FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

(FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01)

COMBINED ARMS IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT OPERATIONS

September 2007DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This protection applies to publications required solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical or operational information. This determination was made on 10 August 2005. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZT-T-TD-D, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 220, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online and the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library at .

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01

C1 Change 1 Headquarters Department of the Army United States Marine Corps Washington, DC, 6 August 2008

Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations1. Change Field Manual (FM) 3-90.119/ Marine Corps Information Publication (MCIP) 3-17.01, 21 September 2007, as follows: Remove old pages: i through vi C-1 through C-5 2. 3. Insert new pages: i through vi C-1 through C-6

A bar (|) marks new or changed material. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This protection applies to publications required solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical or operational information. This determination was made on 10 August 2005. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commandant, United States Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZT-TDD, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 220, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1 6 August 2008

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: GEORGE W. CASEY, JR. General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0819816

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 121724, requirements for FM 3-90.119. By Direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps:

Marine Corps PCN: 146 000003 01

*FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01, C1(FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01)Field Manual No. FM 3-90.119 Marine Corps Information Publication No. 3-17.01 Headquarters Department of the Army United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 6 August 2008

COMBINED ARMS IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT OPERATIONSContentsPage

PREFACE..............................................................................................................vi INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................ix Chapter 1 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT...................................................................... 1-1 Concept .............................................................................................................. 1-1 Variables............................................................................................................. 1-2 Adaptive Principles of the Enemy....................................................................... 1-4 Varied Actions .................................................................................................... 1-8 MOBILITY OPERATIONS AND THE FRAMEWORK OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ......................................................................... 2-1 Movement and Maneuver................................................................................... 2-1 Combined Arms Mobility Operations.................................................................. 2-1 Clearing Operations............................................................................................ 2-2 The Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Framework ....................................... 2-4

Chapter 2

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This protection applies to publications required solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical or operational information. This determination was made on 10 August 2005. Other requests for this document will be referred to Commandant, United States Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZT-TDD, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 220, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929. Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. *This publication supersedes Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01, dated 21 September 2005. i

Contents

Chapter 3

THREAT ANALYSIS.......................................................................................... 3-1 Military Intelligence Disciplines........................................................................... 3-1 Unit Support to Intelligence ................................................................................ 3-5 Threat Motivation and Construct ........................................................................ 3-6 Component Analysis (Individual and Nodal) .................................................... 3-12 Improvised Explosive Device Descriptions....................................................... 3-16 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ............................................................................................................. 4-1 Planning Processes............................................................................................ 4-1 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield to Defeat Improvised Explosive Devices ............................................................................................................... 4-2 Targeting........................................................................................................... 4-19 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Synchronization ................... 4-20 Composite Risk Management .......................................................................... 4-26 Assured Mobility ............................................................................................... 4-30 Planning Considerations................................................................................... 4-35 ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.............. 5-1 Observations From the Field .............................................................................. 5-1 Commanders Guidance and Authorization........................................................ 5-2 Leaders Decision Considerations...................................................................... 5-2 Actions When Safety or Intelligence is the Priority............................................. 5-4 Actions When Operations Tempo is the Highest Priority ................................... 5-7 Military Search.................................................................................................... 5-8 Electronic-Warfare Considerations................................................................... 5-15 Route Clearance Operations ............................................................................ 5-18 SELECTED ORGANIZATIONS AND UNITS INVOLVED IN IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT .........................................................................A-1 Selected Organizations and Contact Information............................................... A-1 Selected Units and Personnel ............................................................................ A-7 Other Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organizations .............................. A-12 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES, TOOLS, AND PRODUCTS ..............................B-1 Imagery and Geospatial Intelligence .................................................................. B-1 Link Analysis....................................................................................................... B-5 Significant Dates............................................................................................... B-15 Timelines .......................................................................................................... B-15 Culture Description or Culture Comparison Chart............................................ B-16 Perception Assessment Matrix......................................................................... B-16 Population Status Overlays .............................................................................. B-16 Terrain Overlays ............................................................................................... B-17 Lines of Communication Overlays.................................................................... B-17 Line-of-Sight Overlays ...................................................................................... B-18 REPORTING, RECORDING, DISPLAYING, AND TRACKING ........................C-1 Reporting ............................................................................................................C-1 Recording ...........................................................................................................C-2 Displaying ...........................................................................................................C-2 Tracking ..............................................................................................................C-3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix C

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Explosive Hazards Database .............................................................................C-4 Joint Digital Incident Gathering System .............................................................C-4 Future Database.................................................................................................C-5 Appendix D TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES CONSIDERATIONS ............D-1 Typical Improvised Explosive Device Types ......................................................D-1 Immediate Action Drills.......................................................................................D-7 Risk Mitigation for Convoys ................................................................................D-8 Mobility Corridors..............................................................................................D-11 SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT ............................................................................. E-1 Interim Vehicle-Mounted Mine Detector ............................................................. E-1 Buffalo................................................................................................................. E-2 Casspir................................................................................................................ E-3 Mine-Protected VehicleRG-31.......................................................................... E-4 Mine-Protected Armored VehicleRG-33L......................................................... E-5 Cougar ................................................................................................................ E-5 Heavy Wheeled Armored VehicleGOLAN........................................................ E-6 Armored Security VehicleASV M-1117 ............................................................ E-7 Mine-Protected Armored Dozers........................................................................ E-8 Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare ............................................................................................................... E-9 Robots .............................................................................................................. E-11 Specialized Search Dogs ................................................................................. E-12 Handheld Detectors.......................................................................................... E-13 Search Kit ......................................................................................................... E-15 TRAINING EXPECTATIONS AND RESOURCES ............................................ F-1 Training Expectations From the Field................................................................. F-1 Staff and Unit Training........................................................................................ F-2 Training Aids....................................................................................................... F-9 SOURCE NOTES.......................................................................... Source Notes-1 GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................Glossary-1 REFERENCES ..................................................................................References-1 INDEX.......................................................................................................... Index-1

Appendix E

Appendix F

FiguresFigure 2-1. Mobility Operations Army Tasks and IED Defeat ......................................... 2-4 Figure 3-1. Enemy IED Activity Model............................................................................. 3-8 Figure 3-2. Example of Functional Nodes in an IED Network....................................... 3-13 Figure 3-3. Iconic Representation of Functional Node Analysis by Activity .................. 3-14 Figure 3-4. Example Threat IED System Nodal Diagram Showing Relationships........ 3-15 Figure 3-5. Components of an IED................................................................................ 3-17 Figure 3-6. Command-Initiated Concealed IED ............................................................ 3-18 Figure 3-7. Common Areas of IED Emplacement ......................................................... 3-20 Figure 4-1. ASCOPE Construct With Examples.............................................................. 4-9

