Findings and Recommendations: Safety

Firefighter and public safety arethe first priority in every fire

management activity. All FireManagement Plans and activitiesmust reflect this commitment(Federal Wildland Fire Policy 1995).Safety is the responsibility of all ofthose assigned to the fire.

SafetyWithin the first 24 to 30 hours of thisfire, there were several safety-relatedincidents, such as 1) an engine burnover; 2) a road grader burn over;3) a safety officer who had to stop aburnout to save engines in its path;4) three separate incidents wherestrike teams burned out safety zonesto escape the oncoming fire; and 5)many statements of independentactions taken to save structures orescape the flaming front.

People with equipment whoresponded independently, on theirown, to the fire were isolated on aridge above a burn out operation anddidn’t have communications with theburn out personnel. As a result, theburn out had to be halted untilcommunication could be establishedand the safety of the people involvedcould be assured.

Finding: BurnoverDuring the initial attack phase ofthis incident an HFD engine and twoperson crew were involved in aburnover, resulting in the loss of theengine and no injuries. While scoutingthe fire, the vehicle stalled and wasburned over by the approaching fire.The crew members escaped byrunning through the flaming front.The Service ordered an entrapmentinvestigation of the burnover, but itwas not complete. It failed to addressthe risks or decisions made, oridentify lessons learned, which couldhave provided valuable insight toengine crews for reducing the risk ofadditional burn overs.

The engine burnover is an“entrapment.” An entrapment, asdefined by the National WildfireCoordinating Group (NWCG), is whenpersonnel are unexpectedly caught in

a fire behavior-related, life-threatening position, where plannedescaped routes and safety zones areabsent, inadequate, or have beencompromised.

Recommendations:The Service will, per policy:■ Conduct a fire entrapmentinvestigation following NWCGguidelines.

■ Share the information with theappropriate individuals andcooperators.

■ Develop recommendations forimproving existing procedures andpractices.

Finding: Inadequate on site reviewsOne engine specific burnover andentrapment investigation waspreviously mentioned. However, fireand law enforcement personnel whowere interviewed identified manyother burn overs, entrapments, andclose calls. These incidents were notadequately reviewed on site to learnwhat happened, take stress off offirefighters and law enforcementofficers, and prevent similar incidentsfrom occurring.

Recommendations:The Service and the Department ofEnergy (DOE) should work withcooperators to:■ Co-sponsor a fire safety workshopwith the Tri-County Fire Chiefs todebrief those who were directlyinvolved in the fire (firefighter andlaw enforcement) on June 27 and 28,at the fire’s peak.

■ Arrange to have a facilitator at theworkshop to ensure that there is afree exchange of information anddevelop consensus recommendationsto improve firefighter, lawenforcement, and public safety.

■ Create an action plan to implementthe workshop recommendations.

Findings and Recommendations:Safety

An engine burnover occured duringinitial attack. Firefighters escaped byrunning through the flaming frontinto the black.

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While scouting thefire, the vehicle stalledand was burned overby the approachingfire. The crewmembers escaped byrunning through theflaming front.

1224 COMMAND FIRE REVIEW

Fire management plans mustbe coordinated, reviewed,

and approved by the responsibleAgency Administrator to assureconsistency with approved landmanagement plans.

Fire Management PlanThe Federal Wildland Fire Policy(1995) requires that all Federalwildland fire agencies with burnablevegetation have an approved FireManagement Plan. Plans mustaddress firefighter and public safety,values to be protected, and publichealth issues. The plans must beconsistent with land and resourcemanagement plans, address potentialwildland fire occurrences, risksand mitigation, and identify firemanagement actions. Plans must alsopromote an interagency approach tomanaging fires to ensure safety,efficiency, and effectiveness.

Finding: Fire management planis inadequate:The Monument Fire ManagementPlan does not meet the requiredstandards. Instead, the Monumentrelies upon the “Arid Lands Ecology(ALE) Facilities Management Plan,”prepared for the DOE by BattelleMemorial Institute (February 1993).

