalltheartsofcommonluxury,butevenfromthesciences(whichseemtothemtobeafterallonlyaluxuryoftheunderstanding),theyfindthattheyhave,infact,onlybroughtmoretroubleontheirshoulders.ratherthangainedinhappiness;andtheyendbyenvying,ratherthandespising,themorecommonstampofmenwho

eepclosertotheguidanceofmereinstinctanddonotallowtheirreasonmuchinfluenceontheirconduct.Andthiswe

mustadmit,thatthejudgementofthosewhowouldverymuchlowertheloftyeulogiesoftheadvantageswhichreasongivesusinregardtothehappinessandsatisfactionoflife,orwhowouldevenreducethembelowzero,isbynomeansmoroseorungratefultothegoodnesswithwhichtheworldisgoverned,butthatthereliesattherootofthesejudgementstheideathatourexistencehasadifferentandfarnoblerend,forwhich,andnotforhappiness,reasonisproperlyintended,andwhichmust,therefore,beregardedasthesupremeconditiontowhichtheprivateendsofmanmust,forthemostpart,bepostponed.



Forasreasonisnotcompetenttoguidethewillwithcertaintyinregardtoitsobjectsandthesatisfactionofallourwants(whichittosomeextentevenmultiplies),thisbeinganendtowhichanimplantedinstinctwouldhaveledwithmuchgreatercertainty;andsince,nevertheless,reasonisimpartedtousasapracticalfaculty,i.e.,asonewhichistohaveinfluenceonthewill,therefore,admittingthatnaturegenerallyinthedistributionofhercapacitieshasadaptedthemeanstotheend,itstruedestinationmustbetoproduceawill,notmerelygoodasameanstosomethingelse,butgoodinitself,forwhichreasonwasabsolutelynecessary.Thiswillthen,thoughnotindeedthesoleandcompletegood,mustbethesupremegoodandtheconditionofeveryother,evenofthedesireofhappiness.Underthesecircumstances,thereisnothinginconsistentwiththewisdomofnatureinthefactthatthecultivationofthereason,whichisrequisiteforthefirstandunconditionalpurpose,doesinmanywaysinterfere,atleastinthislife,withtheattainmentofthesecond,whichisalwaysconditional,namely,happiness.Nay,itmayevenreduceittonothing,withoutnaturetherebyfailingofherpurpose.Forreasonrecognizestheestablishmentofagoodwillasitshighestpracticaldestination,andinattainingthispurposeiscapableonlyofasatisfactionofitsownproper

ind,namelythatfromtheattainmentofanend,whichendagainisdeterminedbyreasononly,notwithstandingthatthis

mayinvolvemanyadisappointmenttotheendsofinclination.

Wehavethentodevelopthenotionofawillwhichdeservestobehighlyesteemedforitselfandisgoodwithoutaviewtoanythingfurther,anotionwhichexistsalreadyinthesoundnaturalunderstanding,requiringrathertobeclearedupthantobetaught,andwhichinestimatingthevalueofouractionsalwaysta

esthefirstplaceandconstitutestheconditionofalltherest.Inordertodothis,wewillta

ethenotionofduty,whichincludesthatofagoodwill,althoughimplyingcertainsubjectiverestrictionsandhindrances.These,however,farfromconcealingit,orrenderingitunrecognizable,ratherbringitoutbycontrastandma

eitshineforthsomuchthebrighter.

Iomithereallactionswhicharealreadyrecognizedasinconsistentwithduty,althoughtheymaybeusefulforthisorthatpurpose,forwiththesethequestionwhethertheyaredonefromdutycannotariseatall,sincetheyevenconflictwithit.Ialsosetasidethoseactionswhichreallyconformtoduty,buttowhichmenhavenodirectinclination,performingthembecausetheyareimpelledtheretobysomeotherinclination.Forinthiscasewecanreadilydistinguishwhethertheactionwhichagreeswithdutyisdonefromduty,orfromaselfishview.Itismuchhardertoma

ethisdistinctionwhentheactionaccordswithdutyandthesubjecthasbesidesadirectinclinationtoit.Forexample,itisalwaysamatterofdutythatadealershouldnotoverchargeaninexperienced

purchaser;andwhereverthereismuchcommercetheprudenttradesmandoesnotovercharge,but

eepsafixedpriceforeveryone,sothatachildbuysofhimaswellasanyother.Menarethushonestlyserved;butthisisnotenoughtoma

eusbelievethatthetradesmanhassoactedfromdutyandfromprinciplesofhonesty:hisownadvantagerequiredit;itisoutofthequestioninthiscasetosupposethathemightbesideshaveadirectinclinationinfavourofthebuyers,sothat,asitwere,fromloveheshouldgivenoadvantagetooneoveranother.Accordinglytheactionwasdoneneitherfromdutynorfromdirectinclination,butmerelywithaselfishview.



Ontheotherhand,itisadutytomaintainone'slife;and,inaddition,everyonehasalsoadirectinclinationtodoso.Butonthisaccounttheofanxiouscarewhichmostmenta

eforithasnointrinsicworth,andtheirmaximhasnomoralimport.Theypreservetheirlifeasdutyrequires,nodoubt,butnotbecausedutyrequires.Ontheotherband,ifadversityandhopelesssorrowhavecompletelyta

enawaytherelishforlife;iftheunfortunateone,stronginmind,indignantathisfateratherthandespondingordejected,wishesfordeath,andyetpreserveshislifewithoutlovingit-notfrominclinationorfear,butfromduty-thenhismaximhasamoralworth.

Tobebeneficentwhenwecanisaduty;andbesidesthis,therearemanymindssosympatheticallyconstitutedthat,withoutanyothermotiveofvanityorself-interest,theyfindapleasureinspreadingjoyaroundthemandcanta

edelightinthesatisfactionofotherssofarasitistheirownwor

.ButImaintainthatinsuchacaseanactionofthis

ind,howeverproper,howeveramiableitmaybe,hasneverthelessnotruemoralworth,butisonalevelwithotherinclinations,e.g.,theinclinationtohonour,which,ifitishappilydirectedtothatwhichisinfactofpublicutilityandaccordantwithdutyandconsequentlyhonourable,deservespraiseandencouragement,butnotesteem.Forthemaximlac sthemoralimport,

namely,thatsuchactionsbedonefromduty,notfrominclination.Putthecasethatthemindofthatphilanthropistwerecloudedbysorrowofhisown,extinguishingallsympathywiththelotofothers,andthat,whilehestillhasthepowertobenefitothersindistress,heisnottouchedbytheirtroublebecauseheisabsorbedwithhisown;andnowsupposethathetearshimselfoutofthisdeadinsensibility,andperformstheactionwithoutanyinclinationtoit,butsimplyfromduty,thenfirsthashisactionitsgenuinemoralworth.Furtherstill;ifnaturehasputlittlesympathyintheheartofthisorthatman;ifhe,supposedtobeanuprightman,isbytemperamentcoldandindifferenttothesufferingsofothers,perhapsbecauseinrespectofhisownheisprovidedwiththespecialgiftofpatienceandfortitudeandsupposes,orevenrequires,

thatothersshouldhavethesame-andsuchamanwouldcertainlynotbethemeanestproductofnature-butifnaturehadnotspeciallyframedhimforaphilanthropist,wouldhenotstillfindinhimselfasourcefromwhencetogivehimselfafarhigherworththanthatofagood-naturedtemperamentcouldbe?Unquestionably.Itisjustinthisthatthemoralworthofthecharacterisbroughtoutwhichisincomparablythehighestofall,namely,thatheisbeneficent,notfrominclination,butfromduty.

Tosecureone'sownhappinessisaduty,atleastindirectly;fordiscontentwithone'scondition,underapressureofmanyanxietiesandamidstunsatisfiedwants,mighteasilybecomeagreattemptationtotransgressionofduty.Buthereagain,withoutloo

ingtoduty,all

menhavealreadythestrongestandmostintimateinclinationtohappiness,becauseitisjustinthisideathatallinclinationsarecombinedinonetotal.Butthepreceptofhappinessisoftenofsuchasortthatitgreatlyinterfereswithsomeinclinations,andyetamancannotformanydefiniteandcertainconceptionofthesumofsatisfactionofallofthemwhichiscalledhappiness.Itisnotthentobewonderedatthatasingleinclination,definitebothastowhatitpromisesandastothetimewithinwhichitcanbegratified,isoftenabletoovercomesuchafluctuatingidea,andthatagoutypatient,forinstance,canchoosetoenjoywhatheli

es,



andtosufferwhathemay,since,accordingtohiscalculation,onthisoccasionatleast,behasnotsacrificedtheenjoymentofthepresentmomenttoapossiblymista

enexpectationofahappinesswhichissupposedtobefoundinhealth.Buteveninthiscase,ifthegeneraldesireforhappinessdidnotinfluencehiswill,andsupposingthatinhisparticularcasehealthwasnotanecessaryelementinthiscalculation,thereyetremainsinthis,asinallothercases,thislaw,namely,thatheshouldpromotehishappinessnotfrominclinationbutfromduty,andbythiswouldhisconductfirstacquiretruemoralworth.

Itisinthismanner,undoubtedly,thatwearetounderstandthosepassagesofScripturealsoinwhichwearecommandedtoloveourneighbour,evenourenemy.Forlove,asanaffection,cannotbecommanded,butbeneficenceforduty'ssa

emay;eventhoughwearenotimpelledtoitbyanyinclination-nay,areevenrepelledbyanaturalandunconquerableaversion.Thisispracticalloveandnotpathological-alovewhichisseatedinthewill,andnotinthepropensionsofsense-inprinciplesofactionandnotoftendersympathy;anditisthislovealonewhichcanbecommanded.

Thesecondpropositionis:Thatanactiondonefromdutyderivesitsmoralworth,notfromthepurposewhichistobeattainedbyit,butfromthemaximbywhichitisdetermined,andthereforedoesnot

dependontherealizationoftheobjectoftheaction,butmerelyontheprincipleofvolitionbywhichtheactionhasta

enplace,withoutregardtoanyobjectofdesire.Itisclearfromwhatprecedesthatthepurposeswhichwemayhaveinviewinouractions,ortheireffectsregardedasendsandspringsofthewill,cannotgivetoactionsanyunconditionalormoralworth.Inwhat,then,cantheirworthlie,ifitisnottoconsistinthewillandinreferencetoitsexpectedeffect?Itcannotlieanywherebutintheprincipleofthewillwithoutregardtotheendswhichcanbeattainedbytheaction.Forthewillstandsbetweenitsaprioriprinciple,whichisformal,anditsaposteriorispring,whichismaterial,asbetweentworoads,andasitmustbedeterminedbysomething,itthatitmustbedeterminedbytheformalprincipleofvolitionwhenanactionis

donefromduty,inwhichcaseeverymaterialprinciplehasbeenwithdrawnfromit.

Thethirdproposition,whichisaconsequenceofthetwopreceding,IwouldexpressthusDutyisthenecessityofactingfromrespectforthelaw.Imayhaveinclinationforanobjectastheeffectofmyproposedaction,butIcannothaverespectforit,justforthisreason,thatitisaneffectandnotanenergyofwill.SimilarlyIcannothaverespectforinclination,whethermyownoranother's;Icanatmost,ifmyown,approveit;ifanother's,sometimesevenloveit;i.e.,loo

onitasfavourabletomyowninterest.Itisonlywhatisconnectedwithmywillasaprinciple,bynomeansasaneffect-whatdoesnotsubservemyinclination,but

overpowersit,oratleastincaseofchoiceexcludesitfromitscalculation-inotherwords,simplythelawofitself,whichcanbeanobjectofrespect,andhenceacommand.Nowanactiondonefromdutymustwhollyexcludetheinfluenceofinclinationandwithiteveryobjectofthewill,sothatnothingremainswhichcandeterminethewillexceptobjectivelythelaw,andsubjectivelypurerespectforthispracticallaw,andconsequentlythemaxim*thatIshouldfollowthislaweventothethwartingofallmyinclinations.



*Amaximisthesubjectiveprincipleofvolition.Theobjectiveprinciple(i.e.,thatwhichwouldalsoservesubjectivelyasapracticalprincipletoallrationalbeingsifreasonhadfullpoweroverthefacultyofdesire)isthepracticallaw.

Thusthemoralworthofanactiondoesnotlieintheeffectexpectedfromit,norinanyprincipleofactionwhichrequirestoborrowitsmotivefromthisexpectedeffect.Foralltheseeffects-agreeablenessofone'sconditionandeventhepromotionofthehappinessofothers-couldhavebeenalsobroughtaboutbyothercauses,sothatforthistherewouldhavebeennoneedofthewillofarationalbeing;whereasitisinthisalonethatthesupremeandunconditionalgoodcanbefound.Thepre-eminentgoodwhichwecallmoralcanthereforeconsistinnothingelsethantheconceptionoflawinitself,whichcertainlyisonlypossibleinarationalbeing,insofarasthisconception,andnottheexpectedeffect,determinesthewill.Thisisagoodwhichisalreadypresentinthepersonwhoactsaccordingly,andwehavenottowaitforittoappearfirstintheresult.*

*ItmightbehereobjectedtomethatIta

erefugebehindthewordrespectinanobscurefeeling,insteadofgivingadistinctsolutionofthequestionbyaconceptofthereason.Butalthoughrespectisafeeling,itisnotafeelingreceivedthroughinfluence,butisself-wroughtbyarationalconcept,and,therefore,isspecificallydistinctfromallfeelingsoftheformer

ind,whichmaybereferredeithertoinclinationorfear,WhatIrecogniseimmediatelyasalawforme,Irecognisewithrespect.Thismerelysignifiestheconsciousnessthatmywillissubordinatetoalaw,withouttheinterventionofotherinfluencesonmysense.Theimmediatedeterminationofthewillbythelaw,andtheconsciousnessofthis,iscalledrespect,sothatthisisregarded

asaneffectofthelawonthesubject,andnotasthecauseofit.Respectisproperlytheconceptionofaworthwhichthwartsmyself-love.Accordinglyitissomethingwhichisconsideredneitherasanobjectofinclinationnoroffear,althoughithassomethinganalogoustoboth.Theobjectofrespectisthelawonly,andthatthelawwhichweimposeonourselvesandyetrecogniseasnecessaryinitself.Asalaw,wearesubjectedtooitwithoutconsultingself-love;asimposedbyusonourselves,itisaresultofourwill.Intheformeraspectithasananalogytofear,inthelattertoinclination.Respectforapersonisproperlyonlyrespectforthelaw(ofhonesty,etc.)ofwhichhegivesusanexample.Sincewealsoloo

ontheimprovementofourtalentsasaduty,weconsiderthatweseeinapersonoftalents,asitwere,theexampleofalaw(viz.,to

becomeli

ehiminthisbyexercise),andthisconstitutesourrespect.Allso-calledmoralinterestconsistssimplyinrespectforthelaw.

Butwhatsortoflawcanthatbe,theconceptionofwhichmustdeterminethewill,evenwithoutpayinganyregardtotheeffectexpectedfromit,inorderthatthiswillmaybecalledgoodabsolutelyandwithoutqualification?AsIhavedeprivedthewillof



everyimpulsewhichcouldarisetoitfromobediencetoanylaw,thereremainsnothingbuttheuniversalconformityofitsactionstolawingeneral,whichaloneistoservethewillasaprinciple,i.e.,IamnevertoactotherwisethansothatIcouldalsowillthatmymaximshouldbecomeauniversallaw.Here,now,itisthesimpleconformitytolawingeneral,withoutassuminganyparticularlawapplicabletocertainactions,thatservesthewillasitsprincipleandmustsoserveit,ifdutyisnottobeavaindelusionandachimericalnotion.Thecommonreasonofmeninitspracticaljudgementsperfectlycoincideswiththisandalwayshasinviewtheprincipleheresuggested.Letthequestionbe,forexample:MayIwhenindistressma

eapromisewiththeintentionnotto

eepit?Ireadilydistinguishherebetweenthetwosignificationswhichthequestionmayhave:Whetheritisprudent,orwhetheritisright,toma

eafalsepromise?Theformermayundoubtedlyofbethecase.Iseeclearlyindeedthatitisnotenoughtoextricatemyselffromapresentdifficultybymeansofthissubterfuge,butitmustbewellconsideredwhethertheremaynothereafterspringfromthisliemuchgreaterinconveniencethanthatfromwhichInowfreemyself,andas,withallmysupposedcunning,theconsequencescannotbesoeasilyforeseenbutthatcreditoncelostmaybemuchmoreinjurioustomethananymischiefwhichIsee

toavoidatpresent,itshouldbeconsideredwhetheritwouldnotbemoreprudenttoacthereinaccordingtoauniversalmaximandtoma eitahabittopromise

nothingexceptwiththeintentionof

eepingit.Butitissooncleartomethatsuchamaximwillstillonlybebasedonthefearofconsequences.Nowitisawhollydifferentthingtobetruthfulfromdutyandtobesofromapprehensionofinjuriousconsequences.Inthefirstcase,theverynotionoftheactionalreadyimpliesalawforme;inthesecondcase,Imustfirstloo

aboutelsewheretoseewhatresultsmaybecombinedwithitwhichwouldaffectmyself.Fortodeviatefromtheprincipleofdutyisbeyondalldoubtwic ed;buttobeunfaithfultomymaximofprudencemayoftenbeveryadvantageoustome,althoughtoabidebyitiscertainlysafer.Theshortestway,however,andanunerringone,todiscovertheanswertothisquestionwhetheralyingpromiseisconsistentwithduty,istoas

myself,"ShouldIbecontentthatmymaxim(toextricatemyself

fromdifficultybyafalsepromise)shouldholdgoodasauniversallaw,formyselfaswellasforothers?andshouldIbeabletosaytomyself,"Everyonemayma

eadeceitfulpromisewhenhefindshimselfinadifficultyfromwhichhecannototherwiseextricatehimself?"ThenIpresentlybecomeawarethatwhileIcanwillthelie,Icanbynomeanswillthatlyingshouldbeauniversallaw.Forwithsuchalawtherewouldbenopromisesatall,sinceitwouldbeinvaintoallegemyintentioninregardtomyfutureactionstothosewhowouldnotbelievethisallegation,oriftheyoverhastilydidsowouldpaymebac

inmyowncoin.Hencemymaxim,assoonasitshouldbemadeauniversallaw,wouldnecessarilydestroyitself.

Idonot,therefore,needanyfar-reachingpenetrationtodiscern

whatIhavetodoinorderthatmywillmaybemorallygood.Inexperiencedinthecourseoftheworld,incapableofbeingpreparedforallitscontingencies,Ionlyas

myself:Canstthoualsowillthatthymaximshouldbeauniversallaw?Ifnot,thenitmustberejected,andthatnotbecauseofadisadvantageaccruingfromittomyselforeventoothers,butbecauseitcannotenterasaprincipleintoapossibleuniversallegislation,andreasonextortsfrommeimmediaterespectforsuchlegislation.Idonotindeedasyetdiscernonwhatthisrespectisbased(thisthephilosophermayinquire),butatleastIunderstandthis,thatitisanestimationofthe



worthwhichfaroutweighsallworthofwhatisrecommendedbyinclination,andthatthenecessityofactingfrompurerespectforthepracticallawiswhatconstitutesduty,towhicheveryothermotivemustgiveplace,becauseitistheconditionofawillbeinggoodinitself,andtheworthofsuchawillisaboveeverything.

