Fichte's Idealism and Marx's Materialism

TOM R O C K M O R E

Yale University

F I C H T E ' S I D E A L I S M A N D M A R X ' S M A T E R I A L I S M

The inherent danger of distinctions is that if badly drawn or poorly ap- plied they serve to obscure rather than to clarify. The aim of this paper is to call into question a well-known example, the idealism-materialism distinction. I shall argue, through a discussion of various ways in which it has been

drawn, that no central concept is discernible in the different definitions, other than a distinction between thought and being. Through a comparison of Fichte's and Marx's positions, I shall further argue that, however for-

mulated, this distinction does not help to distinguish Marx's views from those of the German idealists.

The distinction between idealism and materialism has long been in use in

philosophy. This distinction is commonly held to refer to a basic methodological option or way of doing philosophy, and its use is still current. Although the doctrine of idealism has enjoyed little support recently, at least not under that name, attempts to demonstrate the validity of various forms of materialism are now in fashion.

Despite the attention ~evoted to the idealism-materialism distinction and the extent to which it is often presupposed in doing philosophy, or perhaps because of these reasons, no single way of drawing the distinction has

achieved anything approaching universal acceptance. A comparison of works which attempt either to define or discuss idealism or materialism reveals the diverse meaning accorded to these two terms. In most instances common to their discussions is the presupposition of the incompatibility of idealism

and materialism, although it is apparent that unanimity is lacking on whether

these two theories divide the philosophical universe between them or must in turn be distinguished from other alternatives.

To consider several representative examples, both the Dictionary of Philosophy and the Philosophisches W&terbuch consider idealism and materialism as exclusive alternatives whose principle difference concerns the relative priority accorded to consciousness or to matter.~ On the contrary,

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the Enciclopedia Filosofica opposes idealism to realism and materialism to both idealism and spiritualism. 2 In the "Refutation of Idealism" G.E. Moore considers the opposition between idealism or spiritualism and common-sense realism. 3 Kemp Smith '4 and H.B. Acton, following Smith, maintain that the distinction refers to whether matter is primary to mind and spiritual values, and both argue that idealism has to be distinguished not only from materialism, but from naturalism and subjectivism as well.

Other writers presume that the two positions in question are not mutually exclusive. Santayana, for instance, argues that idealists are actually crypto- materialists and that a self-consistent theory of idealism is not possible. ~ Rorty claims, in the context of a general discussion of alternative conceptual frameworks, that the distinction cannot be defended, since it rests on a prior, untenable distinction." On the contrary, Bosanquet opposes idealism to realism and argues that they are not sharp contrasts, but positions which have much in common. 7 Following Bosanquet, Urban maintains that a synthesis of both views is possible. 8

Taken together, the two general approaches with respect to the idealism- materialism distinction suggest there are questions which must be answered prior to its use. Among these questions are the following : Are idealism and materialism mutually exclusive or complementary theories ? Is there a "normal" way of drawing the distinction, or can it only be drawn norma- tively ? Can the different forms of the distinction be reduced to one another or are they irreconcilably dissimilar ? In what contexts can the distinction be

used without fear of creating a distortion ? Questions concerning the viability and applicability of the distinction

are of special interest since it has served historically as a watershed to separate theories on methodological grounds. This is especially true for discussions of continental philosophy. Without prejudging the merits of the various views of the distinction, I shall argue that even if some form of it is tenable, the distinction, as commonly drawn, does not help to distinguish Marx's theory from classical German philosophy, which will here be defined as the period from Kant to Marx. My argument will be similar to that of Bosanquet in that I shall be concerned to show that the "idealist" and "materialist" views of this perio d share a common approach which makes it fatuous and misleading to separate them on methodological grounds.

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II

In order to make clear why the applicability of the distinction in question is a topic in need of discussion, a word should be said about the manner in which the philosophic topography of this period is sometimes described. Classical German philosophy is often divided into three, temporarily unequal segments : the critical philosophy, represented by Kant; idealism, including Fichte, Schelling and Hegel; and materialism, Marx's approach? The result of this division is to "identify" a triple-methodological opposition in classical German thought, which comprises three, methodologically-

distinguishable types of theories. This tripartite division is based on two assumptions. On the one hand,

Kant's statements, as early as the first Critique and as late as the Opus Posthumum, that his thought is an idealism are unaccountably ignored, thus establishing an "opposition" between the critical philosophy and idealism. On the other hand, assertions by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel that they are idealists and by Marx that he is a materialist are accepted as accurate, thereby generating an "opposition" between idealism and materialism.