Recommendations:The Monument should:■ Prepare the suppression portionof a Fire Management Plan incompliance with the Federal WildlandFire Policy and the Service’s FireManagement Handbook. The planmust include an appropriate level ofcooperator and public involvement.

■ Develop the plan during the fallof 2000 and implement it prior to the2001 fire season.

Fire Preparedness PlanningThe Service must develop safe andcost-effective fire managementprograms in support of other land andresource management plans, throughappropriate planning, cooperativeagreements, staffing, training, andequipment. Annual reviews and

updates must be completed forpreparedness plans, cooperativeagreements, annual operating plans,and preparedness reviews. Whenconditions exceed those of the normalfire year, the Service should developseverity and contingency plans thatconsider both the agency’s andcooperators’ needs.

Finding: Step-up planThe Monument has not worked withcooperators to develop a step-up plan.To support the suppression portion ofthe FMP, an operational plan isrequired that identifies what actionsshould be taken under certainweather conditions, what actions arerequired if a fire occurs in a givenarea of the Monument, whatresources will be needed undercertain conditions, and what are thekey indicators that should triggercertain preparedness actions.

Recommendations:The Monument should work closelywith local cooperators to:■ Develop a step-up plan forMonument. This plan defines a set ofactions to be taken at each planninglevel; public and firefighter safetysare the primary consideration. Theplan should include, but not be limitedto, the following items:■ Management direction andconsiderations■ Fire prevention/education actions■ Prepositioning of suppressionresources■ Cooperators involvement■ Safety considerations■ Coordination and local Multi-Agency Coordinating Group■ Dispatch ordering procedures■ Fire Danger/behavior assessmentsand notifications■ Briefings for management andfirefighters■ Joint fire information releases■ Enhance fire management staffingcommensurate with conditions

Findings and Recommendations:Fire Management Planning

Plans must alsopromote aninteragency approachto managing fires toensure safety,efficiency, andeffectiveness.

Fire leaves burned cars andvegetation in its wake in BentonCity.

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13 24 COMMAND FIRE REVIEW

Management actions on wildlandfires must consider firefighter

and public safety, be cost effective,consider benefits and values to beprotected, and be consistent withnatural and cultural resourcesobjectives.

Initial and Extended AttackThe cooperative agreement betweenService, the DOE, and their HFDcontractors agrees to “light hand onthe land” tactics. This means they willavoid using tractors, graders, and allother ground surface breaking ormodifying equipment without priorapproval of the Service, except whenthe use of such equipment is essentialto protect life, private property, orprevent the spread of fire to theHanford Site, east of Highway 240.

There was concern expressed thatthe fire might have been containedearlier if light hand on the land tacticshad not placed restrictions on theuse of heavy equipment. The finaldecision regarding use of suchequipment rests with the IncidentCommander, as specified in thecooperative agreement.

Finding: Use of heavy equipmentThe Incident Commander determinedthat attacking the fire quickly tookprecedence over “light hand on theland” guidance in the contract. Heused his discretion to send the crewsdirectly onto the Monument area inan attempt to cut off the fire before itcould spread. Therefore, there was nodelay in suppression tactics due to thelight hand on the land requirements.

Recommendations:The Monument should:■ Determine the areas best suitedfor following light hand on the landtactics, incorporating this into theFMP that is being developed. Thisshould include criteria regardingwhen light hand on the land tacticsare to be set aside and shared withcooperators.

Managing the IncidentThe Agency Administrator plays0a very important role in themanagement of any fire. The AgencyAdministrator is responsible forthe safe, effective, and efficientmanagement of all wildland fireswithin their land. As identified inthe Service’s Fire ManagementHandbook, the AgencyAdministrator’s role andresponsibility to the IncidentManagement Team is to:

■ Develop a delegation of authoritywhich includes specific, measurableobjectives to be accomplished by theIncident Management Team, as wellas limitations of that authority.

■ Brief the Incident ManagementTeam on the situation, safety,cooperators, social and politicalconcerns, objectives, andexpectations. Assign a liaison tointerface with the team.

■ Provide a signed Wildland FireSituation Analysis (WFSA) andestablish daily re-certificationprocedures. The WFSA must describethe situation, evaluate the expectedeffects, establish objectives andconstraints for the management of the

Findings and Recommendations:Wildfire Suppression Operations

The WFSA assists in decision making, such as using a dozerline as a firebreak.

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fire, select an appropriate alternative,and document the decision andrationale.

■ Define situation updaterequirements, time frames, and theperson who should receive thesereports.

■ Set clear and measurable standardsfor safety. Highlight known hazardsin the area.

■ Provide oversight to the IncidentManagement Team to assess theeffectiveness of the strategy inmeeting objectives.

Finding: Inadequate WFSAAn adequate WFSA was notprepared, nor revalidated or updated,as conditions changed.

Recommendations:The Service’s Regional Office should:■ Arrange for the Refuge ProjectLeader and his representatives toreceive additional training in thedevelopment and use of the WFSA.

■ Direct the Refuge Project Leaderand staff to produce those portionsof the WFSA that can be developedprior to the 2001 fire season byworking jointly with the cooperators.

■ Develop a small network of firemanagement expertise that can berapidly deployed to assist a refugewhen the burning conditions areabove normal.

Incident ComplexityAnalysisThe Incident Complexity Analysisdocument assists the AgencyAdministrator and staff in analyzingthe current or predicted complexityof a fire situation to determine theappropriate type of team to use. Thisdocument is prepared concurrentlywith, and attached to, a new or revisedWildland Fire Situation Analysis(WFSA). The WFSA is a requireddecision-making process which allowsthe Agency Administrator (orrepresentative) to assess the fire,establish objectives and constraints,explore alternatives, and select anaction plan.

Finding: Incident Complexity AnalysisThe Agency Administrator and ICT4did not adequately assess thecomplexity of the fire and assign theappropriate level of incidentmanagement within the first 10 hours.This resulted in transfer of commandfive times within the first 27 hours.A guide for assessing fire complexitycan be found in the Service’s FireManagement Handbook.

Recommendations:The Refuge Project Leader andrepresentatives should:■ Become skilled in using complexitylevels to arrange for appropriateincident management. Thesecomplexity levels should be pre-identified and correlated with firedanger indices to establish needsahead of time.

Radio CommunicationsRadios provide a crucialcommunication link during a fire.It is not uncommon for radiocommunications to be somewhatlimited during initial and extendedattack operations, if not pre-planned.A potential problem exists anytime afirefighter cannot contact the firelinesupervisor. Operations must ceaseuntil positive contact is attained/maintained; positive communicationis paramount in providing a safeworking environment.


The fire moved rapidly over dry cheat grass, producing 12 foot flames.

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Note the fire whirl (to left) that precededthe plume.

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Finding: Radio frequenciesThere was no previous agreement asto which frequencies would be usedon an incident. Fire teams continuedto use just one frequency as thecomplexity increased, even whenaerial resources were being used.There was no authorization in placeto use each other’s frequencies.

Even when the frequencies wereknown and more were added, radiocommunication was effective onlywithin line of sight. A Safety Officerhad to be used as a “human repeater,”instead of being able to do his job asa Safety Officer.

People with equipment whoresponded independently, on theirown, to the fire were isolated on aridge above a burn out operation anddidn’t have communications with theburn out personnel. As a result, theburn out had to be halted untilcommunication could be establishedand the safety of the people involvedcould be assured.

When radio frequencies wereoverloaded, there was an attempt touse cell phones. Generally, cell phonenumbers were unknown; some ofthose that were known were no longeraccurate. Cell phones should never beused for tactical communications.

Recommendations:The Monument, DOE, and thecooperators should:■ Arrange for authorizations,agreements and procedures to be in

place to use each others’ radiofrequencies; the procedures should betied to the annual operating plan.

■ Make sure that adequate repeatersare in place to eliminate “line of sight”issues.

Incident QualificationsFighting a fire of this stature requireshundreds of people with a wide rangeof talents. Only qualified people willbe assigned duties in wildland firesuppression. The National WildfireCoordinating Group National(NWCG) establishes minimum firequalification standards acceptable toall agencies. Local agencies can raisethe standard to a higher level.

Finding: Qualification standardsSome of the fire personnel in assignedpositions on the fire did not meetNWCG qualification standards. Oneexample was a Division GroupSupervisor who was only qualified asa Firefighter Type 1. The acceptedinteragency standard is the Wildlandand Prescribed Fire QualificationSystem, PMS 310-1 (January 2000).

Recommendations:The Service should:■ Work with cooperators tounderstand and accept NWCG’straining, qualifications, andcertification standards.

■ Address these standards in theagreement between the Service,DOE, their HFD contractors, andother cooperators.

On the right, Benton City residents evacuate, while those to the leftreturn to get their livestock.

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24 Incident Command Post (ICP)

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Findings and Recommendations:Resource Orderingand Dispatch Operation

Organizations with dispatchingresponsibility, in conjunction

with cooperators, must ensure thatdispatch standard operatingprocedures are developed. AgencyAdministrators must also ensurethat an annual review verifiesthat required elements are updatedand in place and that written,approved procedures are fullyimplemented and followed duringdispatching operations.

Resource OrderingOn June 27 at 1440, the HFD madethe first resource request for oneairtanker to the Central WashingtonInteragency Communication Center(CWICC) in Wenatchee, WA. TheHFD does not normally order fromand had no agreement with CWICC.The CWICC Center Manager calledthe Monument’s Fire ManagementOfficer, who confirmed that HFDwas working a fire for the Service.The Service only had an informalagreement with CWICC for supportdispatch services.

The request was honored and theairtanker departed Wenatchee at 1509with load and return instructions.CWICC initiated a request for a leadplane in accordance with NorthwestGeographic Area policy.

Once the mobile command vehicle wasestablished at the Incident Command

Post (known as 24 Command), HFDtransferred ordering responsibilitiesto the 24 Command, and continuedordering resources beyond mutualaid directly from CWICC.

Finding: Agreement for servicesThe Service does not have anagreement for dispatching services.HFD uses its dispatch center forinitial attack dispatching. Historically,resources beyond mutual aid werenot dispatched through BentonCounty Emergency Services forcontracted lands (Service and Bureauof Land Management). HFD madethe decision to order through CWICCat the beginning of the incident, bothfor extended attack and expandeddispatching support services. TheService confirmed this authorizationwith CWICC.

Recommendations:The Monument should:■ Review local mutual aid agreementsregarding the use of local resourcesbeyond the initial attack.

■ Develop an agreement for localdispatch services for extended attack,Type 2, and Type 1 incidents.

■ Become a party to the Tri-CountyMutual Aid Agreement.

■ Develop an agreement with aFederal dispatch center to accessresources outside of the local area.The agreement should address, ata minimum, the following points:■ Delegation of Authority.■ Roles and responsibilities.■ Ordering resources■ Compensation■ Necessary notifications

Finding: CWICC responseThe review team met with CWICCand made contact by conference callto the Northwest Coordination Center(NWCC) in Portland, OR. Afterreviewing the resource orders atCWICC, there was no indicationthat any resource requests from24 Command had been held orcanceled by CWICC.

Structure protection in the wildland/urban interfaceremains a high priority.

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Finding: Communications with24 CommandCWICC did have problems returningcalls to 24 Command. This led todelays in confirming resourceassignments and their estimated timeof arrival to the incident. CWICC hadquestions regarding individualrequests that were unclear. Onlyportions of the large resource requeston June 27 was received at CWICC.This was not an isolated case ofcommunication breakdown betweenincident personnel, 24 Command, andCWICC. Communications with 24Command were inconsistent, whichdelayed the ordering process.

Finding: Timeliness of responseIt appears that resource requestswere filled on the date and at thetime needed. There are a numberof deviations between the requestor’sdate and time needed and the dateand time noted given to CWICC .There were delays in filling“overhead” requests, or orders forpersonnel assigned to supervisorypositions on the fire. These delaysare common geographically andnationally.

Finding: Incident Action PlanThe Incident Action Plan (IAP)describes necessary resources andassigns them to a specific use. TheIAP was built with resources thatwere ordered, but not by confirmedarrival times.

Recommendations:The Monument should:■ Review procedures for transitioningfrom structural (buildings/municipal)

or local government ordering toFederal dispatch ordering at boththe pre-season meeting withcooperators and the local Type 3 teammeeting. In particular, all involvedwith the ordering process shouldunderstand the date and time thatresources are required at the site.Procedures should:■ Provide the date and time resourcesare required at the incident.■ Understand estimated time framesinvolved in routing the orders throughthe Federal dispatch orderingchannels.■ Provide information from theincident to assist the dispatch centersand multi-agency coordinating groupsin setting priorities locally, within thegeographic area, and nationally.

Finding: Non-authorized ordersfor resourcesThe DOE attempted to orderresources from CWICC and theirrequests were denied. This is outsideof the normal ordering channels, sinceHFD was authorized by the Serviceto order for the 24 Command Fire.

A local Multi-Agency Coordinating(MAC) group is made up of agenciesand/or jurisdictions that cometogether to make decisions related toincidents and resource sharing in ageographic area. A geographic area isa political boundary designated by thewildland fire protection agencies,where these agencies work togetherto coordinate and effectively useresources within their boundaries.

When the local MAC has resourcerequests, they are processed throughthe Incident Command’s expandeddispatch organization, utilizing thenormal dispatch ordering channels.(See the National Mobilization GuideChapter 30.)

Recommendations:The Monument should:■ Activate their local MAC Groupwhenever wildland fire activities areaffecting more than one agency orthere is competition for incidentresources in a geographic area.

■ Ensure that MAC groups at alllevels do the following:■ Determine the incident priorities.■ Allocate or reallocate resources.


Communications with24 Command wereinconsistent, whichdelayed the orderingprocess.

Refuge engine working on the fireline.

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■ Develop and recommendcontingency action plans.■ Issue coordinated situationassessments.

■ Ask the Northwest GeographicArea Coordinating Group to providetraining to the local agencyadministrators and their delegatedrepresentatives.

■ Ask the local MAC group to meetat least annually and conduct mockexercises to become familiar witheach others’ roles and responsibilities,as well as to develop workingrelationships.

■ Include the DOE as a member ofthe local MAC Group and ask them tobring their resource requests to thelocal MAC meeting.

Finding: Dispatch operating planThe Monument does not have aDispatch Operating Plan. This planoutlines procedures for identifyingroles and responsibilities,preparedness levels, notification tosuppression forces, management ofongoing fire activity, and more.

Recommendations:The Monument should:■ Develop a Dispatch Operating Planto assist local office personnel withestablished procedures when keyemployees are not available. (Referto Chapter 30 of the NationalMobilization Guide.)


The IAP was builtwith resourcesthat were ordered,but not by confirmedarrival times.

Suppression efforts to save shrub-steppe-habitat.

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■ Provide input to the servicingdispatch center’s Dispatch OperatingPlan. The dispatch operating plansshould address, at a minimum, thefollowing points:■ Authorities■ Roles and responsibilities fordispatch activities■ Resource order procedures andflow.■ Integration of buying teams andsources of supply.■ Necessary notifications along withtime frames.■ Resources outside the local mutualaid agreements.■ Dispatch procedures for orderingprocessing.■ Communication between incidentresources and dispatch center.

Interagency cooperation is vital inattaining fire management. The

ability of a single agency to implementa fire management program is limitedwithout coordination and assistancefrom other organizations. Interagencycooperation and coordination ofshared resources and commonactivities is imperative at allorganizational levels.

Agreements and ContractsRefuges are responsible fordeveloping agreements with localagencies and fire departments to meetmutual needs for fire protection. Theyshould be comprised of twocomponents: the actual agreement orcontract and an operating plan. Theagreement/contract outlines theauthority and general responsibilitiesof each party. The operating plandefines the specific operatingprocedures. The agreements andoperating plans must also be providedto the servicing dispatch center.

Finding: Agreements and operatingplansThere were not adequate agreementsor operating plans in place to enhancesafe, effective, and efficient fireprotection.

Recommendations:The Monument should:■ Meet with contractors andcooperators to identify opportunitiesto increase the safety, effectiveness,and efficiency of fire protection on theMonument and adjoining lands.

■ Review and update existingcontracts and agreements annually.Develop new agreements asidentified.

Findings: Agreements unclear or wereinadequateLocal fire districts appear to believethat Service philosophy and policyrestrict the use of certain tactics andthat Federal wildland fire suppressionactivities would cease at the Federalland boundary. Both of theseperceptions were unfounded based onreview of existing policy, currentagreements, and actions taken duringthe incident.

Some cooperators felt that theService’s fire agreement with HFDshould include lands east of theColumbia River, not just part of theMonument. Revision of the agreementshould involve discussion of expandingthe agreement to include all HanfordMonument lands.

The cooperative fire agreementbetween the Service and HFD expiresthis fiscal year and must be updated.The current agreement is inadequate.The model agreements now availableare not suitable for rural fire districtsand should be improved.

Additionally, the Type 1 team feltthey lacked knowledge of potentialradiological hazards at the DOE site.DOE was not included in the MACand did not have an agreement withthe Service; consequently, importantprocedural information aboutradiological hazards was not available.

Findings and Recommendations:Interagency Coordinationand Cooperation

Refuges areresponsible fordevelopingagreements with localagencies and firedepartments to meetmutual needs for fireprotection.


An air tanker drops retardant near the Plutonium UraniumExtraction Facility.

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Recommendations:The Monument should:■ Clarify Service policy and tacticalguidance with the local and DOEfire community to eliminatemisconceptions regarding perceivedrestrictions.

■ Develop agreements to ensureDepartment of Energy representationand guidance on these type ofincidents.

■ Update and improve the cooperativefire agreement between the Serviceand HFD before it expires. Be surethe new agreement addressespotential radiological hazards for thebenefit of all cooperators.

■ Prepare briefing information for thehazards on site.

Finding: Community and cooperatorinvolvementThere was some level of local andFederal coordination and cooperation,but the level of pre-incident planningand preparedness on the part of theentire community should be improved.DOE is not part of NWCG or thegeographic area coordinating group.They should be more involved withother wildland fire groups andincrease familiarity with ICS system.

Recommendations:The Service Regional Office and otherfederal wildland fire agencies should:

■ Work with State and local resourcesto reevaluate current operationalplans to bring the entire Tri-Countycommunity to a higher standard ofpreparedness. Jointly coordinateplanning efforts to include an accurateunderstanding of resource agency(Service, DOE) policy and procedures.Pre-establish and practicecommunication and dispatchprocedures.

■ Encourage DOE to become partof NWCG or the geographic areacoordinating group.

■ Encourage DOE to be moreinvolved with other wildland firegroups and increase familiarity withICS system.

CommunicationMulti-agency communication was asignificant problem at all levels. Itimproved greatly when the Type Iteam assumed the lead role in unifiedcommand. However, multiple agencyinvolvement led to challengingcoordination problems.

Finding: Transfer of commandAdministration and IncidentCommand-level personnel felt thatthe transfer of command from initialattack level to extended attack level(Type III to Type II to Type I ) wasclear and well-coordinated; however,many at the division and lower levelsof command felt that the transferof command was not clear or well-communicated. They felt the chainof command was confusing. Oversightbecame less clear as the fire becamemore volatile.

Recommendations:The Service and DOE should:■ Evaluate and revise the establishedtraining/drills to provide informationabout local, Type 3, Type 2, and Type 1resource ordering.

Finding: Cell phone communicationsLine-of-sight communication usingradios was difficult because of theterrain. Fire command relied heavilyon cell phones for communication, butthere were difficulties with busysignals, getting recordings, notreceiving good signals, overloadedlines, and unanswered phones.


The road and green vegetation may have spared one home,while others nearby burned.

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Recommendations:The Service and cooperators should:■ Not use cell phones for tacticaloperations.

■ Jointly explore with cooperatorspotential solutions to radiocommunications problems.

Findings: Communication with localcommunityLocal fire and emergency personnelfelt that the incident teams did notadequately communicate orcoordinate with them. Liaison fromlocal sources (Benton CountyEmergency Operation Center, BentonCounty Sheriff, and local fire officials)found it difficult to gather and obtaininformation regarding emergencyoperations from command centers,except under Type I command.

Initial attack and extended attack(Type 3) operations did not chooseto use the established local firecoordinator to keep local communityinformed in early stages of the fire.This is a normal local procedure whichwas not activated, resulting inconfusion among local resources.

There is an expansive, well-organized,and well-equipped local frameworkfor emergency response in the localcommunity.

Recommendations:The cooperators should:■ Evaluate personnel assignmentscriteria to improve information flowfrom field units to the EmergencyOperation Center.

■ Increase communication with localfire chiefs to enhance coordinationof preparedness planning, training,and tactics.

Delegation of AuthorityDelegation of Authority is a statementprovided to the Incident Commanderby the Agency Administratordelegating authority and assigningresponsibility. The Delegation ofAuthority can include objectives,priorities, expectations, constraints,and other considerations orguidelines, as needed. Many agenciesrequire that written delegationauthorities be given to commandersprior to assuming command onlarger incidents.

Findings: Unprepared AgencyAdministratorThe Agency Administrator duringthe early stages of the fire wasunfamiliar with the need orprocedures for preparation of aDelegation of Authority or WFSA.

Recommendations:The Service should:■ Provide training to the RefugeProject Leader and designatedrepresentatives for the WFSA, alongwith responsibilities associated witha Delegation of Authority. The FireManagement Leadership course willcover these and many more topics.

The Monument should:■ Include Delegation of Authorityand WFSA statements in the firesuppression portion of the FireManagement Plan (FMP) to becompleted prior to fire season 2001.

Finding: No Delegation of AuthorityThe Type 1 team felt that the WFSA,an important guiding document, wasinadequate.

The Type I team was ordered throughthe Service, and not through the localMAC group that had been formed. Ittook some time to settle thedelegation issue and blend into unifiedcommand, and in particular determinewho was authorized to sign thedelegation. The lack of Delegation ofAuthority did not hinder suppressionefforts, but certainly could have.

The transition from Type 3 to Type 2IMT was not as effective as it couldhave been. The chaotic situation andextreme fire volatility hinderedtransition.

Recommendations:The Monument should:■ Assure that whenever a localMAC group is formed, membersare kept informed of each othersconcerns and the group’s action arenot circumvented.

■ Have the Agency Administratorand his representatives attend theFire Management Leadership courseand invite members of other firedistricts to attend, as well.


The following findings andrecommendations are offered to

assist the Service and its cooperatorsin documenting the fire managementactions and assessing the areasrequiring improvement. The intent isto provide insights that will improvesafety, efficiency, and effectiveness inmanaging wildland fires.

The 24 Command Fire was an intensefire-fighting operation. Throughoutthe suppression effort, goodjudgement, quick responses, andhuman kindness prevailed, despite thehuge challenges posed by the fire. Thefollowing are commendable actions:

Finding: Strong initial response by HFDThe Hanford Fire Department’s(HFD) decision to send multipleengines and a tender on the initialdispatch, and the decision by the HFDCaptain and Battalion Chief to call foradditional resources while en route tothe incident, were excellent decisionsgiven the fire danger conditions.

Finding: Forest Service employeesoffer expert helpTwo U.S. Forest Service ForestSupervisors and one Assistant FireStaff stepped forward and offered

experienced perspectives thathelped to assemble and organize alocal Multi-Agency Coordinatinggroup (MAC).

Finding: Cooperators respond wellCommunity leaders, AgencyAdministrators, and others involvedwith the fire responded to this multi-agency and multi-jurisdictionalincident, often having to make toughdecisions under incrediblecircumstances that included threatsto the public and firefighter safety.

Finding: Excellent effort by thefirefighting organizationThe firefighting organization at alllevels of organization, including local,State, and Federal resources, workedhard under extremely difficultconditions and had many successes.

Finding: Followup debriefings identifyhow to improveMembers of the fire teams and othersinvolved with the fire conducted localarea incident debriefings, IncidentManagement Teams debriefings, andother efforts to discuss the lessonslearned and outline what could bedone differently.

Finding: Outstanding communityassistance and supportFinally, there was an outpouringof support from members of thecommunity, who offered invaluableassistance in many areas. Theydonated food to the fire fighters andthe Emergency Operations Centerstaff. They set up shelters for theevacuees. Community leaders andAgency Administrators also workedhard to cooperate and work togetherat the local, State, and Federal levelsunder very trying circumstances.

Findings and Recommendations:Commendable Actions

A Benton City resident hoses down a family member’s home.

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There was anoutpouring of supportfrom members of thecommunity, whooffered invaluableassistance in manyareas.


Completion of this report is animportant step in the overall

review process, but it is not the endof the process.

First, this report is more than adocument. It is a tool that the Serviceshould use to work collectively withlocal cooperators so all can takeownership in solving areas needingimprovement in actions taken tomanage future wildfires.

Second, the implementation of therecommendations is key to thisreport’s success, and a strategic planis key to their implementation.

Finally, the work of the review teamis best captured by answering thequestion, “What should be donetoday to achieve a desired futurefor managing multi-agency, andmulti-jurisdictional wildfires?” Thefollowing summarizedrecommendations should provide astrategic direction for answering thisquestion and realizing that future.

SafetyInitiate strategies that will continueto stress the importance of firefighterand public safety.

PlanningDevelop a fire management planconducted on an interagency basiswith the involvement of all partners,and open to public comment.

OperationsEmploy strategies to managewildland fires that provide forfirefighter and public safety, minimumcost and resource damage, and areconsistent with values to be protectedand management objectives.

CoordinationEvaluate and revise cooperative fireprotection agreements and operatingplans annually.

The review team’s final meeting onJuly 28 provided an opportunity forinteraction among the cooperatorsinvolved with this incident. Thismeeting was also a beginning, a firststep to establishing and renewingpartnerships in a cooperativeapproach to wildfire protection.

After reviewing the eventssurrounding the 24 Command Fire,it is the hope of the review teamthat the Service and its local, state,and Federal cooperators will committhe time, resources, and expertisenecessary to implement therecommendations found in this report.

Conclusion

A herd of elk finds safety on a dozer’s four-blade widefirebreak on the refuge.

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Implementation ofthe recommendationsis key to this report’ssuccess, and astrategic plan is key totheir implementation.


Documents

Findings and Recommendations: Safety