Frederick Neuhouser -- Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity

ModernEuropean

Philosophy

.Fichte'sTheory of Subjectivity

Frederick Neu houser

ModernEuropeanPhilosophy JOHANN GOTTL1EB FICHTE

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This is the first book in English to elucidate the central issues in the work ofJohann Gottlieb Fichte, a figure crucial to the movement of philosophyfrom Kant to German idealism. The book explains Fichte's notion ofsubjectivity and how his particular view developed out of Kant's accountsof theoretical and practical reason.

Fichte argues that the subject has a self-positing structure that distinguishes it from a thing or an object. Thus, the subject must be understoodas an activity rather than a thing and is self-constituting in a way that anobject isnot. In the final chapter, Professor Neuhauser considers how thisdoctrine of the self-positing subject enables us to understand the possibility of the self's autonomy, or self-determination.

"[A] very substantial piece of scholarship which analyzes a number ofimportant historical and systematic issues with great clarity and perception. The presentation and treatment of the,basic historical and philosophi-cal issues is magisterial." Professor Raymond Geuss,

. Department of PhI losophy,ColumbiaUniversity

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CAMBRI{

UNIVERl

PRESS

III 11111111 III 11111111111 111111111111111XOOOOHOFNR

Fichte's Theory of Subjecti...Modern European Philosophy)Used, Good

MODERN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY

Executive editorRAYMOND GRUSS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Editorial hoardHIDE ISHIGURO, BARNARD COLLEGE

ALAN MONTEFIORE) BALLIO'L COLLEGE, OXFORD

MARY TILES, ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

R. M. Chisholm, Brentano and Intrinsic ValueRaymond Geuss, The Idea ofa Critical Theory:

Habermas and the Frankfurt SchoolKarel Lambert, Meinong and the Principle ofIndependence

Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern SocietyMary Tiles, Bachelard: Science and Objectivity

Robert S. Tragesser, Husserl andRealism in Logic and MathematicPeter Winch, Simone Weil: TheJust Balance

Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology ofScientific Reason

FICHTE'S THEORY OF

SUBJECTIVITY

FREDERICK NEUHOUSERHarvard Universiry

Tile riaMof theUII/vasily of Cambridge

to prfllt andsell(/1/ 111(11111(" of hooks

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Henry VIII III 1534.The University liasprimedandpublished('(JIlt/111/0Ilsly

since1584.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESSCAMBRIDGE

NEW YORK PORT CHESTER MELBOURNE SYDNEY

Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of CambridgeThe Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 I RP

40 West eoth Street, New York, NY 1001 I, USA10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia

© Cambridge University Press 1990

First, published 1990

Printed in the United States of America

Library ofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication DataNeuhouser, Frederick.

Fichte's theory of subjectivity l Frederick Neuhouser.

p. em. - (Modern European philosophy)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-521-37433-2. - ISBN 0-521-39938-6 (pbk.)

1. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 1762-1814.- Contributions in concept ofsubjectivity. 2. Subjectivity. 1. Title. II. Series.

B2849·S92N48 1990

126 dC20 89-4973 1

CIP

British Lihrary Cataloguing in Publication Data

Neuhouser, Frederick

Fichte's theory of subjectivity. (Modern Europeanphilosophy) .

I. German philosphy. Fichte, Johann GottliebI. Title II. Series

193

ISBN 0-521-37433-2 hardbackISBN 0-521-39938-6 paperback

FOR UDAY

CONTENTS

AcknowledgmentsAbbreviations

Introduction

I Origins of Fichte's theory: the notion of theunity of reason

~ The development of Fichte's project from1793 to 1799

3 The self-positing subject and theoreticalself-consciousness

4- The self-positing subject and practicalself-determination

Conclusion

BibliographyIndex

vii

page ixx

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66

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people have been of help to me in a variety of ways duringmy work on this project. Above all, I am indebted to CharlesLarmore, whose detailed and thoughtful comments on severaldrafts have made this a significantly better book than it otherwisewould have been. I have also benefited greatly from conversationsand correspondence with Daniel Breazeale, Maudemarie Clark,Stephen Engstrom, Raymond Geuss, Michael Hardimon, PierreKeller, Charles Parsons, Thomas Pogge, and David Weberman. Iwould like to express my gratitude as well to Robert Pippin, whomade his work on Fichte available to me long before it appearedin print, and to Daniel Parish, who prepared the index and spentmany hours checking the accuracy of my translations. In addi- ..tion, I have received generous financial assistance from the Edwinand Louise Bechtel Fund of the Harvard Philosophy Department,as well as a year-long fellowship in 1987-8 from the Mrs. GilesWhiting Foundation, during which time I was able to complete afirst draft of the entire manuscript. Special thanks are due toElisabeth Gladir and Deutsches Haus, Columbia University, whogenerously allowed me the use of the office space in which most ofthese pages were written. Finally, I would like to thank UdayDhar for the encouragement he provided throughout the entireproject, without which it surely would not have been completed.

ix

GA

GMS

KPV

KRV

KUSW

WL 1794

AB·BREVIATIONS

J. G. Fichte: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademieder Wissenschaften, edt R. Lauth, H. Jacobs, and H.Gliwitsky

Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysic ofMorals)

Kant, Kritik derpraktischen Vernunfl (Critique ofPracticalReason)

Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunfl (Critique ofPure Reason)

Kant, Kritik der Urteilskrafl (Critique ofJudgment)

Johann Gottlieb Fichtes siimmtliche Werke, edt I. H. Fichte

Fichte, Die Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschoftslehre(1794) (The Science ofKnowledge, trans. P. Heath and]. Lachs)

x

INTRODUCTION

In 1795, in the first published version of his major philosophicalwork, Fichte declares that one of the fundamental goals of histhought is to bring "uniry and coherence into the entire humanbeing." In describing his system in these terms, Fichte givesexpression to the basic aim that motivates the specific project withwhich this book is concerned. That project can be characterizedas an attempt to construct a "theory of subjectivity," a theorythat, to use the term Fichte himself preferred, provides an explanation of what it is to be an "I." Since it is not immediately clearwhat such a project will involve, or why it is worthy of beingundertaken, it will be necessary to say something about the general nature of Fichte's task before we attempt to understand it infull detail. In the first place, we shall need to know what exactlya theory of subjectivity is a theory of. Moreover, what are thephilosophical problems that give rise to the need for such a theory? Finally, what role can a theory of subjectivity play in establishing the "unity and coherence" of the human being?

Let us begin with the most basic question of all: What is a theory of subjectivity? Or, more precisely, what is it that Fichte's

I. "Es kommt durch dieses System Einheit und Zusammenhang in den ganzenMenschen," SW, I, p. 295.

2 FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY

theory of the subject aims to accomplish? As Fichte conceives of it,the basic goal of his theory is to develop an account of the essentialnature of subjecthood, or to provide an explanation of what it isthat makes a subject a subject. Part of this undertaking will consist in articulating the important ways in which subjects are distinct from nonsubjects or, in other words, in giving an answer tothe question "How is a subject different from a thing?" Central tothis task will be the search for a principle that defines what it isto be a subject in a way similar to that in which the notions of'substance' and 'causal determination' define the constitutive features of objects. But grasping the essential nature of subjectivitywill involve more than comprehending the differences between anI and a not-I; it should, on Fichte's view, also enable us to understand how the various capacities we ascribe to subjects can beviewed as grounded in, or made possible by, the unique set ofproperties that are said to constitute the subject's essential nature.In other words, Fichte will strive to achieve a unified account ofsubjectivity, one attempting to explain the apparently diverseactivities of the subject in terms of a single structure that underliesand informs them all. lM9SmLim,11Qrt~11J,.J.P q§,,,h~1:~,~wjJl.bJ~_Ei~hi~~S

atteJ11p.t.1QJJDjfx-tb~""-tlle5~U:~li~~l~,~I!f;lJ!ri!J~~.ti£..'11~§Jlv_c;,!§~f.,~4l>j5t.~9Jivi t¥_b_)!.."shQwing~.tb.a,tJhe_kap-~(;itie,s-fQJ: ..k.Jl!ttw:l~dg~auJiJr~~~,£g~n cyboth.depend.npan...QJle_ili~lius;tiY..e~m~~,SJJ1>j,e,c ..iliLe~fe.a!JJr~x ..~aLthe.~l,.~When formulated in this way, it becomes clear that Fichte's theorycan be understood as a contribution to the classical philosophicaldebate concerning the relation between theory and practice; Of, toexpress it in Kantian terms, Fichte attempts to comprehend therelation between theoretical and practical reason. The search tofind a single structure of subjectivity, then, will be intimatelyrelated to the question as to whether reason itself is of a unitarynature and, if so, how that nature is to be conceived.

A significant portion of this study will be devoted to filling in .the details of the general project just outlined. In doing so, weshall attempt to understand how Fichte arrived at this particularconception of what a theory of subj ectivity should be, as well aswhy he came to regard such a theory as the primary concern ofphilosophy. It is only after retracing this rather complex set ofdevelopments that we shall be in a position to comprehend thefactors that led Fichte to construct his theory of subjectivity as hedid. Yet even before we have examined this history in detail, it ispossible to get a rough idea of the problem that his theory, at itsmost fundamental level, is intended to address. As we shall see in

INTRODUCTION 3much greater detail later, Fichte's ing!ili:.y}nto the nature of t.ilesu.bj~ct is motivated p-rimarily'. bX cOnce!'.!lJLr~lati.ugJ.Q..!~.1!J§.{i§al

as,12ect.Qf ~.bj~!iYit)!,J!P~ecli!!JY..,!Q.!d~~ti~~g,j;hein1cl1ig!bilU:>;:,.Q(hullllW fr~edo.mbor 'seJBj~,~1Uiilll'. In orderto understand the nature of these concerns, as well as the significance of Fichte's response to them, it will be necessary to recallbriefly the historical context within which they arose.

The feature of the contemporary philosophical landscape thatis of greatest importance for our purposes is directly connectedto the rise of a form of Spinozism in Germany during the latterhalf of the eighteenth century. The particular version ofSpinozismthat is relevant here was articulated most compellingly by F. H.Jacobi in his popular book Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza, whichwas first published in 1785.2 Tlt-Lmost i.illP~!lLas~_Qf

Jac6JJrsjn.teI:pre1a.ti.uaQt:Spin~§...hia.f,9.r.m.yJ.ati~se

litpe.s.leim that the beliefin human freedom is incomp.!itU:>le wiJhthe vi!f,.):LQLr~~_t~son see"m~~yi!:~_,~.~pt.Jacobi's claim is not merely that the belief in our own freedomcannot be rationallyjustified; he holds that any thoroughly consistent, rational understanding of the world will be committed toruling out this very possibility. We are forced, then, on Jacobi'sview, to choose between an irrational faith in the possibility offreedom and a rational but completely deterministic view of theworld in which there is no room for self-determined agency. Oneconsequence of}acobi's claim that will playa significant role inour discussion ofFichte's early development concerns the implications of such a claim for the possibility of morality. If reasoncannot be reconciled with the belief in our own freedom, then it isjust as incompatible with the idea that human beings are boundby moral duties. Since attributing moral obligation to an agentseems to require that the agent be free to do her duty or not, aworld without freedom would also be one in which there could beno moral "ought." A commitment to reason, it would seem,implies that we must also regard commonsense beliefs in bothfreedom and morality as mere illusions.

It is important to note that ~)L.Qf.J~..4~1l~!l9_suJ,l.Q!1A.P!Y.~Q!l~p-tionofth~ure Qfratignalitya conception that finds its classical formulation in the principle of

~. A more detailed account of the controversy surrounding Spinoza and the effectit had on subsequent German philosophy is given by Beiser (1987). See especially Chap. 2, pp. 44-91,

iIj

Ii,II

4 FICHT'E'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY

sufficient reason. According to this principle (or at least the version of it that is relevant here), every existing state of affairs Y isgrounded in some other set of conditions X such that the presenceof X is sufficient to necessitate the existence of r: The troublingimpl,ication of this view is easily seen: Ij52w i~,}t p~ibL~1!

cei~.-Qf_th~_hllrp~}J: ...!?~i~g__~~~.~,~.p.~.Ql~~ Q[f!~~~.~ti9r1, ..jfh,~~&l~~reall~£~.§§..~!)~,,£9n~~.,g u_~"P~~P...r19X ....<;'9IJ.ditiQ.!1§,~ e~~m~JJq ~irp....§~lf?In one of his earliest published writings Fichte struggles to find asolution to this very problem, which he formulates in the followingway:" If it is necessary to posit a sufficient reason, or "ground"(Grund), for every event, then such a ground must be thought toexist for all of the will's choices as well, But if we can in principlealways find a reason to explain the will's choice of a particularaction, we are also capable of showing that the action in questionhad to be chosen and that its opposite was rejected with equalnecessity. In this case, however, it is also shown that the will didnot make a, free, undetermined choice at all. In other words, ifthe principle of sufficient reason holds universally, then it mustapply even to determinations of the will, but the existence of thiskind ofground for the will's actions seems to be incompatible withthe undetermined choice necessary for a conception of humanfreedom.

Although the details of Fichte's earliest attempts to solve thisproblem are too complex to concern us here, it is easy to see thathis basic strategy must involve, in some form, a denial of theu!!iversal a.Rplicability of t.h~_p-dp.ciule Qf sufficient reason. Themain advantage ofsuch a move is obvious enough: If the principleof sufficient reason is .no longer claimed to hold for all of reality,then no special problem is posed by regarding some events, suchas the will's choices, as free from causal determination.

The idea ofdenying universal validity to this principle ofreasondoes not, of course, originate with Fichte. Kant's own distinctionbetween appearances and things in themselves, along with hisrestriction of the principle ofcausality to the former, can be understood as one rather elaborate version of this strategy. Unfortunately, limiting the applicability of the principle of sufficientreason gives rise to a whole new set of serious difficulties. Thevarious problems engendered by Kant's distinction between the

3. The work in question is the so-called Creuzer review (GA, 1.2, pp. 7-14; SW,VIII, pp. 411-17), which is discussed in greater detail in Chapters I and 4.

INTRODUCTION 5tloumenal and phenomenal realms are well known, and we shallhave occasion to examine one of them in greater detail in Chaptel' I. For now it will be sufficient to point out the one issue that ismost relevant to understanding the basic motivation behindFichte's theory of subjectivity: Ifwe exe!.!!Et t4~,will's actions fromthe kjnd ot.r!L~~§-p-rovided by': th<:;..HrinciRle of su£:fidel!!.!:.~'!!:§'Q!!, what ~~!i9n..QL1Jte_~~J!:£!.ioQ1L~!!.(Ltbl# a~Q!sar;;-'X.~J\tft witbr_..

In my opinion, the answer to this question constitutes theimplicit starting point for all ofFichte's subsequent thinking aboutthe subject: As long as the only notion of reason available to usis the one embodied in the principle of sufficient reason, rationality must appear as completely irrelevant and alien to the exerciseof freedom. Why, though, should we find this disturbing? First,such a view seems to allow no way of understanding free actionsother than as random occurrences. The agents of these actionsmay indeed be undetermined by external causes, but are theyfree in any sense that matters to us - that is, are they really selfdetermined? If freedom were to consist in mere randomness, itwould be unclear why being free would bestow a higher worthupon human agents than that possessed by causally determinedthings. Second, in simply denying the applicability of the principle of sufficient reason to the will's choices, we not only rule outthe possibility of giving a causal explanation of free acts, we alsomake it impossible to explain or to understand those acts in anysense whatsoever. We are left, in other words, with another version of the dilemma referred to earlier:I~ thaLQ!!T fre~

a~c~!1.J:!~~~Rlai!!~gJIY sO!1.!.~thingJH(e the urincir-Ie.Qfsufficientr~~~.~e-.s.e~nLl0.ha,y,enQ£hoi.G!:_~tbaDJ.Q~P.Q1JJ1!:.Jl~

iqS,CLytaple kjnd..Q((~e.d.Qm,.Qlle.ih~Ilre.du.des.an~nd.u(r.a.tLQW!1

up.cl~r~.t~ngi,ng ..Qffr~e fic.t.§,jn£11!dinl;tJ;Jl~Jlj';til:m$Qfgth(;.r§_.fl,s. :!Cll:(lLa§"Q1!L9~n. Rejecting the principle of sufficient reason may succeed in salvaging a kind of freedom, but it does so only at theexpense of our self-comprehension as free agents.

The upshot of these considerations is that a satisfactory response to the challenge of Jacobi's Spinoza requires more than asimple denial of the universal validity of the principle of sufficientreason. What is also needed is an alternative account of reason,one that makes it possible to understand freedom as a kind of self-

. determination and that is able to conceive of actions as groundedin reasons without at the same time making them into externally

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determined, unfree events. Kant's moral philosophy - and especially his articulation of a "practical" form of reason - can beunderstood as an attempt to carry out precisely this task. It is notsurprising, then, that Fichte's own philosophical career beganwith an appropriation of the doctrines of Critical Philosophy.Since the considerations that ultimately led Fichte beyond Kant'sposition are too complex to treat adequately in this introduction,we shall postpone a detailed examination of them until Chapters I and 2. For the present it is.sufficient simply to note that themost important way in which Fichte's own theory of subjectivityaimed to improve upon Kant's was by providing a unitary accountof the subject, one that would bring "unity and coherence into thehuman being" by showing that there are not two distinct facultiesof reason but, at root, only one. His-task, the1!Llakes the form ofl!~~~~X~h_1QJji§_~Qv~ the__~!.gg~R!i!1~iQ!.~~l~h~J,~.g~yer!!~~ili£._~!irer...ea.lm_oLsu.bj~~t~yity - a principle that defines what it is to beasubject in a theoretical as well as a practical sense and that, by sodoing, both explains the possibility and illuminates the nature ofrational self-determination. As we shall see, one consequence ofhis quest for a unitary theory of subjectivity is that Fichte isultimately led toward a conception of self-determination thatdiverges in fundamental ways from Kant's own notion of moralautonomy but that is relevant to still unresolved questions concerning the nature of human freedom. By reconstructing the content of Fichte's theory and the history of its development, I hopeto show that, despite its. often bewildering obscurity, Fichte'sthought contains a number of insights powerful enough to haveopened up an inquiry into the nature of subjectivity that, eventoday, has not been brought to completion.

The interpretation I present here ought not to be regarded as anattempt to write the final word on Fichte. Rather, it representswhat I hope will be a contribution to a continuing discussion ofboth Fichte's philosophy and the foundations of German Idealismin general. As such, its ambitions are limited in a number of significant respects that perhaps should be made explicit at the outset. In treating Fichte's philosophy as, above all else, a "theory ofsubjectivity," I aim to give a somewhat more systematic accountof his position than could be had by focusing upon one particularaspect of his thought and examining it in isolation from hisbroader systematic goals. At the same time, however, my attempt

INTRODUCTION 7to deal with a central issue in a systematic way clearly falls shortof providing a comprehensive account of Fichte's thought as awhole. There are, by necessity, many interesting and importantaspects of his philosophical system that are simply left untreatedhere.

A further limitation of my interpretation is that it restricts itselfto the e1!rlY-p-ortion of Fichte's philosophical career, a period Idefine as extending from 1790, the time of his earliest unpublishedwritings, to approximately 1799. Although, as we shall see inChapter 2, Fichte's views underwent rapid and fundamentalchanges even within this period, the year 1799 marks a naturalbreaking point in his lifelongdevelopment. By this time Fichte hadalready finished the first complete version of his philosophicalsystem, which, in addition to his more widely known Wissenschaftslshre (of which there are a number of different versions alreadywithin this early period), includes two other major works, Systemofthe Doctrine ofMorals (1798) as well as a treatise on political theory,Foundation ojNatural Right (1796). More importantly, it was in1799 that Fichte found himself embroiled in a vicious publicdebate over the alleged atheistic implications ofhis own philosophical views." This so-called Atheism Controversy eventually led toFichte's dismissal from his position at the University ofJena, butits consequences extended beyond his change of residence toBerlin. For after 1800 Fichte's thought is based upon a fundamentally new conception of his system, one that is not only obscure inthe typically Fichtean manner, but also extremely difficult tounderstand as a continuous development of his earlier views.

Two other considerations influenced my decision to deal onlywith those of Fichte's works written before 1800. First, the earlytexts played a far more significant role than his later ones inshaping the course German philosophy was to take after Kant.Although both Hegel and Schelling were still philosophicallyactive well into the first three decades of the nineteenth century, itwasFichte's thought before 1800 that had the greatest effecton thedevelopment of their own philosophical systems. With the exception of two of his popular works, The Vocation oj Man (1800) andAddresses to the German Nation (1808), Fichte's later writings failed,for the most part, to exert a significant influence on subsequent

4-. An account of the Atheism Controversy is provided by Breazeale in Fichte(1988, pp. 40-5).


philosophy. Second, Fichte's early thought is closest, both chronologically and in terms of content, to the philosophy of Kant. Thisis important because it is here, if anywhere, that we should beginin order to comprehend the complicated historical developmentthat leads from Kant's Critical Philosophy to nineteenth-centuryIdealism. Moreover, if we are ever to achieve a more adequateunderstanding of Fichte's thought as a whole, we shall need tobegin with his earliest system. This is not merely a matter of proceeding chronologically. Rather, it is necessitated by the fact thatFichte's most important texts are virtually incomprehensible ifsimply delved into without some external point of reference. Itis my view - and this assumption has guided the writing of thisbook - that the only way of making sense of these texts is to beginby situating them in relation to more familiar philosophical terrain, which in this case must be the philosophy of Kant.

There is at least one more significant respect in which the interpretation I offer here must be regarded as incomplete. A numberof prominent claims made by Fichte are relevant to the topics ofthis book but receive little attention in my account of his theoryof subjectivity. This is perhaps most true of my treatment ofFichte's practical philosophy. As I explain in Chapter 4, the conception of self-determination that I emphasize here is not thenotion most visible in his texts - that of moral autonomy in theKantian sense but one that, though clearly present, is suggestedrather than fully elaborated by Fichte himself. Moreover, myaccount of the relationship between theoretical and practical sub-jectivity gives short shrift to one of the positions that is mostwidely associated with Fichte, the primacy of practical over theoretical reason. I t is clear from a variety of texts that Fichte did infact want to assert, in some form, the primacy of practical reason;it is less apparent to me that he ever found a plausible way ofunderstanding that doctrine. Although this claim of Fichte's isprovocative and even historically influential, I do not believe thatit is developed in an illuminating way within his own texts. Thismay simply mean that I have been unable to summon the philosophical imagination required to grasp this aspect of his position;if so, perhaps future interpreters will be able to make more senseof this doctrine than I, Of course, to emphasize, as I do, Fichte'sviews concerning the unity of theoretical and practical reason isnot to rule out that a relation of primacy could also hold betweenthe two; nevertheless, I do not explore this possibility here, In

INTRODUCTION 9short, my decision to emphasize certain aspects of Fichte's viewsover others was made in light of my principal aim in this book,which is to present a relatively systematic account of Fichte's basicproject that is both coherent and philosophically interesting, andthat remains true to what I take to be the most fundamentalconcerns that motivate his thought as a whole.

This book is divided roughly into two halves, each of which ismade up of two chapters. The first half is primarily historical innature and attempts to understand the route by which Fichtearrived at his conception of a theory of subjectivity. Chapter I isconcerned primarily with an analysis of the notion of the unity ofreason. It aims to layout and distinguish the three most prominent senses in which the post-Kantian project of unifying theoretical and practical reason can be understood. In order to understand the motivation for carrying out such a project, this chapterdiscusses the young Fichte's dissatisfaction with the two separateaccounts of reason given by Kant in the first and second Critiques.It also analyzes the relationship between the issue of the unity ofreason and what Fichte takes to be another crucial problem inKant's moral philosophy, the lack of a positive proof that purereason has a practical capacity. Chapter 2 traces Fichte's development from his early criticisms of Kant through the Wissenschoftslehre of I 797-9 and examines the various strategies he considers inhis attempt to demonstrate the unity of reason. The main concernhere is to clarify the sense in which Fichte ultimately comes toregard theoretical and practical subjectivity as unitary. It is argued that his main strategy consists in showing that a singlestructure underlies consciousness in both its theoretical and practical forms, a structure that he intends to capture with his distinctive notion of the subject's "self-positing" activity.

The second halfof the book attempts to reconstruct the detailsof Fichte's main thesis through separate analyses of the fundamental phenomena of the theoretical and practical realms (Chapters 3 and 4, respectively). Chapter 3 discusses Fichte's conception of the self-positing subject as it is developed in relation to thephenomenon of theoretical self-consciousness. It focuses on threeclaims about the I's self-awareness that are central to Fichte's viewof the subject: the nonrepresentational nature of self-awareness; therole of self-consciousness in securing the unity of consciousnessand thereby "grounding" experience;and the self-constituting nature


of the subject. Chapter 4 begins by analyzing in some detail thevarious notions of self-determination that are present in Fichte'sethical theory. Its main intent is to determine how Fichte uses theconception of the self-positing subject developed in the previouschapter to construct a theory of practical self-determination thatexplains the autonomous subject's relation to itself withoutrecourse to a "two-worlds" view in which the subject of experienceis determined by a rational but unknowable noumenal self. Thebook ends with a brief assessment of the extent to which Fichte'stheory succeeds in showing that an identical structure informsboth theoretical and practical subjectivity. (

Finally, a word about textual sources: Fichte's works appear inGerman in two excellent sets of collected works: Johann GottliebFichtes sammtliche Werke (SW), edited by Fichte's son, I. H. Fichte,and the more authoritative but still incomplete] G. Fichte: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschoften (GA) , editedunder the direction of Reinhard Lauth. In the following, initialreferences to works that appear in both of these collections givepage numbers from both editions; subsequent footnotes, however,refer only to the pagination of SW, since these page numbers arealso clearly provided in GA. Most of the translations of Germansources are my own, although some are based upon the existingEnglish translations cited in the footnotes and bibliography. Themost notable exceptions to this generalization are quotations fromthe Critique ofPure Reason, all of which are from Norman KempSmith's excellent translation, sometimes with very minor emendations of my own. I have tried to avoid the extensive use of abbreviations in the text; those that I have used for frequently citedsources are listed on page x,

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ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY:THE NOTION OF THE UNITY

OF REASON

The first half of our account of Fichte's theory of subjectivity willbe devoted primarily to clarifying the basic nature of his project:What precisely is it that Fichte's theory intends to show, and whydoes he come to regard the development of such a theory as thecentral task of philosophy? In the first two chapters we shallattempt to answer these questions by examining the historicalorigins of Fichte's project and by tracing the developments hisconception of that project underwent during the early portion ofhis career. On the basis of what we already know about the general nature of Fichte's theory, the basic issue that will concern usin Chapters I and :2 can be formulated as the following question:W-ltat reasons IDight theE. be for wall!illgJ;,~on.~!.!ill.Lasi!!gle fynd!!!!lental atru~t;m<~_ll!!.derlies '!lU.9.I..m.a.,Qi~~~ityl

As I indicated in the Introduction, the main problem addressedby Fichte has its roots in questions raised by Kant's successors,and to a lesser extent by Kant himself, concerning the relationshipbetween theoretical and practical reason. The question, more precisely, is wltether theoretical. an<;LRraC:!~.£*.l1 re~ card~~_saicj. '0cQ!1:§.titRt~.J!. §i!!gll(1Aflll!X,,~QI_1:Yl!~J,l1.~r th«Y.m!l.~J."R~_!:!':.g~rg~sL'!§.e.~~~DJi.~l1Y.J!~J~IQg!~OU~. I t is, of course, widely recognized thatthe issue of the unity of reason becomes one of the principalthemes of German Idealism after Kant. The need to demonstrate

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this unity is usually understood as arising from the fact that Kantbequeathed to his followers two distinct accounts of reason, in twoseparate critiques, but failed to bring these together into a single,unitary theory of the faculty of reason in its most general form.What is often-kft unarriculated.,l!Q:w~y~.!'.,js-p..l'~~i~~l>~,wwhJlt.killd~f

unity~the.or_e.tic.al~and_p1:actic.a.Lr_eas.Qn~~s,hQlll.dJ2.e<~h~QJ~ll=tQ~pO~ses.s

a.nd."Jl1Q.r~_jmI2QIlanjJ}:'""nw,b"y~KqJ1t.~a.,in~.bility .,tQ_..de.._s.Q~~shQJJ,Ld~.~constmcd.ea..a-~d~f~~.t Jh~tJ!~~g.§.,,, tQJ'~h~"llr~m~~t~~.d. The presentchapter aims to give an answer to just these questions and has,therefore, two primary goals. The first of these is to distinguishand discuss three senses in which one might conceive of the"unity" of theoretical and practical reason within the context ofKant's Critical Philosophy. The second is to specify the particularforms that the task of unifying theoretical and practical reasontakes in Fichte's earliest, presystematic writings. An importantpart of the latter goal will be to understand Fichte's motivation forplacing the theme of the unity of reason at the center of his philosophical project. In other words, we shall want to know not onlyin what sense Fichte wanted to uphold the unity of reason but alsowhy he felt so keenly the need to espouse such a position.

Let us begin by specifying the three different senses that thenotion of the unity of reason assumes in Fichte's thought. Theoretical and practical reason can be claimed to be unified insofar as

I. they are compatible with each other, that is, insofar as the principles ofone do not conflict with those of the other;

2. both can be derived as components ofa unitary and complete systemof philosophy, which has as its starting point a single first principle;

3. they possess an identical underlying "structure," or constitute what isin essence a single activity of the subject.

In what follows I refer to these distinct theses as

I. the compatibility of theoretical and practical reason;2. the systematic unity of reason; and3. the structural identity of theoretical and practical reason.

In the rest of this chapter I shall attempt to clarify each of thesesenses by examining the forms in which they appear in Fichte'searliest philosophical writings.

c

ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY

The compatibility of theoreticaland practical reason

It was in 1790, four years before the publication of the first versionof the Wissensckaflslekre, that Fichte undertook for the first time aserious study of the central texts of Kantian philosophy. Althoughhis initial reading of the Critique ofPure Reason made little impression upon him, his encounter with the second Critique was arguably the most powerful and consequential philosophical experience ofhis life. The most visible effectof this encounter was Fichte'simmediate conversion to Kantianism. In a letter to his friendFriedrich WeiBhuhn he writes:

I live in a new world since having read the Critique qf PracticalReason. . .. Things I thought could never be proved - the conceptof absolute freedom, duty, etc. have been proved, and I feel all thehappier because of'it, It is incomprehensible how much power andrespect for humanity this system gives us!'

Statements such as these leave no room for doubt as to whataroused Fichte's enthusiasm for Critical Philosophy: Kant's account ofpractical reason in the second Critique seemed to providethe philosophical groundwork upon which the reality of moralityand human freedom could be affirmed.

After his initial, unqualified acceptance of Critical Philosophy,the first major problem in Kant's system to attract Fichte's attention was the question of the unity of theoretical and practicalreason i!!.;.the fir~t of!!le three sense~._gi§tingill.§!1edRreviou~ly. AsI have suggested, this sense of the "unity" of reason is best characterized in terms of the compatibility of theoretical and practicalreason. Wha~at issu.!..mo.!e ~_<:.ci.f}s~j~h!U;2!!!etttih!!i!yof .t1l.~~2!ld~Y.!~~~!!:~L~~.<2h.~f~!~.2f!.~!l§'9~I!_re9.!rtL~~_gL~.P_~S!QR.t·Formulated in its most general terms, the question addressed hereconcerns whether the view of the world that follows from theprinciples of theoretical reason (a world of natural events thatoccur in accord with universal causal laws) can be reconciled withthe kind of world required by the laws of practical reason. As weshall see, this question can be understood in at least two distinct

r. GA, III.I, p. 167.


senses, each of which receives its own treatment at different placesin the Kantian system - in the third antinomy of the Critique ofPureReason and in the introduction to the Critique ojJudgment.

Fichte's concern with the compatibility of theoretical and practical reason is evidenced by a very early unpublished text from theyear 1790 that bears the provisional title "Attempt at an Explication of an Excerpt from Kant's Critique ofJudgment. ,,2 As its titleimplies, the primary aim of this piece was to explicate the views ofthe third Critique by paraphrasing and revising Kant's text in sucha way that the difficult doctrines of that work could be liberatedfrom Kant's obscure language and articulated in a more precisemanner. It is in the introduction to the third Critique that Kantaddresses the issue of the compatibility of theoretical and practical reason most explicitly, and, significantly, it was also this portion of the text that was of most interest to Fichte himself.f SinceFichte's concerns here are so closely connected to Kant's own text,we shall approach the former by first considering the main issueaddressed in the latter.

The fu~d~_~~E_~J._.EE5~P,~~~.~~f_~~~~..i~_~5!_,,£r.i~ique,. ~.-Eresented inth~ _.~!:1:!:.9;!~~~~!~~_,}.~_..clearly ..~ne of."r~~~?~.!A!!g_!h~!~!!cal r.~ason(referred to bv Kant in this text as "the understandina " ) with1-=~~~~_~_~G...-" __ .....iLrw~>"l .........,..:.\IIl..:.ll.,/< _ l..I' o;l",,{;.. ~..I••". ,. ....... "' .... _ •• .' - , ,,,-""'l ', '. - • - ~, 'l-'J 1~';rli,~4/r,>'l":t·:"nt-rrt: !'\:··i."'r~t:¥f~.vIn:'f1'~)"I~",¥J;;;"~:;iI"Li'.~1I.£"t ~~;.t~"'""'

P~~.£.~i~~t,~!,~~.~.!?~~,J~,~_~~.~, ..~~~.P-~Y ,~~~~,~~9~")' Kant formulates theproblem in terms of a potential conflict between the "legislations"(Gesetzgehungen) of the understanding, the source of natural concepts, and reason, the giver of the moral law. First, Kant recallsthat each legislation is completely independent of the other interms of its content. That is, the moral law does not need to seekadvice from the understanding in order to tell us what we ought todo, and, conversely, the understanding provides the gene-tal lawsof natur.e without the aid of practical reason. Second, it is clearfrom the results of the first Critique that the two faculties cannotcontradict each other in what they might tell us about supersensi-:ble reality, since the understanding can make no legitimate claimsto provide knowledge of things in themselves. A potential conflictdoes arise, however, when one considers the effects of these twolegislations within the world of appearances. The principle of

2. GA, II. I, pp. 325-73.3. See Fichte's letter to WeiBhuhn of 1790, where he writes that he finds the

introduction to be "the most obscure part of the book" and, by implication, thepart most in need of reformulation (GA, 111.1, pp. 188-g).

c

ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY 15

natural causality holds universally in this realm, and yet, according to Kant, practical reason also requires that its own "legislation" be realizable within the sensible world:

There is a vast gulf fixed between the realm of the concept ofnature, as the sensible, and the realm of the concept of freedom , asthe supersensible. The nature of this gulfis such that it is impossible to pass from the former to the latter (by means of the theoreticaluse of reason) - just as if they were two different worlds, the first ofwhich could have no influence on the second. Yet the latter is supposed to (solt) have an influence on the former. That is, the conceptoffreedom is supposed to realize within the sensible world the purpose proposed by its laws."

Kant's point is that while the principle of natural causality is ofservice only within the realm of appearances, the effects of thelaws of morality cannot be restricted in the same way to thenoumenal world. The latter are principles that command therealization of ends, and unkss moraliW)s toJ:lsc.~u<b;"lLL~littio.o.

alflQ!!Kn2)lm.~21ent!!~.L~llP n~L,~ffe~.t~jn.the.~9.rlg,,~e~k!l9~.i!p.d

e~Q~~l£!2~~.l..th~~~_~smJ.l~Lbe !e~li.~f!.Rle ~j!hiUJ;.heI2h~.!¥lID!fna,l~QrldLJn order to satisfy the demands of both theoretical andpractical reason, then,ilm~_tbe P.2!Jsi.ble to thi~k of t~~ se.!:l~il?te

wOLlgJ!§._9l!iilll!:)..Qf.~2£illpiti!1g_th!l..~lf~£.t;LolJ?oth ,kjpdLQf.kgi§l<!.:tion. In Kant's words, "nature must be able to be thought in such;;Yay that the lawfulness of its form is compatible at least with thepossibility of the realization within nature of purposes in accordwith laws of freedom.t" It is precisely this task to which theCritique ofJudgment is addressed, namely, to show that it is possibleand legitimate to think of the natural realm both as universallygoverned by the principle of natural causality andas embodyingthe effectsof a rational, nonmechanistic causality. Kant goes on toelaborate the only way in which human thought can accommodate the demands of both theoretical and practical reason:

There must be a foundation (Grund) for the uniry ofthe supersensible that constitutes the ground of nature and that which is practically contained in the concept of freedom. The concept of thisfoundation, although incapable, both theoretically and practically,

4. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (KU), pp. 175-6. Published in English as Critiqueif'judgmilnt, p. 12.

5. KU, p. 176; English, P: 12.


of attaining to knowledge of it, ... nevertheless makes possible thetransition from the mode of thought in accord with the principlesof one to the mode of thought in accord with the principles of theother."

Of course, Kant must do more than merely assert the conceiv... 'ability of this unity; he must convince us that there is in fact nocontradiction in the view that a world governed by universalcausal determination might also be one that can accommodate theeffects of a completely independent set of laws, namely, those offreedom. Kant argues for the conceivability of the two kinds oflegislation within one and the same world by referring to the roleplayed by a particular kind of teleology within natural science.In the third Critique Kant recognizes that the legislation of thecategories of the understanding, even as universally applicable inthe realm of experience, is not itself sufficient to guarantee thepossibility of systematic knowledge of nature according to empir..ical laws. The world of experience might indeed be structuredaccording to the categories of the understanding and still be toocomplex - infused with too great a diversity - to be captured interms of simple empirical laws that could then be combined intoa system of natural science. ~_cond!j:ions fa!:th~~~pil!lY~Le~gl~!~~P:-<;_~. J.~.~.~.Qld~ .!!!..!4~ Critique qfr~,r~R~!!~Qll ..£Q!).jl!!Jlt~~~~sarybut .not sufficient condition (o.r.,.th~-.J!Q§§jl!i!itY.,,,.QfJ!=--\!Jlifled

§~Y~J~.m--QiJl~!YJ:~",§£i~~.. For the latter to be possible, the facultyof reflective judgment must supply a transcendental principle thatcan be derived neither from theoretical understanding nor frompure practical reason. Kant characterizes this transcendentalprinciple in the following way:

With respect to what is left undetermined by the general laws ofnature grounded in our understanding, particular empirical lawsmust be regarded as if they were in accord with a unity such as theywould have if an understanding (though not our own) had, for thebenefit of our cognitive faculties, provided them in order to makepossible a system of experience in accord with particular laws ofnature."

Thus, in the quest for a systematic knowledge of the empiricalworld, it is possible, indeed necessary, to regard the events of thatworld both as completely subject to natural causality and as

6. KU, p, 176; English, p. 12," 7. KU, p. 180; English, p. 16.

ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY 17determined teleologically, that is, in accord with a purpose - inthis case, the purpose of a hypothetical intelligence that undertook to determine the details of the empirical world in such a waythat it could be known by the human mind in a system of particular empirical laws.

Kant's point with regard to natural science seems clear and, forour purposes, unobjectionable. What is not so apparent, however,is precisely how this point can be of help in the reconciliation offreedom and natural causality. In a very general sense, the example of natural science is relevant in that it shows how a kind ofpurposiveness (a legislation distinct from natural causality) canbe attributed to the phenomena of nature without thereby violating the principle of natural causality. The cruci!!:Lwstio!!~.llOw~

e)l~~L~~ht;!b.!!_Jh~Jilllliof ~l!E20S!.Y.~§§!l.m~9:...l:?yj:!m,,~fa_~Y.ms te!l1aJi.S~12~~.l~E.!g~..0(~J1!!£j~".~}l@~i<;;!:!!Y.,J!.lla12,g.Q}lL!2..!h~P9!Posiv~!!~.s-s.J.~,EljS'J.!..}£o.!J:.(LPr!!:.stp}£~,,2Ip.!.~s~!~eLr£.~~Q!.LJg._~~a91~t9 ..~h£9.!!-.~ly.1ight1JP?r.Lt~~.gQtnP~t,!2!lit.YJ?Lth~_Ul:.t~er J;~·:ilhJh£:w

l~gi§'!'.l:!Lq.12 ..9L~~~.!Pl~,e.r.~!~!1:s!i!1g.The answer to this question depends upon how one under-

stands the particular "legislation" of practical reason that is atissue. Kant's statement of the problem, quoted above, is ambiguous in one crucial respect: I.Q what se!!!,~<~:I.~.~)ound~rs~n(Lthe

"p.ur:l?.Q~~~._(Z!£~.f~.!L!ha1J.l:l.~~L~..2Lfr£~i!9J2LComq1and 10 ber~,llJi:;::~.~1Y.Hhi,!H!:ty. se!!~lg!~_w'9r!9? It is natural to assume that thepurposes referred to are simply the duties that the moral lawrequires rational agents to perform. On this interpretation, thetask of the introduction to the Critique ofJudgment would be to showhow the commands of the moral law itself can be realized withina world that is goverued by natural causality in other words,how the phenomenal world can be rigorously determined as wellas an arena in which free actions can be realized.~~cou.d_ interJIDlli1.tiol1,._bmvever._~.tb..e ...~p.ur.p.QS.e.s":.p.m

ILos.~ll.b..x.ili£:JJ!W.Il oUr.~J:<d9wm"tQ.r~i~tlQj~LB1!rJiC1\L<J:.r"ds:mandJJla!:le

Qy.m.Qn1li.ty',Jb~.Lh~l?l?ilJ.!t.~.~.jJ;l ..t!:l~..§~wjp.l~.:w..QdgJ?J~..gi~!!:ipu t~"di.n'proJ29Lt;iQ;p...J.Q.YirJ:ll~~ There is good evidence to suggest that thisis the sense in which Kant understood the problem of the thirdCritique, not the least of which is that under this interpretationthe purposiveness at issue becomes tr)l1y analogous to that involved in his example of natural scienn(8Jfhe presupposition that

8, Two other pieces of evidence support this interpretation of Kant's problem inthe third Critique; (I)Under the first interpretation, the problem of the Critique


happiness should accord with virtue contains nothing that wouldnecessarily violate the universality of the causal principle innature. It merely requires an assumption to the effect that anintelligent being has predetermined the details of the naturalworld in such a way that the normal, causally determined courseof events will also fulfill this req uirement of morality. -

Nevertheless, it is clear from Fich~e's text that he takes Kant'sprg!?_~~~_,.!_~__~._ ,.~h~~~·i~f~2f~·~1i:~·:-f)Yq~·~~!t.~rci!~iIY~~~j~\i§1=Qilillti~a~~r

.him, the problem consists in explaining how the realization of theprinciples of practical reason, understood here as moral commands, can be compatible with the requirement of theoreticalreason that the world of experience be universally determined. Inother words, Fichte's problem becomes one of understanding howa particular subset of human actions - moral deeds - .can, asevents within the empirical world, be both causally determinedand consequences of the free determination of the will.

Despite the importance of this issue, the fact remains that it is.a different problem from the one Kant intended to solve in thethird Critique. For this reason, it is easy to see why Fichte could notfind satisfaction in a solution based upon the strategy of thatwork. Although Kant may have successfully articulated how akind of natural teleology is compatible with the universal causallaw, it is difficult to see how the kind of purposiveness involvedhere could help us understand what Fichte takes to be the problem at hand. The crucial difference between Kant's example ofnatural teleology and the realization of free, moral actions withwhich Fichte is concerned is that the former can be understood in

ofJudgment collapses into the problem of the third antinomy. Not only is thisunlikely - why would Kant need two distinct solutions to the same problem? - but Kant explicitly characterizes the third antinomy as directed at adifferent problem (KU, p. 175; English, p. I I). (2) In this and other worksKant often refers to the problem of "purposiveness in nature" and the "harmony of the laws of nature with those of freedom." In most of these passagesit is clear that the problem he has in mind is that of the correspondence ofhappiness and virtue. For example, see Kant, Kritik der Praktischen Verunurft(KPV) , p. 144. Published in English as Critique ofPractical Reason; p. 150. Also,Kritik der reinen Vernutifl (KRV), A810-I I/B838-9.

g. This is made clear by statements such as the following: "The legislation offreedom is aimed only at the mere determination of the will" (GA, ILl,p. 329). Hence, Fichte takes "legislation offreedom" to refer to moral laws thatpresent commands for the determination of the will, rather than to morality'sdemand that nature be determined in accord with moral purposes. See alsoGA, ILl, p. 347.

ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY 19

a way that does not require a continuous intervention of supersensible causes into the phenomenal chain of events. In the case ofFichte's problem, however, no mere principle of reflective judgment can solve what appears to be an outright contradictionbetween the requirements of the two forms of reason. While theoretical reason requires the effects offree decisions to be realizablewithin the phenomenal world, practical reason seems to rule outthe possibility ofan uncaused act breaking into the chain of causally governed events to initiate a new series of consequences.

Although Fichte's reading of the introduction misunderstandsthe specific issue that Kant intended to address in the third Critique, it nevertheless illuminates another important sense in whichthe problem of the compatibility oftheoretical and practical reasonarises for Critical Philosophy. This problem, however, is moreclosely related to the one addressed in the third antinomy in theCritique ofPure Reason than to the concerns of the Critique rifJudgment.The question Kant asks in the third antinomy is whether naturalcausality is the only causality applicable to appearances, or whetheranother species ofcausality, freedom, might not apply as well. Thedilemma Kant faces, as well as its relevance to moral philosophy,is easily understood: Ifmorality is to have a place in the empiricalworld, then it must be possible to conceive of human actionswithin that world as free, or uncaused. Yet Kant's argument in thefirst halfof the first Critique for the universal validity of the causallaw in the realm of nature seems to rule out the possibility of anuncaused event within that realm. Hence, the prospects for maintaining the possibility of free events within the empirical worldseem quite dim. For to h.gllLthat J~:.Y!t..rX,,!eillp-iri~~L~yentll. dete..!:'l1!i1!~d~~1h_~tr!~tI!~f!-:~~!LQL~H!Qlh~r,._.t~.mI2orillJ.Y._I2.rigL~vel).l~~eJ~mtt.tQ.j!!!ply, .1l;H!.t.Jh~.~RQc§W.ng,.Qf,"fr~£<dQ,m,,~J;I~.gj,_':~fl:JJIl~:,:-9L<il!¥

m~h,,~'yent.,i~_,V.£lL!P-!:(rd¥,§llll<;xjlYQ-lJ..§J~llLini1QmRaJ:ibl(:_.:w:iilLthe.

uece,s.,(litY_1:~QJJirJ;d,~h.Y,J.bJ~.Hrin~j.l?l~.QLtlal1JJ:.aL{;~l,lS.ali ty.Although Kant attempts to resolve this difficulty by making

a distinction between appearances and things in themselves, andby correlating them with natural causality and freedom, respectively, Fichte devotes a considerable portion of his early philosophical efforts to understanding how this move can solve Kant'sproblem. Fichte's doubts about Kant's solution center not only onthe ability of the noumenal-phenomenal distinction to makeintelligible the possibility of a free act occurring in the naturalworld; he is also concerned with the implications ofapplying such


a distinction to the practical subj ect itself: Does the radical dis ...tinction betw.e.~_~p'pear~t.l~sand thiqgs in themselves leave rOQm(QI_.~1!.Y~.!9!1,Q._of COJ].11~ctiQ!LP~~en..Jbe nOlLmenal ~e.mpirical&~lve~§...iY..hj.clL~Qyld..!lli!-~~.mw:aLa.ktjD..ll-4:1.-coher.erlLp.o.asibilii~? I

0

Although worries about the compatibility of Kant's accounts oftheoretical and practical reason constituted an important motivating factor for the young Fichte, as well as for many of his con~

temporaries, this sense of the unity of reason is not the mostimportant for understanding the philosophical system that heultimately develops. Rather, the systems that Fichte attempted toconstruct from 1793 on are concerned primarily with the unity ofreason in two different senses (the second and third theses outlined earlier), each ofwhich asserts a deeper unity than mere compatibili"ty. Nevertheless, the problems underlying Fichte's earlymisgivings about Kant's two accounts of reason do not simplydrop out of view in his later thought. Although the issue does notreappear in Fichte's systematic works in precisely the form consid- .ered here, the same basic question - can.Dritical.Philoscphyprovide..an-ad-e.q.uat.e....defeJlS~~.Qf..mQf,.ality.:.J\nd-hl!mAn~fr:e.edQmLoccupies a central place in later texts as well. For, as we shall~entu~~see,iponefurmQr~sdti~~t~~a~s

the ..PL9j~y£tQ.fJ!nify.i!!g-!h~Q!~ti~_'!l aJ1g_Rrac.t~l1:e.a~.Qnjn~~e_ach.,J)f

tht;~ffe~.!!t,K.l!!§~~~=Jh~1Jh~t ,Qr21,~_~1 takes.J1.n..__-._

10. The first of these concerns is found in both versions ofFichte's first major work,Attempt ata Critique ofAll Revelation (1792). Original at GA, 1.1, pp. I 5- I 6I; andSW, V, PP.9-172. See especially pp. 118-22 (GA, Lr , pp,6g-74; SW, V,pp. 106-12), where, in the context of considering the notion of revelation,Fichte attempts to make sense of the possibility of the effectsofa supernaturalcause appearing within the empirical world: "Is it even conceivable thatsomething outside ofnature can have a causality within nature? Weshall answerthis question, in part, in order to shed a bit more light upon the still obscuredoctrine of the possibility of the coexistence ofnecessity in accord with naturallaws and freedom in accord with moral laws') (p. 118; GA, 1.1, P: 69; SW, V,pp. 106-7). The latter issue is Fichte's main concern in the Creuzer review of1793, where Fichte eventually concludes that the only way available to Kantof understanding the relation between noumenal and phenornenal subjects isin terms of "a pre-established harmony between the determinations of freedom and those of the law of nature," the foundation (Grund) of which liesneither in nature nor in freedom, "but only in a higher law which subsumesand unites both under itself" (SW, VIII, p. 415). It is, of course, impossibleto attain any insight into how this higher law can bring the elements of twocompletely independent realms. into a relationship of correspondence, buttheoretical reason is impotent to prove the impossibility of such a law, and, inthe absence ofany other possibility of relating the subject as noumenon to itsexistence as an appearance, practical reason requires such a belief.

pH: .'. --~ .. - ' '-.' __ no -

ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY 2 I

The systematic unity of reason

In the second of the three theses outlined earlier, theoretical andpractical reason are understood to constitute a unity if the principles of each can be derived within a single system of philosophy,all parts of which are deducible from a chain of arguments arisingout of one first principle. It is this conception of the unity of reasonthat figures most prominently in Fichte's earliest efforts at constructing a philosophical system. Thus, Fichte's attempt to demonstrate the unity of reason takes the form of a search for a firstprinciple capable offounding a system of philosophy that encompasses both theoretical and practical reason. While it is clear thatsuch a project is distinct from one that merely aims to prove thecompatibility of the two forms of reason, it is not so clear whydemonstrating the unity of reason in this sense should be regardedas an important, or even desirable, goal for philosophy. "'lh.!ll.pre_cisel~ is to .he-gained.by. brblgingJ;Qg$:ther theor~ti~al and pr.a&-ti'gl reason_Ji':itgin~i!...§j,Dgh,-~y~tc.w_Q.LIiliilQ.§Q.~ In order toanswer this question we must briefly consider the historical context in which Fichte's idea for such a project originated.

Fichte's quest for a single principle of reason has its immediateroots in the thought ofK. L. Reinhold, who by the early I 790S hadbecome, apart from Kant himself, the most influential expositorand proponent of Critical Philosophy. I I During this period Reinhold's principal philosophical goal was to unify the disparate elements of Kant's thought into a more systematic philosophy, andcentral to this effort was the search for a first principle from whichall of philosophy could be derived. Reinhold's actual attempts atsystematizing philosophy focused primarily on Kant's first Critique, and especially on the task of tracing the two sources of theoretical knowledge - the forms of sensible intuition and the categories of the understanding - back to a single common root. Yetthere is no reason why this same strategy could not be followed todemonstrate a fundamental affinity between the two faculties ofreason as well. If it were possible to discover a single principlecapable of grounding all of philosophy, then theoretical and practical reason would be "unified" in the sense that each could beshown to derive from a common first principle. In the followingchapter we shall examine in greater detail Fichte's initial attempts

II. Most significant here is Reinhold (1789).


to realize this general conception of a philosophical system. l~ Fornow it is more important to understand why Reinhold and Fichte_ I

considered this kind of systematicity to be an important goal ofphilosophy.

The idea that there might exist a fundamental principle sharedby both theoretical and practical reason does not originate withFichte, or even with Reinhold, but is suggested already by Kant inthe Critique of Practical Reason. In a notoriously obscure passagetoward the middle of that work Kant states that comparisons ofthe respective structures of the first two critiques "legitimatelyarouse the expectation that perhaps one day it will be possible toarrive at insight into the unity of the whole faculty of pure reason'(theoretical as well as practical) and to derive everything from oneprinciple.t '" In the second Critique, however, Kant does not go onto consider in any more detail how the two faculties of reasonmight be shown to proceed from a common ground. In fact, apartfrom this vague allusion to the possible unity of reason, Kantnever takes up this question in precisely the same form again.W)ly,__iliJ~..~-,,"_g9~§~.!i~llt~_I~g.~[<!JJ1~~gi~.~QX~y- ..QfJt~if!gl~~,p.rinQPle

\.Qf~~~~,~~Q.t!_~§.,~~u_!:!~l!!LI].j~h~Q ...~Q,"g.!!~9,~§§_~rx. ..t~§..k. (QLQ;:iticalP,h.iW.s.o-...-.£~lX In other words, why is it that what for Kant was mereconjecture was to become for Fichte a statement of one of philoso...phy's necessary and most urgent tasks?

The reason given by Kant for his suggestion that searching fora common principle of reason would be an appropriate philosophical goal is that such a search springs from "the unavoidable needof human reason, which only finds complete satisfaction in a per ...fectly systematic unity of its knowledge." 1

4 Since it is the task ofreason to unify particulars by subsuming them under principles ofever greater generality, philosophy can be completely satisfiedwith itselfonly when it has succeeded in recognizing the essentialcommonalities among what initially appear to be wholly disparate entities. At the same time, however, it must be emphasizedthat for Kant the fact that reason is compelled to search for systematic unity does not guarantee that such unity can actually befound. Reason's need for unity is sufficient to legitimize Fichte's

12. As we shall see in Chapter 2, Fichte's initial idea was to attempt to deduce theprinciples of both theoretical and practical reason as necessary conditions ofthe unity of consciousness. Hence, on this. view, the unity of consciousnesswould serve as the first principle of all of philosophy.

13. KPV, p. 91; English, p. 94. 14. KPV, p. 91; English, p. 94.

ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY 23quest for a single principle of reason as an enterprise that isconsistent with the spirit of Critical Philosophy, but it does notimply that Kant's inability to find such a common ground necessarily constitutes a defect in his system. The absence of a single <principle for the whole of philosophy may be regarded as a disit,R:pQintment but llQ~:,strictlyspeaking, as .a.failure.