Now one way to answer the question, what's in a name ? is to reply that the importance we accord toi ts choice should in some sense be proportional to its importance in ordering our perceptions. Accordingly, it is less important to decide if it is correct to call the Kantian philosophy a form of idealism than to decide if we may properly distinguish between idealism and materialism. In the former instance, although Kant criticizes certain forms of idealism as untenable, his claim that his own thought is itself a form of idealism casts doubt on the attempt to distinguish between the critical philosophy and idealism.

In the latter case, both in the thinkers concerned and in the secondary literature, the labels are taken seriously and the claim is made for a fundamental difference in approach. Hence, in this instance both the viability as well as the applicability of the distinction are important. Its use pre- supposes both that these two conditions are fulfilled and that its employment is helpful in separating theories as so type. But if the theories in question do not differ with respect to methodology, the distinction cannot be invoked to refer to such a difference and its application serves only to create an arbitrary or "unnatural" and misleading separation among methodologically- similar views.

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There are various ways to study the applicability of a distinction. One might, for instance, envisage different meanings it could be given in order to facilitate its use. In such an approach, it is presumed that the difference to be described in fact obtains. In that case, it the distinction accurately. Another approach, the views in question in order to determine dissimilar.

Obviously too much occurred in classical possible a full discussion of even the major

is only necessary to "capture" that used here, is to analyze if they are methodologically

German philosophy to make thinkers of this period. It is

hence necessary widely thought rialist, it seems respectively, of

to choose thinkers to serve as examples. Since Fichte is of as an idealist and Marx is usually classified as a mate- appropriate to concentrate on their views as representative, idealism and materialism. It further seems reasonable to

suppose that if there is a methodological difference between idealism and materialism, it will be discernible either in the particular theory each thinker advances or in his views on theory in general, or meta-theory. Accordingly, I shall begin by a review of the respective theoretical positions and then proceed to an examination of the two meta-theories.

III

The idealism-materialism distinction is important for Fichte's thought. Appropriate philosophic methodology is a frequent topic in his writings and he holds that central to the problem of methodology is the relation of idealism and materialism, two basic ways of doing philosophy. In this regard Fichte often comments favorably on idealism as the "correct" philosophic approach and unfavorably on materialism, which he describes variously as dogmatism or realism. But although this might lead one to infer that Fichte rejects materialism and embraces idealism, I shall argue that a close reading of the texts will show that his view of critical idealism is an attempted synthesis of both idealism and materialism.

Critical idealism is a theory of experience. It may be summarized as follows : According to Fichte, all experience can be analyzed as a relation of subject and object or, in his terminology, self and not-self. He examines this relation in terms of a first principle, namely, that the self is to be understood in terms of its activity. 1~ The first principle functions axiomati- cally in Fichte's system, since he uses it to "derive" the rest of his position.

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In particular, through application of the first principle to the relation of self and not-self, Fichte "deduces" a series of propositions which, he claims, are self-consistent, form a coherent whole and which, taken together, account for the condition of the possibility of the facts of experience.

Fichte explicitly distinguishes between theory and meta-theory. He bases his own view on meta-theoretic considerations which concern his normative view of the goal of philosophy as well as the type of theory adequate to that end. Although he clearly holds that the goal of philosophy is the explanation of experience, it is easy to misunderstand which type of theory he feels is adequate to that end. The misunderstanding can be ascribed to a simple reason, for although Fichte offers at least three different analyses of the problem, from two of the discussions one conclusion follows, whereas a different conclusion follows from the third discussion. But one can, nevertheless, specify the type Of theory Fichte favors.

In what may be called Fichte's two semi-popular discussions, he maintains, through separate lines of reasoning, that there are only two possible approaches to philosophy, idealism and realism. Idealism is the view that experience is to be accounted for through a theory of the subject or self as the basis of reality. Realism, which Fichte also calls dogmatism, corresponds to what Marx calls materialism. It is the position that experience is to be explained in terms of an independent given, the real.

From this analysis, Fichte draws two separate, apparently incompatible conclusions. In a first discussion, he argues that neither possible approach to experience can refute the other. He concludes that the method one elects is a function of one's interests :

What sort of philosophy one chooses depends, therefore, on what sort of man one is; for a philosophical system is not a dead piece of furniture that we can reject or accept as we wish; it is rather a thing animated by the soul of the person who holds it. A person indolent by nature or dulled and distorted by mental servitude, learned luxury, and vanity wi!l never raise himself to the level of idealism. 11

The evident weakness of this "psychogenetic" analysis is that, if both views are of equal value, no reason can be given to opt for one method as opposed to another but, as will be seen, Fichte holds that the views are of unequal importance and that argument can be advanced for the non-arbitrary choice of the proper approach.