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Figure 4-2. Example of Threat Analysis Layers ............................................................ 4-14 Figure 4-3. Example Event Template for IED Defeat Operations ................................. 4-18 Figure 4-4. Example Incident Overlay Identifying Allegiances ...................................... 4-19 Figure 4-5. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Development Process ...................................................................................................... 4-21 Figure 4-6. ISR Synchronization.................................................................................... 4-25 Figure 4-7. IED Defeat Framework ............................................................................... 4-31 Figure 5-1. Example of a Leaders Decision Considerations .......................................... 5-3 Figure 5-2. Diagrammatic Representation of Levels of Risk, Training, and Technology.......................................................................................... 5-11 Figure 5-3. Detection Element....................................................................................... 5-20 Figure 5-4. Improvement Element................................................................................. 5-21 Figure 5-5. Example Organization for a Route Clearance Operation ........................... 5-22 Figure B-1. Example Coordinates Register..................................................................... B-3 Figure B-2. Example Pattern Analysis Plot Sheet ........................................................... B-4 Figure B-3. Example Time Event Chart........................................................................... B-6 Figure B-4. Example Association Matrix ......................................................................... B-7 Figure B-5. Example Activity Matrix ................................................................................ B-8 Figure B-6. Example Link Analysis Diagram ................................................................. B-14 Figure B-7. Example Timeline Created in an Analysts Notebook ................................ B-15 Figure B-8. Example Population Status Overlay ........................................................... B-17 Figure C-1. IED Equipment .............................................................................................C-3 Figure C-2. IED Explosion ...............................................................................................C-3 Figure C-3. Explosive Hazards Spot Report Flow...........................................................C-6 Figure D-1. Command-Wired IED ...................................................................................D-1 Figure D-2. Suicide IED...................................................................................................D-2 Figure D-3. Radio-Controlled IED ...................................................................................D-3 Figure D-4. Explosive Laden Vehicle ..............................................................................D-4 Figure D-5. Vehicle-Borne IED ........................................................................................D-4 Figure D-6. Victim-Operated IED With a Tripwire ...........................................................D-5 Figure D-7. Example Diagram of a Victim-Operated IED With a Pressure Plate............D-6 Figure D-8. Simulation of a Penetrator Formation...........................................................D-7 Figure D-9. Example of an Explosively Formed Penetrator ............................................D-7 Figure D-10. Basic Attack..............................................................................................D-10 Figure D-11. Change of Traffic Attack...........................................................................D-11 Figure D-12. Multiple IED Attack ...................................................................................D-11 Figure E-1. Meerkat......................................................................................................... E-2 Figure E-2. Husky With Mine Detection Trailer ............................................................... E-2 Figure E-3. Buffalo........................................................................................................... E-3 Figure E-4. Buffalo With the Clearing Arm Extended...................................................... E-3 Figure E-5. Casspir.......................................................................................................... E-4 Figure E-6. Medium Mine-Protected VehicleRG-31 ...................................................... E-4

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Figure E-7. Mine-Protected Armored VehicleRG-33L................................................... E-5 Figure E-8. Cougar .......................................................................................................... E-6 Figure E-9. Heavy Wheeled Armored VehicleGolan..................................................... E-7 Figure E-10. Armored Security VehicleASV M-1117 .................................................... E-8 Figure E-11. Mine-Clearing Armor Protection Dozer ...................................................... E-8 Figure E-12. D-9R Armored Dozer.................................................................................. E-9 Figure E-13. Hunter ....................................................................................................... E-10 Figure E-14. Warlock Family of CREW Systems .......................................................... E-11 Figure E-15. EOD Robot ............................................................................................... E-12 Figure E-16. Specialized Search Dogs ......................................................................... E-13 Figure E-17. AN/PSS-14 Mine Detector........................................................................ E-14 Figure E-18. Handheld Explosive Sniffer ...................................................................... E-14 Figure E-19. Search Kit Equipment............................................................................... E-16

TablesTable 3-1. Threat Motivations.......................................................................................... 3-7 Table 3-2. Possible Nodes Located in an IED Network ................................................ 3-10 Table 4-1. Risk Assessment Matrix............................................................................... 4-27 Table 4-2. Composite Risk Assessment Aligned With the MDMP ................................ 4-29 Table 4-3. TLP and CRM Steps .................................................................................... 4-29 Table 5-1. Military Search Equipment Capabilities........................................................ 5-14 Table 5-2. Rate of March During Clearance Operations............................................... 5-21 Table F-1. Example Training Task List for Training Expectations From the Field .......... F-3 Table F-2. Critical Tasks for Collective Training.............................................................. F-6

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PrefaceField Manual (FM) 3-90.119/Marine Corps Interim Publication (MCIP) 3-17.01 establishes doctrine for improvised explosive device (IED) defeat operations. It is based on existing doctrine and lessons learned from combat operations. To make this manual useful to leaders involved in IED defeat operations, regardless of where these operations may occur, the doctrine contained herein is broad in scope and involves principles applicable to various theaters. The intent of this FM is not to focus on any region or country; however, Iraq and Afghanistan are often referred to in this manual in an effort to relate the material to current operations and captured lessons learned. IED defeat operations exhibit common characteristics, but their methods of implementation may vary widely. This FM is not a stand-alone document. Readers must be familiar with the warfighting functions (WFFs) found in FM 3-0 and the fundamentals of assured mobility found in FM 3-34. While IED defeat operations have applicability to tasks in all of the WFFs, this FM focuses on the applicability to the WFFs of intelligence and movement and maneuver along with the necessary linkages to command and control (C2). The purpose of this focus is to develop a doctrinal approach that facilitates the coordination and synchronization of those tasks most critical to successful IED defeat operations. The intelligence WFF contains those tasks that most directly impact those operations that collect and analyze information to predict, prevent, detect, avoid, neutralize, and protect against the procurement, proliferation, and use of the IED. This WFF is focused on a proactive approach that enables commanders to interdict and exploit IED networks and the associated operations before IEDs are planned or emplaced. The movement and maneuver WFF contains those tasks that directly impact those operations that investigate and report information to detect, avoid, neutralize, and protect against the emplaced IED. This WFF tends to be reactive in nature, but is an essential function to mitigate or negate the intent of the emplaced IED. It is important to understand that tasks within these two functions overlap and are a continuous processcollect, analyze, investigate, and report. To integrate this continuous process into the military decision-making process (MDMP) and the rapid decision-making and synchronization process (RDSP), this FM focuses on the integrating process of assured mobility and its six fundamentals as the shared framework for IED defeat and to assist leaders with planning and executing IED defeat operations. Additionally, this FM incorporates lessons learned and major studies from sources across the Army and joint community. It focuses on asymmetric threats and establishes doctrine to defeat them. This FM is designed primarily to assist Soldiers and Marines at all echelons in planning and coordinating IED defeat operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is also a resource available to Department of Defense (DOD), Joint, and other military Services and agencies that have a role in executing or supporting the execution of IED defeat operations. It is the primary manual to define the doctrinal linkages and integrating processes associated with IED defeat. This manual Provides doctrinal guidance for commanders and staffs for planning, preparing for, and executing and assessing IED defeat operations. Outlines the critical integration processes that must be incorporated into the staff planning process for IED defeat. Serves as an authoritative reference for emerging doctrine-providing linkage for IED defeat from the movement and maneuver WFF, through mobility operations, to the focused application of IED defeat in support of primarily route clearance operations. Highlights the linkages between reconnaissance, clearance, and military search as focused tasks in support of IED defeat.

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Prefacez

z

Describes the relationship of the assured mobility fundamentals to the construct for IED defeat, incorporating the focuses of exploit and mitigate into the established framework of assured mobility. Provides a general description of the threat associated with IED operations and the intelligence support to counter those operations and activities.