For Fichte, however, the demand for a single principle of reasonacquires an urgency that seems inappropriate for a goal that, fromKant's perspective, remained nothing more than ~.J~g!:;lIa..~!:Y~

ideal. It is understandable that philosophy would rejoice at suchadiscovery if it were made, but it is unclear why it should becomeone of the main preoccupations of post-Kantian philosophy. Ishall argue that the task of finding a first principle capable ofgrounding both theoretical and practical reason takes on suchsignificance for Fichte because he com~U;Q believe tllii~y:,~.....QL~tl~b_t;L,Rrinci.l1kl-IDlL~QabJ.sLbJmj:.Q..pmyide.J),...J.llO.I~~sQlidd<ie11§.~-9fKID.1..t~Ull..Qr.~l.tb.e.QLx..lhanK;mj;.hims~l(~l~w..gh;,e.,_This view derives from Reinhold's general notion of a philosophical system and especially from his belief that uniting disparateelements into a single system would allow one to discern important relations between those elements that would otherwise remain hidden. Thus, in the field of theoretical reason Reinholdhoped that a truly systematic version of Critical Philosophy wouldyield not only definitive proofs of the validity of each individualcategory of the understanding but also a demonstration of thecompleteness of Kant's set of categories. Applied to the case athand, a system that could comprehend all of philosophy as proceeding from a single principle might also be able to settle issuesconcerning the relationship between theoretical and practical reason that Kant's version of Critical Philosophy is unable to resolve.More specifically, :Eicltt..~llQ~.~mUQ...lliLthat if the llJ.i1Jcilll!<.§..QLp-ractigll..r.~so!l..QQJJl4...11~_§b..Q.w.njQ....Q1:~LlPY_./!'.P-;;U:li~:lJ.lat_place

within_lL..Y..uita~.iUl(LrigQx!X!lSlY.:Jj~dYf.Y.~LRhiJQ§QBpi9ltL§:xftt~m,

thl;n..thQs.~_priu~ip.1e~j;Y.ollld.a"c.q.ui:r.e.aJsln~Qfgr~unding ..that.:ths:ydQ~nQLtlQS,§ ..~s_iQj~Qh\tiQn~fmm.~tht;~~~n4.Jn other words, tolocate the tenets of practical reason within such a system mightalso enable Fichte to prove their validity. As we shall see in greaterdetail in the following chapter, Fichte's first attempt (in the Gebhard review) to find a common principle for all of reason revealsvery dearly how, at least for the young Fichte,' the task of defending Kant's view of morality converges with that of deriving all of


philosophy from one principle. For now our task is to understandthe sense in which Fichte believed Kant's practical philosophy tobe in need of a more stable foundation.

Fichte's criticism of the foundations of Kant's moral theory isarticulated for the first time in the Gebhard review of 1793.15 Inthis piece Fichte turns his attention to what he believes to be acrucial problem of Kant's philosophy, one that calls into question"nothinf less than the general validity of the Kantian moral prin.ciple." I The unresolved difficulty to which Fichte refers is theabsence within Kant's moral philosophy of a positive proof of thepractical nature of pure reason. At the end of the Gebhard reviewFichte explicitly formulates what for him is the central task yet tobe accomplished by Critical Philosophy: "It must be proved thatreason is practical.' 17 This assertion raises two questions in needof closer attention: First, what must be shown about pure reasonin order to prove that it is practical? And second, why are Kant'sown arguments for this claim insufficient?

The first question can be made more precise if reformulated asfollows: Is the human agent capable of being motivated to act bysome incentive other than those that are merely sensuous andhence supplied to her from an external source (nature) in accordwith natural causal laws? That is, can certain human actions bedetermined by a purely rational incentive derived from the awareness of a law of pure reason that the human agent, as a rationalbeing, legislates for herself? It is clear that both Kant and Fichtewant to answer these questions in the affirmative, for they agreethat a positive answer to each is necessary in order to sustain twoclosely related beliefs, namely, that human beings have moralobligations and that they are capable of genuine autonomy. Beforeconsidering these connections in closer detail, let us turn to thesecond issue raised earlier concerning the inadequacy of Kant'sown arguments in support of his claim that pure reason has apractical capacity.

15. GA, 1.2) pp. 21-9; SW, VIII) pp.418-26. This work is a review of F. H,Gebhard's book Ueber die sittliche Gilte aus uninteressiertem Wahlwollen (1792).

16. SW, VIII) p. 418.17. SW, VIII, p. 425. Fichte consistently uses the term 'practical reason' to refer

to what Kant called 'pure practical reason' and contrasted to 'empiricalpractical reason'. I shall follow Fichte's usage here, so that 'practical reason'should be taken to signify practical reason in its pure (i.e., empirically unconditioned) form.

c

ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY 25Fichte's main o~ction to Kant's position is that the mere ~

e.!!£~Y.!i!hin con1!£iouSnfl~!Ull:lLmoral ~wg~jfJnSJltlkient..to..es~lLl!Lpun; r~a:mn i~~l. In other words, Fichte's <1~

claim in the Gebhard review is that a proofof the practical natureof pure reason cannot be attained simply by appealing to facts ofconsciousness. An awareness of the moral "ought" is not by itselfsufficient to demonstrate that pure reason has a practical capac- D",... < =..\~~ity, for the mere presence of "the moral feeli!.!B:~llic~e o, ....'~" +~

GQJ1llL) 18 implieL!!Q1:bing~ut its ..Q!!gIn.... that is, the feeling of ('(.,'''''''''",,,,'.,_,,,,,,~~moral necessity may indeed be present within consciousness, butjl.dQJ,~§cJ1Qj_i,lJ~tlLe~IIJ.~.;tim.C;<.R!'..Q,£1~imit~tQ.~rQ...c!uqLQf.BYIer~~'!§.Qn, Thus, both Kant and his opponents could conceivablyagree upon the facts of moral consciousness and still disagree overwhether those facts point to the existence of a faculty of practicalreason. For example, t;h.e mor2.Li~~ling might just as well bee~l?,!~tJ;l.!Q.!J:§.!Ll}!i!!}ji~l~!J!Q!LQf~_"f1-lndq~lJ,JJ1Ldri~.thtmi~:(ein Grundtrieb des Gemuts) QJ',j!Lq!hliJ.,WQn;t§'~_i\~!!1~J?roduct of,!lu[;ltur..al cid:v..e" that, like the drive for pleasure, is simply a compo-nent of human nature.I'' If explained in this way, moral feelingcould still be perceived as qualitatively distinct from other kindsof feelings such as pleasure and pain, but it would neverthelessshare one crucial characteristic with these more obviously sensu-ous feelings: As the products of natural drives, both would have tobe regarded as simply given to the subject. Thus, for Fichte thefeeling of moral necessity is a fact of consciousness, but that thisfeeling derives from a faculty of pure reason is not itself revealedby consciousness and, indeed, represents only one possible inter-pretation of it.

The philosophical import of this challenge becomes clearerwhen one sees that, for Fichte, the crucial distinction betweenattributing moral feeling to a faculty of practical reason and regarding it as an effect of a natural drive is that the former viewimplies that moral consciousness derives from "an absolute selfactivity of the human spirit," while the latter implies that the feeling is given to a passive subject from without." Thus, on the first

18. Fichte also uses the expression "the feelingofmoral necessity (the ought)" and"the feeling of the absolute right" (jenes GtifUhl des schlechthin. Reehtes) (SW,VIII, pp. 423-4),

19. SW, VIII, p. 420. 20. SW, VIII, p. 420.


account, an action for which the moral feeling served as the determining incentive could be considered autonomous in the sensethat the subject's will would have been determined by a self-givenincentive; on the second account, where moral feeling is simplythe result of natural drives, a deed motivated by moral feelingwould be no more "self-determined" than those acts motivated byother, more obviously natural incentives. At issue in this debate,then, is nothing less than the nature of human freedom and thequestion as to whether the human being is capable of genuineself-determination: Is freedom to be understood as limited to theability to choose among given incentives, or is the human beingcapable of supplying himselfwith his own practical ends? Viewed

/" in this light, the gravity of Fichte's challenge becomes apparent,for in the_absGnce of~_PJ:~9iJh~.tJ!1~rn.Q.rat~feelillg~ithin__~_~~~fr£!!lE.rll£t!£~.,"!~~.~2~!h_Q.t~!!£~~L£h!!Q~Q.RbY-=fann0t£~t!f1.!!sivelY::~~,!~£!i~.h ..~!,h~a-!,~~~~._ E9.§.~X~! ..U~~y.,.9i.h'!!mL~u'f"~L!!,tQ!!Q!!!y, Thus) thequestion of the existence of practical reason is bound up with thevalidity of the moral law itself. For if the human being were incapable of acting on the basis of reason alone and therefore had nocapacity for genuine autonomy, then "real morality would bedestroyed," and the belief that we have moral obligations wouldbe a "demonstrable illusion."2I

It is clear that Fichte's criticism of Kant here is directed primarily at the version of his position laid out in the Critique ofPracticalReason. To demonstrate that pure reason has a practical capacityKant appeals there not to a "moral feeling," as Fichte would haveit, but to an undeniable "fact of reason." Kant describes this factof reason as the consciousness of the fundamental law of moralityand as "the only fact of pure reason," which "thereby proclaimsitself as an original giver of laws" (als urspriinglich. gesetzgebend). Inanother passage Kant characterizes this fact of reason 'as a principle that "forces itself upon us as a synthetic a priori principlewhich rests upon no intuition, either pure or empirical.Y'" Starting from this original, "undeniable" fact Kant argues that a moralcommand cannot be valid for the human being unless one assumesthat pure reason, apart from all natural inclination, is capable ofdetermining the will. In other words, the immediate and undeniable consciousness of moral obligation to which Kant appeals in

21. SW, VIII, p. 424. 22. KPV, p. 31; English, p. 31.

ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY 27the second Critique is held to establish the reality of practical reason, since in the absence of such a faculty, moral action, andtherefore moral obligation as well, would not be possible.

On the latter pointthat morality requires a faculty of practicalreason - Fichte is in complete agreement with Kant. What heobjects to is that the argument for practical reason rests merelyupon an appeal to a fact of consciousness. Alt!J.o~g!l.Fi£!:!.!&.~ts

t»lu:~alit~hLJ1t~r{lLfee1i~~~_f~_~22.,~ne~f-~'!so!?$£tiQgj§ th~~~J.sar!:X t~e we~.tth~J;Ji~!1~l2.~.lLt:!?Perhaps Fichte's point can best be put in the following way: Ananalysis of what we mean by the "ought" and of how we understand moral obligation does indeed show that if we regard ourselves as subject to moral obligations, we are also required tobelieve in practical reason and therefore in the possibility ofautonomy as well. Thtliluestiq!!J~ft U!}l!:fl~d.J2Lt!2!~_~':!':!:ly~is,

!>(')~,tY~!ljL'Yhether t~,,~[w.at.w~l1J:munJ!.RYillqt~lQhliga

tiOtlUl1ight.n9Li!~~ll§.iQn.Fichte's rejection of Kant's appeal to the notion of a "fact of rea

son" is most plausibly understood as based upon the belief that, intaking this position, Kant fails to carry out a thoroughgoing,consistent application ofhis own Critical principles to the field ofmoral philosophy. That is, Kant's treatment of reason in the second Critique seems to stand in conflict with his procedure in thefirst. For the former characterizes the moral law as a syntheticprinciple, yet Kant does not ground this synthetic proposition ineither of the two ways available to the Critical Philosopher of thefirst Critique namely, by pointing to an intuition upon which itrests or by providing a transcendental deduction. Rg Furthermore,in the "Transcendental Dialectic" of the Critique if Pure ReasonKant asserts the need for a critical examination of the beliefs towhich theoretical reason inevitably leads us. This he does by asking whether, despite the necessity with which reason arrives atthese beliefs, they might nevertheless be illusory. 011L~:yhatJ~!.2!!!lds ~.

~es _()Jl.Lh~lief in th~_~lidity_ofJh~.m.Qral !IDY..eluc!.t..!El~_..!~~_ ..criti~~..el\,lLrui!l~ti.Q!! an\i esc..!1Re ili~J.ema!:s! fo!~~_<!~~~on? What

23. See also Kant, Grundlegung ,turMetaphysik der Sitten (GMS), 420. Published inEnglish as Groundwork of the Metaphysic qf Morals, pp.87-8. Significantly,though, Kant speaks here of demonstrating only the possibiliV of a practicala priori synthetic proposition, not ofproving that there is one (i.e., that we doin fact have moral obligations), as Fichte seems to have in mind.

28 FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJ.ECTIVITY

the young Fichte seeks, then, is a stronger '~efense of the validityof our belief in the reality of moral obligatio or, in other words,a more rigorous deduction of the moral law than is provided byKant in the second Critique.

Although the position implicit in Kant's doctrine of a "fact ofreason" denies that such aproofis necessary, it is important to note

v that Kant espoused this view only after a futile, decade-long searchfor precisely the kind of deduction demanded by Fichte.i" But theposition at which Kant eventually arrived - that the validity andbinding force of the moral law require no external justification failed to satisfy the young Fichte, and the quest for a more substantial proof of practical reason came to be one of the most powerfulmotivating forces behind the development of his own philosophical system, one expression of which, as we shall see more clearlyin Chapter 2, consists in the attempt to show that both theoreticaland practical reason rest upon a single first principle. Althoughthe hope behind this search for a more rigorous deduction of themoral law may not accord with Kant's position in the Critique ofPractical Reason, it is at least consistent with the spirit of CriticalPhilosophy in general. Furthermore, in the absence of a definitiveargument on Kant's part that such a proofis in principle unattain..able, there is nothing to prevent one from assuming that, althoughKant himselfwas unable to discover it, a more conclusive proofofpractical reason might lie within philosophy's grasp.

Fichte's preoccupation with the unity of reason in the sensejustdescribed differs from the first version of his project in the follow-

~:p ing crucial respect: In attempting to demonstrate the compatibil...ity of theoretical and practical reason Fichte j§.-£QUfernfd withllCOY!n,g.!h~71lgJ!ililitY~Q[R!:~.£!!.s~L~~~Q - of explaining how, giventhe determinism implied by theoretical reason, it is possible alsoto believe that human beings are free in the sense of being capable~moc~ au~no~. ~~_~y~on beWnd ~~,~~demoQ§tr!!-!~._Jh~_r§Y,~.t~!!H~!if"...Y.n.j1Y..2f)~ea,~gll_ain:!§--l! t somet~ing,stI:Qnge.r,-.nam~l.~,~~,p~Q~itj,~~«pr~Qt:..QLtb:e~~.lih'_Q~.:t}r~~£~son.Formulated in this way, lioweve~ltbeconies'~crear :that thedifference between these two projects is overshadowed by what

24. That such a project was a major concern of Kant's between 1770and 1785isdemonstrated by a number of such attempts in the Rejlexionen as well as bytraces of this project still to be found in Section III of the Groundwork. For athorough account of these 'attempts see Henrich (1960, PP' 77- I 15).

ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY 29they have in common. For both are ultimately motivated by onebasic concern: the desire to uphold Kant's conception of autonomy against those who deny that the belief in human freedom canbe rationally defended.

The structural identity of theoreticaland practical reason

In the remainder of this chapter we shall consider, although onlybriefly, the third sense in which the theme of the unity of reasonappears in Fichte's thought. Although I shall argue that it is ultimately this third conception which is most important for understanding Fichte's theory of subjectivity, \t haU!!L~igQifj._«;;~J!tR~sen,~ei.~ad~!!L~~i!i,~gs. For this reason we shall restrict ourselvesto a brief sketch of this notion of unity and postpone filling in thedetails until the end of Chapter 2, after we have traced the particular developments of Fichte's philosophical system.

To uphold the "unity of reason" in this third sense til to claimtha.uh.e.Ql:.etkaLalliLprA~.ti~l,l.Lte.a.§'Q!t~J:~JlQLtwQ~tin.ktl~.11l~

Qyt rat.heJ:.._tl'iQ...i9..x:.ma•...Qr..:~rnR1Q;y.m~.nt§.,::-g,(.~~gle..f."'.£lJ.ll):...Qf.r.ea.s.Qn.•.There is a sense, then, in which this notion of unityimplies the existence of a deeper affinity between theoretical andpractical reason than what is envisioned in the previous two conceptions. In the first place, the relation asserted here is clearlystronger than mere compatibility. Moreover, it involves more thanthe claim that the principles of theoretical and practical reasoncan be derived from one first principle, or even that both can bebrought together within a single philosophical system. What is .t

asserted here is that each faculty has in some sense the sameinternal structure. The relation between theoretical and practicalreason on this view is one of genuine uniry, implying a fundamentalidentiry between them. The notion of a deep, structural unity between two apparently disparate subjective faculties finds expression in Kant's well-known remark in the introduction to the firstCritique that "the two stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibil-iry and understanding, perhaps spring from a common, but to usunknown, root."25 Although what Kant alludes to here is a unity

25. KRV, A1S/B29. See also KRV, A649-so/B677-B, where Kant makes a similar suggestion with regard to the diverse faculties of imagination, pleasure,desire, etc.


within theoretical reason itself, there is no obvious reason why thesame idea might not also be applicable to the relationship betweentheoretical and practical reason. In fact, in at least one place in hispublished writings Kant explicitly endorses the thesis of the unityof reason in precisely the sense we are currently examining:

· .. a critique of pure practical reason, if it is to be complete,requires, on my view, that we should be able at the same time toshow the unity of practical and theoretical reason in a commonprinciple, since in the end there can only be one and the samereason, which is to be differentiated solely in its application."

Kant's insistence that "there can only be one reason, which is ...differentiated solely in its application" can be considered the classical formulation of this third sense of the unity of reason; and, asI shall argue later, it is this provocative but unelaborated idea ofKant's that Fichte attempts to work out. Such a project, then,would take as its most basic question the following: Is it possibleto comprehend theoretical and practical reason as two forms ofa single faculty of reason? Or, alternatively, does a single structure - a structure of reason in general- underly both the theoretical and practical uses of reason?

Of course; it is by no means obvious from this brief characterization what precisely it would mean to attribute to theoretical andpractical reason an identical "structure." One way in which aKantian might attempt to fill in the details of such a claim is byarguing that reason has an identical function in both its theoretical and practical employments, since in both cases it bestows akind of unity upon some given manifold content - in the first case,a manifold of intuitions, in the second, a manifold of natural desires. Although this is not the particular direction taken by Fichte,it nevertheless qualifies as an example of the unity that can beattributed to reason in the sense under consideration here. In theview that Fichte will ultimately develop, the identical structure ofreason will be articulated in his most distinctive philosophicalnotion, that of the self-positing subject. As we shall see in Chapter 2,

Fichte comes to believe that his theory of subjectivity can demonstrate the essential unity of reason by showing that the subject'stheoretical and practical faculties are derivative of the same funda-nental activity of the mind, which he calls "self-positing."

26. GMS, p. 391.; English, p. 59.

ORIGINS OF FICHTE'S THEORY 3 I

This way of unifying theoretical and practical reason can easilybe seen as ~ continuation of the philosophical proJ~,cJJunderJakenby::;Leibniz, cQnti!!"!!~d-hy,.J;YQJ!h.Jtni...~llud.!:.d to by_Ka,11.Lin..rheearlier quote) of ~b.Q.wingJhl:!-.L~ll oQhe...§ubjeds capacities derivefremlL!!!!gkJundam,l;nl~LR9..w~.L(Q.1Y.tY.lkraJt1...Qf.J.b.e~Q..ul.27 Although Kant in the Critique qf Pure Reason denies that the unity ofthe subjective capacities can be guaranteed in advance of anyactual philosophical inquiry, he does admit the legitimacy of philosophy's endeavor to demonstrate this kind of unity among thevarious faculties, and this for a reason similar to one mentionedearlier, namely, that the "principle of reason calls upon us to bringabout such unity as completely as poseible.t''" Thus, the unity. ofr.(~!!:lton in.this third sense i~ taken by Kii:{l.i..t~~P...§.tjtU_tk..GJs:ind.Qf.~ulat~l that philosophy by its very nature must strive toattain (even though, of course, it may not actually be able torealize it). Viewed in this context, Fichte's attempt to demonstratethe unity ofreason in this deepest sense can be seen not only as acontinuation ofa project central to the tradition of modern philosophy, but, at least in its basic intent, as one that is consistent withthe spirit of Critical Philosophy as well. The question remains,however, whether this particular version of Fichte's philosophicaltask also responds in some way to his concerns about philosophy'sability to defend human freedom. We shall return to this questionat the end of the following chapter, after we have examined ingreater detail how the specific features of his undertaking emergeout of his attempts to find a proof of practical reason and toground all of philosophy in a single first principle.

27. See Henrich (1955, pp. 28-69).28. KRV, A649/B677. In the first version of the introduction to the Critique of

Judgment Kant also characterizes such an attempt as one which "is undertaken in a genuinely philosophical spirit" (p. 206).

2

-------------:::::=.r ~----------~

THE DEVELOPMENT OFFICHTE'S PROJECTFROM I 793 TO I 799

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the development thatFichte's philosophical project undergoes during the period from1793 to 1799. OUf ultimate goal will be to understand how hisconception of that project as a theory of subjectivity emerges outof earlier attempts to uphold the thesis of the unity of theoreticaland practical reason. As we shall see, in his early philosophicalwritings Fichte concentrates primarily on the task of demonstrating the unity of reason in the second of the three senses outlinedin Chapter I (where both theoretical and practical reason are tobe brought together into one system that proceeds from a singlefirst principle). By 1797, however, Fichte comes to have a differentunderstanding of his enterprise, one that embodies the third senseof the unity of reason, according to which theoretical and practical reason are to be comprehended as a single faculty, each ofwhich exhibits the same "structure" of reason in .general. Thestory of this transformation is significantly complicated by the factthat fuL,Ficht..e_Jh~.jsAslle_Qf__tht,~lWit~_~Qf ..J:~~on is inextri~

boun<L,!!lL.}Y.ith.=biJ;~~w<Jim,-to.Jl!!.Q.,~~.~Jl.Q§!jiYsr.~J1[9Q:[J2L~alit~ of...12ractic_alr~~.§Q!!!.,Jnitially, it is the latter concern that dominateshis attempts to construct a new philosophical system. In order tounderstand how Fichte intends to carry out the tasks he sets forhimself, it will be necessary to investigate the general structure

32

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 33and method of his most significant philosophical achievement, theDoctrine of Science, or, as I shall refer to it here, the Wissenschoftslehre. lOur examination of Fichte's system will lead us to focusprimarily upon his notion of a first principle of philosophy. Specifically, we shall attempt to answer the following questions: Whatprecisely is meant to be asserted by Fichte's first principle? Onwhat grounds is that starting point justified? What relation isthere between the first principle and the other truths "deduced"within that system?

Unfortunately, there exists very little consensus among interpreters ofFichte as to how even these most fundamental questionsare to be answered." My own approach to understanding theWissenschoftslehre is based upon the conviction that much of thisdisagreement can be resolved by viewing the texts of the periodfrom 1793 to 1799 not as representatives of a single, coherentsystem, but rather as @K~.;U!!.1!:-!u1l!}!!!!:l.Q!!~p.!9ce.ss ~U!1'§'~Kht,

self-criticism, and revision, all of which are aimed at the development of a more consistent philosophical position. In other words,it is my view that the widespread controversy over the generalnature of the Wissenschqftslehre stems in part from the often unacknowledged fact that Fichte]._own conceptiop. ofhi~E!9ject uEde!.w~!1J: a number of ragical chall;.g~..!. The notion of a fundamentaldevelopment in Fichte's position is already universally accepted,insofar as commentators generally distinguish between Fichte'sviews prior to 1800 and the system developed immediately afterthe Atheism Oontroversy.t What is less widely recognized, however, is that the general conception of the Wissenschaflslehre wasin a state of continual evolution even before 1800, especially inthe first five years of its existence. Not only are there developmentsin the system's method (i.e., in its starting point and strategy of

I. I shall use the term Wissenschaftslehre to refer to Fichte's system in the abstract,as opposed to specific texts that expound the doctrines of that system. Thelatter will be referred to by full tides or, in the case of the first published version, by the abbreviation WL 1794:.

2. For a good discussion of the different (German) schools of interpretation seeB~manns (1~2P..:..!.,2-4:7). Missing from this account, however, is a discussion of the main Frenal: current ofFichte interpretation, represented by AlexisPhilonenko, Luc Ferry, and Alain Renaut.

3. Ofcourse, even here there is disagreement over whether the post-r 800 versionsof the Wissenschaftslehre constitute a discontinuous rupture with the earlier period or whether they are to be seen merely as further developments of whatremains essentially a single project.


argumentation), but its very aims (or at least the priority accordedto its various goals), undergo considerable revision as well. Sinceour concern in this study is to examine Fichte's most advancedposition prior to the break of 1800, it will be necessary both todistinguish the different stages of Fichte's early development andto understand the reasons behind these changes. RetracingFichte's development will constitute the largest part of the presentchapter. The point, however, is not merely to narrate the historyof Fichte's early years, but to enable us to reconstruct the generaloutline of what I am claiming to be the most interesting aspect ofFichte's project, his attempt to construct a "theory of subjectivity."

For the purposes of our discussion Fichte's development before1800 will be divided into three major phases: (I) the presystematic writings prior to 1794; (2) the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794; and(3) the system of 1797-9. The ~~~:e~~t.~c!-extendsfrom the begin..ning of Fichte's philosophical career to the point just before thepublication of the first of his systematic writings. The texts ofgreatest interest here are the collections of unpublished notesentitled "Eigene Meditationen iiber Elementar-Philosophie" and"Praktische Philosophic" (1793-4), as well as the Gebhard review of I ~93.4 The ~~,::~.~ri~is represented primarily by thefirst published version Of'FlcIite's system, Foundation ofthe, EntireWissenschaftslehre (Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, 1794-5),but includes as well two minor texts that are directly associatedwith that system, the Aenesidemus review (1794) and Concerning theConcept ofthe Wissenschaftslehre (Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, 1794).5l:b!liin~J. and, for our interpretation, most importantstage is more dilhcUIf'to demarcate precisely, because it is composed ofa number of lesser known works, both published and unpublished. The published works include the two introductions tothe Wissenschoftslehre (both from 1797) and "Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre' (1797).6 The principal unpublished sources are two distinct sets of students' notes taken during

4. "Eigene Meditationen" and "Praktische Philosophic" are published in GA,11.3, pp. 21-266. The Gebhard review is discussed in Chapter L

5. All three texts are found both in SW, I, pp. 1-328, and in GA, 1.2, pp. 41-67,106-461. The Grundlage appears in English as The Science ofKnowledge. Thelatter two are translated by Daniel Breazeale in Fichte: EarI:J PhilosophicalWritings, pp. 59-77; 94-135.

6. SW, I, pp. 417-534. English translations of the two introductions appear in TheScience ofKnowledge. In distinguishing' between the system of 1794and a secondsystem of 1797-9, I am essentially following the suggestion of Perrinjaquet

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 35Fichte's academic lectures in 1796-9 on what he considered to bethe second formulation of his system, the Wissenschaflslehre novamethodo. 7 Another published work, System ofthe Doctrine of Morals(1798), will not be discussed here, but in later chapters will beconsidered as part of the system of this third period.

The presystematic period

As mentioned earlier, the search for a proofof the practical natureof reason is the dominating concern ofFichte's presystematic writings. During this phase Fichte also asserts the unity of reason, inthe second sense distinguished in Chapter I, insofar as he attemptsto show that the unity of consciousness can function as the "firstprinciple" of both theoretical and practical reason. As we shallsee, however, this quest for a single principle of reason is important to Fichte primarily because he believes that the discovery ofsuch a principle holds the key to a proof of practical reason. InChapter I we examined Fichte's early criticism of Kant's inabilityto prove the reality of practical reason. What is of interest to usnow is the way that Fichte envisioned solving this problem in theperiod before the development of the Wissenschaftslehre. To this endwe must turn again to the Gebhard review, which, in addition tosetting forth Fichte's critique of Kant's position, contains a preliminary sketch of how the young Fichte thought such a proofcould be carried out.

Fichte's proposal for a proof of practical reason consists of fourbrief lines:

The human being (der Mensch) is given to consciousness as a unity(as an I); this fact can be explained only by presupposing anabsolutely unconditioned in him; therefore one must assume the

(1985, pp. 7-18). It has been conclusively demonstrated by Perrinjaquet andothers that the two introductions of 1797 belong to the later system withrespect to both chronology and content. Although an attentive reading of theseintroductions provides ample reason to distinguish the conception of the Wissensahaftslehre presented therein from that carried out in 1794, this differencehas been obscured for English speakers by the unfortunate decision of thetranslators of the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre to place the 1797introductions before the text of 1794, as if the former constituted an introduction to the system expounded in 1794.

7. Wissenschaftslehre nooa methode: Kollegnachschrif; K. Chr. Fr. Krause 1798/99. Thesecond set of notes appears in GA, IV.2, pp. 1-267.


existence of an absolutely unconditioned in the human being. Butsuch an absolutely unconditioned is a [faculty of] practical reason."

The argument advanced here is far from compelling. Fichte himself tacitly acknowledges the inadequacy of his demonstration byprefacing it with the following qualifier: "Such a proof [that is, ofpractical reason] would have to go something like this." In otherwords, ~Itich!~~~_§_ygg~.~.tjQn-.~hQylQ._J~~_r_~g~rg~Jl_!!~_.1l_sketch..Qfa

I2hi1o~QDhis;al .R.[Qg.r.~m..Jh-S!.th~~_~eJ_!Q, be~..carrie..d__Q.m,.nithe.r...than~~:~_r~~!Lz.£!.!ig!l_qfJ.Q'!~t.,P,!,QJ~ct. For this reason we shall set asidefor now the question of the validity of'Fichte's argument and focusinstead upon the structure and aims of such a proof.

Let us begin by noting the general structure of the proposedargument. First, the proof begins with a "fact" (Tatsache) and,more specifically, with a fact that is "given to consciousness."From there it proceeds to deduce the reality of something (practical reason) that, according to the argument, must be assumed inorder to explain the possibility of that fact. Thus, th€J2IQQffj~eillQP~q!~§.1!~I~~~i!!!~!!f!~q.J!~~_ttan~~1l..(t~!!!~_erg!!!!lmtsimilar toKant's mode of argumentation in the Critique of Pure Reason. Itbegins with a fact of consciousness that presumably will be universally admitted and argues toward its conclusion by elaborating the conditions that make that fact possible. A second featureof the proof to be noted is the nature of the fact that serves asits starting point. Here the terseness of Fichte's sketch gives riseto some degree of ambiguity, for it is not immediately clear inwhat sense Fichte understands the "unity" of the human beingthat constitutes the initial fact. Nevertheless, for reasons thatwill become clearer helow.? the 11)..Q,SiRl~~lble...,~~y...Qf...~nder~tandiqg Fichte's aim here is--.!£,.t'!k~ tq!§,~~.~J!!!t!Y~~,"..llt!~fur.JQ.~th(( ..fQrP1aluni1¥~~Q[c-c'Oll.ltcifl1J..sne£a~Cl.s.sQ~ia. ted. witb__K~t's doC;,yiDjLQf tran.:s~enden.tal~:eE~~S~J~tion. In other words, the unity singled out byFichte in this early phase is nothing more than the unity that asubject's diverse representations possess by belonging to a singleconsciousness. 10

8. SW, VIII, p. 425.9. The most important of these reasons is that in his "Eigene Meditationen"

Fichte explicitly takes the "unity" at issue to be the unity of apperception.10. It is worth pointing out here that Fichte obviously understands this unity as

afaet "given to consciousness" as well as a transcendental condition for thepossibility of experience in general.

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 37Finally, let us consider the goals that Fichte's argument aims to

achieve. I t is not difficult to unders tand the sense in which such anargument, if successful, would constitute a proofof practical reason, since it attempts to show that practical reason is a necessarycondition for the possibility of the formal unity of experience ingeneral. Less obvious, but surely of great importance to Fichte aswell, is the fact that such an argument would constitute a significant step toward achieving his goal of unifying theoretical andpractical reason into a single, comprehensive system of philosophy. This intention is expressed in Fichte's remark that "such aproof... could easily be the foundation of allphilosophical knowledge."lI Unfortunately, in the Gebhard review itself Fichte saysnothing more specific about how a proofof practical reason couldbe construed as a foundation for the whole of philosophy. My suggestion (which, as we shall see, is borne out in his initial positionin the "Eigene Meditationen") is that F,ichte envisWlYl..JL.Iili.ilo.:1!2P.!Ij.91~~1!!i!L~.his~Jll~1l9El~§_2f!?9'!hJ?rac9~t~nd tEeoretical reason could be deduced as transcendental conditions ofMinile '~f~ct:::th~~rti~"f;;~~§,~~~~~:rn'this"~;~the "~cifi-cation of theoretical and practical reason" would take on a quitespecific meaning, one that is already familiar to us from Chapter I: The two faculties of reason would be unified in the sense thatthe principles of each could be deduced (transcendentally) withina system that begins from a single starting point, which wouldthus constitute the first principle of all of philosophy. Hence,Fichte's rather vague suggestions in the Gebhard review reveal theoutline of a systematic program in which the tasks of provingpractical reason and demonstrating the unity of reason (in at leastone of its senses) converge in a single project. For if it could beshown that both theoretical and practical reason were necessaryconditions for the unity of consciousness, then Fichte could claimto have satisfied reason's demand for unity among its principleswhile at the same time rectifying one of the most troubling deficiencies in Kant's system - the lack of a proofof practical reason.

Although one might be tempted to dismiss Fichte's schematicremarks in the Gebhard review as "presystematic" and therefore

1 I. SW, VIII, p. 425.12. Here the unity of consciousness is (implicitly) regarded by Fichte as the first

principle of theoretical reason in the sense that the validity of the categorieswithin objective experience can be established by showing that the application of the categories is a necessary condition for a unified consciousness.

38 FICHTE'S THE·ORY O·F SUBJECTIVITY

largely irrelevant to his more mature positions, there is clear evi...dence that the ideas expressed in this early article also informedFichte's initial attempts to construct the system that was to evolveinto the Wissenschaftslehre of I 794. This evidence is found in Fichte's"Eigene Meditationen iiber Elementar-Philosophie," a looselyconnected and extremely circuitous set of unpublished notes inwhich Fichte attempts to clarify to himselfhow Reinhold's projectof founding and constructing an Elemeniar-Philosophie, a completeand unitary system oftranscendental idealism, could be realized.Fichte begins his search for a truly systematic philosophy bydefining the notion of an Elementar-Philosophie in the following way:

There might be certain fundamental rules, universal rules, which applyto everything that occurs in the mind- For: everything must be assimilated (aufgenommen) to the subjective unity; it occurs in a singlemind; therefore everything must be assimilable to this subjectiveunity and everything must be in agreement at least with this uniryandwith the conditions of this unity (if such conditions. can be found).These conditions, if they can be known, constitute an ElementarPhilosophic."

Both the starting point and the goal of the projected system areclearly stated in Fichte's question to himself:

Can one prove the categories and the forms of sensibility, time andspace, as Reinhold wanted sensibility, understanding, reason, thefaculty of knowledge, the faculty of desire - can the necessity of allthese things be demonstrated? Or, more specifically, can the wholeof philosophy be constructed upon a single fact? ... Is it possibleto think of a path [which proceeds] from the unity of apperceptionup to the practical legislation of reasoni"?

These passages clearly reveal that Fichte originally conceived ofhis system as a single chain of arguments that would begin from"subjective unity" - or, what is the same here, "the unity of apperception" - and terminate with a deduction of the faculty of'practical reason. Furthermore, the elements that comprise this system("everything that occurs in the mind") are to be deduced by showing that each (including practical reason) constitutesone of thenecessary conditions for the possibility of the unity of consciousness.

13. GA, 11.3, p. 21. 14. GA, 11.3, p. 26.

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 39What remains unclear is how these deductions, especially in thecase of practical reason, are to be accomplished. If we recallFichte's remarks in the Gebhard review, it seems likely that thebasic thought behind his intended proof is something like thefollowing: The unity among a subject's representations that isinherent in consciousness cannot be understood as a feature ofexperience that is passively received by the subject from without,but must be regarded instead as a product of the subject's ownspontaneity. Insofar as subjective activity constitutes the conditions under which experience alone is possible, it necessarilystands outside of that experience and is therefore empiricallyunconditioned. Although Fichte does not argue for this claim,there is nothing in it that is not already contained within thedoctrines of Kant's first Critique. The puzzling point, and the crucial one as well, is what appears to be Fichte's ilkgitimat~J~JL.

from the spontaneity of the theoretical subject to the conclusionthat this unconditioned activity is identical to a faculty ofpractical reason. There is no apparent reason to assume that the kindof spontaneity invoked by Kant in his account of theoretical reason - that is, a spontaneity that unifies diverse representationsinto a single consciousness - is also practical in the sense requiredby Kant's account of morality, namely, as producing an incentivefor action that is capable of determining the will independently ofsensibility.

Although Fichte is not much clearer in the "Eigene Meditationen" as to how the link between the unity of apperception andthe moral law of practical reason is to be made, his frequent references to the categorical imperative as the "highest unity" ofconsciousness's suggest that some such connection might bedrawn by pointing out the similar roles theoretical and practicalreason playas "unifiers" of the manifold of experience. AlthoughFichte was surely unaware of it, this same connection had alreadysuggested itself to Kant, who devoted considerable energy in hisRejlexionen to finding a transcendental deduction of the categorical imperative from the starting point of pure apperception. 16Theanalogy between theoretical and practical reason that Kant

15. For example, GA, 11.3, p, 48. Numerous other references to the same occurthroughout.

16. For a discussion of these attempts, including the reasons for which Kantultimately rejected this strategy, see Henrich (1960, pp. 98-11O).


attempted to exploit here was based upon the following idea:Whereas the concepts of the understanding order and unify themanifold of empirical intuition, the. ~~t~gQ.riG,~l.imllcratlYe can he.s~~~,,~§ ...~[e~,t.i!1g. auni ~y,-. in the .sense of 199j~~1~.o.nsis tenc:)!, among.t.b~ ,~1JJ)j ~.Qf~_m~n!.f9!q,., g~~!r~.~.~_I}.<;l. il?-~!hJ~t.!Q!!.~,.__

Although Kantultimately rejected this strategy of deducing themoral law, it at least points out an interesting analogy that mightbe drawn between the two faculties with respect to their functionsof unifying different aspects of experience. Fichte, however, is prevented from exploring this more plausible connection by the peculiar way in which he, in this early phase, conceives of practicalreason and the unity it effects. This conception, which to someextent can still be found in the 1794 version of the Wissenschaftslehre, is articulated in the following excerpt from the "Eigene Meditationen' :

[In the preceding analysis] I and not-I are [in a certain respect] ...the same . . . but they remain two, a duality. Shouldn't there also benumerical identity? I believe this to be the highest task of philosophy. It is only possible insofar as things come to be adequate determinations of our pure I, [that is, insofar as] justice prevails. This isthe case with God."

Acc£u:ding_.to_Fichte.,.Jhen,,~the,.~kirld.QfJJ.nit.):._S~1l.ght-r.>b.¥...1h~_favcJJlty

.ofpracticalreascn Is. nQ,t_a."unitY..Qr ~QnSiS1en~Yr7·.am.Q.ng~.~th.~

J~~.fS. ..YJl!iQll,s~.d~J~.ire.s Dl.\t.,a1!!1it):~"Qf.!h~(f~!~h th'~'R,!lot- I , QI"".~Ultityof s!!bj"~£1.,.~.JJ..(;lJ~bJe.t~l~,,More concretely, practical reason demandsthat the objective world be determined in such a way that it con...forms to the requirements of the "pure" subject. This is to beunderstood simply as a rather abstract reformulation of Kant'sown view, according to which practical reason requires that themoral subject act within the objective world and that this actionbe carried out in accord with norms that derive not from somethingexternal to the subject but, as Fichte puts it, from "our pure I." 18

For the present we shall not quibble with Fichte's characterization of practical reason in terms of the subject's demand that the

17. GA, 11.3, p. 132.18. This aspect of Fichte's thought is presented in more detail in his 1794 lecture

series entitled "The Vocation of the Scholar," where he redefines the categorical imperative in terms of the demand for harmony between oneself and theworld, the 1 and the not...I. See GA, 1.3, pp. 25-68, and SW, VI, pp. 291-346;these lectures are also translated by Breazeale in Fichte (1988, pp. 144-84).

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 4 I

object conform to its own essence. What interests us here is thefact that once the unity involved in the exercise of practical reasonis understood in these terms, ~t becom~.Ldiffi.Clllt..iiLsee-ho.W.aplausihle.analogy.cculd.be dra;WILhet:w.e.en,.the.,unil}(.,produc.edjntha.thenretical.emplczment...QLr.eas.Qn,_and_.the-uniLy.-fur_.w.hichprac..ili::.~LriiasQn.-SllPPQsedl:y_.atrives. In the theoretical employment of reason, representations are unified in the sense that eachbelongs to a common subject, but this merely formal unity amongthe manifold elements of experience is quite distinct from the"numerical" unity of the I and not-I that is claimed to be involvedin practical reason. The latter, on Fichte's view, requires a realtransformation of the qualities of the objective world, an actualdetermining of the not-I in accord with the dictates of the subject'sown being. It is fortunate, then, that Fichte soon abandons thisparticular strategy of deducing practical reason from the unity ofapperception. In fact, Fichte's rejection of the latter as a startingpoint for his system can be regarded as the point that separates hispresystematic phase from that of the Wissensckaflslehre proper.This important transition is clearly documented in the "Eigene IMeditationen" in Fichte's explicit rejection of his initial starting 1

point - the "merely formal principle" of the unity of appercep-]tion and his subsequent instruction to himself to continue the I

search for a suitable starting point by "pursuing the unconditionedness of the I." 19

The Wissenschaftslehre of 1794

The two main texts of 1794 that will interest us here are the Foundation ofthe Entire Wissenschaftslehre (henceforth, WL 1794) and itscompanion piece, Concerning the Concept ofthe Wissenschqftslehre."Fichte intended the first text to be used as a handbook by the students attending his first academic lectures on the Wissenschoftslehre, and it is the main source for the doctrines of the 1794 system. The second work, which was written as a prospectus for thesame lectures, is of value for its relatively clear presentation of the

19. "A spark of light: I get nowhere with the merely formal principle.... TheI - can something be done here? - Pursue the unconditionedness of the I"(Geh« der Unbedingtheit des 10k nach) (GA, 11.3, P: 48).

20. Since the Foundationwas actually published in installments that appeared into1795, it might be more accurate to refer to it as WL 1794-5. For the sake ofsimplicity, however, I shall use the shorter abbreviation.

/


general structure and method of Fichte's new system. The issuemost central to Fichte's early conceptioniof'his philosophical system is the choice of a first principle, and it is in the discussion ofthe requirements of this starting point that this text provides theclearest insight into how Fichte understood the general aims of theWissenschqftslehre in 1794.

ill- this.._p~rio(l_f_i~h.t~i~ ...s..tj.lL_engagk.d~ ..in.JbJ~..pIQJec.w_dooucingp:Ql&!i~l~r~~s.-.Qn.irQma,JnQre_j)aID.!;~_PLi.ncipkJ.h'J,!J1~AJJ~~lieY.~IDll

Q.~:~pt~ JQ_~~_rY~ ~._~~__~h~.~~.~~J;~i,lJ:g_PNQit!.t.-(Q!JJ,JLQf"Rmllt~Ql?hy~ ..Ye t theposition of the WL 1794 differs from Fichte's presystematic phasein two ways. First, Fichte no longer attempts to deduce practicalreason from the mere fact of the unity of consciousness; the paththat his proof takes, rather, is to begin with a deduction of theprinciples of theoretical reason from the system's first principleand only then to deduce the principles of practical reason - thistime by demonstrating them to be a necessary condition for thepossibility, not of the unity of apperception, but of theoreticalreason itself. Thus, the basic claim madehere is that a facultz.nfthecrctical.rcason.is.possiblc.onlycn. the .".p.res.ull}lQS.itiQJ.l~_Qf-.the

c'!P.l1g.t~_ for ...}lr.~~.tiCn~l.~=,r~~~.Qn, and.in,this.". s.e.nae",.".rhe...former. isgrpunde4i!!J.he t~!t~r~,.The ~~~g,..andrnnre.imporrant.difference-c..is.Ekht~s n~.w..Qon~pjiQJ}'__Qr.tK~~Qllk~l ...Q[.fu~.Jirs t.ILtillriRle that.ia.to....grp....u,ncL1b..Jl whQl~ of-lJ.hilo§...Qphy. Hence, what must concern us'now is to understand each of these developments: What is Fichte'snew principle in 1794, and by what path is philosophy led fromthis starting point to the rest of the system? .

With regard to the former point Fichte's basic position is afamiliar one to post-Cartesian philosophers: If philosophy is toprovide us with genuine knowledge, then it must begin from a firstprinciple that possesses absolute certainty in itself and independently of the system that is to follow from it. Such a principlecannot itself be proved (for then the premise of that proof wouldbe the first principle) but must be in some way self-justifying."And, if philosophy is to attain the status of a Wissenschaft, the firstpriaclplc.must.he cap-able of conferring. its ce.rtaint~pon thePJlQP.Q§.itiQ.n~_g~.rjved f[Qill.jt,,~~9 that what results is a system ofknowledge in which each proposition possesses the same degreeof certainty as the initial principle. Furthermore, Eichte.-C.QI1C...eizesQfthis.~JllQYelneJltJLQJI1.,.the,jirsl~p.rillciplU9~Y-S1enl

21. SW, I, pp. 38-42.

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 43as a chain of tran§cendentWrg:wnents in which each new proposition is deduced as a necessary condition for the possibility of thepreceding one." In other words, if an already established X can beshown to be impossible without the condition expressed in a newproposition Y, then Y must be accorded the same degree of certainty originally attributed to X.

Although the general structure of the system that Fichte intendsto construct is relatively clear, the content o( the claims actu!!1lyputJorthhy. the WL 1_7.9.4j.!l.llQJ.Qri9..Y1ily_Qb~{;.ure. Nowhere is thismore evident, nor of greater consequence, than in the case of thesystem's first principle. There is, of course, no difficulty in identifying the proposition that is to serve as first principle: "The Ioriginally and unconditionally posits its own existence." 23What isless clear is what this principle is intended to mean. I shall try toshow that part of this obscurity is due to the fact that in the WL1794 Fichte himself is still confused about the precise content ofhis first principle. This confusion manifests itself in a basic conflict between the content of the first principle as it is articulated inSection r of the WL r 794 and the way in which Fiehte actuallyuses this principle throughout the work, especially in the transition from theoretical to practical reason.

As we have already seen, in r 793 Fichte turned from his initialstarting point of the unity of apperception and proceeded tosearch for a new first principle by investigating what he calls the"unconditionedness" (Unhedingtheit) of the 1. This decision, recorded in the "Eigene Meditationen," suggests that the principlewith which the WL r794 begins is intended, above all, to giveexpression to the "unconditioned" nature of the 1. Indeed, thelanguage of the first section of the WL r 794 seems to bear out thishypothesis, for in discussing his first principle, Fichte invariablyuses expressions such as 'self-grounded', 'absolute', and 'unconditionally posited' (schlechthin gesetzt) to characterize the 1.24 Our

22. SW, I, P.446. Although this passage dates from a later period (1797), itapplies equally well to the 1794 Wissenschoftslehre.

23. "Das Ich setzt urspriinglich schlechthin sein eigenes Sein" (SW, I, p. 98).The precise translation of schlechthin is notoriously problematic. I have chosen'unconditionally' to emphasize the unconditioned nature of the subject'sself-positing. Other possibilities include 'unqualifiedly', 'absolutely' (Heathand Lachs, 1982), 'simply' (Breazeale, 1988). At GA, IV.2, p. 31, Fichteclarifies a bit what the term schlechihin is intended to convey: "The I positsitself unconditionalV' (sohlechthin), i.e., without any mediation."

24. SW, I, pp. 95-6.


task, then, is to uncover the sense in which the WL 1794 assertsthe subject to be absolute or unconditioned.

I t is at this point that we encounter one of the most fundamentaland controversial issues within Fichte scholarship: WhaLis-it.abQJJLtll~~.~.!!!?j~f!.~!h~J'dfi,~h~~_m~a.n~ .JQ_S:~P!'.~~~_iE~,..!Iisyery. f!r§.tpri~~~~~! its most general level, the controversy consists in thequestion of whether the notion of the unconditioned, self-positingI involves a claim about the practical nature of the subject, orwhether it is to be understood as a starting point with a purel.}Ltheor.aical con~e~t. 25 ACGording to the former interpretation, Fichte'sfirst principle is above all a statemeni"'about the moral nature ofthe subject and embodies a claim concerning the subject's capacity for practical freedom. The subject, on this view, is "unconditioned" in the sense that, unlike objects, which are always subjectto the conditions of causal determination, the I is capable ofself-determination. A&-c~Qtding_,t<?:::!~e~Jat~ interpretation, 'selfpositing' denotes a feature of the 1 that is appropriately describedas "unconditioned" but that, to use Kant's distinction, belongs tothe domain of theoretical rather than practical reason. Proponents of this reading tend to see the first principle as expressing adoctrine borrowed from or developed out of Kant's account ofpure apperception in the first Critique. The subject matter of theprinciple is characterized by these interpreters in a variety ofways, by means of such formulations as the "formal identity ofself...consciousness," the "immediate self-certainty" of the I, the"'1 am I" of pure self-consciousness," and simply the Cartesian "Iam.,,26Although there is some disagreement over the precise content of the starting point, what is common to all of these interpretations is the view that the first principle itself makes no directclaim about the ethical or practical aspects of subjectivity.

According to the position that I shall develop in this chapter,there is no way of deciding between these two interpretations aslong as one restricts oneself to the text of the WL 1794. This isbecause in different parts of this work Fichte unwittingly and

25. This is the same question addressed by Peter Baumanns, although he characterizes the two alternatives as "ethical-anthropological" and "transcendental-phenomenological," respectively. See Baumanns (1972, 1974).

26. Baumanns (1974, pp. 149, 185, 12). This line of interpretation is representedby an otherwise extremely diverse group of commentators that includes Lauth(1964, pp. 253-85), Pippin (I988~ PP' 74-96), Henrich (1982, pp. IS-53),and Wildt (1982).

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 45nconsistently subscribes to botkversions of his starting point. Inirder to see more clearly how Fichte operates with two distinctxmceptions of his first principle, it will be necessary to examinehe first substantive account of this principle given in the opening.ection of the WL 1794.27 In this portion of the text, where one of~ichte's main concerns is to emphasize the apodicticity of hisrtarting point, it is possible to establish conclusively that the firstorinciple is intended as a purely "theoretical" starting point thatzan be fully grasfed without reference to the moral or practicalaature of the 1.2 Apart from this general conclusion, though,what specifically is meant to be asserted by this principle?It is tempting to conclude from Section 1 that what Fichte

.ntends to express in his first principle is simply Descartes's "Iam." Apart from the fact that this starting point would cohere wellwith his Cartesian understanding of the nature of a first principle,there are a number of passages that, by emphasizing the idi bin,suggest such an interpretation.i? Although the subject's certaintyof its own existence as a conscious being is of great importance toFichte's first principle, it is not this self-certainty alone that is atissue. The unconditioned nature of the I, rather, is expressed inthe following claim: "The I posits itself, and it exists by virtue of thismere self-positing.Y'" A full account of Fichte's doctrine of the

27. SW, I, pp. 91-101.28. Apart from the argumentation provided later, there is a considerable amount

of straightforward textual evidence to support this conclusion. Most importantly, there is simply no reference in the first section of Part I to the subject'spractical capacity. More specifically,one could point to Fichte's remark at theend of this section (SW, I, p. 99) that Kant himself in his deduction qf thecategories (and, hence, in his account of theoretical consciousness) implicitlyreferred to the same principle that is taken by the Wissenschaftslehre as the firstprinciple of all of philosophy. As I shall try to show, it is only in the next phaseof Fichte's development, the period of 1797-9, that Fichte explicitly comes toregard his first principle as having a practical as well as a theoretical content.Although Baumanns (1972) argues forcefully for the ethical interpretation ofthe WL 1794, most of the textual evidence that he cites in favor of his positionis taken from the 1797 introductions and then read back into the position of1794. In his second book (1974) Baumanns comes very close to endorsing myown interpretation, insofar as he emphasizes the dual nature of Fichte'soriginal starting point and insofar as his detailed analysis of Section I of theWL 1794 confirms that Fichte's own arguments here (to their detriment,according to Baumanns) concern exclusively theoretical subjectivity. Seeespecially pp. 174-5, 185.

29. See numerous references to the "I am" and its connection to the Tathandlungthroughout SW, I, pp. 94-9.

30. "Das Ich setztsidt selbst, und es ist, vermoge dieses blossen Setzens durch sichselbst" (SW, I, P: 96).


self-positing subject would'lead us too far afield here, but thespecific point in which we are presently interested is clarifiedin a subsequent passage: "What was I before 1 came to self-

r consciousness? 'The natural answer to this question is: I did not

\

exist at all, for I was not an I. The I exists only insofar as it isconscious of itself. ')3 1

. #

This passage makes clear that J.:ichte usea.the notion of self__RositingJ.Q1cl'~rJo q.IJ~rtiQul$!rJ~ind...Q(.~clf-.co.ns._c.iQ,u.sness.,and..thathischaracterization.of. the.L .aaahscluteor ~unccnditinncd.ia.ta.heUJ1d.~r§JQQd~.~!.J~~Q!J.~i~!i!!g__ in...Jhe.. claim that the..subiect.haa.noe~~J&!!gt£\~.r.lf:CQm..~~!l.M~§J~Jf:.~W!J.I~ness. The I is "self-grounded"in the sense that its act of self-intuition constitutes its being. Although we shall investigate this fundamental claim in greaterdetail in the following chapter, for our present purpose it is important to note the relatively modest nature of Fichte's understand...ing of the subject's "unconditionedness." .Qpntrary to popularn.Q!iQ.!1Lt!QQ.ID.Jpe F-~_Ll.9.4,._YiGl!~_i~._n9JAaiming.k.re......thaLt.he

jj§.-~lt~~Qilll~ ...i!t.th~ .,§~}l~.~.Jha tjt.i§_jh~,.~!!l1§~_"Qf,Jl.t.r.tQ",b.e.id.e.llitii<illwjjh, the~~WahQl~_QfJ:~alit¥,~,.,Furthermore, the first principle, as itis explicated in the beginning of the WL 1794, cannot plausiblybe said to possess any immediate implications concerning the practical or moral: nature of the subject. In other words, the principleof the self-positing subject found in Section I is manifestly not,nor was it intended to be, a principle about the subject's capacityfor practical freedom or moral autonomy. Even though Fichtecharacterizes the subject's self-positing as an act, there are noapparent grounds for concluding that his first principle is, for thisreason alone, relevant to real, practical activity as well. This pointis best illustrated by recalling that for Kant, too, theoretical self...consciousness consisted in a spontaneous act on the part of thesubject. Yet this capacity - the ability to recognize my representations as belonging to me - does not imply in any direct way thatthe subject is also free in the practical sense of being able todetermine its own will in accord with the dictates of practicalreason. This is not to say that the WL 1794 is unconcerned withpractical reason and its relation to the theoretical realm. On the

3I. SW, I, p. 97. A more systematic analysis of the notion of the absolute, self..positing subject, including the doctrine of the Tathandlung, will be postponeduntil Chapter 3. For the present we are concerned only with the generalnature of the WL 1794's first principle and the role it will play in the deduc..tion of practical reason.

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 47contrary, the task of proving practical reason remains a primaryobjective of this work, as evidenced by Fichte's claim in Section 5of Part III to have done precisely this.32

T..he....cr.ulli!LP..Qi~l..hQ.vys:.;ver.,. is.th~J:.iclll!<...®~ILQQ!..x~~gJge existence of p.m.vJ.i~J!Lr~$!

iW»~~Alr~JHiy.c;;QnJ!!iQ.!<q~withillJh~..fir.§t.p..rin£ip"l~..i tself Whereasthe Gebhard review envisioned an immediate move from the unityof apperception to the existence of practical reason, the path traversed in the WL 1794 is considerably less direct. It is the course ofthis "deduction" of practical reason to which we now turn.

The general structure ofFichte's intended proofis clear enough:A proofof practical reason "is possible only by showing that reason cannot itself be theoretical ifit is not practical, that no intelligence in the human being is possible unless it also possesses apractical faculty."33 Thus, Fichte will endeavor to prove the existence of practical reason by showing that such a faculty is a necessary condition for the possibility of theoretical reason. Thisstrategy is consistent with our previous characterization ofFichte'smethod as consisting in a continuous series of transcendentalarguments that moves from a particular feature of consciousnessto the conditions of the same. .Mthough th<ul{<9lliltt.Q(lh..~c.almas.Q.lLwilL~....thl!tQ(p-ra"tkaLmf.!.S_Q!1j!!.9L~1I:<LQL~p"Q§.iliQ.u,

this st~gy~X imI.!lies..lLl!1ima£p~ o(p..r~.£ti£.i!Lr~~§stll..Qy!;:r

.~oretical reason itl..!h~L§en~~ t1l&!:L!Jl!~d.!!!te;r_j~".~1t2c~!L!9".peg!Q.1.Hldep. in,.l!L5<Qn«;}ijiQP,J:!i.b.y,:,..lh.{{Jorrru:a:".