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In a second analysis, Fichte maintains that although neither approach can refute the other, realism is inadequate to explain experience. But if realism is not a viable theory, this leaves idealism as the sole possible view.

Thus dogmatism can only repeat its principle, and then reiterate it under various guises: it can state it, and then state it again; but it cannot get from this to the explanandum, and deduce the latter. Yet philosophy consists precisely of this deduction. Hence dogmatism, even from the speculative viewpoint, is no philosophy at all, but merely an impotent claim and assurance. Idealism is left as the only possible philosophy. 12

So stated this indirect argument for idealism is unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. First, it is not clear why these two positions are the only ones which can be advanced. Elsewhere Fichte, for instance, proposed a third view, namely critical idealism. Second, even if we grant Fichte's point that realism cannot be an adequate theory, no reason has been advanced for the appropriateness of idealism.

In a third discussion Fichte gives the analysis on which he bases his own position. Here, as in the first two analyses, idealism and realism are separate, consistent positions, neither of which can refute the other since the quarrel is about first principles. Further, reason cannot choose between them since each position concerns a different facet of experience. The proper view is a third alternative which combines the virtues of the a posteriori approach of realism and the a priori approach of idealism. In this way, realism is explained through idealism, but idealism is grounded in realism. Fichte writes :

The philosopher says only in his own name: Everything that exists for the self, exists through the self. The self, however, itself says in its own philosophy: As surely as I am and live, something exists outside me, which is not there by my doing. How it arrives at such a claim, the philosopher explains by the principles of his philosophy. The first standpoint is that of pure speculation; the second that of life and scientific knowledge... The second is only intelligible on the basis of the first; realism has grounds, indeed, apart from that, for we are constrained to it by our own nature, but it has no known and comprehensible grounds : yet the first standpoint, again, exists only for the purpose of making the second intelligible. Idealism can never be a mode o I thought, it is merely a speculative point of view? a

Critical idealism, the position described by Fichte, has various synonyms in his writings, such as real idealism, ideal realism or transcendental idealism.

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This view is a hybrid, composed of rationalistic, idealistic and realistic elements. It is rationalistic in that, like Spinoza's position, it is modelled on geometry and is, Fichte claims, a science. It is idealistic in that it is a speculative, categorial analysis. In particular, Fichte makes use of the hypothesis that the self is activity in order to formulate a theory of experience. It is realistic in that it accepts as a given the real and independent world. In fine, Fichte's public opposition to realism is mainly rhetorical, although his position has not always been understood on this point, since his own view is an attempted synthesis of both idealism and realism. ~4

IV

The task of ascertaining Marx's meta-theoretic and theoretic views is complicated by the inability of many to distinguish between Marx and Engels. 15 But even if we confine our attention to Marx's writings only, it is necessary to bear in mind that Marx does not always distinguish clearly between theory and meta-theory. Further, as I shall point out, his comments on the distinctions between idealism and materialism, and between his own position and methodology in general, are ambiguous. This ambiguity renders difficult the determination as well as the evaluation of his position.

The distinction between idealism and materialism is prominent in Marx's early writings. Here "idealism" is synonymous with "speculative philosophy," whose chief representative is Hegel, and "materialism" is a doctrine which, in different forms, has been put forward by, among others, thinkers as diverse as Democritus, Descartes, Locke, Helvetius, and latterly Feuer- bach. Marx frequently ridicules idealism, as in the following, typical passage:

...finite understanding, supported by my senses, distinguishes an apple from a pear and a pear from an almond, but my speculative reason declares these perceptual differences to be unessential and unimportant. My speculative reason sees in the apple the same thing as in the pear and in the pear the same thing as in the almond - - namely, "the Fruit." Particular, actual fruits are taken to be only apparent fruits whose true essence is "the Substance," "the Fruit. ''1~

Conversely, Marx praises materialism, especially the Feuerbachian variety, although his appreciation of it is not uncritical :

The highest point reached by contemplative [i.e., Feuerbachian] materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as

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practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society. The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or social humanity, iv

Marx's theory is easy to characterize. Its aim is to specify the conditions of the possibility of human self-realization. The beginning point is the given of experience or social reality, which is assumed to exist and whose existence must be explained. The explanation takes the form of a genetic inquiry into the nature and origin of social reality. Social reality is analyzed as an ensemble of social relations which is generated through the manifestation of human activity, for the most part in the process of production. Among the results due to human activity are individuals, whose social roles determine their way of being, products, private property, particular social relations, and social reality in general.