Thus,then,withoutquittingthemoral

nowledgeofcommonhumanreason,wehavearrivedatitsprinciple.Andalthough,nodoubt,commonmendonotconceiveitinsuchanabstractanduniversalform,yettheyalwayshaveitreallybeforetheireyesanduseitasthestandardoftheirdecision.Hereitwouldbeeasytoshowhow,withthiscompassinhand,menarewellabletodistinguish,ineverycasethatoccurs,whatisgood,whatbad,conformablytodutyorinconsistentwithit,if,withoutintheleastteachingthemanythingnew,weonly,li

eSocrates,directtheirattentiontotheprincipletheythemselvesemploy;andthat,therefore,wedonotneedscienceandphilosophyto

nowwhatweshoulddotobehonestandgood,yea,evenwiseandvirtuous.Indeedwemightwellhaveconjecturedbeforehandthatthe

nowledgeofwhateverymanisboundtodo,andthereforealsoto now,wouldbewithinthereachofeveryman,eventhecommonest.Herewecannotforbearadmirationwhenweseehowgreatanadvantagethepracticaljudgementhasoverthetheoreticalinthecommonunderstandingofmen.Inthelatter,ifcommonreasonventurestodepartfromthelawsofexperienceand

fromtheperceptionsofthesenses,itfallsintomereinconceivabilitiesandself-contradictions,atleastintoachaosofuncertainty,obscurity,andinstability.Butinthepracticalsphereitisjustwhenthecommonunderstandingexcludesallsensiblespringsfrompracticallawsthatitspowerofjudgementbeginstoshowitselftoadvantage.Itthenbecomesevensubtle,whetheritbethatitchicaneswithitsownconscienceorwithotherclaimsrespectingwhatistobecalledright,orwhetheritdesiresforitsowninstructiontodeterminehonestlytheworthofactions;and,inthelattercase,itmayevenhaveasgoodahopeofhittingthemar

asanyphilosopherwhatevercanpromisehimself.Nay,itisalmostmoresureofdoingso,becausethephilosophercannothaveanyotherprinciple,whilehemayeasilyperplexhisjudgementbyamultitudeof

considerationsforeigntothematter,andsoturnasidefromtherightway.Woulditnotthereforebewiserinmoralconcernstoacquiesceinthejudgementofcommonreason,oratmostonlytocallinphilosophyforthepurposeofrenderingthesystemofmoralsmorecompleteandintelligible,anditsrulesmoreconvenientforuse(especiallyfordisputation),butnotsoastodrawoffthecommonunderstandingfromitshappysimplicity,ortobringitbymeansofphilosophyintoanewpathofinquiryandinstruction?

Innocenceisindeedagloriousthing;only,ontheotherhand,itisverysadthatitcannotwellmaintainitselfandiseasilyseduced.Onthisaccountevenwisdom-whichotherwiseconsistsmoreinconductthanin

nowledge-yethasneedofscience,notinordertolearnfrom

it,buttosecureforitspreceptsadmissionandpermanence.Againstallthecommandsofdutywhichreasonrepresentstomanassodeservingofrespect,hefeelsinhimselfapowerfulcounterpoiseinhiswantsandinclinations,theentiresatisfactionofwhichhesumsupunderthenameofhappiness.Nowreasonissuesitscommandsunyieldingly,withoutpromisinganythingtotheinclinations,and,asitwere,withdisregardandcontemptfortheseclaims,whicharesoimpetuous,andatthesametimesoplausible,andwhichwillnotallowthemselvestobesuppressedbyanycommand.Hencetherearisesanaturaldialectic,i.e.,adisposition,toargueagainstthese



strictlawsofdutyandtoquestiontheirvalidity,oratleasttheirpurityandstrictness;and,ifpossible,toma

ethemmoreaccordantwithourwishesandinclinations,thatistosay,tocorruptthemattheirverysource,andentirelytodestroytheirworth-athingwhichevencommonpracticalreasoncannotultimatelycallgood.

Thusisthecommonreasonofmancompelledtogooutofitssphere,andtota

eastepintothefieldofapracticalphilosophy,nottosatisfyanyspeculativewant(whichneveroccurstoitaslongasitiscontenttobemeresoundreason),butevenonpracticalgrounds,inordertoattaininitinformationandclearinstructionrespectingthesourceofitsprinciple,andthecorrectdeterminationofitinoppositiontothemaximswhicharebasedonwantsandinclinations,sothatitmayescapefromtheperplexityofoppositeclaimsandnotruntheris

oflosingallgenuinemoralprinciplesthroughtheequivocationintowhichiteasilyfalls.Thus,whenpracticalreasoncultivatesitself,thereinsensiblyarisesinitadialeticwhichforcesittosee

aidinphilosophy,justashappenstoitinitstheoreticuse;andinthiscase,therefore,aswellasintheother,itwillfindrestnowherebutinathoroughcriticalexaminationofourreason.

SEC_2

SECONDSECTION

TRANSITIONFROMPOPULARMORALPHILOSOPHY

TOTHEMETAPHYSICOFMORALS

Ifwehavehithertodrawnournotionofdutyfromthecommonuseofourpracticalreason,itisbynomeanstobeinferredthatwehavetreateditasanempiricalnotion.Onthecontrary,ifweattendto

theexperienceofmen'sconduct,wemeetfrequentand,asweourselvesallow,justcomplaintsthatonecannotfindasinglecertainexampleofthedispositiontoactfrompureduty.Althoughmanythingsaredoneinconformitywithwhatdutyprescribes,itisneverthelessalwaysdoubtfulwhethertheyaredonestrictlyfromduty,soastohaveamoralworth.Hencetherehaveatalltimesbeenphilosopherswhohavealtogetherdeniedthatthisdispositionactuallyexistsatallinhumanactions,andhaveascribedeverythingtoamoreorlessrefinedself-love.Notthattheyhaveonthataccountquestionedthesoundnessoftheconceptionofmorality;onthecontrary,theyspo

ewithsincereregretofthefrailtyandcorruptionofhumannature,which,thoughnobleenoughtota

eitsruleanideasoworthyofrespect,isyetwea

tofollowitandemploysreasonwhichoughtto

giveitthelawonlyforthepurposeofprovidingfortheinterestoftheinclinations,whethersinglyoratthebestinthegreatestpossibleharmonywithoneanother.

Infact,itisabsolutelyimpossibletoma

eoutbyexperiencewithcompletecertaintyasinglecaseinwhichthemaximofanaction,howeverrightinitself,restedsimplyonmoralgroundsandontheconceptionofduty.Sometimesithappensthatwiththesharpestself-examinationwecanfindnothingbesidethemoralprincipleofdutywhichcouldhavebeenpowerfulenoughtomoveustothisor



thatactionandtosogreatasacrifice;yetwecannotfromthisinferwithcertaintythatitwasnotreallysomesecretimpulseofself-love,underthefalseappearanceofduty,thatwastheactualdeterminingcauseofthewill.Weli

ethemtoflatterourselvesbyfalselyta

ingcreditforamorenoblemotive;whereasinfactwecannever,evenbythestrictestexamination,getcompletelybehindthesecretspringsofaction;since,whenthequestionisofmoralworth,itisnotwiththeactionswhichweseethatweareconcerned,butwiththoseinwardprinciplesofthemwhichwedonotsee.

Moreover,wecannotbetterservethewishesofthosewhoridiculeallmoralityasamerechimeraofhumanimaginationoversteppingitselffromvanity,thanbyconcedingtothemthatnotionsofdutymustbedrawnonlyfromexperience(asfromindolence,peoplearereadytothin

isalsothecasewithallothernotions);fororistoprepareforthemacertaintriumph.Iamwillingtoadmitoutofloveofhumanitythatevenmostofouractionsarecorrect,butifweloo

closeratthemweeverywherecomeuponthedearselfwhichisalwaysprominent,anditisthistheyhaveinviewandnotthestrictcommandofdutywhichwouldoftenrequireself-denial.Withoutbeinganenemyofvirtue,acoolobserver,onethatdoesnotmista

ethewishforgood,howeverlively,foritsreality,maysometimesdoubtwhethertruevirtueisactuallyfoundanywherein

theworld,andthisespeciallyasyearsincreaseandthejudgementispartlymadewiserbyexperienceandpartly,also,moreacuteinobservation.Thisbeingso,nothingcansecureusfromfallingawayaltogetherfromourideasofduty,ormaintaininthesoulawell-groundedrespectforitslaw,buttheclearconvictionthatalthoughthereshouldneverhavebeenactionswhichreallysprangfromsuchpuresources,yetwhetherthisorthatta

esplaceisnotatallthequestion;butthatreasonofitself,independentonallexperience,ordainswhatoughttota

eplace,thataccordinglyactionsofwhichperhapstheworldhashithertonevergivenanexample,thefeasibilityevenofwhichmightbeverymuchdoubtedbyonewhofoundseverythingonexperience,areneverthelessinflexiblycommandedbyreason;that,e.g.,eventhoughtheremightneveryethavebeena

sincerefriend,yetnotawhitthelessispuresincerityinfriendshiprequiredofeveryman,because,priortoallexperience,thisdutyisinvolvedasdutyintheideaofareasondeterminingthewillbyaprioriprinciples.

Whenweaddfurtherthat,unlesswedenythatthenotionofmoralityhasanytruthorreferencetoanypossibleobject,wemustadmitthatitslawmustbevalid,notmerelyformenbutforallrationalcreaturesgenerally,notmerelyundercertaincontingentconditionsorwithexceptionsbutwithabsolutenecessity,thenitisclearthatnoexperiencecouldenableustoinfereventhepossibilityofsuchapodeicticlaws.Forwithwhatrightcouldwebringintounboundedrespectasauniversalpreceptforeveryrationalnaturethatwhich

perhapsholdsonlyunderthecontingentconditionsofhumanity?Orhowcouldlawsofthedeterminationofourwillberegardedaslawsofthedeterminationofthewillofrationalbeingsgenerally,andforusonlyassuch,iftheyweremerelyempiricalanddidnotta

etheiroriginwhollyapriorifrompurebutpracticalreason?

Norcouldanythingbemorefataltomoralitythanthatweshouldwishtoderiveitfromexamples.Foreveryexampleofitthatissetbeforememustbefirstitselftestedbyprinciplesofmorality,whetheritisworthytoserveasanoriginalexample,i.e.,asa



pattern;butbynomeanscanitauthoritativelyfurnishtheconceptionofmorality.EventheHolyOneoftheGospelsmustfirstbecomparedwithouridealofmoralperfectionbeforewecanrecogniseHimassuch;andsoHesaysofHimself,"WhycallyeMe(whomyousee)good;noneisgood(themodelofgood)butGodonly(whomyedonotsee)?"ButwhencehavewetheconceptionofGodasthesupremegood?Simplyfromtheideaofmoralperfection,whichreasonframesaprioriandconnectsinseparablywiththenotionofafreewill.Imitationfindsnoplaceatallinmorality,andexamplesserveonlyforencouragement,i.e.,theyputbeyonddoubtthefeasibilityofwhatthelawcommands,theyma

evisiblethatwhichthepracticalruleexpressesmoregenerally,buttheycanneverauthorizeustosetasidethetrueoriginalwhichliesinreasonandtoguideourselvesbyexamples.

Ifthenthereisnogenuinesupremeprincipleofmoralitybutwhatmustrestsimplyonpurereason,independentofallexperience,Ithin

itisnotnecessaryeventoputthequestionwhetheritisgoodtoexhibittheseconceptsintheirgenerality(inabstracto)astheyareestablishedapriorialongwiththeprinciplesbelongingtothem,ifour

nowledgeistobedistinguishedfromthevulgarandtobecalledphilosophical.

Inourtimesindeedthismightperhapsbenecessary;forifwe

collectedvoteswhetherpurerational

nowledgeseparatedfromeverythingempirical,thatistosay,metaphysicofmorals,orwhetherpopularpracticalphilosophyistobepreferred,itiseasytoguesswhichsidewouldpreponderate.

Thisdescendingtopopularnotionsiscertainlyverycommendable,iftheascenttotheprinciplesofpurereasonhasfirstta

enplaceandbeensatisfactorilyaccomplished.Thisimpliesthatwefirstfoundethicsonmetaphysics,andthen,whenitisfirmlyestablished,procureahearingforitbygivingitapopularcharacter.Butitisquiteabsurdtotrytobepopularinthefirstinquiry,onwhichthesoundnessoftheprinciplesdepends.Itisnotonlythatthisproceedingcanneverlayclaimtotheveryraremeritofatrue

philosophicalpopularity,sincethereisnoartinbeingintelligibleifonerenouncesallthoroughnessofinsight;butalsoitproducesadisgustingmedleyofcompiledobservationsandhalf-reasonedprinciples.Shallowpatesenjoythisbecauseitcanbeusedforevery-daychat,butthesagaciousfindinitonlyconfusion,andbeingunsatisfiedandunabletohelpthemselves,theyturnawaytheireyes,whilephilosophers,whoseequitewellthroughthisdelusion,arelittlelistenedtowhentheycallmenoffforatimefromthispretendedpopularity,inorderthattheymightberightfullypopularaftertheyhaveattainedadefiniteinsight.

Weneedonlyloo

attheattemptsofmoralistsinthatfavouritefashion,andweshallfindatonetimethespecialconstitutionof

humannature(including,however,theideaofarationalnaturegenerally),atonetimeperfection,atanotherhappiness,heremoralsense,therefearofGod.alittleofthis,andalittleofthat,inmarvellousmixture,withoutitsoccurringtothemtoas

whethertheprinciplesofmoralityaretobesoughtinthe

nowledgeofhumannatureatall(whichwecanhaveonlyfromexperience);or,ifthisisnotso,iftheseprinciplesaretobefoundaltogetherapriori,freefromeverythingempirical,inpurerationalconceptsonlyandnowhereelse,noteveninthesmallestdegree;thenrathertoadoptthemethodofma

ingthisaseparateinquiry,aspurepractical



philosophy,or(ifonemayuseanamesodecried)asmetaphysicofmorals,*tobringitbyitselftocompleteness,andtorequirethepublic,whichwishesforpopulartreatment,toawaittheissueofthisunderta

ing.

*Justaspuremathematicsaredistinguishedfromapplied,purelogicfromapplied,soifwechoosewemayalsodistinguishpurephilosophyofmorals(metaphysic)fromapplied(viz.,appliedtohumannature).Bythisdesignationwearealsoatonceremindedthatmoralprinciplesarenotbasedonpropertiesofhumannature,butmustsubsistaprioriofthemselves,whilefromsuchprinciplespracticalrulesmustbecapableofbeingdeducedforeveryrationalnature,andaccordinglyforthatofman.

Suchametaphysicofmorals,completelyisolated,notmixedwithanyanthropology,theology,physics,orhyperphysics,andstilllesswithoccultqualities(whichwemightcallhypophysical),isnotonlyanindispensablesubstratumofallsoundtheoretical

nowledgeofduties,butisatthesametimeadesideratumofthehighestimportancetotheactualfulfilmentoftheirprecepts.Forthepure

conceptionofduty,unmixedwithanyforeignadditionofempiricalattractions,and,inaword,theconceptionofthemorallaw,exercisesonthehumanheart,bywayofreasonalone(whichfirstbecomesawarewiththisthatitcanofitselfbepractical),aninfluencesomuchmorepowerfulthanallothersprings*whichmaybederivedfromthefieldofexperience,that,intheconsciousnessofitsworth,itdespisesthelatter,andcanbydegreesbecometheirmaster;whereasamixedethics,compoundedpartlyofmotivesdrawnfromfeelingsandinclinations,andpartlyalsoofconceptionsofreason,mustma

ethemindwaverbetweenmotiveswhichcannotbebroughtunderanyprinciple,whichleadtogoodonlybymereaccidentandveryoftenalsotoevil.

*IhavealetterfromthelateexcellentSulzer,inwhichheas

smewhatcanbethereasonthatmoralinstruction,althoughcontainingmuchthatisconvincingforthereason,yetaccomplishessolittle?MyanswerwaspostponedinorderthatImightma

eitcomplete.Butitissimplythis:thattheteachersthemselveshavenotgottheirownnotionsclear,andwhentheyendeavourtoma

eupforthisbyra

ingupmotivesofmoralgoodnessfromeveryquarter,tryingtoma

etheirphysicrightstrong,theyspoilit.Forthecommonestunderstandingshowsthatifweimagine,ontheonehand,anactofhonestydonewithsteadfastmind,apartfromeveryviewtoadvantageofany

indinthisworldoranother,andevenunderthegreatest

temptationsofnecessityorallurement,and,ontheotherhand,asimilaractwhichwasaffected,inhoweverlowadegree,byaforeignmotive,theformerleavesfarbehindandeclipsesthesecond;itelevatesthesoulandinspiresthewishtobeabletoactinli

emanneroneself.Evenmoderatelyyoungchildrenfeelthisimpression,anaoneshouldneverrepresentdutiestotheminanyotherlight.



Fromwhathasbeensaid,itisclearthatallmoralconceptionshavetheirseatandorigincompletelyaprioriinthereason,andthat,moreover,inthecommonestreasonjustastrulyasinthatwhichisinthehighestdegreespeculative;thattheycannotbeobtainedbyabstractionfromanyempirical,andthereforemerelycontingent,

nowledge;thatitisjustthispurityoftheiroriginthatma

esthemworthytoserveasoursupremepracticalprinciple,andthatjustinproportionasweaddanythingempirical,wedetractfromtheirgenuineinfluenceandfromtheabsolutevalueofactions;thatitisnotonlyofthegreatestnecessity,inapurelyspeculativepointofview,butisalsoofthegreatestpracticalimportance,toderivethesenotionsandlawsfrompurereason,topresentthempureandunmixed,andeventodeterminethecompassofthispracticalorpurerational

nowledge,i.e.,todeterminethewholefacultyofpurepracticalreason;and,indoingso,wemustnotma

eitsprinciplesdependentontheparticularnatureofhumanreason,thoughinspeculativephilosophythismaybepermitted,ormayevenattimesbenecessary;butsincemorallawsoughttoholdgoodforeveryrationalcreature,wemustderivethemfromthegeneralconceptofarationalbeing.Inthisway,althoughforitsapplicationtomanmoralityhasneedofanthropology,yet,inthefirstinstance,wemusttreatitindependentlyaspurephilosophy,i.e.,asmetaphysic,completeinitself(athingwhichinsuchdistinctbranchesofscienceiseasilydone); nowingwellthatunlessweareinpossessionofthis,itwould

notonlybevaintodeterminethemoralelementofdutyinrightactionsforpurposesofspeculativecriticism,butitwouldbeimpossibletobasemoralsontheirgenuineprinciples,evenforcommonpracticalpurposes,especiallyofmoralinstruction,soastoproducepuremoraldispositions,andtoengraftthemonmen'smindstothepromotionofthegreatestpossiblegoodintheworld.

Butinorderthatinthisstudywemaynotmerelyadvancebythenaturalstepsfromthecommonmoraljudgement(inthiscaseveryworthyofrespect)tothephilosophical,ashasbeenalreadydone,butalsofromapopularphilosophy,whichgoesnofurtherthanitcanreachbygropingwiththehelpofexamples,tometaphysic(whichdoesallowitselftobechec

edbyanythingempiricaland,asit

mustmeasurethewholeextentofthis

indofrational

nowledge,goesasfarasidealconceptions,whereevenexamplesfailus),wemustfollowandclearlydescribethepracticalfacultyofreason,fromthegeneralrulesofitsdeterminationtothepointwherethenotionofdutyspringsfromit.