Having pointed out the kind of argument that is envisioned, ourtask becomes one of understanding how Fichte intends to show

.'that theoretical reason requires a faculty of practical reason as itscondition. Since the strategy for this proofis embedded in the verystructure of the work, it will first be necessary to note briefly theoverall organization of the WL 1794. After a first section, whichelucidates the three fundamental principles of the Wissenschoftslehre as a whole, the text is divided into two main parts, of whichthe first is devoted to theoretical knowledge and the second to the"science of the practical." Unlike Kant in the first two Critiques,Fichte does not intend to provide two separate and unconnectedaccounts of the two forms of reason. Rather, Fichte's position hereis that there is an important continuity between the analyses oftheoretical and practical reason and that the existence of the latter can be proved by articulating the nature of this connection.

32. SW, I, p. 264. 33. SW, I, P: 264.


Hence, the argument behind Fichte's attempt to prove practicalreason in the WL 1794 will be found in the transition from theanalysis of theoretical reason in Part II to the treatment ofpractical reason in Part III. The manner in which this transition is toproceed is laid out clearly near the end of Part 1:34 The analysis oftWJ}retical r~~_QtL:wjlLr~§.yltin ~ aufl;lp:d~mJ~ntal. Q9n.tr~~1~.ti.Qll.1ha t~~JJnQtp.c..~rf:!gi~~1~JlJ?y. I~Il1J!iJ).iJ].g, within the. dOln.fJ.i!tgf t~~ti~C!Lf~t!-§Q~\\"t!tQ!l:~).~ndCAJ:he ~e~~~~ity...Qf pQ.stulatipg Jl<Nf~.,..Qllt~" ofp,.~~tiG.(!l.r~a~~Qn,-wilLb.e,..d_mQJ1SJr-a.te~_.h}'.-ah.-o_wing_.thatit ..alone.is.;cimaQl~J~f,!~§91ying~thJ\t~c,Qnttadiction. The first step in under...standing Fichte's argument, then, is to uncover the contradictionthat allegedly inheres in the account of theoretical reason.

The primary aim of the theoretical part of the WL I 794 is togive an account of the features of theoretical consciousness that,wh~n~Y~.r,.PQ§~JR1~" .~~plail1:$ .tAQ.s.~ftf~.t!t1J.r.e.s_.aa~a~C~QnS,e~qJ.te!l~~fthesubj..e~c.t~S.~.Q.wD..,..nature,.rath.e,r"Jh.a[t.a,s ..de,p~.nd.e,nj:,,- u,p.on...s,oooe..tbiIlge~erQ~L~tQ.,,_th~,..§yJ?j~~9J~ Whereas for Kant the subject's activityprovided the formal elements of empirical knowledge, the contentof that knowledge was understood as resulting from the object'sability to "affect" a subject that, in this relation to its object, ismerely passive. It is Fichte's aim to go be~QJJ.d -:this _position and..claim~:that~th~ect pl~~[.~lJ. ~£!ix~~!Qk",,-l.!9t lJler~lx with respectto.the,..forma.of.cognition.cbut.in....g.enex:ati.ng.yihe_.cQnten,Lo(.s..~nsation.aa.ssell.Tc is this position that is expressed in Fichte's wellknown doctrine of the AnstojJ (check) and that constitutes the endpoint of the theoretical portion of the WL 1794. ,Eicbte invq]ses thenorinn.of.an..AllJiQjlj.n>~QrckLt.Q.Atxplai.athe_JlQssibility: ...of.repreaen-ti!Ji9J1 ~nd,-D1or.,~~p~cifi~J~11r"~j:Q.,,giY.~ ..lUl__~Q~9JJ.J!t._of ..w:ha t ~aJJtcalled..lh.e~~~matterr.J:>.f...s~tion./' The matter of sensation is explained here, not in terms of a thing's activity upon the self, butrather as the result of an "infinite" activity on the part of thesubject that is "checked," or blocked, by the inert, wholly passiveAnstoj1 and then reflected back to the subject. T1J.~!efl=~n<GJJQ~J!th~

t~ubj.e..cfs..,r..a.c.tiyity.,~~undJ~.r.gQes.".is.,.j_ntend.ed_h.to ...explain.whz.rhe,per~~ng_~y1?JT~'~!.,p.()rm~lly.J.~k~§_Wb.~.ti.~.Jl~tYal1yjt$.rQWI.l.a.cjiyj.ty_

...lD...lte..~affectiQn ,hy.,.an,~,~terllal~~jn~l~R~1lv<i~llt .....thiijg. Although ourpresent concerns do not require that we retrace the tortuous pathby which Fichte claims to have arrived at this position, it is impor-

34- SW, I, p. 115.

I;.t~

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 49ant that we understand the basic claim underlying the doctrine ofhe AnstojJ: Although it is possible to go farther than Kant iniccounting for the characteristics of knowledge in terms of the:ubject's own activity, there remains an element of that knowledgevhich is fundamentally irreducible to the subject's spontaneity. Inrther words, it is ultimately impossible to eradicate every trace of.he nonsubjective (the "not-I") from an account of theoreticalmowledge. Even though Fichte has redu_q4..1h~..!Qle._Q:LK!iQ.t.~s i:.hjng.initsclf..tQJhat oLlLIDerC:;J;h~fk uRop..J;h~.3H~pj!<.9.r§J!JJ1~.rJ:Vjse

!I!Jjmi!,!:d activily',..rsmrest;nU!riQ,Qj!t!!QD.!:tbelt1.§§jmp",Qmbl~L'\rith~:lltt Jhi~~~JlJld.1h~tdQr~ib&Jh~QX~.Jit;;.!}.l§UW5:...<;'Li~jrr!tml;d.iably ..dep,eJ:l.d.en1...up,Qn..§.QJll~1hiug._Qth~r....tQ.~u...it§clI,_tllilU§.,_\!P-ill!..anot-I,h is precisely this dependence of the I upon the not-I that, inFichte's view, generates a contradiction within his system. Morespecifically, Fichte's claim is that philosophy cannot be satisfiedwith this account of theoretical reason, because the dependence ofthe I required by this account conflicts with the first principle ofthe Wissenschaftslehs». This is important for our account of Fichte'sstarting point, for it allows us to determine the sense in whichFichte, outside of Part I of the WL 1794, actually construes hisfirst principle. Indeed, in the transition to practical reason Fichtecharacterizes this principle as asserting that "the 1, in all of itsdeterminations, is to be unconditionally posited by itself and,therefore, completely independent of any possible not-I."35 '".Q!eiW..Rort o:t:.jJle first P~.I!k~Lwould ~~em,j§ \o.ill'1§ert tb.atth~j~~I~enc~ Qf.ilis:. I li~jn it~..§!!f::'lUlffici~p.cYaJI!l\.LiU§..l~!ili!!e

p.Lth...J{" LtQ..h~£Q,ml?ktelxJ!lQ.~!!d~D.tQfJh~ ...!!2tLQ!,j!L2t.!lerWQrd§,..lQJ?~. WI!911Y.~eylf~4~t~rm!ni!!:g_l:1!!:<i..~.n.<1~!~!:!piI~_egjll_1i.QYw.a~y~it§ gh.is:£t, And, if the first principle is understood in thisway, it becomes apparent why Fichte regards it as conflicting withthe theoretical subject's ultimate dependence upon an AnstojJ.

The second step in the deduction ofpractical reason consists inshowing that a faculty of practical reason can eliminate the conflict between theoretical philosophy and the system's startingpoint. The contradiction between the radical independence of the

35. SW, I, p. 249. See also GA, 1.2, pp. ISO-I, where Fichte states clearly thatthe contradiction at issue is one between the results of the theoretical Wissenschcfislehre and the system's "highest and absolutely first principle."

..,'~


I that is asserted in the first principle and the dependence of theI required by theoretical reason is to be resolved in the followingmanner: " ... the dependence of the I as intelligence [i.e., as theoretical subject] must be eliminated. This is .conceivable only underthe condition that this hitherto unknown not-I to which the Anstoj1 isattributed ... be determined by the I itself."3

6 ~n...o..th.er_w:.nt:d.a,~the

reijyit~I]).~J§.-_Q(,!.b~.fir§t.Rrin.~ipl~~~QJJ.!g_b",~~~~tis1i~iLthe..s.Y.l:ij~t

coul.d..b.eJ.eg.ar.dOO.-'lJLh.aYi.llg_Ji~l~r.min~.d.,..,.Qr ..c.'1y~~d,~req.uir.ed..fu.r.~eOLeii~kn~kdge. For in this case, that uponwhich the 1 is dependent within theoretical knowledge, the not-I,would be nothing more than a product of the 1 itself. By creatingthe object upon which it, as theoretical subject, depends, the Iwould remain wholly self-determining, even though that selfdetermination would be indirect in the sense that it would bemediated by what appears to be a not-I. Yet this attempt toresolve the conflict between theoretical reason and the first principle must itselfbe revised, for it too engenders a contradiction, thistime with the Wissenschqftslehre's second principle: "A not-I isunqualifiedly posited in opposition to the 1."37In this context thesecond principle is to be understood as asserting the essentialfinitude and limitedness of the subject inherent in the claim thatthe 1 requires a relation to something radically different from itselfin order for it to be an I. If the second principle is understood inthis sense, the solution just sketched becomes untenable. The 1cannot simply be the cause of the Anstofi, for then there would beno not-I in the true sense. All difference between subject andobject would be apparent rather than real, and the claim articu...lated in the system's second principle would be negated.

At this point it becomes clear that the contradiction' at issue isgrounded in the basic conflict between the first two principles ofthe WL 1794 and that, as Fichte explicitly says here, this conflictstems from two necessary, yet seemingly opposed characterizations of the self as "infinite and unlimited," on the one hand, and"finite and limited," on the other.3a Thus, the problem to be solved I

by an appeal to practical reason is one of reconciling the I's I'.:..

"absolute" nature with its fundamental finitude, that is, with thefact that it cannot exist as an I without an "other." What must be t,:

found is a way of understanding the activity of the 1 in such a way I:;

that it remains "absolute" without at the same time annihilating~ -r

36. SW, I, p. 249. 37. SW, I, p. 104. 38. SW, I, p. 255.

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 5 I

the not-I. Fichte attempts to fulfill this requirement by introducing the notion of "striving" (Streben). Instead of postulating therelation between I and not-I to be one of complete determinationof the latter by the former, Fichte ascribes to the I "merely atendency, a striving toward determination [of the not-I]."39 Thegoal of this striving is the subject's absolute independence from itsobject in the sense that the determinations of the latter are whollydependent upon the I: "The I is to be absolutely independent,whereas everything is to be dependent upon the I. Hence, what isdemanded is the conformity (Uebereinstimmung) of the object withthe 1."40 Thus, the striving subject is "absolute" with respect tothe goal of its striving (i.e., insofar as it endeavors to make thenot- I conform to its own essence), but the point of characterizingthe I's activity as a "mere" striving is to accommodate the factthat the I can never attain its goal of complete independence fromits object. In other words, the principle of striving is inte!1~ed t9take into account _Jh~ in~radicable finit].ld!';LQLthe_subj~

P!ess~~[~_~QIlciJJ.r!:g",!pl~,_~h!k_~till..i!.tttip.1lting..1~..lim_.'~~solut~_qll~E!y_. th'.!:b.. by'".!.h~_~d of the Wi~~f".jIL~~rs~~L~L!!!.t!Jl§~.&~.t~l?9..Yl1J;u~~~y.l}j~l;.t,..lmlalLaJhm.a.t1d.th.~_I_I!!I!~.ll~1!IlQ!!jj:l!cl(alld_i!:a.wQdd,.",

The third and final step of the deduction occurs in the identification of the subject's striving with a faculty of practical reason.The basic idea behind this move is already familiar to us from thecharacterization of practical reason in the "Eigene Medi ta tionen."Fichte's conclusion in the WL 1794 that the I is characterized byan infinite striving to make the not-I conform to itself is to beunderstood as nothing more than the claim that the I is subject tothe moral law. This step of the argument becomes comprehensibleif we regard the moral law as demanding that the subject act uponthe objective world in order to make it conform to an imperativethat is given by the subject to itself in accord only with the principles of its own nature. Therefore, for Fichte, deducing the necessity of such a striving is tantamount to proving the reality of afaculty of practical reason: "The demand that everything conformto the I, that all reality is to be unqualifiedly posited by the I, isthe demand of what one calls practical reason. ".p

A number of objections could be raised against this proof, butwhat is of concern to us here is not so much the validity of Fichte's

39. SW, I, p. 261. 40. SW, I, p. 260. 41. SW, I, p. 263.


argument as the general outline of the deduction and its implications for an understanding of the Wissenschaftslehre's first principle.As we saw earlier, the conflict that necessitated the introduction ofpractical reason arose because the I's dependence upon the object - a dependence that could never be eliminated within thetheoretical realm - contradicted the system's first principle. xetj!L~~orger for..§.!t~h...~-S..Q~.!t~£t.tQ.,~ri§~ itj§'}~~f~§.§,,~:.IY..J.Qit}1~!'.R!:~t5he firstprj~..-£!pJ~jIt.~v.~~Y~-.tbJ!.t isJ?J~j!!!!tJy'-,!t.Q~d.(ls_1Y:ithJ~:i.k.1}j:~~s~JmrJi~ize!!0~2f.1tg~:! ..lttiI1~ipl~jD~:r"~tt.J._QfJh~J:YL.J...~g4~ln th e transitionto practical reason, the principle "the I unconditionally positsitself" is taken to mean something like "the I demands completeindependence from the not-I" or "the I must be wholly self...determined and completely undetermined by anything external toitself," Yet this construal of the first principle obviously constitutes a shift in meaning with respect to the position laid out inPart I. For there the I's "self-positing" seemed to refer not to thesubj ect's quest for practical "self-sufficiency," but rather to analleged characteristic of the theoretical subject, namely, that thesubject has no existence apart from its own activity of self-awareness.Thus, there is nothing in Part I of the WL 1794 that could justifyinterpreting the first principle in the sense required for the deduction of the I's absolute striving. Moreover, if this interpretationwere given to the first principle, it is difficult to see how thatprinciple could satisfy Fichte's unambiguous demand in the 1794system for an apodictic starting point.

For these reasons we must conclude that the proof of practicalreason attempted in the WL 1794 fails due to a fundamentalinconsistency in the employment of its first principle. In Part IFichte claims to begin with what is allegedly an absolutely certainstarting point derived from a consideration of the phenomenon oftheoretical"self-consciousness. In Part III, however, his aim ofdeducing practical reason requires him to ascribe to that principlea meaning that is quite distinct from its original sense. lri effect,the first principle here, in asserting the I's need to be completelyself-sufficient and undetermined by any object, takes on a practicalsignificance that, though useful to a proof of practical reason,cannot measure up to the standards of apodicticity espoused byFichte elsewhere. In adopting the practical version of his firstprinciple, Fichte necessarily surrenders the certainty of that principle and thereby dissolves the very foundation upon which thetruth of his system, including its proof of practical reason, was to

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 53ae based. Although Fichte never explicitly points out this basicnconsistency in the WL 1794, the focus of his work during theoeriod immediately following strongly suggests that he eventuallycame to recognize this very problem. For, as we shall see, one ofthe central preoccupations of these later .texts is the attempt toclarify both the content and epistemological status of the principleof'the self-positing subject and, in doing so, to re-think the relationbetween theoretical and practical reason.

The system of 1797-9

In 1797 Fichte published the first chapter of what he intended tobe a second and improved version of his philosophical systemunder the name "Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissensdioftslehre. " There is no doubt that the philosophical community'swidespread misunderstanding and ridicule of the first versionplayed a major role in convincing Fichte that a "new presentation" of his system was necessary. But it would be wrong to conclude that Fichte's sole motive for composing this second versionwas simply to present more clearly the same doctrines put forth inthe first. In addition to their greater clarity, the writings of 1797-9bear witness to substantive developments in Fichte's thought,especially with respect to the choice of a first principle and to therelation between theoretical and practical reason. The texts of thisperiod that address these issues most directly are the two introductions to the Wissenschaflslehre published in 1797 in Fichte's ownPhilosophisches Journal. The purpose of these new introductions,according to Fichte, is to prepare and orient the reader by providing a "description of the perspective from which the transcendentalphilosopher beholds all knowledge.t'f" They are introductory inthe sense that they aim to lead the uninitiated reader to the pointat which entry into the system proper can be gained. Since thisentry point is nothing other than the system's first principle, theprimary goal of the two introductions is to enhance the reader'sability to comprehend and accept that founding principle. Whatwe can expect from Fichte's new introductions, then, is a moredetailed account than we have seen thus far of the sense in whichphilosophy's first principle is to be understood. Moreover, thesimple fact that Fichte now deems such a propaedeutic to be

42. SW, I, pp. 33-4, my emphasis.

,~

i


necessary for an understanding of that principle suggests a fundamental revision of his earlier notion of a self-evident, universallyrecognized starting point.

The mQ!L~!gnificanL.~.Y.~JQI!!!!eI!.~.~.Lll.Kicl!!.~.!.J?Qsition c.Q!l~

in<· -the faC1..Jhat tlter~~j~~.no .IQng~r~~~Jy:~,~:mQigl1i t~~lth restlecttp~th~.+J!ra<jjf£lJrlt.t!1..lJre....Q[_th~~§.y!t~m's _n!g_m:inct~ The selfconsciousness from which the Wissenschaftslehre begins is nowexplicitly and consistently described as a "feeling of [one's] freedom and absolute self-sufficiency.t'< and numerous passages makeclear that Eichte mean~_!le~~_~rt_~~~~_~!~!!~!!~~~_!l5~..~just of th~Q.2.ntt!n~!.~.Y..~Q(!.h~~~~~£~~~~1 ...~~1~~_~~~~~.9ilJ.!~tical freedom as.."Yell.This self-consciousness is also characterized as an awarenessof the "absolute self-activity of the I," of one's "independence ofeverything outside of oneself,' and, further, as the awareness ofoneself "not as determined by things, but rather as determiningtheJ;n."44 These formulations are easily recognized asessentiallyidentical to those used by Fichte to characterize the absolutenature of the I in the later sections of the WL 1794 where he wasconcerned with the deduction of a faculty of practical reason.Although these expressions remain rather vague, they are apparently intended to assert both the importance and the possibility ofthe subject's achievement of genuine autonomy through real,practical self-determination. For the moment it is unnecessary todetermine more precisely the notion of autonomy at work in thischaracterization of the subject; what is of greater interest is thath~, for_tb~Jit.sJ_mtime,~.Ii<;.bm__e.xp,..liQtl)!-a.cl<.~kdg~.t..Jliapoint ofde.par.1ur.ej.s_<alliLits~lfallractical"IJritlcillle.In other words,Fichte gives us to understand that the principle of the self-positingsubject that founds the Wissenschqftslehre is, at least in part, astatement about the practical nature of the subject, where 'practical' refers not merely to ideal "activities" of consciousness but tothe subject's interaction with and determination of real objects.This explicit emphasis upon the practical nature of the first principle is undoubtedly intended to resolve the confusion surrounding the precise meaning of that principle in the WL 1794. In thiscontext Fichte's move in 1797 is to be understood as a rejection ofthe purely theoretical starting point of the opening section of the

43. "[Ein] Gefiihl ihrer Freiheit und absoluten Selbstandigkeit" (SW, I, p. 433).44· SW, I, pp. 471, 433, 467.

r,t\I

e(

r

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 55VL 1794 in favor of the fuller, more substantial interpretation ofae first principle prominent in the later sections of that work,.here the "absolute" nature of the I was defined in terms of itsssential need for complete self-determination. Furthermore, thishoice most likely proceeds from a realization that the narrower,aerely theoretical starting point will never enable him to arrive at. deduction of a faculty of practical reason.

This shift in Fichte's conception of his first principle raises twoerious questions with implications for his most basic philosophial goals. first, and most obv~ous.l....what ilecomes ofFi~E!,gi~~Lof J2.~q~ir!i.l!!]f1~q[Q!L~Q.wfug.iLta~e:onditions for Q1.£J?9~sib!1j.!"y:'.2f.j1l~2!,etjE~lr!1,~'§.Q.1:}1 How can suchL proof be carried out if Fichte begins with the practical subject?Ne shall return to this important question later, after we havexmsidered th~¥fg}¥lE!:0bl~1!l,w!!islU!L.s!£~~YJel~te(t.Wha!~tp.aiE.L~~§..p.t~yiQ"!.!~,,!!£~9~1l!!l.Qflh~.r.~qyh:.~l.!ltJlt§.gf.~~II~p.bi1.&>"Wll!bi.g!1.§y~lJ.1?Can this new starting point mea.ure up to the standard of self-evident certainty that Fichteespoused in I794? Is it not at least possible that the subject's sense)f itself as free with respect to the objective world might be illurory? It was undoubtedly this very problem that was responsibleDr the second major change in Fichte's understanding of his firstorinciple in 1797: the abandonment of the view that the startingJoint of idealism is a self-evident, universally recognized proposi.ion. This development finds expression in Fichte's characterizadon of that principle, in contrast to his view of 1794, as a "belief"(Glaube) and in the related claim that the justification of thatstarting point is not grounded in purely speculative reason but ina choice that is based upon "inclination and interest."45

This last claim arises in the context of Fichte's discussion ofwhat he takes to be the only two systems of philosophy possible:dogmatism and his own system, idealism. The former, which . M

FL§hte~t:U;12~se~.h:y. SP.iQ.Q~'§Il), 46 t~k~.~ thing \(Ir"\~ ~

IQ~.lf::.Qt..::.s.uhs.t!J,~=WJ1~<pQinl,QLd.~tti!!'llJr~g.ndiIJHltthereilllitll.:Rts tQ..g~~~£QYJ1tQf£!llQ.f.r£<~!ilYc,,"in£!.!!gltlg"~JJJJj~J~.tiyity,Such a system, on Fichte's view, is obligated to understand all of

!5. SW, I, pp. 466,433.'1-6. Perhaps it should be stated explicitly that we are concerned here not with the

actual views of Spinoza but with Fichte's understanding of the nature of"dogmatism."

r


the features of consciousness as effects of the, actions of externalthings upon the subject. Thus, even the subject's seemingly freechoices must be explained as resulting in some complex way fromcausal determination by things rather than as instances of gen...uine self-determination. 1&e strateg~ofide~li~..l-!n£on!ras!~~~begiIL~j!11.w.lHJ..!jJJ:~g~rc!§~§_!~~~enti~lnaw"".orthe subl~~t t.4~.~~§~Jf~~~§£!~_ll-~Y."9f,,th~J" - atl.9_~gI?.~n. !hi~2.e~~~ .!Q.,e~~. allof<~R~!i~~~~2.,.,!!!,~l:g4!g.g,__~h~ ...!)..~~.t~~,~!Y.L~[~,~!~!l~~m_<2f...!h~"Vi2.!?j~y.~Gworl£~,,}Yhat is of interest to us in this discussion of the conflictbetween idealism and dogmatism is the new way in which Fichteunderstands the kind and .degree of certainty that can be attributed to his first principle and to the system that follows from it.The crux of Fichte's view is expressed in his admission that ideal..ism cannot "directly" refute dogmatism, as well as in his celebrated dictum that "1h!j_k.in.d_Qf.pl!ilos.Ql?l!Yn--~,choo.§,esdeI2,~s

uE2.!!~hat ~1I.!.~J2[R~!§_9}}_.QP:~5:s."47

Fichte's position here has often been taken to imply a kind ofradical relativism, according to which the espousal ofa particularphilosophy is a fundamentally personal and subjective choice thatcan ultimately be based upon nothing more than an unfoundedpreference for one view of the world over another. In what followsI ~h~!J...~!:gP.~, ..t.h~~, this..is I19t i.n. fact .fiGh,t~~~.~yj,*~~JJ~nq_1bGl:t.iliis

fre~J:l.Y~.£il~~t claim applies only to ~.~p~~ili~,,~G.M!:.~...,.Ua.m~~~J.Q...one '.~_ iPi!!~~lJ?h!JQ~.9:ph!f~~.9r.~~Vt~.t.i.on .Q~fQ-~!1.Jmg!!gjI\g,.in.~nY~Ykte!Jlatic__re&.£!!2..l}__l!.RQ"tl_!h~t".12~r§'R.~£!iye. 4 Since on Fichte's account it is· each system's starting point that embodies the generalorientation of that philosophy, his position here 'can be translatedinto a claim about the epistemological status of philosophy's firstprinciple: With regard tQ.,.~!h~initi9,L.£4Qi~~LLfir~-l2rinci~,

before ...Q!lUf!L~~lJ§iq...~L~ci..j:J:l~ ..",t!9t~1~t .§Y.~t~!!l...~w-tQ.e.tiq!!~mcij!fu.rent Qr~n..£!pl~.1.,.re~so q...i!:\~.!.t~.l?l!X~!Y~.§J!~.~!!.!~Ji~",fu!LSi~an

rovide us with no basis for referrtfr~"'·one~·sl'aFfrnv'-o"M-oinr overthep~ ~_._ _ -....~" __ ,."..E,.. _ , ' .vg .' _., " g...R. ' _._. otp.er. This should not be taken to imply that the two candidatesfor the role of first principle express propositions that, althoughdistinct in content, are both apodictically certain. This could notbe the case, sinceFichte views the two principles as contradictory.

47. SW) I, p. 434. See also p. 429: "Keines dieser heiden Systeme kann das entge-gengesetzte direkt widerlegen." .

48. I argue more thoroughly for this interpretation later. My position here isbased upon two detailed discussions of the I 797 introductions, one byBreazeale (1988, pp. 97-123)} the other by Baumanns (1974> pp. 122-38).

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 57Hence, it must be that from a speculative point of view neither canbe regarded as apodictically certain. Indeed, this conclusion isborne out by Fichte's statements in the first introduction that thedogmatist does not acknowledge the truth of idealism's first principle and is even prevented from doing so because of "the kind ofperson" he is. This claim becomes more comprehensible when werecall that Fichte now regards his first principle as an assertion ofthe essentially practical, autonomous nature of the subject; thoseindividuals who do not believe in their own capacity for real selfdetermination will be unable to assent to the Wissenschaftslehre'«starting point. By admitting that there are rational human beingswho are incapable of recognizing the truth of that starting point,Fj£hte commits_.hLrpJ!!1.1f t<;l, the Yi~J;Y_!hl'!:.t h,j.§.Q1Xn fjrs(Plin!t.iR~ inii!illa..tiQnil:Q.W~_§~mJh.Mkl':.ng,e.ud~r.s,.g.Q~,uQ1hay.e..Jh.e...kind

Q[ sel£-e:~dde~ ~!<S'§'~_'§'llch...§lat~$l!t§;.J!L«A.=lt= or,~:!.l!'m...'~ What this implies for Fichte is that even the vivid and immediate sense offreedom possessed by those characters most suitedto the study of idealism cannot be taken as certain knowledge ofthatfreedom. The most that such a "natural" idealist could be said tohave prior to systematic philosophical reflection is a strong beUif'in her freedom. Furthermore, what brings one to believe in thatfeeling - that is, to regard it as more than illusory is not theoretical rationality but the subject's interest in its own autonomy.

Hence, the development that Fichte's conception of his startingpoint undergoes in the system of 1797-9 can be understood interms of two significant changes.T~ of these concerns thecontent of that starting point and consists in the fact that theprinciple of self-positing is no longer understood as a statementonly about the self-consciousness ofthe theoretical subject but asa principle that also asserts the subject's capacity for practicalself-determination. The ~cond chlIDge is that the first principleno longer expresses an abs~tely certain fact about the subjectbut is accorded instead the status of a belief that is grounded inone's interest in one's own autonomy. Characterizing Fichte'sdevelopment in this way, however, leads us back to a problem thatwas raised earlier, for, taken together, these two revisions seem topose insuperable obstacles to Fichte's goal of devising a more substantial proof of practical reason than Kant was able to provide.First, it is difficult to see how Fichte could now be in a position tosurpass Kant's own appeal to practical belief as the ultimatejustification for freedom. For in light of his new conception of the


Wissenschaftslehre, the system that was to furnish a proofofpracticalreason now rests upon a first principle that is itself founded upona kind of practical belief. Furthermore, it is clear that the strategyof such a proof can no longer be conceived of as a transcendentalargument that begins with an indisputable principle and deducespractical reason as a necessary condition of that starting point.For now, we are told, the first principle itself already asserts whatfor Fichte has always been the crucial thing to be established by aproof of practical reason, namely, the subject's capacity for genuine self-determination. Ifwe take seriously Fichte's claims aboutthe practical import of his first principle, it is no longer clear whatremains for a proof of practical reason to demonstrate.

It would seem, then, that Fichte's new conception of his firstprinciple would require him to abandon his project of providing aproof of practical reason. His actual response, however, is not togive up this basic goal, but only to pursue it along a different route.In other words, there remains an important sense in which Fichteregards his system of I 797-9 as providing a philosophical ground..ing for the principles of practical reason. To understand this aspectof his new system it will be necessary to return to Fichte's comparison of idealism and dogmatism and, more specifically, to hisclaim that the choice between them ultimately depends uponone's character. We have already noted that this point has oftenbeen understood as a thoroughly relativistic claim that would ruleout the possibility of a rational choice between the two rival systems. While it is easy to recognize the textual basis for this interpretation, it is demonstrably not the view Fichte intended touphold. In the section immediately following the passage at issue,Fichte goes on to claim that idealism's superiority to its rivalcan be demonstrated but that this decisive proof can be had onlywhen one is in a position to view the results of both attempts toconstruct a philosophical system. The inadequacy of dogmatismconsists in the fact that, by starting from the thing itself, it willnever be able to arrive at an account of the consciousness of thingsand therefore will prove incapable of constructing a single, allencompassing system. Idealism, on the other hand, will prove tobe successful- the Wissenschaflslehre itselfis to be concrete evidenceof this fact in establishing a single chain of connected argumentsthat deduce a complete catalogue of the features of subjective ando~ectiveexperience, The~si~~tre~ ofjd~~s

in lis ability to achieve c2E.lplet~~.L.!ll!£li!_~"Q~ci~et~. thm feature_.

1,

J

fi

IiIIII.

~

!

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 59that Fichte regards not onl~proofof its oy~rall superiori~y..J.Q

dQgmatism but as a cQnfirmatiml of thill~W.tut~g.;IlQinta~ll. Hence, the beliefin the subject's freedom with which theWissenschqftslehre begins is ultimately verified (bewahrt) by its abilityto serve as the foundation for the only truly systematic and complete philosophy achievable.49

It is not difficult to see that the kind of argument that is to provethe reality of practical reason in the system of 1797-9 is fundamentally different from Fichte's earlier strategies for achieving thesame goal. Fichte no longer conceives of his proof as a particularargument that could be reconstructed outside the context of thesystem itself, nor does it correspond to a single step within thatsystem, such as the transition from theoretical to practical philosophy in the WL 1794. Rather, it is no~ the su~~§-2f the ~J&JJl

~$-a-whole that ~J:!~Ji!El~.lht~~:R!:Q2C_Qf..Rra£ti£:~!.r!:~§'Q!l'Moreprecisely, it is the system's capacity to comprehend the whole ofexperience that demonstrates the truth of its initial, merely hypothetical assertion offreedom and thereby delivers what Fichte hasbeen looking for all along decisive proofof the subject'S capacityfor practical self-determination.

Thus, it is clear that in 1797 Fichte is still pursuing one versionof his goal of proving the reality of practical reason, but in themeantime, what has become of his attempt to demonstrate theunity of theoretical and practical reason? The answer to this question is complex, but the upshot of what I shall argue is thatFichte's system of 1797-:9 continues to assert the unity of the twofaculties in the second (and weaker) sense distinguished in Chapter I (i.e., both are unified within a single system that proceedsfrom a common first principle) but that his new position alsoallows him to maintain the unity of reason in a deeper sense aswell (the third sense outlined, namely, that both have the sameinternal "structure").

One interesting consequence of Fichte's new strategy is that thetask ofproving practical reason merges completely with his aim ofsystematizing the disparate elements of Critical Philosophy into acoherent whole. This means that by 1797 a single desideratum,the achievement of systematicity (which includes bringing theoretical and practical reason into a single system), is seen as thesolution both to the problem ofproving practical reason and to the

49. SW, I, p. 466.

..•. "('''~~~


issue of the unity of reason in its weaker form. In a sense, this convergence of strategies represents nothing new, since from the verybeginning Fichte regarded the remedy for the lack of unity between theoretical and practical reason as inseparably bound upwith his more general project of constructing a single unifiedsystem of philosophy. But it is possible to pinpoint even moreprecisely the aspect of systematicity around which these two tasksconverge in the system of 1797--9. The preceding account of theearly versions. of Fichte's system has pointed out how the singlemost important element of the quest for a proofof practical reasoncame to be the search for an appropriate first principle, one thatwould permit a deduction of the principles of both theoretical andpractical reason. We shall see that the selection of a suitable firstprinciple holds the key to the unification of theoretical and practical reason as well and, moreover, that this is true for both theweaker and stronger versions of that project.

Even in Fichte's initial conception of his system, as laid out inthe Gebhard review, the attempt to demonstrate the unity of reason was closely connected to the issue of a first principle. Although the precise details of his argument remained unarticulated, the general strategy of the project was clear enough toindicate the sense in which that early system understood theoretical and practical reason to be unitary: The principles of eachwere to be deduced from a single starting point and within asingle, connected system. More specifically, Fichte envisioned atranscendental argument that would reveal how both theoreticaland practical reason constituted necessary conditions for the possibility of the formal unity of consciousness. In this way, Kant'sstrategy in the first Critique - his demonstration of the necessity ofthe categories as a condition for the unity of consciousness in general - was to be extended to include the principles of practicalreason as well. .

There is indeed a sense in which the successful execution of thisplan could be said to demonstrate an important connection between theoretical and practical reason. What..sy~h_~!!!!lentcotzld claim tQ...§.how_js the !1~.£~§§.i1)!..Q[N.J).Q.§.itiQg,J2.Q.tl:t.f~&..ul ties~ a~flw~L'!.s th~_~.!ib!lilY_of rl~g!!ci!!&L~~ch~fJhem_~~!Jt~!lJll~rn.tt.-_.w9.rk qL~ sing!~~ Although the latter achievement can beunderstood as establishing a sort of unity of theoretical and practical reason (in the second sense), it clearly does not demonstratethe deeper unity (ofthe third sense) alluded to in Kant's expression

DEVELOPMENT OF FIOHTE'S PROJEOT 6 I

of hope in the Groundwork for a future account of theoretical andpractical reason that would show them to be, not two distinct faculties, but merely two "applications" of a single faculty of reason.5°

Such an account would presumably have to point out a moreintimate affinity between theoretical and practical reason, anaffinity that would be somehow internal to the structure of eachand that would constitute the "identity" of the two. Whateverform such an account might actually take, it is clear that Fichte'searly conceptions of his system do not go very far toward demonstrating the unity of reason in this stronger sense.

Although Fichte rejects the specific strategy of the Gebhardreview early on, he never abandons the goal of accounting for boththeoretical and practical reason within a single system, and forthis reason his project during this period can be seen as upholdingthe unity of reason in the weaker of the two senses. Beyond this,however, I shall try to show that the developments undergone bythe Wissenschaftslehs» in response to the difficulties of proving practical reason enable Fichte in the system of 1797-9 to assert theessential unity of theoretical and practical reason in a more substantial sense than was possible in either of the two earlier phases.As I have suggested, the key to this new possibility lies in Fichte'srevised conception of his first principle. The crucial point to berecalled here is that by 1797, in contrast to his earlier positions,Fichte had come to see that the Wissenschoftslehre's first principlemust itself include some kind of assertion about the practicalnature of the I ifit is to succeed in founding a system that encompasses both the theoretical and practical aspects of reason. At thesame time, however, ifit is to engender a unitary system, the starting point must be a single principle, as opposed to a compoundthat simply conjoins a theoretical principle with a practical one.liwould seem, th.J:lL_i:l:lltt the role of t1).~ ijrstp1:1nciW1L m!l~Lk...t.Q...,

p,QLll1.tQJ!..featlU:~-OLoon.s.ci.u~B:Uha.t.ia.~enttaLt!;uJ,nd.$lla.ted.b.:)(_,

ho.th..throu:1ica.Lalld-pl:aJ,;!;jcal reason. Thus, it would be reasonable to expect that the key to understanding the unity of reason isto be found already within that principle itself.

This point, however, provides us with only an abstract understanding of the role that Fichte's first principle is to perform inarticulating the essential unity of theoretical and practical reason.What is missing from our account is a specific analysis of what the

50. GMS, p. 391.


principle of self-positing asserts about the subject. It is one thingto understand why Fichte, given his general goals, lays down certain formal requirements for his first principle; it is quite anothermatter to envision how these requirements are actually to be metby a particular principle. The rest of this study will be concernedwith filling in the details of this undertaking, and in the remainingpages of the present chapter I shall attempt to sketch out the basicfeatures of what I take to' represent the guiding force behind themature form of Fichte's project.~ centralguestion tha!iaces us is: l:J.Q1\:-ar.e..we-ta-understand

Fichte'~ claimJhat hi§n first .p..ri.ll~iRl~".J?9~se§.$~~J;!QtU_Iml!<1ical

aI\el~"aJJ~i>L~rn,p_Q!.L'Yh~le reill!lining_~Kk-Rri~.£iI21e? ...Inorder to answer this question we shall turn first to a letter writtenby Fichte to Reinhold after the publication of the WL 1794. Ofmost concern to us is a passage in which Fichte attempts to clearup some of the obscurity surrounding his first principle by articulating the disagreement that he believes to exist among Kant,Reinhold, and himself:

In my view our disagreement consists in the following: If you [inyour Elemeniar-Philosophie i have laid out the foundation of thewhole of philosophy, then you must derive feeling and the faculty ofdesire, as a single species, from the faculty of knowledge. Kant doesnot even claim to order those three faculties of the human beingunder one higher principle but allows them instead to remainmerely coordinated.

I agree with you completely that they can be subordinated to ahigher principle but disagree that this principle can be that of thetheoretical faculty. On this latter point I am in agreement withKant, but I disagree with his view that those three faculties are notto be subordinated at all [to anything higher]. I subordinate them tothe principle ofsubjectivity in general. 51

Fichte's statement here that the starting point of the Wissenschaftslehre is a "principle of subjectivity in general" is consistentwith our account of his development after 1794 and, more specifically, with our conclusion that subsequent to the WL 1794 Fichtecame to believe that the content of his first principle must somehow embrace both the theoretical and practical aspects of the I.

5I. "Ich subordiniere sie dem Prinzip der Subjektivitat Iiberhaupt'' (my emphasis, GA, III.2, pp. 314-15).

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 63MQr.eoy.er,"~thia...pass.ag!:Jend.~~~J!PporLto O\!r~gg!:.~Jion t!:J.at tl~"~

unity,~Q(JheQ.r~d~J.&L<\'ll.cl.pr~£tkf!.Jx.~~§'Q!t jp,Jh~ ..(t~l';J2~;:tJdl!1l!§'~_:::'~"~oRJ2,..Q.~~sl._l\L~,J!J§J:~jY.2!l~PQ~JtjQn."Q!~',£Q9~(;lina.liQn, ~:~~,Q,i~e locat~d!!1 theJl!£t!h~.tl~g~h.ii!~ £apab~~,()fl?~i!!K§~!!!?_~_~!l!.~dlJ.l!df$r.a~.ingle,_m.Qfl<~g~llJ<r.!!Lpl'iQ<;;iR!!1J'his same theme becomeseven more prominent in Fichte's texts of 1797-9. In his "FirstIntroduction to the Wissenschoftslehre," for example, Fichte describes his starting point, the notion of the self-positing subject, asa characterization of the single activity of the I, which constitutesthe "one essential nature of consciousnees.v'" In his Foundation ifNatural Right of 1796 Fichte says even more explicitly that thenotion of self-positing is intended to "comprehend both practicaland theoretical activity at once as [the I's] activity in general(uberkaupt) ."53

What these passages do not explain, however, is precisely howsuch a "principle of subjectivity in general" is to be understood.Although Fichte never really provides a more explicit elaboration,I shall suggest that his position is best understood in the followingway: The demand that the accounts of both theoretical and practical reason begin from a common principle and be carried outwithin a unitary system is based upon the implicit belief that asingle principle exists that expresses the fundamental nature ofsubjectivity itselfand in terms of which all of consciousness, theoretical as well as practical, can be comprehended. Another way offormulating this position is to say that a single, essential structure("the one essential nature of consciousness") underlies and informs the whole of subjectivity and that it is the task of philosophy's first principle to articulate the nature of this fundamentalstructure.

In some sense, then, the firsLprjpciple !,;an..1>.l< unckrtl..1Qod_~~ as,tatement abQyt the essentia..l!1l!illre...9f"::.J.=hQ.Qd:_(.lddle.it).,..w:..m(sl;1bjectivity~rbl!!lPt, Jfyrthermore, it is in this general structureof subjectivity that the unity of reason in its deepest sense can besaid to reside. This unity is no longer regarded as consistingmerely in the fact that the principles of both theoretical and practical reason can be deduced within a single system as conditions

52. "Das Eine Wesen der Intelligens," As noted previously, this first introductionwas published in 1797 and belongs to the system of 1797-9 (SW, I, P: 441).

53. Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prin<.ipien der Wissenscllaftslehre, GA, 1.3,pp. 313-460 and 1.4, pp. 1-165; SW, III, pp. 1-385. The passage cited hereoccurs at SW, III, p. 27.


of the same fundamental feature of consciousness (i.e., its formalunity). Rather, t.h~q..rJltical an..dJ2ra.£!.~..!~~§£n constitute~ U~!5Y

.in th ~~~!!~~.!J.1u.o<£!t.~~shu~~h!!?.i!!.!!!~",§..~..m~.JJ.:t~r!!~l,~ll:\!£!ms.,..1.h.f!t2. f

SM!?jZY..Yitxi!.tg~.u~I..~l4::JJ!,_~h~tj.s"JJ)~~",~i!Dl~,,~(Qr Fkb£tt,~l...~ct~~t§..cl(~4 What Kant was ultimately constrained toregard as two distinct species of reason will be shown by the Wissenschqftslehre to be merely two manifestations of a single rationalfaculty.

Furthermore, it is important to recall here that what is assertedby this principle is no longer regarded by Fichte as an indubitableor apodictic "fact" but as a hypothesis whose truth can be decidedonly on the basis of its success in founding a complete philosophical system. Thus, the ultimate verification ofFichte's initial assertion about the essence of subjectivity is gained only at the end ofthe philosophical process, after it has been shown to enable philosophy to comprehend the totality ofexperience. for this reason thet~sk of eyal!!at~gFichte's ~.!!~cess il}J~,~Juall.y_.:provil1ghi&.fljarJingP9intJ~k..~-!lY~~h~_9_~_~_®Jl!~~~Ql~~~Qfjhe .nresep.t J,ll',.oJe,et. I t will not bepossible to assess Fichte's claim to have established a completesystem that includes a deduction of every feature of experiencefrom the principle ofcausality to the feelings ofpleasure and pain.In-what follow-~ we shalL(Q&-l!s.J!PJ1Jl..QneJl&P..e...G1J)~lar.gtI....ptoje<t.~..whatJ.j~sei!j!J?'.Q§~ibl~,lQ~.illake7tofJ:='i~l;1J~~1l~1halhothth_e,QreticatJlnd ..}l[£lC!iCaLr~o~,can.ka~c~cuQun.ted;£oI:in...termsl ofa §iQgle eS~l).tial struct~re?-!t should be obvious that in concentrating upon this question we shall address the issue of the unityof theoretical and practical reason more directly than Fichte'sefforts to prove the reality of practical reason. Yet it would be amistake to think of the former as completely irrelevant to the

~~tte~ ~rK~caD~hownjh~~e~~~k~r~~soIl.IT!l,pl~§~'L.§imilarly~.rucw_c;L~uqjf£l~§~iq~2I~~\~alJ:,~a

s.Qn~~Jfu\ili~.~911s..i~t.s~in.lh~..ae!lltl~"b_asi£,.~£ti~!!y~ oft~lllilli!~J~nth~_1?~lieiil)<'n~BrACuti~~/L<;ARi1cit.:x.....furrv~a~lf:5i~t~I~tnjDAililU.,,,,j(J1QLeXilcJ!Y-l2£Qved~.J2~J;QJl1~'l<!~<:l§UJ!!Q~Rl~ ust2kJJ]:Ilot~i§.

In the next two chapters we shall examine Fichte's attempt tounderstand both theoretical and practical reason in terms of thesingle fundamental structure of subjectivity articulated in his sys-

54. The System ofthe Doctrine of Morals (1798) begins with the following claim:"Subjectivity (die Ichheit), intelligence, reason ... is [the single] point ...from which our system begins" (SW, IV" p. I).

DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE'S PROJECT 65tern's first principle. Although he formulates numerous versions ofthis principle in the period between 1794 and 1799, it is quiteclearly the notion of self-positing that is central to all of them. Forthis reason we shall need to examine the concept of self-positing ingeneral by addressing two main points: first, Fichte's notion of thesubject as Tathandlung and, second, his characterization of selfpositing as "an activity that returns into itself."55 In addition, weshall need to consider how this structure informs both theoreticaland practical consciousness by showing how Fichte attempts togive an account of the basic phenomena of each (self-consciousness inthe former case and self-determination in the latter) in terms ofthe subject's self-positing activity. Finally, we shall examine thenotion of self-determination that results from this account of practical reason, comparing it with Kant's own conception and assessing the merits of the view to which Fichte is led.

55· "[Ein] in sich zuriickkchrendes Handeln" (SW, I, f.' 462). Fichte uses thisand similar expressions in numerous passages: SW, ,pp. 458, 461, 522, 532.

3-----------~ ~-----------

'THE SELF-POSITING SUBJECT'AND THEORETICAL

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

This chapter marks the beginning of our attempt to reconstruct insome detail the theory of subjectivity centered around Fichte'snotion ofthe self-positing subject. In this respect our interpretation is based upon one of the few claims about Fichte with whicheveryone can agree, namely, that the concept most fundamental tohis theory of subjectivity is that of the self-positing subject, or,alternatively, "the absolute I." Unfortunately, o~ce we venture

j}11:Y..Qnd .t.llli_mOS1.g~neral claim, consensus among inJ~:Rreters ofF~~tiall:>: cea~This is evidenced not only by the lack ofany generally accepted, comprehensive interpretation of Fichte'sthought, but also by the fact that there is widespread disagreement over the most elementary aspects of his principal doctrines,including that of the self-positing subject. For this reason one ofour main aims here is simply to articulate in as coherent a form aspossible the content of the conception of the subject that Fichtecame to espouse. This alone is a sufficiently formidable task, giventhe obscurity of the texts .involved and the great divergence ofopinion among expositors of Fichte at even this basic interpretivelevel. This expository aspect of our project will be guided by thehypothesis that Fichte's development of the theory of the absolutesubject is best understood as an attempt to come to terms withsome of the implications of Kant's theory of self-consciousness -

66

~I

IIi]!j[1~1

~

II

I

I

THEORETIOAL SELF-OONSOIOUSNESS 67especially the doctrine of transcendental apperception - and to doso within an essentially Critical framework. I In other words, Ishall take seriously Fichte's own understanding of his relationshipto Kant, as he expresses it in the following claim made in 1797,four years after developing his notion of the self-positing subject:"I have always said, and I say it here again, that my system is noneother than the Kantian. That is, it contains the same view ofthings, even though its method is completely independent of Kant'spresentation." 2

At the same time, our concern will be not merely to restateFichte's views but to understand them as well. That is, we shallwant to know, as far as is possible, why Fichte espoused the positions he did. To this end we shall attempt to develop an account ofthe various factors that led Fichte to the notion of the self-positingsubject. In addition to a consideration of the philosophical arguments in support of his theory, it will be necessary to look at theimmediate historical context within which that theory developed.This will require a consideration of not only Kant's views but alsothose of lesser known figures whose reception and interpretationof Kant played a crucial role in shaping Fichte's own approach tothe issues he addressed.

The aspect of Fichte's theory with which we are concerned herehas its beginnings in the Wissensduftslehre of I 794 but is articulatedmost clearly and consistently in the system of 1797-9. In the preceding chapter I argued that in the system of 1797-9 the conceptof the self-positing subject was meant to capture the essentialnature of subjectivity in both its theoretical and practical forms.Yet we also saw, particularly in Part I of the WL 1794, that Fichteoriginally developed his conception of the subject in connectionwith a particular issue from the domain of theoretical philosophy,namely, theoretical self-consciousness. Hence, our first step inunderstanding Fichte's theory of subjectivity will be to examinehis account of theoretical self-consciousness and to articulate thenotion of the self-positing subject that emerges from that account.

This way of proceeding raises an important question concerning Fichte's overall project: In what sense does Fichte intend toclaim that theoretical reason as a whole, and not merely one aspect

I. In this fundamental respect my interpretation is inspired by a doctoral dissertation written by Benson (lg74), as well as by Pippin (lg88, Ig8g).

2. SW, I, p. 420.


of it (i.e., self-consciousness), is grounded in the activity of selfpositing? In the WL 1794 it is clear that Fichte envisioned asystem in which the categories of the understanding and the formsof sensible intuition could be deduced by a dialectical chain ofarguments that was generated by a basic' contradiction betweenthe principle of the self-positing I and the second principle ofphilosophy: "The I posits a not-I in opposition to itself:" Thisclaim is not examined in detail here, in part because there is somedoubt about the extent of Fichte's commitment to this project inlater versions of the Wissenschqftslehre (including the system of1797-9), but also because it.Qelon.gs to that class ofGer.m.~. Idealism's ambiti9..Y~'§' that, ,.althoug!LRhilosoEhiciYly_Rrqvoca-(tiY~~,...ar.~£.ll[!loS,i.£.~rtainl): inca~ of actl1a,H):. beipg carried. out.Yet, even if we abstract from Fichte's claim to be able to deducethe principles of theoretical reason from his system's first twoprinciples, it is still possible to understand the principle of selfpositing as. fundamental to the whole of theoretical reason in thefollowing sense: The very possibility of theoretical subjectivity canbe understood as dependent upon the subject's self-positing activity, since for Fichte (as well as for Kant), the self-consciousness atissue here constitutes the most basic condition upon which thepossibility of all empirical knowledge depends.

In the present chapter, then, we shall focus rather narrowly onissues relevant only to theoretical self-consciousness, postponinguntil the next chapter a discussion of whatever implicationsFichte's account might have for a theory ofsubjectivity in general.Our treatment of theoretical self-consciousness is divided intothree sections, each of which focuses on one central aspect of thetheory.. In the first section we shall discuss the nature of the distinctive self-awareness that Fichte attributes to the "self-positing"subject, an awareness that he sometimes characterizes as "intellectual intuition .. " In the second part we shall examine the arguments that allegedly support Fichte's view, especially the claimthat his account of self-awareness has a. transcendental grounding. Finally, we shall look at Fichte's discussion of the peculiarsense in which the subject of consciousness can be said to "exist."

Self-positing as nonrepresentationalself-awareness

This first section examines Fichte's views concerning the unique,nonrepresentational nature of self-awareness. In its most general

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 6gform FJchte's claim wilU?~,1J:1at thesuli~~g times presentto.itself}xithin, conscioJ!S_~s bl!!..iliat its modiL~g..Ilresent teLit§e1fis funqament'!lly~t.ft.Q..I!uh!;_:W.~y')q ~hM<h it is GOPs£1oUS of o!.>jjfcts.,.Our task will be to understand precisely how thesubject's awareness of itself differs from the consciousness ofobjects. In light of the widespread disagreement surrounding thenotion of the self-positing subject, we shall first approach Fichte'stheory via an indirect route, beginning with an examination of thenature of the problem that the theory was originally intended tosolve. Following this path, our first !1uesti9P.-.kcomes: mat constitutes "Fichte's Eroblem"? In what has become one of the mostirrlluentialW-gceiitii1terp;etations, Die!.t:LHe.ruiQb_t9£.t.IJ.. Ficht«'s.l>enttaLpr,Qblm.j;{U;,Q;O§i~Lip'-_.,1}.JJJJml>~LQLr~l~t~!Lp_¥~£lQ!es that'1Jlege.dl:y,..arise..1V,llia!.._Q~"jl,itl<mpl§.JIt .~.?!\PlahtJh~ ..ROS~ip,ili1;):.~ofs.df-co!!~iou,lill.£ss.3 Although it cannot be denied that Fichte'sproject is closely bound up with the task of finding an adequateaccount of self-consciousness, I!eJ)Jjfll,]_~xclusive co~cern_with

~.i!lJ3u~,lll!i!llill=.rlY. has the e[~£1_ofc!istQxti:qg the ~~!1tral is.§!!st ina"[4.IJ.9AI!lJfll!1l:Lw,,~y',]or Fichte's problem arises not out of a consideration of the phenomenon of self-consciousness per se, but inthe wider context of a theory of consciousness in general. Moreover, it is only by locating Fichte's concern within this widerframework that hisproblem, as he himself understood it, becomesvisible. This "wider context," of course, is Kant's theory of consciousness or, more accurately, Kant's theory as it was understoodby his immediate successors. Although both of the passages inwhich Fichte explicitly lays out what I take to be his centralproblem date from 1797, three years after the first published version of the Wissenschaftslehre, clues to the origins of this problem, aswell as an account of the context in which it emerges, are to befound in an early text of 1794, the Aenesidemus review," Since ourpresent aim is to understand the precise nature ofthis issue, it willbe helpful to begin with a brief consideration of the relevant passages of this review.

The Aenesidemus review constitutes Fiehte's first serious endeavor.-.. ..to come to terms witlrsome of the problems faced by contemporary

3. This interpretation is found in Henrich (1982). In German as "Fichtes ursprungliche Einsicht" (1966, pp. 188-232). Earlier versions of this articleappear as "Fichte's 'Ich' " in Henrich (1982, pp. 57-82) and as "La decouverte de Fichte" (1967, pp. 154-69). For a short account and criticism ofHenrich's interpretation, see Pippin (1988, pp. 80-4).