The condition of self-realization is, according to Marx, a change in the structure of social reality. Marx argues that in contemporary society or capitalism the existence of the institution of private property has as its result that the manifestation of human activity in the productive process takes the alienated form of work or labor. Alienated activity is sufficient to meet man's subsistence needs, although insufficient to permit man to develop his human potentials or potentials qua human being. Such development will be possible only if private property is aufgehoben, for instance, in communism. Under communism participation in the process of production will take the form of free human activity, through which man will be able both to meet his subsistence needs and to develop his species being in his practice.

At the center of Marx's analysis is the conviction that there are two basic forms of human praxis, namely, fulfilling and alienated types of human activity. But the claim that there are basic forms of human activity is intelligible only if grounded in the idea of activity itself which subtends its various manifestations; this idea cannot be verified through discussion since it is the hypothesis upon which the analysis is based. In fine, it seems that in his inquiry into the conditions of human fulfillment through an analysis of social experience, Marx makes use of human activity as the category in terms of which man is to be understood.

Although in the passages cited above Marx apparently identifies with materialism and ~egisters his opposition to idealism, it is not easy to grasp what is at stake in this dichotomy. For Marx, unlike Fichte, there is no text which gives a systematic discussion of the sense in which he under-

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stands the terms "idealism" and "materialism" and his use of them is frequently ambiguous. The ambiguity extends even to the problem of whether the opposition is one of two philosophic positions or that of philosophy and science.

The term "idealism" apparently has at least two distinct meanings in Marx's view. In one sense, as already indicated, it is clear that by "idealism" Marx means the speculative philosophy associated with Hegel. Marx's main criticism of this approach is that it gives priority to thought as opposed to being, and this in turn results in a fictitious view of social relations, which appear incorrectly to be logically posterior to thought, although the reserve is true. But in another sense, by "idealism" Marx means philosophy itself. That this is Marx's view is implicit in his comments that philosophy is itself self-alienated and naturally tends to misconstrue practical questions to which practical solutions are appropriate as theoretical problems to be resolved through theory alone.

Similarly, the term "materialism" seems to have two distinct meanings for Marx. In simplest terms, materialism is that theory which gives priority to being over thought. On this definition, materialism is the philosophic view which is the opposite of idealism, and Marx is aware of the former's long philosophic lineage. The opposition between materialism and idealism is therefore one between two philosophic positions distinguished by the relative priority accorded to thought and being. But in his adherence to materialism, Marx also believes that he is going beyond mere philosophy. For if, as Marx maintains, the possibility of philosophy's internal self- transformation depends on fundamental social change, then it is implicit that materialism is not itself a philosophic position, but in some undefined sense meta-philosophic, i.e., a position beyond philosophy. This conclusion is suggested, for instance, by Marx's comment that Feuerbach's achievement was, in part "to have founded genuine materialism and positive science [Wissen.schaft]... ''1~ But if by "materialism" Marx means "science," the dichotomy is not between two kinds of philosophy, but between philosophy

and non-philosophy or science. Although there are few explicit discussions of methodology in Marx's

writings, his theory of methodology is clear. 19 Marx holds that being is prior to thought. This means that all discussion must start with the given of experience, which is assumed to exist independently of the experiential subject.

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The concrete subject remains outside the intellect and independent of it... the subject, society, must always be envisaged therefore as the precon- dition of comprehension even when the theoretical method is employedY ~

This position is both empirical in that it begins from an independent real world or given and, in Marx's terminology, "dialectical," since the given has priority over our thoughts about itY 1

Conversely, thought is posterior to being. The task of theory is to produce, on the level of mind, a conceptually-articulated description of the given :

...the concrete totality regarded as a conceptual mental totality, as a mental fact, is indeed a product of thinking, of comprehension; but it is by no means a product of the idea which evolves spontaneously and whose thinking proceeds outside and above perception and imagination, but is the result of the assimilation and transformation of perceptions and images into concepts. The totality as a conceptual entity seen by the intellect is a product of the thinking intellect which assimilates the world in the only way open to it...~2

The description differs from the independent given or real in that it occurs only on the level of mind. But, if accurate, the description is similar to the given in that the former reproduces and exhibits in conceptual form the interconnections of the various elements which compose reality.

According to Marx, any theory must confront a crucial question, namely, how to get from being to thought in a way which can result in an adequate conceptualization in thought of being ? There are only two possible re- sponses to this question : to begin from real, concrete elements in order to proceed to abstractions; or conversely, to begin from one or more abstract, general relations or categories in terms of which the given is to be "con-

stituted." Marx argues for the second approach :

The latter is obviously the correct scientific method. The concrete concept is concrete because it is a synthesis of many definitions, thus representing the unity of diverse aspects. It appears therefore in reasoning as a summing up, a result, and not as the starting point, although it is the real point of origin of perception and imagination. The first procedure attenuates meaningful images to abstract definition by way of reasoning to the reproduction of the concrete situationY ~