Specifically, this manual provides commanders, leaders, and staffs with fundamental principals and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the defeat of adversary IED operations. The following briefly describes the contents of this manual: z Chapter 1 provides a description of the operational environment (OE) in which IEDs are employed. It explains how and why the enemy uses IEDs to disrupt friendly operations from a strategic to a tactical perspective. z Chapter 2 defines IED defeat operations. It describes the doctrinal framework and provides the necessary linkages so that commanders and staffs have a common approach to planning, preparing, executing, and assessing IED defeat operations. z Chapter 3 defines typical intelligence gathering assets and the processes used to conduct threat analysis for IED defeat. Additionally, it provides a summary of how threat forces operate and use IEDs. z Chapter 4 provides an overview of the planning processes of the Army and United States Marine Corps (USMC) and describes how a commander and staff integrate IED defeat considerations into unit plans. Additionally, it discusses intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB); targeting; intelligence synchronization; composite risk management (CRM); and assured mobility as integrating processes to assist the commander and staff in integrating IED defeat considerations throughout all planning processes. This chapter also offers planning considerations for IED defeat based on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). The METT TC factors are not all-inclusive, but serve as a base for further development depending on the situation. Note. The Marine Corps and joint doctrine use METT-T, without civil considerations being added.z

z

z

Chapter 5 provides guidance for a leader upon encountering an IED. All units must be able to maintain operations despite these hazards. It briefly describes military search, route reconnaissance, and clearing operations. Appendix A identifies United States (U.S.) military and government agencies that are involved in IED defeat operations. Although not an all-inclusive list, it covers selected military and other governmental centers of expertise and special coordination and response organizations from the strategic to the operational level and includes intelligence and technology development organizations. This chapter provides basic mission statements of the organizations. Appendixes B through F provide greater depth to the chapters and offer basic suggestions for conducting IED defeat operations. z Appendix B. Analytical Techniques, Tools, and Products. z Appendix C. Reporting, Recording, and Tracking z Appendix D. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Considerations. z Appendix E. Specialized Equipment. z Appendix F. Training Expectations and Resources.

Terms that have joint or Army definitions are identified in both the glossary and the text. Glossary references: The glossary lists most terms used in FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01 that have Joint or Army definitions. Terms for which FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01 is the proponent FM (the authority) are indicated with an asterisk in the glossary. Text references: definitions for which FM 3-90.119/MCIP 3-17.01 is the proponent FM are printed in boldface in the text. These terms and their definitions will be incorporated into the next

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revision of FM 1-02/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-12A. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent FM follows the definition. As a dual Service manual, references made to the U.S. Army, Soldiers, and brigade combat team (BCT) are interchangeable with and/or include the USMC, Marines, and regimental combat team (RCT) unless stated otherwise in the text. This publication applies to the Marine Corps, Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve unless otherwise stated. The primary audience for this FM includes commanders, leaders, and staffs at corps-level and below. The proponent for this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commandant, United States Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZT-T-TD-D, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 220, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 64573-8929. Submit an electronic DA Form 2028 or comments and recommendations in the DA Form 2028 format by e-mail to .

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IntroductionThis is not a new war. Our enemies have been waging it for some time, and it will continue for the foreseeable future. As President Bush has stated, This is a different kind of war against a different kind of enemy. It is a war we must win, a war for our very way of life.General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army Arrival Message, 1 August 2003

The proliferation of IEDs on the battlefield in both Iraq and Afghanistan has posed the most pervasive threat facing coalition forces in those theaters. The persistent effectiveness of this threat has influenced unit operations, U.S. policy, and public perception. IEDs are a weapon of choice and are likely to remain a major component of the war on terrorism (WOT) for the foreseeable future. The definitive history of IEDs has not been extensively documented. However, many specific incidents in the last 100 years have been well documented. In recent history, there has been a continuing trend of terrorist acts against the United States. These attacks have increased in frequency, level of sophistication, and lethality. For example, the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, was attacked with a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) that killed 241 U.S. Marines in 1983. This was followed by the bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. The plane carried passengers from 21 countries, but 189 of the 259 on board were Americans; the crash also killed 11 people on the ground. In the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, New York City, New York, in 1993, a VBIED failed to cause the desired number of casualties but nevertheless demonstrated the ability to attack the U.S. homeland. In 1996, another truck bomb killed 19 U.S. Soldiers and injured 372 at the Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The violence continued with the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the United States Ship (USS) Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, in 2000. Recently, with the development of sufficiently powerful, stable, and accessible explosives, a bomb or IED has become a preferred weapon for terrorists and has been used extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. IEDs are characterized as obstacles to movement and maneuver but can also serve as a close contact weapon, depending on the intent of individual or group employing the IED. As an obstacle, the IED is typically emplaced to fix, turn, block, or disrupt the movement or maneuver of U.S. military, coalition forces, or host nation (HN) civilians. When used in conjunction with other obstacles or as a close contact weapon, IEDs are typically used to ambush military forces; assassinate key military, government, or civilian figures; or to target a particular group or organization. When an IED is used as a close contact weapon, the event is often recorded and later televised in an effort to maximize the psychological (and perhaps political) effectiveness of the IED and distract U.S. efforts at the strategic level. However the IED is used, as an obstacle or close contact weapon, the approach to IED defeat is the same. The sophistication of the IED depends on the maker. IEDs range from being very simple to very complex with booby traps, antihandling devices, and sophisticated electronic-initiation devices to prevent disarming. IEDs may be encountered as a singular explosive hazards (EH) or as multiple devices daisy-chained together (such as secondary, tertiary, or more) per tactical encounter. Generally, IEDs can be triggered in a variety of ways. A timer is common and can be set hours in advance. Remote-controlled detonators with a limited range allow the exact timing of the detonation. IEDs can be manufactured out of many household products (including fertilizer and batteries), but most sophisticated IEDs use a small amount of explosive to trigger a larger quantity of explosive material. IEDs do not have to be large to be effective. Most IEDs are small and are directed at individual targets, such as military personnel or civilians. Often these are planted along a roadside and detonated as a vehicle passes. Larger devices can be placed in vehicles parked along the roadway or driven into the target by suicide bombers willing to give up their lives for the cause.