4. GA, 1.2, pp. 41-67; SW, I, pp. 3-25.

~~~,t.

;\<\("'V"'''''''


followers of Kant who attempted to reconstruct and defend Kant'ssystem. The review itself represents Fichte's response to some ofthe skeptical objections leveled against Critical Philosophy byG. E. Schulze in his book Aenesidemus. 5 Our efforts to understandFichte's defense of Kant against Schulze are complicated by thehistorical fact that Schulze's book itselfwas a response to a particular version of Critical Philosophy, namely that of Reinhold. Inhis reconstruction of Kant's system, Reinhold's intention was notto criticize Kant's basic positions but rather to purify them of theirinconsistencies and to recast them in a more systematic form.Without" entering into all ,of the details of Reinhold's notion of aphilosophical system, it suffices for our present purposes to notethat ~rt of Reinhold's att<1!!!Rt to s~matiz~ Critical ~hilosqphyiB-.Y~<i~~.1fLr..Jhe"highe~!:-Rrinc;.iRleof.I1.bilosoRhx,~rin

ctBle, frqm Whi~.4 ~!...Q.th£LJ?hi.l9.!QRhi£~loq!!y_~h~f~~erived:6Since Reinhold understood Kant's philosophy as primarily a phi-losophy of consciousness, his first principle was at the same timea characterization of the most general concept needed to give anaccount of all of the contents of consciousness. This most generalconcept for Reinhold was that of Vorstellung, or "representation,"and was expressed in what Reinhold termed the "principle of consciousness" (der Sat; des BewujJtseins): "In consciousness the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and theobject and relates it to both."?

Reinhold's principle can be understood as making tw.2.~~t;b~ral

philosQphical claims: The1il;~i£..that allconscious states, whethercognitive, volitional, or affective, share a single underlying structure. Although this claim does not appear explicitly in Reinhold'sformulation of the principle itself, it follows from his conception ofits role as the first principle of a comprehensive philosophy of consciousness. The s..e~&imspells out what this basic structureof consciousness is, identifying it with the structure that Reinholdascribes to Vorstellung. On this view, all consciousness involves not

5. Schulze ([179 2], 191 I).6. Although Fichte initially stood under the spell of Reinhold's conception of a

philosophical system (especially in Ueber den BegrijJ der Wissenschaftslehre butalso in the WL 1794), his writings after this point are considerably less in..formed by the notion of system in Reinhold's sense. My approach in thischapter will be to deemphasize Fichte's early views on method in favor ofwhatI consider to be his philosophically more interesting theory of the subject.

7. "Im BewuBtsein wird die Vorstellung durch das Subjekt vom Subjekt undObjekt unterschieden und aufbeide bezogen" {Reinhold, 1790, p. 167).

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 7I

only a subject that is distinct from its object, but a third elementas well a representation, which the subject distinguishes both fromitself and from the object. In other words, the subject ofconsciousness not only distinguishes itself from its representation; it alsomakes a distinction between the representation and the objectwhich that representation is a representation of. In addition tothese two species of "distinguishing," consciousness also involvestwo kinds of "relating," since the subject relates the representation both to itselfand to the object. I t is the first of these - the subject's relation to its representations - that will be of most concern to Fichte, and for this reason we shall consider the nature ofthis "relating" in greater detail later.

Fi,chte~prjJ.!1~~EY..~!:lti,S~2!!~~L~l:,!QhQl.g in 1!l~Aenesidem~

q;)n!1stsi!lth1:£!~iI!!lll~tr~Rr~§'~!lj;,?!!i2n.,..QrJ1!ul~1Jg.i~

~prv£}ts tjle hig~es~_~.2§.~!!.~~for_~hil9soRhy tha!intends to use such a c2!!£!mt as the basis for an understandhlg_<iconsciousness in its entir~ty. Although Fichte's text itselfprovidesfew clues to the reasoning behind his rejection of Reinhold's basicclaim, a look at Schulze's own objections to Reinhold's principlehelps to supply the missing argument. As we saw earlier, Reinhold's principle asserts that all consciousness involves a dual relationship - a "relating" and a "distinguishing" - between representation and subject. On the one hand, the representation isdistinguished from the subject. Thus, I recognize my representationof an object as distinct from myself, the representing subject. Onthe other hand, every representation is related to a subject in thesense that all of my representations are regarded as belonging toa particular subject, namely, to me. ~ulze's p-qint is..!h.a.t,jLalL<;@nsciousn~~sjnvol-Y.e£uhis re..1.ati9!Lbet~~p.resenta1jQrLi.!-nd

&J!bjectd!!1!l if.J:P~<ttiQK o£.£ill:L:with!!!~~.",£2X!§~S.t9US!!!:~~_:a.sRcinhcl.d~a..prin.cilllt_g1.ittm~JlL~.!l£Ol1§£iQ.llS~~!.I~I!:lst.al~QJ!!yolve~sloU!~l;!n:ne~h.~t ~E!:.1!! other words, in order torelate a representation to myself as subject, in order to recognizeit as mine, I must in some sense be aware of myself as subject..fu!Lt~lf-~i:t.areness on.Jhe__Ill1f.Lof.Jb.l:L§J!Wect c.&.Q!1Q.Lij:§J1If .beag;:ounteg fo!:j!UermJLQ.Lth~ strJ!£lt!tf.Jh.!!t Reinh.9.ld aUrihytes,J..Q.r.eBFesent~ili?1!' The reason for this is easily grasped: If the selfawareness involved in my representation ofX were itselfa speciesof representation, then there would need to be another subjectdistinguished from and related to that representation of myself,and so on ad infinitum. An account of even the simplest state of

72 FlCHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY

consciousness would require the assumption ofan infinite numberofsubjects and an infinite number ofacts of relating between sub..ject and representation.

Whereas Schulze's conclusion that the self..consciousness involved in representational consciousness cannot itself be anotherspecies of representation is regarded by him as a decisive critiqueof the Critical theory of consciousness in general, for Fichte ittakes on a different meaning. For him, SfhJJJ~~.~§.~£riJ.j£i~mjmRlie~

tlliit the_4efend~~L,QrJ!.!f!IMPhilosQI2.hY_!!11!§.t_ITj~~.t~Rei!lh,£>lr!'sclaint.~lh,at.tb.u.:tL\lm.y~_Qf_rSR!S§~~JJ1.~tj.OQ~J-fJl.l!§~<iQ!!wes~is th~

stmr1JJJ:t;,~lL{;Q!J..§_~JQJ!~Jl!t.§,§,..~n(;l.~u.§J:..12L9vide inst~ad",an ,~£.£Qlln:t.

o[J.b.e_-s¥elf7.,aw.ar~,n~a~,~i!!:)r.QlY.~~lr-ill,J:~llt-v~§,~P..tfJ:!iQ.U~!s.Q.DA~iQ:t!§.,.u~th~t a:Y2!.gi§H~\~!?-_~,j~~:§!!Jte .!~g!~bw,in.!~t.1Y!lifh3~!!i': ..aC~Q!ln t~bas5lg_~nR(~'!!ll:!.2J£'L~_IE ..q£I_~uL!!!~yJl~!>Jy¥f~lls. Thus, it should come as no surprise that this task - a characterization of self-awareness in non-representational terms - should appear to Fichte as the principalchallenge for anyone wishing to defend the basic soundness ofCritical Philosophy."

Before turning to Fichte's response to Schulze in the Aenesidemusreview, it is worth calling attention to two points about thisaccount of Fichte's problem. The first concerns, the great ironythat surrounds the philosophical exchangejust depicted. FQ·r itisSchul~~-,-J.Q.e sk~.I.~.tic ~!lc!..friticofKanL..-whQ~1LgitiGiziP...g",~RcinhQlg'J..!h.~.~InQ§,t,.J~.tQIPin~qt"KJ!!!tiMt~!?f~.hi~_!imSt.,_.fQ!j;,~~.,Jfj'£bJ~_~tCl.redi~,CQy~t~,h~1"J!t le~~tiJl.,i!,_~L)!.,genetal"a~~"". is a trvlx...&.aJ).!.iAp.R9~.i!~9.r.~=£" ..g~mQ~!Y,,~Jh~t.§~<:.!f:~W3:!.~.~§~)~J!§j1j~~tr~~~<i.~ll~m<K.antun:~l~~!h.~~<wt!J!~~.~,I?.llI~.,,~:RR~~R1iQ!l'm~~Ji~_tQ.k!JJ)~~[alQQ,tliDmtArerJIlSfWLdamtJlt.a.ll)!.;.di[~[ie,pj.ftQm.JbQ$~vlbr:l;l.t.~llPlY~ ...~Q!!!~n~Ssot:2.W~ct.s. Although this "rediscovery" of Kant's position coheresnicely with Fichte's frequent claims to being the only true Kantianamong his contemporaries, it does not., ofcourse, exhaust the issueof'Fichte's relationship to Kant. For, as we shall see later, the theory of the self..positing subject is not merely a rediscovery of Kant'sown position on the topic of self-consciousness. In order to settlethe issue of Fichte's relationship to his predecessor, we shall needeventually to ask as well whether those aspects of Fichte's theory

8. Thus, Fichte's task exhibits striking similarities to Sartre's account of consciousness, which is constructed around a fundamental distinction betweenintentional, or thetic, consciousness of an object and nonintentional, nontheticself-consciousness. The similarities between these two positions will becomeeven more apparent lat~r. See Sartre (1966, 'pp.. 9-17; 1957, pp. 31-54).

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 73that go beyond Kant's explicit position on this score are consistentwith, or in violation of, the spirit of Critical Philosophy.

Second, we are now in a position to see that the problem of selfawareness addressed by Fichte in the Aenesidemus review is identical to the one articulated by him in two separate passages from1797. Consider the following passage from the"Attempt at a NewPresentation of the Wissenschaftslehre," in which Fichte lays out theproblem that is supposed to provide the principal motivationbehind his theory of the self-positing subject:

Insofar as you are conscious of some object - for example, the wallin front of you - you are ... conscious of your thinking (deines Denkens) of this wall, and a consciousness of the wall is possible onlyinsofar as you are conscious of your thinking. But in order to beconscious of your thinking, you must be conscious of yourself....[Thus,] no object comes to consciousness except under the condition that I am also conscious of myself, the conscious subject. Thisprinciple is incontrovertible. But if it is claimed that in this selfconsciousness I am an object to myself, then what was true of thesubject in the previous case [i.e., in the consciousness of the wall]must also hold for the subject here [i.e., in self-consciousness].It too becomes an object and requires a new subject, and so onad infinitum. On this view, subject and object are distinct fromeach other in every state of consciousness, and ... this is the reasonwhy ... consciousness cannot be accounted for in this manner,"

Although Fichte's problem is concerned with self-awareness andwith the task of understanding it in a way that avoids an infiniteregress, it is important to see that Fichte arrives at this problemnot simply by way of an inquiry into the phenomenon of selfconsciousness per se but rather along a path that starts from a theory of consciousness in general and leads to the problem of characterizing the nature of the self-awareness that is involved in every

g. SW, I, pp. 526-7. The second passage is found at GA, IV.2, p. 30. It is thelatter which Henrich (lg82) cites (p. (2) in support ofhis own interpretation,but in doing so he omits the passage's first sentence, which actually serves asa crucial premise for the paradox Fichte lays out: "We cannot be aware ofexternal objects without being aware of ourselves, that is, without being anobject for ourselves." Note that Fichte's conclusion (in both passages) is thatconsciousness (not self-consciousness) "cannot be accounted for in this manner."Thus, the problem to which Fichte is pointing is not, strictly speaking, aproblem of self-consciousness per se but one that arises within a larger theoryof consciousness in general.


representational state. Thus, as Fichte himself makes quite explicit,the problem to which he is calling our attention depends upon thespecific assumption, inherited from Reinhold's account of representation, that all consciousness of objects requires a kind of selfawareness. The problem arises when one realizes, as Schulzepointed out, that this self-awareness cannot itself have the structure that Reinhold attributed to representational consciousness.Given this account of the genesis of Fichte's view, one might askwhether, in accepting Reinhold's description of representationalconsciousness, especially its insistence that each representation isrelated within consciousness to a subject, Fichte does not alreadysubscribe to a position that Kant himself would reject. For, as iswell known, Kant held not that the "I think" does in fact accompany each of my representations, but only that it must be able to doso. This is indeed an important question, but since our presentconcern is primarily to articulate the content of Fichte's understanding of the nature of self-awareness, we shall postpone a consideration of this problem for now and return to it in the secondsection of this chapter.

Once we understand the nature of the problem pointed out bySchulze, the path which Fichte must take to solve it becomesclearer: In order to save whathe takes to be the Critical doctrinethat every representation of an object is related within consciousness to the subject of consciousness, he must find a way to characterize this relation that does not rely upon the structure ofrepresentational consciousness, in which the subject of awareness isalways distinct from what it represents. This is indeed the position that Fichte begins to stake out in a passage from the Aenesidemus review that anticipates, in both language and substance, hismore developed theory of the self-positing subject:

The absolute subject, the I; is not given through empirical intuition but is posited (gesetzt) through intellectual intuition.... [Itis] not present within empirical consciousness except insofar as arepresentation is related to [it] .... One can never become conscious of the absolute subject - that which represents but is notrepresented ... as something empirically given. 10

Although this passage does not shed much light on the nuts andbolts of the theory that Fichte will ultimately develop, it is of

10. SW, I, p. 10.

.\.'

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 75considerable importance to our attempt to understand the notionof the self-positing subject, for, as an argument directed explicitlyat Schulze's critique ofReinhold, it points out the intimate connection between the problem of an infinite regress raised by Schulzeand Fichte's theory of the self-positing subject. More specifically,it makes clear that ~.9ins the term 'Hositiill!' as ~•.~r~ponse toSchulz~does so in order t~gyjiliJh.es~t's n2!!!:!mreseQ!i!.!!.2lli!ll!:.~2r.~nessofit~.<l.m"~Ir!Ekt~J"

(i.&_,-..Q.hi,!i<;:!tY:~~~__ Qr"..r~":RJ:~~~l)"!~!JiQ!1..~!LSQllScio~.!:.[~ Moreover,Fichte's statement that "the I is not present within empirical consciousness except insofar as a representation is related to it" suggests what kind of self-awareness Fichte intends to designate bythe term 'positing', namely, the subject's "relation" to each of itsrepresentations, which, as we know from our analysis of Reinhold's principle of consciousness, refers to the subject's awarenessof its representations as belonging to itself.

Apart from the use of the term 'positing' in connection with"intellectual intuition" (a topic to which we return later), thereare very few clues in this early passage to help us determine moreprecisely the nature of the awareness that is at issue. We can dosomewhat better by looking at Fichte's account four years later ofthe general strategy required to solve his problem of the nature ofself-awareness. I1L!hi§.latet..Rm~gw!;..!ilitJn~k~L<;1l;?~r .!D.i'!lJ;11l;,.infin~ti<J:{;gr~~§'£.Iis~pnl'yj(Q.Q!l_yug~r~l~n.g!.~£lf:.1""~Y:!:!X,~!1~§,1L~Jl:':~'!:s~Q,cl'!§lJ!n 09jS~ct." Consequently, the problem"can be resolved only by discovering something in which consciousness is simultaneously both object and subject, that is, byexhibiting an immediate consciousness." II The logic of the strategybehind Fichte's response to Schulze is clear: In order to avoid aninfinite regress in a general account of representational consciousness, t4.tt_!~!f:J!:yy:.~relM(,ss reguirsd for th:g conscjpusnetls may' noti~seILt>~J:~mJ~'§!:mt!!t.iQP..&..(~__J;llarke(t.tlX~~J<~nt.M'§!J!?l~fJd!n.Q..g!?ject o~aren,~Jml ..ill!!§.tlli!t~~~.1!!!tdll!:.te" consciousness. Although, at a general level, this strategy iscleare'ii';ugh, mchte's theory of self-positing must be able to givea more precise characterization of the nature of this "immediate"consciousness.

It seems natural to begin this task with the assumption that thekind of awareness involved in the doctrine of self-positing is to be

II. GA, IV.2, p. 30.


equated with self-consciousness. This seems to follow both fromour discussion of the historical background of Fichte's problemand from Fichte's own references to self-positing as a kind of selfconsciousness. Yet Fichte often emphasizes that intellectual intuition, or self-positing, is distinct from self-consciousness: "[S'elfpositing] is a pure intuition. Thus, it is not a consciousness, not evena self-consciousness." 12 The characterization of self-positing as anintuition but not as "a consciousness" seems paradoxical 'at firstglance, but Fichte explains this distinction in the following passage:

, In ordinary consciousness . . . pure self-consciousness [Le., the'\ awareness involved in self-positing] does not constitute a comp,lete\state of consciousness. Rather, it is only a necessary component by

Imeans of which consciousness first becomes possible ... '. Neither

.' self-consciousness nor sensible intuition nor a concept is by itself arepresentation. Rather, they are those elements by means of whichrepresentations become possible. According to Kant ... and to me,three elements go to make up a complete representation: I) that bymeans of which the representation is related to an object andbecomes the representation of something, which we agree in callingsensible intuition; ... 2) that by means ofwhich the representationis related to the subject and becomes my representation. (AlthoughKant ... does not call this element an intuition, I do because itstands in the same relation to a complete representation as doessensible intuition.) And, finally, 3) that which unifies both ... andwhich we again agree in calling a concept. 13

The first thing to be noticed here is that although self-positingischaracterized as a kind ofself-consciousness, it is qualified by theadjective 'pure) (in other instances Fichte uses the term 'immediate'). Moreover, this passage helps to make clear part of what itmeans for Fichte to call self-positing "pure". or "immediate" self...consciousness. The awareness involved in self-:Ros.itingjs a kin9....Qfself=ilYYa..r.eIle.-S~s-t.hat} ....thoqghA~n.eJ;~~~ry_g:>_1!lPQ,ne.nt _(JiMlan,dlei1)y~rif

e\{.er,¥-,cons"ciQUs".sJate,~.mn~\!.e[_CQ.llS.titutJ~s~lly_.i.ts ..e.lf,.a...~Qm,pl{j,e_ata.teo(cQnsci.oJJ~lJ.~.ss. The reason that pure self-consciousness cannotstand alone becomes clearer when we determine more preciselythe content of this self-awareness.

I I1Jater texts Fi_~h.~.._~Q!!!.!!!,Qn!.y ..,_glli!-!.~J;!~ri~~IL§.rlf:.P_Q§j1ing~M_f!-nimmedi~te _intuitiQ!!.._2.f.~l).~_.~£~~yi_~Y ..2f.!!J",qJ~l:ght. 14 This characterization is reminiscent of the claim, cited earlier, that my conscious-

12. SW, I, p. 459. 13. SW, I, pp. ~3-4. 14. SW, I, p. 522.

..~.i'

Ic

THEORETICAL SELl"-CONSCIOUSNESS 77ness of an object always involves an awareness of my thinking(meines Denk~n: ). Thi~ sug?ests that at leas.t part of the doc.tr~ne ofthe self-posItmg subject involves the claim that the activity ofthought always includes an awareness ofitselfas thinking- or thatconsciousness is necessarily aware of itself as consciousness.According to this view, then, all consciousness of objects requiresan activity of thought that is directed at an object and, at the sametime, "self-positing" in the sense that it always carries with it anawareness of itself as engaged in the activity of thinking. Hence,the consciousness of an object always involves a kind of selfawareness on the part of the subject of consciousness. The 1 thatis conscious is at the same time immediately aware that it isconscious. 15 Thus, it is understandable that Fichte also describesthis self-awareness as an immediate awareness of my having theparticular representations 1 do: "When 1 say that 1 represent'something, this is equivalent to saying the following: 'I am awarethat I have a representation of this object.' ,,16 Moreover, thischaracterization of self-positing is consistent with Fichte's assertion, quoted earlier, that it is through self-positing that the representation becomes related to the subject.

At this point we are in a position to understand why Fichtecharacterizes self-positing as pure and spontaneous, and why heregards it, in what seems to be an outright violation of orthodoxKantianism, as a species ofintellectual intuition. .1!Lthdh:s.tpla,ce,_ .;J::~

'intellectual intuitiQIl'js oft~!l..\!~tsLtQJlenote.!!..kLndQ[!3QgDitionjIl ~~v'~~~w:hi<:h::J1Le-5.lJbj,e,ct] int!!ii;ing..f1£t.ll'jly'j~jn~gJl1e."~n§'!<"jl!,Q.j.§lIn- .~guiiih.a.bldQID.~~l1n11ilii2U,; One historically significantversion of this conception is the notion of a divine intuition that,in knowing its objects, creates them. Ofcourse, F,ichte's doctrine ofintclka:uaLintuition s.hQ.'!Jl(L!!QLh~,Jlli~.sL~J!ri.!.:m.ting..tQ.

t~JlUman int~lli:.!J.~~~Qf.\;.~J)gjlWj~~nQ~g~

w.haj;,jt-hQlJ:QW§.~[:r,Q1IUbj~.Jh.eQJJ)gki;l,L,~QI1\;;,~RliQ!!,,,.[i:!:,ili_~.!.h.f;.

ge.~l1LnQtiQn,.Qt:.a....s.p,es.;ie.s_Q~..aJ~t;;,ne~IJ..xY.hi~d.Win.l.;.timl

tlt'!Li!LnQnn~l!Y~,m~!kJ;)~l)¥e~[L thsl!!l1!it~Lan.9-thau ·y.!:icl,I. i~

jD.tui~d..dpJ::fi"~uQLapply.•._a_'sJate..QL<;!.:j[i3ir.JulJAtl:ish.t<;.~ts_!.Qa~~.bjp">~.QJ!ltiQL11A.~tQJ.~1?j~£!~!fR.Q§i.tir!g~ (Actually,Fichte's notion of intellectual intuition is somewhat closer to the

15. GA, IY.Il, p. 30.16. SW, I, p. 473. Although here Fichte is quoting a passage from]. F. Schulz, it

is clear that he agrees with Schulz on this point.17. See, e.g., GA, 11.3, p. 144: "that which is intuited is at the same time the

intuition. "


, , ,j,\ ~p>'!W notion of a creative intellect than the present disclaimer implies., (\/\ I') ~w. 'I ~or, ~ltho.ugh.,th.e.F~:Ptell«f.tdo.e~ n~~ate ~.t§.~i~~t.h~revt \J" ISl.anJmportant..s,ens.e.ltl.whlCh.tbJU!~.1ty.!lYJ?LW~\f.tY,~11J;lj:.YJ1:lOn

, ~\i~'x. ~ ~~~~~~~i;~~~~~~fi1~~;~~tft~r~~~~:s:~~:~'; ~~t;-:~~~~~as self-constituting existence.)

Beyond this consideration, however, there is a more specificreason, one more intimately connected to Kant's own position, forchoosing the term 'intellectual intuition'. By now it should beclear that much ofFichte's doctrine can be understood in the context of Kant's views regarding the "1 think'vthat must be able toaccompany all of my representations. And, when viewed in thislight, the characterization of self-positing as a kind of intellectualintuition no longer appears as blatantly un-Kantian as it seems atfi~t~gh~Rathe~~an~gard~asonen!!~l~f~

ing~wjJ.hj:h.e~djftjlfyltk,.~_~ncoun~L~Ql?~J~~!ltillJ!.Yi!!K!Q.§~~=,~vQAt1>iQ.Q ~f a",:a!,enes§_i[ujrr~91y~9-Ln_lh~ __~2<u..!hi~k.l" For Kant, therecognition that a particular representation X belongs to me is tobe distinguished conceptually from a .simple, un-self-consciousawareness ofX. Unlike the latter, the awareness of myself as having particular representations is not itself an empirical state ofaffairs and is therefore not given through sensible intuition but isto be attributed rather to the subject's spontaneity. At the sametime, t.lliL~l.,thjnlC-~.s.es..for.KantA_s,p.e_cific<~chaI:acter:is.tic_that

suggests th4t.ltb~ un.get:S..t.QJL(t.aS_L&.p-eJ;i~~s.OfJJliuitior.t. FQr-1he'-::I~Jn.yQlves mo:r.e..Jhan..Jll.e.r.cl)!~j:h.e-1hQ..1Jgh.t,-2r.£..~pi, __Q£_as..y_bJ~g;- i~Qnn.~t;'§-.!l.n_LID!P~~.diattL~~reness of.Jhe~j.~rs

exisJ.e11'tL_-::",sDme1hing_that,""fo.r"_._Ka.ttt.",Jlnl.¥.~jn.ty.iti.9.Jl~_ capahle-ofgiyingJ.~? As Fichte points out, Kant denies that there is a humanfaculty of intellectual intuition because he understands such afaculty to be the capacity for an immediate acquaintance withthings in themselves. Here, of course, Fichte is in complete agreement with Kant. His noint, rath~,j_~L.tb~lKa!lrr_dichotomy 'of~CQncept and sensible intuition is insufficient. to characterize thesu~tct's immediate awareness of_its own consciolJ§... activit}:,~jJJldthAt. the features Qf.....1llis a...w~r~~.!l~.llll:~llyJ&~Q~..J.Q. uu.d.eJ~

stand it as a kind of intellectual intuition.-It7h~-ul~~;~'-beClwwh.yFiChte makes the claim that

self..positing as such cannot alone constitute a state of consciousness.

18. A consideration of the sense in which the subject "exists' in intellectual intuition will be postponed until the final section of this chapter.

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 79Ifintellectual intuition consists in the awareness of my having therepresentations I do, then \!!.-.o!der for it to oC<mL thtre must bet!mresentatiop.s~I2reJ)£!!Lt(:'Lco'!}!fiQ.Rsn~~.!QJ?e recQgnized as myow.d:9These representations, however, can be given only throughsensible intuition. T!!.~!a"::tIl~3l:~~:E.~!!~_~~..Y..£l?nscio~~y ispo,l!sible on!y...QlLt;pe cQ.u.g,iti<mib.!!!Jh.~t <J&ti.Yi!Y.als~tan~ect otheL!hau)tself. For this reason, Fichte claims thatintellectual intuition is always conjoined with sensible intuition.T.hj.s viJ<.,w mjgbt also be .expressedas the t~ll~hat conli!Cioulin~

asJ!cwhQIUI.l.JllfQrm!<..dJ;rX,J!J;I!L~L&.tr1!&t!!~On the one hand,c~~sciousness is always directed at an empirical object suppliedthrough sensible intuition. On the other hand, consciousness isessentially self-referential in that each representation also necessarily enters into a relationship to one and the same subject. It isthis self-referential aspect of consciousness that is expressed in theclaim that the subject is "self-positing."

Fichte explicitly sets out the thesis of the dual structure of consciousness in the following passage:

Consciousness, as such, observes itselj(sieht sich selbst zu). This selfobservation is immediately united with everything that belongs toconsciousness, and the nature of consciousness consists in thisimmediate unity of being and seeing.... Thus, in consciousnessthere is, figuratively speaking, a double series of being and observing, of the real and the ideal, and its essence consists in the inseparability of these two elements."

The "dual series" to which Fichte refers is to be understood interms of the cl~im that ev~_conscio1.!~~.Qfl!,nobj~ctJ."~.estwo ~QnceJ~.tgElJ!y.~Qjsti~.£l£Q!!lJ12!1.$!l~~ inse~rable w!tpin

19. The distinction employed here between intellectual and sensible intuitionshould not be taken to imply that Fichte simply takes over, unmodified,Kant's dichotomy between the subject's spontaneous activity and a purelyreceptive faculty of sensible intuition. Fichte clearly makes a distinctionbetween intellectual and sensible intuition (e.g.,SW, I, p. 464), although, ofcourse, ultimately he (as well as Hegel after him) will want to reject this dichotomy in the sense that he will try to understand even the content of empiricalintuition as grounded, at least to some extent, in the subject's activity. Thispoint has been touched upon in the earlier discussion of'Fichte's notion of theAnstqjJ, although it remains, in the thought of both Fichte and Hegel, a veryobscure doctrine.

20. Once again, the deep affinity between the views ofSartre and Fichte becomesapparent, for Sartre also puts such a dual structure at the center of his theoryof consciousness.

21. SW, I, pp. 435-6.

80 FICHTE'S THEORY OF SU.BJECTIVITY

actual consciousness: anQutwar~1,.Ji9ject..direcJed awareness (a con...~tQY§n~§.§.v ..,Qf..K)__~p._c.L._~!1_J!lW~tg~._..self- referential a:warene~LJ~c"Q~LQJLSJ1.e.$. ..§-tha.1l...11nl.~pn~cious of-K).. ~~ Ofcourse, Fichte's characterization of the latter component as a kind of "self-observation"is, as he himselfpoints out, merely figurative. In the first place, theterm 'observation' is borrowed from discourse about objectiveconsciousness and implies the very distinction between observerand observed that Fichte wants to claim is irrelevant in the case ofself..positing. Second, as we have already seen, the self-positingsubject does not really observe "itself," at least not in the sense thatit attains a "picture" ofitself as if regarding its image in a mirror.Th~~c~cioussubj~~~.t~~Yf.£~,~g~§..i!!Jllt!kiggjj;§s~l[in.tQnit§.J»YnobJect. I ts "self:.obs_ery'ati.Q!l".~:..!.~Jhg~..!~fyx.§...m~!!l!~,Jq c"'TQD:J..ki~l.ll§.n.,.e.M's

a~et;l~§'§ Q(jts -!~j~"H.~h~!j§",~tQ~.U!.l!~~l:5tJl~~1~jli..ll..~~.Certainly the most difficult aspect of Fichte's notion of the dual

structure ofconsciousness is the idea that each state of consciousness is composed of two elements, each of which is itself a kind ofawareness. Although Fichte provides very little to aid our understanding of the relation between these two components, we canbegin with his characterization of their unity as "i~~diate" and"i!!§~'!E_~ble. ,)Th~.tth~J~Q,",£Qwm.RQ!!~I~J§~~r.~.!.!!§~R~~R.L~.Yl!Qg_-gJ?t,egly ref~!'§_J9".t.h~.,f~~tJhJ:'J.JJ~L~h~r.<r£€l!LQg.f!!!_1Y~ithin'f~9_qD§9jQ1!~lleSS

\~~g~~e::~~e-r:c~:~:~!~'~:U;~n~~I!:~~~:~~~:~ :~~conversely, in order for intellectual intuition to occur, there mustbe an empirical intuition to be appropriated as "mine." What itmeans to attribute immediate unity to the two mental acts involvedin a representational state is, however, less clear. Nevertheless, wecan find a clue to part of Fichte's meaning in a later passage fromthe same text: "The philosopher does not immediately find thisintellectual intuition ... as an isolated fact of consciousness butdiscovers it rather by distinguishing among what, within ordinary'consciousness, occurs as unified, and by breaking the whole intoits component parts."23 Hence, the. immediate unity of self-positingand sensible intuition refers to the fact that ordinarz.consciousness"jD con.tr.asi to a12hi!&!J!.bl1.tcal understandi1!g~f conl!J;iQPsne~.s,

is_~ itself a~are of.~~al~cture~thatis, it is not directlyaware of the fact that there are two distinguishable acts of awareness that comprise each single state of consciousness.

22. This point is nicely made by Benson (1974, p. 188). 23. SW, I, p. 465.

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 8 I

The most important implication of the thesis of the "immediateunity" of intellectual and empirical intuition is that the two meJ;ltalacts.-that cE1!~!i!!:l!_~~"~!!I~l(;u~ons.~io!;lltm:ate .1!!1U!9..t19 be under~d~§.JWQJ!~R~r~i~_!lYlsimultalf~oussta~Jsom~holY:~~rll!£:}t is certainly not F~chte's i~tention to cl~im, for example, thatin every instance of ordmary visual perception there are two fullyconstituted conscious states corresponding to the judgments "Isee Xl' and "I know that 1 am seeing X. " The implausibility ofanaccount of consciousness that would require an explicit, secondorder consciousness of the "I think" to accompany all representations suggests that the kind of awareness Fichte ascribes tointellectual intuition must be understood as implicit in nature. Onthis view, the. "imm!::-clj.lt..1e" self-awareness _of intellectual int;uiti~Q!!!!';Ll1aY1UQ.P~tstQ_Qd.Jts. ,~J'"dk£ilirJlJlJl.d~ticu-lated iD;_.!:.1!I~~.EJ.i<:iU!?'.r!se. This merely implicit self-awareness ~~\v(\:'lyt,would then sta.mtjn.£QJltt~~lJ;Q,,:w.hi!:lJ~1:l:11..£~.!L5:S2fleq!~\' 010\ \ r I

c~Q.lJsness,~:',w.1).if!l.i~.1Q,,1!~J!!!g~!Q2sL.~ flJ~ly_ (.a"I,V'l11A

o:C..cDnscious.ne.$s.-rfa.ultjng.frQmJh.~JtyQ.j~CLc!).n.fi.ciQWlly....dm.:.C1· "its.attentionJo.iJ;se .. . .. t.~:

The distinction referred to ear ier etween se osrnng selfconsciousness suggests this distinction between the implicit, immediate self-awareness of intellectual intuition and an explicit,fully articulated self-conscious state.

There are numerous passages in Fichte's texts that directly contrast the act of self-positing with what the conscious subject doeswhen it deliberately reflects upon itself. One such passage fromthe Wissenschaflslehre nova methode confirms that Fichte did in factconceive of the difference between these two acts in terms of thedistinction between immediate and reflective self-consciousnessthat I have suggested here:

Let everyone now think of his I and pay attention to how he doesthis. Now, in contrast, let everyone think of an external object. Inthis latter case we do not notice (bemerken) ourselves as the thinkerof the object. That is, we do not notice that we are the thinker of theobject hut rather disappear, so to speak, in the object. Nevertheless,

24. The term 'reflective self-consciousness' is jnsQireq.b.y. Sartre, who, like Fichte,distinguishes "nonthetic" self-consciousness, which is involuntary and universally present, from reflective self-consciousness, which is optional andconsists in reflecting upon oneself as an object, for example, of possibleknowledge.


it is easily and obviously discovered that the thinker and thatwhich is thought are distinct from each other."

Fichte's initial challenge to "think one's I" is obviously a call toengage in reflection, to bring about a state of explicit, reflectiveself-consciousness. This consciously undertaken reflection mustbe understood as distinct from the activity of self-positing, whichis part of all conscious states and occurs independently of the sub-ject's volition. What is most important here is Fichte's assertionthat in the consciousness of an object the subject does not explicitly "notice" itself as the thinker of its thoughts but "disappears"into the object. Unless we are to give up Fichte's fundamentalclaim that an act of intellectual intuition is involved in everyconscious state (a claim discussed more fully in the followingsection), we must take his assertion that the subject disappears inobjective consciousness to mean that the subject, in directing itsattention to an external object, has no explicit consciousness ofitself. That there is, however, an implicit self-awareness in objective consciousness is suggested by the next statement that thedifference between the thinker and its thought is "easily and obviously discovered." ~art of the "imllledi~.t~:.....!1ill.!J.re of the self~a~n~§.s...~[.itLt~lectu~1 intllj!ion §_~!,_th~Q,--tq..£9.,.Q.§..~1Jn__thef~QtJh~J."; ..altb,QJJighjti~,JlQt._exIlU~~tly,,.pres.,eni.w,.h~;ij....e~ ..J.bink...anobj.ecl"~OTli,~h.aYe.. ,e.asy,. and..jm,merdiale."J1~~~§"'~_7>iQ.......I!!X~~Jf~,*,(gJ:, __1T!oreaccuratelv to the fact that mv conscious state is mine) whenever~7iI::lln__.-..... J.••l_'."""A-'''_'_''''''''''''''h'''~'''~"''''=''~''''='''''' l ..~"""~",,,. "'. n"_....~.""~"'........".4_ ....m"· '_"".'.'~"""":__"'_" ~". ..."',.,......:"""'~

I ~b£lQse,JJtJn~~J~r.Jb~t~~!~J:.~r-Qf.~ifeJ!J, ..th7~~q!>i~£!_2f J!l:.y~~ntion. 2

Although Fichte's view does seem to include the claim thatthe awareness involved in self-positing is implicit, whereas thatof reflective self-consciousness is of an explicit nature, it is alsoclear that this cannot be the only respect in which the two speciesof self-awareness differ. Reflective self-consciousness cannot beunderstood simply as an explicit awareness, of the same contentthat is present, though only implicitly, in the subject's immediate

~sel~awareness. For if the_~istinct!~~t~he t~o ~r~f

sel~mns~io_usne.s.s..i£J..o_J:u&lt th~.iufi_ni~~~gress J.!lf!!~tity ted

25. GA) IV.2) p. 29. Other passages with similar implications are pointed out byPippin (1988, p. 82, n. 24).

26. See also Fichte's discussion of the "immediate" nature of self-positing at SW,I, p. 527: "The consciousness of my thinking is not something accidental tomy thinking; it is not merely added on or attached to it; rather, it is inseparable from my thinking."

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 83

Fichte's initialP..roblem2then .t~ mY!L~J~in.ltr1!~ure~ndrWt merely in deg!'~Lawar~s. This point is simply an implication of Fichte's basic claim that the subject's self-positing, incontrast to reflective self-consciousness, may not exhibit the structure of representational consciousness.

This realization leads us to an issue that lies at the heart of anytheory that postulates a kind of prereflective self-awareness: VYha(~ccc

e~yj§iUh.<~J.§.H£hJ!:!mX!(PXe.~!ms~!i~!lal~ne"~.lli..M-_~£nl,:.S~.of,.a,\ldqhQwdo~s... the.coutenLQf th;:tU!W.J!lX!.1n~_sJ~.~jJ[<;Lfr.Qm

thaj;.0f!e.fle~tz.self-£9'!!!'92.1!§..1]..s:~s? As we have seen, to claim thatSelf-positing is nonrepresentational in nature is to deny that thesubject is constituted as an object for itself in its immediate selfawareness. But what, more precisely, does this mean? AlthoughFichte does not provide us with a fully elaborated answer to thisquestion, we can get some idea of his position by piecing togethera number of remarks made at different places throughout hisdiscussion of the subject's self-positing, particularly in those passages where he&Q.,nJm'§!§.ll£ll§.~bl§.l!.V..QjptellectuaJinlYiti9n. Tl!~

.distinguishh!!Lfe'!~.<QL1.ltl!L((m;n.C1:j!l..Jhi1t<iLh.all,~ts-ubj~i"Jlcing'::_("'itt.&itJ_~,..,l~hik.ib_di1ttcIJs~dire{;!~d,1lQJ<a.t.thing[,_buL:;\t'!!L!!~W:tlU?.rd!~LfI~hl!':.!l»tY§.d!!U.~'~.C;Jing:_(§i'!Lliand,~lr,t). 2 7 As wehave seen, the "acting" that is at issue here is simply the activityof thinking, where the term 'thinking' (das Denken) is used broadlyto designate something like representing, or conscious activity ingeneral. The content of this awareness is further characterized byFichte as "the immediate consciousness that I am acting and [of]what I am enacting. It is that by means of which I know something because I do)t."28 Thus, the subject's self-ROSi.!.i!tg is t~und~1]t90<!..~'§.A.!l~QgQ.!!§..!Q..lh~kiilllof!JU!!]!Qiate aw~~§§.Jhata,!U!g~n.Lhi!~. Qfjlit,QJY!L~,<jiQg,...iQ£l!!,gimLRQ!h_JhyJa~,UhaUUsac!ing,"..i!.S.,WS;Ua~,cth~CQJ1t.l':nl.JJiit's"~w~'p~.umably what isimportant to Fichte about this analogy is the notion that theawareness referred to is internal to, and therefore inseparable from,the agent's acting, an awareness without which the activity wouldno longer be an "acting." Thus, it is actuaJJy somewhat mis~adin~to saYL~~chteAoe~L.!...4atint~Il~(;!!:1<l,Li1!t.'l:l!!i9.llj!L"dir~,~te,<;L

at~ th~actiyit.}L.QfcO!l..§Q.Q...l!§ltess. As his explication of that claimmakes clear, what he means to assert is that the former is internal

27- SW, I, pp. 471-2. See also pp. 522, 527 and GA, IV.2, p. 30.28. SW, I, P: 463.

29. Although Fichte never explicitly distinguishes between these two alternatives, there is ample evidence that he takes the latter view. Recall first that

.'!)~N,; \

~\&' N'ti!"Q' ,v-!;,r

/"~ ~..?\~ ~~ ,

)( c;f v.~t-( 84 FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY('-'

""~~. to the latter - that part of what it is to think is to be aware of one-\fl't'IJ~ '(Ill . selfas thinking. In other words, the nature ofconsciousness is such\-..-J' f .I~~\ that there is no representing ofX without a c0l!cur~~at:.~ness

C"I',,,, ~X\ Ii that one is doing so.!CJ.~J u"-tl\ :",1,.., ' A second aspect of what it means to deny that the subject is"\v\tJ1(~J, constituted as an object for itself in intellectual intuition can ber' formulated in the claim that such awareness is nondiscursive in

nature. This implies that the subject's immediate positing of itsrepresentations as its own is not to be understood as involvinga synthesis ofdiverse, otherwise unconnected units which are givenindependently of the activity-that brings them together. Selfpositing is not to be thought of as a composite of two distinguishable elements, concept and intuition, but as a simple, unitary

Ii awareness. One way of spelling out this difference might be to',! distinguish between a still unarticulated awareness ofone's repre...Ii; senting activity in general and a consciousness of self that is con-il: Eo stituted through a synthesis of past instances of self-awareness.:!l <cr'g..&Immediate self-awareness, then, might be characterized as con-1,'1!! "\v-:<"",,t/"o()->t~l sciousness's ever-present awareness that it is cons<;;!.c:!.'!s (and con-~/ scious of a particular content). Reflective self-consciousness,

:i'! however, would consist in the awareness ofa particular represen-III tation as mine, or as belonging to me, where the "1" to which my;!:! representations were ascribed would be a subject that was also:111 recognized as identhical with the subject of other? previous con-"'! scious states. On t is view, reflective self-consciousness wouldii',!i:\\ require, in addition to a fleeting, unsynthesized awareness now of,Iii my activity of thought, an explicit awareness of the numericalII:! identity of the subject with respect to its past representational states.i!l; Yet this way ofdistinguishing the two types ofself-consciousnessiJ!: is not completely satisfactory, for it implies aS9n9ill.l!Qn ofim.!Qe-:1:; djat~~~.,S;~lf::~'W.'!.r~l'!..(:}~S as ..§y.Qject1e~ or as consisti~g...!.l1erely in the;jl! a:war~enes.s_tha.t.1hgJJLi~~~g_takjng_plaG..e. B\!UIg~L!_!?e1ieve,

~~ ~W~~~~Ek~a~fur~~e~Jobecl~~gW that intellectut}.lintujtiQ!l,alr~J;tc!-yj!lg!!.d.~§...~91l1~ k~pd Qf..awa.r...eness:ll:; ofthu~lp.other words, in my immediate self-awareness I am not[If'll aware merely that there is a representing going on presently; I am~Iil pres.umabl.y..aJ.s.o.a.w~actiyit)!..of..f.Q.!!§fiousI!.~ssas in.aome"I S~~~~9 In ~~~,_then, to some later accounts of prere..,!:IIii,

l::;:\i l

!

THEORETICAL SELF·CONSCIOUSNESS 85flective self-awarenes(,§)Fichte seems to hold that, although the1 first becomes fully constituted as an object in reflective selfconsciousness, it does not first appear therein. Rather, ~ad'yillintellectual intuition the I i§.1ll'es~nt to itselfin sQme form - notL9fc~.~,..!![.£LP~r.ti~111!!!:~jndivisLq~L~~JL,p_qL simEly~'a~~!!~j~~t,"as~:£2~~£igus _8.QlJ.lething" (das BewujJtseiende ).3'

Of course, it is notoriously difficult to specify what such a nondiscursive, prereflective reference to an I would consist in.~

,v.eJ:yJJ;:m.it..WQYkl.§.eem t9JeqYir~ sO~J!».:~...Qf....till<,,"a~.tix:itJ:-.

o£~Ilr.~~nYDg.Jh!!.t.jLt th~ s_~m.~Ji!!lljU.Y!ily~g.,eD ..eRP.L~.h~llii2.n Qf.t~~~!Jg~1!&~. of !J1~2:~I?resenJJ!!K§.ubj~ct.32 The difficultyhere arises in specifying what that apprehension of the I's unitywould consist in, ifnot in the awareness ofsome relation among itspresent and past representations. Yet this possibility seems to beruled out by the requirement that self-positing be a simple awareness, one not constituted through a synthesis of past representational states. Even if this were not ruled out, however, how wouldthe content of immediate self-awareness differ from that of reflective self-consciousness? Is intellectual intuition perhaps to beunderstood as a synthesizing intuition that actively establishes thesubject's identity - unites its representations into a single consciousness - while reflective self-consciousness is merely an explicit awareness of this already constituted unity? And if so, isthere a way of picturing the former activity? Is it, as it were, afitting of each representation with some quality or marker thatthen makes it possible for them to be recognized as constituting asingle consciousness? These are difficult questions that a fully e1ablorated Fichtean theory would have to address; for now perhaps iis sufficient simply to have made explicit the various propertiethat Fichte believes must be attributed to the subject's intellectua \intuition. Thus, self-positing involves (I) an immediate, nondiscursive

already in Reinhold's formulation of the principle of consciousness each representation is said to be related to a subject. Moreover, Fichte consistentlycharacterizes intellectual intuition not as awareness of some (anyone's) activity of thought, but (e.g., at SW, I, p. 526) as the awareness ofyour thought(deines Denkens).

30. The best known example of such a theory is Sartre's, especially in The Transcendence qf the Ego.

S!. GA, IV.2, p. 33.32. For example, in WL 1794 Fichte explicates the notion of self-positing by

means of the formula "I = I," which is said to express the fact that the I "isidentical to (gleich) itself, always one and the same" (SW, I, p. 94).


~' awareness that consists in (2) the relating of the representations ofconsciousness to a subject, a relating that is (3) internal to and inseparable from the activity of consciousness itself.

Self..positing as a transcendental conditionof consciousness

If we accept the foregoing account as an accurate description ofFichte's view of the nature of self-awareness, we are still left withthe question as to what reasons there might be for espousing sucha view, a question that Fichte himself formulates in the followingway: "If it must be conceded that there is no immediate, isolatedconsciousness of intellectual intuition, how then does the philosopher arrive at an isolated conception and knowledge of it?"33 In,other words, what grounds are there for believing that consciousness includes as one of its components an omnipresent but merelyimplicit self-awareness? In the same passage Fichte provides uswith a partial answer: "Undoubtedly in the same way that he [i.e.,the philosopher] arrives at an isolated conception and knowledgeof sensible intuition, through inference from the obvious facts ofconsciousness."~eas~~ionthat~nowle~ofsel~Ro~ting

~gai!!,~~~L4Jill:Q!!gh__~!)..j!!f~I~!},£~__(4?lrch ein~!L SC..blEJ1..L..'!..ather t1:@nthyoug!J. simpk int!Q~H.~_£t!Ql}.r~~i.~fQrf~_th~~..l~oiql.illlY,d~.dJgear..J.~~t_!~.~t.~~~!~~~~.!!Qf~~~!f:l?.Q-~!!!!!gj~~.nQ1J9_l!.~.yggJ~!§.lood ~s a meredescr]pJiQn._QfJh~~f~f!~"Qf.J~gns.9jQY$J!~~..t.QY.t~.rJ!.ther __~_..~cco un tof[th~_~!>J~f.tm!b~t_i~,=J~Y:RRQrted.lly_moLe .theQ~ti£-aLGQnsider..ations-,Indeed, this follows necessarily if we take seriously Fichte'sfrequently repeated claim that the act of self-positing is never itselfthe object of consciousness - that is, we can never observe ourselves carrying out the act of intellectual intuition. Instead, thetheory of the self-positing subject must be understood as anattempt to articulate the underlying structure, the Grundstruktur,that informs consciousness but is not immediately apparent to it.Although the route to this goal cannot simply bypass the facts oiconsciousness, it must also lead beyond them, !~. this it canaccomplish only through philosophical argument.~

33. SW, I, p. 464.34. The reader should be aware that this claim as to the need for a philosophica,

grounding for the thesis of intellectual intuition is difficult to square wideverything Fichte says on the topic. For example, in the same passage irwhich the previous quotation occurs, he also makes the following, apparentlj

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 87Fichte's response invites a second, more difficult question: What

precisely are these arguments that allegedly lead philosophy toFichte's conclusions about the self-positing subject? In the preceding section we examined the theoretical considerations thatled Fichte to develop his conception of self-awareness as immediate and nonrepresentational- namely, the need to avoid the infinite regress inherent in Reinhold's account of consciousness. In thepresent section, then, we shall concentrate on another centralaspe_ct of Fichte's theory, one that finds expression in t~laim

th~n act ofi.m~n~f.tlJ.aljn~.ll!!!Q!h..Jh.~~.!ml)jec!:§~re.lles~.gJitt£~!! c~ns~io~ctiy~!y~. ts_.~E.~!~.m:£!1.tQf~~~ry~<,:on.~siQ!1~~:35Unfortunately, it is difficult to find passages where Fichte clearlyarticulates arguments that might support this basic claim. Nevertheless, I believe that his texts can be shown to suggest tY!9.d.llitinglines Qfarg~ti.on. T~~:!~! of these is a phenomenological argument that proceeds from a consideration of certain "factsof consciousness," namely, the experience of the "I think" inreflective self-consciousness; th~.~§~9nd_lill~of argumentation istranscendental in nature and is intirnatefy·oound up with Kant'sown argument for the claim, central to the first Critique, thatself-consciousness is a necessary condition for the possibility ofexperience.

As we have seen, Fichte explicitly rejects the possibility that hisaccount of intellectual intuition can be established in a directmanner by simply "finding" this act itself as a fact of consciousness. Yet at times Fichte seems to contradict this view and to suggesta more straightforward grounding ofhis position. In a number

contradictory claim: "Neither the fact that there is such a faculty of'intellectual intuition, nor what that faculty is, can be developed out of concepts.Everyone must find it immediately in himself, or he will never becomeacquainted with it" (SW, I, p. 463). See also p. 435: "I want only to recall tomemory what anyone who has taken even one good look into himself musthave found long ago." This tendency is especially prominent in earlier textswhere, under the influence of Reinhold, Fichte emphasizes that the first principle of philosophy, the principle of the self-positing subject, must be immediately obvious. Notice, though, that even here Fichte does not claim that thefact that intellectual intuition belongs to every state of consciousness can beknown without a philosophical theory. I emphasize the latter aspect ofFichte's position, because it seems more interesting than the claim that arguing for the theory of self-positing is simply a matter of'inspecting "the facts ofconsciousness."

35. That this is indeed Fichte's position is made quite clear by a number of passages, including the one cited above (p. 76), as well as SW, I, p. 463: " ... thisintellectual intuition occurs in every moment of consciousness."


ofpassages from both the first and second introductions he impliesthat a simple inspection of ordinary consciousness is sufficient toconvince anyone of the reality of intellectual intuition: "No doubtit is possible, within the experience admitted by everyone, to demonstrate that this intellectual intuition occurs in every moment ofconsciousness."36 I believe that Jlichte i~bes~!?-derstoo<iJ~<;re~

Il?€~?i11.g,tQ,~!._~h~ exis ~t?!l~~__2fj~!~~l~~-!~al j~!!:11!iQ;~.J~". deIr!0ns tra.:ble not because _it,. ~~!1_~j~P.~y_~J~~,,~fQ7g!1g ....~~within ..J..he...J~XP..eli~'!QI!?:i tted by __~y-~r.Y~I!~/~ . .PE!_.E~~~~r beca~.~.~.,~h.~._ ~,~.~~,!!!,I?!i.2!!-L.£[..it~existence in every instance of C9tl:~~~9~~Q~§~,.h.~JR.~..t.Q...ill~k~_§,.~~2_~~!i.~_~~_~~,-P.~,~,~<?~~~~~ that. is. "e- .P~~t._Qf_~y.~!)!.9n~~§. ..~~R~rie!1~_.The phenomenon of ordinary experience to be explained by thehypothesis of self-positing is, I shall claim, that of reflective selfcopsci01d!:g.!::~~_.

On this view, one of Fichte's reasons for espousing the theory ofthe self-positing subject rests upon the claim that the unique features of explicit self-consciousness require the assumption of animplicit, immediate self-awareness as a constitutive part of all conscious states. The characteristics of reflective self-consciousnessthat are relevant here are what we might call its immediacy anduniversality. The latter feature consists in the fact that reflectiveself-consciousness is always a possibility for a subject and can bebrought about whenever the subject chooses to make its ownthinking the object of its attention. The immediate nature oj

reflective self-consciousness is best exhibited by considering thenature of the transition from a state ofobjective consciousness ("]perceive the wall") to an explicitly self-conscious one ("I t's I whram perceiving the wall"). Although the second state clearly differ:from the first in terms of its content, the move from the former t<the latter does not proceed via an inference nor on the basis 0

some further intuition concerning myself as subject. This fact suggests that no new content of knowledge is acquired in the seconrinstance but that what occurs in reflective self-consciousness is :transformation of my immediate and implicit self-awareness intia kind ofknowledge about myself that has the form of an objectiv[udgment: "It was I [i.e., this self-identical subject] who waperceiving the wall."37

36. SW, I, p. 463.37. Sartre understands reflective self-consciousness as arising from a "consul

ing" and "reconstituting" of the "nonthetic memories" left behind by OUf

everpresent prereflective self-awareness (1957, p. 46).

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 89Although this argument does lend a certain degree of'plausibil

ity to Fichte's position, it is clearly not the only justification towhich he appeals in support of his view, for these phenomenological considerations are reinforced in Fichte's texts by a second,transcendental line of argumentation. Central to this second argument is a claim that, although cited earlier, has thus far remainedunexplicated. As we have seen, in cataloguing the components ofawareness that make up all representational states, Fichte saysthat intellectual intuition is a "necessary component by means ofwhich consciousness first becomes possible. "3

8 Other statements are'made repeatedly throughout Fichte's texts that unambiguouslyclaim that the subject's self-positing "makes possible" consciousness in genera1.39 Statements such as these make it clear that,following in the tradition of Critical Philosophy, Fichte believeshis theory of the self-positing subject to be supported by a kind oftranscendental argument in addition to the phenomenologicalargument already considered. In other words, Fichte's view is thatphilosophy can do more than verify his conception of the subjectphenomenologically; it can also show how this structure of subjectivity is necessary in the-sense that, without it, consciousness itselfwould not be possible!'!?' Ficbte's gmeral G1..~im,~.!~!kwjllJ)~that

tl:!~intell~g;!1111i!!!!Iiti2!Lm:_~§~J:.i.f!.,~v.el:Y. l:;2~~f~q!:!.§..~_t!.te C.Qn~ tit!!tes..Ql).~_QfJ:l!~Jl~s:~_~sa!:Y_.c.Q!!4i.~~9n~" f9.r" .!h~..Y~!Y_ p().s~!1:lilitY.9fconsciousness. And, since intellectual intuition is for Fichte a kindofsJr:awa~er:;ess, it is easy to see that his position must be relatedin some general way to Kant's argument that self-consciousness isa necessary condition for the possibility of experience. It is a farmore difficult task, however, to figure out, on the one hand, exactly what role Fichte believed the subject's self-positing to play in

f the constitution of experience and, on the other, to determine theprecise relation of this claim to Kant's arguments concerning thenecessary conditions for the possibility of experience.

Perhaps the best way of finding answers to these questions is tofocus first on the issue of the relationship of Fichte's transcenden-

e tal argument to Kant's. Although Fichte nowhere provides a verys explicit answer to this crucial question, it should be possible to

38. SW, I, p. 473, my emphasis.39, See, e.g., SW, I, pp. 91, 459, 462, 466, 521. Also GA, IV,2, p. 31.40, This is an important respect in which Fichte's account of self-consciousness

t- differs from Sartre's, for the latter does not make the transcendental claim'8 that prereflective self-awareness is a necessary condition for the possibility of

consciousness.

go FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY

reconstruct the logic behind his position by taking a closer look athis references to Kant and at those passages of the first Critique towhich he appeals for support. Of particular importance to this .reconstructive enterprise is a rather long passage from the "Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre" in which Fichte explicitly locates the roots of his own doctrine of intellectual intuition inKant's theory of pure apperception. Included here is Fichte'ssignificant remark that "the intellectual intuition of which theWissenschaftslehre speaks ... is not given a name by Kant, unless, ifyou will, by the expression 'pure apperception'. "4

1 The remainderof this passage makes it quite clear that lti~~te regarqs his owng<?~!!iQ.~ n2!..~!llL~~co~siste~~_wi!h ~ant's, but~~n e~'!!.!!:.~!al Eart ofit<flS wel~ ..That is, the theory of the self-positing subject is claimedto be already contained within the account of the subject given by I

Kant in the Critique ofPure Reason.Unfortunately, Fichte does not distinguish very carefully between

two distinct ways in which his position might be regarded as anessential part of Kant's own. In some places he seems to take theview that the theory of the self-positing subject is already, developed by Kant himself and can be shown to be present in Kant'stexts, even if it is couched in terms somewhat different from hisown. He says at one point, for example, that "in Kant we find avery precise concept of the pure I, which is exactly the same asthe one asserted by the Wissenschaftslehre. "42 Moreover, much ofFichte's actual treatment of those Kantian texts to which heappeals seems to imply this understanding of his relationship tohis predecessor.43 Qg~thi~-Y.L%_ttt_~~E,2.ctrine 9.f t~~self:Qg§iting

•.~l:!:.~j ~~c!~~!~"'L~!.~.plY.~!l):~~9.!:!!_~Q~~gfit cq!:rect ~11.t.!!P'!etation of Kat?-t 's~~arriving at it requires only a proper understanding ofKant's doctrines; not a genuine development of them. At othertimes, however, Fichte suggests that his relationship to Kant issomewhat more complex. The implicit claim here is that his conception of subjectivity actually adds something to Kant's in thesense that it is a necessary implication of Kant's position, though notone that Kant himself recognized. Q.l}.,,!pis in~retationJ the factthat Kant never actu~!!Y~~I?o~se~_~_J:!_~~pl~ci~!L~ichtea~ charac..