Everythinginnaturewor

saccordingtolaws.Rationalbeingsalonehavethefacultyofactingaccordingtotheconceptionoflaws,thatisaccordingtoprinciples,i.e.,haveawill.Sincethedeductionofactionsfromprinciplesrequiresreason,thewillisnothingbutpracticalreason.Ifreasoninfalliblydeterminesthewill,thentheactionsofsuchabeingwhicharerecognisedasobjectivelynecessaryaresubjectivelynecessaryalso,i.e.,the

willisafacultytochoosethatonlywhichreasonindependentofinclinationrecognisesaspracticallynecessary,i.e.,asgood.Butifreasonofitselfdoesnotsufficientlydeterminethewill,ifthelatterissubjectalsotosubjectiveconditions(particularimpulses)whichdonotalwayscoincidewiththeobjectiveconditions;inaword,ifthewilldoesnotinitselfcompletelyaccordwithreason(whichisactuallythecasewithmen),thentheactionswhichobjectivelyarerecognisedasnecessaryaresubjectivelycontingent,andthedeterminationofsuchawillaccordingtoobjectivelawsisobligation,thatistosay,therelationofthe



objectivelawstoawillthatisnotthoroughlygoodisconceivedasthedeterminationofthewillofarationalbeingbyprinciplesofreason,butwhichthewillfromitsnaturedoesnotofnecessityfollow.

Theconceptionofanobjectiveprinciple,insofarasitisobligatoryforawill,iscalledacommand(ofreason),andtheformulaofthecommandiscalledanimperative.

Allimperativesareexpressedbythewordought[orshall],andtherebyindicatetherelationofanobjectivelawofreasontoawill,whichfromitssubjectiveconstitutionisnotnecessarilydeterminedbyit(anobligation).Theysaythatsomethingwouldbegoodtodoortoforbear,buttheysayittoawillwhichdoesnotalwaysdoathingbecauseitisconceivedtobegoodtodoit.Thatispracticallygood,however,whichdeterminesthewillbymeansoftheconceptionsofreason,andconsequentlynotfromsubjectivecauses,butobjectively,thatisonprincipleswhicharevalidforeveryrationalbeingassuch.Itisdistinguishedfromthepleasant,asthatwhichinfluencesthewillonlybymeansofsensationfrommerelysubjectivecauses,validonlyforthesenseofthisorthatone,andnotasaprincipleofreason,whichholdsforeveryone.*

*Thedependenceofthedesiresonsensationsiscalledinclination,andthisaccordinglyalwaysindicatesawant.Thedependenceofacontingentlydeterminablewillonprinciplesofreasoniscalledaninterest.Thistherefore,isfoundonlyinthecaseofadependentwillwhichdoesnotalwaysofitselfconformtoreason;intheDivinewillwecannotconceiveanyinterest.Butthehumanwillcanalsota eaninterestinathingwithoutthereforeactingfrominterest.Theformersignifiesthepracticalinterestintheaction,thelatterthepathologicalintheobjectoftheaction.Theformerindicatesonlydependenceofthewillonprinciplesofreasoninthemselves;thesecond,dependenceonprinciplesofreasonforthesa

eofinclination,reasonsupplyingonlythepracticalruleshowthe

requirementoftheinclinationmaybesatisfied.Inthefirstcasetheactioninterestsme;inthesecondtheobjectoftheaction(becauseitispleasanttome).Wehaveseeninthefirstsectionthatinanactiondonefromdutywemustloo

nottotheinterestintheobject,butonlytothatintheactionitself,andinitsrationalprinciple(viz.,thelaw).

Aperfectlygoodwillwouldthereforebeequallysubjecttoobjectivelaws(viz.,lawsofgood),butcouldnotbeconceivedasobligedtherebytoactlawfully,becauseofitselffromitssubjectiveconstitutionitcanonlybedeterminedbytheconceptionofgood.

ThereforenoimperativesholdfortheDivinewill,oringeneralforaholywill;oughtishereoutofplace,becausethevolitionisalreadyofitselfnecessarilyinunisonwiththelaw.Thereforeimperativesareonlyformulaetoexpresstherelationofobjectivelawsofallvolitiontothesubjectiveimperfectionofthewillofthisorthatrationalbeing,e.g.,thehumanwill.

Nowallimperativescommandeitherhypotheticallyorcategorically.Theformerrepresentthepracticalnecessityofapossibleactionasmeanstosomethingelsethatiswilled(oratleast



whichonemightpossiblywill).Thecategoricalimperativewouldbethatwhichrepresentedanactionasnecessaryofitselfwithoutreferencetoanotherend,i.e.,asobjectivelynecessary.

Sinceeverypracticallawrepresentsapossibleactionasgoodand,onthisaccount,forasubjectwhoispracticallydeterminablebyreason,necessary,allimperativesareformulaedetermininganactionwhichisnecessaryaccordingtotheprincipleofawillgoodinsomerespects.Ifnowtheactionisgoodonlyasameanstosomethingelse,thentheimperativeishypothetical;ifitisconceivedasgoodinitselfandconsequentlyasbeingnecessarilytheprincipleofawillwhichofitselfconformstoreason,thenitiscategorical.

Thustheimperativedeclareswhatactionpossiblebymewouldbegoodandpresentsthepracticalruleinrelationtoawillwhichdoesnotforthwithperformanactionsimplybecauseitisgood,whetherbecausethesubjectdoesnotalways

nowthatitisgood,orbecause,evenifit

nowthis,yetitsmaximsmightbeopposedtotheobjectiveprinciplesofpracticalreason.

Accordinglythehypotheticalimperativeonlysaysthattheactionisgoodforsomepurpose,possibleoractual.Inthefirstcaseitisaproblematical,inthesecondanassertorialpracticalprinciple.The

categoricalimperativewhichdeclaresanactiontobeobjectivelynecessaryinitselfwithoutreferencetoanypurpose,i.e.,withoutanyotherend,isvalidasanapodeictic(practical)principle.

Whateverispossibleonlybythepowerofsomerationalbeingmayalsobeconceivedasapossiblepurposeofsomewill;andthereforetheprinciplesofactionasregardsthemeansnecessarytoattainsomepossiblepurposeareinfactinfinitelynumerous.Allscienceshaveapracticalpart,consistingofproblemsexpressingthatsomeendispossibleforusandofimperativesdirectinghowitmaybeattained.Thesemay,therefore,becalledingeneralimperativesofs

ill.Herethereisnoquestionwhethertheendisrationalandgood,butonlywhatonemustdoinordertoattainit.Thepreceptsforthe

physiciantoma

ehispatientthoroughlyhealthy,andforapoisonertoensurecertaindeath,areofequalvalueinthisrespect,thateachservestoeffectitspurposeperfectly.Sinceinearlyyouthitcannotbe

nownwhatendsareli

elytooccurtousinthecourseoflife,parentssee

tohavetheirchildrentaughtagreatmanythings,andprovidefortheirs

illintheuseofmeansforallsortsofarbitraryends,ofnoneofwhichcantheydeterminewhetheritmaynotperhapshereafterbeanobjecttotheirpupil,butwhichitisatalleventspossiblethathemightaimat;andthisanxietyissogreatthattheycommonlyneglecttoformandcorrecttheirjudgementonthevalueofthethingswhichmaybechosenasends.

Thereisoneend,however,whichmaybeassumedtobeactually

suchtoallrationalbeings(sofarasimperativesapplytothem,viz.,asdependentbeings),and,therefore,onepurposewhichtheynotmerelymayhave,butwhichwemaywithcertaintyassumethattheyallactuallyhavebyanaturalnecessity,andthisishappiness.Thehypotheticalimperativewhichexpressesthepracticalnecessityofanactionasmeanstotheadvancementofhappinessisassertorial.Wearenottopresentitasnecessaryforanuncertainandmerelypossiblepurpose,butforapurposewhichwemaypresupposewithcertaintyandaprioriineveryman,becauseitbelongstohisbeing.Nows

illinthechoiceofmeanstohisowngreatestwell-being



maybecalledprudence,*inthenarrowestsense.Andthustheimperativewhichreferstothechoiceofmeanstoone'sownhappiness,i.e.,thepreceptofprudence,isstillalwayshypothetical;theactionisnotcommandedabsolutely,butonlyasmeanstoanotherpurpose.

*Thewordprudenceista

enintwosenses:intheoneitmaybearthenameof

nowledgeoftheworld,intheotherthatofprivateprudence.Theformerisaman'sabilitytoinfluenceotherssoastousethemforhisownpurposes.Thelatteristhesagacitytocombineallthesepurposesforhisownlastingbenefit.Thislatterisproperlythattowhichthevalueevenoftheformerisreduced,andwhenamanisprudentintheformersense,butnotinthelatter,wemightbettersayofhimthatheiscleverandcunning,but,onthewhole,imprudent.

Finally,thereisanimperativewhichcommandsacertainconductimmediately,withouthavingasitsconditionanyotherpurposetobeattainedbyit.Thisimperativeiscategorical.Itconcernsnotthematteroftheaction,oritsintendedresult,butitsformandthe

principleofwhichitisitselfaresult;andwhatisessentiallygoodinitconsistsinthementaldisposition,lettheconsequencebewhatitmay.Thisimperativemaybecalledthatofmorality.

Thereisamar

eddistinctionalsobetweenthevolitionsonthesethreesortsofprinciplesinthedissimilarityoftheobligationofthewill.Inordertomar

thisdifferencemoreclearly,Ithin

theywouldbemostsuitablynamedintheirorderifwesaidtheyareeitherrulesofs

ill,orcounselsofprudence,orcommands(laws)ofmorality.Foritislawonlythatinvolvestheconceptionofanunconditionalandobjectivenecessity,whichisconsequentlyuniversallyvalid;andcommandsarelawswhichmustbeobeyed,thatis,mustbefollowed,eveninoppositiontoinclination.Counsels,

indeed,involvenecessity,butonewhichcanonlyholdunderacontingentsubjectivecondition,viz.,theydependonwhetherthisorthatmanrec

onsthisorthataspartofhishappiness;thecategoricalimperative,onthecontrary,isnotlimitedbyanycondition,andasbeingabsolutely,althoughpractically,necessary,maybequiteproperlycalledacommand.Wemightalsocallthefirst

indofimperativestechnical(belongingtoart),thesecondpragmatic*(towelfare),thethirdmoral(belongingtofreeconductgenerally,thatis,tomorals).

*Itseemstomethatthepropersignificationoftheword

pragmaticmaybemostaccuratelydefinedinthisway.Forsanctionsarecalledpragmaticwhichflowproperlynotfromthelawofthestatesasnecessaryenactments,butfromprecautionforthegeneralwelfare.Ahistoryiscomposedpragmaticallywhenitteachesprudence,i.e.,instructstheworldhowitcanprovideforitsinterestsbetter,oratleastaswellas,themenofformertime.

Nowarisesthequestion,howarealltheseimperativespossible?



Thisquestiondoesnotsee

to

nowhowwecanconceivetheaccomplishmentoftheactionwhichtheimperativeordains,butmerelyhowwecanconceivetheobligationofthewillwhichtheimperativeexpresses.Nospecialexplanationisneededtoshowhowanimperativeofs

illispossible.Whoeverwillstheend,willsalso(sofarasreasondecideshisconduct)themeansinhispowerwhichareindispensablynecessarythereto.Thispropositionis,asregardsthevolition,analytical;for,inwillinganobjectasmyeffect,thereisalreadythoughtthecausalityofmyselfasanactingcause,thatistosay,theuseofthemeans;andtheimperativeeducesfromtheconceptionofvolitionofanendtheconceptionofactionsnecessarytothisend.Syntheticalpropositionsmustnodoubtbeemployedindefiningthemeanstoaproposedend;buttheydonotconcerntheprinciple,theactofthewill,buttheobjectanditsrealization.E.g.,thatinordertobisectalineonanunerringprincipleImustdrawfromitsextremitiestwointersectingarcs;thisnodoubtistaughtbymathematicsonlyinsyntheticalpropositions;butifI

nowthatitisonlybythisprocessthattheintendedoperationcanbeperformed,thentosaythat,ifIfullywilltheoperation,Ialsowilltheactionrequiredforit,isananalyticalproposition;foritisoneandthesamethingtoconceivesomethingasaneffectwhichIcanproduceinacertainway,andtoconceivemyselfasactinginthisway.

Ifitwereonlyequallyeasytogiveadefiniteconceptionofhappiness,theimperativesofprudencewouldcorrespondexactlywiththoseofs

ill,andwouldli

ewisebeanalytical.Forinthiscaseasinthat,itcouldbesaid:"Whoeverwillstheend,willsalso(accordingtothedictateofreasonnecessarily)theindispensablemeanstheretowhichareinhispower."But,unfortunately,thenotionofhappinessissoindefinitethatalthougheverymanwishestoat.it,yethenevercansaydefinitelyandconsistentlywhatitisthathereallywishesandwills.Thereasonofthisisthatalltheelementswhichbelongtothenotionofhappinessarealtogetherempirical,i.e.,theymustbeborrowedfromexperience,andneverthelesstheideaofhappinessrequiresanabsolutewhole,amaximumofwelfareinmypresentandallfuturecircumstances.Now

itisimpossiblethatthemostclear-sightedandatthesametimemostpowerfulbeing(supposedfinite)shouldframetohimselfadefiniteconceptionofwhathereallywillsinthis.Doeshewillriches,howmuchanxiety,envy,andsnaresmighthenottherebydrawuponhisshoulders?Doeshewill

nowledgeanddiscernment,perhapsitmightprovetobeonlyaneyesomuchthesharpertoshowhimsomuchthemorefearfullytheevilsthatarenowconcealedfromhim,andthatcannotbeavoided,ortoimposemorewantsonhisdesires,whichalreadygivehimconcernenough.Wouldhehavelonglife?whoguaranteestohimthatitwouldnotbealongmisery?wouldheatleasthavehealth?howoftenhasuneasinessofthebodyrestrainedfromexcessesintowhichperfecthealthwouldhaveallowedonetofall?andsoon.Inshort,heisunable,onanyprinciple,to

determinewithcertaintywhatwouldma

ehimtrulyhappy;becausetodosohewouldneedtobeomniscient.Wecannotthereforeactonanydefiniteprinciplestosecurehappiness,butonlyonempiricalcounsels,e.g.ofregimen,frugality,courtesy,reserve,etc.,whichexperienceteachesdo,ontheaverage,mostpromotewell-being.Henceitfollowsthattheimperativesofprudencedonot,strictlyspea

ing,commandatall,thatis,theycannotpresentactionsobjectivelyaspracticallynecessary;thattheyarerathertoberegardedascounsels(consilia)thanpreceptspreceptsofreason,thattheproblemtodeterminecertainlyanduniversallywhatactionwould



promotethehappinessofarationalbeingiscompletelyinsoluble,andconsequentlynoimperativerespectingitispossiblewhichshould,inthestrictsense,commandtodowhatma

eshappy;becausehappinessisnotanidealofreasonbutofimagination,restingsolelyonempiricalgrounds,anditisvaintoexpectthattheseshoulddefineanactionbywhichonecouldattainthetotalityofaseriesofconsequenceswhichisreallyendless.Thisimperativeofprudencewouldhoweverbeananalyticalpropositionifweassumethatthemeanstohappinesscouldbecertainlyassigned;foritisdistinguishedfromtheimperativeofs

illonlybythis,thatinthelattertheendismerelypossible,intheformeritisgiven;ashoweverbothonlyordainthemeanstothatwhichwesupposetobewilledasanend,itfollowsthattheimperativewhichordainsthewillingofthemeanstohimwhowillstheendisinbothcasesanalytical.Thusthereisnodifficultyinregardtothepossibilityofanimperativeofthis

indeither.

Ontheotherhand,thequestionhowtheimperativeofmoralityispossible,isundoubtedlyone,theonlyone,demandingasolution,asthisisnotatallhypothetical,andtheobjectivenecessitywhichitpresentscannotrestonanyhypothesis,asisthecasewiththehypotheticalimperatives.Onlyherewemustneverleaveoutofconsiderationthatwecannotma

eoutbyanyexample,inotherwordsempirically,whetherthereissuchanimperativeatall,butitis

rathertobefearedthatallthosewhichseemtobecategoricalmayyetbeatbottomhypothetical.Forinstance,whenthepreceptis:"Thoushaltnotpromisedeceitfully";anditisassumedthatthenecessityofthisisnotamerecounseltoavoidsomeotherevil,sothatitshouldmean:"Thoushaltnotma

ealyingpromise,lestifitbecome

nownthoushouldstdestroythycredit,"butthatanactionofthis

indmustberegardedasevilinitself,sothattheimperativeoftheprohibitioniscategorical;thenwecannotshowwithcertaintyinanyexamplethatthewillwasdeterminedmerelybythelaw,withoutanyotherspringofaction,althoughitmayappeartobeso.Foritisalwayspossiblethatfearofdisgrace,perhapsalsoobscuredreadofotherdangers,mayhaveasecretinfluenceonthewill.Whocanprovebyexperiencethenon-existenceofacausewhen

allthatexperiencetellsusisthatwedonotperceiveit?Butinsuchacasetheso-calledmoralimperative,whichassuchappearstobecategoricalandunconditional,wouldinrealitybeonlyapragmaticprecept,drawingourattentiontoourowninterestsandmerelyteachingustota

etheseintoconsideration.

Weshallthereforehavetoinvestigateapriorithepossibilityofacategoricalimperative,aswehavenotinthiscasetheadvantageofitsrealitybeinggiveninexperience,sothat[theelucidationof]itspossibilityshouldberequisiteonlyforitsexplanation,notforitsestablishment.Inthemeantimeitmaybediscernedbeforehandthatthecategoricalimperativealonehasthepurportofapracticallaw;alltherestmayindeedbecalledprinciplesofthe

willbutnotlaws,sincewhateverisonlynecessaryfortheattainmentofsomearbitrarypurposemaybeconsideredasinitselfcontingent,andwecanatanytimebefreefromthepreceptifwegiveupthepurpose;onthecontrary,theunconditionalcommandleavesthewillnolibertytochoosetheopposite;consequentlyitalonecarrieswithitthatnecessitywhichwerequireinalaw.

Secondly,inthecaseofthiscategoricalimperativeorlawofmorality,thedifficulty(ofdiscerningitspossibility)isaveryprofoundone.Itisanapriorisyntheticalpracticalproposition;*



andasthereissomuchdifficultyindiscerningthepossibilityofspeculativepropositionsofthis

ind,itmayreadilybesupposedthatthedifficultywillbenolesswiththepractical.

*Iconnecttheactwiththewillwithoutpresupposinganyconditionresultingfromanyinclination,butapriori,andthereforenecessarily(thoughonlyobjectively,i.e.,assumingtheideaofareasonpossessingfullpoweroverallsubjectivemotives).Thisisaccordinglyapracticalpropositionwhichdoesnotdeducethewillingofanactionbymereanalysisfromanotheralreadypresupposed(forwehavenotsuchaperfectwill),butconnectsitimmediatelywiththeconceptionofthewillofarationalbeing,assomethingnotcontainedinit.

Inthisproblemwewillfirstinquirewhetherthemereconceptionofacategoricalimperativemaynotperhapssupplyusalsowiththeformulaofit,containingthepropositionwhichalonecanbeacategoricalimperative;forevenifwe

nowthetenorofsuchanabsolutecommand,yethowitispossiblewillrequirefurtherspecialandlaboriousstudy,whichwepostponetothelastsection.

WhenIconceiveahypotheticalimperative,ingeneralIdonot

nowbeforehandwhatitwillcontainuntilIamgiventhecondition.ButwhenIconceiveacategoricalimperative,I nowatoncewhatitcontains.Forastheimperativecontainsbesidesthelawonlythenecessitythatthemaxims*shallconformtothislaw,whilethelawcontainsnoconditionsrestrictingit,thereremainsnothingbutthegeneralstatementthatthemaximoftheactionshouldconformtoauniversallaw,anditisthisconformityalonethattheimperativeproperlyrepresentsasnecessary.

*Amaximisasubjectiveprincipleofaction,andmustbedistinguishedfromtheobjectiveprinciple,namely,practicallaw.Theformercontainsthepracticalrulesetbyreasonaccordingtotheconditionsofthesubject(oftenitsignoranceoritsinclinations),sothatitistheprincipleonwhichthesubjectacts;butthelawistheobjectiveprinciplevalidforeveryrationalbeing,andistheprincipleonwhichitoughttoactthatisanimperative.

Thereisthereforebutonecategoricalimperative,namely,this:Actonlyonthatmaximwherebythoucanstatthesametimewillthatitshouldbecomeauniversallaw.

Nowifallimperativesofdutycanbededucedfromthisoneimperativeasfromtheirprinciple,then,althoughitshouldremainundecidedwhatiscalleddutyisnotmerelyavainnotion,yetatleastweshallbeabletoshowwhatweunderstandbyitandwhatthisnotionmeans.

Sincetheuniversalityofthelawaccordingtowhicheffectsareproducedconstituteswhatisproperlycallednatureinthemostgeneralsense(astoform),thatistheexistenceofthingssofar



asitisdeterminedbygenerallaws,theimperativeofdutymaybeexpressedthus:Actasifthemaximofthyactionweretobecomebythywillauniversallawofnature.

Wewillnowenumerateafewduties,adoptingtheusualdivisionofthemintodutiestoourselvesandourselvesandtoothers,andintoperfectandimperfectduties.*

*ItmustbenotedherethatIreservethedivisionofdutiesforafuturemetaphysicofmorals;sothatIgiveithereonlyasanarbitraryone(inordertoarrangemyexamples).Fortherest,IunderstandbyaperfectdutyonethatadmitsnoexceptioninfavourofinclinationandthenIhavenotmerelyexternalbutalsointernalperfectduties.Thisiscontrarytotheuseofthewordadoptedintheschools;butIdonotintendtojustifythere,asitisalloneformypurposewhetheritisadmittedornot.

1.Amanreducedtodespairbyaseriesofmisfortunesfeelsweariedoflife,butisstillsofarinpossessionofhisreasonthathecanas himselfwhetheritwouldnotbecontrarytohisdutytohimselfto

ta

ehisownlife.Nowheinquireswhetherthemaximofhisactioncouldbecomeauniversallawofnature.Hismaximis:"Fromself-loveIadoptitasaprincipletoshortenmylifewhenitslongerdurationisli elytobringmoreevilthansatisfaction."Itisas

edthensimplywhetherthisprinciplefoundedonself-lovecanbecomeauniversallawofnature.Nowweseeatoncethatasystemofnatureofwhichitshouldbealawtodestroylifebymeansoftheveryfeelingwhosespecialnatureitistoimpeltotheimprovementoflifewouldcontradictitselfand,therefore,couldnotexistasasystemofnature;hencethatmaximcannotpossiblyexistasauniversallawofnatureand,consequently,wouldbewhollyinconsistentwiththesupremeprincipleofallduty.

2.Anotherfindshimselfforcedbynecessitytoborrowmoney.He

nowsthathewillnotbeabletorepayit,butseesalsothatnothingwillbelenttohimunlesshepromisesstoutlytorepayitinadefinitetime.Hedesirestoma

ethispromise,buthehasstillsomuchconscienceastoas

himself:"Isitnotunlawfulandinconsistentwithdutytogetoutofadifficultyinthisway?"Supposehoweverthatheresolvestodoso:thenthemaximofhisactionwouldbeexpressedthus:"WhenIthin

myselfinwantofmoney,Iwillborrowmoneyandpromisetorepayit,althoughI

nowthatInevercandoso."Nowthisprincipleofself-loveorofone'sownadvantagemayperhapsbeconsistentwithmywholefuturewelfare;butthequestionnowis,"Isitright?"Ichangethenthesuggestionofself-loveintoauniversallaw,andstatethequestionthus:"How

woulditbeifmymaximwereauniversallaw?"ThenIseeatoncethatitcouldneverholdasauniversallawofnature,butwouldnecessarilycontradictitself.Forsupposingittobeauniversallawthateveryonewhenhethin

shimselfinadifficultyshouldbeabletopromisewhateverhepleases,withthepurposeofnot

eepinghispromise,thepromiseitselfwouldbecomeimpossible,aswellastheendthatonemighthaveinviewinit,sincenoonewouldconsiderthatanythingwaspromisedtohim,butwouldridiculeallsuchstatementsasvainpretences.



3.Athirdfindsinhimselfatalentwhichwiththehelpofsomeculturemightma

ehimausefulmaninmanyrespects.Buthefindshimselfincomfortablecircumstancesandpreferstoindulgeinpleasureratherthantota

epainsinenlargingandimprovinghishappynaturalcapacities.Heas

s,however,whetherhismaximofneglectofhisnaturalgifts,besidesagreeingwithhisinclinationtoindulgence,agreesalsowithwhatiscalledduty.Heseesthenthatasystemofnaturecouldindeedsubsistwithsuchauniversallawalthoughmen(li

etheSouthSeaislanders)shouldlettheirtalentsrestandresolvetodevotetheirlivesmerelytoidleness,amusement,andpropagationoftheirspecies-inaword,toenjoyment;buthecannotpossiblywillthatthisshouldbeauniversallawofnature,orbeimplantedinusassuchbyanaturalinstinct.For,asarationalbeing,henecessarilywillsthathisfacultiesbedeveloped,sincetheyservehimandhavebeengivenhim,forallsortsofpossiblepurposes.

4.Afourth,whoisinprosperity,whileheseesthatothershavetocontendwithgreatwretchednessandthathecouldhelpthem,thin

s:"Whatconcernisitofmine?LeteveryonebeashappyasHeavenpleases,orasbecanma

ehimself;Iwillta

enothingfromhimnorevenenvyhim,onlyIdonotwishtocontributeanythingtohiswelfareortohisassistanceindistress!"Nownodoubtifsuchamodeofthin ingwereauniversallaw,thehumanracemightverywell

subsistanddoubtlessevenbetterthaninastateinwhicheveryonetal

sofsympathyandgood-will,oreventa

escareoccasionallytoputitintopractice,but,ontheotherside,alsocheatswhenhecan,betraystherightsofmen,orotherwiseviolatesthem.Butalthoughitispossiblethatauniversallawofnaturemightexistinaccordancewiththatmaxim,itisimpossibletowillthatsuchaprincipleshouldhavetheuniversalvalidityofalawofnature.Forawillwhichresolvedthiswouldcontradictitself,inasmuchasmanycasesmightoccurinwhichonewouldhaveneedoftheloveandsympathyofothers,andinwhich,bysuchalawofnature,sprungfromhisownwill,hewoulddeprivehimselfofallhopeoftheaidhedesires.

Theseareafewofthemanyactualduties,oratleastwhatwe

regardassuch,whichobviouslyfallintotwoclassesontheoneprinciplethatwehavelaiddown.Wemustbeabletowillthatamaximofouractionshouldbeauniversallaw.Thisisthecanonofthemoralappreciationoftheactiongenerally.Someactionsareofsuchacharacterthattheirmaximcannotwithoutcontradictionbeevenconceivedasauniversallawofnature,farfromitbeingpossiblethatweshouldwillthatitshouldbeso.Inothersthisintrinsicimpossibilityisnotfound,butstillitisimpossibletowillthattheirmaximshouldberaisedtotheuniversalityofalawofnature,sincesuchawillwouldcontradictitselfItiseasilyseenthattheformerviolatestrictorrigorous(inflexible)duty;thelatteronlylaxer(meritorious)duty.Thusithasbeencompletelyshownhowalldutiesdependasregardsthenatureoftheobligation(notthe

objectoftheaction)onthesameprinciple.

Ifnowweattendtoourselvesonoccasionofanytransgressionofduty,weshallfindthatweinfactdonotwillthatourmaximshouldbeauniversallaw,forthatisimpossibleforus;onthecontrary,wewillthattheoppositeshouldremainauniversallaw,onlyweassumethelibertyofma

inganexceptioninourownfavouror(justforthistimeonly)infavourofourinclination.Consequentlyifweconsideredallcasesfromoneandthesamepointofview,namely,thatofreason,weshouldfindacontradictioninourown



will,namely,thatacertainprincipleshouldbeobjectivelynecessaryasauniversallaw,andyetsubjectivelyshouldnotbeuniversal,butadmitofexceptions.Ashoweverweatonemomentregardouractionfromthepointofviewofawillwhollyconformedtoreason,andthenagainloo

atthesameactionfromthepointofviewofawillaffectedbyinclination,thereisnotreallyanycontradiction,butanantagonismofinclinationtothepreceptofreason,wherebytheuniversalityoftheprincipleischangedintoameregenerality,sothatthepracticalprincipleofreasonshallmeetthemaximhalfway.Now,althoughthiscannotbejustifiedinourownimpartialjudgement,yetitprovesthatwedoreallyrecognisethevalidityofthecategoricalimperativeand(withallrespectforit)onlyallowourselvesafewexceptions,whichwethin

unimportantandforcedfromus.

Wehavethusestablishedatleastthismuch,thatifdutyisaconceptionwhichistohaveanyimportandreallegislativeauthorityforouractions,itcanonlybeexpressedincategoricalandnotatallinhypotheticalimperatives.Wehavealso,whichisofgreatimportance,exhibitedclearlyanddefinitelyforeverypracticalapplicationthecontentofthecategoricalimperative,whichmustcontaintheprincipleofalldutyifthereissuchathingatall.Wehavenotyet,however,advancedsofarastoproveapriorithatthereactuallyissuchanimperative,thatthereisapracticallaw

whichcommandsabsolutelyofitselfandwithoutanyotherimpulse,andthatthefollowingofthislawisduty.

Withtheviewofattainingtothis,itisofextremeimportancetorememberthatwemustnotallowourselvestothin

ofdeducingtherealityofthisprinciplefromtheparticularattributesofhumannature.Fordutyistobeapractical,unconditionalnecessityofaction;itmustthereforeholdforallrationalbeings(towhomanimperativecanapplyatall),andforthisreasononlybealsoalawforallhumanwills.Onthecontrary,whateverisdeducedfromtheparticularnaturalcharacteristicsofhumanity,fromcertainfeelingsandpropensions,nay,even,ifpossible,fromanyparticulartendencypropertohumanreason,andwhichneednot

necessarilyholdforthewillofeveryrationalbeing;thismayindeedsupplyuswithamaxim,butnotwithalaw;withasubjectiveprincipleonwhichwemayhaveapropensionandinclinationtoact,butnotwithanobjectiveprincipleonwhichweshouldbeenjoinedtoact,eventhoughallourpropensions,inclinations,andnaturaldispositionswereopposedtoit.Infact,thesublimityandintrinsicdignityofthecommandindutyaresomuchthemoreevident,thelessthesubjectiveimpulsesfavouritandthemoretheyopposeit,withoutbeingableintheslightestdegreetowea

entheobligationofthelawortodiminishitsvalidity.

Herethenweseephilosophybroughttoacriticalposition,sinceithastobefirmlyfixed,notwithstandingthatithasnothingtosupport

itinheavenorearth.Hereitmustshowitspurityasabsolutedirectorofitsownlaws,nottheheraldofthosewhicharewhisperedtoitbyanimplantedsenseorwho

nowswhattutelarynature.Althoughthesemaybebetterthannothing,yettheycanneveraffordprinciplesdictatedbyreason,whichmusthavetheirsourcewhollyaprioriandthencetheircommandingauthority,expectingeverythingfromthesupremacyofthelawandtheduerespectforit,nothingfrominclination,orelsecondemningthemantoself-contemptandinwardabhorrence.



Thuseveryempiricalelementisnotonlyquiteincapableofbeinganaidtotheprincipleofmorality,butisevenhighlyprejudicialtothepurityofmorals,fortheproperandinestimableworthofanabsolutelygoodwillconsistsjustinthis,thattheprincipleofactionisfreefromallinfluenceofcontingentgrounds,whichaloneexperiencecanfurnish.Wecannottoomuchortoooftenrepeatourwarningagainstthislaxandevenmeanhabitofthoughtwhichsee

sforitsprincipleamongstempiricalmotivesandlaws;forhumanreasoninitswearinessisgladtorestonthispillow,andinadreamofsweetillusions(inwhich,insteadofJuno,itembracesacloud)itsubstitutesformoralityabastardpatchedupfromlimbsofvariousderivation,whichloo

sli

eanythingonechoosestoseeinit,onlynotli

evirtuetoonewhohasoncebeheldherinhertrueform.*

*Tobeholdvirtueinherproperformisnothingelsebuttocontemplatemoralitystrippedofalladmixtureofsensiblethingsandofeveryspuriousornamentofrewardorself-love.Howmuchshetheneclipseseverythingelsethatappearscharmingtotheaffections,everyonemayreadilyperceivewiththeleastexertionofhisreason,ifitbenotwhollyspoiledforabstraction.

Thequestionthenisthis:"Isitanecessarylawforallrationalbeingsthattheyshouldalwaysjudgeoftheiractionsbymaximsofwhichtheycanthemselveswillthattheyshouldserveasuniversallaws?"Ifitisso,thenitmustbeconnected(altogetherapriori)withtheveryconceptionofthewillofarationalbeinggenerally.Butinordertodiscoverthisconnexionwemust,howeverreluctantly,ta eastepintometaphysic,althoughintoadomainofitwhichisdistinctfromspeculativephilosophy,namely,themetaphysicofmorals.Inapracticalphilosophy,whereitisnotthereasonsofwhathappensthatwehavetoascertain,butthelawsofwhatoughttohappen,evenalthoughitneverdoes,i.e.,objectivepracticallaws,thereitisnotnecessarytoinquireintothe

reasonswhyanythingpleasesordispleases,howthepleasureofmeresensationdiffersfromtaste,andwhetherthelatterisdistinctfromageneralsatisfactionofreason;onwhatthefeelingofpleasureorpainrests,andhowfromitdesiresandinclinationsarise,andfromtheseagainmaximsbytheco-operationofreason:forallthisbelongstoanempiricalpsychology,whichwouldconstitutethesecondpartofphysics,ifweregardphysicsasthephilosophyofnature,sofarasitisbasedonempiricallaws.Buthereweareconcernedwithobjectivepracticallawsand,consequently,withtherelationofthewilltoitselfsofarasitisdeterminedbyreasonalone,inwhichcasewhateverhasreferencetoanythingempiricalisnecessarilyexcluded;sinceifreasonofitselfalonedeterminestheconduct(anditisthepossibilityofthisthatwearenow

investigating),itmustnecessarilydosoapriori.

Thewillisconceivedasafacultyofdeterminingoneselftoactioninaccordancewiththeconceptionofcertainlaws.Andsuchafacultycanbefoundonlyinrationalbeings.Nowthatwhichservesthewillastheobjectivegroundofitsself-determinationistheend,and,ifthisisassignedbyreasonalone,itmustholdforallrationalbeings.Ontheotherhand,thatwhichmerelycontainsthegroundofpossibilityoftheactionofwhichtheeffectistheend,thisiscalledthemeans.Thesubjectivegroundofthedesireisthe



spring,theobjectivegroundofthevolitionisthemotive;hencethedistinctionbetweensubjectiveendswhichrestonsprings,andobjectiveendswhichdependonmotivesvalidforeveryrationalbeing.Practicalprinciplesareformalwhentheyabstractfromallsubjectiveends;theyarematerialwhentheyassumethese,andthereforeparticularspringsofaction.Theendswhicharationalbeingproposestohimselfatpleasureaseffectsofhisactions(materialends)areallonlyrelative,foritisonlytheirrelationtotheparticulardesiresofthesubjectthatgivesthemtheirworth,whichthereforecannotfurnishprinciplesuniversalandnecessaryforallrationalbeingsandforeveryvolition,thatistosaypracticallaws.Hencealltheserelativeendscangiveriseonlytohypotheticalimperatives.

Supposing,however,thatthereweresomethingwhoseexistencehasinitselfanabsoluteworth,somethingwhich,beinganendinitself,couldbeasourceofdefinitelaws;theninthisandthisalonewouldliethesourceofapossiblecategoricalimperative,i.e.,apracticallaw.

NowIsay:manandgenerallyanyrationalbeingexistsasanendinhimself,notmerelyasameanstobearbitrarilyusedbythisorthatwill,butinallhisactions,whethertheyconcernhimselforotherrationalbeings,mustbealwaysregardedatthesametimeas

anend.Allobjectsoftheinclinationshaveonlyaconditionalworth,foriftheinclinationsandthewantsfoundedonthemdidnotexist,thentheirobjectwouldbewithoutvalue.Buttheinclinations,themselvesbeingsourcesofwant,aresofarfromhavinganabsoluteworthforwhichtheyshouldbedesiredthatonthecontraryitmustbetheuniversalwishofeveryrationalbeingtobewhollyfreefromthem.Thustheworthofanyobjectwhichistobeacquiredbyouractionisalwaysconditional.Beingswhoseexistencedependsnotonourwillbutonnature's,havenevertheless,iftheyareirrationalbeings,onlyarelativevalueasmeans,andarethereforecalledthings;rationalbeings,onthecontrary,arecalledpersons,becausetheirverynaturepointsthemoutasendsinthemselves,thatisassomethingwhichmustnotbeusedmerelyasmeans,andso

farthereforerestrictsfreedomofaction(andisanobjectofrespect).These,therefore,arenotmerelysubjectiveendswhoseexistencehasaworthforusasaneffectofouraction,butobjectiveends,thatis,thingswhoseexistenceisanendinitself;anendmoreoverforwhichnoothercanbesubstituted,whichtheyshouldsubservemerelyasmeans,forotherwisenothingwhateverwouldpossessabsoluteworth;butifallworthwereconditionedandthereforecontingent,thentherewouldbenosupremepracticalprincipleofreasonwhatever.

Ifthenthereisasupremepracticalprincipleor,inrespectofthehumanwill,acategoricalimperative,itmustbeonewhich,beingdrawnfromtheconceptionofthatwhichisnecessarilyanendfor

everyonebecauseitisanendinitself,constitutesanobjectiveprincipleofwill,andcanthereforeserveasauniversalpracticallaw.Thefoundationofthisprincipleis:rationalnatureexistsasanendinitself.Mannecessarilyconceiveshisownexistenceasbeingso;sofarthenthisisasubjectiveprincipleofhumanactions.Buteveryotherrationalbeingregardsitsexistencesimilarly,justonthesamerationalprinciplethatholdsforme:*sothatitisatthesametimeanobjectiveprinciple,fromwhichasasupremepracticallawalllawsofthewillmustbecapableofbeingdeduced.Accordinglythepracticalimperativewillbeasfollows:Soactastotreat



humanity,whetherinthineownpersonorinthatofanyother,ineverycaseasanendwithal,neverasmeansonly.Wewillnowinquirewhetherthiscanbepracticallycarriedout.