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The primary focus of this manual is IED defeat operations conducted by the combined arms team. Furthermore, the manual accentuates clearing operations that are purposely planned and executed to eliminate current and/or recurring IED and obstacle threats. The common use and lethality of the IED as an obstacle or close contact weapon requires that the combined arms team fully integrate those members with special expertise in reducing, clearing, or neutralizing the IED. While engineers and others have special expertise that is well-suited to support the maneuver commander in this combined arms operation, it is only the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team that is capable or authorized to eliminate or render safe an IED. As such, commanders must consider the availability and use of EOD personnel during both the planning and as part of the clearing team. This manual adopts the framework of assured mobility to define the framework for IED defeat. Assured mobility is defined as actions that give the force commander the ability to maneuver where and when he desires without interruption or delay to achieve the mission (FM 3-34). Soldiers and Marines contribute to assured mobility by reducing or eliminating the effects of EHs on the force. Assured mobility is an integrating process relating to each of the WFFs similar to that of IPB, targeting, intelligence synchronization, and CRM. As an integrating process, assured mobility provides linkage between the tasks associated with mobility, countermobility, and survivability and their roles across the six WFFs. It applies in all operations and across the complete spectrum of conflict. While focused primarily on the WFFs of movement and maneuver, intelligence, and protection, assured mobility has linkages to each of the WFFs and both enables and is enabled by those functions. It strives to ensure freedom of maneuver and preserve combat power throughout the area of operations (AO) as it seeks to exploit superior situational understanding (SU). This framework (or construct) is one means of enabling a force to achieve the commanders intent. Assured mobility emphasizes proactive mobility and countermobility (and supporting survivability) and integrates all of the engineer functions (combat, general, and geospatial engineering) in accomplishing this. Assured mobility is broader than the term mobility and should not be confused with the limited application of the mobility operations. Its focus is on supporting the maneuver commanders ability to gain a position of advantage in relation to the enemy; by conducting mobility operations to negate the impact of enemy obstacles, conducting countermobility to impact and shape enemy maneuver, or a combination of both. Assured mobility provides the broad framework of fundamentals (predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect) that serve to retain the focus and integration of mobility, countermobility, and survivability within the combined arms team. Planners at all levels of the combined arms team rely on this framework to ensure that adequate support is provided to the commanders scheme of maneuver and intent. The engineer plays an integrating role in assured mobility that is similar to the role played by the intelligence officer in the IPB integrating process. Ultimately assured mobility is the commanders responsibility. Other staff members also integrate mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks as a part of assured mobility. Examples include regulating traffic in the maneuver space, handling displaced persons, and performing other mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks to support the maneuver plan. Within the combined arms team planning staff, it is the assured mobility section at the BCT and RCT level (and those same staff members at echelons above the BCT and RCT) that provides the input for engineer; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE); and similar specialized reconnaissance. Each plans for the application and coordinates the integration of specialized reconnaissance. In the case of the engineer coordinator, this applies across the engineer functions and spanning the range from tactical to technical reconnaissance capabilities. See FM 3-34 for an in-depth discussion of assured mobility. As identified in Joint Publication (JP) 3-15, there are two basic approaches for organizing IED defeat operations. The first involves creating specialized cells within the intelligence staff section (J-2), operations staff section (J-3), and engineering staff section (J-7) to plan and oversee the conduct of IED defeat operations. This approach is normally used in small-scale, short-duration operations when supporting technical specialist forces are limited. The second approach is to create a separate headquarters (a combined joint task force [JTF]) to manage the EOD assets, associated technical specialists, and other

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specialized organizations that may be attached to the joint force for the IED defeat fight. This approach is appropriate to large-scale, long-duration operations with a large specialist presence. At the BCT and RCT echelon and the tactical level, a single integrated IED defeat cell is typically created to optimize the available assets and respond to the requirement for very rapid synchronization of staff interaction. What is referred to in this manual as the IED defeat cell may actually be as many as three separate cells at the joint and echelons-above BCT and RCT level.

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Chapter 1

Operational EnvironmentThe continued effectiveness of the IED threat has impacted unit operations, U.S. policy, and public perception. Therefore, this deadly enemy capability is likely to be a component of war and armed conflict for the foreseeable future. This chapter provides an overview of the OE and the baseline rationale for why and how state and nonstate actors employ IEDs against a superior military force. In the complicated environment of today, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of the OE in which IEDs might be used. Therefore, the U.S. Army and USMC must be ready to meet challenges that IEDs present within a multitude of diverse OEs. FM 3-0 provides an analysis of the OE using the variables of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, and the added Army variables of physical environment and time. An analysis of these variables and their association and impact on IED defeat assists commanders in defining conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect operational options and decisions for military forces.

CONCEPT1-1. The OE is defined as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 1-02). The OE is complex, dynamic, and multidimensional; it encompasses a collection of eight interrelated variables. 1-2. Military forces seeking to transform the OE must consider all factors that bear on tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. An IED is defined as a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components (JP 3-07.2). Due to the extensive use, destructive nature, and overall impact on military operations, the IED has a significant impact on the OE and, therefore, must be considered by commanders at all levels. 1-3. In practice, reshaping fundamental conditions and human perceptions, behaviors, and actions is extremely difficult. Therefore, the ability of leaders and Soldiers and Marines to understand the OE, interact with the people, and use capabilities effectively, bears directly upon the ability of the Army and USMC to achieve its tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. 1-4. Analysis of the OE proceeds through the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables. Conceptually, PMESII-PT provides an unconstrained view of the situationnot not only in basic terms, but also in terms of its emergent characteristics. Such a comprehensive view assists commanders in appreciating how the military instrument complements the other instruments of power. To gain a broad understanding of these influences, commanders will normally consult with specialists in each area. In some cases, senior commanders will have specialists in nonmilitary subjects assigned to their staffs. 1-5. Analysis of the OE in terms of PMESII-PT variables provides an encyclopedic look at the overall situation in terms of the variables and their interactions. This analysis provides the relevant information that senior commanders can use to frame operational problems. When Army forces receive a mission, they use a much more focused analysis of the factors of the situation. At the tactical level, and at the operational level for major operations, Army leaders use METT-TC as a planning and execution tool. The PMESII-PT

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variables support the decision-making process by providing the underlying detailed information upon which METT-TC and mission analysis draw. (See Chapter 4 for more discussion of METT-TC as a planning consideration.) This enables leaders at the tactical and operational levels to act effectively, anticipating the consequences of their operations before and during mission execution.

VARIABLESPOLITICAL1-6. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance or cooperation. Such political institutions and actors enjoy varying degrees of legitimacy with the populations at local, regional, and national (or transnational) levels. 1-7. In the state or states where IEDs are employed, the nature and stability of a country often are related to where the real strength of the state lies. It may be the political leadership, the military, the police, or some other element within the population. In understanding where the power resides, analysts can consider who would use IEDs, against whom, and whyas a means to achieve a specific end. Those who employ IEDs may be nonstate actors (such as criminals, insurgents, or terrorists) that are either subnational or transnational in nature; in that case, Soldiers and Marines need to understand the nature and stability of the nonstate organization. A weak state may be unable to control the activities of nonstate actors who would use IEDs within its territory. 1-8. Another consideration for the political analysis of an OE is the concept of will. Will encompasses a unification of values, morals, agendas, effort, and the probability of acting on them. Through this unity, participants are often willing to physically sacrifice themselves or members of the group to employ an IED to support the achievement of the unified goal. Understanding the will of key groups (political, military, insurgent, and terrorist) in the OE will help further define various groups goals and their willingness to support and achieve their ends.

MILITARY1-9. The military variable explores the military capabilities of all relevant actors in a given OE. Such capabilities include equipment, manpower, military doctrine, training levels, resource constraints, and leadership issues. Military leadership is especially important in gaining an understanding of individual leaders and the human characteristics of their forces. Analysis should focus on an actors ability to field forces and leverage them for use domestically, regionally, or globally. 1-10. Military institutions or groups have the knowledge and ability to use a combination of conventional and unconventional capabilities. When confronted by stronger military power, weaker forces will employ irregular capabilities and methods, using indirect approaches to achieve their aims. The IED is an example of an irregular weapon that has become a weapon of choice for criminals, insurgents, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations.

ECONOMIC1-11. The economic system encompasses individual behaviors and aggregate phenomena related to the production, distribution, and consumption of resources. Specific factors may include the influence of industrial organization, international trade, development (foreign aid), finance, institutional capabilities, geography, and the rule of law. Differences in the ability to produce, distribute, and receive goods are important to the frequency of IED use and the types of IEDs used. With IEDs, an enemy can use a large number of cheap, expendable items that affect U.S. capabilities and can cause the United States to use high-technology systems to defeat the IED. In other cases, IEDs are used to disrupt the flow of goods or against critical infrastructure that can impact a local economy.

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1-12. The economic situation within an OE should be carefully analyzed to determine the enemys: z Currently available resources. z Ability to acquire materials. z Level of sophistication. z Ability to sustain IED operations.

SOCIAL1-13. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE. A social system consists of the people, groups, and institutions that exhibit shared identity, behaviors, values, and beliefs. Social groups consist of groups organized, integrated, and networked by relationships, interacting within their environment. Societies are comprised of structured, interrelated, and overlapping groups and institutions, each with statuses and roles that support, enable, and provide opportunity to achieve personal or community expectations. Culture is a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that the members of society use to cope with their world and among each other. Oftentimes, this social commonality is a basis for support of the enemy. Providing information to the enemy about potential targets, troop or other target movements, and locations of IED materials are examples of how societal variables support the enemys use of IEDs. If treated properly, the populous can be cooperative with the U.S. or coalition forces and provide information about enemy activity and locations of weapon caches, bomb-making factories, and emplaced IEDs. 1-14. Important characteristics of a social system include population demographics, migration trends, urbanization, standards of living, and cohesiveness of cultural, religious, or ethnic groups. Understanding these characteristics can be a crucial element in successfully fighting the IED threat.

INFORMATION1-15. The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. Information involves the access, use, manipulation, distribution, and reliance on data, media, and knowledge systemscivilian and military, by the global community. Information systems are the infrastructure that enables the dissemination and storage of information. The enemy understands the value of information. The enemy has seen the important role that information operations (IO) has played in achieving the overall objectives of various actors in current and past conflicts. Media and other information means facilitate the visibility of IED operations to the world (providing publicity), while the use of IEDs can provide standoff and anonymity to the user. The enemy can use IO to try to provide justification for its actions as a means for recruitment. Knowing that casualties from IEDs will be publicized in the media in the United States and other coalition countries, the enemy can use this reporting to affect the U.S. national will and the coalition will. The enemy will exploit U.S. mistakes and leverage the media and other information systems to impact U.S. political decision making. IO is a nonlethal tool that is used in conjunction with lethal operations to achieve an end. 1-16. The enemy will emphasize the fact that U.S. and coalition forces and/or local authorities are unable to protect themselves or the local population from the effects of IEDs. This is a physical and psychological threat to elements of the local population; it can keep them from supporting U.S. objectives and coerce them into providing aid to enemy forces or at least passively protecting them. 1-17. Information may flow by complex telecommunications or by less sophisticated meanscouriers, graffiti, rumors, cultural symbols, art, literature, radio, or local print media. Understanding whatever communication infrastructure exists is important because it facilitates the IED information flow that can promote IED activities and/or influence local, regional, national, and international audiences.

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INFRASTRUCTURE1-18. The infrastructure variable is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society. IEDs can be used to degrade or destroy needed infrastructure which can affect the entire OE. Conversely, selected infrastructure may be used for bomb-making factories, weapons caches, and/or a place to conduct planning and training as they typically offer space and some level of cover and concealment. 1-19. This variable also reflects the technological sophistication of a given OE. Since IEDs may be remotely detonated using communications technology and range from relatively crude to fairly sophisticated devices, analysis of this and other variables is critical to assist in determining potential types of IEDs, methods of emplacement, and triggers the enemy may use. 1-20. This category also represents the industrial base of the local setting and the availability of toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) For example, cylinders or ton containers of chlorine may be used in conjunction with IEDs.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT1-21. The physical environment defines the physical circumstances and conditions that influence the execution of operations throughout the domains of air, land, sea, and space. The defining factors are urban settings (super surface, surface, and subsurface features), and other complex terrain, weather, topography, hydrology, and environmental conditions. 1-22. The enemy clearly understands that less complex and open environments favor U.S. forces with long-range, precision-guided weapons and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Because of this, the enemy usually avoids open terrain and operates in urban areas and other complex terrain to mitigate U.S. technical superiority. Such terrain is also optimal for emplacing IEDs with minimal risk to those who emplace them. However, the physical environment includes more than just terrain and weather patterns. Natural resources, population centers, and critical infrastructure are also important especially since they may become targets for IEDs.

TIME1-23. The variable of time influences military operations within an OE in terms of the decision-cycles, operational tempo, and planning horizons (see FM 5-0.) It may also influence endurance or protraction of operations since popular support for extended operations may diminish over time. Timing is often a critical planning factor that the enemy uses to maximize the effectiveness of an IED. 1-24. The enemy may take advantage of a relatively immature and nonsecure sea port of debarkation (SPOD) or aerial port of debarkation (APOD). Additionally, if the enemy determines that time has caused complacency or lack of attention, they will typically employ IEDs to take advantage of the vulnerability.

ADAPTIVE PRINCIPLES OF THE ENEMY1-25. An enemy who is not a peer competitor will avoid engaging U.S. or coalition forces in a head-to-head conventional fight. The enemy will not fight U.S. or coalition forces in the same manner as it would its peers or lesser forces in its region. Instead, it will have to resort to adaptive approaches to accomplish its goals against a U.S. or coalition force that overmatches it in conventional military power. Asymmetry in warfare is not a new phenomenon, but given the relative capabilities of the United States as opposed to its potential opponents, it is increasingly likely that enemies will seek adaptive, asymmetric approaches. They will seek to avoid or counter U.S. strengths without having to oppose them directly, while exploiting perceived U.S. weaknesses. In such cases, IEDs may become the weapon of choice. 1-26. Various nation-state and nonstate actors generally view the United States as having an overall advantage in technology and warfighting capability. Despite these U.S. strengths, these actors also see some weaknesses that they may be able to exploit. Actions against such a superior force will focus on perceived centers of gravity (such as national will and the willingness to endure casualties, hardship, stress,

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and continued deployments over time). Based on these perceived vulnerabilities, enemy forces are likely to employ the following principles for dealing with technologically or numerically superior forces: z Cause politically unacceptable casualties. z Control access into the region. z Employ operational shielding. z Neutralize technological overmatch. z Control the tempo. z Change the nature of the conflict. z Allow no sanctuary.

CAUSE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE CASUALTIES1-27. The enemy will attempt to inflict highly visible and continuous losses on U.S. forces to weaken U.S. domestic resolve and national will to sustain the deployment or conflict. In recent history, modern wealthy nations have shown an apparent lack of commitment over time and sensitivity to domestic and world opinion in relation to conflict and seemingly needless casualties. The enemy will try to influence public opinion in the U.S. homeland to the effect that the goal of intervention is not worth the cost. 1-28. IEDs are well-suited to the goal of causing politically unacceptable casualties. They can cause a relatively large number of casualties for a relatively small expense. The United States or its coalition partners may be unwilling to accept military or civilian casualties regardless of the location or situation.

CONTROL ACCESS INTO THE REGION1-29. U.S. and coalition forces capable of achieving overmatch against the enemy must first enter the region using power-projection capabilities. To completely deter U.S. or coalition involvement or severely limit its scope and intensity, the enemy would first target the national will of the United States and/or its coalition partners. Given the challenges IED operations have caused for U.S. and coalition forces in the past, an enemy could mount an extensive IED campaign in its region to dissuade such forces from intervening there. 1-30. Access-control operations do not necessarily have to deny access entirely. A more realistic goal is to limit the U.S. or coalition accumulation of applicable combat power to a level and to locations that do not threaten the goals of the enemy organization. One means of accomplishing this is the employment of IEDs to attack U.S. or coalition forces at APODs and SPODs, along routes to the region, at transfer points en route, at aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) and sea ports of embarkation (SPOEs), and even at their home stations. These are fragile and convenient targets. To selectively deny a U.S. or coalition force the use of or access to forward operating bases (FOBs) within or near the region, enemy organizations might use IEDs to attack the indigenous (or regional) population and economic centers for the intimidation effect.

EMPLOY OPERATIONAL SHIELDING1-31. The enemy will use any means necessary to protect key elements of its forces or infrastructure from destruction by a more powerful U.S. or coalition force. This protection may come from the use of urban and complex terrain and may exploit U.S. or coalition concerns about the attendant risk of civilian casualties or unacceptable collateral damage when engaging the enemy. Dispersion and the use of IO can also help protect the enemy. The enemy will try to conceal and protect the locations where its personnel plan IED operations, collect the necessary materials, make bombs, or train operatives for IED emplacement. 1-32. Operational shielding generally cannot protect the entire enemy organization for an extended time period. Rather, the enemy organization will seek to protect selected elements of its forces for enough time to gain the freedom of action necessary to execute IED operations.

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NEUTRALIZE TECHNOLOGICAL OVERMATCH1-33. Although the United States currently enjoys overwhelming military superiority, this no longer serves as an adequate deterrent against many emerging threats, especially those from nonstate actors. When conflict occurs, any enemy will seek ways to neutralize U.S. technological advantages. Against a technologically superior force, enemy organizations will disperse their forces in areas where complex terrain limits the U.S. ability to apply a full range of technological capabilities. However, the enemy can rapidly mass forces from these dispersed locations to conduct IED operations at the time and place of their choosing. Enemy organizations train their forces to operate in adverse weather, limited visibility, rugged terrain, and urban environments. Such conditions can shield the enemy from the effects of U.S. or coalition force high-technology weapons and/or deny U.S. or coalition forces the full benefits of their advanced ISR and targeting assets. 1-34. Adversaries also use TICs in conjunction with IEDs. Despite the U.S. militarys advanced detection, protection, and medical counter-measures against traditional chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats, U.S. systems offer limited capabilities against TICs. Odor and symptoms may be the warning systems Soldiers and Marines use to identify a TIC hazard. The primary protection is to don a military mask and immediately vacate the area. 1-35. Enemy forces might concentrate the use of IEDs on the destruction of high-visibility (flagship) U.S. systems. Losses among these premier systems may not only degrade operational capability, but also undermine U.S. or coalition morale. Thus, attacks against such targets are not always linked to militarystyle objectives.

Technology for Situational Understanding1-36. The enemy will use its own ISR means to support IED employment. The proliferation of advanced technologies permits some enemy organizations to achieve a SU of U.S. or coalition deployments and force dispositions formerly reserved for the militaries of technologically advanced nations. Much information on the sources of such technology is readily and cheaply available on the Internet and in open-source documents. These media sources can provide enemy forces with extensive information on U.S. or coalition members and their armed forces. 1-37. Intelligence can also be obtained through greater use of human intelligence (HUMINT) assets that, among other sources, gain information through sympathetic elements in the local population and from civilians or local workers contracted by U.S. or coalition forces for base operation purposes. Similarly, communication technologies are becoming more reliable and inexpensive. Therefore, they could act as a primary communication system or a redundant measure. There will be little U.S. or coalition forces can do to prevent the use of these assets, especially since it is becoming harder to discriminate between civilian and military-type usage.

Availability of Technology1-38. Enemy forces use all the technology available to them, sometimes in adaptive or innovative ways. Low-technology solutions could be used against high-technology systems of an enemy. The construction of IEDs often involves employment of components for other than their originally intended purpose. Enemy forces take advantage of opportunities to upgrade available materials primarily through captured equipment, the black market, or outside support. 1-39. The enemy can use IEDs in conducting what many foreign forces, including potential adversaries, called systems warfare. This concept describes how an enemy force would prefer to operate against U.S. or coalition forces that overmatch the enemy technologically, as a means of leveling the playing field. In this approach, the enemy views its adversary as a collection of complex, dynamic, and interrelated systems and advocates the use of all elements of available power to create actions leading to desired effects on those systems. IEDs may be the weapon of choice, since they can produce disproportionate, often unpredictable affects. The focus of systems warfare is not just on the immediate target, but on the effects that can be created by striking that target. The enemy will frequently attack the more vulnerable, soft

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components of the U.S. or coalition force (such as logistics, C2, and ISR assets). This can allow the enemy to degrade the effectiveness of the overall force without having to directly engage superior U.S. maneuver and fire support forces. 1-40. IEDs are useful for systems warfare, as a means of attacking U.S. and coalition lines of communications (LOCs), convoys, and other logistics assets. They also provide a means to attack U.S. or coalition C2 and sustainment forces without having to mount force-on-force attacks. In the complex OE, some of the smallest activities and interactions can cause the greatest effects. No activity is subject to successful prediction.

CONTROL THE TEMPO1-41. The enemy forces will try to execute IED operations at a time and place of their choosing. IED activities may not be linked to other enemy actions or objectives. Rather, their purpose is to inflict mass casualties or destroy flagship systems (both of which can reduce the will of U.S. or coalition forces to continue the fight). 1-42. Enemy forces can vary the tempo of IED operations. A period of relatively low activity in IED employment might lull U.S. or coalition forces into a false sense of security, making them more vulnerable to the next round of IEDs.

CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT1-43. Enemy forces will try to change the nature of the conflict to exploit the differences between friendly and enemy capabilities and sensitivitiespresenting the U.S. or coalition forces with conditions they are not prepared for. Enemy organizations will adjust their IED TTP to the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. or coalition forces. The enemy is prepared to disperse its forces in areas of sanctuary and employ them in ways that present a battlefield that is difficult for U.S. or coalition forces to analyze and predict. 1-44. Enemy forces may use a sympathetic population to provide refuge or a base of operations. They move out of sanctuaries and employ IEDs when they can create a window of opportunity or when physical or natural conditions present an opportunity. Also, they may use IEDs against U. S., coalition, and HN civilians, Soldiers, or Marines not directly connected to the intervention as a device to change the fundamental nature of the conflict.