41. SW, I, p. 472. The entire passage in question is found on pp. 471-7.42. SW, I, p. 476.43. See, e.g., his remark at SW, I, p. 476: "We shall not merely reason ifolgern)

here, but will cite Kant's own words. H

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 9 I

terization of the subl~t i~Aue .!1~U.Q._<!_~.1.!.tl.~!!tnt!y'c::..disagre~Il!entb1ween .tb..Q.tw:o aC.QQ!1J].ts.J:}!!t.!.SUh~Lto ~J!!lt~~J.1!:,il!1..!~ to_g!1!-.§}l thefUll-imp-li<;i!ti2n~QfbitLQWl!mQ§.tflJP.-.Q!U!feQt~l.Yi~w§j)nJ1!~subiective conditio.ns.x~q!!h:<!gJ9!Jh~possibiU!y. ofJ::2ffierience.

It is worth noting here that Fichte's claim to be articulating anessentially Kantian conception of the subject possesses a significance that extends well beyond our immediate goal of understanding Fichte's view. For the way in which Fichte understands anduses Kant is of great relevance to the larger historical questionconcerning the relationship between Kant's Critical Philosophyand the philosophical movement that succeeded it, nineteenthcentury Idealism. ~U~!1.!.~))~E~j§,J.geeJ!Sm'~.cl1:":!~,.£~E!!!Ltgj~_QW!!_~~Jf~~Q.Q<;l;fpli9J!,.JQJ2~..pr.iI!U\.:dly: ..~,.dey.clQpment.immaw1tLto~!!til}-11l?~i]g1l2P.hY"Q!l~tf.1at !-!irl1~b.!19t,J\t r,~RM9j~!.~,lieJtt,JIY! t9g!~rtq,Jl,tl,d~th~r~l?YsQn:mt~ty~th~..9Jiti£l;}Lp"!.9ject. Since a largepart of both Schelling's and Hegel's conceptions of the task ofIdealism are derived from Fichte's own appropriation ofKant, thequestion as to the precise nature of the link between Kant andFichte is of no little significance to making sense of Idealism'sclaim to be carrying on the Critical enterprise. Especially relevanthere are those aspects of Idealism that purport to be motivatedprimarily by the need to work out the implications of Kant's ownarguments concerning the nature of self-consciousness and theimportance of the subject's self-relation for the constitution ofexperience.44 Hence, it is important for our understanding ofFichte's theory, and for any attempt to assess the degree of continuity between Kant and his successors, that an answer be foundto the question ofwhy Fichte thought that his theory of the subjectconstituted an essential part of Kant's own position. Yet, as weshall see, specifying the nature of this relation turns out to be atask of considerable difficulty.

As a first step toward settling this issue, it is necessary to remindourselves of an obvious, and crucial, difference between Fichte'stheory of self-positing and the view of self-consciousness that isgenerally attributed to Kant. As we have seen, this difference doesnot lie in Fichte's assertion that self-awareness is to be understood

44. Pippin (1989) provides a sustained interpretation of Hegel that attempts tofollow up precisely this connection. That is, Pippin tries to understandHegel's thought as a project that consists primarily in drawing out the implications of some of Kant's basic positions, including, most centrally, the doctrine of apperception.


as a kind of intellectual intuition, since, as he himself points out,the characteristics he attributes to intellectual intuition are essentially consistent with those ascribed by Kant to the "I think."Rather, thcimI2Qrtant di~e.!.~!!£~...~esiQ~~ in Fichte'~~.~laim that this\~~n.~~t.!J~l..ip.t!!!!iQ~=¥tllU!!pJ~f!~~,J~:~~;r:~,n~~~_Qfltself - is a consti1!!!iv~__lL~t.2f~~e~ry .....~!.~~"..QJ...£,qQ!~tQ~§~~~_~ As is well known,Kant's explicit position, as it is laid out in the transcendentaldeduction of the Critique's second edition, is that, although selfconsciousness must always be a possibility for the conscious sub-ject, it is not for that reason always actual: "The, 'I think' must[only] be able to accompany all of my representations. "45

The key to assessing the extent to which Fichte's position isgenuinely Kantian lies, I believe, in understanding the reasons forFichte's apparent divergence from Kant on .this fundamental 'issue. How is it that Fichte, without much comment, comes toespouse a view that, at first glance anyway, is so obviously at oddswith Kant's own? Ifwe return to the problem ofself-consciousnesswith which the present interpretation began, we find that thisdistinctive position of Fichte's is already implicit in his formulation of that problem. It will be recalled that the specter of an infin- I

ite regress arose for Fichte as a result of two assumptions inherited Ifrom Reinhold: first, that every representation is related in consciousness to the subject and, second, that all consciousness conforms II

to the subject-object structure characteristic of representation.Hence, il~9l:!~~,,~~!!!Jh_~tn!h~._Y.~lY.M~~y_Jl!_whj£.Q.Fi~.bt~~""Rroblem I

i§...fe!:!!12:!!~!~s:L ..~~~!!!!l~~_ ..E~.!h.~! ..!l~~~!!.,~~r.gy.~§",.fQ.t_.Jp.~~gtion that a I

ki,E9 qr.~~!f~=~~.~E~~~_~~~_jljn.YQly~~lj.tl-e.Y~r:y-cQns~~~a t~Since I

the source of this assumption is easily identified as Reinhold's Itheory of representation, it is tempting to conclude that Fichte's Idivergence from Kant on this issue is to be attributed to a careless I'

misunderstanding of Kant's position that was widely shared byhis immediate successors. This conclusion, however, is untenable, I

for there exists clear evidence that Fichte was fully aware oflKant's weaker claim that the "1 think" must only be able to accom-.pany all ofa subject's representations. In Fichte's attempt to drawlan explicit connection between the theory of self-positing andKant's doctrine of pure apperception he quotes this very claim o~

Kant's: "What is the condition of the original unity of appercep-1

45. "Das: Ick denke, muf alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten konnen, H KRV, BI3I'11Kant's emphasis.

I

I

I

I

I

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 93tion? According to §I 6 [of the Critique 0/Pure Reason] it is thefollowing: 'that my representations can be accompanied by the: Ithink.' "46 Fichte's citation of Kant, and especially his emphasis ofthe decisive word konnen, effectivelyrule out the possibility that thebasis for Fichte's position is simply a careless reading of Kant. Buthow, then, might Fichte have arrived at his claim that every state ofconsciousness involves an element of immediate self-awareness?

In the following paragraphs I shall try to answer this questionby examining the way in which Fichte attempts to use the arguments of the transcendental deduction to provide his own theorywith a transcendental grounding. That is, I shall attempt touncover whatever Critical arguments there might be in Fichte'stexts for his claim that an intellectual intuition necessarily accompanies every conscious state. Before turning to the details of thosetexts, however, it may be helpful to sketch out the general natureof Fichte's argument: Much Qf wh~...LK!illt_~l!,.Y1L~bQY.LJht~_~~ItI:!i..!l~~j!1cl!!dil1g_his_as~rtiQ..ll that it is oRlY-iLne..c.essar.y_fto.s.sih.iliry,utJQ.1:>~.YndIT§j:OQ.!i..\l§ ..rcl:erdJ!g...!Q_tb_t;,.~~P.IWL1!Il{;;!:ipJ:kLILQ[.Q!lfi 'S

r/;!PE()se!1.t~!.~Q!l'!l..!1als;.Ll.!LQl151.[,elf ~t ...takes p'lace.Jn.L~flect!.ves~f:.£QD.§.ciousQ...!~mh..But this aspect of Kant's position must not beregarded as exhausting his account of self-consciousness. Rather,th!tJQgiG.gf.JS.J!nl'§..:rtQ§.iYQn.'<:;Qmmi,.t§..him)~w ...}:Y~tUR.~ ..r~~QgnHiQ.Q.Qf.tIJ~ sltpjef{~imm~gjf!!~=rela ti,Qn..JQjt!!.!flf h;u4L2filL12Q!1§'£!2l!§s.tates._and~themm:uQ....iLPOsi tiQ!!s_~rY.....IDuclLlik~J!l~u:»eorY-!lfs~RQ~iting. Moreover (Fichte sometimes claims), not only isKant logically committed to such a theory, but its basic tenets caneven be found articulated in his texts, alongside the better knowndoctrine of the "I think" referred to above. (Recall here Fichte'sassertion that Kant's notion of the pure 1 "is exactly the same asthe one asserted by the Wissenschqftslehre.")

Fichte's attempt to portray the subject's immediate self-awarenessin all of its conscious states as a necessary condition for the possibility of consciousness takes the form of an exposition with commentary of Kant's own argument in the transcendental deductionconcerning the necessary features of subjectivity. The implicitpoint of such a procedure, of course, is to show that Kant's ownview of the I, if correctly understood, turns out to be identical tothe notion of the self-positing subject. Fichte begins his account ofthe transcendental deduction by rehearsing Kant's point that the

46. SW, I, p. 475, Fichte's emphasis.


"original unity ofapperception" constitutes the fundamental condition for the possibility of any consciousness whatsoever. He thenasks what the condition of this unity of apperception itselfis. §.i!!,,~~

Fj~ht~_~!p!Lq~JY~~~.q!!.~t~~.. ~~~p:~J~y .9f ~pp"~r~~.PJJQ!!.~,.wjJ!l.. w~Jg ~};)J~lY-2f~q!!~.£!9_!!~l}~~§.~',~c:~~~hic~ ..questionhere ~~~!.1?~.llI,l.q~r.~.tQQ£.y~~~~§..~JJ:!g _'YE~.t-~~~g~!igl!q~~s t hold if consciousness js "t_q.J?Q~§<N~~§~,,!h.~~l.!!Q.~t

e~E?-~?~.~!)T_unity it requires, namely.that alt9fjt$_X~:Rr~$.J~I!!J!&i.Q,:Q.s

R.~!<?.ng.._t()." QQ,,~r_~.Qn.§~i<;L~ess~In response to this question Fichteinvokes Kant's doctrine of the "I think": This most basic unityof consciousness is possible only on the condition that all of myrepresentations be recognizable as belonging to a single, selfidentical subject of consciousness - in other words, that they all beaccompaniable by the "I think." Fichte then goes on to ask whatkind of a subject this doctrine of the "I think" requires:

Which "1" is being spoken of here? That, perchance, which theKantians blithely piece together from a manifold of representations, in none of which it was contained individually, though it ispresent in all of them together; so that the above-cited words ofKant would mean this: I, who think D, am the same I who thoughtC and B and A, and only through the thinking of my manifoldthinking do I become an I for myself, namely that which is identicalin the manifold? In that case Kant would be just as much a miserable babbler as the said Kantians; for then, according to him, thepossibility of all thinking would be conditioned by another thinking, and by the thinking of this thinking, and I should like to knowhow we are ever to arrive at any thinking whatsoever!"

Beneath the polemical tone of this passage lies a philosophicalpoint that we must now try to understand. In its most generalform Fichte's point can be characterized as the claim that, fromKant's perspective, and in contrast to the view of the majority ofso-called Kantians, ~he I ..!!ll.!~.£_1:!!1derst02-9......as ..~ore than e_mnstr.YJ~.t.,_!h~.£9nftcioq~!!~.§§_.Qf..~Which_ ..~_J!!~!g~§ __Q!11Y..~Jl..fler actualexpeJi.~Dt;~_~ng, ..tll~t.£Q!1.~~§J§ r j!t..~tt..~,~~~!!:~~~~..2f.l~~~ subj~ssimply "tb:~t.w.bJ~1)..is.id~Qli~.~tj!t.ili~N~,if91.g./' It is important tonote straightaway that Fichte does not reject this characterizationof the I. On the contrary, it is precisely this - the identity of thesubject with respect to its diverse representations - that we areaware of in reflective self-consciousness. Fichte's lloipt must be:~her2...!:hat this aC£2unJ.2f~the _~_~!!.llQt ~e tak~~U~llQ!.~ oi

47. SW, I) pp. 475-6..' 48. SW, I, p. 475.

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 95l<,ant's theo~f t~e sub~ct, and the reason given for this in thepassage cited here is that such ~ ~~nception o~th~ subject ~s insufficient to account for "the possibility of all thinking," or, motherwords, the possibility of consciousness. But what does thisaccount of the I as "that which is identical in the manifold" leaveout, thereby rendering the possibility of consciousness inexplicable? A clue to what Fichte thinks is omitted here is provided by hisnext statement, a citation of Kant's claim that the "I think" is anact of spontaneity rather than something that is given to or foundwithin inner sense. Thus, t~_e.,".~~~.g_f!.h~J.~.§..~!!!E!y-!:_hesubjectL~e

cOJ.E~~.t~QLthel!!2LtY",2flh~1E~111fQ!.ci_QL«;xp.<e!'imf.~_9l1lits ~£r.Y.(~ialcgp1PQD~nLQ[K.;;tl1_fIL.tb~Qr~,J!ffQ.n:li.ng_tQ_W'hj..£b_th~..§JJpj.f<ft,hulot.m~I.~ly,~J~,~P.IOc!1t<;LQf.,th~_JJI1jlX"Qf.~9ll,S,.~i9J!S,ll~s,§ ...Qut..,!l"§,p.Q.n!,~n.~QY§"JH';Jiyit~_~~ w~11,...Furthermore, t~~~spontan~ity~f the .Li.~..essenJial-1.Q_K'!.nt'tllt~9Ly,iQ.Liti§....1hi§ ..{1,,!;;.thdJ.y_tb.a..t.is_iILSJ>.IDe...l\:,a:y__respol1llible~fm:JM;;tllClllyb.ringi1JgqbQul.th<; ..<;;Q!1gWQn§Q.(Jl!).i!y'jJl?.Qp.wbl<jIHthe.p.Qs,~jbi1itYTgLc9);t&.gQ.lJ..alle.s._s.-d~pen.ds. The account of

.the subject as merely "that which is identical in the manifold" turnsthe I into something that is conditioned by the very thing it (thesubject) is supposed to be the condition of. T~asic _ldni.!X,ofc@~,C.!Q!!~!!~~ t@J_ma.k!<~it.p.Q.§.~!.bl<; fcU:Jhe .mQi.!<.!:!J tQ recQguizeJ.!;s.QWn..s,elf=..idelLtit):'.Jb.LQygb.QJJLgiYfrJt~.rePIe~!<.ll.ti!tiQIJ111~li!!~§j§~IJQ.t

@n~ly_g,iY,!i.!LinJ5,!.t!l(~"yieyv;,~ti"s,jJJ:9..rjtl£e..4,!lx.,. the,"~x.!U.h!:tjs.2£.thi!y.

.ofJlI.!:llJ!.l:?jecU,1&~lf. Thus, the I is not merely encountered withinconsciousness; it is what actually unites its representations withone another, thereby establishing the fundamental unity of consciousness upon which the awareness of the identity of the subjectof thought depends.

Thus far there is nothing problematic about Fichte's construalof Kant's doctrines, including his point that something more mustbe said about thesubject in order to account for the possibility ofconsciousness in general. What we have not yet understood, however, is why that "something else" must be filled in by Fichte'sown conception of the subject, including the view that an elementofself-awareness belongs to every representational state. Immediately after the passage discussed earlier, Fichte cites and comments on a statement of Kant's that he clearly regards as supportfor this view:

"I call [the 'I think'] pure apperception ... because it is thatself-consciousness which, in bringing forth the representation 'Ithink' (which must be able to accompany all other representations

96 FIOHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY

and which is one and the same in all consciousness), cannot itself beaccompanied by any other representation." Here the nature of pureself-consciousness is described. Itis the sarnein all consciousness.t"

Fichte's singling out of Kant's statement that pure apperception is"one and the same in all consciousness" is obviously intended toconvince us that Kant himself held something like Fichte's viewthat a kind of self-awareness accompanied all states of consciousness. But merely citing an isolated remark of Kant's - one that,after all, is capable of supporting other interpretations as well fails to tell us why Fichte might have believed his view to benecessary for Kant's doctrine, especially when in so many otherplaces Kant explicitly insists that self-consciousness must alwaysbe only a necessary possibility. Therefore, we are still left with thecrucial question: Why must an account of the conditions of thepossibility of consciousness include the assumption of a subjectwith an immediate self-awareness in each state of consciousness?

In this and other passages Fichte frequently associates the prin...ciple of self-positing with "the identity of consciousness, H suggesting that this activity of the subject is supposed to play somecrucial role in securing the unity of the 1.50 Unfortunately, it isextremely difficult to flesh out the details of this still very generalclaim. The most natural way of understanding Fichte's position isto take him' to be claiming that the unity ofconsciousness is possibleonly on the assumption ofa subject that stands in some relation toall of its representations. The strategy of this argument would be !to identify this necessary relation with the self-awareness that !Fichte characterizes as self-positing, or intellectual intuition. !Hence, the latter would be understood as the subjective activity!that establishes the unity among representations required for the I

I

49. SW, I, P: 476. The citation of Kant comes from KRV, BI32. Not only does IKant say here that self-consciousness is the same "in all consciousness," but!he also seems to distinguish pure apperception from the awareness of the "I Ithink" when he says that the former is that self-consciousness which generates, !or "brings forth" (hervorhringt), the "I think." It is possible that this formula-Ition also played a role in leading Fichte to think that Kant postulated an!original, pure species of self-consciousness in addition to the explicit ascrip-.tion of representational states to oneself. This suggestion is supported bylFichte's emphasis in the same passage of the distinction between "pure apper-!ception" (i.e., self-positing) and "empirical" apperception, which he associ-,ates with the awareness of the I as "that which is identical in the manifold."!

50. The other passages referred to include Section I of WL 1794, where self,positing is characterized as "I = r' (SW, I, p. 94; see also p. 107). !

I

I

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 97possibility of consciousness. This interpretation, however, raises aperplexing question: How could such a position be regarded as anessential part of Kant's own account of the apperceptive subject?

If there is a basis in the first Critique for such an understandingof the conditions of the unity of consciousness, then P~'~.I~s it i~

tQr1J~JQ1!.1ls,linJS.!Ult~fll!:im,(l,tJJ;h33Lt4!!Uh~.:~~Y..1i~:,l!nit.y_Qf.a.pp.~r<;~PtiQP ~.w.j!r~~ll~~Qf th~.1tni ty,..QL. ideA.tity.,~".QLc.Qn

~~c.iillJ.sn~ss"-is.. its~JIPQl!.csiblC,9Jl1y':,QJLth~.hy-'p~Qtk~js.~oiJ!Qme.,px:i9r,

"9riginer'sYf!tht:sJs,t.ha,1.a,.<:tm~nx,,~:!:t~kli~he-tt4~sQ..llJl~i~~!JDQugr~pres.~U~!l:tj.Q»JL~t\g ..m'!J5.v~sth~ .../l,nl\1:yJj.p.!lnity"Qbp.pe.r.c~ptiOD,PQSsil?lcyIn other words, Kant's doctrine of original synthesis attributes to the subject an active role in producing the conditions of theunity of consciousness, conditions that make possible the subject'sability to become aware of its identity throughout its manifoldrepresentations. Furthermore, Kant himself points out that all ofmy representations, not merely those with respect to which Ibecome explicitly self-conscious, must be subject to this originalsynthesis, for otherwise they would not all belong to my consciousness and would "be nothing to me."

Thus, the theory of the self-positing subject might be understood as an attempt to specify the nature of this original syntheticactivity." It is obvious that the self-ascription of conscious statesthrough the "I think" cannot itself be what establishes the unityamong all of my representations, since, on Kant's own account,the "I think" is not always actual that is, not every representation is, in fact, accompanied by an explicit "I think." In otherwords, the unity of consciousness does not first come about whenI reflectively attach the "I think" to a representation; rather, thatunity must already exist in some sense before the act of explicitself-ascription can be carried out. From this consideration Fichteseems to conclude that ECpresentall(ms" caIl~,e~(),!llYJ~~.l't ..9L~~i!i.~.~s.2.~~Si~~~E~s..~_2~Y_tIl'§'2f~L~~.S;i!£h.Qlle~.~~JJ!!iJ~Jnw J!4ind~f.r~l<lti()l1t<:>th~.s.1l1Jj~C::1,{)r<t~~,renes~l.<,ip,d i!jsp!t:g!.~~!y.lh~,§ .r~!~tiQ!!that.the!1QtiQD. Qfi:nt~ll.e.£~lJ.~J intuiti2r}~,~~a.:r,t.l.9~E~Eture. Thus,Fichte's theory of self-positing can be seen as an attempt to give anaccount of the subjective conditions that must hold in order thatall of a subject's representations can belong to a single consciousness. The activity of self-positing, then, would play the unifying

5I. This account of'Fichtc's position is based, very roughly, on the interpretationput forth by Benson (r974, Chap. 3).

98 FICHTE'S THEORY OF 8UBJECTIVITY

role attributed by Kant to original synthesis and would consist ina kind of relation between subject and representation, a relationunderstood by Fichte to be consciousness's immediate, prereflective awareness of itself as the subject of its conscious states. Onthis view, the "I think," as an explicit recognition of my selfidentity in the face of diverse representations (or what I haveearlier called "reflective self-consciousness") must always be possible with respect to each of my representations. But, Fichte wouldadd, this "necessary possibility" of reflective self-consciousnessitself depends upon the unity among my representations thatintellectual intuition in each case establishes.

Although, as I have indicated, Fichte sometimes seems toregard his account of intellectual intuition as implied by Kant'sposition in the direct manner sketched above, this view is beset bya serious problem: A-ft recol}struc~Qfl ......l:l~r~, ..~.!h~jJ!Slifica.tiQ.nJ.orFlchte~§_._RQ~i~JQ1!_ .Q~R~Aq~- "lJ.P.q~_ J!~ .._f@~m J·&~_l>_~_._~!L~lt§~ t~~h.jfperb~.R~ __in1Plicit,_~.Q~P9~~l}t Qf_K~!!J~~_ s:l.Q_~tr.in~..in the transcen4.e!!~~1 deduction, yet this ~J~lr:rtf_~l1..be..~J~QWl)..J.9.J~~t1!PJm~~i-Jl!J~:·lTIisundersta:nding ..,QfJh~.J:l.e.d.u.C1j.Qn:~ ....~tmtegy. The import ofKant's crucial claim that the analytic unity of apperception necessarily presupposes a more fundamental synthetic unity of themanifold is not to suggest that the subject must therefore stand insome original relation to each of its representations that precedesits ability to recognize them as its own through an explicit attach...ing of the "I think." Kant's conclusion, rather, is that the unity ofapperception is itself possible only on the presupposition that acondition of synthesis exists among the subject's representationsthemselves - or, more precisely, that those re.presentations aresynthesized in accord with rules that Kant identifies later in thededuction as the categories of the understanding. The point of

)(' KAnt's argum~!1t he:r:~._.!$_tQ.~~~~_!lL~_§M"Pj~i.t!,?l~JADiJJ:,..QLjslenti.!YLthat is iIl:Y91v~~:tj!l-~~!f-:~Q,!?:§.9.!Q!!~!1~§§,.j~L-P.9r~<~iPl~.,.Q111~,QU~ theP~llRI?Q§ili9~l.l2J..e_kLl1.Q~i~Q/Ji~£tiv~_u.ni t:>::,-The.eonditi.on~-I.~fe:rr..ed\0_9Y .~~~,!.2 ..E!!.sL~r-~_1E_s.1},.,qlLr¥~I?t~~~>~nt~!!.9l!~J!l.lJ§.t,~t~D.d.,if d~e.)! are!2-~~_~'4~l}.!t~~H'~!.th~EMn~~.§.i,EgJ~_.£9~~f!.9.1t$P.~~-~,,~tllJI!~~QYt~..JQ,..D.e. ar~eJiQQ..~l>_~t)y~~!Lth~§ltt>J.~",~t.f,tlJ5iJ:~~flt of i ts r~llf~~~n!AtiQiii1im..aDactivi~y_ ~f~~x.!?:!h~~~~~.,,1h~~!..~~!&!2!i~b~~~..Q.m ..~£liY_~$;911n~ionS-aOlQngthe,..s_u.bj~Cl:~tr.e.p.r.eq&~nl~tiQu§~lh~.!!1rlcly~s.52

52. That Fichte may have actually misunderstood Kant in this way is suggestedby the fact that his discussion of the conditions of the unity of consciousness

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 99What we must conclude from all of this is that Fichte's claim that

intellectual intuition necessarily accompanies every representational state cannot be justified simply by pointing to Kant's arguments in the transcendental deduction. If there is a transcendental grounding for this view, it must be supplied by Fichte himself.What looks most like an argument for this position is formulatedby Fichte in a single statement located several pages before thetreatment of apperception referred to previously. There Fichte saysthat sensible intuition "is possible only in combination with intellectual intuition, since everything that is to become my representation must be related to me" (presumably through intellectualintuition).53 On a first reading this claim seems plausible enough,but it quickly loses its initial intuitive force when we recall thatKant gave an alternative account of the conditions that must holdfor a representation to be "my own," one that does not require eachof'my representations to be related to me in the Fichtean manner:In order for representations to count as mine, I must be able (reflectively) to recognize them as belonging to a single unitary consciousness. VVha_tE!a1<~sJhi~ (;()JlgiJiQ}}J)()lllliJJ.le fQ}:K~111.1s..J.!QLl.J,!L

ori.gJ!.!~J~i~l!!r.rl£9.ia te.<:i!yarell~§s ()f.~<lSh()f,th~l1)..!'t~mYQrYJ1,J~11J;J;.Q~

joininKt()g~ther of Jh~se.Ft:Ptesentati()"nll.i!l tl~cor.9.1IY.~H~..th~_f~~t?:g2.!i~~ I..e,.~ynth~sis that e§.~a.bU§he!t,th~,.mjJlim;ll.g!<g.r~,Q[!<Qnn.t;J:JeQ!J.ess among the cont,~msgf~IrlP~r.i£f!L~Q.l}§£!.Q.1.!,~!l~'§l'££lgired iprt!?-~~ie.~~s re~()g~Lti(.m,~fits g,Wl). identity,.WhaLwQ.uld,beneeded,then, to conyjnce us th.1l.LFjj;hte'iLllQsitiQn.is a gi:..llJJine extensiQnofJh~J~.imti~J1Yi.f.w is an inQ~gen<ie!lt argurn~nt~s.Qq.~C'!~.

~1l1J;l.~~j.§ -; 2~E~P,~I(~~.¥.;;~t~t:!,QllS",tf[~~le.~L~~};;"",9!!p~~~lb!ts.clfiu-s.ufficient. ro.accountfor .thftpo§si9jlit:Y,ct;;l~~~Jf;~;@§~!~gsn¥ss: Butif there is such an argument to be found in Fichte's texts, it is adeeply buried one indeed. In what follows I shall point out twoshort passages that hint at something like the desired argumentand then make some brief and tentative suggestions as to howthese remarks might be understood.

The first of these passages appears in a footnote to the passagecited earlier in which Eichte discusses apperception and Kant'saccount of the conditions of experience:

at SW, I, pp. 4:75-7, completely ignores the crucial role that the synthesis ofrepresentations according to the categories plays for Kant in ensuring theobjective unity (among representations) required for the analytic unity ofapperception.

53. SW, I, p. 464.


Through the joining together of various representations therewould emerge only a manifold thinking (ein mannigfaltiges Denken ), asone thinking in general, but by no means would there emerge something that thinks (ein Denkendes) within this manifold thinking.v'

Here Fichte does appear to be claiming that the establishment ofobjective connections among one's representations in accord withthe categories ("the joining together of various representations")is itself insufficient to explain the possibility of self-consciousness.What is both interesting and puzzling about this passage is thatwhereas he admits that the synthesis effected by the categories iscapable of yielding a unity of consciousness ("one thinking"), hedenies that this unity alone constitutes a sufficient condition forself...consciousness. What this merely objective synthesis cannotaccount for, we are told, is the awareness of a thinker of thoserepresentations (ein Denkendes [.

A similar line of thought is expressed in the paragraph to whichthe footnote just cited is appended. Although we have quoted thispassage once before, let us recall a portion of it, this time with therelevant points given special emphasis:

Which "I" is being spoken of here? That, perchance, which theKantians blithely piece together from a manifold of representa...tions, in none qfwhich it wascontained individually, though it is present inall of them together; so that the above-cited words of Kant wouldmean this: I, who think D, am the same I who thought C and BandA, and only through the thinking ofmy manifold thinking do I become an Ifor myself, namely that which is identical in the manifoldrw

Fichte's objection to the conception of the 1 as merely "that whichis identical in the manifold" is that it is committed to the (absurd)view that "I become an I for myself" only in retrospect, that is,only through "thinking" (we would say "reflecting on") previousinstances of thinking. On this view, it is only through this thinkingor reflecting that I come to recognize that "I, who think D, am thesame I who thought C and B' and AI" But h9W.~£1;t]. i!..h~,.,.Fichte

54. SW, I, p. 476n.: "So wiirde durch das Zusammenfassen dieser mehreren Vorstellungen doch nur ein mannigfaltiges Denken, als Ein Denken uherhauptJ

keineswegs aber ein Denkendes in diesem mannigfaltigen Denken herauskommen' (Fichte's emphasis).

55. SW, I, p. 475·


sk!41hf\tth!'dJ)~fol1}~Qr~§~I1.Lt.Qjt.~elf~Jl~!l~ts rellresent!UiQnsk~p tQgethe:r,ifjli~D,Qt~QlJJf!,J!1!<.djn i!J!~Jl!1.e._Q.nMm ipdjyid-

~? Is it plausible to conceive of the I as appearing for the firstime in reflective self-consciousness without it already being presnt in some form in the individual representational states that areeflected upon?

Fichte's remarks in these two passages seem to rest upon theclaim that there is more to the phenomenon of reflective selfconsciousness than can be accounted for by the synthesis of representations according to the categories. Thus, it mu.!t..QQ.XJ.£hte's.v~a~~elf-consciou~nes~.i~'yolyesI!!.0re. t~~~:LtJ.!~ a"Y~!.~,!H~_~.!? ofa !!lli!YJ1IDQ!!K!h~ ..E~R~~.~S.J2t~1~211_~. ~L<::.2!l;.~Si2.t,l,~J?:~~~I"E!,9.~E.,,!h~..simplY..~IL<:l.W:!!I<';;J!e~~Qf the .mrrne!i.c~lj4.(}nUty ()f~QUlHik!.Ym~S

(i&h,fJ,J! ::l,w!!renes~ Qfthe.f~ctthlJ,t ~UQfmy..x~lu:~~.ntatio.n.a~c.om.1i-

tuJfu!,,§iUg!e.thin1<.iJ;tg). In addition, self-consciousness is said toinclude an awareness of the subject assubject, tbat is, as "a thinking something." Another way of putting this would be to say thatbeing conscious of myself as the single thinker of A, B, C, and Dinvolves more than recognizing that A through D exist togetherwithin a single consciousness; it also involves an awareness oftheir being (or having been) represented, or present for a subject.Self-<::Q!!§fiq!!~es~~£!1_~1!!.<iJ!1cludel.!l.one of its elements ana:w.ar..enes£JlLt1Le..lUlbj.e.Cj;~~.su.bj§iiti'QiV!.::::: ..thilt...i.s,.all.~ilJ.1<~.ofitsMJLiug. of L<;':Rr.~~t';,w;.aJm"_QLi~J?,,ng9ing.J:tGtiyi1Y. of re~~g.Thus, Fichte's implicit claim would be that this aspect of selfconsciousness is not derivable from any merely objective featuresof consciousness, including the synthetic connections that necessarily hold among a subject's representations. Moreover, it is precisely this defect that Fichte apparently thinks can be remedied byhis hypothesis of intellectual intuition: The explicit, reflective consciousness of myself as the subject of my diverse representationalstates is possible only insofar as such consciousness can drawupon prior, implicit awarenesses of my subjectivity, my having ofrepresentations, in each of those conscious states.

Whatever the merits ofthis reconstructed argument might be, itis important to note that 1lfaiLus...JJ,.JIiUl.S.C~.i!l.&:glJlD..~t:l1..Qfth.~J~.<!!Ui~!u.Qr!· Wh~Lit!~l,;.l!na!?le to sho'~JQL..R~rhal?.!lrwhat ':Y:Ch~~ failed,tQ JJ.ndera!ap.d).jlLW,hY."tb~".§J!Dj~<;;U~at~ §elfa~«.I).~§~,i:n.;:tltQfit~Q9!!~ciQlJ§§!~!~lti§,~~~~~!~jf~<,tpnscj..Q.y!..1f~s


is-.trLbe poss.!bl~. It is not enough simply to say, as Fichte sometimes does,56 that if consciousness requires self-consciousness asone ofits conditions, then whatever is involved in the constitutionof self-consciousness must be regarded as a necessary condition ofconsciousne~~wen.~orili~~b~n~e~~sof~

ph~qQJq~I!Q!!...Qf.~~!f.~Q!J~,~iQ Y§Jl~§.~. '.t.4~t ~r.,~,,, ~,QPSl!h.~J~~§.<,.,VQt .w£esSfl!y__in..!h~_J:r.~l1~~~nQ-v~,!!~l§~~~Q._What must be shown if this transcendental claim is to succeed is that the aspect of self-consciousnessunder consideration - in this case, the alleged presence ofintellectual intuition in all instances ofrepresentation - p.!aYS.-SQme indisp~~.~~le,Iole.inthe constitution of consciousness. What we mustconclude, then, is that this aspect of Fichte's account of selfconsciousness is the most difficult to reconcile with not only theletter but also the spirit ofKant's philosophy. This does not implythat Fichte's view is wrong. W1}~_~~J.!,~Q~~~.~.m~~~nJ~th.~tJb~w,12h~

nom~!!ologi~~.!.J~~~I).!L~!~.~.!Qns.!hat _!!!Q.!iY~!~~-.!!!~~.Hosition are ul ti..mately ~?E~.,P~t?!!.l!~~~y~.!~.~~_~!.~_g~!.1~S~~~_~E.t~!..sLt!,!!ll-and that,

~1t~t:~R~n~~~1~~tif~fi?:eiie~~~si~~~~~~~~-~~?e~~~' ••_~ __.~." h'- _W'~"~''''.r~.•'' "'~"'_~'·~.H~--~ " ..-u. __ ~-_. -••. ~ .-. -,-'" ..~ .-,.= ._.,~.Y_.--.,~_ .........................w .:!p_

Self-positing as self-constituting existence

At this point it is important to make clear that the foregoingaccount of self-positing as a species of self-awareness constitutesonly a part of Fichte's theory of the self-positing subject. This willcome as no surprise to anyone who is familiar with Fichte's texts,for on the basis of the interpretation put forth in the preceding twosections we are not yet in a position to understand some of themost distinctively Fichtean language associated with the doctrineof self-positing. Above all, we have not yet provided an explanation of Fichte's peculiar, but central claim that "the I posits itselfunconditionally," nor have we understood what Fichte meanswhen he employs the term Tathandlung to characterize the subject.We can understand this aspect of Fichte's theory only by examining a different set ofquestions that played an equally central rolein motivating the development of the doctrine of the self-positingsubject. This second set of problems revolves around the needto clarify the ontological status of the Kantian subject by providing an answer to the question, What kind of being is to be

56. See SW, I, pp. 459, 466, 525.


attributed to the subject? Or, alternatively, in what sense does therepresenting subject exist? In order to answer these questions weshall need first to uncover the nature of the problem of the existence of the I and then to examine the means by which Fichteattempted to arrive at a solution. The basic thrust of this solutioncan be expressed in general terms as the thesis that~ subj~g:~s

e&sten<;e m..Es tJ2e u~g~l]~gQ~.l!s,J1JI!Qi;\Q1~~.t~11y..gj!fer~tJ..L!J_mnJ1L~_,kind..of existellce~_q.Urj.blli5f.."tQ..thing~~.nd for this reason theconcepts required for an adequate account of subjectivity willnecessarily differ from those used to comprehend objects. Theremainder of this section will be concerned primarily with spellingout more clearly what Fichte believed these fundamental differences to be. Once again, we shall gain access to the details ofFichte's theory by first examining the specific philosophical controversy out of which his view emerged.

Our attempt to understand this aspect of Fiehte's theory leadsus again to the Aenesidemus review, for it is here, in response to thequestion of the subject'sexistence, that we find the first use of theexpression Tathandlung, a term later abandoned in favor of the language of self-positing. Although Fichte explicitly states that thedoctrine of the Tathandlung "can be neither explained nor proved"in the Amesidemus review itself, it is possible nevertheless to gleanfrom this article an understanding of one of the important motivating forces behind the notion of the self-positing subject.57 Astarting point for such an understanding is provided by Fichte'sclaim, central to the review, that the absolute_su1;>fu,ct is noJ.JQbel:l!!g.<;:..tS1QQQ as a kinQ.,9f thj!!,g in it~~lf. Since this claim arises in thecontext of Fichte's response to Schulze's critique of Reinhold, itwill be necessary to examine briefly the nature of that critique asit pertains to the issue of the subj ect's existence.

The problem of the type of existence to be attributed to the subject arises as part of the debate over how Kant's claim that themind serves as the "ground" for its own conscious experience canbe understood in a way that is consistent with Critical principles.Schulze begins his attack on this doctrine by setting out what bothhe and Reinhold take to be the central tenet of Kant's philosophy,namely, "that the ground (Grund) of a large part of the determinations of the objects of our representations is attributed to thenature of our faculty of representation (Vorstellungs- Vermogen)

57. SW, I, p. 8.


itself."58 The term 'faculty of representation' derives from Reinhold's reconstruction of Kant and is defined by him in the following passage:

The faculty of representation is that through which pure representation ... is possible and that which must be present prior to allrepresentation in the cause of representation, i.e., in that whichcontains the ground of the reality of pure representation.... Theefficient cause, the ground of the reality of pure representation, iscalled the representing power.... This power is distinct from purerepresentation in the same way that every ground is distinct fromits consequence, and every cause from its effect.59

Two important claims about the subject are contained in thisnotion of a faculty of representationff:!r~he subject ("the faculty of representation") exists prior 0 any particular instance ofconsciousness, and ~d, the subject plays a causal role in theconstitution of consciOUsness in that it produces, or creates, its

ii "pure representations" (i.e., the synthetic a priori components. of

iI its exp,erience). k~nde.nc~(,.~RehlhQJsJ·lYndbJ:;~·s.tand.s.Jhyeia..Gllh·lty-a£.llr.e.p.re-II sentannn...as.a.r .,1 - ,-.0. .noumcna _.51\ ,UJ;.cl,#.a...~m.elap-= ..¥,8.1!;.a ¥_r.e.alill!!l elltitY..Jbi1tJ~.¥i&t~ prior to.and... indf1pende.ntly..of.expedencc.andII! \~'t, th~kmg~J,QJb~real.mQfJhings iQ.1l.llm!m~s, Analogous to theII! J'.,~~ thing in itself, which, at least on some accounts of Kant's philoso-Ii! x 't~<1 phy, supplies the Qhi~tiYe.£Q!!t~.ntofsensation, Reinhold's facultyI:: "0'" 'l~ 'j ofrepresentation is the t;fficient..calls,e, or Real-Grund, of the subjec-.111 tive, a priori elements of experience. Moreover, the faculty of rep-111 resentation, like the noumenal object, is in principle incapable ofII being represented or known within experience, since it necessarily

stands outside of experience as a condition of it.Needless to say, Schulze has an easy time disposing of Rein

hold's notion of the faculty of representation from within the perspective of Critical Philosophy itself. ~isiYe~j)bjections arerai~~d £\g.~.iJl~J..£~inbold'§,_yi~w.T~!:~l~i$ that this explanationof the a priori elements of experimce'mlsuses the category ofcausality, since the thesis that a noumenal faculty is the cause ofitspure representations violates the fundamental Kantian principle

58. SW, I, p. 10. This is actually Fichte's own paraphrased version of Schulze'sstatement.

59, Reinhold (1790, I, pp. 175-6, 178). This passage is also cited in a similarcontext by Benson (1974, pp. 10g-10).


according to which the theoretical validity of the categories isrestricted to the realm of experience. Yet on Reinhold's view thesubject necessarily stands outside all experience, and for this reason the category of causality cannot be employed to characterizewhatever relation might hold between it and its conscious representations. The s!..copd objection has to do with Reinhold's implicit claim that pfiU;:)sopnycan provide us with knowledge of thefaculty of representation and of the role it plays in the constitutionof experience. According to Schulze, the most that Critical Philosophy could claim to establish (and on his view it fails to accomplish even this) is that we are compelled to think of the mind as theground for certain of its representations, but it is prevented by itsown principles from claiming to know that this view in fact accordswith reality.

Fichte recognizes the validity of Schulze's objections and yet isconvinced that they do not really apply to Kant's philosophy if thelatter is correctly understood. It is easy to see that the force of bothof Schulze's objections relies upon Reinhold's assumption that thesubject in its role of "grounding" experience is to be interpreted asa transcendent entity that serves as a kind of noumenal cause ofthe formal elements of consciousness. It is no surprise, then, thatFichte's first move in his defense of Kant is to deny that the subjectis a kind of thing in itself. This is certainly part of the point madein the well-known passage from the Aenesidemus review in whichFichte charges that Schulze, "as soon as he hears the word 'facultyof representation,' can think of nothing other than some kind ofthing (round or rectangular?) which exists independently of its representing as a thing in itself, more specifically, as a thing whichrepresents (ein oorstellendes Ding).,,60 As this early passage indicates, Ekht.(;~]Lpoint inYclves IIlQJ'J:_tbJ:lJLthe cg!!ll th!tt~ctis-lli?t ~Ltbingj.tl it~Ii;)t is not a thirzgj!Lany': sense whatsoever.That is, it is not enough to point out that the subject cannot becoherently understood as having a noumenal existence; it m\!§..talJ'loJ~!u·e~Qgnize<l1h1!.tJJle ~ggrif.L!haU!:Q.RIY_1Q.,"~QlnirjS2,\!!

oQj.ec.ts..r: slJ:b.stan~~'lli,lity - ar~_J~q!Jf!!l):j!!~tlRrQ,P-L~Jor

unde~st'!!2£i,~g,!h~"~j;.\!UU2£!~l?i~S£vity.While it is clear that Fichte's response to Schulze indicates the

general direction in which a defender of Critical Philosophy mustgo, it is less obvious how precisely the subject is to be understood

60. SW, I, p. II.

106 FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJEOTIVITY

so that one avoids the thesis of a noumenal subject while still 'allowing for the mind to "ground" experience. This challenge, thevery one taken up by Fichte, is implicitly posed by Schulze's criticism of Kant, which is articulated in the following passage:

In the Critique ofPure Reason Kant never clearly and expresslyexplains how one isto think of the subject from which the necessaryelements of our knowledge are supposed to originate.... He neverstates, in any of those passages where he presents representationsand principles as originating from the mind, what this mind reallyis that according to him is to be thought as the source of certaincomponents of our knowledge."

Schulze's ultimate conclusion is that it is no mere accident that thefundamental question raised here ("what this mind really is") isleft unanswered by Kant.. Although Reinhold's conception of afaculty of representation is naive and contradictory, Schulzeattributes this not to a lack of acuity on Reinhold's part but ratherto the fact tha!.he_.,att~mllt~_t9_,,~!1§1Y~L,~~Jl.y~§!jon. tb.AL!!jp._Illinfipk__M!!~U§}V_e,r~b!~.,.frQ!1t ,K~.:Qt:~.~R.~r~I?~fJiy.e. Schulze tries to showthat this is so by considering what he takes to be an exhaustive listof the alternatives open to Critical Philosophy. He asks whetherthe mind, or "the subject of representations,"62 is to be understoodas a thing in itself, a noumenon, or a transcendental Idea and thengoes on to reject each of these candidates in turn. WeJnight. addJQ...S.chul~e'sJ~tKa1}t's..Q}y'Il_p.Qjnt th.~l_tb~._sJ!bje~t ..of QQn.s~ci.ollS--

.[1.~~~_._~~~~?!_"'~~..~_ kind q[~~ptrt~.~!..gJ?J~~~t, .s,~.Q_~~.,..~s. ..Hume.p.girtJ~dOqt)_W~ .h~ve no "impression," or sensible ~I1t.lJjjiQ!l"..._Q.f.it~ ....Thua, adefender of Critical Philosophy is left with the following question: If the subject cannot be any of these possibilities, then whatexactly is it?

The path that Fichte will ultimately follow is already hinted atin his rather obscure claim in the Aenesidemus review that thesubject is to be understood not as a mere fact, a Tatsache, but as aTathandlung, a "fact-act." In creating this new term for the subjectFichte starts with the word Tatsache but replaces Sache ('tlling')with Handlung ('ace), thereby expressing what will become-thecentral point of his theory of the subject: The I is not to be under-

61. Schulze ([1792], 191 1, p. 125).

62.· That Schulze ([1792],191 I) equates 'mind' with 'the subject of my representations' is made clear on p. 121.

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THEORETICAL SELF·CONSCIOUSNESS 107

stood as a thing but as an activity. Furthermore, the subject is a"Tat"-handlung, an activity that is at the same time a deed, or fact.The point ofjoining Tat with Handlung to coin a new term for thesubject is to suggest that the existence of the I, its facticity, stands_iv.~S9m~"jntimatu~ill!Q!L10 i!§._~g;iyity. and, fy..r.ther,...!bat it is.thi§.:.Lt2li:!-,d91Lth1'!L<;;§,§!WJi~lly disti!!gui§.hesJ!"§J!9i~ct from a thiqg~Whereas in the preceding sections we examined the nature of thefundamental activity that Fichte attributes to the subject (itsimmediate intuition of itself in its own conscious states), ourpresent concern is to understand more precisely how he conceivesof the relationship between this activity and the subject's existence. Unfortunately, merely creating a new philosophical termstill leaves us a long way from a fully articulated account of thisrelationship. After all, an analysis of the term Tathandiung does notitselfenable us to understand the precise way in which the Tat, theexistence of the I, is related to its Handlung, or activity. One_9..11e.s- -1fti91!_J1tl!LtL~E:Y~~_,,1J.n::t!!§:w.l;r~Q,"iL'WMJh.!<.L1b_U!lpJ~j;.i~_.iQJlerigardedAI'l_.a_r.e..s.ult~.Qr ..produc; :::::.Oiit,§,.•Q;W,DJl&.l;iXiiy....Q~the.riti~U2Jl~_iQ~Jn!fj.~dwith. itsactivity",.lfQCh tb~Lil.~implyJJ~its"

activitY~!ld}!.~!hi!!Kelse.One central passage from the WL 1794 lends strong support to

the first of these interpretations: "[The I] is at once the agent (dasHandelnde) and the product of the action (das Produkt der Handlung), that which is active (das Tatige) and that which is producedby the activity."63 This formulation seems to imply that in characterizing the I there are two things to be distinguished from eachother - the subject's activity and the result of that activity - andthat the I is somehow to be identified with each of these. If understood in this way, however, Fichte's view seems to raise morequestions than it answers. The most obvious question is how weare to envision the subject as both activity and product of thatsame activity. Apart from the logical difficulties involved in ideniifYing the subject with two distinct things, one is left wonderingprecisely what this subject is that is supposedly produced by theactive I. l(I1h.~ili§..tin.Qti.Q.1! int~Il:de.d,~~_g!!~J~~!~!Uht?..!.E-.~~><p're:

c~scious_"tran~end_e.!.ltaL!!:.<ltiy!!i.~..!!.(Lt~JJhf:!-.t!~J.:;!rQduct:Q..Qy

14i.Ls!&tiYity~J!nQ .JmQY\'11..within. ,e,xperiel1£e.,Jl:1e.l1 __91lL§iIllPJyLe.<::'Q!I!..t.!!it~ Re!!,iE.s>ld '~.~rr()L()Ll!l}g,!:t:§.!!!!!gingJ.h.~J!Y..1?j~_ti.l§"fJ,. !l.Q.JJ.:!l1,$nal cause that ()p~r.a!e~.priot:toeXfleriel1cyjl1JheJ)r9g!1C::~~().J;1;ofa paE!J?,uhat ex~:.~ ..

63. SW, I, p. 96.


Fortunately, there is another way of understanding this claim ofFichte's that avoids these problems and that fits more closely withhis other attempts to characterize the existence of the I in terms ofits activity. The principal difficulty of the previous formulationstems from its use of the language of "production." This metaphoris fundamentally misleading, for it encourages us to think of thesubject's activity in terms analogous' to those that apply to actualconstructive activities, such as the building of a house or themaking of a shoe. In the latter case, it is meaningful to distinguishproduct from productive activity for the simple reason that a shoe,once created, acquires an existence that endures independently ofany shoe-making activity. But if we recall the preceding account ofthe I's activity as intellectual intuition, that is, as the subject'sconstant and immediate awareness of itself as conscious, it becomes clear that there is no meaningful analogy to be drawnbetween the production of things and the kind of activity that ischaracteristic of the subject. The reason for this is that in the caseof intellectual intuition the activity at issue is inseparably boundup with its "object," with that which it "produces." U1!like,activi.ties_.involY.h}g~.x,~~L,9Qj ects.,t}1~~~.~~!Jyity .QfJ3.~lf-.}}Q,§j!mg...do~Ll!9j:".P·t9,g.y.£,~:j!Llh~.,~§-!~.n.~",~ __of ~!!genJk!irrg~J?rod...ll.£t that coutinyeUi>exi§J: ~~!'JJ!Em-..~!l~.>ft~~,-!iy.~y __~iliM cr~3~'"'tedJJ~JJ1e cessation of theI's immediate self-awareness leaves no trace or residue behinditself; in the absence of that intellectual intuition there is in fact noconscious subject "still there."

Hence, we must conclude that, on its most straightforwardreading, Fichte's characterization of the subject as both productand activity is, unsatisfactory. This may mean that this way ofcharacterizing the I is simply misguided, or it may mean that wehave failed to understand it correctly. Might there not be otherkinds of production, different from the construction of real objects,in terms of which we could make more sense ofFichte's c~m thatthe subject is both agent and product of its activity? Pe~,Qs theS((~~~_9f'~~l?Eg_@S_ti2....tl.' ~~shoukt!J.Jlve in mind herejs more akin toth~.!i!!.J~hi~h_~~~!~~lri~.~~JJ:r.r.:~J!ti~~_~.~i~t .tQ,l?~~£~~RrQduC~QJ2Y~.Jhemotion of electr01?-s. In .thi~,case the GJJrr~n.ti§"J1QJ.hing..mr.e...than

t!l~_motio~QQf.~ltl£..~[Q!!~L~!!Q..Y~,t .!t~Qylg,J!QJ.!1~,uu.1Jsual to sa:}!..thatth~~~~he~herwords, there is asense in which the current both "is" and "is a product of" its ownactivity, and it seems to be along similar lines that Fichte wants tcunderstand the relationship of the I's existence to its activity


Thus, Fichte's claim that the I is "at once" agent and product ofthe same activity requires a notion of production in which thedistinction commonly made between activity and product doesnot apply. This same idea, however, is formulated more clearly inthe second of the two interpretations of the Tathandlung suggestedpreviously. There the crucial point is stated quite explicitly: Thesubject simply is its activity. In fact, this formulation of Fichte'sposition is found in passages from a number of works, includingthe first published version of the Wissenschoftslehre. In articulating the first principle of philosophy in the WL 1794, Fichte provides the following account of the subject's existence:

That tohos« being oressence (Wesen) consists simply in the fact that it positsitselfasexisting is the I as absolute subject. Insofar as it posits itself,it is;and insofar as it is, it posits itself.... TO posit oneselfand to be are,as applied to the I, perfectly Identical.S

This passage explicitly takes the position that the subject is to beidentified with its activity of self-positing, or, in other words, thatthe existence of the I consists in nothing more than its awarenessof itself as representing. his not lJlerelY-JhaUk~lJl:!!1.'~~!1!l..h~irif£.xud from the"I think"; rather, the two PLQRQsitio~to b~

u1!gerstood as expressiJ:!g the same conten!: To be aware of oneselfas thinking is already to exist as an I, and to be an I consists innothing beyond such self-awareness. Not surprisingly, it is thissecond formulation of his view that Fichte retains and emphasizeseven more strongly in later writings. Typical here is his statementfrom the first introduction that "for idealism the intellect is a doing(ein Tun), and absolutely nothing beyond that; one should noteven call it something active (ein Tdtiges), because this expressiondenotes an existing something in which activity inheres.,,65

It is clear from passages such as these that Fichte eventuallyabandons the potentially misleading language of his early formulation in favor of clearer statements of his position, whichemphasize that.theJmI;>J~f1.Ll!_neithera "something" that acJh.m>rl;t,Lfa<;E!tY,:\,i!h a..~pg~~_ to~S!.l..J~ut_~imply' is. the as..tiYhY_9f self:....Qositing. Fichte's rejection of the view of the subject as "an active

64. SW, I, pp. 97-8. In contrast to the Heath-Lachs translation, I have rendered'Ich' as'!' rather than 'self'.

65. SW, I, P.440. 'Intellect' (Intelligent) is here a synonym for'!' or 'absolutesubject'. See also SW, I, p. 495.

110 FICHTE'S THEORY O,F SUBJECTIVITY

something" is clearly intended to circumvent the problems thatplagued Reinhold's assumption that the faculty of representationhas an existence prior to actual consciousness. In denying thisassumption Fichte frees himself from the position, untenable forCritical Philosophy, of postulating a preexisting subject as thenoumenal ground of its conscious states. But Fichte's identification of the subject with the activity of self-awareness entails morethan a rejection of the notion that the subject exists prior to actualconsciousness. For he also denies that the activity of self...positingresults in the subject's acquiring any kind of being apart from thatactivity itself: "Self-positing does not produce some sort of exis...tence (Existenz) of the I as a thing ... persisting (bestehen) independently of consciousness." 66 N:9,t q!1Jy.oQQ~~.~the ~l!Qj~£1l!..qt existp_ripr.~.!9~~<;j:J!al cO!!~flQJ!~~§§.,.~.!tj~g~!)'Q",~.~~e~"~.Q!!1~~L!_Q".§h.~~ne~ofthe f~tlJI~".ch~LttC1~~i§!jcof thiEg!..(~lQJjlJ&tJ.hil1g§..j!lJ.h~~,but ~~mRiti£ill..~pbJ~}£l~,",l!.~=.~~!!)...,.::'J!~m~lY, ..~th~tJh~~¥gQ-9"lL~S. ting.~ipde~n~_~~y~o~s~. ~his point can beseen as a denial of the claim that subjectivity can be understood interms of the concept of tsubstance'{? That is, the subject is nottobe conceived of as a kind of enduring, underlying substrate that"has" its representations in the way that a substance has properties. QItihe vie~Fich~~120Y~~2th~...Q!!lY_~Y.i.Q_whicltihe sub-j.~.~_£~!1~'have:L<1Rrestllil~tioQ§~~J?y~!?~~.iQg.J!~~~L~.~QfJ!l~lJlMlt~

QWll,..P.Y_.x~f~,rril!g.~J!t~m...!.9..Jts~l(JhIQpgh..~.n ..!!~t.9fi!1!l!itiug~" ..With:~>o.11.llVbj~ltlh!2.:st~QU-l!lyk£~~U9~.§!lbi~~t,JQ~ .. ~ppr.~,h,,~,D-jll

I t is not difficult to see that these claims are more or less directconsequences of Fichte's basic strategy of identifying the subjectwith the activity of self-positing. For if the I is nothing apartfpomits activity, and if that activity never occurs apart from actualinstances of consciousness, then it must be concluded that thesubject does not exist independently of its actual conscious states.This point is already expressed in the Aenesidemus review inFichtc's rejection of Reinhold's assumption that the subject exists"independently ofits representing.t'P'' But there-is more to Fichte'sposition than merely this. Since the fundamental activity of thesubject, its self-positing, is a kind ofself-awareness, it follows that~~_~_~~~!ris !~~!~,~!!.9..",~~~je<:!w~E~~.!nfrQ'!!!""~£tu_al conyciousness, bu~~lso_~~_~!~!h~E..~ iS~lll?i~£Lr!h.llt i~n9t J.!~. As Fichte

66. SW, I, p~ 529. 67. GA, IV.2, p. 29.68. "Unabhangig von seinem Vorstellen' (SW, I, p. I I).

THEORETICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS I I I

expresses it in theWL 1794, "What does not exist for itself is notan 1.,,69 Self-awareness, then, is an essential feature of subjectivitywithout which there can be no subject at all.

In addition to the identification of the I with its self-positingactivity and the related claim that self-awareness is an essentialfeature of subjectivity, there is a further aspect of Fichte's characterization of the subject's existence that we must now examine. Inthe beginning of this chapter we saw that, especially in his earlierwritings, Fichte sometimes refers to the self-positing subject as ¥->

"the absolute I." Before ending our treatment of his account of A(.&<"~

self-consciousness, we should attempt to understand in what sensethe self-positing subject is "absolute." It should be obvious by (now that Fichte does not intend to assert anything like the views J-most commonly attributed to him. H.is them:,):, for exttlliPJ£'_.i~-t

mfID~l'y.1l~s~d:up-on th« claim that the subject, in an original .-;:", ,"'-_, ~ae--.LQfselfpQsiting~reates itself, its world, ancl1!ll of the determi.: (~'" \ ~ I.,

JlatiQlllL.QfJhai..w.orld. It should be equally obvious that Fichte '''~~ P'b-~;;

does not intend 'absolute' to be understood as a synonym for 'nou-menal', for hj:: cl""rries tllJ~JJh~.§JJQj ~ctis.f!,Jhingjnjt~elf.GapabJ~_ ofe~tin.gjlld(:)p{:nQ,ently of'actual, corm:ipYS,"le!ls. In what sense,then, is the subject absolute? A partial answer to this question isto be found by recalling the role that the self-positing subjectallegedly plays in "grounding" consciousness. Although Fichterejects Reinhold's conception of the faculty of representation asthe noumenal cause of its synthetic a priori representations, heneverthelessf~rib.efULkin<i.cl.gr.QundingJ:01e.JJLthe..subj.ec.Lwithre,sp~~t,iQ._it§,~pta:i~ As a!!intuiting activity. immall.e-uL1;Q.~QJls.nes£,.Jhe ...mhjt~DLs..clf ..p.p..sitillg.js.'yil:;w.ed.Jl,£.gmundillgexp.e.rie.ru::.e_insID,aLlliLi.tlUntclle.l;;.t],lal,_jLlj;JJ.i.tinn...GQUs.ti~~__Q.ne...2fthe, congj_ti2!!~..f()r:._!h~.R~~il.>.g~tyof s.eli:.<:.~!!~<;:i£I}~t:~~~t _,:,:~~!t5?~~i!;h,cQ-';!.~ciml~tg.~l!~jj:self~(mJ...!Lnot.P~.....R0s~t2Le.

Yet the subject is absolute for Fichte in more than just the sensethat the activity of self-positing is regarded as a necessary condition for the possibility of consciousness. A second sense is alludedto in the Aenesidemus review in rather mysterious statements suchas the following: "The faculty of representation exists for the faculty of representation and through the faculty of'representation."?"

69. SW, I, p. 97.70. SW, I, p. I I. Notice that Fichte refers to the absolute I as afaculty(ofrep resen

tation) only in this early text, before having fully developed the view that thesubject must be understood as an activity rather than a capacity or faculty.


That the subject exists "for itself" clearly refers to the positionmentioned before that the subject is necessarily self-aware. Although it is only implied in this quote, one could add to this theclaim that the subject exists only for itself; that is, it ceases to existin the absence ofits own self-awareness and can exist, qua subject)only for itself, never for another conscious subject.