*Thispropositionisherestatedasapostulate.Thegroundofitwillbefoundintheconcludingsection.

Toabidebythepreviousexamples:

Firstly,undertheheadofnecessarydutytooneself:Hewhocontemplatessuicideshouldas

himselfwhetherhisactioncanbeconsistentwiththeideaofhumanityasanendinitself.Ifhedestroyshimselfinordertoescapefrompainfulcircumstances,heusesapersonmerelyasameantomaintainatolerableconditionuptotheendoflife.Butamanisnotathing,thatistosay,somethingwhichcanbeusedmerelyasmeans,butmustinallhisactionsbealwaysconsideredasanendinhimself.Icannot,therefore,disposeinanywayofamaninmyownpersonsoastomutilatehim,todamageor

illhim.(Itbelongstoethicspropertodefinethisprinciplemoreprecisely,soastoavoidallmisunderstanding,e.

g.,astotheamputationofthelimbsinordertopreservemyself,astoexposingmylifetodangerwithaviewtopreserveit,etc.Thisquestionisthereforeomittedhere.)

Secondly,asregardsnecessaryduties,orthoseofstrictobligation,towardsothers:Hewhoisthin

ingofma

ingalyingpromisetootherswillseeatoncethathewouldbeusinganothermanmerelyasamean,withoutthelattercontainingatthesametimetheendinhimself.ForhewhomIproposebysuchapromisetouseformyownpurposescannotpossiblyassenttomymodeofactingtowardshimand,therefore,cannothimselfcontaintheendofthisaction.Thisviolationoftheprincipleofhumanityinothermenismoreobviousifweta

einexamplesofattac

sonthefreedomand

propertyofothers.Forthenitisclearthathewhotransgressestherightsofmenintendstousethepersonofothersmerelyasameans,withoutconsideringthatasrationalbeingstheyoughtalwaystobeesteemedalsoasends,thatis,asbeingswhomustbecapableofcontaininginthemselvestheendoftheverysameaction.*

*Letitnotbethoughtthatthecommon"quodtibinonvisfieri,etc."couldservehereastheruleorprinciple.Foritisonlyadeductionfromtheformer,thoughwithseverallimitations;itcannotbeauniversallaw,foritdoesnotcontaintheprincipleofdutiestooneself,norofthedutiesofbenevolencetoothers(for

manyaonewouldgladlyconsentthatothersshouldnotbenefithim,providedonlythathemightbeexcusedfromshowingbenevolencetothem),norfinallythatofdutiesofstrictobligationtooneanother,foronthisprinciplethecriminalmightargueagainstthejudgewhopunisheshim,andsoon.

Thirdly,asregardscontingent(meritorious)dutiestooneself:Itisnotenoughthattheactiondoesnotviolatehumanityinourown



personasanendinitself,itmustalsoharmonizewithit.Nowthereareinhumanitycapacitiesofgreaterperfection,whichbelongtotheendthatnaturehasinviewinregardtohumanityinourselvesasthesubject:toneglectthesemightperhapsbeconsistentwiththemaintenanceofhumanityasanendinitself,butnotwiththeadvancementofthisend.

Fourthly,asregardsmeritoriousdutiestowardsothers:Thenaturalendwhichallmenhaveistheirownhappiness.Nowhumanitymightindeedsubsist,althoughnooneshouldcontributeanythingtothehappinessofothers,providedhedidnotintentionallywithdrawanythingfromit;butafterallthiswouldonlyharmonizenegativelynotpositivelywithhumanityasanendinitself,ifeveryonedoesnotalsoendeavour,asfarasinhimlies,toforwardtheendsofothers.Fortheendsofanysubjectwhichisanendinhimselfoughtasfaraspossibletobemyendsalso,ifthatconceptionistohaveitsfulleffectwithme.

Thisprinciple,thathumanityandgenerallyeveryrationalnatureisanendinitself(whichisthesupremelimitingconditionofeveryman'sfreedomofaction),isnotborrowedfromexperience,firstly,becauseitisuniversal,applyingasitdoestoallrationalbeingswhatever,andexperienceisnotcapableofdetermininganythingaboutthem;secondly,becauseitdoesnotpresenthumanityasanend

tomen(subjectively),thatisasanobjectwhichmendoofthemselvesactuallyadoptasanend;butasanobjectiveend,whichmustasalawconstitutethesupremelimitingconditionofalloursubjectiveends,letthembewhatwewill;itmustthereforespringfrompurereason.Infacttheobjectiveprincipleofallpracticallegislationlies(accordingtothefirstprinciple)intheruleanditsformofuniversalitywhichma

esitcapableofbeingalaw(say,e.g.,alawofnature);butthesubjectiveprincipleisintheend;nowbythesecondprinciplethesubjectofallendsiseachrationalbeing,inasmuchasitisanendinitself.Hencefollowsthethirdpracticalprincipleofthewill,whichistheultimateconditionofitsharmonywithuniversalpracticalreason,viz.:theideaofthewillofeveryrationalbeingasauniversallylegislativewill.

Onthisprincipleallmaximsarerejectedwhichareinconsistentwiththewillbeingitselfuniversallegislator.Thusthewillisnotsubjectsimplytothelaw,butsosubjectthatitmustberegardedasitselfgivingthelawand,onthisgroundonly,subjecttothelaw(ofwhichitcanregarditselfastheauthor).

Inthepreviousimperatives,namely,thatbasedontheconceptionoftheconformityofactionstogenerallaws,asinaphysicalsystemofnature,andthatbasedontheuniversalprerogativeofrationalbeingsasendsinthemselves-theseimperatives,justbecausetheywereconceivedascategorical,excludedfromanyshareintheirauthorityalladmixtureofanyinterestasaspringofaction;they

were,however,onlyassumedtobecategorical,becausesuchanassumptionwasnecessarytoexplaintheconceptionofduty.Butwecouldnotproveindependentlythattherearepracticalpropositionswhichcommandcategorically,norcanitbeprovedinthissection;onething,however,couldbedone,namely,toindicateintheimperativeitself,bysomedeterminateexpression,thatinthecaseofvolitionfromdutyallinterestisrenounced,whichisthespecificcriterionofcategoricalasdistinguishedfromhypotheticalimperatives.Thisisdoneinthepresent(third)formulaoftheprinciple,namely,intheideaofthewillofeveryrationalbeingasauniversally



legislatingwill.

Foralthoughawillwhichissubjecttolawsmaybeattachedtothislawbymeansofaninterest,yetawillwhichisitselfasupremelawgiversofarasitissuchcannotpossiblydependonanyinterest,sinceawillsodependentwoulditselfstillneedanotherlawrestrictingtheinterestofitsself-lovebytheconditionthatitshouldbevalidasuniversallaw.

Thustheprinciplethateveryhumanwillisawillwhichinallitsmaximsgivesuniversallaws,*provideditbeotherwisejustified,wouldbeverywelladaptedtobethecategoricalimperative,inthisrespect,namely,thatjustbecauseoftheideaofuniversallegislationitisnotbasedoninterest,andthereforeitaloneamongallpossibleimperativescanbeunconditional.Orstillbetter,convertingtheproposition,ifthereisacategoricalimperative(i.e.,alawforthewillofeveryrationalbeing),itcanonlycommandthateverythingbedonefrommaximsofone'swillregardedasawillwhichcouldatthesametimewillthatitshoulditselfgiveuniversallaws,forinthatcaseonlythepracticalprincipleandtheimperativewhichitobeysareunconditional,sincetheycannotbebasedonanyinterest.

*Imaybeexcusedfromadducingexamplestoelucidatethisprinciple,asthosewhichhavealreadybeenusedtoelucidatethecategoricalimperativeanditsformulawouldallservefortheli epurposehere.

Loo

ingbac

nowonallpreviousattemptstodiscovertheprincipleofmorality,weneednotwonderwhytheyallfailed.Itwasseenthatmanwasboundtolawsbyduty,butitwasnotobservedthatthelawstowhichheissubjectareonlythoseofhisowngiving,thoughatthesametimetheyareuniversal,andthatheisonly

boundtoactinconformitywithhisownwill;awill,however,whichisdesignedbynaturetogiveuniversallaws.Forwhenonehasconceivedmanonlyassubjecttoalaw(nomatterwhat),thenthislawrequiredsomeinterest,eitherbywayofattractionorconstraint,sinceitdidnotoriginateasalawfromhisownwill,butthiswillwasaccordingtoalawobligedbysomethingelsetoactinacertainmanner.Nowbythisnecessaryconsequenceallthelabourspentinfindingasupremeprincipleofdutywasirrevocablylost.Formenneverelicitedduty,butonlyanecessityofactingfromacertaininterest.Whetherthisinterestwasprivateorotherwise,inanycasetheimperativemustbeconditionalandcouldnotbyanymeansbecapableofbeingamoralcommand.Iwillthereforecallthistheprincipleofautonomyofthewill,incontrastwitheveryother

whichIaccordinglyrec

onasheteronomy.

Theconceptionofthewillofeveryrationalbeingasonewhichmustconsideritselfasgivinginallthemaximsofitswilluniversallaws,soastojudgeitselfanditsactionsfromthispointofview-thisconceptionleadstoanotherwhichdependsonitandisveryfruitful,namelythatofa

ingdomofends.

Bya

ingdomIunderstandtheunionofdifferentrationalbeingsinasystembycommonlaws.Nowsinceitisbylawsthatendsare



determinedasregardstheiruniversalvalidity,hence,ifweabstractfromthepersonaldifferencesofrationalbeingsandli

ewisefromallthecontentoftheirprivateends,weshallbeabletoconceiveallendscombinedinasystematicwhole(includingbothrationalbeingsasendsinthemselves,andalsothespecialendswhicheachmayproposetohimself),thatistosay,wecanconceivea

ingdomofends,whichontheprecedingprinciplesispossible.

Forallrationalbeingscomeunderthelawthateachofthemmusttreatitselfandallothersnevermerelyasmeans,butineverycaseatthesametimeasendsinthemselves.Henceresultsasystematicunionofrationalbeingbycommonobjectivelaws,i.e.,a

ingdomwhichmaybecalleda

ingdomofends,sincewhattheselawshaveinviewisjusttherelationofthesebeingstooneanotherasendsandmeans.Itiscertainlyonlyanideal.

Arationalbeingbelongsasamembertothe

ingdomofendswhen,althoughgivinguniversallawsinit,heisalsohimselfsubjecttotheselaws.Hebelongstoitassovereignwhen,whilegivinglaws,heisnotsubjecttothewillofanyother.

Arationalbeingmustalwaysregardhimselfasgivinglawseitherasmemberorassovereignina

ingdomofendswhichisrenderedpossiblebythefreedomofwill.Hecannot,however,maintainthelatter

positionmerelybythemaximsofhiswill,butonlyincaseheisacompletelyindependentbeingwithoutwantsandwithunrestrictedpoweradequatetohiswill.

Moralityconsiststheninthereferenceofallactiontothelegislationwhichalonecanrendera

ingdomofendspossible.Thislegislationmustbecapableofexistingineveryrationalbeingandofemanatingfromhiswill,sothattheprincipleofthiswillisnevertoactonanymaximwhichcouldnotwithoutcontradictionbealsoauniversallawand,accordingly,alwayssotoactthatthewillcouldatthesametimeregarditselfasgivinginitsmaximsuniversallaws.Ifnowthemaximsofrationalbeingsarenotbytheirownnaturecoincidentwiththisobjectiveprinciple,thenthenecessityofacting

onitiscalledpracticalnecessitation,i.e.,duty.Dutydoesnotapplytothesovereigninthe

ingdomofends,butitdoestoeverymemberofitandtoallinthesamedegree.

Thepracticalnecessityofactingonthisprinciple,i.e.,duty,doesnotrestatallonfeelings,impulses,orinclinations,butsolelyontherelationofrationalbeingstooneanother,arelationinwhichthewillofarationalbeingmustalwaysberegardedaslegislative,sinceotherwiseitcouldnotbeconceivedasanendinitself.Reasonthenreferseverymaximofthewill,regardingitaslegislatinguniversally,toeveryotherwillandalsotoeveryactiontowardsoneself;andthisnotonaccountofanyotherpracticalmotiveoranyfutureadvantage,butfromtheideaofthedignityof

arationalbeing,obeyingnolawbutthatwhichhehimselfalsogives.

Inthe

ingdomofendseverythinghaseithervalueordignity.Whateverhasavaluecanbereplacedbysomethingelsewhichisequivalent;whatever,ontheotherhand,isaboveallvalue,andthereforeadmitsofnoequivalent,hasadignity.

Whateverhasreferencetothegeneralinclinationsandwantsofman

indhasamar

etvalue;whatever,withoutpresupposingawant,correspondstoacertaintaste,thatistoasatisfactioninthe



merepurposelessplayofourfaculties,hasafancyvalue;butthatwhichconstitutestheconditionunderwhichaloneanythingcanbeanendinitself,thishasnotmerelyarelativeworth,i.e.,value,butanintrinsicworth,thatis,dignity.

Nowmoralityistheconditionunderwhichalonearationalbeingcanbeanendinhimself,sincebythisaloneisitpossiblethatheshouldbealegislatingmemberinthe

ingdomofends.Thusmorality,andhumanityascapableofit,isthatwhichalonehasdignity.S

illanddiligenceinlabourhaveamar

etvalue;wit,livelyimagination,andhumour,havefancyvalue;ontheotherhand,fidelitytopromises,benevolencefromprinciple(notfrominstinct),haveanintrinsicworth.Neithernaturenorartcontainsanythingwhichindefaultoftheseitcouldputintheirplace,fortheirworthconsistsnotintheeffectswhichspringfromthem,notintheuseandadvantagewhichtheysecure,butinthedispositionofmind,thatis,themaximsofthewillwhicharereadytomanifestthemselvesinsuchactions,eventhoughtheyshouldnothavethedesiredeffect.Theseactionsalsoneednorecommendationfromanysubjectivetasteorsentiment,thattheymaybeloo edonwithimmediatefavourandsatisfaction:theyneednoimmediatepropensionorfeelingforthem;theyexhibitthewillthatperformsthemasanobjectofanimmediaterespect,andnothingbutreasonisrequiredtoimposethemonthewill;nottoflatteritintothem,which,inthe

caseofduties,wouldbeacontradiction.Thisestimationthereforeshowsthattheworthofsuchadispositionisdignity,andplacesitinfinitelyaboveallvalue,withwhichitcannotforamomentbebroughtintocomparisonorcompetitionwithoutasitwereviolatingitssanctity.

Whatthenisitwhichjustifiesvirtueorthemorallygooddisposition,inma ingsuchloftyclaims?Itisnothinglessthantheprivilegeitsecurestotherationalbeingofparticipatinginthegivingofuniversallaws,bywhichitqualifieshimtobeamemberofapossible

ingdomofends,aprivilegetowhichhewasalreadydestinedbyhisownnatureasbeinganendinhimselfand,onthataccount,legislatinginthe

ingdomofends;freeasregardsall

lawsofphysicalnature,andobeyingthoseonlywhichhehimselfgives,andbywhichhismaximscanbelongtoasystemofuniversallaw,towhichatthesametimehesubmitshimself.Fornothinghasanyworthexceptwhatthelawassignsit.Nowthelegislationitselfwhichassignstheworthofeverythingmustforthatveryreasonpossessdignity,thatisanunconditionalincomparableworth;andthewordrespectalonesuppliesabecomingexpressionfortheesteemwhicharationalbeingmusthaveforit.Autonomythenisthebasisofthedignityofhumanandofeveryrationalnature.

Thethreemodesofpresentingtheprincipleofmoralitythathavebeenadducedareatbottomonlysomanyformulaeoftheverysamelaw,andeachofitselfinvolvestheothertwo.Thereis,however,a

differenceinthem,butitisrathersubjectivelythanobjectivelypractical,intendednamelytobringanideaofthereasonnearertointuition(bymeansofacertainanalogy)andtherebynearertofeeling.Allmaxims,infact,have:

1.Aform,consistinginuniversality;andinthisviewtheformulaofthemoralimperativeisexpressedthus,thatthemaximsmustbesochosenasiftheyweretoserveasuniversallawsofnature.



2.Amatter,namely,anend,andheretheformulasaysthattherationalbeing,asitisanendbyitsownnatureandthereforeanendinitself,mustineverymaximserveastheconditionlimitingallmerelyrelativeandarbitraryends.

3.Acompletecharacterizationofallmaximsbymeansofthatformula,namely,thatallmaximsoughtbytheirownlegislationtoharmonizewithapossible

ingdomofendsaswitha

ingdomofnature.*Thereisaprogresshereintheorderofthecategoriesofunityoftheformofthewill(itsuniversality),pluralityofthematter(theobjects,i.e.,theends),andtotalityofthesystemofthese.Informingourmoraljudgementofactions,itisbettertoproceedalwaysonthestrictmethodandstartfromthegeneralformulaofthecategoricalimperative:Actaccordingtoamaximwhichcanatthesametimema

eitselfauniversallaw.If,however,wewishtogainanentranceforthemorallaw,itisveryusefultobringoneandthesameactionunderthethreespecifiedconceptions,andtherebyasfaraspossibletobringitnearertointuition.

*Teleologyconsidersnatureasa

ingdomofends;ethicsregardsapossible

ingdomofendsasa

ingdomnature.Inthefirstcase,the ingdomofendsisatheoreticalidea,adoptedtoexplainwhat

actuallyis.Inthelatteritisapracticalidea,adoptedtobringaboutthatwhichisnotyet,butwhichcanberealizedbyourconduct,namely,ifitconformstothisidea.

Wecannowendwherewestartedatthebeginning,namely,withtheconceptionofawillunconditionallygood.Thatwillisabsolutelygoodwhichcannotbeevil-inotherwords,whosemaxim,ifmadeauniversallaw,couldnevercontradictitself.Thisprinciple,then,isitssupremelaw:"Actalwaysonsuchamaximasthoucanstatthesametimewilltobeauniversallaw";thisisthesoleconditionunderwhichawillcannevercontradictitself;andsuchanimperativeis

categorical.Sincethevalidityofthewillasauniversallawforpossibleactionsisanalogoustotheuniversalconnexionoftheexistenceofthingsbygenerallaws,whichistheformalnotionofnatureingeneral,thecategoricalimperativecanalsobeexpressedthus:Actonmaximswhichcanatthesametimehavefortheirobjectthemselvesasuniversallawsofnature.Suchthenistheformulaofanabsolutelygoodwill.

Rationalnatureisdistinguishedfromtherestofnaturebythis,thatitsetsbeforeitselfanend.Thisendwouldbethematterofeverygoodwill.Butsinceintheideaofawillthatisabsolutelygoodwithoutbeinglimitedbyanycondition(ofattainingthisorthatend)wemustabstractwhollyfromeveryendtobeeffected(sincethis

wouldma

eeverywillonlyrelativelygood),itfollowsthatinthiscasetheendmustbeconceived,notasanendtobeeffected,butasanindependentlyexistingend.Consequentlyitisconceivedonlynegatively,i.e.,asthatwhichwemustneveractagainstandwhich,therefore,mustneverberegardedmerelyasmeans,butmustineveryvolitionbeesteemedasanendli

ewise.Nowthisendcanbenothingbutthesubjectofallpossibleends,sincethisisalsothesubjectofapossibleabsolutelygoodwill;forsuchawillcannotwithoutcontradictionbepostponedtoanyotherobject.Theprinciple:"Soactinregardtoeveryrationalbeing(thyselfandothers),thathemay



alwayshaveplaceinthymaximasanendinhimself,"isaccordinglyessentiallyidenticalwiththisother:"Actuponamaximwhich,atthesametime,involvesitsownuniversalvalidityforeveryrationalbeing."ForthatinusingmeansforeveryendIshouldlimitmymaximbytheconditionofitsholdinggoodasalawforeverysubject,thiscomestothesamethingasthatthefundamentalprincipleofallmaximsofactionmustbethatthesubjectofallends,i.e.,therationalbeinghimself,beneveremployedmerelyasmeans,butasthesupremeconditionrestrictingtheuseofallmeans,thatisineverycaseasanendli

ewise.

Itfollowsincontestablythat,towhateverlawsanyrationalbeingmaybesubject,hebeinganendinhimselfmustbeabletoregardhimselfasalsolegislatinguniversallyinrespectofthesesamelaws,sinceitisjustthisfitnessofhismaximsforuniversallegislationthatdistinguisheshimasanendinhimself;alsoitfollowsthatthisimplieshisdignity(prerogative)aboveallmerephysicalbeings,thathemustalwaysta

ehismaximsfromthepointofviewwhichregardshimselfand,li

ewise,everyotherrationalbeingaslaw-givingbeings(onwhichaccounttheyarecalledpersons).Inthiswayaworldofrationalbeings(mundusintelligibilis)ispossibleasa

ingdomofends,andthisbyvirtueofthelegislationpropertoallpersonsasmembers.Thereforeeveryrationalbeingmustsoactasifhewerebyhismaximsineverycasealegislating

memberintheuniversal

ingdomofends.Theformalprincipleofthesemaximsis:"Soactasifthymaximweretoserveli

ewiseastheuniversallaw(ofallrationalbeings)."A

ingdomofendsisthusonlypossibleontheanalogyofa ingdomofnature,theformerhoweveronlybymaxims,thatisself-imposedrules,thelatteronlybythelawsofefficientcausesactingundernecessitationfromwithout.Nevertheless,althoughthesystemofnatureisloo

eduponasamachine,yetsofarasithasreferencetorationalbeingsasitsends,itisgivenonthisaccountthenameofa

ingdomofnature.Nowsucha

ingdomofendswouldbeactuallyrealizedbymeansofmaximsconformingtothecanonwhichthecategoricalimperativeprescribestoallrationalbeings,iftheywereuniversallyfollowed.Butalthougharationalbeing,evenifhepunctuallyfollowsthismaximhimself,

cannotrec

onuponallothersbeingthereforetruetothesame,norexpectthatthe

ingdomofnatureanditsorderlyarrangementsshallbeinharmonywithhimasafittingmember,soastoforma

ingdomofendstowhichhehimselfcontributes,thatistosay,thatitshallfavourhisexpectationofhappiness,stillthatlaw:"Actaccordingtothemaximsofamemberofamerelypossible

ingdomofendslegislatinginituniversally,"remainsinitsfullforce,inasmuchasitcommandscategorically.Anditisjustinthisthattheparadoxlies;thatthemeredignityofmanasarationalcreature,withoutanyotherendoradvantagetobeattainedthereby,inotherwords,respectforamereidea,shouldyetserveasaninflexiblepreceptofthewill,andthatitispreciselyinthisindependenceofthemaximonallsuchspringsofactionthatitssublimityconsists;anditisthis

thatma

eseveryrationalsubjectworthytobealegislativememberinthe

ingdomofends:forotherwisehewouldhavetobeconceivedonlyassubjecttothephysicallawofhiswants.Andalthoughweshouldsupposethe

ingdomofnatureandthe

ingdomofendstobeunitedunderonesovereign,sothatthelatter

ingdomtherebyceasedtobeamereideaandacquiredtruereality,thenitwouldnodoubtgaintheaccessionofastrongspring,butbynomeansanyincreaseofitsintrinsicworth.Forthissoleabsolutelawgivermust,notwithstandingthis,bealwaysconceivedasestimatingtheworthofrationalbeingsonlybytheirdisinterestedbehaviour,asprescribed



tothemselvesfromthatidea[thedignityofman]alone.Theessenceofthingsisnotalteredbytheirexternalrelations,andthatwhich,abstractingfromthese,aloneconstitutestheabsoluteworthofman,isalsothatbywhichhemustbejudged,whoeverthejudgemaybe,andevenbytheSupremeBeing.Morality,then,istherelationofactionstotherelationofactionswill,thatis,totheautonomyofpotentialuniversallegislationbyitsmaxims.Anactionthatisconsistentwiththeautonomyofthewillispermitted;onethatdoesnotagreetherewithisforbidden.Awillwhosemaximsnecessarilycoincidewiththelawsofautonomyisaholywill,goodabsolutely.Thedependenceofawillnotabsolutelygoodontheprincipleofautonomy(moralnecessitation)isobligation.This,then,cannotbeappliedtoaholybeing.Theobjectivenecessityofactionsfromobligationiscalledduty.

Fromwhathasjustbeensaid,itiseasytoseehowithappensthat,althoughtheconceptionofdutyimpliessubjectiontothelaw,weyetascribeacertaindignityandsublimitytothepersonwhofulfilsallhisduties.Thereisnot,indeed,anysublimityinhim,sofarasheissubjecttothemorallaw;butinasmuchasinregardtothatverylawheisli

ewisealegislator,andonthataccountalonesubjecttoit,hehassublimity.Wehavealsoshownabovethatneitherfearnorinclination,butsimplyrespectforthelaw,isthespringwhichcangiveactionsamoralworth.Ourownwill,sofaraswe

supposeittoactonlyundertheconditionthatitsmaximsarepotentiallyuniversallaws,thisidealwillwhichispossibletousistheproperobjectofrespect;andthedignityofhumanityconsistsjustinthiscapacityofbeinguniversallylegislative,thoughwiththeconditionthatitisitselfsubjecttothissamelegislation.

TheAutonomyoftheWillastheSupremePrincipleofMorality

Autonomyofthewillisthatpropertyofitbywhichitisalaw

toitself(independentlyofanypropertyoftheobjectsofvolition).Theprincipleofautonomythenis:"Alwayssotochoosethatthesamevolitionshallcomprehendthemaximsofourchoiceasauniversallaw."Wecannotprovethatthispracticalruleisanimperative,i.e.,thatthewillofeveryrationalbeingisnecessarilyboundtoitasacondition,byamereanalysisoftheconceptionswhichoccurinit,sinceitisasyntheticalproposition;wemustadvancebeyondthecognitionoftheobjectstoacriticalexaminationofthesubject,thatis,ofthepurepracticalreason,forthissyntheticpropositionwhichcommandsapodeicticallymustbecapableofbeingcognizedwhollyapriori.Thismatter,however,doesnotbelongtothepresentsection.Butthattheprincipleofautonomyinquestionisthesoleprincipleofmoralscanbereadily

shownbymereanalysisoftheconceptionsofmorality.Forbythisanalysiswefindthatitsprinciplemustbeacategoricalimperativeandthatwhatthiscommandsisneithermorenorlessthanthisveryautonomy.

HeteronomyoftheWillastheSourceofallspuriousPrinciples

ofMorality



Ifthewillsee

sthelawwhichistodetermineitanywhereelsethaninthefitnessofitsmaximstobeuniversallawsofitsowndictation,consequentlyifitgoesoutofitselfandsee

sthislawinthecharacterofanyofitsobjects,therealwaysresultsheteronomy.Thewillinthatcasedoesnotgiveitselfthelaw,butitisgivenbytheobjectthroughitsrelationtothewill.Thisrelation,whetheritrestsoninclinationoronconceptionsofreason,onlyadmitsofhypotheticalimperatives:"IoughttodosomethingbecauseIwishforsomethingelse."Onthecontrary,themoral,andthereforecategorical,imperativesays:"Ioughttodosoandso,eventhoughIshouldnotwishforanythingelse."E.g.,theformersays:"Ioughtnottolie,ifIwouldretainmyreputation";thelattersays:"Ioughtnottolie,althoughitshouldnotbringmetheleastdiscredit."Thelatterthereforemustsofarabstractfromallobjectsthattheyshallhavenoinfluenceonthewill,inorderthatpracticalreason(will)maynotberestrictedtoadministeringaninterestnotbelongingtoit,butmaysimplyshowitsowncommandingauthorityasthesupremelegislation.Thus,e.g.,Ioughttoendeavourtopromotethehappinessofothers,notasifitsrealizationinvolvedanyconcernofmine(whetherbyimmediateinclinationorbyanysatisfactionindirectlygainedthroughreason),butsimplybecausea

maximwhichexcludesitcannotbecomprehendedasauniversallawinoneandthesamevolition.

ClassificationofallPrinciplesofMoralitywhichcanbe

foundedontheConceptionofHeteronomy

Hereaselsewherehumanreasoninitspureuse,solongasitwasnotcriticallyexamined,hasfirsttriedallpossiblewrongways

beforeitsucceededinfindingtheonetrueway.

Allprincipleswhichcanbeta

enfromthispointofviewareeitherempiricalorrational.Theformer,drawnfromtheprincipleofhappiness,arebuiltonphysicalormoralfeelings;thelatter,drawnfromtheprincipleofperfection,arebuilteitherontherationalconceptionofperfectionasapossibleeffect,oronthatofanindependentperfection(thewillofGod)asthedeterminingcauseofourwill.

Empiricalprinciplesarewhollyincapableofservingasafoundationformorallaws.Fortheuniversalitywithwhichtheseshouldholdforallrationalbeingswithoutdistinction,theunconditional

practicalnecessitywhichistherebyimposedonthem,islostwhentheirfoundationista

enfromtheparticularconstitutionofhumannature,ortheaccidentalcircumstancesinwhichitisplaced.Theprincipleofprivatehappiness,however,isthemostobjectionable,notmerelybecauseitisfalse,andexperiencecontradictsthesuppositionthatprosperityisalwaysproportionedtogoodconduct,noryetmerelybecauseitcontributesnothingtotheestablishmentofmorality-sinceitisquiteadifferentthingtoma

eaprosperousmanandagoodman,ortoma

eoneprudentandsharp-sightedforhisowninterestsandtoma

ehimvirtuous-but



becausethespringsitprovidesformoralityaresuchasratherundermineitanddestroyitssublimity,sincetheyputthemotivestovirtueandtoviceinthesameclassandonlyteachustoma

eabettercalculation,thespecificdifferencebetweenvirtueandvicebeingentirelyextinguished.Ontheotherhand,astomoralfeeling,thissupposedspecialsense,*theappealtoitisindeedsuperficialwhenthosewhocannotthin

believethatfeelingwillhelpthemout,eveninwhatconcernsgenerallaws:andbesides,feelings,whichnaturallydifferinfinitelyindegree,cannotfurnishauniformstandardofgoodandevil,norhasanyonearighttoformjudgementsforothersbyhisownfeelings:neverthelessthismoralfeelingisnearertomoralityanditsdignityinthisrespect,thatitpaysvirtuethehonourofascribingtoherimmediatelythesatisfactionandesteemwehaveforheranddoesnot,asitwere,tellhertoherfacethatwearenotattachedtoherbyherbeautybutbyprofit.

*Iclasstheprincipleofmoralfeelingunderthatofhappiness,becauseeveryempiricalinterestpromisestocontributetoourwell-beingbytheagreeablenessthatathingaffords,whetheritbeimmediatelyandwithoutaviewtoprofit,orwhetherprofitberegarded.Wemustli

ewise,withHutcheson,classtheprincipleofsympathywiththehappinessofothersunderhisassumedmoralsense.

Amongsttherationalprinciplesofmorality,theontologicalconceptionofperfection,notwithstandingitsdefects,isbetterthanthetheologicalconceptionwhichderivesmoralityfromaDivineabsolutelyperfectwill.Theformeris,nodoubt,emptyandindefiniteandconsequentlyuselessforfindingintheboundlessfieldofpossiblerealitythegreatestamountsuitableforus;moreover,inattemptingtodistinguishspecificallytherealityofwhichwearenowspea

ingfromeveryother,itinevitablytendstoturninacircleandcannotavoidtacitlypresupposingthemoralitywhichitistoexplain;itisneverthelesspreferabletothetheologicalview,first,

becausewehavenointuitionofthedivineperfectionandcanonlydeduceitfromourownconceptions,themostimportantofwhichisthatofmorality,andourexplanationwouldthusbeinvolvedinagrosscircle;and,inthenextplace,ifweavoidthis,theonlynotionoftheDivinewillremainingtousisaconceptionmadeupoftheattributesofdesireofgloryanddominion,combinedwiththeawfulconceptionsofmightandvengeance,andanysystemofmoralserectedonthisfoundationwouldbedirectlyopposedtomorality.

However,ifIhadtochoosebetweenthenotionofthemoralsenseandthatofperfectioningeneral(twosystemswhichatleastdonotwea

enmorality,althoughtheyaretotallyincapableofservingasitsfoundation),thenIshoulddecideforthelatter,becauseitat

leastwithdrawsthedecisionofthequestionfromthesensibilityandbringsittothecourtofpurereason;andalthoughevenhereitdecidesnothing,itatalleventspreservestheindefiniteidea(ofawillgoodinitselffreefromcorruption,untilitshallbemorepreciselydefined.

FortherestIthin

Imaybeexcusedherefromadetailedrefutationofallthesedoctrines;thatwouldonlybesuperfluouslabour,sinceitissoeasy,andisprobablysowellseenevenbythosewhoseofficerequiresthemtodecideforoneofthesetheories



(becausetheirhearerswouldnottoleratesuspensionofjudgement).Butwhatinterestsusmorehereisto

nowthattheprimefoundationofmoralitylaiddownbyalltheseprinciplesisnothingbutheteronomyofthewill,andforthisreasontheymustnecessarilymisstheiraim.

Ineverycasewhereanobjectofthewillhastobesupposed,inorderthattherulemaybeprescribedwhichistodeterminethewill,theretheruleissimplyheteronomy;theimperativeisconditional,namely,iforbecauseonewishesforthisobject,oneshouldactsoandso:henceitcannevercommandmorally,thatis,categorically.Whethertheobjectdeterminesthewillbymeansofinclination,asintheprincipleofprivatehappiness,orbymeansofreasondirectedtoobjectsofourpossiblevolitiongenerally,asintheprincipleofperfection,ineithercasethewillneverdeterminesitselfimmediatelybytheconceptionoftheaction,butonlybytheinfluencewhichtheforeseeneffectoftheactionhasonthewill;Ioughttodosomething,onthisaccount,becauseIwishforsomethingelse;andheretheremustbeyetanotherlawassumedinmeasitssubject,bywhichInecessarilywillthisotherthing,andthislawagainrequiresanimperativetorestrictthismaxim.Fortheinfluencewhichtheconceptionofanobjectwithinthereachofourfacultiescanexerciseonthewillofthesubject,inconsequenceofitsnaturalproperties,dependsonthenatureofthesubject,either

thesensibility(inclinationandtaste),ortheunderstandingandreason,theemploymentofwhichisbythepeculiarconstitutionoftheirnatureattendedwithsatisfaction.Itfollowsthatthelawwouldbe,properlyspea ing,givenbynature,and,assuch,itmustbe nownandprovedbyexperienceandwouldconsequentlybecontingentandthereforeincapableofbeinganapodeicticpracticalrule,suchasthemoralrulemustbe.Notonlyso,butitisinevitablyonlyheteronomy;thewilldoesnotgiveitselfthelaw,butisgivenbyaforeignimpulsebymeansofaparticularnaturalconstitutionofthesubjectadaptedtoreceiveit.Anabsolutelygoodwill,then,theprincipleofwhichmustbeacategoricalimperative,willbeindeterminateasregardsallobjectsandwillcontainmerelytheformofvolitiongenerally,andthatasautonomy,thatistosay,thecapabilityofthe

maximsofeverygoodwilltoma

ethemselvesauniversallaw,isitselftheonlylawwhichthewillofeveryrationalbeingimposesonitself,withoutneedingtoassumeanyspringorinterestasafoundation.

Howsuchasyntheticalpracticalaprioripropositionispossible,andwhyitisnecessary,isaproblemwhosesolutiondoesnotliewithintheboundsofthemetaphysicofmorals;andwehavenothereaffirmeditstruth,muchlessprofessedtohaveaproofofitinourpower.Wesimplyshowedbythedevelopmentoftheuniversallyreceivednotionofmoralitythatanautonomyofthewillisinevitablyconnectedwithit,orratherisitsfoundation.Whoeverthenholdsmoralitytobeanythingreal,andnotachimericalideawithoutany

truth,mustli

ewiseadmittheprincipleofitthatishereassigned.Thissectionthen,li

ethefirst,wasmerelyanalytical.Nowtoprovethatmoralityisnocreationofthebrain,whichitcannotbeifthecategoricalimperativeandwithittheautonomyofthewillistrue,andasanaprioriprincipleabsolutelynecessary,thissupposesthepossibilityofasyntheticuseofpurepracticalreason,whichhoweverwecannotventureonwithoutfirstgivingacriticalexaminationofthisfacultyofreason.Intheconcludingsectionweshallgivetheprincipaloutlinesofthiscriticalexaminationasfarasissufficientforourpurpose.



SEC_3

THIRDSECTION

TRANSITIONFROMTHEMETAPHYSICOFMORALSTOTHE

CRITIQUEOFPUREPRACTICALREASON

TheConceptofFreedomistheKeythatexplainstheAutonomyoftheWill

Thewillisa

indofcausalitybelongingtolivingbeingsinsofarastheyarerational,andfreedomwouldbethispropertyofsuchcausalitythatitcanbeefficient,independentlyofforeigncausesdeterminingit;justasphysicalnecessityisthepropertythatthecausalityofallirrationalbeingshasofbeingdeterminedtoactivitybytheinfluenceofforeigncauses.

Theprecedingdefinitionoffreedomisnegativeandthereforeunfruitfulforthediscoveryofitsessence,butitleadstoapositiveconceptionwhichissomuchthemorefullandfruitful.

Sincetheconceptionofcausalityinvolvesthatoflaws,accordingtowhich,bysomethingthatwecallcause,somethingelse,namelytheeffect,mustbeproduced;hence,althoughfreedomisnotapropertyofthewilldependingonphysicallaws,yetitisnotforthatreasonlawless;onthecontraryitmustbeacausalityactingaccordingtoimmutablelaws,butofapeculiar

ind;otherwiseafreewillwouldbeanabsurdity.Physicalnecessityisaheteronomyoftheefficientcauses,foreveryeffectispossibleonlyaccordingto

thislaw,thatsomethingelsedeterminestheefficientcausetoexertitscausality.Whatelsethencanfreedomofthewillbebutautonomy,thatis,thepropertyofthewilltobealawtoitself?Buttheproposition:"Thewillisineveryactionalawtoitself,"onlyexpressestheprinciple:"Toactonnoothermaximthanthatwhichcanalsohaveasanobjectitselfasauniversallaw."Nowthisispreciselytheformulaofthecategoricalimperativeandistheprincipleofmorality,sothatafreewillandawillsubjecttomorallawsareoneandthesame.