ALLOW NO SANCTUARY1-45. Enemy forces seek to use IEDs to deny U.S. or coalition forces safe haven during every phase of a deployment and as long as they are in the region or threatening to intervene. The resultant drain on U.S. or coalition manpower and resources to provide adequate protection measures can reduce strategic, operational, and tactical means to conduct war. Such actions will not only deny U.S. or coalition forces sanctuary, but also erodes their national will. 1-46. IEDs can be used to cause politically unacceptable casualties anywhere and at any time. However, they can be used at a particular time and/or place to deny U.S. or coalition forces access to an area, deny them safe haven, disrupt logistics, or impede movement. They can also be used to assassinate key military, government, or civilian figures or to target a particular group or organization. Physical casualties caused by IEDs also create a psychological effect that can intimidate or coerce others. 1-47. The enemy, whether a nation-state or nonstate actor, will try to present U.S. or coalition forces with a nonlinear operational environment in which there is no safe rear area. The enemy can use IEDs to attack U.S. headquarters, logistics centers, and supply and evacuation routes. The enemy can also use IEDs to attack living quarters, dining facilities, and places frequented by off-duty Soldiers, Marines, or civilians.

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VARIED ACTIONS1-48. Most of the above principles, to some degree, involve decentralized, dispersed, and distributed activities. To best attack superior forces, enemy leaders use initiative to conduct IED operations at a time and place of their choosing. This may mean under circumstances that offset U.S. advantages and maximize sanctuary from the effects of U.S. or coalition systems. 1-49. The enemy also varies the types of IEDs it employs and the methods of employment. This can make pattern analysis and templating challenging for U.S. or coalition forces.

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Chapter 2

Mobility Operations and the Framework of Improvised Explosive Device DefeatWith the proliferation of technology and access to explosive materials, many enemy groups have come to rely on IEDs as a primary means of attack due to the overwhelming strength of conventional U.S. military capabilities. As seen in recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, IED attacks have destabilizing and destructive effects on friendly operations. This chapter provides commanders, leaders, and staffs with the doctrinal hierarchy and linkages to the WFFs necessary to define and integrate IED defeat. Additionally, it describes the IED defeat framework.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER2-1. The WFFs are defined as a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (FMI 5-0.1). The movement and maneuver WFF encompasses the related tasks and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. It includes those tasks associated with moving and employing forces in relation to a threat in combination with direct fire or fire potential (maneuver), force projection, and repositioning within or between joint operational areas (movement), mobility, and countermobility. 2-2. Movement and maneuver are the means by which commanders mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance. FM 3-90, Tactics, discusses maneuver and tactical movement, while FMI 3-35 provides additional detail on force projection.

COMBINED ARMS MOBILITY OPERATIONS2-3. Conduct Mobility Operations is an Army tactical task (ART) and a Marine Corps task (MCT) subordinate to the movement and maneuver WFF that has applicability across many of the other WFFs (to include intelligence, protection, and sustainment); however, as it relates to IED defeat it is primarily focused on the WFF of movement and maneuver. As a combined arms operation, mobility operations assure freedom of movement within the AO, allowing the commander to move and/or maneuver units, weapon systems, and critical supplies to desired locations without delay or disruption. 2-4. Mobility operations consist of five functional areas or supporting tasks that are focused on providing uninterrupted maneuver and mobility on the battlefield. These five areas are articulated in FM 3-34.2 and include Conduct combined arms breaching operations. Detect, reduce, neutralize (by combined arms breach or bypass), mark, and proof mined areas and obstacles. Countermine and counterobstacle activities are typically performed in a close combat environment. Conduct clearing operations. Employ tactics and equipment to detect and eliminate obstacles, mines, and other EHs. While this is not always part of a combined arms breaching operation and is typically not performed in a close combat environment, it will still generally include the task of breach. Conduct gap-crossing operations. Fill gaps in the terrain to allow personnel and equipment to pass. For specifics on gap-crossing operations, see FM 90-13/MCRP 3-17.1.

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z

Construct and maintain combat roads and trails. Expediently prepare or repair routes of travel for personnel and equipment. This includes temporary bypasses of damaged roads and bridges. Perform forward aviation combat engineering. Construct and maintain forward airfields and landing zones (LZs), forward arming and refueling points, landing strips, or other aviation support sites in the forward combat area.

2-5. The combined arms team clearing of IEDs is the main focus of this manual, because they are performed to eliminate current or recurring obstacle threats such as those presented by IEDs. While there are specific special considerations for IEDs, the same basic principles apply to other EHs and obstacles in general.

CLEARING OPERATIONS2-6. The maneuver commander may order clearing operations be conducted to facilitate mobility within the AO, based on a METT-TC analysis. The operation could be conducted as a single mission to open or reopen a route or area; or it may be conducted on a recurring basis in support of efforts to defeat a recurring threat to a critical route. FM 3-90 will identify clearing operations as a type of tactical enabling operation when it is revised. Conduct Clearing Operations is one of the three subordinate ARTs of Conduct Mobility Operations that enable a force to maintain its mobility by reducing and/or clearing obstacles. 2-7. Clearing operations are a combined arms tactical enabling mission conducted when the commander orders all EHs (enemy and friendly) and enemy or natural obstacles within an assigned area or along a specified route cleared. They can include a combined arms breach but are not limited to reducing a lane or lanes through identified obstacles. In both route and area clearance, EHs and other obstacles that are a threat to mobility along the route or within the specified area are eliminated or neutralized. Clearing operations may include the tactical mission task to clear. Clear is defined as a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area (FM 3-90). The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces so they cannot interfere with the friendly units mission. 2-8. The main focus of clearing operations is clearing the IED. However, the focus on the IED is merely the end product of a complex set of enemy activities. Commanders operating in the OE or fighting an asymmetric enemy have ordered clearing operations in support of an overall IED defeat mission. Defeat is a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated forces commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commanders will, and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use (FM 1-02). 2-9. Combat engineers supporting clearing operations are task-organized to conduct either route or area clearance. If a combined arms breach is required as part of the clearing operation, selected combat engineer and other forces are task-organized specifically for the breaching operation. Bypassing or otherwise avoiding the obstacle may be preferred over a combined arms breach; however, in clearing operations the objective is to eliminate the enemy force or organized resistance within an assigned area or along an assigned route. Combat engineers within the task-organized clearance force detect and mark EHs. They then either clear within their capability, or allow an EOD unit to respond appropriately based on METT-TC and the commanders guidance. Only the EOD team is capable of eliminating or rendering safe an IED.

AREA CLEARANCE2-10. In land operations, area clearance detects and if found, identifies, marks and neutralizes, destroys, or removes mines or other explosive ordnance, IEDs, and booby traps in a defined area to allow a military operation to continue with reduced risk (FM 3-34.2). It is a combined arms operation. The clearance of land mines is primarily the responsibility of combat engineer units; the clearing of most other EHs is primarily the responsibility of EOD units within the Army or from EOD elements in other Services.