Yet how is it that the subject exists "through," or by means of,itself? This enigmatic claim is expanded upon in a later passagefrom the same text: "The mind ... is a transcendental Idea whichis to be distinguished from all other such Ideas by the fact that we 'realize it through intellectual intuition, through the '1 am' and,more specifically: 'I am simply because I am.' "7

1 One of thepoints of this statement is to emphasize that the subject is unique

.among ~!lJ~~!!ti!~~j!!~~t.!t~tjntlllq!!ei§~~~EJ~~4,," 0t:.. brQ!!ght ink!.~ingi}!1l:2}!gh~..!!!~.E~~i}!~k~.2.~' This itselfconstitutes a fundamen..tal distinction between a subject and an object, for it is an essential characteristic of a thing, whether empirical or transcendent,that it cannot be bI:Q.1lgbJiDtoQ~~jstertce through the mere activityof consciousness. But there is apparently more to Fichte's claimthan this, for the subject ("the faculty of representation") is saidto exist "through itself"; in other words, the I is in some sense aself-constituting being. Fichte's causa sui language here is bound tostrike us at first either as a retreat to a position that ascribes mystical or divine characteristics to the subject, or as committing himto a blatantly incoherent conception of the I as self-caused orself-created. Perhaps, however, a more sympathetic reading ofthisclaim can be found that is also consistent with the foregoing analysis of the notion of self-positing, As we have seen, Fichte does notmean to claim that the act of intellectual intuition results in thecreation of a subject that then exists, as objects do, independentlyof consciousness. Nor is the subject to be understood as the agent

7I. SW, I, P: 16. One question this p.ass~g,eJJlis.~.§ is wb~t~t Ficq.te..reaU:y.:...Y.l&.ws.th~ftu;bject asa lr.~n~geng.~j.aJ Idea in the Kantian sense. I would argue thathe simply takes over this suggestion from Schulze and that it is merely anearly, provisional characterization of the subject that is abandoned shortlythereafter. The passage itself explicitly draws a fundamental distinctionbetween the absolute subject and Kant's Ideas, for the former, unlike thelatter, is actually realized, or made real (although certainly not in the same.sense in which objects could be said to be real). What the subject might beregarded as sharing with the Ideas is their absolute, unconditioned nature,although, as the present discussion implies, there are crucial differences hereas well in the sense in which each is absolute.

1}.~- (~ d--Jt~> .ll;-.:;·t(.!,; t.;ll. ...Ib<_~ ·",f"(';,·.e':. ~(~~;),:IIJ"'J"- .(':',t\.~,.,-<:~ t..,.

('i';!':': ,af""",& .jC"" .Jlc"({S:)"((.. L,/:i../c(V\ t.,,'" f? ~;,\.\/u.i'1 '-;;.."' .: l'M

THEORETICAL SELF.CONSCIOUjNESS I 13of an activity that brings about its own existencd, Rather,' Fichtemust be understood as holding that ~h~.J....i.!!~Lk.!.Q~.".f1g!yity.._Qfref~r.ri!J.g, .. diy!<Xs,!<. X!:PX~,IH<nliio\.tiQ11LtQ ...-"L.s...iJlgl!:..p.ds.5.e.~,QL,...QLt.hv..s.e~ep.!~eos,$X!!~J.Lon1!.j" To positoneselfand to be are, as applied to the I,perfectly identical.") If the subject is identical with its activity,and therefore has no existence beyond that activity, then it followsthat the subject is "realized" (in the only sense that a subject can"exist") solely through this conscious activity; it is only in or"through" the act of self-awareness that the subject comes to be.

If, however, Fichte denies that the subject preexists its selfpositing as the agent of that activity, can the I really be said toconstitute itself? The subject may very well be constituted bythe activity of intellectual intuition, but in what sense is it selfconstituting? Fichte's answer here, I believe, ultimately rests uponhis (and Kant's) view of the spontaneous, unconditioned nature ofsubjective activities. Unlike the motion of electrons, which couldalso be said to constitute the electric current, the .actiyltY...9f selfRpsiting that.consti tllt.e~..the..§'l!t>j.!:f.lj'§"ltl}S~(l; it has llQ~g!Q!!n9•.iJ1.~gything ..e.:":j&r}::tcllJ.9~ itself. This feature of the I points to another sense in which subjectivity is to be understood as structuredaccording to principles distinct from those that govern the worldof objects. For neither the subject's existence nor the nature of itsactivity is bound by or explainable in terms of the principle ofcausality. In contrast to activities within the objective realm, thesubject's self-positing is not the effect of some antecedent causethat produces it in accord with a universal and necessary law. Itis both meaningless and futile to attempt to explain the subject'sactivity by postulating or searching for some prior cause thatmakes the activity of self-positing proceed as it does. The onlypossible "explanation" of the subject's activity is transcendentalrather than causal. That is, the subject cannot be "understood" inthe sense that its activity can be shown to be a necessary consequence of some antecedent ground. ::Dlu:..J!l1dersJ.anding_Q(§ubj~tM.ty.-isJimited..t.QJ;rJms.{;!:1!d~DJ!ll.l<~p.l!llLa tiQ,n thill...~~ll!2g~rs ~!!.m!.§"

,the subject by rev..!'.!!Jing.Jp.e essential strJl..GJ.ll!.u>f igLactivit'y'-ill.lSLQy..,shQ..wing_h~tw-s.uc.h _ill;t1yitY..J.S..JL necess'!!f..y_<ml.dition focthep.QMibility of cO.l).sGjQ.lJ!>JI.~ss-,-_

At this point the account of self-consciousness put forth bythe theory of the self-positing subject can be summarized in threedistinct claims: Eirs..t,. throughout all of its states, consciousness not only is dI;ected at something outside itself, an objective

I 14 FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY

epresentation, but is at the same time inwardly directed as well;that is, in all of its conscious states the subject stands in a relationto itself that consists in an immediate, nonempirical awareness an "intellectual intuition" - of its own conscious activity. Secon.d,it is this conscious relation between subject and representationthat accounts for the possibility of a unitary self-conscious subjectand thereby constitutes a necessary condition for the possibility ofconsciousness in general. FilmJl.X~ the I simply is its constant activity of self-awareness, and nothing more. As such, the subject isessentially self-relating (always aware of itselfas subject) and selfconstituting (ungrounded in anything that is not its own activity).

Having acquired an overview of his account of self-consciousness,we are now in a position to raise a question that has dominatedmuch recent discussion of Fichte's thought: C~n. th~.1h~orY-.Qi.the

self'::lJ!>...s.!tiJ.1g-sJLbjk.G..tJ2~-fQ!ln.yl!!!~.~t __wJthQut_Q~~Pnll.ng~_~D.!1l11gkdin aJQgi~1!l.,P~I~dQ~l.::.:rhis question is especially important, sincewhat appears to be problematic in Fichte's conception arises atthe most fundamental level of the theory, namely, in its attempt todefine the I in terms of the activity of intellectual intuition. Theproblem here is not simply that Fichte regards the subject as akind of activity but, rather, that the activity in which it is said toconsist is an essentially self-referring one, a self-intuiting. Iri-sliort,such an account seems to be bQRele~ circ"ylar: How can a singleentity be both the intuiter and that which is intuited and) at thesame time, be identified with the intuiting activity itself?

Part of this mystery can be cleared up if we move beyond thisvery general way offormulating the problem and recall how Fichteactually characterizes the subject's distinctive .activity. Above all,it is important to keep in mind the sense in which the intuitingunder consideration is "reflexive." As we have seen, the I's selfintuiting is not to be understood as directed at some independently constituted object ("the self") that is distinguishable fromthat activity ofintuiting. It is, rather, an awareness that is internal

72 . The most influential discussion of this topic is found in Henrich's interpretation of Fichte (1982; also 1971, pp. 3-28). Henrich comes to the conclusionthat the thesis of the self-positing subject is inherently paradoxical. Since hisinterpretation of Fichte's account of self-consciousness differs substantiallyfrom the one presented here, it is difficult in the present context to restatesuccinctly Henrich's account of the various forms in which the alleged paradox manifests itself. Nevertheless, the plausibility of the general claim thatFichte's position rests upon a logical paradox is easy enough to grasp withoutrep rod ucing Henrich's objections in detaiL


to the activity of consciousness itself, consis ting in an awareness onthe part of the conscious subject that it is aware. When articulatedin this way, Fichte's theory loses some of its paradoxical appearance. There is nothing incoherent in the claim that consciousnessis always aware of its own awareness - that, in other words, thereis no such thing as "un-self-conscious" subjectivity.

Nevertheless, merely reminding ourselves of this point does notdrive away all suspicion of paradox surrounding Fichte's position.On the contrary, it only enables us to formulate the problem moreprecisely. For, as we saw in the first section of this chapter, Fichte'sunderstanding of the content of the subject's immediate selfawareness is not completely captured by the formulation just considered. That is, the subject's self-awareness is not merely theawareness that there is a representing going on, or even the awareness that there is a representing of a specific content X. Rather, thesubject apprehends itself as representing; mor,e p-reciseJy, in mysfIf=_PDsitinglam..a.:w.llJ:.e..utXas mine, as pelongillg.!2-me. But thisdescription of self-awareness, coupled witnt'fieCIiiffi-inat the subject does not exist apart from this awareness, yields a conceptionof the subject that, at the very least, is extremely difficult to grasp:On this view, the subject must be understood as an entity thatsimply consists in the activity of apprehending its representationsas its own. Put in another way, the subject apprehends its representations as its own and exists only through that apprehending.

At this point I would like to propose a way of restating thisapparently paradoxical claim that captures what I take to beFichte's central point and articulates it in a somewhat less perplexing form: In the case of the subject's basic activity its intellectual intuition - that which is apprehended (the mineness of aparticular representation X) is not to be conceived of as preexisting the act of apprehending it. The claim here is not merely thatmy awareness of X as mine is a sufficient epistemic guarantee of itsactually being so; tl.!epgJIgj§..l!:tl!t X does !fot eve1!_~ld§!~Q1~in-.tb~, ab,~~nce.QfS1!£.l.!~~.ess. LQ!12l,.t~~J:~f!!i£.1! b~!!"ee~~.q~

.kft and r.<:':~.!t:ntatiQ..nt~ati~~RP~~tce.iy.~Qj!}jP-~~!~£J!!all!!till"ti.9n

doe~qt~ts~lfl121~.iQ.q~JLe,.Ilg<;;.PtlyClLth~1~§jm)JitinKQfj 1.73 Alternatively, there is no way for a representation to be mine apart frommy intuiting it as such. The awareness involved in intellectual

73. Something like this point is suggested by Nozick's brief but helpful remarkson Fichte (1981, pp. 76, 89, 108).


intuition, then, must be understood as having the peculiar property of actually bringing about that which it is an awareness of.The implication of this view is that the subject of consciousnesscan be characterized only in terms that are bound to strike us asparadoxical: The I is essentially a self-referring activity that, onlyin referring to itself, is constituted as an existent.

We should not, I think, immediately conclude from this thatFichte's account of the subject is hopelessly paradoxical. Ofcourse,the capacity for self-constitution that it. ascribes to the subjectviolates the strictures to which empirical objects (understood ascausally determined, extended substances) must conform. Butthis should not surprise us, for it is precisely this point that theI cannot be understood as a kind of object - that underlies andmotivates Fichte's basic project of attempting to grasp the essential structure of subjectivity. To insist that the subject be comprehensible in terms familiar to us from our knowledge of theobjective world is to rule out from the beginning the possibilityof attaining the comprehension we seek. At the very least, I wouldurge that we refrain from deciding whether Fichte has actuallyachieved this goal until we have seen his project carried out tocompletion. For the conception of the subject developed in thischapter will gain in plausibility if it can be shown that the-same"paradoxical" structure attributed to the I of theoretical selfconsciousness also informs practical subjectivity, I t is preciselythis claim that Fichte's theory of self-determination, the topic ofour final chapter, aims to establish.

4---------_.~ ~-----------

THE SELF-POSITING SUBJECTAND PRACTICAL

SELF-DETERMINATION

In Chapter 2 we saw that Fichte's theory of subjectivity is bestunderstood as one version of the project ofdemonstrating the unityof theoretical and practical reason. As such, the theory attemptsto specify the essential feature of subjectivity in general by isolating a single, fundamental structure of consciousness that can account for the possibility of subjectivity in both its theoretical andpractical forms. Furthermore, we saw that Fichte understands thisstructure as a particular kind of activity, which he terms "selfpositing." The aim of Chapter 3 was to analyze Fichte's attemptto account for theoretical self-consciousness in terms of a subject'sself-positing activity, and the task that faces us in the present.chapter is to understand how Fichte intends to use the same notionas a principle of practical philosophy. In general terms, whatFichte must show is that practical subjectivity depends in anessential way upon self-positing activity, or upon the subject'sentering into a kind of reflexive, nonobjective relation to itself,through which the subject also constitutes itself.

One important part ofthis project will be to specify the particular aspect of practical subjectivity that Fichte intends to give anaccount of. In doing so, it should first be pointed out that there areactually a number of ways in which Fichte attempted to draw anessential connection between theoretical and practical subjectivity.

II?


One of the most widely known of these is expressed in remarksthroughout the two 1797 introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre thatrefer to both pure apperception and the consciousness of the cate..gorical imperative as kinds of intellectual intuition. I Such passages suggest the possibility of drawing an important parallelbetween theoretical and practical reason by showing that thepractical subject's consciousness of its moral obligation is an immediate, nonrepresentational, and self-constituting kind of awareness and therefore similar to the self-positing involved in theoreti-cal self-consciousness. .

In this chapter, however, I shall examine only what I take to bethe most philosophically promising of the connections that Fichtetried to draw between the theoretical and practical realms. As thetitle of this chapter indicates, my interpretation will focus primarily on Fichte's notion of self-determination. Within the Kantiantradition, of course, the notion of self-determination, or autonomy, is very closely linked to the categorical imperative and toissues of moral obligation. It is also possible, however, to conceiveof self-determination more broadly, as a, concept that mightinclude but is not necessarily restricted to specifically moral formsof autonomy. Ultimately the principal aim of Fichte's practicalphilosophy was to defend something like Kant's own conceptionof moral autonomy. Yet the most interesting part of his discussionof self-determination takes place at a more abstract level of conceptual analysis, where the issue of greatest concern to him can be

I. SW, I, P.472. There are other similar passages throughout the two intra ..ductions, among them the following piece from P: 466: "The intuition of selfactivity and freedom is grounded in the consciousness of [the moral] law,which is undoubtedly not a derived, but an immediate consciousness....O~th·rot!gp the m.~djMJl1...QfJlt~_mQr..~a:.w_g~Q~.1.J:>ehQkl...tzl.l.f£lf~!lQj!LQeholcling~lfthrou~ Inecessa~hol~selfassel&active."~~claimthatI

can..gr~s~Il.m..Y_$.,elf_Q..r.!l.y_j;.br.Ql!gh lJ1Y,A.W~~~§~",Qf..tb-J~JnQral.l~~~aRrov9£ativeftde.a-inde..e.d,.~which",.~admittOOly,-ffiY"uQWll..in.tgw~iQ!L.9..Ltbslin.k.~:~re~l~.R~~lit~:~~possibletodevelopa coherent and sustained reconstruction of the position, Fichte hints at here?Perhaps, although I myself do not see how it is to be done. The difficulty liesin making out the claim that identifies theoretical with practical spontaneity, orat least grounds the former in the latter. As I have argued in Chapter 2, it isnot enough merely to point to the active nature of theoretical subjectivity inorder to establish a deep connection between the theoretical and the practical.The activity of the theoretical subject is, or at least seems to be, of such adifferent nature from that of the practical subject that the burden falls on theproponent of such a position to explain more precisely how the two may beunderstood as identical, or in what sense the former is dependent upon thelatter.

r

PRACTICAL SELF~DETERMINATION I 19

formulated in terms of the following questions: How is it possibleto make sense of the notion of self-determination? For what kindof being is self-determination a possibility?

This emphasis on the notion ofself-determination iajustified bythe fact that it is regarded by Fichte himself as the most basicconcept of practical philosophy. Tp be a practical being, forFi£h!~~j!!'yqY.K~~qal terms to.possess the c~actty.for determiI!h!g.Q!!~sJ?!LtQ..~£!~.3!§_.Qp.P9_sed!Q...l.!av:ing one'~ actions determil1;~4J~y tl.Q!!!.~thiQKy~tgnJ!l.Of course, this characterization ofFichte's view still leaves open the question of what precisely selfdetermination is and how it relates to self-positing. A preliminaryarticulation of this notion is found in his statement that the selfdetermining subject "is in every respect its own ground and positsitselfunconditionally in a practical sense.'?' Two relevant pointsemerge from this statement:~ crucial to the concept of selfdetermination is the subject's ability to be, in some sense, "its ownground." S~..9, self-determination is to be understood as a formofself-posiiIDg:-For now, we shall postpone a more precise analysisof ,self-groundedness' and turn instead to the relation between'self-determination' and the more general notion of 'self-positing' .

Fichte's remark that self-determination involves self-positing"in a practical sense" is consistent with my claim that the conceptof self-positing in Fichte's thought refers to a very general structure ofconsciousness that is somehow common to both theoreticaland practical subjectivity. The role that the notion ofself-positingis to play in Fichte's account of self-determination can be clarified

, by looking at his own characterization of the primary aim of hismajor work on ethics, System of the Doctrine of Morals, or, as I shallrefer to it here, the Sittenlehre. 3 Toward the beginning of that workFichte outlines his basic task by raising the following questions:.w_.i.tp~~sible.J.9de...velop..2.£Q.l!,~~!1.L~9£~E,g.Q.1!.9.L~~Jf-:2~.tE!.minanQ!1..

"one that elucidates what it means to be self-determined, in con-t~~~!~!0-~e1·~gd-e-teirrll~~~·~V21i1eih!~i.eit~Q"i!t·o·~2iiesil£LA~d~'"''''''''what must be true of the practical subject in order to allow for thepossibility of this self-determination? The answer Fichte gives canbe formulated as follows: It is possible to arrive at a coherentconception of self-determination, but only if one starts with an

2, "Es ist in jeder Riicksicht sein eigener Grund, und setzt, auch in praktischerBedeutung sidt selbsi schlechthin" (SW, IV, P: g8).

3. DasSystem der Siuenlehre nad: den Prinzipien der Wissenschqftslehre (1798), GA, 1.5,pp. 19-317; SW, IV, pp. 1-365.


Jtet~-gY~!~~!?:9~!!£!?:~f~~~~le~!~!m~c:t.~i~~l,~~on~k}"'th~~~~zesthef\lJ1da~.~!!!~lJ¢l.i~~L~ll:~~tw~!!,,~~~~~~fan~~l... ana tIiere6yavoids the pitfall ofthinking of the subject as a kind ofobject." Thisis precisely what is supposed to be accomplished by the conceptionof the self-positing subject. In its most general form, then, Fichte'sthesis will be that(!~![ <k_t.~!,!!1in~!ion is a coherent po~sibi~ityo~ '<,

f~~.£Upj~ft..~.!h~1_~., ..~QI!lYXqI.-_~.!!,.J~nJity~~~l>le ofen~gj!ltothe kil1~L-.of self- :r~.la,t.i()n..=.!h~t,he_~l!~act~izes=~a.~clf::pusi1iug~~_Since the principal aim of this chapter is to make sense of thisbasic project of Fichte's, it must involve not only an analysis of thenotion of self-determination but also an examination of how theconcept of the self-positing subject might be regarded as an essential foundation for a theory of self-determination.. In order to accomplish the latter goal we must first determinemore precisely the content of Fichte's conception of the self-positingsubject. Our analysis of this notion thus far has taken place in thecontext of theoretical self-consciousness, so we must now attemptto understand how the nature of the subject as it was articulatedthere might be relevant to an account of self-determination. First,we should recall that Fichte characterized the theoretical subjectas an activity (rather than as afaculty for carrying out a su1JJ~ctive

activity) and that this activity was simply a species of self-awareness.In Chapter 3 we saw, that this position was intended in part as arejection of Reinhold's view that the theoretical subject has a kindof (noumenal) existence prior to and apart from actual consciousexperience. As we shall see in this chapter, FiJGht~~2!.~~_~t to

aIll?!Y.~!.h~~...y'~~..Q[!h~a~yl>i~~.t ..tg.,~iliQ.!'~~lm~qfR[!!£!!£~L sq!?i~£.tlY.~!Yim.plie.&J.h~tJl~,JnY~1.,RrQyJQ~..~,l},-.~£g9~~!1_t2f~_~1f:s!~!~~!:.1?i!!.~.!i~2!1 th';tt\dQe.s.~~t}.nY~Q.k~.,.§_QIu.~_nQt!Q!1,,,.Rf-'7~~.~n.QYlU~Qf.!L~~,g.~.!1t. More specifically, Fichte must find a way of understanding self-determinationthat does not rely upon the hypothesis ofa hidden, "true" self thatexists outside of actual consciousness as the source of determinations for the agent's deeds in the empirical world.

A further aspect of the notion of self-positing subjectivity thatwill be relevant to Fichte's account of self-determination is theessentially reflexive nature of the subject's activity. This reflexivity is evident. in the term 'self-positing', as well as in Fichtc'sdescription of the same as "an activity that returns into itself"

4. These questions, as well as the' outline of Fichte's answer, are formulated mostexplicitly at SW, IV} pp. 34-6.

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 121

(eine in sich ZUrUckgeltende Tdtigkeit). W,hat these formll!ati9~einte1!q~.dJQ e:lip-re~~js ili.{Lt thui§.titl~~c;;..fe.a!!Jl:.e.,..D~.ubj.e.ct., ..asopposed" tQ...;';\.,,~htw6,_gQp.§,i§j;§..jl1 ••i!,J~ind...oL.c.Q1lS..cmus..J:e1a.ti.onshi pt~,~!t.!~~,!!;.blI,~J1e~.~f, Moreover, this self-relation is held to beofa very particular sort, which, as we saw in the case of theoreticalself-consciousness, Fichte describes as "immediate," "nonrepre

,sentational," and, further, as a relation in which "the agent andthat which is acted upon are one and the same."> In the contextof practical philosophy Fichte expresses this same point by denying that the relation the self-determining subject has to itselfis oneof "a passive looking on" (ein leidendes Zusehen ),6This is to be takento mean that the subject's relation to itself is not the same as itsrelation to an object of representational consciousness, where theobject is thought to be there and to be constituted as it is independently of the subject's awareness of it. Rather, the subject's relation to itself-its self-positing - is a kind of conscious activity that,in both its theoretical and practical forms, constitutes the subject.We have already seen the sense in which, on Fichte's view, thesubject constitutes itselfin theoretical self-consciousness; our tasknow is to understand how, in "self-determination," this occurs forthe practical subject as welL

Having made these preliminary points about the relationshipbetween practical philosophy and the notion of self-positing, let usturn to the central question that faces us here: How does Fichteunderstand the notion of" self-determination? CharacterizingFichte's position is made difficult enough by the existence of anumber of distinct senses of self-determination in his texts, but itis complicated even further by the fact that he usually seems to beunaware of these crucial differences. For now it is sufficient to callattention to the most important of these distinctions, one betweena weak and a strong sense ofself-determination. In what follows Ishall refer to these different conception}l~s "formal" and "substantive" self-determination, respectively.Z'The former is treated

5. The latter formulation appears in the Sittenlehre, SW, IV, p. 22.

6. SW, IV, p, 32.

7. Although Fichte does not articulate this distinction in precisely the same formas I do here, my distinction is based upon Fichte's attempt to distinguishbetween "formal" and "material" freedom (SW, IV, pp. 135-56). My characterization of "substantive self-determination" is intended to capture theimportant features of Fichte's notion of "material freedom" and to spell outmore clearly the differences he intended to assert between weak and strongself-determination,


in Fichte's account ofwilling in general under the name of"formalfreedom." As we shall see, what Fichte has in mind here is close toKant's conception of "practical freedom," or Willkur. T~YJP..1lt

~l §ltbJ~~t~§~.~~,tiollj.fi ...~_~!f:g~!.~mjq~.g jQ .thi~ ..seJls..e ..is·..wereix to Sj!y!l!~~_.it is freely chosen, which further implies for Fic4t~,..th~tit~

c~~~t:I_}~ __accord withapr..~gr~.~~~!~!?}~!J~~vAlthough Fichte's textsare confusing on even this issue, I shall try to show that it ispossible to extract from them a coherent and plausible account ofthis weaker notion ofself-determination, and it is this task that weshall undertake first. Our examination of the stronger conceptionof self-determination will encounter interpretive problems of asignificantly greater magnitude, for Fichte offers several distinctaccounts of self-determination in this sense. IE:-general terms, one

co.!!Lg, ._§_~y~!he.!_t.hi_~ ..~~~c~~<1.m~QP.~~~Rt!9.!.l: _j~~_~!!.!~.!!~t~4J2.J~E.res~!'l tS01!!f-!29..!i.2,!l-.2[...~l!!9E~q~~y. At times Fichte clearly has in mindsomething close to Kant's account of moral autonomy, but I shallshow that he also develops or takes steps toward developing - adifferent conception of substantive self-determination, one thatfits more consistently with his general theory of the subject a'sessentially "self-positing." .

Since it is not immediately clear what these different a~ebuntsof substantive self-determination have in common that distinguishes them from formal self-determination, we should attemptat the outset to formulate this distinction more precisely. ForFichte any freely chosen act represents an instance of formal selfdetermination. That is, the subject is formally self-determinedwhenever it determines itself to act in accord with any practical

maxim whatsoever. Suhs..taJ!tiY~"s.~lf7sk!~1!!iuat.i2!b""",,qlU!!.~e2J;'Ahe~.

haJ1.d,,~"rJ~{1.Bi!:-~~~tb.~~tm.~~@j~£t~!~_g~lermin~ the ~e.?£~!~E2:"s~ly~§~£o!,di!!g to "Yl.!ictljj~~£.t.~~..-elbe intuition that lies behindthis distinction is that to act on any subjective maxim is alreadyto act freely, but that the subject is self-determined in an evendeeper sense when it determines which maxims it wants to govern its actions. Furthermore, in order to be "substantively" self-determined, the~4Ql?,!~J)n..~Qf.2}!~:~L~~~~ ..!!!..~.~.h.9~~in,:,01v~~~oreth'1-n._me-.r~Jy~'lr.biJI ..ar~ Ch9i.Q~.jl_my.§.t_:Rro..£~~~_r~th~,,& ..in accQ.rdviith_high~.r::ky~t~ti!!!g~r.Q~ ,.gr, ::!lq!J!!§.,:.mllJ:ir~ t the cri teriafor which maxims.the..,.agent~Q.ughttQ.""adnpi,~".".Yinally, the subjectis self-determined in a substantive sense only when these norrns

8. Fichte uses the term 'norm' (Norm) in this context (SW, IV, p. 52)) although Ishall give it a somewhat more specific meaning than Fichte himselfarticulated.


themselves originate in a significant way from the subject itself.The central task of an account of substantive self-determination,then, will be to articulate in what sense the practical subject canbe understood as the source of its own norms. We shall return tothis issue, including a more careful consideration of the concept ofa "norm," in our discussion of substantive self-determination. Fornow let us turn to a consideration of Fichte's account of formalself-determination.

Formal self-determination

In contrast to Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic ofMorals, whichopens with a consideration of the notion of a morally good will,Fichte's Sittenlehre begins with an extended analysis of "willing"(das Wollen) in general. ,£he term 'willing' is intended here to haveaJaidy,_~p_~~ifi.(Lmeal}i.I!K..i!!_lhaUt is distingl!itl~"Jro~~re

desiring()rw:~shil!g""Jmtit !§'_E-l~o e..g:tJit~g~E~!!Q~far~

itis-l11!lanUQ~.w...£Q!!!PJ!§.IL\!11o(a s11mect's .(J;'e~!x..£QnlIDjlt~d..~.Y:9SregardleslLQiilicil:.JJlQ_ral..w:JWJ~"" In other words, I "will" in bothmy moral and immoral actions, as well as when I choose to followone morally neutral course of action over another. As Fichtemakes clear in a later part of the Sittenlehre, the aspect of the willthat he is attempting to characterize in his analysis of willing ingeneral is nothing more than what he calls Willkur, which isunderstood to be the will's "capacity to choose," or its ability to"make a choice among several equally possible actions."? Although Fichte begins his moral theory with a consideration ofWillkur, he does not at the same time explain what role it will playin his account of the ethical will. A clue to the connection Fichteintends to establish between the two is provided by his assertionthat all willing involves a kind of self-determination - "a realself-determining of oneself by oneself." 10 Since we already knowthat self-determination will be the central category of Fichte'sethical theory, our first task must be to understand in what senseall willing involves for him a kind of self-determination.

As mentioned earlier, Fichte distinguishes between an instanceofwilling (ein Wollen), on the one hand, and merely having a desire,on the other. The main point of this distinction becomes clear

9. SW, IV, p. 159.10. "Ein reelles Selbstbestimmen seiner selbst durch sich selbst" (SW, IV, p. 22).

That he is referring here to all willing is made clear in other passages, e.g.,p.28.


when one considers that it is possible to experience a desire for aparticular state of affairs without at the same time willing to act onthat desire. What characterizes the latter state in distinction tothe former is that willing involves, beyond merely having anincentive to act, a positive resolution (EntschlufJ) to pursue or torealize the object of one's desire. II Unlike sensuous drives anddesires, this resolving to act is itselfnever given to the subject fromwithout but requires instead the latter's own active participation.This capacity for transforming a mere incentive into a resolutionto act is described by Fichte as constituting the will's "absoluteness" (Absolutheit) ,12 which leads us to ask, In what sense is thewill's res.2l~i!!K to ~~ct "absolut~~~

An important part of Fichte's point is expressed in his frequently repeated claim that natural drives "have no causalityupon the will's freedom," a claim that is expanded upon in the following statement: "Despite [the presence of] a drive I ca~termine myself in opposition to it; or, even if I determine myself inaccord with the drive, it is still always I who determines me, neverthe drive." 13 The point that Fichte is making here is reminiscentof Kant's description of the will's "practical freedom" in the firstCritique, according to which the will (Willkur) is affected, but notdetermined, by sensuous desire. The will is characterized there aspractically free in the sense that "sensibility does pot necessitateits action; rather, there is in the human being a 'capacity for determining oneself independently of any coercion by sensuous im...pulses." 14 Hence, the essential feature of the will's absolute natureconsistsL~:Ist" in its Unbestimmharkeit, its "inability to be determined by anything external to itself," 15 and, s.e...c..on,d.,,, in the factthat it is free to determine which among the variOUs incentivesavailable to it will ultimately guide its action. This ability of thewill to make a given incentive into a determining motive for actionis regarded by Fichte as "absolute" in the sense that it is "something original (ein Erstes) which is grounded absolutely in itselfand in nothing outside of itself. H l 6 As such, it "is not to be explained out of the influence of something that is external to the I,but solely out of the I itsel("I7

I L SW, IV, p. 159. 12. SW, IV, pp. 24-5. 13. SW, IV, p. 108.

14. KRV, AS34/BS62. 15. SW, IV, p. 28.16. "Das Wollen, als solches, ist ein Erstes, absolut in sich selbst, und in nichts

auBer ihm Gegriindetes" (SW, IV, P: 24).17. SW, IV, p. 25. Moreover, it is made clear here that it is this feature of the

practical subject that constitutes its Absoluthelt.

.-,.--------,--------------


This characterization of the will's ability to "determine itself,"to determine which incentives will govern its actions, does notspell out precisely how this self-determination is to be understood.Does the will simply determine itself arbitrarily, or is there moreto be said about the way in which the will resolves to act? AI~

~houghj:i~4t£.9ge_s.s_~~m to a~~l?~Q the will the ability_t.Q..mak~,

a~b.itmr:y:,__ungmJ!!ld~~(j,e., choices that are neithercaused by natural processes nor made on the basis of a subjectivereason), iLi£nQt.tbiL~1as.lt"..Q.C1l1i.ud:..a.c.tiQllLthaiJ1l~QLmtittt.cre.s.1:,,_tuhim. Fichte's statement that one's willed acts aregrounded in oneself is intended to refer not primarily to the subject's capacity for ungrounded" choice but to a more articulatednotion of self-groundedness, It is in the context of explaining thelatter notion that Fichte introduces one version of the concept thatwill playa central role in his ethical theory, namely, the concept ofreflection:

By means of reflection ... the individual tears himself away fromthe natural drive and makes himself independent of it (stellt sid:unabhangig von ihmhin) as a free intelligence; he thereby obtains forhimself the capacity to postpone the self-determination and, withthis, the capacity to choose between various ways of satisfying thenatural drive.'?

As this passage makes clear, it is the subject's entering into akind of relation to itself that accounts for the possibility of its"independence," or its capacity for formally free action. The selfrelJ~JjQ.!!.Jtlj'§'§Jl_e here is characterized as one between th~tiJ1gl(;llld.1h~1J.rnldrive".Jlflb.e.l•..i:Y..hich in this context simplyrefers to the subject's immediate, given desires. What Fichteintends to express in the language of the "individual's tearingaway from himself" is the idea that the subject is capable of stepping back and distancing itself from its immediate and perhapsonly momentary desires, and that it is only under this conditionthat free choice becomes possible. 20 Yet refiecting upon one's desires,

18. The textual basis for this assertion is somewhat ambiguous, but Fichte doesseem to allow for a class of actions that are free (in the sense of being spontaneous) and that do not conform to the characterization offormal freedomdeveloped later as requiring purposive concepts and some degree of reflection. See, e.g., SW, IV, p. 178.

19. SW, IV, p. 179.20. In the context of formal self-determination this stepping back from one's

immediate inclinations does not require what one might call a "radical"


in the sense ofmerely being aware ofthern, is obviously not ofitselfsufficient to understand the capacity for willing, for the subjectmust also be capable of affirming or rejecting those desires. Fichteelaborates upon the form that this "absolute" capacity of thepractical subject assumes in his claim that "the absolute nature ofreal action . . . comes under the jurisdiction ofthe concept and onlythen becomes genuinefreedom. ,,21 The kind of concept Fichte hasin mind here is what he calls a Zweckbegriff, or "purposive con..cept." Thus, to say that the "absoluteness" of the practical subject"comes under the jurisdiction of concepts" must be to claim thatthe will's transition from its original indeterminacy to a deter...mined state (i.e., to willing a particular something) takes place inaccord with the subject's conception of the purpose it wants topursue through its action. Thl~_"§JJ.1>j~cr§..choice between~ll!Q!]L~..Q.l!!~~~~..Qf..~ct!Q!!.L~l!9uK.4 .._~2~~al!_~.~~EY~_~~t~~ng_ external _to i tself; is not th.erefQr~~~implY"K,\!n.Q~J.~!:ITlill~g.)_J2111j§..-.gr.ounded_

i!!~~~Q.!!.I~9!1:a.c()nception of one's goal, which serves as the stan-d£lJ:~l.for c1l90~T~g1!~qgg~~f~eavaITabfe ~Etion's-:Furtilermore:1DSo~.~_ when sucha..P.~EE2~!~~ c0t.!.ceEt is..!!?-yol':,edin the will's d~ter..!J1ination of itself that. jt~~,.~~!!g,!!.,j~P~.g.~!!~-~~.h'~f:r~~~J.~,~_,~2QQ,9.!<:E-!9-.

m~r~lX..JJ!!.£~JJ.~~gL~g!:.,.JJI!!Q~ltrrnID~g. Fichte's statement that thewill's Unbestimmbarkeit becomes freedom only when it is subjectedto the rule of concepts is to be taken as a rejection of the idea thatthe subject somehow exists originally as free and that, in additionto this quality, it also possesses the capacity to exercise its freedomin a rational way (i.e., in accord with concepts). Fichte's view,rather, must be that the subject's freedom, its ability to resist theimpulses of nature and to determine itself in any meaningfulsense, depends upon, and is inseparable from, its existence as anintelligence (lntelligenz), as a being that is capable of constructingand employing concepts.JrJJ~....willi!!g.jnvoly.es2.J~~~1.-!he a~ili!y

not Q,qlY;JQ..~bstr~.9JJl:Qm ..Q~.:§~RI~§,~nts!~~ir~~§"J2JJ.t.,,~l~JUQ~oQ§.ecoe's.determiningIncenrizea QI1Jh~e .ba~j~LQ.£a, ...ciln~epJ...9L~ip Qth.~r

~I£l~".fQt~~bj.e~ti.Y...kJ.:~a~Q.n~4C'- .In the following passage Fichte elaborates upon the role played

by ZweckbegrijJe in free willing:

abstraction from everything that one values. On the contrary, it is preciselyon the basis of these value commitments that one's immediate desires are tobe judged.

2 I. "Jene Absolutheit des reellen Handelns ... kommt unter die BotmqjJigkeit desBegrijJs; unddadurch erst wird sie eigentliche Freiheit" (SW, IV, p. 32).


The free being determines itself only with and according to concepts. Thus, its choice must be grounded upon a concept relatingto the choice, to that which is to be chosen. Let us say that a choiceis to be made among A, Band C. If the free being chooses one ofthem for example, C - can it prefer C without any ground whatsoever, that is, without an intelligible ground in a concept? Absolutely not, for then the choice would not take place throughfreedom but rather through blind chance. Freedom acts in accordwith concepts. There must be something in C by virtue of which itbecomes preferable. Let us call this something X. ... How does ithappen, then, that X determines the choice rather than some possible not-X? This can only have its ground in a general rule that therational being already possesses, '" which Kant ... calls amaxim. 22

While this passage contains a clear statement of the role of purposive concepts in willing, it also complicates Fichte's accountsomewhat by introducing the further notion of a maxim. Althoug,..hF,.ichteg,isting!ili;hes her~ b~..1ween ~w..eckbegriff":.r}E.3.. max~~L~e M

..cls:arl}i:. un.d~gi;l.l1Q§Jh~. two to be inJimateIY-L~g.J!.!!d...~.m;tJlJ.!ye.ssentia~~<i.~,Let us try to make Fichte's examplehere more concrete: I choose C (a run in the park) over B (a napin the sun) on the basis ofme..g~n~r;lLf~~t.1Jll~ of the former (X)thals!g,~ti!!g1!!~h.~.§..P fr2.!P.-i!§.!iYl:l.1 B. It is this general feature Xthat Fichte apparently refers to by the term Zweckbegrijf, and thisis to be taken to indicate simply that my choice of C is made on thebasis of my conception of a particular purpose - in this case,perhaps the enjoyment afforded by physical exercise or, alternatively, the state of good health it helps me to maintain.

Fiehte's additional point is that the adoption of a particularZweckbegrif[ is itself grounded in a general rule, or maxim, thatranks one purpose over another. The choice described here couldconceivably be based upon a number of distinct maxims, but letus consider only two possibilities: In the less complicated caseI simply enjoy jogging more than sunbathing and thus chooseto do the former. Here the maxim that governs my action is merelya subjective preference for Cover B, and the kind of "reflection"involved in this choice consists in nothing more than consulting my preferences. In a second case I find running tedious, andmy immediate impulse is to lie in the sun instead. However, in

22. SW, IV, p. 179.

FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY

'l"JA....tAr- ... 'n£'t' upon that desire and the alternative available to me, Iexercisewill be of greater benefit to my health and choose

for that reason. Here my reflection upon my immediate desire isisomewnat more complicated, as is mirrored in the fact that my act

determined by a higher-level maxim that ranks that which is! necessarv for good health as preferable to passive amusement.

Although this sketch leaves certain questions unanswel}q as tothe role played by maxims in formal self-determinationfj/Iet usturn now to a more general question about Fichte's acc~t,

namely, Why should we regard a choice grounded in a Zweckbegrijfand maxim as free, or self-determined? At least two distinctanswers are suggested by Fichte's text. In the passage' quotedearlier Fichte characterizes free action as following from a maximthat the subject "already possesses." The conclusion one mightdraw from this is that merely to determine my actions in accordwith a general rule represents itself a significant, though perhapsnot the deepest, form of self-determination, regardless of the originof that rule- that is, regardless of whether the rule itselfis in somefundamental way "self-given." Fichte's more characteristic position, however, is that the maxims that govern even the subject'sformally free choices are themselves freely chosen, or given by thesubject to itself "by means of absolute spontaneity.Y'" as opposedto having their origin in something external to the will: A maxim"becomes a maxim through an act of my own freedom, [thatis.] ... by means of the fact that I, as empirical subject, freely makeit into a rule for my action.t''" Thus, Fichte's view seems to be that,although one always chooses to act on the basis of some reason,what one allows to count as a decisive reason must depend, at leastin part, upon the subject's spontaneity. Moreover, Fichte seems tohold the position that if this spontaneity were not involved in theadoption of maxims, "all freedom would be nullified. "26

Thus, there seem to be two possible ways of understanding thestatus of the subject's determining maxims in Fichte's account of

23. For example, to what extent must the subject be ~onsciC2.,!~..!?fits determiningmaxims in order for its actions to be regarded as free? We Shall return to thisquestion later in the discussion of "full" formal freedom. The upshot ofFichte's apparent position is that the subject is capable of various degrees ofawareness of its maxims and that the more one is explicitly aware of themprior to acting, the freer the action. On this view, then, the freedom of Willkurwould be subject to differences of degree. See SW, IV, pp. 153-4, I g8.

~4. SW, IV, p. 181. See also p. Ig8. 25. SW, IV, p. 180.

26. "So wiirde alle iibrige ~reiheit aufgehoben" (SW, IV, p. 180).


formal self-determination. 9n onei~!.~r~i2!b....th!;_~m:axifQjLlr..r~k'yant to...1ht~L~.§.~ wh~th~Lth~h§!-1.11r2.q,,~$dsfr.o.mjt.iun-b.e.~.r.eg.~~w fQ,rru~Jy-free. ~~ny act that is done fora reason, as opposed to having a cause in nature, is to be considered to have been freely willed. Furthermore, it is not implausibleto regard this notion offreedom as a species of self-determination,since my particular acts are determined in accord with a principlethat, in a very straightforward sense, is "my own." 1:!.te secQ.nd~nt~rpr.e.tatfuIL(Q..n.d the one timt ~~J.!ls to ha'y~been Fic.h.t~§J!Q!!l-

.JnflllLp.Oll.itim1)Jl.old~.JbAan a~tid!:.~!L!l!ll¥ whwJ1.S det~r.illining

m~in::LiJLit~clfJLRro..Q.1lg.tQitbe subJ~rl:~~~. On thisview the practical subject's determining power (the "absoluteness" of its will) ultimately resides in its capacity to determinefreely which maxims will govern its actions, a capacity that ischaracterized here simply as a kind of spontaneity. I shall not tryto resolve this ambiguity in Fichte's position, for I believe that itis ultimately irrelevant to an understanding of the larger aims ofthe Sittenlehre and its analysis of self-determination in its moresubstantive form. The reason for this is that, on Fichte's view,neit:heLQfJhe..J.w£LQal!!;~til1g.l!~lled.~L<:.~s..l.l.sS~E~..~t cOilliir.~~,heading..§.d.8kc..~I!!1jnation in the dee~t sense of the term. Thisis because neither position offers an account of the s~ject's adoption of maxims that allows for those maxims to be understood as"its own" in a sufficiently substantive sense. This is obvious in thefirst case, where one's maxims might well have their source insomething external to the subject, but there is an important sensein which it is true of the second scenario as well. For in Fichte'selaboration of the latter view, nothing more is said about thesubject's adoption of maxims apart from an appeal to its spontaneity. If the account of self-determination were to end here, thenthe subject could be held to determine itself through rationalreflection with respect to its particular actions, but with respectto its maxims it would be self-determined only in the most abstract of senses. FOL.!!!ere!y to s£!Ylh~.&.!he.t.~~£.L~22E~jec!f

it~ m<l~~rr:t§_ s.p0t.l!.~!1~ou.sh:"i!'.~~Ll~~y.~...gp'~};!'..!h.~..1J.2~.~i,!?.~l~~Y...lhatit~sP<:>l!~an~!!Y.~9.l].llj§.ts in,,!t.Q.~hj.l1tu~J.Q~11~r.bi~y' ch.2!ce. Butif this were so, in what sense would the subjc'cl'innaxims reallybe "its own"? In what significant sense would they be selfdetermined? In the absence of a more developed account of thesubject's spontaneity, the difference between the two views sketchedhere is ofless consequence than initially seemed to be the case. It


is precisely this line of thought, I believe, that informs Fichte'smain project in the Sittenlehre. This general view finds its expression in the fact that Fichte calls the kind of freedom analyzedabove "formal freedom." To call this species offreedom "formal"is not to deny that it is genuinely freedom - it is even properly con..sidered a kind of'vself-determination'V? - but only to indicate thati t §ll;Q!!lg__1!Q!..~~~J~!J~~!!N.!Q~.I~Rr~§.~~nt§~Jf:d~J.eJIDiIUttiQn.injts.iulles t

s~~~. _This point invites us to ask how Fichte in fact conceives Ofsub-

stantive self-determination. Our discussion of the limits of themerely formal freedom involved in all willing constitutes a goodfirst step toward an answer to this question, for it suggests a wayof formulating more precisely what such an account shouldattempt to explain. ThtrPri!lcip,a.l_t.as,k_fa.~~.d_b~..E.i£.ht.~th.eQr:>!...Q.[

s.Ybs ~QJiYJ~,-~~Jf~~l~1~tmi!!~JiQ!L.fE:.;~L.!:2~7,_..Yn~1<~r,§JQQ~.c~.~",~Q1l~..~qf,,~~~plaining how the practiG.l!t.§J!Pj~.~.1...~~nw.b~~~.~~!f~d~!~rm.in.ing",~.!1Qionly on the level of its p(;\rtic"QJ~r_~,~tiQn.~,,,pP!lt~~1§,,9Wiib...r~.~.E,~£t~~pthe maxims that guiq_~cfq.Q!~__Q~~Q§. In other words, is it possibleto conceive of the subject as capable of giving its maxims to itself"spontaneously" in such a way that its espousal ofmaxims is morethan merely arbitrary? Fichte's answer to this question in its mostgeneral form will be that the subject can be self-determining withrespect to its maxims only by virtue ofa particular relation that itestablishes to itself. This very abstract characterization of Fichte'sposition is fairly easy to glean from his texts. The real difficultyconsists in articulating more precisely the nature of this crucialself-relation and in understanding how it enables one to comprehend the possibility ofsubstantive self-determination. An attemptto carry out this task brings us back to a question alluded to earlier concerning the relevance of Fichte's analysis ofwilling in general at the beginning of the Sittenlehre to his treatment of the moreimportant issue of substantive self-determination. We have already seen one way in which the earlier account is relevant here:An examination of formal self-determination enabled us to seemore clearly what a theory of substantive self-determinationshould attempt to accomplish. But for Fichte the discussion offormal freedom plays a more essential role than this. As we shall see,

27. Recall Fichte's statement, cited earlier, that all willing involves a "determining of oneself by oneself" (SW,IV, p. 22). Kant, too, uses 'self-determination'to refer to this notion of freedom, as evidenced by the passage from KRV,AS34/BS62, quoted earlier.


the most common way in which he characterizes the self-relation'that is fundamental to substantive self-determination is in termsof the subject's reflection upon its own capacity for willing - or,what is the same, upon its formal freedom.

Substantive self-determination

The universalist account

We have already seen that, on Fichte's view, the main goal of anaccount of substantive self-determination is to explain how thesubject can determine its own practical maxims, not in a merelyarbitrary manner, but in accord with "norms" that it somehowgives to itself. Before examining Fichte's attempts to explain howthis is possible, we must say something more about the notion ofa norm that is involved in substantive self-determination. It is notsurprising, given his Kantian heritage, that Fichte sometimescharacterizes his strong notion of self-determination as a kind ofautonomy, or "self-legislation" (Selbstgesetzgebung). Since autonomy consists in the giving of laws to oneself, it seems reasonableto look to Fichte's notion of a practical "law" to provide us with aconception of the kind of norms required for substantive selfdetermination.28

Although Fichte never provides an adequately detailed analysisof this crucial concept, he does at one point characterize a law asthe "inviolable maxim of all of [one's] willing."29 This definition,terse as it is, makes reference to two important characteristics ofa practical law: First, a law is itself a kind of maxim and, second,since it governs "all of one's willing," it is universal and thereforea maxim of the most general sort. What this seems to mean forFichte is that a practical law expresses the subject's "highest"

28. Our concern here is to articulate in a more general way than Fichte himselfdoes the minimal conditions that must be satisfied in order for a higher-levelmaxim to be considered a "norm" and hence capable of having a role insubstantive self-determination. Fichte's notion ofa practical law is regardedhere as one example of a norm that would satisfy these conditions. As such,it can provide us with a closer conception of the general features a norm musthave, but since the notion oflaw is bound up with only one of his accounts ofsubstantive self-determination (i.e., the one closest to Kant's theory of moralautonomy), it should not be regarded as the only possible exemplification ofa norm for self-determination in the stronger sense.

29. SW, IV, p. 56.


maxim, a principle. of action that, though not necessarily determin...ingevery particular deed, is never violated in one's willing. As such,a law must be understood as a kind ofhigher-order maxim capableofranking and harmonizing other possible maxims.3° Hence, a lawcan be conceived of as articulating a subject's highest value, whichestablishes a kind of consistency among its actions and maxims.The consistency provided by such a practical law, however, does'not by itself constitute autonomy for Fichte. S....~lf:~l~~te:rmination illjl._~~.d)~ta~~iye_.~~l}s..~_ requires mq;r_~ ..than ...l!?:~.t.:~l~Jh~. circumstancethat.rhere.esist _~., _higbe$.t" principl~ .JQ~..QLd~r~ ...Qn~,]_l!l~1!i!!!§.;.-fuillprinciple must also in some sense be,giYen.tltthe-~~JJ.hi~£th}: itself.

But what can it mean to give practical principles to oneself?In the first place, there is an important restriction upon the content of those principles that can play a role in substantive selfdetermination. One way of formulating this restriction is to saythat such principles must be "norms," but this is of little helpunless we specify how norms differ from other, "nonnorrnative"maxims. Thus far ~~.heY~'hs.h~r:~~~~Jj~~~l~!!.9!In,§.J~nly_as. higher~~Q.~r ma~i~_~_~~p~ble.9(determining ~~",~g.~!1f~~JQYV~r:1~1~x~i~~~ ,Yet clearly Fichte does _!1QJ_~QJJ:~iQ.~r_~t!flJ!jgper.:kveL!!1axims

toll~::po~sible. ~,or!p~t [qr, sup~~a,l).J!y~._.~.~I.f:.g~J_~!'I~Jjll_~.JiQ.~. The factthat the latter is to. involve self-given norms means that there is aclass of higher-order maxims that, because they can never be self...given in a significant sense, cannot be considered potential maxims for substantive self...determination. I!!..Q!der .fora norm to countafr'~~~~_~!.t:giY~l~~_.!tJ!lu~!.~Lm!n.~milJly)l1emQ[e th~..what might bec!!ll€d a~l1l~xiI!.1 ofll~t1.!re'.~ ...(a m~~imJh~_~g~!!t:RQ§.~~§..§~olely byvi,I!p.e ofher_~xi$t~!1~~.e_,~~~~. P~j.n,g,.§y.l?j,~..tD1.Q=na~ural d~ires). Thekinds of higher-order maxims that Fichte wants to rule out hereare those that are based solely upon the maximization of naturalpleasure." It is obvious that such a principle is capable of functioning as a higher-order maxim for determining lower-level maxims. The case described earlier ofmy choosing tojog even though

30. Even though a "highest" maxim ranks and harmonizes other, lower-levelmaxims, it need not be capable of resolving every possible conflict betweenlower-level principles. This is true, for example, in Kant's moral theory,where the supreme law, the categorical imperative, is incapable-of decidingbetween two conflicting maxims of happiness if each has the same moralworth.

3I. This is Fichte's point at SW, IV, p. 18o, where he associates the "naturaldrive" (Naturtrieb) with the maxim of choosing whatever "promises the great..est pleasure with respect to intensity and duration."

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMINATION I33

I prefer a nap in the sun is an example of such maximization ofpleasure, if, for example, the choice is made for the reason that thelong-term pleasure afforded by good health is judged to outweighthe momentary displeasure of vigorous exercise. On this scenario,the decision to run could not qualify as an instance of substantiveself-determination. For even though it involves the evaluation oflow-level maxims by higher ones, the maxim upon which thechoice is ultimately based expresses a purely "natural" purpose.t"But if self-given norms may not be "natural" maxims, what kindof maxims will they be? One obvious response is suggested byKant's distinction between natural and moral purposes, but thereis no reason that all nonnatural norms must be moral in a strictlyKantian sense. Also to be included here are any principles ofvalue that are not based upon a mere calculation of homogeneouspleasures and pains but that evaluate desires in qualitative ratherthan purely quantitative terms.P

Given that only certain higher-order maxims can be regardedas norms, we still need to consider the further question of hownorms can be given to the subject by itself. We can begin to answerthis question by returning to Fichte's notion of a practical law andasking what it means to give such a law to oneself. There is onesense in which the existence of any practical law requires theactive participation of the subject, for presumably the consistencyof will that is secured by such a law does not ever arise naturally,that is, without the subject's commitment to make a particularmaxim an inviolable principle for its willing. 34 Yet the notion ofself-determination that Fichte wants to articulate requires morethan this. It is not sufficient that the subject commit itself tofollowing any general principle whatsoever; that principle must be"its own" in a deeper sense. One way of formulating this extrarequirement is to say that the content of the highest maxim must

32. This same point is made in Charles Taylor's consideration ofa man who postpones the satisfaction of his immediate hunger in order to swim first and eatlater on the grounds that doing so maximizes his pleasure, since the enjoyment of swimming and eating outweighs that of eating alone. See Taylor(Ig8g, P: I IS). A longer version of the essay appears as "What Is HumanAgency?" (Ig85).