If we turn now from Marx's theory of methodology to his comments on his own theory, we shall see that his reflections on the latter are

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ambiguous, although any interpretation of it should attempt to reconcile Marx's hints on this topic. There are passages, for instance, in which he appears to describe his view as a form of philosophy, namely, that position which synthesizes idealism and materialism in a third theory, which Marx refers to variously as "humanism," "naturalism" and "non-contemplative materialism. T M Other passages indicate that Marx sees his view as scientific, in particular, a form of political economy. 25 This tension appaeent in Marx's

understanding of his theory as both philosophic and scientific parallels that in his view of materialism as both philosophy and science and seems to suggest that he views his theory as both rigorous philosophy and a form of science, as Fichte viewed the Wissenschaftlehre.

V

To review the course of the discussion, we began by assuming that any difference between idealism and materialism concerns methodology and must be apparent on the level of .either theory or meta-theory. Taking Fichte and Marx as representative, respectively, of idealism and of materialism, an attempt has been made to determine if a difference exists. In terms of the aim of their theories, both thinkers are concerned with the problem of experience, which is taken as the given; in terms of their approaches, each theory is an attempt to explain experience through a regressive, categorial analysis of its conditions. It follows that there is a parallel between Fichte's and Marx's views since both thinkers attempt to attain similar theoretic aims in similar ways.

The existence of the parallel is surprising since it suggests that with respect to methodology Marx can be considered a member ~ part entJ&e of the classical German tradition and that this tradition possesses a unity which precludes its description in terms of the idealism-materialism distinction. This claim is controversial and certain objections may be antici- pated. One might, for instance, argue that in the distinction between theory and meta-theory a distortion is introduced into the discussion. This objection is based on the frequent observation that any dichotomy between theory and practice is undesirable. Further, one could argue that Fichte and Marx did not always observe the distinction in their own writings.

In response, one should note that if the distinction was not consistently observed, it was certainly familiar to both Fichte and Marx, as exemplified,

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for instance, in Kant. In the present discussion there is no reason to believe that the distinction between theory and meta-theory obscures the nature of the views in question; rather it is an aid in delineating them. Further, in another sense there is no dichotomy here between theory and practice, since theory appears as the philosophic practice in which an explanation is advanced which corresponds to the meta-theoretic criteria devel- oped on the theoretic plane.

Second, one could argue that the difference between idealism and materialism does not concern methodology, but something else, such as conclusions. But in this case, such an argument would be weak, since Fichte's and Marx's conclusions are demonstrably similar. For from their separate analyses of experience each concludes that the subject of experience, namely, the human individual, "generates," through the manifestation of his activity, his social world and himself. Further, each argues that a condition of self-realization is that the human individual manifests his potential in and through his social activity. Hence, the conclusions are not dissimilar, but even if they were one could not therefore infer the existence of a dissimilarity between idealism and materialism. For, if we assume ex hypo-

thesi that it is meaningful to distinguish between idealism and materialism, it is certainly not necessary that representatives of each view reach identical conclusions. In respect to conclusions, Schelling partially disagrees with Hegel, as does Helvetius with Hobbes, yet the former are called idealists and the latter materialists. It follows that even if Fichte and Marx had come to disparate conclusions, this would not, of itself, have counted against the claim that their positions are similar in a way which precludes use of the idealism-materialism distinction to separate them.

Third, one might claim that Fichte's position is not representative of idealism. Although one could answer this objection fully only by detailed

consideration of other positions within the tradition, it should be observed that the above consideration of Fichte's position is very general; in fact, no claim has been made in •'espect to Fichte's view which could not equally well have been made about other "idealist" views. Further, even if Fichte's view were not typical of idealism, the demonstrated similarity between his and Marx's positions weakens considerably any claim that Marx's theory can be distinguished on methodological grounds from ideatism in general.

Fourth, one might object that the approach employed here is reduc- tionistic in that legitimate differences in the two approaches, such as

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Marx's insistence on changing reality or the emphasis on economics, which

gives his view a quasi-scientific flavor, are not taken seriously. The first

point is the result of the widespread misconception that Marx alone was interested in changing the world. Within the classical German tradition, this desire was certainly shared by, among others, Fichte and Hegel. The former was a socialist and social activist who was interested in "raising" social consciousness in order to change social reality; the latter argued that

theory or theoretical understanding is necessary precisely because it is the

necessary prerequisite to bringing about a change in society. ~ Further, even if it were not the case that others were interested in promoting social change, it would have to be shown why the social intent of a given thinker is significant for the classification of that theory in order for this to be

a significant criticism. The second point can be interp:eted in either of two ways, namely as

the claim that Marx's theory is different merely by virtue of his interest in a second discipline, namely economics, or that his theory is itself in

some sense scientific and not philosophic. In response to the first interpretation, it should be indicated that both Fichte and Hegel were interested in economics, even if not to the same extent as Marx. :~ Hence the mere

fact that economic considerations are prominent in Marx's thought does not itself mean that his theory is therefore fundamentally different from

other theories it otherwise resembles. Further, it should be noted that evidence of a thinker's serious interest

in a second discipline is not of itself reason to assert that his work is therefore non-philosophic. Other recent examples of a continuing, quasi-

professional interest in a second discipline include the work of Collingwood and Dilthey in history and that of Sartre and Murdoch in fiction. But in

all cases much of their work is, and properly so, considered to be philosophic.

At this point, one might again object on the grounds that for Marx economics is central to his thought, since without economics his position

would be other than it is. On this inte_'pretation Marx's interest in economics is not in any sense a secondary consideration, while this is not true for any of the other thinkers cited, for each of whom the second discipline remains an avocation in respect to philosophy. My reply is that there is doubtless a sense in which for Marx economics is central to this theory. For as a result of philosophic analysis Marx concludes that the economic

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sphere is that part of the existing social structure which initially retards, but ultimately makes possible, man's development. But it must be observed that Marx's interest in economics and his analyses of economic phenomena are posterior to a prior, independent and philosophic view of man as activity. Concepts such as economic alienation, fetishism, surplus value, exchange value, falling rate of interest, etc., in terms of which Marx dis- cusses economic behavior, are relevant to the consideration of the possibility of human self-realization only if certain conditions are met : if participation in the economic process is a central form of social practice, if self-realization requires social practice, and if man can be understood through the activity he manifests in various forms of social practice, But the claim that in some sense man can be considered in terms of his activity is philosophic. In fine, although in one sense economic considerations are central to Marx's theory of human self-realization, there is another sense in which these considerations are secondary, since the general interest in and critique of economics are both subtended by a prior, philosophic view of man as activityd 8

The second interpretation, namely, the claim that Marx's theory is in some sense scientific and not philosophic, deserves serious consideration. This assertion is made by many writers including, as was seen above, by Marx himself. ~e re this the case, there would be the double consequence that a way had been found to transcend philosophy and that by virtue of this discovery, qua non-philosophy, Marx's view might be immune to philosophic criticism. Among recent critics, Luk~cs and Althusser, for instance, expiidtly draw the first conclusion and imply the second one. ''29

Of course, the claim that Marx's theory is scientific in some sense is consonant with his intentions, but that does not mean that the urge to do "scientific" work necessarily carries with it the renunciation of philosophy. The interest in rigorous or scientific theory is one of the dominant themes of modern philosophy, since Descartes, as I understand it. A common, basic aim in, for example, the rationalist, British empiricist, German idealist, phenomenological, language analytical and Frankfurt school move- ments is to elaborate a theory which, qua critical, is more than philosophy as currently practiced and in some sense "scientific." The belief that this new philosophy will be scientific is common among Marx's predecessors both in general and in the classical German tradition, as is apparent in the titles of Vico's New Science, Hegel's Sdence of Logic and Fichte's

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Science of Knowledge. Despite the fact that Marx sometimes sounds as if he wants to abandon philosophy for science, it could be argued that his real interest is in going beyond contemporary philosophy in order to

achieve a more rigorous approach. But regardless of what Marx's intentions might have been, the issue of

the scientific status of his theory has to be faced. Implicit in this issue is the question of the difference between philosophy and science in general, which has been discussed recently, among others, by Popper. ~~ One way in which to respond would be to develop a normative theory of philosophy, science and their differences, but in this case that seems unnecessary. Rather, it seems reasonable to suppose with Hegel that any general conceptual consideration of the nature of reality which employs a categorial scheme whose acceptance is based neither on empirical data nor faith, but on argument, is philosophic. Judged by this criterion, both Fichte's and Marx's theories are philosophic, and, I suggest, no analysis of these theories can be given which will show either that the theories ought to be reclassified if this standard is utilized or that the classification is inadequate to describe

these views.

VI

In conclusion, I would like to suggest that the idealism-materialism distinction is by means unproblematic. At the very least, those who would use it need to address the problems concerning its tenability as well as the ways in which it can or ought to be drawn, For even if it is concluded that the distinction can or ought to be used, this should be done only with utmost caution.

tn particular, I would like to warn against the use of the distinction in order to distinguish Marx's view from the classical German tradition, in which the terms "idealism" and "materialism" have been taken to refer to separable and separate mini-traditions. This difference is uncritically assumed in most of the secondary literature, al From the side of idealism it is urged that as philosophy materialism is naive, and from the side of materialism it is claimed that philosophy is a mystification which Marx transcends. Neither side feels compelled to take the other seriously since, by virtue of the idealism-materialism distinction which both sides accept, a quasi-automatic objection is constantly available.

But the above discussion indicates that if the idealist-materialist dis-

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tinction is taken to refer to methodology, viewed either as theory or meta- theory, there is no significant difference in Fichte's idealist and Marx's materialist approaches to philosophy; and, by extension, to the extent that Fichte is representative of the classical German tradition, this distinction does not help to distinguish Marx's views from those of other German idealists. For to the extent that Fichte and Marx represent opposing "ten- dencies," the opposition is purely verbal, since discussion has failed to elicit the difference and, on examination, purported distinctions were seen to collapse.

There is an important corollary to this last point. From Marx's writings and the secondary literature it might be inferred that the supposed distinction between idealism and his view is one between philosophy and some other way of understanding reality. But if this distinction is not tenable, it would seem appropriate rather to discuss Marx's view as one philosophical position among others within the classical German tradition. Not only is such an approach suggested by the above consideration of Fichte's and Marx's positions, but it has the added advantage of enabling one to bypass the sectarian and unproductive quarrel of whether Marx's thought is generically different from that of his predecessors for the, I suspect, more fruitful problem of the nature and range of Marx's contribution through study of his view in respect to others in the general philosophic tradition.

N O T E S

1 Cf. Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. D.D. Runes (Ames, I o w a : Littlefield, A d a m s , ~959) articles on " I d e a l i s m " and " M a t e r i a l i s m " and Philosophisches W6rterbuch, ed. Georg Klaus and Manf red Buhr (Le ipz ig : VEB Bibl iographisches Ins t i tu t , 197o ) art icles on " I de a l i smus ' " and " 'Mater ia l i smus . ' " 2 Cf. EncicIopedia F-ilosofica (Firenze : 9ansoni , ~67) art icles on " I d e a l i s m o " and " M a t e -

r i a l i sm o . " a Cf. G.E. Moore, " T h e Refutat ion of I d e a l i s m " in PhiIosophicaI Studies (London : Routledge,

Kegan and Paul , 2965). 4 Cf. N.K. Smith , Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge ( L o n d o n : Macmi l lan , 19a4) and H.B. Acton, art icles on " M a t e r i a l i s m , " " I d e a l i s m , " "Dialec t ica l M a t e r i a l i s m " in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New Y o r k : Macmi l lan and Free Press , :t967). 5 Cf. George San tayana , The Realm of Matter (London : Constable, ~t93o), esp. Chapter R : " T h e Latent Materialism of Ideal is ts . '" Professor John Lachs called my at tent ion to this

reference,

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6 Cf. Richard Rorty, " T h e Wor ld Well Los t " in ]ournaI of Philosophy, vol. LXIX, no. 19 , October x97 a. I owe this reference to David Luban. 7 Cf. Bernard Bosanquet , The Meeting of Extremes in Modern Phi!osophy (London : Macmil lan ,

~921). 8 Cf. W.M. Urban , Beyond Realism and Idealism ( L o n d o n : Allen and Unwin, :t949). This reference was sugges ted to me by Professor John E. Smith. 9 Examples of h is tor ians of phi losophy who describe the classical G e r m a n tradit ion in this m a n n e r include Winde lband and Copleston. 10 Fichte, Fichtes Werke, ed. I .H. Fichte (Ber l in : de Gruyter , ~q71) I, zSo : " D a s Ich ist schlechthin th~tig und bless th~ithig - - das ist die absolute V o r a u s s e t z u n g . " Cf. I, a 7 z : " D a s Wesen des Ich bes teht in seiner Th~t igke i t . " 11 Fichte, Science of Knowledge with the First and Second Introductions, ed. and t rans .

Peter Hea th and John Lachs (New York : Apple ton-Century-Crof ts , 197o), p. 16; Werke I, 434. 1.2 Fichte, op. cir., p. I9; Werke I, 433-434. 13 Fichte, op. cit., p. 31; Werke I, 455- 1.4 Al though Fichte 's posi t ion is critical idea!isra, it is usual ly g iven a subject ivis t in terpreta- tion that fai ls to do just ice to the objectivist side of his theory. Passages such as the fol lowing (Werke I, 281) clearly indicate that his a im was to synthes ize both ideal i sm and real ism in a s ingle view :

Die Wissenschaf t s l eh re h~ilt zwjschen beiden Systeme [i.e. dogmat ic rea l i sm and transcendental realist dogma t i sm , or rea l i sm and ideal ism] bes t immt die Mitre, und ist ein kr i t i scher Idea l i smus , den m a n auch einen Real - Idea l i smus nennen k~Snnte.

For other, s imilar passages , cf. I, ~78 and I, 186. 15 Marx ' s and Engel 's posi t ions are very different , as has been shown, among others, by Luk,~cs, Pannekoek and Kolakowski . Al though fai lure to observe the dis t inct ion makes it diff icult , and perhaps imposs ible , to unders tand M a r x ' s posi t ion, this fai lure is endemic in the secondary l i terature, which is consequent ly of little value for the interpreta t ion of M a r x ' s view. 16 Marx , Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. and trans. Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (Garden C i t y : Doubleday, ~967), p. 370; Marx-Engels Werke (Berlin : Dietz Verlag, I97o), II , 6o. 17 Marx, The German Ideology, ed. and trans. C.J. Ar thu r (New York : In ternat ional Pub- l ' shers , 197e), p. Ia3; MEW III , 555. 18 Marx, Karl Marx: Early Writings, ed. and trans. T.B. Bottomore (New Y o r k : McGraw Hill , Iq64), p. I97; MEW Erg~inzungsband : Erster Teil, 570. 19 The single substant ia l d iscuss ion of methodology in M a r x ' s wr i t ings occurs in section of the Introduct ion to the Grundrisse~ entitled " T h e Method of Political Economy." 2o Marx in Ar thur , op. cir., p. x41; MEW XIII, 632-6~5. 21 Cf. Marx, MEW XXIII , 27 : " M e i n e dialekt isehe Methode ist der Grundlage nach yon der Hege lschen nicht nur verschieden, sondern ihr direktes Gegenteil . Fiir Hegel ist der Denk- prozess, den er sogar un te r dem Namen Idee in ein selbst~indiges Subjekt verwandel t , der Dem iu r g des wirkl ichen, das nur seine aussere Erscbeinung bildet. Bei mi r ist u m g e k e h r t das Ideelle nichts anders als das im Menschenkopf umgesetz te und fibersetzte Mater ie l le ." aa M a r x in Ar thur , op. t i t . , p. 14I; MEW XIII , 63z. This text is a s t rong indication that M a r x ' s early phi losophic in teres t carr ies through into his later work, as well as evidence aga ins t a coupure between the early more philosophic and later more economic texts. 23 Op. ti t , , pp. x4o-~4x; MEW XIII, 652. 24 For a typical passage , cf. MEW 1Erg}inzungsband : Erster Tell 577 : " W i t sehn hier, wJe der durchgefl.ihrte Na tu ra l i smus oder H u m a n i s m u s , als dam Mater ia l is Inus ~anterscheidet und zugleich ihre beide vere inigende Wahrhe i t ist. Wi r sehn zugleich, wie nu r dar Na tu ra I i smus f~ihig ist, den Akt tier Wel tgeschichte zu begrei fen . ' " 2.5 The ma in text is that a l ready referred to in the Grundrisse. Cf. also the Preface to the Paris Manuscripts (:t844) in MEW Erg/ inzungsband-Ers ter Teil, 467. 26 In a letter, Hegel w r i t e s : " D i e theoret ische Arbei t , / iberzeuge ich reich taglich mehr , b r ing t m e h r zus tande in der Wel t als die p r a k t i s c h e : ist erst der Reich der Vorste l lung revolut ionier t , so h~It die "r nich aus . ' " Quoted by ed. Nicolin and P/Jggeler,

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T O M R O C K M O R E

Enzykloplidie der philosophischen Wi~sensehaften im Grundrisse (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1959), p. xxii. This is also Marx's position; although he wanted to change the world, he never asserted that this could occur without the necessary theoretical grasp of it, In a-sense his whole intellectual career was devoted to acquiring the understanding required to accomplish this task. :27 One need only recall Fichte's book on Der gesehlossene Handelsstaat to appreciate the role of economics in his thought. Economic considerations also deeply influenced Hegel's position, as Luk~cs has shown in Der junge Hegel. 28 In another paper, I hope to develop this point by arguing both that in the early "philosophic" as well as later "economic" writings Marx uses a single set of categories, and that these categories are non-empirical, speculative, and based on a metaphysical view of man as activity. 29 Cf. Luk~cs, Geschichte und KIassenbewusstein (Berlin : Malik Verlag, I927) and Althusser and Baliber, Life Ie Capital (Paris : Maspero, 1968 ). .~0 Cf. Popper, Coniectures and Refutations (New York : Harper, x968 ). 3t For a recent example, cf. Bloch, Das Materiatismusproblem (Frankfurt a.M. : Suhrkamp

Verlag, 2972 ).

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Fichte's Idealism and Marx's Materialism