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2-11. An explosive hazards is any hazard containing an explosive component. All explosive hazards currently encountered on the battlefield can be broken down into five categories: unexploded explosive ordnance, booby traps, improvised explosive devices, captured enemy ammunition, and bulk explosives (FM 3-34.210). Unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) is explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause (JP 3-15). A booby trap is an explosive or nonexplosive device or other material, deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed (JP 1-02). An IED is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. Captured enemy ammunition (CEA) is defined as all ammunition products and components produced for or used by a foreign force that is hostile to the United States (that is or was engaged in combat against the United States) in the custody of a U.S. military force or under the control of a DOD component. The term includes confined gaseous, liquid, and solid propellants; explosives; pyrotechnics; chemical and riot-control agents; smokes and incendiaries (including bulk explosives); chemical warfare agents; chemical munitons; rockets; guided and ballistic missiles; bombs; warheads; mortar rounds; artillery ammunition; small demolition charges; and devices and components of the above. Captured enemy ammunition can also include North Atlantic Treaty Organization or U.S.-manufactured munitions that may not have been under U.S. custody or control (FM 3-34.210). 2-12. Enough time should be allotted for area-clearing planning and execution because area clearance is inherently dangerous. Often times, specific information is not known about the area to be cleared. Leaders must perform constant risk, threat, and task analysis using the factors of METT-TC. Area clearance is normally not conducted under fire, only conducted during hours of daylight, and is not normally conducted in adverse weather. Leaders and planners must strive to limit the areas requiring clearing to only those areas necessary to support military operations. When possible, areas not required for military operations and not an immediate threat to joint forces will be permanently marked and avoided. 2-13. As a primary component for making IEDs, caches of explosive remnants of war must be located, secured, and recovered or removed by disposal. To reduce the enemys capability to exploit explosive remnants of war, it is critical for units to include this under area clearance operations of possible sites or former military holding facilities. Also important to such operations is the task organization of necessary skills to accomplish this mission. The inclusion of EOD personnel is critical to this type of mission and engineers can assist as required. Explosive ordnance clearing agent (EOCA) personnel should be aligned with EOD teams, if available, depending on the size of the cache, because they can assist but not conduct these operations alone. By eliminating these caches or explosive remnants of war, the enemys ability to use such ordnance as weapons is greatly reduced.

ROUTE CLEARANCE2-14. Route clearance is a key enabling task in IED defeat. It provides the maneuver commander the capability to employ a combined arms force of combat engineers, EOD, and other units task-organized, equipped, and trained to neutralize the IED threat along critical routes. Neutralize is defined as rendering enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation (FM 3-90). In land operations, route clearance is the detection, investigation, marking and reporting, and neutralization of explosive hazards and other obstacles along a defined route to enable assured mobility for the maneuver commander. It is a combined arms operation that relies on a reconnaissance of the route to be cleared (FM 3-34.2). It is usually preceded by but can include a reconnaissance of the route to be cleared. It can be conducted to open a route for the necessary traffic or on a recurring basis to minimize the risk along selected routes. 2-15. The clearing operation aims to completely eliminate or neutralize EHs or other obstacles along the route. The route clearance is typically not conducted under fire. However, a task-organized route clearance team must be prepared to employ the fundamentals of SOSRA (suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and

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assault) at any point along the targeted route (see FM 3-34.2). While these actions may not be executed during a route clearance, they are planned for just as they are in breaching operations. The clearance team must be prepared to execute SOSRA fundamentals as necessary. 2-16. Route and area clearance are not the only tasks required to defeat a sustained IED threat throughout the AO, but they can provide a solution the commander may employ to defeat this type of threat. For more information on clearing operations see FM 3-34.2. 2-17. Figure 2-1 provides a graphical depiction to describe the ARTs and MCTs discussed in the preceding paragraphs. While it is not inclusive of all the mobility operations ARTs and MCTs, it is important to understand the doctrinal linkages of those subordinate ARTs and MCTs that describe those tasks that support IED defeat operations as they relate to the movement and maneuver WFF. The IED defeat framework provides structure to the focused discussion of IED defeat.

Figure 2-1. Mobility Operations Army Tasks and IED Defeat

THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT FRAMEWORK2-18. With a focus on clearing IEDs, the IED defeat framework is derived from the fundamentals of assured mobility. Assured mobility encompasses those actions that enable commanders with the ability to deploy, move, and maneuver where and when they desire (without interruption or delay) and to achieve the mission (see FM 3-34). When properly planned and evaluated, the fundamentals of assured mobility assist in developing SU for the commander that allows them to exploit opportunities to defeat the IED prior to its inception, thus enabling freedom of movement and maneuver. Because all IEDs will not be eliminated, commanders plan to mitigate the impacts by developing standing operating procedures (SOPs), TTPs, battle drills, and other response actions to lessen the effects of the IED and/or eliminate the enemys desired outcome. To effectively mitigate the impact of IEDs, the fundamentals of detect, avoid, neutralize, and protect are used in conjunction with the factors of METT-TC to plan and develop coordinated and well-executed responses. 2-19. As a parallel construct to the framework of assured mobility, the IED defeat framework enables commanders and staffs to exploit (proactive defeat) the IED networks and the associated operations before they occur. It also provides a methodology for mitigating (reactive defeat) the impacts of the IED by

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addressing IEDs upon contact. See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of assured mobility and the IED defeat framework. 2-20. Proactive defeat is focused on denying the enemy the ability to even emplace an IED. Reactive defeat typically is a function of the clearance operation. Proactive and reactive defeat functions and tasks, when planned and employed concurrently and continuously, complete the doctrinal approach to IED defeat operations. See Chapter 3 for more information on the intelligence WFF, Chapter 4 for a discussion of the integrating processes, and Appendix A for a description of selected units that directly support IED defeat operations.

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Chapter 3

Threat AnalysisAlthough virtually any person or type of conventional or paramilitary group may employ an IED, it is a proven and effective weapon for insurgents, terrorists, and other nonstate actors. Such groups may or may not be linked to a nation-state and are not limited by geographic boundaries. Their motivations are often ideological and do not possess the same characteristics or centers of gravity as those found in a typical state versus a state in conflict. They can be organized in a nonhierarchical, noncontiguous network of cells. The structure resembles that of a communication network, such as the Internet, and its noncontiguous nature makes it extremely survivable. There are often many communication paths and decentralized C2. Some of these networks are independent and range from theater down to village level. Others are linked together to provide coordinated attacks against U.S. and coalition forces and are a part of large international terrorist organizations. The rapid technological advances in communication devices (such as wireless) and the Internet provide low-cost and easily obtainable modes of communication. Nevertheless, U.S. forces are equipped and prepared to attack these networks using a variety of capabilities and resources (see FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5).

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES3-1. Military intelligence disciplines are clearly defined areas of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. The Armys and USMCs intelligence disciplines are HUMINT, imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), counterintelligence (CI), technical intelligence (TECHINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and allsource intelligence.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE3-2. HUMINT is the collection of information by a trained HUMINT collector from people and their associated documents and media sources to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passive and active, to gather information to satisfy the commanders intelligence requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines (see FM 2-22.3). 3-3. During operations where IEDs are employed, the most important information and intelligence may come from the population and from those in direct contact with the population. The quantity and quality of this information will depend on the credibility U.S. forces have established with the local population, the effective security they provide the local population, and their ability to interact with the local population. One predictor of the ability to prevent the threat use of IEDs is the quality and depth of relationships between the unit and the communities. Local leaders will root out troublemakers within their towns and villages only if there is a good working relationship and trust built between them and coalition forces. Because HUMINT collectors are trained in the art of building rapport with foreign populations, they can use this skill to gather information to assist in identifying the threat and the location of their bombs, bombmaking supplies, and facilities. They can also record or photograph IED related personnel and events.

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3-4. In the IED fight, HUMINT can collect information to assist in z Identifying hostile personnel in t