33. For example, the judgment that one desire is higher or lower, more worthy orless worthy, more or less noble than another. Hence, the concept of a normarticulated here corresponds roughly to Taylor's notion of "strong evaluation" (I983, pp. II2-I7).

34. This, I take it, is part of Fichte's point at SW, IV, p. 56, where he articulatesdifferent senses in which a law can be given by the subject to itself.


be given to the subject by itself. 35 In attempting to explain howself-legislation is possible Fichte refers again to his earlier

of a Zweckhegrijf. Since a practical law consists in a subject'sgeneral maxim, it can be regarded as an expression of what

values most highly Of, alternatively, of how one conceives ofp nl.gneStpurpose" (Endzweck). 361Q.g.!Y~.9.-nesel~~~hen,

emprace.._~ ...P.~~!~~l_~~!~! 4~~~!.c1~g!.ift' ~~~~RE~!!!~ ....2.Y~~ all other~las embodying most important purpose to be pursued in one'slife. IlLQ.r.der .Io be.autQ~9.mQ!!§j!L.th~.g...~~Q~~t~~u§~, .."'~ the~

sJ!yreme Zweckbegr.iff .~~~t .. i~., ~g9.P~~~~g~ "!!!'!!§"'tJ?~._~:,~~g~J?s~tr.Y£t.esI-!?.Y@Y§.~lf_" Thus, the task of explaining how a practical law can beself-given becomes one of characterizing how the subject constructs for itself a concept of its highest purpose. In carrying outthis task Fichte's primary concern is not to specify which purposiveconcept the subject must adopt as its highest in order to be trulyself-determined. What he focuses upon, rather, is how the subjectcomes to construct such a concept for itself Put in another way,Fichte regards his main task as consisting not in spelling outwhich norms the autonomous agent ought to have but in answer- .ing the question: What does it mean for a subject to adopt itsnorms in a self-determined mode? More specifically, in what kindof relation to itself must the self-determining subject stand?37

A hint at Fichte's conception of the self-relation that is essentialto substantive self-determination is given in a statement that-

35. This is the point implicit in Fichte's oft-repeated claim (considered later) thatmy highest ZweckbegrijJmust be "constructed by myself" (von mirselbst enitoor-fen), that it must be my "own produce' (SW, IV, p. 155). To say that thecontent of the law (not of the lower-level maxims) must be given by thesubject to itself does not exclude the possibility that the law might be of anextremely formal nature, such as Kant's categorical imperative. 'C,Qntent'h~d~~JQ "w!t~.1.1.4.~1!}y'.£.Qm1P~.D.d.~. U In Kant's case, although the morallaw does not command any particular maxims, it does have a content in thesense that it requires all lower-level maxims to meet the formal condition ofuniversalizability.

36. The concept of a "highest purpose,'> like the notion of a law's "content" discussed earlier, is intended in a very general sense such that even Kant'spurely formal notion of autonomy could be considered a kind of Endaoeck. ForKant my Endzuieck would consist in willing only those maxims that can beuniversalized.

37. This characterization ofFichte's aim is consistent with Tugendhat's observation that "it is only since Fichte and Kierkegaard that it has seemed necessaryto relate the question of the right mode of conduct not only to normative contents but also to the way in which I appropriate them for myself as an individual, that is) to the-way in which I relate to myselfin their appropriation."See Tugendhat (1986, P. 131).

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 135appears throughout the Sittenlehre in a number of formulations:"By means of its absolute reflection upon itself, the subject tearsitself away from everything external to itself, gains control overitselfand makes itselfabsolutely self-sufficient."38 This statementmakes clear that Fichte intends to)ocate the...§Y..!;;ri~ct~p.g,~.

d~Lmi1]._e~j!§,dfj!LillL~Q.ilit~~,.tQ._~t~p"b~£t.itQl1lj.t§_gw.n..n~

(h~b.Jromj~,'£lriy~~lUlfLdl;(.~irt~),f!n~:ltQrdl~~L)JR,Q!lit~~.lt:Jmd.w~itM~!i@:This general idea is already familiar to us from Fichte'sanalysis of willing in general, for formal self-determination wasseen there to require a kind of reflection as well. In that earliercase the subject was described as reflecting upon itselfas a Naturtoesen that is, as a being that finds itselfmotivated by a variety ofnatural incentives and then choosing among those incentives onthe basis of a particular purposive concept. I t should be clear,however, that an account of substantive self-determination requires something more, for what we are attempting to understandin this case is not merely the capacity for free choice but thesubject's ability to construct for itself a conception of its highestpurpose. Whereas formal self-determination is consistent with thesubject's free adoption of any purpose whatsoever, spbstantiv~

s.elf~de.texxninatioR.r~qllireJl.Jhe,~"bjeGLtQ.:wjiLin,.a~s;.Qr.d ,.Witl:Ll!.sp~{:ifj.~.kitl~LQf :Z;JP'§'f/s,l!.~gltIL o:g.e..JhaL~mbQdies" the.. subjecfs.sqpreme valueand thalit ':gixe..s tQjtseIC: It is for this reason thatwhen characterizing substantive self-determination Fichte furtherspecifies the notion of reflection referred to earlier as "the subject'sabsolutely free reflection upon itself in its true essential nature (inseinem wahren J#sen)."39 Thus, choosing in a.fully self-determinedmode requires that I reflect upon "my true nature" and makechoices that are in accord with that nature, choices that are insome sense expressions of "who I really am." In other words, insubstantive self-determination this conce12tiQ!LQL:::w.lliLLaxne~entiall.y': is to .serve as the "norm in accord with.JY~I:!illL.

sqPjec.t is tqtgeterm~.£!f freely.'~40 This general formulationseems plausible enough, but it raises two crucial questions: Whatis contained in Fichte's notion of a subject's essential nature? And,

38. This statement occurs nowhere in the Sittenlehre in precisely this form, but itis a translation of a passage at SW, IV, p. 133, with some interpolations (inbrackets) from SW, IV, p. 73: "Durch die [absolute] Reflexion [auf sichselbst] reiBtdas Ich sich los von allem, was aufler ihm sein soll, bekommt sichselbst in seine eigene Gewalt und stellt sich absolut selbstandig hin."

39. SW, IV, P: 57, my emphasis. 40. SW, IV, p. 51l.

136 FICHT~'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY

once its content is specified, how can this notion function as a normative guide for one's actions? Since neither of these questions canbe answered in a straightforward way, we shall restrict ourselvesfor the present to a consideration of the firs t.

Unfortunately, the Sittenlehre does not provide us with a clearanswer to even this most basic of questions. In fact, the text suggests that Fichte.unwittingly embraced..t:w.Q.JJifferentj!-..tlsw~-S_tothis_.Q~_~Ji.Q!!,_.~qch of which implies a distinct conception of selfdetermination. The distinction between the two answers is bestcharacterized as follows: Wb~n_J_.r.efk.CJ...lJ.12QtlJl1)!.~.~£..!!.~ture, H

a!E:J.~~ER<?~~g,Jl? .consider "Who I really am" ~§}J'?.e~.t4i§.J2£Y:t!£Yl~r

~g~y'!d~.~~i.~,..!J.r.. amI...to .reflect uP_9n.some universa] f~-c;t.t!!r,~,.."Qf,J!lYidentity, for exgtml~le,_"Yho !_~!!Lq1Lt!!.M!ftnal ~.!!Pj~ct? Fichte's actualdiscussion of substantive self-determination fails to distinguishconsistently between these two questions and, as one would expect, winds up following paths that lead in two different directions. The second alternative, which we shall examine first, is themore prominent in the Sittenlehre, and, beyond this, it shares deepaffinities, at least in intention, with Kant's own attempt to deducemoral obligation from a universal feature of the human subject,namely, its capacity for rationality. LetM.$ ~a,lttb.is. ..~.~cQl!!!ificq.~~s"lUllver,s,~lis.t~ .. c'Qll~~.:R tiqXt,,9f...;~1JQ.~J~.tttiy~. ~elf:·Q.~!~tmix~,~~:!i9n. Thisacro~~t''''iS'''intended to articulate a notion of self-determinationthat roughly corresponds to Kant's account of moral autonomy..Therefore, this version of Fichte's project is most consistent withhis long-held goal of providing a firmer foundation for Kant'smoral theory.

Yet, as I shall attempt to show, this account is beset by a number of confusions that make it considerably less interesting thanone might initially think. For this reason we shall also examine aStf&Q..nd..J,lJl!j.&!n~!,~~.f~~r~~rJBiq~ion that derives from the first ofthe two alternatives. This account is admittedly less prominent inFichte's writings, but it is present nonetheless, even though itremains undeveloped in important respects. As we shall see, thissecond account yields a notion ofself-determination that is broaderthan Kant's purely moral conception of autonomy but that is stillrelevant to the practical question "How ought I to live my life?"

We shall call this tb~~H~:i]1;9lxJ~,}!&\j~.~;.~£9lt9~Pt!Q!t~9[..~l!!?~te!2tiy~.self-determination, since it understands the subject's "true nature"to refer to its nature as a particular individual. There are tworeasons for paying so much attention to this second, undeveloped

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PRACTICAL SELF·DETERMINATION 137notion of self-determination: First, I believe that it is philosophically more interesting than the first of Fichte's conceptions; and,second, it is this interpretation that makes the most sense ofFichte's stated goal of understanding self-determination as dependent upon the "self-positing" that is unique to subjects.

Let us turn now to Fichte's universalist account of self- -\Z,,,

determination. As already mentioned, the principal way in which l ..",:v<r~... Q.I~

this view differs from the individualist conception is that it takesthe question of the subject's "true nature" to refer to an essentialfeature of all subjects rather than to one's own individual nature.Fichte begins to develop this account by locating the essentialfeature of the subject that is relevant to self-determination in whathe calls the I's "self-sufficiency" (Selbstandigkeit): "The principleof morality is consciousness's necessary thought that it ought todetermine its freedom in accord with the concept of selfsufficiency, unconditionally and without exception. ".j.! If it is mytrue nature as a subject to be self-sufficient, my actions are to beconsidered self-determined in the deepest sense when this concep-tion of my nature functions as the Zweckbegriffthat grounds them.In other words, my actions are self-determined when I choosethem for the reason that they either further or are consistent withmy nature as a self-sufficient being. The crucial concept here isclearly "self-sufficiency," but since this notion can be understoodin a variety of ways, it is necessary to ask what precisely Fichtemeans by it. The term Selbstandigkeit might also be translated as"independence," a 'notion that appears explicitly in Fichte's fre-quent characterizations of Selbstandigkeit as "absolute indepen-dence from all of nature."¥! Yet what does it mean for a subject tobe independent of nature? In the rare cases where Fichte ad-dresses this issue explicitly, he resorts to a familiar notion: The I'sself-sufficiency consists in its Unbestimmbarkeit, or its "absoluteinability to be determined by anything external to the 1."43Fichte's appeal to the I's Unbestimmbarkeit to explicate the notion ofself-sufficiency makes it clear that he intends to use his earlieranalysis of the radically undetermined, "absolute" nature of thewill in all of its willing to provide him with a notion of the I's

41. SW, IV, P: 59. See also pp. 50-60 and throughout the work.42. "Absolute Unabhangigkeit von aller Natur" (SW, IV, P: 131).43. SW, IV, p. 56. Fichte also identifies the I's self-sufficiency with its freedom

(p, 49), as well as with its Absolutheit (p. 50), a concept discussed earlier inconjunction with the notion of the absolute nature of all willing.

138 FICHTE'S- THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY

self-sufficiency that can serve as a norm for self-determined actionin the strong sense. In other words, F~ht~~s..JUlgg.e.s.ili>ll..s.em~

bJLili~~tin.~t!~9ting~.R~1l..!!1Y__!1~llir.~~~.a1Q!1!1,~1j! fr..et-hcing-»itlLth~ capacity tQ_sl~tMminewhi$;D of rnY..,JDJ;s;ntiyes mgQ~rn my....a£tio.o", t .fttt~!l1 .~ ..~9nJ;~11!j.Qn",g,[my.§~~lfJ~§~~~5fJf:,§1!ffi.~ivll.Uha t "1~'!nfUJ1.Ytion.J~l;cS. a.s.t~JJd9r~t.fQrn;d~~~oxtLJ1ing~whi~b.<a.-~tiQJl,§,aa.mQllg thosea~~J~Ql~Lt.QJ!!~~l...,Qyght!o4-J1gertak~ Ifsome sense could be madeof this scenario, then the actions chosen could be considered selfdetermined in the sense that they would follow from my "truenature" as a free, practical being. ,

1Lh.is..~s.tr.a-tcg~M"lJ.LtiJ)l-at~1)Liw..1or_J:h.~.mpk,J:,~~~L_

imR9-~~iible, -.to.. .!lnd~.!§.,tjl.l!d_§"yMt~,nti~e.,J~el~dtJ;~.,r.tIDjnatiQll~me.1.el y '.jn terms.ofJh,e,...s!lbj~~t:s~~~tle~(;JjQttJJ,P.Q!l<jtS<~.~apJ\citY«¥.JIQL..ful:ma1 ...fr~~J19m. In focusing upon the will's "independence from nature,"what Fichte clearly has in mind is something akin to Kant's pointthat truly autonomous action requires one's will to be determinedby a purely rational incentive, as opposed to one that derives fromnature (i.e., sensuous desire). Thus, autonomy for Kant doesinvolve an "independence from nature," but in a sense that isdistinct from the way it is understood in Fichte's original accountofwilling. According to the latter, the.practical.subject is indepenck!l!tf!9mJl~~4-r~jnall .. .QfjJ~ ..wjltingin,..the ~~!19~,thlli...I! incentive-)oUha1eY~r~.kind~,.,.G~1},~8tJl~t~~miu~~.t!t~lYill_~n it~~'.Y..!1. This istrue not only when cruty' is o'pposecft'o--a"esirel)iif~als'()'when natu-ral desires 'conflict. !!l this sense I._am_j!!.Q~R~_~Q.~~tfrom naturelffi~~per.l~~i~h.~~gCl.r:4!~~.~_,QrJb..~.~~QQt~l1tQfJ!ty_ch,Qice$. Since it istaken as a fact that the human will is independent from nature inthis sense, it is difficult to see how reflection upon this feature ofthe practical subject could give rise to norms for self-determined

/ action. S~y_no amQ.~Qtof..!'.f..flection,...!!PQ!1~~~j!:!'£LQ.fmyc!!R,f!.C~t.y..for .freechoice, ~a.!lJ~~lp..,m~,~.!Q_.,g~cige w4i91l.,fQl!!'se of~Gti9!l.l.,J),yghtJQ,.fQ!lQ:W·

In addition to this suggestion that reflection upon my formalfreedom can provide me with my highest Zuieckbegriff, Fichtealludes to a weaker sense in which reflection upon one's "inabilityto be determined by nature" (Unbestimmbarkeit durch die Natur)could be said to playa role in self-determination:

When I become aware of my merely formal freedom, I ... therebyacquire the capacity to postpone the [immediate] satisfaction ofnature, ... and at the same time I acquire the capacity to reflect

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 139upon the natural drive in the different forms in which it offers itselfto me and to choose among the various possible satisfactions if it. . . . Ichoose with full freedom of the will (mit volliger Willenifreiheit), forI choose with a consciousness of [my] self-determination.f

The crux of Fichte's claim here apparently is that to be explicitly aware of my formal freedom prior to acting has the effect ofdeepening the sense in which I am free. What.Eicht.e..has..in.mindmust be.the.fQJ1Q.~.ing:To be expressly aW!!ffiQf the fact tha.1.l.~Jl1

capable .Q[,(J;;e~_.I<..QQice is~iztl thq.1J:y.qill do d~P-end§...1!1ti

mately.upnn...m..t.xa~t..~n uPQ!tJQ.l,:~~,.mlt.liid~ ..~QLm.y~~Iill.91.This realization itself, however, can move me to reflect more carefully upon the choice before me in order to determine which of thealternatives I want to pursue. This interpretation ofFichte's notionof the "full freedom of the will" is consistent with his further characterizations of it as "acting with circumspection (Besonnenheit)and consciousness" and as "being conscious ofthe reason (Grund)for which I act as I do. "4.') This "full" freedom is contrasted with"finding the rule in accord with which the act ... occurred onlyafter the fact."46 Thus, the distinction made here between "full"freedom and a state that is somehow less free turns upon thedifference between consciously followed maxims and maxims thatdetermine actions more or less unconsciously. This im~hat~the extem_.itLwhiQh,.,Qn~.i&.i1LJl~Jre.edependl;l uPQ.uJlte.degr.e.e_m.which.one.is ..explici.tly...aw'ilr.e..Q[thex.ule$.Jhatin.fiu~t.g.oxern.Q~lL_.\;tctiQo,s. Hence, this distinction does not coincide with the onemade between substantive and formal self-determination, butrather operates within the sphere offormal freedom itself: Some ofour formally free actions are fully free in the sense that the reasonsfor which they are done are explicitly known by the agent prior toaction, while others those in which the determining maximsremain partly obscure to the agent must be considered less free.Nevertheless, if "full freedom of the will" in this sense does not yetconstitute substantive self-determination, it is certainly not irrelevant to it, and indeed, may plausibly be regarded as a necessarycondition for it. For if true self-determination consists in the subject's capacity to evaluate its own maxims in relation to a highest,self-given principle and to determine its particular actions inaccord with this evaluation, then the subject must be capable both

44. SW, IV, pp. 161-2. 45. SW, IV, p. 154. 46. SW, IV, p, 188.


f- of ~ing_th!<.r~-.!~§.Q.~~J)~ind its actions an.d..9f..<:<ngJ!gmgjp.a.auhstannal.degrce _QfJ:efl~,cJ.iYe,.d~lib~eI:atiQn .•pJi9.J to acting.

Fichte's inability to account for substantive self-determinationin terms of the subject's reflection upon its self-sufficiency (where'self-sufficiency' is understood as the subject's freedom from determination by nature) should lead us to ask whether there might notbe another way ofinterpreting the I's "independence from nature"that could make Fichte's account somewhat more plausible. Thereis, in fact, a second and very different sense that Fichte sometimesgives to the notion of self-sufficiency, but unfortunately, as we shallsee, it too proves incapable of serving as the basis for an adequateaccount of self-determination in the desired sense. This secondsense of self-sufficiency is especially prominent in later passages ofthe Sittenlehre, where "our complete independence from everythingexternal to us" is clearly meant to refer not to a subjective aspectof agency but to "an objective state" (einen objektioen Zustand) thatone's actions bring about. Hence, thi.s-s.trQ;nd...Qf~Ekbl~~.t9..Q!!ghtdefines.. the, snbject's....self-suflicie..ncy.in,tcrma.of.irs.relaticn.to.an,Qhj/~<;,.tive.. ~et of.cir~JlmSlallce.§,,~_RrQdJlCc~~t .._b~.~.itl'I4 ..Q.~tLll&,tiQl1. Toqualify as "self-determined" in this sense, an action must fostermy objective freedom from nature; it must be "part of a serieswhich, if continued, would have to lead to the I's indepen...dence."47 According to this view, a subject is self-determinedwhen "the intention, the concept of 'its acting, aims at completeliberation from nature"48 or, in other words, when the highestZweckbegrijf in accord with which it orders all other maximsembodies the aim offreeing itselffrom the objective constraintsofnature.

What does it mean, though, for the subject to have an objectiveexistence in which it is free from nature? Once again, Fichteunderstands this idea in a number of ways. In the first place, thenotion of the 1'8 independence from nature is reminiscent of hisposition in the WL 1794 that the I's essential nature resides in itsstriving to eliminate limits imposed upon it by the not-I. As wesaw, this idea had there a primarily moral content, according towhich it was the I's essential Bestimmung, or vocation, to realizemoral purposes within the empirical world. This was understoodnot only as a demand that moral intentions be translated into real'

-


actions but, more significantly, as urging that the objective worlditself be rearranged so as to foster the moral development of theagents who inhabit it. This strictly moral interpretation of thesubject's objective "independence from nature" is still present inthe Sittenlehre, but it is no longer the only, or even the predominant,sense Fichte gives to the notion. For in many places he seems tohave in mind simply a naturalistic ideal in which the humanspecies attains a state Q.("compktce_dmnin..qj;ion"QYer nature in thesense that we learn successfully to realize all human purposeswithin the world, including those that derive from our sensuousnature alone.t? At still other times Fichte defines self-sufficiency asth\4indivi~;hlilJ~'L~:P.RIQIH:lliYOllQ[,tb!f.,.PQW!~LQInailJ]·.e." his abilityto make the natural world a mere extension of himself, as aninstrument of his particular will:

Self-sufficiency, our ultimate goal, consists ... in that state ofaffairs in which everything is dependent upon me and I am notdependent upon anything, where everything that I will occurs inmy sensible world simply because I will it to be so, just as in thecase of my body, the starting point of my absolute causality. Theworld must become for me what my body is for me. Now, to be sure,this goal is unattainable, but nevertheless I should always advancetowards it that is, I should work upon (bearbeiten) everything inthe sensible world so that it comes to be a means for the attainmentof this final purpose.5°

Taken at face value, the notion that our highest ethical goalconsists in making the world into a corporeal extension ofour willsurely counts as one of Fichte's more outrageous ideas. Yet whMqp~erlies this,,_1!s~'y'y~l1 as .hiLyari~..Qj:~llce.p.tiQns.....aLs.clf

suflicie.nc:y_.a.a-an'~objective state..~'js,.th.e~Qr,e"s.e.rlo.lJ.Ii,.claim..thaLs.eJ£-;deter.minatiQuJn»its..deep.e,s.t. fQrm.is,J:l,R,t~~!:,w..,4gll~~pj.,\:;&.ti¥eajf~i!'c but .one.that.cequires..some..kiud...oLexpI.e.s.siQ.n,ju_the.,Q4j.eC::.

49. This aspect is especiallyprominent in Fichte'spopular writings. See, e.g., hisimpassioned description of the future in Fichte (1956, pp. 102-4; SW, II,pp. 266-9): "Cultivation shall quickenand ameliorate the sluggishand baleful atmosphere of primeval forests, deserts and marshes.. , . Nature shallbecome more and more intelligible and transparent; ... human power ...shall rule over her without difficulty, and the conquest, once made, shall bepeacefully maintained." And so on.

50. SW, IV, p. 229.

142 FICHTE'S THEORY OF SUBJEOTIVITY

tive world ll~ell. While Fichte's scattered remarks on this topicare philosophically provocative (as evidenced by their influenceon later German philosophy), they nevertheless fall far short ofconstituting a coherent and adequately elaborated conception ofthe subject's Selbstandigkeit as an objective state of freedom fromnature.

Apart from this objection, there is another problem with defining substantive self-determination in terms of an objective statethat is more relevant to our purposes here. Even if we grantFichte's intuition that true self-determination requires some kindof realization in the external world, something more substantial isneeded for a complete account of self-determination. 'Lhe-pr...Qb.l~m

with~,1his__str.a.tegY_J\.S_.Eic.ht,e.J~~x.e.Cu.te~Litjs~Jha.t_it,,!lefines...th.e~.ub:ject'sautoncmv.only interms ofits indepcndencefrom.some..thlng..-e.in. this.case, somethingthat .is conceived...a_s...r.a.dicall.}!'",~o ...tb..er~~.,withour beingable to say more positively what se.lf:,~d.ete.r.mi.na.tion

j~!__Jf.it means anything at all, "independence from nature" mustrefer to the subject's ability to accomplish its own purposes unhindered by natural impediments. But then the main question of atheory of self-determination remains unanswered: What does itmean for a subject to have "its own" purposes? It is certainlypossible to conceive of these purposes in wholly naturalistic termsas the totality of natural needs characteristic of an embodiedsubject. Although Fichte does not completely disregard thesepurely natural purposes, it is clearly not his intention simply toidentify a subject's self-given purposes with the promptings ofnature. J.:Q1h~ absence..Qf~~.n~fYr..th.e.r.g}J1Jlly-s.i"s_QLwh~Jj.t_meanaJQfthe,pIac.tic.al...s.ubj"ect_t.Q.-de..te.rmine_jt.s._.Qwn.,,_g~_a1La..cca.unLof.suhstantizc...,self::de:te.rmi.ruu.LQllJlS_nle.:r.e.jnde.p~n.den~e from riaturer.~m£).lns-J:aiheLel!l.pjy: Th~,".~sil~~.t_s,triv~.s~j.Q~ir~.e_~it~clfJr.o.D1

nature. jn._jlr.deJ:~tQ,~r.e..aljze£'..it.s,,,.Qw.n.~P-lJ.rp.Q..sJ~~.,~lly_tlJ.~~,,_elld...frQmwh~r.~,_dqC:;'~4itQbJ~iD-<-lh.~§-~~P-Y.rP.QSt~-thaJ...a[~~~lleg~,dl¥.ilS-P..iUJ.l Itis precisely this question that Fichte's account is intended toanswer.

This marks the end of our examination of the first group ofFichte's attempts to construct a theory of substantive selfdetermination. As I outlined earlier, what the members of thisgroup have in common is the view that self-determination consistsin the subject's determination of its actions in accord with its"essential nature," where that notion is taken to refer to an essential, universal feature ofsubjects in general. The main conclusion

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 143to be drawn from the foregoing analysis is that the central notionbehind these conceptions - that the I's Selbstiindigkeit constitutesits essential nature - is represented by Fichte in such a variety ofways that it is difficult to reconstruct a single, coherent account ofhow substantive self-determination is to be understood. Moreover, none of the alternatives sketched thus far seems a verypromising first step toward an account that could explain what itmeans for a subject to give itself general practical principles.

In what follows I shall try to show that Fichte's second way ofconceiving of substantive self-determination - what I referred toearlier as his "individualist" conception - is more interesting thanthe first, despite the fact that it is found in the Sittenlehre only in anundeveloped form. Before turning to this task, however, let usbriefly note two points concerning the relationship between thesealternative conceptions. First, and most important, the twoaccounts employ fundamentally distinct notions of substantiveself-determination. Although both understand self-determinationto be willing in accord with one's "true nature," the second takesone's "nature" to refer not to an essential feature of all subjects butto the different natures of particular individuals. Second, Fichtedoes not address the issue of whether there are significant connections between these notions of self-determination. The two aresimply presented side by side in his texts and appear to be developed in complete independence of each other. The most likelyexplanation for his failure to integrate the two accounts is that, asis so often the case with Fichte, he himself was unaware of thedifferent strands within his own position. As we shall see later, oneimportant consequence of this fact is that Fichte was unable todevelop the basic idea underlying this second conception into afully articulated theory of substantive self-determination.

The individualist account

We shall begin this account of self-determination by demonstrating that Fichte does indeed sometimes conceive of the subject's"true nature" in terms of an individual's particular nature, or"character," rather than as a universal essence of subjects perse, As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Fichte understandsthe task of his account of substantive self-determination to consist in explaining in what sense the practical subject can be "itsown ground," and one of the ways in which he conceives of this


self-groundedness is as the subject's ability to make itself into thekind of individual it wants to be: "Originally, i.e., apart from itsown doing, the subject is absolutely nothing: what it is to become,it must make itself into by means of its own activity,"?' ThatFichte has in mind here the different natures of particular individuals is made clear by passages such as the following:

Who am I really - that is, what kind of an individual am I? Andwhat is the reason that I am thatindividual? I answer: I am ... thatindividual into whom Ifreely make myself, and I amthis [kind ofindividual] because I make myselfinto it. 5~

What Fichte is alluding to here is clearly some notion of individual character.P which includes the idea that one's nature is insome sense self-created rather than merely given. The notion of aself-created character, as well as the attempt to relate this notionto the topic of self-determination, are not themes unique to Fichtebut have their origin, I would suggest, in a particular part ofKant's moral philosophy, namely, his theory of moral disposition'(Gesinnung) and its relation to free choice, or Willkur. Before considering Fichte's account, it will be helpful to examine in somedetail Kant's own understanding of moral disposition, especiallyinsofar as it is a response to a particular conception of Willkurthatis found in Reinhold's moral theory. Since the version of Fichte'saccount of self-determination under consideration here can beseen as a part of this very debate, our treatment of Kant andReinhold will be less a detour than a first step toward understanding Fichte's view.

Fichte's interest in the notion of Willkur and its relation to moraltheory does not originate in 1798 with the publication of the

.Sittenlehre. As early as 1793 Fichte was preoccupied with this issue,

5I. SW, IV, p. 50; see also p. 38.52. "Wer bin ich denn eigentlich, d.i. was fur ein Individuum? Und welches ist

der Grund, daf ich de:bin? Ieh antworte: ieh bin ... detjenige, zu ioelchem ic}!mick mit Freiheit mache, und bin es darum, weil ich mich daru mache" (SW, IV,p. 222). '

53. Tugendhat's interpretation supports this reading of Fichte's project as well:"Kant does not yet mean by au tonomy a self-determination of the person asa person or of the I as an I, but a self-determination of reason. It is Fichte whofirst attempts to understand the rationality of the person on the basis of theI's relation to itself" (Tugendhat, pp. 133-4; translation amended).


as evidenced by the Creuzer review." which is devoted almostexclusively to the task of giving a coherent account of the kind offreedom characteristic of Willkur. In this early text Fichte arguesthat it is essential to distinguish between two senses of freedom or, in his words, between two kinds of "absolute self-activity"(absolute Selbsttatigkeit) both of which are required by Kant'smoral philosophy; .'The fiJ'.§.Ll~i.n£!....QL'.~glf-1!f!iyity~~j.Ltlill.L."by

rrt~~J)& oL~l!l~hL~A.~Qt.lj!'l,~P.L,!ctiSf-l~nsLg1v~sit~~lfJl.l::!:j:y:'55 Although Fichte does not elaborate upon this conception in theCreuzer review, it is clear that this sense of self-activity corresponds to the most prominent notion of freedom in Kant's moraltheory, namely, the idea of moral autonomy, which is defined asdetermining one's will in accord with self-prescribed laws of reason, independently of desire and natural inclination. In choosingto follow the moral law the subject is autonomous because itstands under no laws other than those that it gives to itself. Underthis conception, freedom is coextensive with morality. To actimmorally - or amorally - is to act in accord with "external"incentives that are given to the subject by nature. This stands incontrast to true self-determination through the adoption of incentives supplied to oneself by the faculty of reason.

For the present it is unnecessary to explore this conception ofautonomy in greater detail, since it is the second notion offreedomthat is of greater concern to us here. The latter is defined by Fichteas "that by means of which the human being determines himself(in this function, his will) to obey or disobey [the moral] law."56

Although every human being, by virtue of being rational, standsunder the obligation to follow the moral law, not every individualin fact chooses the path of moral action.ltia..tb.i.s.a$Pl;~LQffr~gQlJl

-;:::the illdiYiciual 's__choi£~jQjQlli.llY..QLj;!u:lisr§ganljb~dktllt«§ .Qftl1¥mQI~lJSlJ:Y_._.lh~Us involve4 in the secqpd~~~m.This act of choice is a kind of freedom, because presumably it iscarried out by the will alone, independently of anything externalto itself. The will either accepts or rejects the moral law as determining its own maxim, and this choice cannot be explained orpredicted on the basis of factors outside of the will itself.

54. This article is Fichte's review of Leonhard Creuzer's book Skeptisdu: Betrachtungen iiber die Freiheit des Willens mitHinsichi aufdie neuesten Theorien iiber dieselben(GA, 1.2, pp. 7-14; SW, VIII, pp. 411-17).

55. SW, VIII, p. 412. 56. SW, VIII, p. 412.


1.L~hould be __obvious..__th§l:!~t.h~~_!'YY,.q..J~l}~~~~Q.U!.eedgE!-.illstill:,guish~~_ here by Fichte are ~p:t~~~.Q.~"!9~~Q~.E~~P2E.~~L!"2,...!hc~~vg,!§!iJ1c"riQ]! between the will (Will~.t_~~9..!!l~~~[~,~~!!Y.~2~h~!£~~a~L!11l~~.~!),which was articulated by Kant in its most explicit form in 1793,after the publication of the second Critique, in his work entitledReligion Within the Bounds ofReason Alone. 57 That Kant considersWillkur to involve a kind of freedom is evidenced by his frequentuse of the locution "freedom of choice" (Freiheit der Willkur). Fur-thermore, it is clear that this ~~~.~~,.Qf.Jr~.~~tQ.!!!..,L~...!!!t~J}!l~~-!!QJJ2r~:RJE.-fe the _IlQ~iQ.!1_qffr~eQ2!!!.2-~..!!}gt~~t!!~~t<2.!!Q.~1?ut !QYT~Rr!t~~n.L

A ·§p~c;!~E.s)ffr~~.slQI!lili!!~tj<£~=dis t!.!}9.~ frQ,!l!., ~~~1.Qf a.:~!Q.!lQmY~ ..e!l9.~xete.gJ!allY..~§~~~t!~!.."tq..AJ1!1!.J!~£Q!!!lt2[!!!.Qr~lity. It is not difficult tosee why this second sense of freedom is required by Kant's moraltheory. As long as the only sense of freedom available to Kant isdefined in terms of the autonomy involved in following the morallaw, then all nonmoral acts must be regarded as unfree. The problematic implication of this view is that immoral actions wouldthen not be free, and therefore one could not ascribe moral responsibility to the individuals who commit them. If, however, thenotion of the freedom of choice is incorporated into the theory,then immoral acts can still be considered unfree in the deepestsense (i.e., in that they are not autonomous), but they can nevertheless be regarded as freely chosen and, for that reason, theiragents may be held morally responsible for them.

As mentioned earlier, one of the concerns that plagued Fichte

57. Henceforth cited as Religion. English translation by Theodore M. Greene andHoyt H. Hudson (1960); original in Akademie-Ausgabe, VI. It is unclear towhat degree this distinction is already present within Kant's earlier moralwritings. It is sometimes suggested that Kant's distinction in the Groundworkbetween positive and negative freedom is a forerunner of the Wille-Willkurdistinction. It seems to me, however, that the earlier version of the distinction is best understood not as articulating two distinct kinds of freedom but,rather, as two ways of conceptualizing the same thing. The negative conception·offreedom is negative, not because it refers to a kind offreedom differentfrom the positive sort, but because it merely defines freedom negatively,in terms of what it is not (Le., natural causality), whereas the positive conception spells out more concretely what human freedom consists in (i.e., determination in accord with a self-givenlaw). On the other hand, Kant's accountof "practical freedom" in Canon I of the first Critique (A798-8oS/B826-SI)is very close to his later conception of Willkur. What is clear is that Kant'sexplicit discussion of Willkurin the Religion is directly motivated by the criticism made by various contemporaries, including Reinhold, that Kant's moraltheory required for its coherence some notion of the freedom of choice.

«

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 147from the time of his earliest contact with Kant's moral philosophywas the question: What is the nature of Willkur? We have alreadyexamined Fichte's treatment of free choice in an earlier portion ofthis chapter. The notion of Willkur we are about to examine herehas a somewhat narrower scope than that offree choice in general,for as Kant treats it in the Religion, Willkur has a purely moral significance, which means that what is at issue is not a choice between two morally equivalent actions but one between followingthe moral law and rejecting it. Nevertheless, this more specifictreatment of Willkur is relevant to our earlier account as well, forKant's notion of moral disposition can be seen as an attempt togive an answer to a question we encountered in Fichte's moregeneral account offree choice: Iffree acts are grounded in subjective maxims, what, if anything, determines those maxims themselves? I want to argue that this same issue recurs in Fichte'sattempt to give an account of substantive self-determination inthe Sittenlehte and that the project undertaken there can be understood as an attempt to steer a middle course between two opposing ways of conceiving of Willkur: one as the capacity for carryingout isolated and arbitrary choices, the other as a faculty that is insome sense determined to choose in accord with one's fundamental, noumenal disposition. Ifwe were to recast Fichte's dilemma interms of the historical figures who hold these positions, we couldcharacterize it as the choice between Reinhold's account of Willkurand the one offered by Kant.

Before the publication in 1792 of Kant's account of Willkur inBook I of the Religion, Reinhold developed his own account fdf)Willkur in the second volume of his Letters on Kantian PhilosophY..5f3 '

1?hJ,;r~..B~i.nhQI<1. aclol:lts~h<!LiLiLl.!.relY..lll!:..!li°~.L!!.~t~al "Y~.Y.•!2_conceive of Will~~~?.~~ly, as the SU~1~!~~_a:!?i!~!Lto_m~~e ~<?!l

t.~neous a1!c!.~2!1:l.pl~_~~!L~E~eterml,!1ed chC?ic~~.i!:9!~·u~..~~various .. pra£ti.~!l1..J~os~iElli.!i~~.l! ..f~£~~~Reinhold reasons that inorder for the choices of Willkur to be free, they must be whollyspontaneous, which means for him that they must have no objective ground outside of the subject itself. This, for Reinhold, isequivalent to saying that these choices are not causally determined by some state of affairs external to the will. From thisconsideration Reinhold concludes that "the free act is nothing less

58. Reinhold (1792, II). See especially Letter 8.


than groundless (grundlos ),"59 Of, as we might say, undetermined.This view of Willkilr fits into the larger theory of moral agency inthe following way: The practical subject is aware of itselfas standing under a universal moral law that it gives to itself by virtue ofits rational capacities. The practical nature of pure reason, then,consists in its ability to supply the subject with a general law thatderives solely from its own rational nature without recourse to anyempirically conditioned notions such as happiness. In addition toits awareness of the moral law, the rational subject is also able tofeel respect for such a law, and this feeling is capable of serving asan incentive for choosing to follow the dictates of duty over thepromptings of natural desire. But, since human beings are notonly rational but sensually affected as well, other incentives in theform of natural inclinations will be pulling the will in opposingdirections and competing with the moral incentive of respect todetermine the will's course of action. In every instance of suchmoral conflict, the outcome, on Reinhold's view, is determined byan act of Witlkilr, an ungrounded and arbitrary choice betweencompeting incentives.

Now it is clear that this notion of Witlkilr succeeds at solving theproblem it was originally intended to address, for it enables one toascribe freedom, and therefore m~ritpr blame, to both moral andimmoral deeds. Wh:Yi th~:QL4Q,~~_,~.~EJ,,,!:~J~ct t.hJs.,~f~ql.lJ}!J~,.!l9 fOf:m1.!lgJ~ ~l!Qth~!' ..~!!l<~~!§~~,l?.t<?,~9.? Rather than answer this questiondirectly, let us turn first to Kant's alternative account of Willkurwith the aim of contrasting the two positions in order to discoverKant's reasons for going beyond Reinhold's view. Since Kant'streatment of Willkilr is considerably more complex than Rein- (\hold's, we need to take a rather detailed look at Kant's account,especially in its most fully articulated form, in Book I of theReligion. Crucial to Kant's :goiliion here isJh~flaitp. that all deedLip_lh~._~~nsiQ!~_wor~4-.~~..E!~~E.ci~~~n~det~rl1!ined by, a "subjec!t~,-~_ ..g,!:Q.1J1!f!~~_~,60 The term 'deed' here is significant, for it is certainly not Kant's view that all empirical events have a subjective

59. Reinhold (1792, II, P- 282).60. Religion, p. 21; English, Pi 16. In explicating the concept of human nature

Kant refers to "the subjective ground of the use of one's freedom in general... , which precedes all sensible deeds" (der subjektioe Grund des Gebrauchs seinerFreiheit iiberhaupt I • • , der vor alter in die Sinne fallenden Tat vorhergeht). Laterreferences make clear though that the subjective ground does not precede itsdeed in a temporal sens~.

II!

cd

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMJNATION 149ground, nor even that all of human behavior has such a ground.'Deed', rather, refers to that class of human actions that we thinkof as resulting from the volitions of practical beings. Wl1.!l:~distil1

g!!!she§...!hti!~_ act~Q!!:.s.lt9.!!!_ptheL~y~g!~2.. OtL!<:<l:nt'svie\y, is that _Jh!?-)L_£tJ~ ":tfLQiU~?ipl~in"<::g"QKtJ.h~ .h?:s.h!c g.L.~.!lt>i~£!h:~ r(;l.tl1~r thanobj~£tiy~~_g£2.\:!g9s. It is this notion of a subjective ground thataccounts for the principal way in which Kant's account of Willkurdiverges from Reinhold's, and this difference is based upon thefollowing consideration: Both Kant and Reinhold agree that anecessary condition for Willkur's choices to be free is that they beundetermined by an objective ground or, what is the same, thatthey not be the causally determined effects of some objective process. On ~ant's view, how~Y.~,~~!:il1.h9l(L~r!~j!!J!!"~!!b;,,~I&SUilli.!!gt!lat if l!s.boiceJ1!9ks~JtQ{lj.§£lipg.<:te!<-;J:'mi~hlggrl;mng,jtmJ.!§lJhrnbe c0.!!!.ELl'?!~1y.R21!.l1Q~~.~.~~ Kant's strategy, in contrast, is to employ the notion of a subjective ground in order to explain the possibility of choice that is free but not therefore randomly chosen.Kant's view,)n oth<;rr words,j~J19j: t:QJ!tjh.<::J[~!L~,£.1Jl.Qf.J±lllkilLare

ahSQIJJ.~lY_lll1determil],ed ..bJJt..:r<l,.th~r. thllJJhQy~~.Jk!:~.!!!i!!~9 gygJ:QJ)..rn:1§..Jl1at U!!:ye.(1. sJJP'j~.f.tiy.<L.!,ath~.r th~ILQ.W~a ture. Dl

Now, how are we to conceive of a subjective ground that governsthe exercise of freedom? The answer to this question is madeexplicit in the following passage from the Religion:

The freedom of Willkiir is of a wholly unique nature in that noincentive can determine Willkilr to an action, except insofar as thehuman being has incorporated that incentive into its maxim (hasmade it into a general rule in accord with which he will conducthimself).6'

In part, this passage simply makes the general point that thefreedom characteristic of Willkur consists in the fact that mereincentives never of themselves determine the will- they are determining only to the extent that Willkur allows them to be so. Theother important point made here is that the choice of which incentives are to reign is not carried out in random fashion but in

61. See, e.g., Religion, p. 50n. (English, p. 45n.), where Kant explicitly espousesa kind of "determinism" (as opposed to "predeterminism") and declares that"freedom does not consist in the contingency (Zlffalligkeit) of the act (that itis determined by no grounds whatsoever), i.e., in indeterminism."

62. Religion, pp. 23-4; English, p. 19.

150 FICI-ITE'S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY

accord with maxims, or general rules. Hence, I~ilJlj:~.~Qn~~:R.ll.on

Qf...~ __subjective .ground turns.. out to be no~?i~,g .. !!!QE~_~ ..~h:~~l~~£0ti~~~ofa maxim__!~~!..E!~Y~.~ < ~ ~~~tral ~~9J~~..!~~.h!~_ ..~!li~E.~!!lQ!~1'Y.E!.!!!:g~:A maxim, Kant tells us. in the Groundwork, is the "sub..jective principle of willing" or, more clearly, the "principle inaccord with which the subject acts.,,63

This distinction between a subjective and objective ground isrelatively easy to grasp. What is less clear, is why invoking thenotion of a subjective ground for Willkur's choices enables us toregard those choices as free. Why are acts that are determined bysubjective grounds free, while those determined objectively areconsidered unfree? To this question Kant gives the following.response: WjJj%~'L~ .. _(~J~9i.f~, .. Q[rQ"'1~~~iQg~.nJiY~,_9j'~L_ll~ ...Iiy~~aIl;-..peug.g~!.E.tQod as free only if the ,~gQPtjQJ!...,9f...1h~§.y1?l~£!iyy__grqun<;lwhi~Jl determines.._!h~t~_£b-.Q.i£~"i§ ..Jt§.~lL.!t.Il~,~.~~t ",Qf~fr~~.9J!1. ,,64 Inother words, Willkitr chooses between two incentives on the basisofa maxim, but one can always then ask about the subject's choiceof the maxim itself, and the problem of comprehending Willkitr'sfreedom is simply pushed back one step from the level of choicebetween two particular acts to that of choosing between two (ormore) general principles: Why does Willkur choose one maximover its rival? Is this choice merely arbitrary, or does it too have adetermining ground of some sort? Q'fice again, Kal1L~ects thecQncl!l~ion.~.thatjts"._<;hQic~~ _at-.thi~L.DlQr..~,.g.e..~1~X~11~y~J..J!r~"§.im,12Jy_groulldl~sJ2!.l!Jl~l~t~IWil}~c.l.. At the same time, he realizes that if

\{\I.I Willkitr is to be a faculty of freedom, its acts of adopting maxims,~~v to'l~ may not be traced back to a first objective ground - that is, they areJ .'r-~{'\ ''. not to be explained at any level as the result of determination by7'\, ~tJ\'

(,\tF natural causes. I-Ience Kant opts for the same route he followed in)r,. '. the earlier case and maintains that the choice of a determining:~r- i V-'\ " · maxim must have its own subjective ground in yet another, preJ.}" tl \ sumably more general maxim.. It then becomes clear, however,

that this series of subjective grounds runs the risk of becoming aninfinite regress that never arrives at a first, self-determined groundand that therefore fails to explain in what sense the choices determined by those grounds are "free."

As is well known, Kant's solution is to avoid an infinite regressby invoking the notion of a disposition (Gesinnung) in which all of

63. GMS, pp. 4oon., 42In.64. "Ein Aktus der Freiheit," Religion, p. 2 I; English, p. 17.

.~ J


Willkur's particular choices are ultimately grounded. 'Disposition'here does not refer to empirical personality traits but rather to themost basic rule in accord with which a subject adopts all of itsmaxims. The distinction between a good and an evil dispositionboils down simply to the question: Is the character of the individual such that she has made it a universal practice to subordinateall maxims unconditionally to the moral law? Now, if the disposition itself is to be a moral phenomenon - if we are to be able todescribe it as good or evil - then it too must somehow be freelychosen by the person who possesses it. In fact, Kant regards thechoice that constitutes one's moral disposition as simply anotherinstance of the adoption of a maxim, although in this case themaxim at issue is the most general ofall, namely, whether to makethe moral law the guiding principle behind all of one's morallyrelevant deeds. Since the choice of one's fundamental dispositioncannot be a fact given in experience, it must be thought of as theresult ofan "intelligible deed that precedes all experience. ,,65 Theindividual "earns" (erwirbt) her disposition, but only through afundamental choice that must be regarded as taking place outsideof all temporally conditioned experience.

Let us now take a step back from the details of Kant's accountof free choice and attempt to articulate more precisely what iscontained in the notion offreedom ascribed to Willkur and how allof this is relevant to the issue ofself-determination, Willed actionswithin the empirical world are regarded as free because they arenot causally determined but are instead the results of choicesmade by Willkur in accord with maxims. It is not the case, however, that in each of its choices the subject simply chooses itsdetermining maxim from point zero. ~ra(;tical m.~xims, ,!:ather,aktLch.QS.flLQU-thehasi£.Q[mQr~~ g~n~r~LRri1l9ipJ&s., ..w.hi9h ~h<;m

s.elYe~. ge.dY..~. Jmill. even hig,l1~ 01:!~.s.l. ..al1.()t':Vhi(;h.a£.~Lll:lt~!ll~~t:~ygr:Qunded.in_tbL~.91~.QL!h<:; ..m()st)~si(;. principle ofalL. ~~i£.~KI!ItUden.ti(i~ith· thC:;_.5;J2Qice of ,Q!l~'§mQrl:l:LgisEQl;!itiol1. Willkilr's choices at the level of particular acts are free, then, not on thebasis of some property that is intrinsic to each and independent ofthe rest of one's choices, but rather because they all depend upona fundamental choice made by the subject in a realm outside ofallexperience. Kant's strategy, of course, requires that this originalchoice itself be an act offreedom, which in this case means that

5.'). Religion, p. 39n.; English, p. 34n.


thercfu.l?~J.t!2~~J~.9J)~C?1£~j~,l!Q_Lg!Q.YJ1~leJl,~in_~s.om.~.bjgh~LHI.!!1£iQlebut..iscin..~,some~ ..,sens.e,.~..-:~self-::.gr:o.unded." Si~~"~,K£\111 ...J~lrQyicl~. noalt~~!!-~!!y~ .c~!pJ~}}~~~1.2~_ ..9f.,.!h~_~,~~.f-g!g~!!q~gg~§,~~,9f __t9i~~...Q!igj~alc!L~!ceLW~_~~n ..Q~Jy_ ~Qnf~iY~~Qf. it..n~,g~tively,.' ~§...S.PQQti\!lt;!?..\!§~;~\11 tim.at.ely-c.arbitraxy.,_..,~" .

Finally, it is worth noting that on this view the freedom charac-teristic of Willkur's particular choices can be understood as a kindof self-determination. The crucial point to recall here is that forKant the distinction between a caused event and a freely chosenact is not identical to, or in any way dependent upon, the distinction one might make between a determined and an undeterminedevent. The difference, rather, turns upon the distinction betweentw.Q' different kinds'MQf.sl~.!~!.mi!!llig_gLQ.!:!n.Q§__(Bestimmungsgrunde):objective and subjective. This is why Kant can say, as he does,that the acts chosen by Willkur are subject to a kind of determinism and, what is the same, that the notion offreedom that charac..terizes those acts is not equivalent to indeterminism.66 Now, inorder that the "determined" nature offree acts also be understoodas constituting a kind offreedom, it is clear that the determinationinvolved in these acts must be a species ofself-determination. IMf~ a~~9fJYil?k~r..,.~r~. free not because,they ~~'~'"I.~.~9,~t~t~I~Al}\~~_2tgrQ~!?-~l~§§",QYX because they a!e self-determined.where the..l~Im __'self-determined'..~e':tp.s .,that ...tny _fr.~~ -~:hQ!.9~~~1!;tJ~_~~~rxi~Q,~~QJJljIL

acc9!:.sI._~~!!! <~~~i~.~,. ~.l1.~~.. themselves q~!JY~.,f!Q!n.\.~_m£?r~,,~g~!!~ral_.c~pti9~~._.Q('~!!!Y"J.f~.:P:~t,!,!'p,~nt~lcn-,41.tY!~~~lVhat I choose to do isself-determined because it follows from "who I am," or from mymost basic identity, an identity that is itself the result of my own(noumenal) choice. This notion of self-determination implied byKant's account of Willkur is not to be confused with the conceptionof moral autonomy that is central to his moral philosophy, for,unlike the latter, it has no normative significance but is intendedonly to describe the sense in which free actions are free or selfgrounded. In this sense, the actions of both evil and morally goodagents are self-determined, since both kinds of maxims equallyderive from one's fundamental moral disposition.

Having laid out the basic features of Kant's understanding ofWillkisr, we are now in a position to ask what motivated him todevelop such a complex and counterintuitive view of human

66. Religion, p. 50n.; English, p. 450.

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 153choice. Why should one not be content with Reinhold's morestraightforward view?J]Lih~j!r~i.p-@Ge..}.l.l>~li~Yl'<JI:L'1t K..a.nLP.t~.

~e!:redJ2i.~il:ECOunt .to B:~~!!hq!sJ)p~C.~~§.e. it.iD)pHe.~Jh!!-.t~olTI~JQ!:mpfgene.ral principle governfj.all empjriG~L~.~nt~,~illQllJ.gingJ?,Qtt;L

nJ!tural,objective processes and the willed a~ti.9l!~QJJ1\!Jnf!-}!.!.'!1?;:.

~t§J This is accomplished not by subsuming both classes ofevents under a single kind of "grounding" such as the principle ofnatural causality, but rather by using the notion of a subjectiveground to articulate a second sense in which a particular class ofempirical events, human actions, can be said to be determined. Tosay that some form of principle governs all empirical eventsimplies that there is a sense in which all such events can beunderstood or explained, although the distinction between a subjective and an objective ground means that our way of understanding natural events will differ from that which applies tochosen deeds. The former are understood by locating their causesin a temporally prior state of affairs, while the latter are explained,at least in principle, by discerning the maxims that determinethem and by understanding those principles as consistent with amost general maxim or, as Kant conceives it, with one's fundamental disposition. In other words, Kant's account of Willkurimplies a view of human agency that is fundamentally differentfrom that proposed by Reinhold. F.<Q.cKw!,..d:u,jn4heid.uaLdeedsofhUIDJ:ln .a.gent!;Lar.~nQUQJll::_undJ<r§to.Qd ..f!.alhereJrIJlts..ot:s!una,uyrr~QgQru, ..1,lnq)J!nJ1Gt!"(d.. it~ts .ofShQicelu!ta.B<..irulJ&~d~rl::l:;!J:'!'$.!:lJ;,.q.eac1:u;lth.ej'.ln.Jhe~ense_tha.tthey-.Gan.allJ;lf.Jln.d!;x,Sj;Q.Qd.~.!u:n~nifeJl

t<jttjQ!:H'u?f~Jlingle}.funclal1lental disp(}~i tiQn.It is clear from his own attempts to understand self-determination

that Fichte rejects the account of self-determined choice just outlined. Nowhere does he explicitly layout his reasons for this, butI believe it is possible to determine retrospectively what thosereasons must have been. On the most general level, it is not that D\.- t. ~Hv'{,

Kant's account is incoherent but rather that ittf~i1s to Cl!pJ:Jlre..._ \ ~o

c.e.rj;!!'inf~i!Jures ell..§..crMial to tQe_p-.1JeQQQ:ll;noQ..QL~lfJleicrJ:l1inati!:>.11. \\ (>.ItA

In the first place, and most obviously, Kant's theory fails to allowfor the possibility of mQI.aUmpI.~Jllen.t or, more generally, forthe possibility of development of one's basic character.f? Since the

67. Kant himself recognizes and struggles with this problem in a variety ofplaces: Religion, pp. 31, 37,44,47,5°; English, pp. 27, 32, 40, 43, 46.


choices one makes in the empirical world derive from one's fundamental disposition but do not have the capacity to affect or toamend that original choice, it is difficult to see how one's charactercould ever undergo genuine change.

The second reason for rejecting Kant's account constitutes, Ibelieve, a more fundamental critique of that position and is morecentral to Fichte's own primary concerns as well. lE..-y~~y--g~~?~-~al

terms, w4_~tfiGp.~~.Jl?l!~tqpJ~~tJQ i$ :KcalJ.~t'~..\+~~_Qf£\.n9J!~11~,t~JJ.b-j~~t_~~, a ground for the ,Gh9i~~~.,~~=9~.1?Y.~.h~,.l?X~£~,!~!~t§Jl,~J~~ti!!theempiri~!!l'wQr1..~l. This wish to avoid recourse to a noumenal subjectis, at least on Fichte's own self-understanding, closely connected tohis conception of subjectivity in general, as it is articulated in thenotion of a self-positing subject. This notion finds 'partial expression in such statements as "What does not exist for itself is not asubject," and "The subject exists only for itsel£,,68 W/hat is i.n.._tt(qge,d,:Q.~r.~.,j~" .,~..,!~j~g:iQ!!..JdfJ.h.~ ..,yi~!y,~th!!!_!hJ;L~.Y.bj~£!iy~~ly.,~Qnltitu teg~,,~§p~.£!.~...Qf.~~!'.R~r.!,~11£~)."lYl!~!!l~.rhin .,~~lf:Jj~t~[mi~dtr.a..ctiQlLQr_~

il}~lhe ~~~QI~!.~~~t.,,£Q!!.~,ti.~~~.i9~"M of .~he~~~p.~ri~.x!£~Q.-.:WtQrl~t'<'Nart::,J.Q_Q~\!Aq.,~!:§'!QQ~Q.,_~§..Jh~~T,.r~~H!l~.-.Q[.lh~" !!~j:jyitYm ..Qf l!~"~JJ.l~i~C,Jf%lbat,"e.H~~,{!2~~~tQ_~J}f!..~R~r.tf~QmJ~J.t<:?.Q.n~N~~2:y§',.~?fP~~!'.i<?!1.~~e. Although thisview was originally developed by Fichte in the context of theoret-ical philosophy, it applies as well to the analysis of practical subjectivity. With respect to the specific issue of self-determination, itimplies the rejection ofKant's notion ofa fundamental choice thatfalls outside of all time and experience and that grounds all ofone's particular choices. Hence, in the context of the issue of self:'determination Eichta_wis.h_tQ,"Jle...J:id_..9LJ.b~.~J!oY~11ql-=$.,y1U~ctconverges ,w.i.th, .th~_ ,~QmmQ.!!,~i!!!.yitiQ1l-tl!,~t.=~~.t!l.~Ql:Xl!l)V l].icp th~

~J;ts of an empirical ~g~nt,~r~,d~.t.ermi:l}e.d.J2y.Jh~",.~hQi~~-,-,QfLgt..nc>u:_menal.sub] e.c~t.d,Q.~SJJ.~QtI'~"AqllY."RrQyig~_ JJ§.,,,:~~i!!tc!!g. ..,,!£,£Q!!.ul,J)i-l~lfdetermination From my perspective as an empirical subject, theoriginal choice of my disposition is not my own in any meaningfulsense, since it is something which necessarily takes place outsidemy own awareness and over which I have no control. F:rom this

.~~ RQiQ!_Qf.yk~1_.mY-.fr~M~~~~qyir~,g,.Q>i§.:RQ~itiQn_~,:Rl?_~at§~~ltJ!]}~illnaj:jL

chara~ter ~_tll~t.J;YhC\t.,,,.ft.Q..!LL.lb~~>J1QYm~1la.1.,..R~J~12e~Ciiy.,ye.,_.js,.A.clf~d~1.~rlnin~!iQ;g..JnYsJ,.~pp~ar~.!Q~th~_~mpiri~atj!g~lltl\.s.,JlJ§J_~ttQtller:..

mod.e."Qf_detel.JlJ.ina..ti.Q.nJ2Y~v~Qm~Jhi.ng<s~!~r.\1&.-lQ.~~m~:~..._~,,~

68. "Was fur sich selbst nicht ist, ist kein Ich" (SW, I, p. 97); "das Ich [is't] nurfur sich selbst" (SW, I, p. 457).