Onthehypothesis,then,offreedomofthewill,moralitytogetherwithitsprinciplefollowsfromitbymereanalysisoftheconception.However,thelatterisasyntheticproposition;viz.,anabsolutely

goodwillisthatwhosemaximcanalwaysincludeitselfregardedasauniversallaw;forthispropertyofitsmaximcanneverbediscoveredbyanalysingtheconceptionofanabsolutelygoodwill.Nowsuchsyntheticpropositionsareonlypossibleinthisway:thatthetwocognitionsareconnectedtogetherbytheirunionwithathirdinwhichtheyarebothtobefound.Thepositiveconceptoffreedomfurnishesthisthirdcognition,whichcannot,aswithphysicalcauses,bethenatureofthesensibleworld(intheconceptofwhichwefindconjoinedtheconceptofsomethinginrelationascausetosomethingelseaseffect).Wecannotnowatonceshowwhatthisthirdisto



whichfreedompointsusandofwhichwehaveanideaapriori,norcanwema

eintelligiblehowtheconceptoffreedomisshowntobelegitimatefromprinciplesofpurepracticalreasonandwithitthepossibilityofacategoricalimperative;butsomefurtherpreparationisrequired.

FreedommustbepresupposedasaPropertyoftheWill

ofallRationalBeings

Itisnotenoughtopredicatefreedomofourownwill,fromWhateverreason,ifwehavenotsufficientgroundsforpredicatingthesameofallrationalbeings.Forasmoralityservesasalawforusonlybecausewearerationalbeings,itmustalsoholdforallrationalbeings;andasitmustbededucedsimplyfromthepropertyoffreedom,itmustbeshownthatfreedomalsoisapropertyofallrationalbeings.Itisnotenough,then,toproveitfromcertainsupposedexperiencesofhumannature(whichindeedisquiteimpossible,anditcanonlybeshownapriori),butwemustshowthatitbelongstotheactivityofallrationalbeingsendowedwithawill.NowIsay

everybeingthatcannotactexceptundertheideaoffreedomisjustforthatreasoninapracticalpointofviewreallyfree,thatistosay,alllawswhichareinseparablyconnectedwithfreedomhavethesameforceforhimasifhiswillhadbeenshowntobefreeinitselfbyaprooftheoreticallyconclusive.*NowIaffirmthatwemustattributetoeveryrationalbeingwhichhasawillthatithasalsotheideaoffreedomandactsentirelyunderthisidea.Forinsuchabeingweconceiveareasonthatispractical,thatis,hascausalityinreferencetoitsobjects.Nowwecannotpossiblyconceiveareasonconsciouslyreceivingabiasfromanyotherquarterwithrespecttoitsjudgements,forthenthesubjectwouldascribethedeterminationofitsjudgementnottoitsownreason,buttoanimpulse.Itmustregarditselfastheauthorofitsprinciples

independentofforeigninfluences.Consequentlyaspracticalreasonorasthewillofarationalbeingitmustregarditselfasfree,thatistosay,thewillofsuchabeingcannotbeawillofitsownexceptundertheideaoffreedom.Thisideamustthereforeinapracticalpointofviewbeascribedtoeveryrationalbeing.

*Iadoptthismethodofassumingfreedommerelyasanideawhichrationalbeingssupposeintheiractions,inordertoavoidthenecessityofprovingitinitstheoreticalaspectalso.Theformerissufficientformypurpose;foreventhoughthespeculativeproofshouldnotbemadeout,yetabeingthatcannotactexceptwiththe

ideaoffreedomisboundbythesamelawsthatwouldobligeabeingwhowasactuallyfree.Thuswecanescapeherefromtheonuswhichpressesonthetheory.

OftheInterestattachingtotheIdeasofMorality



Wehavefinallyreducedthedefiniteconceptionofmoralitytotheideaoffreedom.Thislatter,however,wecouldnotprovetobeactuallyapropertyofourselvesorofhumannature;onlywesawthatitmustbepresupposedifwewouldconceiveabeingasrationalandconsciousofitscausalityinrespectofitsactions,i.e.,asendowedwithawill;andsowefindthatonjustthesamegroundswemustascribetoeverybeingendowedwithreasonandwillthisattributeofdeterminingitselftoactionundertheideaofitsfreedom.

Nowitresultedalsofromthepresuppositionoftheseideasthatwebecameawareofalawthatthesubjectiveprinciplesofaction,i.e.,maxims,mustalwaysbesoassumedthattheycanalsoholdasobjective,thatis,universalprinciples,andsoserveasuniversallawsofourowndictation.ButwhythenshouldIsubjectmyselftothisprincipleandthatsimplyasarationalbeing,thusalsosubjectingtoitallotherbeingendowedwithreason?Iwillallowthatnointeresturgesmetothis,forthatwouldnotgiveacategoricalimperative,butImustta

eaninterestinitanddiscernhowthiscomestopass;forthisproperlyan"Iought"isproperlyan"Iwould,"validforeveryrationalbeing,providedonlythatreasondeterminedhisactionswithoutanyhindrance.Butforbeingsthatareinadditionaffectedaswearebyspringsofadifferent ind,namely,sensibility,andinwhosecasethatisnot

alwaysdonewhichreasonalonewoulddo,forthesethatnecessityisexpressedonlyasan"ought,"andthesubjectivenecessityisdifferentfromtheobjective.

Itseemsthenasifthemorallaw,thatis,theprincipleofautonomyofthewill,wereproperlyspea

ingonlypresupposedintheideaoffreedom,andasifwecouldnotproveitsrealityandobjectivenecessityindependently.Inthatcaseweshouldstillhavegainedsomethingconsiderablebyatleastdeterminingthetrueprinciplemoreexactlythanhadpreviouslybeendone;butasregardsitsvalidityandthepracticalnecessityofsubjectingoneselftoit,weshouldnothaveadvancedastep.Forifwewereas

edwhytheuniversalvalidityofourmaximasalawmustbethecondition

restrictingouractions,andonwhatwegroundtheworthwhichweassigntothismannerofacting-aworthsogreatthattherecannotbeanyhigherinterest;andifwewereas

edfurtherhowithappensthatitisbythisaloneamanbelieveshefeelshisownpersonalworth,incomparisonwithwhichthatofanagreeableordisagreeableconditionistoberegardedasnothing,tothesequestionswecouldgivenosatisfactoryanswer.

Wefindindeedsometimesthatwecanta

eaninterestinapersonalqualitywhichdoesnotinvolveanyinterestofexternalcondition,providedthisqualityma

esuscapableofparticipatingintheconditionincasereasonweretoeffecttheallotment;thatistosay,themerebeingworthyofhappinesscaninterestofitself

evenwithoutthemotiveofparticipatinginthishappiness.Thisjudgement,however,isinfactonlytheeffectoftheimportanceofthemorallawwhichwebeforepresupposed(whenbytheideaoffreedomwedetachourselvesfromeveryempiricalinterest);butthatweoughttodetachourselvesfromtheseinterests,i.e.,toconsiderourselvesasfreeinactionandyetassubjecttocertainlaws,soastofindaworthsimplyinourownpersonwhichcancompensateusforthelossofeverythingthatgivesworthtoourcondition;thiswearenotyetabletodiscerninthisway,nordoweseehowitispossiblesotoact-inotherwords,whencethemorallawderivesits



obligation.

Itmustbefreelyadmittedthatthereisasortofcircleherefromwhichitseemsimpossibletoescape.Intheorderofefficientcausesweassumeourselvesfree,inorderthatintheorderofendswemayconceiveourselvesassubjecttomorallaws:andweafterwardsconceiveourselvesassubjecttotheselaws,becausewehaveattributedtoourselvesfreedomofwill:forfreedomandself-legislationofwillarebothautonomyand,therefore,arereciprocalconceptions,andforthisveryreasononemustnotbeusedtoexplaintheotherorgivethereasonofit,butatmostonlylogicalpurposestoreduceapparentlydifferentnotionsofthesameobjecttoonesingleconcept(aswereducedifferentfractionsofthesamevaluetothelowestterms).

Oneresourceremainstous,namely,toinquirewhetherwedonotoccupydifferentpointsofviewwhenbymeansoffreedomwethin

ourselvesascausesefficientapriori,andwhenweformourconceptionofourselvesfromouractionsaseffectswhichweseebeforeoureyes.

Itisaremar

whichneedsnosubtlereflectiontoma

e,butwhichwemayassumethateventhecommonestunderstandingcanma

e,althoughitbeafteritsfashionbyanobscurediscernmentofjudgementwhich

itcallsfeeling,thatallthe"ideas"thatcometousinvoluntarily(asthoseofthesenses)donotenableusto

nowobjectsotherwisethanastheyaffectus;sothatwhattheymaybeinthemselvesremainsun nowntous,andconsequentlythatasregards"ideas"ofthis indevenwiththeclosestattentionandclearnessthattheunderstandingcanapplytothem,wecanbythemonlyattaintothe

nowledgeofappearances,nevertothatofthingsinthemselves.Assoonasthisdistinctionhasoncebeenmade(perhapsmerelyinconsequenceofthedifferenceobservedbetweentheideasgivenusfromwithout,andinwhichwearepassive,andthosethatweproducesimplyfromourselves,andinwhichweshowourownactivity),thenitfollowsofitselfthatwemustadmitandassumebehindtheappearancesomethingelsethatisnotanappearance,namely,thethingsinthemselves;althoughwe

mustadmitthatastheycanneverbe

nowntousexceptastheyaffectus,wecancomenonearertothem,norcanweever

nowwhattheyareinthemselves.Thismustfurnishadistinction,howevercrude,betweenaworldofsenseandtheworldofunderstanding,ofwhichtheformermaybedifferentaccordingtothedifferenceofthesensuousimpressionsinvariousobservers,whilethesecondwhichisitsbasisalwaysremainsthesame,Evenastohimself,amancannotpretendto

nowwhatheisinhimselffromthe

nowledgehehasbyinternalsensation.Forashedoesnotasitwerecreatehimself,anddoesnotcomebytheconceptionofhimselfaprioributempirically,itnaturallyfollowsthathecanobtainhis

nowledgeevenofhimselfonlybytheinnersenseand,consequently,onlythroughtheappearancesofhisnatureandthewayinwhichhis

consciousnessisaffected.Atthesametimebeyondthesecharacteristicsofhisownsubject,madeupofmereappearances,hemustnecessarilysupposesomethingelseastheirbasis,namely,hisego,whateveritscharacteristicsinitselfmaybe.Thusinrespecttomereperceptionandreceptivityofsensationshemustrec

onhimselfasbelongingtotheworldofsense;butinrespectofwhatevertheremaybeofpureactivityinhim(thatwhichreachesconsciousnessimmediatelyandnotthroughaffectingthesenses),hemustrec

onhimselfasbelongingtotheintellectualworld,ofwhich,however,hehasnofurther

nowledge.Tosuchaconclusionthereflectingman



mustcomewithrespecttoallthethingswhichcanbepresentedtohim:itisprobablytobemetwitheveninpersonsofthecommonestunderstanding,who,asiswell

nown,areverymuchinclinedtosupposebehindtheobjectsofthesensessomethingelseinvisibleandactingofitself.Theyspoilit,however,bypresentlysensualizingthisinvisibleagain;thatistosay,wantingtoma

eitanobjectofintuition,sothattheydonotbecomeawhitthewiser.

Nowmanreallyfindsinhimselfafacultybywhichhedistinguisheshimselffromeverythingelse,evenfromhimselfasaffectedbyobjects,andthatisreason.Thisbeingpurespontaneityisevenelevatedabovetheunderstanding.Foralthoughthelatterisaspontaneityanddoesnot,li

esense,merelycontainintuitionsthatarisewhenweareaffectedbythings(andarethereforepassive),yetitcannotproducefromitsactivityanyotherconceptionsthanthosewhichmerelyservetobringtheintuitionsofsenseunderrulesand,thereby,tounitetheminoneconsciousness,andwithoutthisuseofthesensibilityitcouldnotthin

atall;whereas,onthecontrary,reasonshowssopureaspontaneityinthecaseofwhatIcallideas[idealconceptions]thatittherebyfartranscendseverythingthatthesensibilitycangiveit,andexhibitsitsmostimportantfunctionindistinguishingtheworldofsensefromthatofunderstanding,andtherebyprescribingthelimitsoftheunderstanding

itself.

Forthisreasonarationalbeingmustregardhimselfquaintelligence(notfromthesideofhislowerfaculties)asbelongingnottotheworldofsense,buttothatofunderstanding;hencehehastwopointsofviewfromwhichhecanregardhimself,andrecogniselawsoftheexerciseofhisfaculties,andconsequentlyofallhisactions:first,sofarashebelongstotheworldofsense,hefindshimselfsubjecttolawsofnature(heteronomy);secondly,asbelongingtotheintelligibleworld,underlawswhichbeingindependentofnaturehavetheirfoundationnotinexperiencebutinreasonalone.

Asarationalbeing,andconsequentlybelongingtothe

intelligibleworld,mancanneverconceivethecausalityofhisownwillotherwisethanonconditionoftheideaoffreedom,forindependenceofthedeterminatecausesofthesensibleworld(anindependencewhichreasonmustalwaysascribetoitself)isfreedom.Nowtheideaoffreedomisinseparablyconnectedwiththeconceptionofautonomy,andthisagainwiththeuniversalprincipleofmoralitywhichisideallythefoundationofallactionsofrationalbeings,justasthelawofnatureisofallphenomena.

Nowthesuspicionisremovedwhichweraisedabove,thattherewasalatentcircleinvolvedinourreasoningfromfreedomtoautonomy,andfromthistothemorallaw,viz.:thatwelaiddowntheideaoffreedombecauseofthemorallawonlythatwemightafterwardsinturn

inferthelatterfromfreedom,andthatconsequentlywecouldassignnoreasonatallforthislaw,butcouldonly[present]itasapetitioprincipiiwhichwelldisposedmindswouldgladlyconcedetous,butwhichwecouldneverputforwardasaprovableproposition.Fornowweseethat,whenweconceiveourselvesasfree,wetransferourselvesintotheworldofunderstandingasmembersofitandrecognisetheautonomyofthewillwithitsconsequence,morality;whereas,ifweconceiveourselvesasunderobligation,weconsiderourselvesasbelongingtotheworldofsenseandatthesametimetotheworldofunderstanding.



HowisaCategoricalImperativePossible?

Everyrationalbeingrec

onshimselfquaintelligenceasbelongingtotheworldofunderstanding,anditissimplyasanefficientcausebelongingtothatworldthathecallshiscausalityawill.Ontheothersideheisalsoconsciousofhimselfasapartoftheworldofsenseinwhichhisactions,whicharemereappearances[phenomena]ofthatcausality,aredisplayed;wecannot,however,discernhowtheyarepossiblefromthiscausalitywhichwedonot

now;butinsteadofthat,theseactionsasbelongingtothesensibleworldmustbeviewedasdeterminedbyotherphenomena,namely,desiresandinclinations.IfthereforeIwereonlyamemberoftheworldofunderstanding,thenallmyactionswouldperfectlyconformtotheprincipleofautonomyofthepurewill;ifIwereonlyapartoftheworldofsense,theywouldnecessarilybeassumedtoconformwhollytothenaturallawofdesiresandinclinations,inotherwords,totheheteronomyofnature.(Theformerwouldrestonmoralityasthesupremeprinciple,thelatteronhappiness.)Since,however,theworldofunderstandingcontainsthefoundationofthe

worldofsense,andconsequentlyofitslawsalso,andaccordinglygivesthelawtomywill(whichbelongswhollytotheworldofunderstanding)directly,andmustbeconceivedasdoingso,itfollowsthat,althoughontheonesideImustregardmyselfasabeingbelongingtotheworldofsense,yetontheothersideImustrecognizemyselfassubjectasanintelligencetothelawoftheworldofunderstanding,i.e.,toreason,whichcontainsthislawintheideaoffreedom,andthereforeassubjecttotheautonomyofthewill:consequentlyImustregardthelawsoftheworldofunderstandingasimperativesformeandtheactionswhichconformtothemasduties.

Andthuswhatma

escategoricalimperativespossibleisthis,thattheideaoffreedomma

esmeamemberofanintelligibleworld,in

consequenceofwhich,ifIwerenothingelse,allmyactionswouldalwaysconformtotheautonomyofthewill;butasIatthesametimeintuitemyselfasamemberoftheworldofsense,theyoughtsotoconform,andthiscategorical"ought"impliesasyntheticaprioriproposition,inasmuchasbesidesmywillasaffectedbysensibledesiresthereisaddedfurthertheideaofthesamewillbutasbelongingtotheworldoftheunderstanding,pureandpracticalofitself,whichcontainsthesupremeconditionaccordingtoreasonoftheformerwill;preciselyastotheintuitionsofsensethereareaddedconceptsoftheunderstandingwhichofthemselvessignifynothingbutregularformingeneralandinthiswaysyntheticaprioripropositionsbecomepossible,onwhichall

nowledgeofphysicalnaturerests.

Thepracticaluseofcommonhumanreasonconfirmsthisreasoning.Thereisnoone,noteventhemostconsummatevillain,providedonlythatbeisotherwiseaccustomedtotheuseofreason,who,whenwesetbeforehimexamplesofhonestyofpurpose,ofsteadfastnessinfollowinggoodmaxims,ofsympathyandgeneralbenevolence(evencombinedwithgreatsacrificesofadvantagesandcomfort),doesnotwishthathemightalsopossessthesequalities.Onlyonaccountofhisinclinationsandimpulseshecannotattainthisinhimself,butatthesametimehewishestobefreefromsuchinclinationswhichare



burdensometohimself.Heprovesbythisthathetransfershimselfinthoughtwithawillfreefromtheimpulsesofthesensibilityintoanorderofthingswhollydifferentfromthatofhisdesiresinthefieldofthesensibility;sincehecannotexpecttoobtainbythatwishanygratificationofhisdesires,noranypositionwhichwouldsatisfyanyofhisactualorsupposableinclinations(forthiswoulddestroythepre-eminenceoftheveryideawhichwreststhatwishfromhim):hecanonlyexpectagreaterintrinsicworthofhisownperson.Thisbetterperson,however,heimagineshimselftobewhenbetransfershimselftothepointofviewofamemberoftheworldoftheunderstanding,towhichheisinvoluntarilyforcedbytheideaoffreedom,i.e.,ofindependenceondeterminingcausesoftheworldofsense;andfromthispointofviewheisconsciousofagoodwill,whichbyhisownconfessionconstitutesthelawforthebadwillthathepossessesasamemberoftheworldofsense-alawwhoseauthorityherecognizeswhiletransgressingit.Whathemorally"ought"isthenwhathenecessarily"would,"asamemberoftheworldoftheunderstanding,andisconceivedbyhimasan"ought"onlyinasmuchasheli

ewiseconsidershimselfasamemberoftheworldofsense.

OftheExtremeLimitsofallPracticalPhilosophy.

Allmenattributetothemselvesfreedomofwill.Hencecomealljudgementsuponactionsasbeingsuchasoughttohavebeendone,althoughtheyhavenotbeendone.However,thisfreedomisnotaconceptionofexperience,norcanitbeso,sinceitstillremains,eventhoughexperienceshowsthecontraryofwhatonsuppositionoffreedomareconceivedasitsnecessaryconsequences.Ontheothersideitisequallynecessarythateverythingthatta

esplaceshouldbefixedlydeterminedaccordingtolawsofnature.Thisnecessityofnatureisli

ewisenotanempiricalconception,justforthisreason,thatitinvolvesthemotionofnecessityandconsequentlyofa

prioricognition.Butthisconceptionofasystemofnatureisconfirmedbyexperience;anditmustevenbeinevitablypresupposedifexperienceitselfistobepossible,thatis,aconnected

nowledgeoftheobjectsofsenserestingongenerallaws.Thereforefreedomisonlyanideaofreason,anditsobjectiverealityinitselfisdoubtful;whilenatureisaconceptoftheunderstandingwhichproves,andmustnecessarilyprove,itsrealityinexamplesofexperience.

Therearisesfromthisadialecticofreason,sincethefreedomattributedtothewillappearstocontradictthenecessityofnature,andplacedbetweenthesetwowaysreasonforspeculativepurposesfindstheroadofphysicalnecessitymuchmorebeatenandmoreappropriatethanthatoffreedom;yetforpracticalpurposes

thenarrowfootpathoffreedomistheonlyoneonwhichitispossibletoma

euseofreasoninourconduct;henceitisjustasimpossibleforthesubtlestphilosophyasforthecommonestreasonofmentoargueawayfreedom.Philosophymustthenassumethatnorealcontradictionwillbefoundbetweenfreedomandphysicalnecessityofthesamehumanactions,foritcannotgiveuptheconceptionofnatureanymorethanthatoffreedom.

Nevertheless,eventhoughweshouldneverbeabletocomprehendhowfreedomispossible,wemustatleastremovethisapparent



contradictioninaconvincingmanner.Forifthethoughtoffreedomcontradictseitheritselfornature,whichisequallynecessary,itmustincompetitionwithphysicalnecessitybeentirelygivenup.

Itwould,however,beimpossibletoescapethiscontradictionifthethin

ingsubject,whichseemstoitselffree,conceiveditselfinthesamesenseorintheverysamerelationwhenitcallsitselffreeaswheninrespectofthesameactionitassumesitselftobesubjecttothelawofnature.Henceitisanindispensableproblemofspeculativephilosophytoshowthatitsillusionrespectingthecontradictionrestsonthis,thatwethin

ofmaninadifferentsenseandrelationwhenwecallhimfreeandwhenweregardhimassubjecttothelawsofnatureasbeingpartandparcelofnature.Itmustthereforeshowthatnotonlycanboththeseverywellco-exist,butthatbothmustbethoughtasnecessarilyunitedinthesamesubject,sinceotherwisenoreasoncouldbegivenwhyweshouldburdenreasonwithanideawhich,thoughitmaypossiblywithoutcontradictionbereconciledwithanotherthatissufficientlyestablished,yetentanglesusinaperplexitywhichsorelyembarrassesreasoninitstheoreticemployment.Thisduty,however,belongsonlytospeculativephilosophy.Thephilosopherthenhasnooptionwhetherhewillremovetheapparentcontradictionorleaveituntouched;forinthelattercasethetheoryrespectingthiswouldbebonumvacans,intothepossessionofwhichthefatalistwouldhavearightto

enterandchaseallmoralityoutofitssupposeddomainasoccupyingitwithouttitle.

Wecannothoweverasyetsaythatwearetouchingtheboundsofpracticalphilosophy.Forthesettlementofthatcontroversydoesnotbelongtoit;itonlydemandsfromspeculativereasonthatitshouldputanendtothediscordinwhichitentanglesitselfintheoreticalquestions,sothatpracticalreasonmayhaverestandsecurityfromexternalattac

swhichmightma

ethegrounddebatableonwhichitdesirestobuild.

Theclaimstofreedomofwillmadeevenbycommonreasonarefoundedontheconsciousnessandtheadmittedsuppositionthatreasonis

independentofmerelysubjectivelydeterminedcauseswhichtogetherconstitutewhatbelongstosensationonlyandwhichconsequentlycomeunderthegeneraldesignationofsensibility.Manconsideringhimselfinthiswayasanintelligenceplaceshimselftherebyinadifferentorderofthingsandinarelationtodetermininggroundsofawhollydifferent

indwhenontheonehandhethin

sofhimselfasanintelligenceendowedwithawill,andconsequentlywithcausality,andwhenontheotherheperceiveshimselfasaphenomenonintheworldofsense(ashereallyisalso),andaffirmsthathiscausalityissubjecttoexternaldeterminationaccordingtolawsofnature.Nowhesoonbecomesawarethatbothcanholdgood,nay,mustholdgoodatthesametime.Forthereisnotthesmallestcontradictioninsayingthatathinginappearance(belongingtothe

worldofsense)issubjecttocertainlaws,ofwhichtheverysameasathingorbeinginitselfisindependent,andthathemustconceiveandthin

ofhimselfinthistwofoldway,restsastothefirstontheconsciousnessofhimselfasanobjectaffectedthroughthesenses,andastothesecondontheconsciousnessofhimselfasanintelligence,i.e.,asindependentonsensibleimpressionsintheemploymentofhisreason(inotherwordsasbelongingtotheworldofunderstanding).

Henceitcomestopassthatmanclaimsthepossessionofawill



whichta

esnoaccountofanythingthatcomesundertheheadofdesiresandinclinationsand,onthecontrary,conceivesactionsaspossibletohim,nay,evenasnecessarywhichcanonlybedonebydisregardingalldesiresandsensibleinclinations.Thecausalityofsuchactionsliesinhimasanintelligenceandinthelawsofeffectsandactions[whichdepend]ontheprinciplesofanintelligibleworld,ofwhichindeedhe

nowsnothingmorethanthatinitpurereasonaloneindependentofsensibilitygivesthelaw;moreoversinceitisonlyinthatworld,asanintelligence,thatheishisproperself(beingasmanonlytheappearanceofhimself),thoselawsapplytohimdirectlyandcategorically,sothattheincitementsofinclinationsandappetites(inotherwordsthewholenatureoftheworldofsense)cannotimpairthelawsofhisvolitionasanintelligence.Nay,hedoesnotevenholdhimselfresponsiblefortheformerorascribethemtohisproperself,i.e.,hiswill:heonlyascribestohiswillanyindulgencewhichhemightyieldthemifheallowedthemtoinfluencehismaximstotheprejudiceoftherationallawsofthewill.

Whenpracticalreasonthin sitselfintoaworldofunderstanding,itdoesnottherebytranscenditsownlimits,asitwouldifittriedtoenteritbyintuitionorsensation.Theformerisonlyanegativethoughtinrespectoftheworldofsense,whichdoesnotgiveanylawstoreasonindeterminingthewillandispositiveonlyin

thissinglepointthatthisfreedomasanegativecharacteristicisatthesametimeconjoinedwitha(positive)facultyandevenwithacausalityofreason,whichwedesignateawill,namelyafacultyofsoactingthattheprincipleoftheactionsshallconformtotheessentialcharacterofarationalmotive,i.e.,theconditionthatthemaximhaveuniversalvalidityasalaw.Butwereittoborrowanobjectofwill,thatis,amotive,fromtheworldofunderstanding,thenitwouldoverstepitsboundsandpretendtobeacquaintedwithsomethingofwhichit

nowsnothing.Theconceptionofaworldoftheunderstandingisthenonlyapointofviewwhichreasonfindsitselfcompelledtota

eoutsidetheappearancesinordertoconceiveitselfaspractical,whichwouldnotbepossibleiftheinfluencesofthesensibilityhadadeterminingpoweronman,but

whichisnecessaryunlessheistobedeniedtheconsciousnessofhimselfasanintelligenceand,consequently,asarationalcause,energizingbyreason,thatis,operatingfreely.Thisthoughtcertainlyinvolvestheideaofanorderandasystemoflawsdifferentfromthatofthemechanismofnaturewhichbelongstothesensibleworld;anditma

estheconceptionofanintelligibleworldnecessary(thatistosay,thewholesystemofrationalbeingsasthingsinthemselves).Butitdoesnotintheleastauthorizeustothin

ofitfurtherthanastoitsformalconditiononly,thatis,theuniversalityofthemaximsofthewillaslaws,andconsequentlytheautonomyofthelatter,whichaloneisconsistentwithitsfreedom;whereas,onthecontrary,alllawsthatrefertoadefiniteobjectgiveheteronomy,whichonlybelongstolawsofnatureandcanonly

applytothesensibleworld.

Butreasonwouldoverstepallitsboundsifitundertoo

toexplainhowpurereasoncanbepractical,whichwouldbeexactlythesameproblemastoexplainhowfreedomispossible.

Forwecanexplainnothingbutthatwhichwecanreducetolaws,theobjectofwhichcanbegiveninsomepossibleexperience.Butfreedomisamereidea,theobjectiverealityofwhichcaninnowisebeshownaccordingtolawsofnature,andconsequentlynotinany



possibleexperience;andforthisreasonitcanneverbecomprehendedorunderstood,becausewecannotsupportitbyanysortofexampleoranalogy.Itholdsgoodonlyasanecessaryhypothesisofreasoninabeingthatbelievesitselfconsciousofawill,thatis,ofafacultydistinctfrommeredesire(namely,afacultyofdeterminingitselftoactionasanintelligence,inotherwords,bylawsofreasonindependentlyonnaturalinstincts).Nowwheredeterminationaccordingtolawsofnatureceases,thereallexplanationceasesalso,andnothingremainsbutdefence,i.e.,theremovaloftheobjectionsofthosewhopretendtohaveseendeeperintothenatureofthings,andthereuponboldlydeclarefreedomimpossible.Wecanonlypointouttothemthatthesupposedcontradictionthattheyhavediscoveredinitarisesonlyfromthis,thatinordertobeabletoapplythelawofnaturetohumanactions,theymustnecessarilyconsidermanasanappearance:thenwhenwedemandofthemthattheyshouldalsothin

ofhimquaintelligenceasathinginitself,theystillpersistinconsideringhiminthisrespectalsoasanappearance.Inthisviewitwouldnodoubtbeacontradictiontosupposethecausalityofthesamesubject(thatis,hiswill)tobewithdrawnfromallthenaturallawsofthesensibleworld.Butthiscontradictiondisappears,iftheywouldonlybethin

themselvesandadmit,asisreasonable,thatbehindtheappearancestheremustalsolieattheirroot(althoughhidden)thethingsinthemselves,andthatwecannotexpectthelawsof

thesetobethesameasthosethatgoverntheirappearances.

Thesubjectiveimpossibilityofexplainingthefreedomofthewillisidenticalwiththeimpossibilityofdiscoveringandexplaininganinterest*whichmancanta

einthemorallaw.Neverthelesshedoesactuallyta

eaninterestinit,thebasisofwhichinuswecallthemoralfeeling,whichsomehavefalselyassignedasthestandardofourmoraljudgement,whereasitmustratherbeviewedasthesubjectiveeffectthatthelawexercisesonthewill,theobjectiveprincipleofwhichisfurnishedbyreasonalone.

*Interestisthatbywhichreasonbecomespractical,i.e.,acausedeterminingthewill.Hencewesayofrationalbeingsonlythattheyta

eaninterestinathing;irrationalbeingsonlyfeelsensualappetites.Reasonta

esadirectinterestinactionthenonlywhentheuniversalvalidityofitsmaximsisalonesufficienttodeterminethewill.Suchaninterestaloneispure.Butifitcandeterminethewillonlybymeansofanotherobjectofdesireoronthesuggestionofaparticularfeelingofthesubject,thenreasonta

esonlyanindirectinterestintheaction,and,asreasonbyitselfwithoutexperiencecannotdiscovereitherobjectsofthewilloraspecialfeelingactuatingit,thislatterinterestwouldonlybeempiricalandnotapurerationalinterest.Thelogicalinterestofreason(namely,toextenditsinsight)isneverdirect,but

presupposespurposesforwhichreasonisemployed.

Inorderindeedthatarationalbeingwhoisalsoaffectedthroughthesensesshouldwillwhatreasonalonedirectssuchbeingsthattheyoughttowill,itisnodoubtrequisitethatreasonshouldhaveapowertoinfuseafeelingofpleasureorsatisfactioninthefulfilmentofduty,thatistosay,thatitshouldhaveacausalitybywhichitdeterminesthesensibilityaccordingtoitsownprinciples.



Butitisquiteimpossibletodiscern,i.e.,toma

eitintelligibleapriori,howamerethought,whichitselfcontainsnothingsensible,canitselfproduceasensationofpleasureorpain;forthisisaparticular

indofcausalityofwhichasofeveryothercausalitywecandeterminenothingwhateverapriori;wemustonlyconsultexperienceaboutit.Butasthiscannotsupplyuswithanyrelationofcauseandeffectexceptbetweentwoobjectsofexperience,whereasinthiscase,althoughindeedtheeffectproducedlieswithinexperience,yetthecauseissupposedtobepurereasonactingthroughmereideaswhichoffernoobjecttoexperience,itfollowsthatforusmenitisquiteimpossibletoexplainhowandwhytheuniversalityofthemaximasalaw,thatis,morality,interests.Thisonlyiscertain,thatitisnotbecauseitinterestsusthatithasvalidityforus(forthatwouldbeheteronomyanddependenceofpracticalreasononsensibility,namely,onafeelingasitsprinciple,inwhichcaseitcouldnevergivemorallaws),butthatitinterestsusbecauseitisvalidforusasmen,inasmuchasithaditssourceinourwillasintelligences,inotherwords,inourproperself,andwhatbelongstomereappearanceisnecessarilysubordinatedbyreasontothenatureofthethinginitself.

Thequestionthen,"Howacategoricalimperativeispossible,"canbeansweredtothisextent,thatwecanassigntheonlyhypothesisonwhichitispossible,namely,theideaoffreedom;andwecan

alsodiscernthenecessityofthishypothesis,andthisissufficientforthepracticalexerciseofreason,thatis,fortheconvictionofthevalidityofthisimperative,andhenceofthemorallaw;buthowthishypothesisitselfispossiblecanneverbediscernedbyanyhumanreason.Onthehypothesis,however,thatthewillofanintelligenceisfree,itsautonomy,astheessentialformalconditionofitsdetermination,isanecessaryconsequence.Moreover,thisfreedomofwillisnotmerelyquitepossibleasahypothesis(notinvolvinganycontradictiontotheprincipleofphysicalnecessityintheconnexionofthephenomenaofthesensibleworld)asspeculativephilosophycanshow:butfurther,arationalbeingwhoisconsciousofcausalitythroughreason,thatistosay,ofawill(distinctfromdesires),mustofnecessityma

eitpractically,

thatis,inidea,theconditionofallhisvoluntaryactions.Buttoexplainhowpurereasoncanbeofitselfpracticalwithouttheaidofanyspringofactionthatcouldbederivedfromanyothersource,i.e.,howthemereprincipleoftheuniversalvalidityofallitsmaximsaslaws(whichwouldcertainlybetheformofapurepracticalreason)canofitselfsupplyaspring,withoutanymatter(object)ofthewillinwhichonecouldantecedentlyta

eanyinterest;andhowitcanproduceaninterestwhichwouldbecalledpurelymoral;orinotherwords,howpurereasoncanbepractical-toexplainthisisbeyondthepowerofhumanreason,andallthelabourandpainsofsee

inganexplanationofitarelostan

ItisjustthesameasifIsoughttofindouthowfreedomitselfis

possibleasthecausalityofawill.ForthenIquitthegroundofphilosophicalexplanation,andIhavenoothertogoupon.Imightindeedrevelintheworldofintelligenceswhichstillremainstome,butalthoughIhaveanideaofitwhichiswellfounded,yetIhavenottheleast

nowledgeofit,noranIeverattaintosuch

nowledgewithalltheeffortsofmynaturalfacultyofreason.ItsignifiesonlyasomethingthatremainsoverwhenIhaveeliminatedeverythingbelongingtotheworldofsensefromtheactuatingprinciplesofmywill,servingmerelyto

eepinboundstheprincipleofmotivesta

enfromthefieldofsensibility;fixingits



limitsandshowingthatitdoesnotcontainallinallwithinitself,butthatthereismorebeyondit;butthissomethingmoreI

nownofurther.Ofpurereasonwhichframesthisideal,thereremainsaftertheabstractionofallmatter,i.e.,

nowledgeofobjects,nothingbuttheform,namely,thepracticallawoftheuniversalityofthemaxims,andinconformitywiththisconceptionofreasoninreferencetoapureworldofunderstandingasapossibleefficientcause,thatisacausedeterminingthewill.Theremustherebeatotalabsenceofsprings;unlessthisideaofanintelligibleworldisitselfthespring,orthatinwhichreasonprimarilyta

esaninterest;buttoma

ethisintelligibleispreciselytheproblemthatwecannotsolve.

Herenowistheextremelimitofallmoralinquiry,anditisofgreatimportancetodetermineitevenonthisaccount,inorderthatreasonmaynotontheoneband,totheprejudiceofmorals,see

aboutintheworldofsenseforthesuprememotiveandaninterestcomprehensiblebutempirical;andontheotherhand,thatitmaynotimpotentlyflapitswingswithoutbeingabletomoveinthe(forit)emptyspaceoftranscendentconceptswhichwecalltheintelligibleworld,andsoloseitselfamidstchimeras.Fortherest,theideaofapureworldofunderstandingasasystemofallintelligences,andtowhichweourselvesasrationalbeingsbelong(althoughweareli

ewiseontheothersidemembersofthesensibleworld),thisremains

alwaysausefulandlegitimateideaforthepurposesofrationalbelief,althoughall

nowledgestopsatitsthreshold,useful,namely,toproduceinusalivelyinterestinthemorallawbymeansofthenobleidealofauniversal ingdomofendsinthemselves(rationalbeings),towhichwecanbelongasmembersthenonlywhenwecarefullyconductourselvesaccordingtothemaximsoffreedomasiftheywerelawsofnature.

ConcludingRemar

Thespeculativeemploymentofreasonwithrespecttonatureleadstotheabsolutenecessityofsomesupremecauseoftheworld:thepracticalemploymentofreasonwithaviewtofreedomleadsalsotoabsolutenecessity,butonlyofthelawsoftheactionsofarationalbeingassuch.Nowitisanessentialprincipleofreason,howeveremployed,topushits

nowledgetoaconsciousnessofitsnecessity(withoutwhichitwouldnotberational

nowledge).Itis,however,anequallyessentialrestrictionofthesamereasonthatitcanneitherdiscernthenecessityofwhatisorwhathappens,norofwhatoughttohappen,unlessaconditionissupposedonwhichitisorhappensoroughttohappen.Inthisway,however,bytheconstantinquiryforthecondition,thesatisfactionofreasonisonly

furtherandfurtherpostponed.Henceitunceasinglysee

stheunconditionallynecessaryandfindsitselfforcedtoassumeit,althoughwithoutanymeansofma

ingitcomprehensibletoitself,happyenoughifonlyitcandiscoveraconceptionwhichagreeswiththisassumption.Itisthereforenofaultinourdeductionofthesupremeprincipleofmorality,butanobjectionthatshouldbemadetohumanreasoningeneral,thatitcannotenableustoconceivetheabsolutenecessityofanunconditionalpracticallaw(suchasthecategoricalimperativemustbe).Itcannotbeblamedforrefusingtoexplainthisnecessitybyacondition,thatistosay,bymeansof



someinterestassumedasabasis,sincethelawwouldthenceasetobeasupremelawofreason.Andthuswhilewedonotcomprehendthepracticalunconditionalnecessityofthemoralimperative,weyetcomprehenditsincomprehensibility,andthisisallthatcanbefairlydemandedofaphilosophywhichstrivestocarryitsprinciplesuptotheverylimitofhumanreason.

THEEND

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Fundamental Principles of the Met a Physic of Morals