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMINATION I55

The task facing us now is to understand how Fichte can give anaccount of self-determination without resorting to the hypothesisof a noumenal subject, that is, solely in terms of the conscioussubject's relation to itself. To do so, we must recall that Fichte'sstrategy was to conceive of substantive self-determination interms of the subject's ability to reflect upon its "true essentialnature." Furthermore, in the account under consideration herethe subject's nature was to be understood as the nature ofa particular individual rather than of subjects in general. Hence, we mustfirst ask what it means for a practical subject, as an individual, tohave a true nature. The answer Fichte gives to this question isclosely related to his notion of self-positing subjectivity and, moreparticularly, to the way in which a subject differs from a thing.In a passage that strikingly anticipates themes within twentiethcentury existentialism, Fichte locates the central difference between a subject and a thing in the contrasting senses in whicheach can be said to have a nature:

A free being must exist before it is determined - it must have anexistence which is independent of its determinacy. For this reasona thing cannot be thought as self-determining, because it does notexist prior to its nature, i.e., prior to the whole of its determinations.... A being that is to determine itseif[however] would haveto exist in a certain respect ... before it has properties and a naturein general. This can be understood only on the presupposition thatthe free being exists, prior to its real existence, as an intelligencewith the concept of its real existence and that the latter containsthe ground of the former.69

For our purposes the important point of this passage is theclaim that the essential nature of a free (or self-determining)being, unlike that of a thing, is not simply given along with thefact of its existence, but instead the being's essential nature follows from its concept ofwhat it is. In the case of a self-determinedagent, in other words, the conception within consciousness ofone's essential identity precedes the real existence of that nature.In order to understand what this might mean more concretely,we should recall that in Kant's account of Gesinnung preciselythe opposite is the case. There one's essential nature, as defined bythe concept of moral disposition, is, from the perspective of the

69. SW, IV, p. 36.


empirical subject, already constituted prior to the particularchoices made by Willkur. The choices I make in the empiricalrealm followfrom my original ordering offundamental values thatis established by the dispositional choice. For Kant, then, there isa sense in which "who I am essentially," understood as the hier ..archy of values to which I subscribe, precedes and determines myindividual choices and deeds in the empirical world. In ~9~Q.t~!!.st t9_.the view. that Fichte iaattempting to f9~mblJ~lJ~,_ fq.!'~.J5~.~l)JL.J!l:Y

t1.$s.tJ)lif\Ll).~tYX~....I~X.~,s;.~g!:§ ~mY ..,t~~l. ~xi~!~.n~e.Our problem now becomes one of understanding how Fichte

can claim, on the one hand, that self-determination requiresreflection upon one's true nature and, on the other hand, thatone's true nature is not something that is merely found or given tothe subject as already constituted but rather depends in some wayupon the subject's own "concept" of itself. At this point it isnecessary to recall Fichte's statement, cited earlier, concerning thedistinctive nature of the subject's relation to itself, in contrast tothe relation a subject has to an object in representational con...sciousness. The self-awareness at issue here (i.e., in practical selfdetermination) is a self..positing - or, as Fichte repeatedly says, itis more than a "passive looking on," more than a mere apprehending of an independent, already existing something. Rather, thesubject's reflecting upon itself actually constitutes, in part, thatwhich it apprehends.

.. Now, is there a way of making sense of this notion of reflection,according to which, in reflecting upon one's true nature, oneallegedly constitutes that nature? At this point we must leaveFichte's texts behind, for they fail to provide a more determinate (,answer to this question. My suggestion, however, is that somehelp can be found by turning to ~,recent discussion of self...determination by Ernst Tugendhat.F' According to Tugendhat,self-determination requires that the subject reflect upon its truenature in the sense of posing to itself what he calls the "fundamental practical question": Who am I really? Which among mymanifold desires, intentions, and social roles represent the realme? For Tugendhat, as for Fichte, this question is not primarily atheoretical one to which an answer can be found simply through

70. Self-Consciousness andSelf-Determination, cited earlier. Tugendhat himselfunderstands his account of self-determination as a part of "the tradition followingFichte" (die sich an Fickte anschliej)ende Tradition). A historical account of thistradition is found on pp. 132-43.

I.'·.•.'l·M

t.J

~~

~.•~~f!o

IIf

I!

!

-

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 157introspection. It is, rather, a question to which there is no alreadyexisting, fully determinate answer, a question that can be answered only by actually choosing what one's true nature is to be.To ask, "Who am I?" in a fundamental way, then, is really to ask"What kind of person do I want to be and how do I want to livemy life?" TQ,~~n:>w,~r tl!~Sl~.~cti2,~j~~Qt~2":fl,n<:!"5)l}~'§.,tm£,~~1f!>JJl ~; ~""".,j;Qcr.eate.,~Qr to J:;QQstitlJte, in part,Ql1e'~ J:>?;l~iGjge.tltJtY· Further- "" -. ('\ \f-,

more, to reflect. upon oneself at this fundamental level, and to ::::.::::,~ "k 's choi d wi h h' fl . . yma e one s c orces III accor WIt t IS re ecnon, IS to escape (A,!', f"'~"(l''''''''

heteronomous determination by immediate desires, conventional ' ;;norms, or unexamined value commitments and, instead, to deter-mine oneself.

Put another way, Tugendhat's account of self-determinationcan be understood as an attempt to develop Fichte's central, andcontroversial, claim concerning the self-constituting nature ofreflection. The claim here is that the subject's reflection upon itsessential identity opens up the possibility for a deeper kind ofself-determination than that involved in Fichte's notion of merely"formal" freedom. Thus, on this view, reflection can accomplishmore than simply allowing us to avoid being determined by ourimmediate desires and impulses; it can also enable us to escapedetermination by conventional, or "heteronomous," norms. Inother words, the account of reflection that both Tugendhat andFichte espouse will involve something more than merely employingsocially derived norms and conventions to determine which ofone's desires are worthy of being acted upon. ,IhJ~.iLY.i~F~~~~[t~ralher.,.Jhat nOrm:L~l}l!.jllllPJJ1~,.~~,me .Sl:.<:;tW~J!y.J::>er:omtil!J,t~dJJLY.S

wiihin_the,_pJ:D.c.e~..J;lt.r~~ffeJ;JiQ!LJlllQ"'th!!L,~l,!,<::9,C,9A~!i.!!:I!~<:>lt:.s>fnQnud~.'>:Xb.ai..~u¥lf~d<:;tenni!tqtiQn jl.t" it!l.qeePt;~t teve!g()l11>,illJ§, .iI,l.

This view raises an obvious but important question: What is the,nature of that process by means of whieh the subject comes toespouse its most fundamental values? Do I simply choose myidentity arbitrarily? Is my adoption of basic norms wholly, or evenin part, based upon some kind of reasoning? Or are my fundamental choices ultimately determined "from without" by unexamined, ~perhaps unconscious norms that I inherit from my culture or I)social.class? Let us consider these three possibilities more systematic~lly. Eir~ if the adoption of one's fundamental principles isspontaneous in the sense of being wholly ungrounded, then anobvious objection arises, one that is reminiscent of Kant's critiqueof Reinhold's conception of the nature ofthe spontaneity involved


particular free acts: If my choice of principles is truly un..r~.I.'UlAJL.l'-'l,.....,,"-I, and therefore cannot be explained as following from areason or from some basic feature ofmyself, such as my character,then in what meaningful sense are they "my own"? In this case)the notion of completely arbitrary choice, already rejected at thelevel of individual deeds, simply recurs at a much higher levelwhere the object of my choice is my fundamental identity. Yet thesecond possibility - the view that these highest values are chosenrationally - seems no more promising. Forjfr~!i9r.!~t~b..9j_<;~IDakes

sense only__hl.J.tl~_.sl9n1&xt-.illj:J.jgher _l?rincipJ~ to \'Y.hich Q..llUsalread-)CcQ!!unill~J~t".Jh~l!.J~Iing.I!l~~.Jh.f!t_f!!:~tl!.~RtQ4..qc~s Qfra1!Q!!alchoiC~~~~l?~n~l~!!RQ!!~~X~!!,-.h!gh~~:J~yqtfgmmtLIt!~~~t§J.J~J:19_Yt which __a lb.e~n:y~f.~ ~~l.f:rl~t~I.mj!I~1~,Q~r.~!!!!t~J ...~§k: Ar.~ ,-}1~~.,Jh.~.,_,~§~Qj~s:t's~1~And, ifso, in what sense? I t is obvious that continuing in thisway one can never reach a principle that is both highest andrationally grounded. This conclusion leads us to the third possibility suggested above, namely, that one's most basic value commitments ultimately derive not from oneself, but from the varioussocial groups to which one belongs, so that one's basic identity isessentially a product of one's social formation. It would seem,

j then, that we are left with the following conclusion: One's highest,seemingly self-determined values are in reality determined eitherby a choice that is thoroughly arbitrary, or externally by inheritedsocial norms. But in either case the notion of self-determinationseems to be illusory.

Is there a way out of this dilemma that takes cognizance of theseobjections and still is capable of defending a substantive conception ofself-determination? Although Tugendhat is not unaware ofthis problem, he fails in the end to provide a wholly satisfactorysolution to it. This is due in part to two related assumptions hemakes about the nature ofself-determination, namely, that whatis at issue in self-determination is the choice of one's deepest values,and that in order to be considered self-determined in a substantivesense, the choice of those values must be made from a positionthat abstracts from all established, pregiven norms. Th.~s .~~.~t

assumptionchowevercfalla.prey..to...the__argumenrthat.has..been.made__in__criticism...Qf_..lb~.grik~,,_Qf._..r.~giG.fl1_ JklJ. tQn_Q.mY.__(!!!.~JJldillgTugendh.~ t's) -; tllfiJ. the".individY!1l.is-.ll-Q.~J>.l~~tQ.£bQQ~.e__"hi§. Jd~~-et1ti t~

in-aiy..m~:i~i~g(I!LW~~~~;t~~~~~iI_;t\i~Y~~~h~ti,~~~~te~~y;Y~do[(llLp-r...et-,~.~,.tmg,,~f\l\lt.wc-c'"'''M{''' -c-;.. z 'w. '<--:''''''''''''''_'D'_-'''~~.AW don w

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 159the further question of the desirability of striving to attain such aperspective.) Not only is it a fact of human development that wearrive at the age of maturity with already constituted systems ofvalue, butit is alsoconceptuallyprQblem~tic to.suggest, that. one.caJLSim~!i~~rmillewhat is ultimatel~able i.ll.JJ1Jstractionfr.QllLi!lL.9j;Jl~r,Y.."1bJ~s. In,J>Jh.!<cWl:m!§....:we mu§.t~ban_don l)Jg!4!1_4:•._~(J1QttQD thS!<,L1Q..1?~~&~lEdetqJJlin~dj!Li:Llm1l:5,1anliy~.~S<n~.LQn~

.rriust .stand...I;m£:.kJmmJ'),lLprl:giY~!UU~rm,,§,j.p_Qrd~J_1Q._chQQ.~~ Jhemost basic prin(;ipl~.s~c;C:9I.9!!!.g·tQ.-,:y.hi£!l9.lllLjy,,<lJ:.t~J.2.ljy~one's

..~•.".If we grant this point, however, are we thereby committed to

abandoning the very concept of substantive self-determination, oris there a weaker sense of this notion that can still be defended?This question is perhaps best addressed by considering a concreteexample of the kind of self-determined choice that Tugendhatseems to have in mind: A young woman faces the decision of

"--.whether to marry a certain man whom she loves but who hasdeeply rooted, traditional ideas concerning marriage, family life,and the roles of men and women in each. A sober assessment ofher future tells the woman that each of the two alternatives offersreal but contrasting goods. One life offers the possibility of agreater degree of personal independence, the chance to pursue acareer, perhaps more risk and adventure, while the other offers therewards of parenting, stability, and a life together with a manwhom, after all, she is in love with. In order to choose in a selfdetermined mode the woman must realize that the decision shefaces involves more than the choice between two particularactions; it is also a choice between two distinct identities. Inposing the questions "Who am I? Which of the two lives is reallyme?" she asks herselfnot a factual question about her identity, buta fundaments] practical question about the relative values of dis-tinct andjneommensurable goods. The point I take to be implicitin Tugendhat's (and Fichte's) view of the practical subject is thatiL~!!k1..JJ.~...w-j§.tC!ketL.1o.....§.JJ.RP-Qse_.~h<'l._L.~IMUY.2!!!~!Lh.'!9at her .g"~ ::;.vs. 0dWPJ).~al \UU!lrJ:).il!:tY~.§.~!;>H§h~.ghilC.r(lrchy ofvahl~s~t~~t~pe ~1,lst~ .;i,=-"simply._cQns.Jlh,.in.QrJl~&j!;t,~t~~kl,e whether to.m';~J.rYI. Rather, her \fA~~rl' ~i".~decision, if self-determined, must proceed from a ranking of val- (,UiM.,1'd.ues that emerges only in the process of reflecting upon the kind of a'rCtfVl~'(

person she wants to be."

72. It should be noted that this is not the onb scenario on which the decision tomarry would count as self-determined. For the decision might also follow

j¥.:.)t ..

~vvl·,~'t"

~t. .d~


Before we go on to consider whether this example allows us tomake sense of some weaker notion of self-determination, it is important to call attention to a crucial point that Tugendhat hints at butdoes not adequately emphasize, namely, that ~Jf::..ckj~!mtn~<liQl1,

P..Q,§!ng.~.,.t.Q._Qn.es~I[,,!p~.-iqndaID~!l!E-lJlri!£lig~.L,.q:q~stjpp.". i~ _tQ~>L'~ullQ.erstQQd.. as,~il!!!5!E~~m!Y~!\t~~~igt~~J.73 One does not ask aboutone's true identity simply as a matter of course, but only in ratherspecial circumstances. What this means, I believe, is that "who Ireally.amf.hecomes.an.isauefor.me.o..DJy.wh~U:.Jn~_~y§t..~m QfvalU{L~._"~4~,: that is, only 'yJl~!lI.!eaJ!~~~t4~~.tl!~..Y!!:~~~~~c..9!",~

ing~tQ...w.hi.ch_I..b~~~Jiy.ed-1l!tt.il DOW are ·tQSutfi,Gj~,nt.JQjnfQ.rm.~.Jifethat.Lean...~eJ~Qgp.i~~~JM.J~l,fl.ti§,fyil,lg. This realization can occur in avcietyH"of" cl;~~mstCaii'ces:~-'when my beliefs about myself or theworld undergo significant change (e.g., I come to see that myclosest personal relationships have been based upon self-deception);when I find that two of my values conflict in a fundamental way(my wish to develop my artistic talents vs. a desire to become apolitical activist); or when, as in the present example, the relations among my previous commitments are insufficiently determinate to tell me what to db in the particular situation I face.

None of these cases requires the individual involved to abstractfrom all of her value commitments but, more accurately, to harmonize a certain subset of those values - the ones at issue in theparticular situation - both with each other and with what oneknows (or believes) to be the case. Thus, in the present example,the woman does not set aside all of her normative commitments;in fact, she does not even set aside those that her situation callsinto question, for she does not ask simply, "Should I value independence (or, alternatively, a domestic existence)?" but rather,"When these two values conflict, which of them should I deemto be more important?" Of course, the suggestion that selfdetermination consists in harmonizing the different values to whichone subscribes must not be taken to mean that it is only, or evenprimarily, a matter of infusing them with mere logical consistency.

from an already constituted disposition that was itself the result ofa previous,fully reflective choice. Since the intelligibility of this possibility, however,relies upon our ability to make sense of the notion of self-constituting reflection, only the latter need be considered in detail here.

73- See Tugendhat (1986, p. 172) ~ where he characterizes the fundamental practical question as always "situationally related" (situationsbezogen) but fails todraw from this the conclusions I suggest here.

('\ !


For it is often the case that what are logically consistent values inthe abstract become, in the context of real-life situations, practically incompatible. Furthermore, although the agent in such situations certainly possesses "higher" (i.e., more general and morefirmly held) practical principles (e.g., that it is wrong to take innocent lives), it need not be the case that these principles suffice tosettle the particular conflict of values at issue. Hence, the "harmonizing" of one's normative commitments in this view of selfdetermination involves determining which of two distinct valuesis to be preferred over the other in the absence of any alreadyexisting principle that could resolve the conflict.

But how is such "self-determination" - the determination of therelative worth of one's values - to proceed? One way of conceptualizing something very close to this weaker sense of substantiveself-determination has been suggested by Charles Taylor.ct Onhis account, determining for oneself'what one really values is to beunderstood not in terms of a choice that is made either of or amongvalues, but rather as a process of ar(iculaJiJ1gJE-or,e exp!!£!!~"Y.J!I!c!

withgr~?"t~ ..cl1J,.ri!y. one's .Qrlgh1f!.1,._~i!!9J)..Q1!!~~ sensuLwh§,! .i~

~()Ithy, In other words, the agent who is faced with having todecide which values he will live by does not attempt to chooseamong possible values but undertakes instead a search within, areflection upon his "deepest unstructured sense of what is important" with the aim offormulating and defining that original sensein dearer, more precisely articulated terms. ijRt if this is how..Q!I~~1!

nox:m.a.tjYe.-Q.uestion/l are_~ttl~cl,jn:~y.bjt.L~1}§Y_ can thj.!LR!9C~~sbetel1~~~~~lf:-q~t~i!latipn"? I t ll~~m~..Qn thi~. ~c~ni!riQ.Jbill; Jb~

spbj~ct,,,t~th!<r.~t~!l §f!1!J.tiJJ&li!1gjJ§~yal uatiO!l".~.d.~J!~g~"§jllq,:g:l..sthing.like.a.JheoreticaLenterp,me..tQ_~~~If.w..what. it.J.ryly...hgl~ tob\}jmum:li+Dt. Taylor agrees with this characterization in part, forhe believes that it is possible for one self-interpretation to be moreor less "adequate" (i.e., more or less true) than another. But at thesame time he denies that reflection upon one's values can beunderstood as just a species of theoretical inquiry, for he holdsthat in articulating my values I also constitute them, at least inpart. To articulate one's sense of what is worthy is not merely todescribe or define an independently constituted object but actually

74. Taylor (1983, pp. 118-26). Although Taylor does not use the term 'selfdetermination', he treats the same issue in his discussion of the agent'sresponsibility for its "strong evaluations."


"to make it something different from what it was before.~'75 Taylor's position here has a deep affinity with Fichte's theory of subjectivity, for what he suggests is simply a version of the thesis ofthe self-positing subject: In reflecting upon itself the subject alsoconstitutes itself. Taylor's attempt to characterize the kind ofreflection involved in determining what one holds to be of value isprovocative, but it never quite succeeds in answering the questionof central importance: In what sense is my articulation of my values tobe understood as also constituting those values, beyond theobvious sense that what is originally implicit and vague becomesexplicit and more defined?

A second possibility for understanding substantive selfdetermination in a weaker sense is suggested by modifying theaccount of Tugendhat's described earlier. Here the basic point tobe gleaned from Tugendhat is the idea that when faced with a"breakdown" in one's system of values, the self-determining individual has more at her disposal than merely arbitrary "picking"but somewhat less than the wholly determined rational choicecharacterized earlier. The reason this choice cannot be "fully"rational (in the sense of being completely determined by reasons)is that, as suggested before, although the individual is not completely without prior normative commitments, she does not necessarily possess a fully articulated hierarchy of values that specifiesthe relation that is to hold between values that come into conflict.On Tugendhat's view, the self-determining subject attempts toresolve its dilemma by searching for reasons to choose one normover another, but it is seldom the case that such reasons completely determine the decision's outcome.76 At some point, havingcarried out the search for rational justification as far as possible,I am left simply to make my choice.

It will no doubt be objected that on this scenario the decisionthat is, made rests upon what is ultimately an arbitrary choice. Butis this conclusion justified? Let us suppose that for the woman inour example the prospect of individual autonomy wins out over

75. Taylor (198g, p. 123).76. Tugendhat (1986)suggests a variety of ways in which reasoning plays a role

in self-determination. Included are a realistic assessment of one's availableoptions; the individual's self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge of one's dispositions,capabilities, motives, etc.; an evaluation of the truth of one's beliefs aboutwhat constitutes well-being; and "moral" reasoning about the legitimateclaims of others upon my action, See pp. 2 14, gIg.

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 163the attractions offamily life. It would surely not be right to regardthis choice of a course ifaction (i.e., to break off the relationship) asmerely arbitrary. Ifasked, the woman could even provide a reasonfor choosing as she did: "I chose to remain single because of theindependence it offers me." What is distinctive about her situation, however, is that the principle embodied in her choice - that.,individual autonomy is more important than the rewards ofestablishing a family - did not exist for her prior to the particular choiceitself. What the analysis of substantive self-determination is reallyconcerned with, then, is her espousal of a value - her decision tolet one reason (her independence) count as decisive with respect ",to another (family life). As suggested earlier, I believe it would bewrong to say that one value was chosen on the basis of a higherprinciple that was already a part of the woman's set of normativecommitments. Yet it seems equally wrong to say that her optingfor independence is merely arbitrary or blind, for the choice follows a process of deep reflection and reasoning about what is best(a process that certainly may involve an appeal to other, unquestioned values), even if the reasons produced by such a process areultimately insufficient to determine the choice. If...s...q!ill:...sense is,jorbe,Dlad~,Jh.~,_.Qr the,notiQ!1.9fsQR;jtaf!th:~ .~elf:Q.e.~r.mi!1.~!.~<2n.1jt,~~!;mlLtll..~!jt i~J!.~nUha,t}2n~~,m~§ilQQ~".~l!&m~ly~j1!Jhf;,~~~~§ql,P!:J.c.i!y,j.n..§ilYi!!;iQn13Hwh~r~. his,V<lJ'4es.....<;()pfl;c.t, .. UQLIDt).tely,JQ.d.,S}Cermin~"wl1!~,h ..e_C!!()Il. to take in~hisP<lI#~lJl~J!,'iH!llltiQnJl.!lUP

<.esta!?UshJq! _l1.ixn~~lL~.IlQrQ1ll,tive Prif/:(;j,J;}li .Je,g.,.thJtLQ.!l~.~l:ue illfllQr.eim.pQrJ~ULthan.J;J,!!.Qth~r)"a,£<';Qrgi!1K1Q Jyhi£h,.thi!L£b:.Qi£~.ifLJ:.ll:a,s!.e..\,Vhile it is true that such an espousal of norms might beregarded as "ungrounded" in a strict sense of that term, it is alsomore than merely "blind." For, apart from the important fact thatthis kind of self-determination involves a search for rationaljustification, the choices that result from it are ones about whichthe subject possesses a significant kind of self-transparency. Inopting to pursue one value over another I do so with a clearawareness both of what is at stake for me in the decision, as wellas of the limits to the reasons I have for choosing as I do.

In light of the qualifications that have been made here of thenotion of self-determination, one might well ask whether it is stillreasonable to call what has been described "self-determination."To put the question in Fichtean terms, in what sense does thisaccount of the practical subject's reflection upon itself involve a"self-positing," or in what sense does this subject constitute itself


or determine its identity? As we saw earlier, one of the requirements for a theory of substantive self-determination is that itexplain how the practical subject can give to itself maxims for itsaction that do not simply follow logically from higher-level principles that are already given. But if the practical subject is to determine for itselfmaxims, or principles of action, it must view the resultof its reflection as, the adoption of a value rather than as merely achoice of a particular action. That is, it must see itself as decidingto live a life in which one value is consistently (though not necessarily universally) subordinated to another. In what sense is thistrue of the account just given? That is, why should we regard thewoman as constituting for herself a normative principle rather thanmerely choosing one particular action over another in a situationwhere her established normative commitments are insufficient todecide the case?

There are two ways of answering this question: The first focuseson an objective feature of the action chosen, while the secondrefers to a subjective quality of the agent itself. An importantfeature of the examples to which this (and Tugendhat's) accountof self-determination typically appeal is that they are instances inwhich wlfat ia.to _b"~,,<;.hQ.§J~ltj~ It,~~'fQrm--=Q[ljf~:,~rL\!.h~-th1!!tJn~!~Jy

S}rl_~.L~_ol'!ttg""g~~q~<,,~What one chooses in such cases is not a: singleaction, but an objectively realized way of life that consistentlyrequires the subordination of one value to another and that, onceentered into, is not easily abandoned or exchanged. To opt, forexample, for the monastic life is not simply to choose a particularaction but to espouse instead a form of life, the objective featuresof which necessitate that one value (e.g., sensual pleasure) beregularly subordinated to another (e.g., contemplation). Makingthis kind offundamental commitment is, in a very straightforwardsense, to choose for oneself the kind of person one wants to be. Butsurely it is not only in cases where my choice objectively binds meto a particular form of life that one can speak of the choice ofprinciples, and hence of substantive self-determination. For decidingto act can involve more than the choice of a single deed when theagent also resolves to regard the choice as embodying a rule thatis to be followed consistently. At least in some cases, the veryprocess of engaging in serious deliberation, of posing "fundamental practical questions" to oneself, results not only in thedecision to take a particular course of action, but also in a (subjective) commitment to the value embodied in the choice, a commit-

-

PRACTICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 16 5'

ment to resolve future conflicts in favor of the same set of valuesthat won out in the earlier case.?" .,

At this point one might ask whether such a weakened account ofself-determination can still be recognized as Fichtean or> moreaccurately, as inspired by his second, "individualist" conceptionofsubstantive self-determination that was laid out previously. Wehave already noted one way in which the account just suggestedembodies a weaker version of self-determination than the oneenvisioned by Fichte. For the former denies the claim, implicitin Fichte's account, that the self-determining subject constructsfor itself a single hierarchy of values, at the top of which residesa highest, inviolable principle. On the view offered here, selfdetermination also consists in instilling one's values with a kind ofhierarchy, but it is a hierarchy that is only partial and not necessarily subsumed under one supreme maxim.

Closely related to this point is another, perhaps more important sense in which this vision of self-determination is weaker thanFichte's: On our account the practical subject that reflects upon"its true nature" is no longer conceived as "pure," or stripped ofall of its normative commitments. What this implies> as I havesaid, is that <the notiongCm4kal se!f-determination where theSj;lbj~ct i~ J:eg£lrg~(L~-..fu~~§ol~.sp:urce of its 'deepestV£lll;l~s.. ::.Jilo~..1!Qi!!!Q.2I,led. Although this qualification runs counter to whatis usually taken to be the main thrust of Fichte's ethical thought,it is also possible to see this rejection of radical self-determinationas the kernel of truth in Fichte's well-known dictum that the idealof self-determination is "an unattainable goal, but one which[the subject], in accord with its spiritual nature, ought unceasingly to approach."78 Yet even here Fichte seems to regard selfdetermination as an unqualifiedly desirable ideal, one to be pursued"unceasingly" and, presumably, regardless of one's circumstances. Qn...Qill'~.f£Q.Y.!!h..howeV~L,_!he_~~lf.-.qett;rminecll ..f.dt:i,cal@:arnipa,~iQl1 QL9Jl~1i..Y1!.ll}~~ommi t!!!~!!g~~q !lQt ~.111s!~~9.l-f.~n

UQt::1;!~J!. qo.l1tin,u()t1s,a~tiyjty)JoL!!l~e.k.i.mLQf~_~~~r:m.i!la.tion gf 0ll~'tv..alues Chii.racteri:zed here is occ(l~i9ned only:,bi'sit.l,1~Ji.()ns~them

selves mostly beyond the individual's control, in which one's givensystem of values is shown to be inadequate as a guide for action.

77. This point is suggested and discussed more fully by Nozick (1981, pp. 297,305-6).

78. SW, IV, p, 149; see also pp. 66, 229.


The intuition behind Fichte's position that it is th~.}'s 'y2fati,gnt<2 str!Y~..fQI..~~J.f-:g.~t~!1!!~ ..~,~_tL~QJl!y.§t.!?~.Jh.~1_th~~~.:Rr.f:t~li£~1 ...~!!!?1~£toperates ~,e§L'~a ra ti9!.1~J.,~g~X!t..!.n .Jh!t,_ ..g,~.~,:g~§1)~~!1§.r:;.'w.,.nQJ,_»:!te!:tj.t_~,,,_deliberates only about what particular ~~~§..,!<?",,~~.st~!:!~~~SJ-J2.!!.twJJ.~Itit_$JJ1~,mi!§ ...tl!,~ ..y.~tY.,,~J~ngJ1:rg.§~,.f!:~.9Qr,ging, lQ..~W_G.llJtji~~j9C):itic.al.-exllminaJiQU_,_J.... believe that there is an important truth inthis general assertion but that Fichte's notion of substantive selfdetermination misconceives the way in which the subject's examination of its values must take place. For the claim implicit inFichte's position is that it is possible to understand one's espousalof values as "self-determination" in a strong sense, one thatrequires these norms to be evaluated in accord with one's highestprinciples, which themselves are ultimately self-given. I haveargued, however, that something like this scenario arises only insituations where one is faced with a conflict between distinctvalues for which one does not already have a higher-level principleto decide the case, and that what is self-given in such cases is notthe values themselves, nor some "highest" maxim, but somethingmore modest - a principle that ranks one given value with respectto another. What is to be rejected, then, is the idea, central toFichte's account, that the subject's practical..standards can all beultimately self-given, as well as the illusion, already contained inKant's theory of moral disposition, upon which this idea is based,

amely, that the subject is somehow capable of choosing itself athe deepest level of its identity.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding four chapters we have tried to understand Fichte'stheory of subjectivity as one version of the general project of demonstrating the unity of theoretical and practical reason. After asurvey of his early philosophical development, we arrived at theconclusion that by 1797 Fichte had come to regard his first principle ofphilosophy, as it is formulated in the thesis of the self-positingsubject, as an attempt to grasp the essence of subjectivity in allof its configurations, or, what is the same, to articulate the singlefundamental structure, or "activity," that underlies and informs allof consciousness. If this thesis is correct, then it must be possibleto show that subjectivity in both its practical and theoretical formsdepends upon an activity of the subject that has the structureof what Fichte calls "self-positing" activity. Our analysis of thenotion of self-positing began in Chapter 3 with an examination ofthe issue in connection with which Fiehte initially constructed histheory ofsubjectivity, namely, the phenomenon of theoretical selfconsciousness. We saw there that Fichte's account of the subj ect asa self-positing activity, or Tathandlung, could be understood as adevelopment of Kant's own view of the theoretical subject, especially with respect to two issues: the distinctive nature of thesubject's self-awareness in theoretical self-consciousness and theabsolute, or self-constituting, nature of the representing subject.

167


Starting with an account of the self-relation involved in theoretical self-consciousness, and with a firm commitment to the viewthat subjectivity must be essentially unitary, Fichte was led to theidea that practical subjectivity must also be regarded as groundedin an analogous kind of relation of the subject to itself. In thissphere Fichte's specific goal was described as isolating the fundamental characteristic offree human agency and then showing thatthis characteristic also depends upon a subjective activity that hasthe structure of self-positing. The feature of the subject that Fichtesingled out here as essential to free agency was that of "selfdetermination." On this view, being a free agent, as opposed to adetermined link in a causal chain, consists in determining one'sactions oneself" rather than being determined to act by externalcauses. Furthermore, to be free in the deepest sense was said torequire a self-determination, not only of one's particular deeds,but of the general principles according to which one lives one'slife. It was primarily here in the subject's adoption of its highestpractical principles that Fichte attempted to show that selfpositing was necessary for practical subjectivity. He envisionedone's self-determined norms as arising only from an activity inwhich the subject enters into a uniquely "subjective" relation toitself, insofar as it reflects upon its essential nature and in the process constitutes its identity.

Thus far we have been concerned primarily with Fichte's separate accounts of theoretical and practical subjectivity (in Chapters3 and 4, respectively) and, more specifically, with understandinghow the central phenomena of the theoretical and practical realmscould each be conceived of as dependent upon a self-positingactivity. It now remains for us to consider briefly whether Fichtehas succeeded at his task - to what extent do his discussions ofself-consciousness and self-determination show that both forms ofsubjectivity are grounded in a single activity or, more accurately,in activities that have a truly identical structure?

The plausibility of Fichte's thesis lies in the fact that his accounts of the basic phenomena of theoretical and practical subjectivity both depend upon what one might call acts of "reflexiveself-constitution." Contained in this notion is the idea that, indistinction to things, the subject constitutes itself, and it does so byentering into a distinctively "subjective" self-relation that differsfrom the relations (whether practical or theoretical) that a subjecthas to an object. This is the case in theoretical self-consciousness,

CONCLUSION 169 -insofar as a kind of reflexive, nonrepresentational activity (the I'srelating its representations to itself) constitutes the subject withrespect to its existence. Similarly, in the practical realm the subject is said to constitute itself-establish its own identity - througha kind of nonobjective self-relating. For, as a self-determiningbeing, I determine the principles that will govern my actions bychoosing them in accord with my conception of "who I am,"where the identity that governs the choice of principles does notitself (fully) preexist the act of choosing but emerges instead onlyin the process of self-reflection.

It is important to note, however, that to demonstrate that theoretical and practical subjectivity share this one essential feature isnot necessarily to show that they are structurally identical. Oneobvious, but significant difference between the two resides in thenature of the self-relation involved in each. In his account oftheoretical self-consciousness, Fichte emphasizes that the subject's relation to itselfis "immediate," which, as we saw earlier, isassociated with the claim that the theoretical subject's most basickind of awareness is implicit, involuntary, and prereflective. Yetnone of these attributes applies to the self-relation that is centralto practical self-determination. On the contrary, the kind ofreflexive activity characteristic of this notion is a voluntary andexplicit reflection upon one's "true essential nature" in which thesubject even has itself as a kind of object for reflection. The selfrelation involved here is still distinct from the subject's relations toobjects, since the "object" of practical reflection is constitutedthrough the act of reflecting, but it is also significantly differentfrom the kind of immediate self-relation upon which theoreticalself-consciousness depends.

There exists an even more basic difference between the twoforms ofsubjectivity as Fichte understands them. It is a differencethat Fichte himself seems not to have been aware of but that concerns one of the most fundamental aspects of his theory, the selfconstituting nature of the subject. A careful consideration ofFichte's accounts of self-consciousness and self-determinationreveals that th_cre is an import.antli,,§YJnm~tryh.e~1U~~

whiclLth.e...£uhj1:J,;,LConstit:ut~l:!jjself.hLlts tl!~Qre,ticftl an.d praJ;tka,la£!M!!~~. We can best understand this difference by pointing outa basic ambiguity in the notion of self-constitution. On the onehand, an entity might be thought of as self-constituting withrespect to its. existence, so that the very fact that it exists is in some


sense its own doing. On the other hand, a being might be said toconstitute itself in a qualitative sense. Here it is not that I exist thatis up to me but how I exist; the set of properties that make up myidentity - the kind of being I am - depends, whether in toto or inpart, upon my making myself thus. Having made this distinction,J.tj~ ea~_y to ~~Jhat Fichte conceives Qfth~~J.J1JJ~~t ofJ!l.~Qt.~ical

~s.clf=_QQJ1.s_~iQ1.!~n&~,~§...i!§m~~Jf-cQngitl!t.ing"jn th~ first<FJ)iJh..e.a.u..~3J).d ~tj;riQY1~§_.lb-_~~~.~Qll~l~k.i!ld_Qf.~clf':'~QQn.~ titlc11iQ...Q_t~t.tb.e..praGtic.al

L-I-,_t~ the former case Fichte regards the subject as constitutingitself with regard to its existence in the sense that in the absenceof its self-positing activity- its immediate intuition of its representations as its own - the subj ect cannot be said to exist. In practicalself-determination, however, it is not one's existence that is constituted through the subject's reflective activity; rather, the subjectconstitutes itself qualitatively - it determines what kind of a person it will be.

Although Fichte's theory draws our attention to the existenceof important parallels between theoretical and practical subjectivity, the differences between them suggest that there are limits tothe extent to which a clarification of the structure of theoreticalself-consciousness can shed light on the nature of practical selfdetermination. Despite Fichte's inability to show that the two areinformed by an identical structure, his basic thesis concerning theessentially unitary nature of subjectivity exerts a significant influence on subsequent philosophy. Most notably, not only doesHegel incorporate specifically Fichtean views concerning the selfpositing nature of the subject into his notion of Geist, he alsofollows Fichte's lead in a more fundamental way by making hisown conception ofsubjectivity (a subjectivity that, in a more basicsense than Fichte's I, is also essentially "other-relating") the firstprinciple of philosophy. And, in a sense, Hegel carries Fichte'sproject one step farther, for he regards this transformed Fichteanprinciple as articulating not only the nature of human subjectivitybut the structure of all reality.

These broader systematic issues aside, Fichtc's theory has hada significant influence in at least two other areas. As we saw inChapter 3, his view of theoretical self-consciousness, minus itstranscendental claims, is probably the most important forerunnerof twentieth-century phenomenological accounts, especially inHusserl and Sartre, of the nature of self-awareness and consciousness in general. But perhaps the most provocative and inft.uential

CONCLUSION 1-71

aspect of Fichte's theory lies in his view that practical selfdetermination can be understood only on the basis of a distinctiverelation of the subject to itself, as well as in his attempt to articulate the nature of that self-relation. The view that human freedomin its most substantial form - that is, as self-determination orautonomy - is grounded in a distinctively subjective self-relatingreappears in a variety of guises, not only in the thought of hisContinental successors, but in some Anglo-American discussionsof the topic as well. I In this respect, Fichte's theory makes animportant contribution to one of philosophy's most importanttasks, that ofunderstanding how,and in what sense, human beingscan be free.

L For a detailed account of the forms this basic idea takes in Hegel, Kierkegaard,and Heidegger, see Tugendhat (1986, Chaps. 7, 10).

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Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre. Bonn: Bouvier, 1974.Beiser; Frederick C. The Fate ofReason: German Philosophy from Kant to

Fichte. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ, Press, 1987.,..k--Benson, R?bert Lawre~ce. "~ichte's Original Argument." Doctoral dis-'\ sertation, Columbia Univ., 1974.

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"Fichte's Aenesidemus Review and the Transformation of German Ideal-ism." Review ofMetaphysics, 34 (1981), 545-68.

"How to Make an Idealist: Fichte's 'Refutation of Dogmatism' and theProblem of the Starting Point of the Wissenschaftslehre." PhilosophicalForum, 19, Nos. 2-3 (1988), 97-123.

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Ferry, Luc. Le droit: La nouvelle querelle des anciens et des modemes. Vol. I ofPhilosophic politique. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1984.

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Akademie der Wissenschqften, 15 vols. Ed. Reinhard Lauth, HansJacobs, and Hans Gliwitsky. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: FrommannHolzboog, 1964- .

Johann Gottlieb Fidues sammtliche WCrke, 8 vols. Ed. I. H. Fichte. Berlin:Veit & Comp., 1845-6.

Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo: Kollegnachschrift K. Cllr. Fr. Krause 1798/1799. Ed. Erich Fuchs. Hamburg: Meiner, 1982.

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TheScience ofKnowledge with the FirstandSecond Introductions. Trans. PeterHeath and John Lachs, Cambridge Univ, Press, 1982.

The Vocation ofMan. Ed. Roderick M. Chisholm. Indianapolis, Ind.:Bobbs-Merrill, 1956.

Frank, Manfred. Die Unhintergehbarkeit von Individualittit: Riflexionen ilberSuhjekt, Person und Individuum aus AnlqfJ ihrer "postmodernen" Toterklarung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, Ig86.

Heimsoeth, Heinz. Fichie. Munich: E. Reinhardt, 1923.Henrich, Dieter. "Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre

vom Faktum der Vernunft." In Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren:Denken. Ed. D. Henrich, W. Schulz, and K.-H. Volkmann-Schluck,Tiibingen: Mohr, 1960, 77-115.

"La decouverte de Fichte." Revue de metaphysique et de morale, 72 (1967)I 54-69.

"Fichte's urspriingliche Einsicht." In Suhjektivitat undMetaphysik. Ed.D. Henrich and H. Wagner. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann,Ig66, 188-232.

Selhstverhaltnisse. Stuttgart: Reclam, Ig82."Ueber die Einheit der Subjektivitat." Philosopkische Rundschau, 3

(I955),28-6g.+'~'Fichte's Original Insight." Trans. David R. Lachterman. Contempo

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"Self-Consciousness: A Critical Introduction to a Theory." Man andWorld, 4 (1971), 3-28.

Kabitz, Willy. Studien ;;.ur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Fichtescken Wissenschaftslehre aus der Kantischen Philosophic. I g02; rpt, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968.

Kant, Immanuel. Gesammelte Schrijten, Akademie-Ausgabe, 32 vols. Berlin:Reimer, 1902-83.

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Critique ofJudgment. Trans. J. H. Bernard. New York: Macmillan, 195I.

Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. L. W. Beck. Indianapolis" Ind.:Bobbs-Merrill, 1956.

Critique ofPure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. 1929; rpt. NewYork: St. Martin's, 1965.

Groundwork ofthe Metaphysic, ofMorals. Trans. H. J. Paton. New York:Harper & Row, 1964.

Religion Within the Bounds ofReason Alone. Trans. Theodore M. Greeneand Hoyt H. Hudson. 1934; rpt. New York: Harper, 1960.

Larmore, Charles E. Patterns ofMoral Complexity. Cambridge Univ. Press,1987.

Lauth, Reinhard. "J. G. Fichtes Gesamtidee der Philosophic.' Philo-sophisches ]ahrbuch, 71 (1964), 253-85.

Leon, Xavier. Fichie etson temps, 3vols. 1914; rpt. Paris: Armand Colin, 1954.r~,' Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

Univ. Press, 1981.Paton, H. J. The Categorical Imperative: A Stu£b in Kant~ Moral Philosophy.

Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 197 I.

Perrinjaquet, Alain. "La conscience de soi comme point de depart de laphilosophie dans la deuxierne exposi tion de la doctrine de la sciencede ], G. Fichte." Memoire presente pour l'obtention de la licence eslettres. Univ, de Neuchatel, 1985.

Philonenko, Alexis. La Liberti humainedans la philosophie de Fichie. Paris:Vrin, 1966.

Theorie etpraxis dans lapensee morale etpolitique de Kantet de Fichte de 1793.Paris: Vrin, 1968.

,..-.a.J?ippin, Robert B. "Fichte's Contribution." Philosophical Forum, 19, Nos./r 2-3 (lg88), 74-96.

Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions ofSelf-Consciousness. Cambridge Univ.Press, 1989-

Reinhold, Karl Leonhard. Beitrag» zur Berichiigung bisheriger MijJverstandnisse der Philosophen, Vol. I. Jena: Mauke, 1790.

Briefe iiber .die Kantische Philosophie, Vol. 2. Leipzig: Goeschen,' 1792 •

Versuch einer neuen Theone des menschlichen Vorstellungs- Vermogens. Prague:Widtmann & Mauke, 1789.

Renaut, Alain. Le systems dudroit: Philosophie et droit dans lapensee de Fichie.Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1986.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. NewYork: Pocket Books, 1966.

The Transcendence ofthe Ego. Trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. New York: Noonday Press, 1957.

Schulze, Gottlob Ernst. Aenesidemus oder iiber die Fundamenie der von demHerro Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie. 1792;rpt. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 191 I.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 175Silber, John. "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion." In Religion

Within the Bounds of Reason Alone. Trans. Theodore M. Greene andHoyt H. Hudson. 1934; rpt. NewYork: Harper, 1960, pp.Ixxix-cxxxiv,

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Taylor, Charles. Philosophical Papers. Cambridge Univ, Press, 1985."Responsibility for Self." In Free Will. Ed. Gary Watson. New York:

Oxford Univ, Press, 1983, pp. 111-26.Tugendhat, Ernst. Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination. Trans. Paul

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INDEX

Addresses to the German Nation, 7Aenesidemus review, 34, 69-75, 103,

105-7, 1I0, III-I2Anstoj3, 48-50, 79napperception, see Kant, I.; self-positingAtheism Controversy, 7, 33Attempt at a Critique ofAll Revelation, 20n"Attempt at an Eplication of an

Excerpt from Kant's Critique qfjudgment," 14

"Attempt at a New Presentation ofthe Wissenschoftslehre," 34, 53, 73

autonomy, 6, 8, 54, 57, u8, 122,131-2, 134, 136, 138, 142; Kantian,26, 118, 134n, 138, l44n, 145-6,152; radical, ISS-6o, 165; see alsoself-determination

Baumanns, P., 44n, 45n, 56nbelief (Glaube), 3, 55, 57-9, 64Benson, R., 67n, Son, 97nBreazeale, D., 56n

categorical imperative, see moral lawcategories, see reason, theoreticalcharacter, 58,143-4, 151, 153-4,

158; innate, 154; self-created, 144,151, 154, 158-9, 164, 166

concept, purposive, see Zweckbegrijf

Concerning the Concept qf theWissenschaftslehre, 34, 41-2, 70n

consciousness: dual structure of, 71,79-81; facts of, 25-7, 36-7,80,86-8, IOn representational, 70-2,74-5,83, I2J, 156; unity of, g, 22n,35-41,42, 60, 94-7,98n, 100

Creuzer review, 4, 20n, 145

Descartes, R., 45disposition (Gesinnung) , see Kant, I.dogmatism, 55-9drive, natural (Naturtrieb), 25, 26,

124, 125, 132n, 135, 139

"Eigene Meditationen iiberElementar-Philosophie," 34, 36n,37, 38-41, 43, 51

existentialism, 155

freedom: as arbitrariness, 5-6,125- 7, 129, 130, 147-8, 152,157-8, 162-3; formal, 12In, 122,J25-30, I38-9, 157; "full," 128n,139; as governed by concepts,126-8; material, 12In; objective,140-2; problem of, 3-6, 13-20, 26,29, 3J, 57, 59; see also selfdetermination; Willkur

177

INDEX178Foundation of Natural Right (Grundlage des

Naturrechts), 7, 63

Gebhard review, 23-8, 34, 35-7, 39,47, 60-1

Hegel, G. W. F., 7, 79n, 91, 170, 171nHeidegger, M., 17I nHenrich, D., 44n, 6g, 7sn, 114nHume, D., 106Husserl, E., 170

I, see subject"I := 1/' 85n, 96nidealism (vs. dogmatism), 55-9Idealism, German, 6-8, I I, 68, 91intuition, intellectual: as consciousness

of moral law, r 18; Kant's notion of,77-8, 90-2; relation to sensibleintuition, 76, 78-81, 83, 86, 99; asself-awareness, 68, 74-89, 96-9,101-2,' 108, I I I-IS; see also selfawareness (prereflective)

Jacobi, F. H., 3, 5

Kant, I.: and apperception, 36, 39-40,44, 46, 7'iJ., 90-1, 94-9; defense ofmorality by, 13, 17-20, 24-8, 40,57-8, 136; and disposition(Gesinnung), 144, 147, 150-4, 155-6,166; and fact of reason, 26-8; andfreedom, 4-6, 13, 17-20, 57-8, 122,I'iJ.4, 145-6; and "I think," 74, 78,92-9; and third antinomy, 14, 18n,19; transcendental deduction of,92-9; Critique of judgnunt, 14-19, 31n;Critique ofPractical Reason, 1'3, 2'iJ.,26-8; Critique ofPure Reason, 13-16,19,21,27,29,3 1, 39, 90,9~ 146n;Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals,27n, 28n, 61, 123, 146n, 150;Rejlexionen, 28n, 39; Religion within theBounds ofReason Alone, 146-53; see alsointuition, intellectual; maxims; morallaw; reason, unity of; self-positing;wuu»

Kierkegaard, S., 134n, 171n

Larmore, C., 158nLauth, R., 44nlaw: practical, 131-4; self-legislated,

131, 134, 145, 166Leibniz, G. W., 31

maxims: and formal freedom, I~~,

127-9, 139; higher-order, 12~, 128,"I3 1n, 13~-4; Kant's view of, 149-53;and purposive concepts, 127, 140;and spontaneity, I ~8-30; andsubstantive self-determination, 1~2,130-4, 140, 147, 164, 165, 166

moral feeling, 25-7morality, challenges to, 3-5, 25-8; see

also reason, practicalmoral law, 14, 17, I8n, 26, 39-40 , 51,

132n, 134n ; deduction of, ~7-8, 39-40,5I; as intellectual intuition, I 18

norm (Norm), 40, 122-3, 131- 5, 138,166, 168

"not-I," 2, 40-1, 49-52, 68, 140

Nozick, R., 1150, 165n

objectivity, sec subject, as distinct fromobject .

Perrinjaquet, A., 35nphilosophy, first principle of, I~, 21-3,

42-3, 45, 53, 56-7, 60, 6~-3, 70- I,

87n; Fichte's early candidates for,37-8, 41, 42; see also Reinhold, I{. L.,principle of consciousness;Wlssenschoftslehre, first principle of

philosophy, systematic nature of, 12,21-3, 37, 38, 4~-3, 55, 58-6o, 70

Pippin, R., 44n, 67n, 9 I nprinciple, first, see philosophy, first

principle of; Wissenschaftstehre, firstprinciple of

reason, practical, 5-6, 14-20, 24n; ascondition of theoretical reason, 42,47-52, 55; as condition of the unityof consciousness, 22n, 35-41; primacyof, 8, 47; proof of, 23-9, 3~, 35-43,47-52, 55, 57-60, 64; as unity of Iand not-I, 40-1, 51; see also reason,unity of

reason, theoretical, 13-16, ~7, 41;contradiction within, 48-50;deduction of the categories of, 2I, 23,38, 60, 68, 98-101; and self...consciousness, '67-8

reason, unity of, 2, 8-g, 11-12, 59, 167;as compatibility, 13-20, 28, 29;Kant's view of, 11-1~, 13-20, 22-3,~9-3I, 39-40, 47; as structuralidentity, 29-31, 32, 59-61, 63-5,

INDEX 179II 7, 167; as systematic unity, Ill-9,32, 35, 37, 47, 59-61

reflection, 82, 135, 138-40, 163; uponformal freedom, 131, 138; in formalself-determination, 125-7, 135; uponone's true nature, 135-40, 155-7,161, 165, 168, 169; self-constituting,157, 160n, 162, 168, 169; upon selfsufficiency, 137-40

Reinhold, K. L.: faculty of representation (Vorstellungs- Vermilgen), 103-6,107, r ro, Ill, 120; notion of system,21-3,38,62, 70, 87n; principle ofconsciousness, 70-2, 74-5, 85n, 87,92; see also Willkur

Sartre, J.-P., 72n, 79n, 8In, 85n, 88n,89n, 170

Schelling, F., 7, 91Schulz, J. F., 77nSchulze, G. E" 70-2, 74-5, 103-6,

r rznself-activity (Selbsttatigkeit), 25, 54, 145self-awareness (prereflective): as distinct

from self-consciousness, 69, 76, 78-85;as element of all consciousness, 73-4,76-7,79-89, 911-102; immediate,75-8,81-6,87; nonrepresentational,68-g, 71-86, 87; structure of, 83-6;see also intuition, intellectual

self-consciousness, reflective, 81-5, 88,93-4,97, 101; see also self-positing;self-awareness

self-determination, 3, 6, 8, 10,26,44,49-5°,54-5,57,64-5, Ilg, 168-71;formal (weak), 1111-11, 11l3-31, 135;as independence from nature, Ig8,140-11;individualist account of,Ig6-7, 14g-4, 151-66; possibility of,I 19-1lO; substantive (strong), 11l1-3,11l9, 130, 131-44, 151-66, 168-9;universalist account of, 136-43

self-groundeduess, 43, 46, ll9, IllS,143-4,152

self-positing: as first principle of philosophy, 43-6, 511, 611-3, 87n, 167;general notion of, 44-6, 120-1, 154,167; immediacy of, 43n, 169; interpretations of, 44-5, 511; and Kantianapperception, 44, 66-7, 72-3, 78,89-99, 118; paradoxical nature of,69, 114-16; phenomenological argument for, 86-9, roe; as principle ofpractical philosophy, 44-7, 54,

57, I17; and self-consciousness, 9-10,44-6,52,65,66-9, 711-98, 101l-g,.108-I6, I67-9; as self-constituting(practical), ll8, 1111, 156-7, I60n,162, 163-4, 168-70; as ,self-constituting existence, I12-16,167-70; and self-determination, 10,1I'8-21, 137, 154, 163, 168-g; asstructure of subjectivity, g-1O, 30,63-5,67, I17, I19; transcendentalargument for, 86-7,89-102; see alsointuition, intellectual; self-awareness(prereflecrive); self-consciousness,reflective; self-determination;subject

self-sufficiency (Selbstandigkeit), 49, 511,54,56, 135, 137-8, 140-2

Sittenlehre, 7, 35, 64n, 119, I2In,123-43, 144, 147

Spinozism, 3-5, 55; see also dogmatismspontaneity: practical, 39, 46, 54, ll8n,

I1l5n, 128-30, 147, 152, 157, 158;theoretical, 39,46,49,54, 77, 78,79n,95, ll3, r rfln

striving (Streben), 51-2, 140subject: absolute (unconditioned), 41,

43-6, 49-52, 54, 55, 66, 74, 102-3,I I 1-14, 167; as activity, 46, 107-16,IllO; as distinct from object, 2, 103,105-6, 110, 1111-13, 116, 120, 155,168; as distinguished from thing initself, 103-6, I IO-II; existence of,45-6, 511, 54, 68, 78, 102-16, 155;finitude of, 50-2; independence of,49-52,54, 137: noumenal, 10, 1l0,104-6, 107, lIO, Ill, 120, 147,151-2, 154-5; self-constituting, seeself-positing; as transcendental Idea,106,Il11

subjectivity: reflexive nature of, 65, II I,114-16,117,120-1,155,168-71;single structure of, 2, 6, 9-10, I I,29-g I, 63-5, 67, lI6, 117, 167-9;theory of, 1-6, 117, 167

substance, 2, 55, 105, 110, 116sufficient reason, principle of, 4-5System of the Doctrine ofMorals, see

Sittenlehre

Tathandlung, 45n, 65, ros, 103, 106-9,167

Taylor, C., I33n, 16I-llthing in itself, 49, 55, 78; as

distinguished from absolute subject,103-6, I to-r r

180 INDEX

Tugendhat, E., 134n, 1440, 156-60,162, 164

Vocation ofMan, The, 7, 14I n

"Vocation of the Scholar, The," 400

Wildt, A., 44nwill: absolute nature of; 124, 126, 129,

137; in contrast to Willkur, 146;Unbestimmbarkeit of, 124, Ifz6, 137,138; see also freedom

willing (das Wollen), 122, 123-30 , 135,137, 138

Willkur (practical freedom): Kant's viewof, 122, 124, 144, 146-7, 148-53,156, 157; nature of, 122, 123-8,

144-7; Reinhold's view of, 144, 1460,147-8, 149, 153, 157

Wissenschaftslehre, 7, 33-5, 41; after1800, 7, 33n; first principle of, 33,42-7, 49-65, 109, 167; first andsecond introductions to, 34, 35n, 45n,53-9, 63, 88, 90, 109, 118; secondprinciple of, 50-I, 68; system of1797-9, 34, 45n, 53-65, 67

Wissenschaftslehre, Grundlage der gesammten(WL 1794), 34, 350 , 38, 40, 41-53,

54, 55, 59, 67, 68, 70n, 109, 140Wissenschqftslehre nova methodo, 35, 8 I

Wolff, C., 3 I

Zweckbegriff (purposive concept), 126-8,134-5, 137, 138, 140

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Frederick Neuhouser -- Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity