FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - May00leb

ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310

Features

Departments

6 Focus on OperationsWorking with Informants

15 Unusual WeaponFlashlight Gun

Russian Organized Crime By Scott O’Neal

Establishing a FootPursuit Policy

By Shannon Bohrer, Edward F.Davis,and Thomas J. Garrity

The Citizen Police AcademyBy Giant Abutalebi Aryani,

Terry D. Garrett, and Carl L. Alsabrook

The Qualified Privilege toProtect Sensitive Investigative

Techniques from Disclosure By Jayme S. Walker

1

10

May 2000Volume 69Number 5

United StatesDepartment of Justice

Federal Bureau ofInvestigation

Washington, DC20535-0001

Louis J. FreehDirector

Contributors' opinions andstatements should not be

considered an endorsement bythe FBI for any policy, program,

or service.

The Attorney General hasdetermined that the publicationof this periodical is necessary in

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has been approved by theDirector of the Office of

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EditorJohn E. Ott

Associate EditorsGlen BartolomeiCynthia L. LewisBunny S. Morris

Art DirectorBrian K. Parnell

Assistant Art DirectorDenise Bennett Smith

Staff AssistantLinda W. Szumilo

Internet Address [email protected]

Cover Photo© Spence Stephens

Send article submissions toEditor, FBI Law Enforcement

Bulletin, FBI Academy, MadisonBuilding, Room 209, Quantico,

VA 22135.

Citizen police academies can bringpolice departments and the publictogether.

The complexity of Russian organizedcrime requires a flexible, cooperativeapproach from law enforcement.

16

Law enforcement officers often overlookthe hazards of pursuing fleeing suspectson foot.

26A number of courts have recognizedthat there is a qualified privilege toprotect sensitive investigativetechniques from disclosure.

22 Police Practice Operation Clean Sweep

25 Book Review Police Supervision

May 2000 / 1

he breakup of the former So-viet Union in 1991 led to theprecipitous introduction of

the confines of the former Sovietborders.

Local, state, and federal crimi-nal investigators—whether as-signed to drug squads or property-,white-collar-, organized-, or vio-lent-crime units—increasingly areencountering subjects with roots inthe former Soviet Union. Russianorganized crime presents uniquechallenges for law enforcement inthe United States. Developing in-vestigative strategies to disrupt and

dismantle these criminal enterprisesrequires a familiarity with groupstructures and an understanding ofthe backgrounds of the individualswho form the organizations.

Russian OrganizedCrime Defined

Law enforcement agencies al-most universally refer to crimegroups consisting of members fromthe former Soviet states as Russianorganized crime (ROC).1 Numerous

Tcapitalism and personal freedoms tothe people of Russia and the 14other newly independent states. Un-fortunately, this sweeping changefor a society that had lived underauthoritarian rule for 70 years hashad some significant negative sideeffects. In particular, organizedcrime has proliferated in Russiaand now has expanded far beyond

Russian Organized CrimeA Criminal HydraBy SCOTT O’NEAL, J.D.

© PhotoDisc

2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

ethnic groups—Russians, Geor-gians, Chechens, Ukrainians, Ar-menians, etc.—make up ROC.Crime groups have formed in vari-ous ethnic combinations for a vari-ety of criminal purposes. Somegroups remain ethnically exclusive,such as the Armenian groups in LosAngeles; most, particularly thelarge international enterprises, havemultiethnic compositions.

Yet, beyond its general charac-teristics, ROC resists definition.Unlike the American La CosaNostra (LCN), the Italian Mafia,Chinese Triads, and other ethni-cally-oriented organized-crimegroups, ROC does not fit into or-derly models. Investigators cannoteffectively adopt, in ROC cases, themodel pyramid charts they rou-tinely use to outline the leadershipand rank and file of such groups asLCN families. In traditional orga-nized-crime cases, identifying theleadership and chain of commandof the target group contributes sub-stantially to successful investiga-tions and prosecutions. However,whereas traditional groups havepermanent hierarchical structures

and usually operate within specificgeographical areas, ROC comprisesamorphous gangs that act autono-mously or have loose ties to re-gional, national, or internationalnetworks. Therefore, contrary to themedia-promoted depiction of the“Russian Mafia” as a monolithic in-stitution, ROC groups cannot beclassified as distinct, centralizedentities. Moreover, ROC generallylacks the traditional membershiprules and codes of honor and respectthat add intrigue to Mafia stories.

A distinguishing attribute ofROC relates to the members’common experience of having livedin a police state. In 1990, Russianeconomist Nikolai Shmelev wrote,“Apathy, indifference, pilfering,and a lack of respect for honestwork have become rampant...” inthe Soviet Union.2 The governmentcontrolled and restricted the livesof the people, and for many fami-lies, basic subsistence depended ontheir ability to circumvent themassive bureaucracy. This experi-ence, combined with the fact thatmany former Soviet citizens arewell-educated, produced a unique

population. Although most formerSoviet immigrants had no criminalinclinations, those individuals pre-disposed to criminal activity wereable to “hit the ground running” ascriminal entrepreneurs in theUnited States. More so than themembers of any other ethnicallyoriented organized-crime group,these criminals possess skills andmoral principles that pose an excep-tional threat to society, both in theUnited States and abroad.

ROC in RussiaAlthough little debate exists

among observers—even in Rus-sia—that the problem of organizedcrime in Russia has become largeand broad, the actual size and scopeof ROC there remains uncertain.Reports of the number, size, andactivities of organized-crimegroups vary greatly. Much of theinformation, whether from newsagencies or official sources, is oftenspeculative, anecdotal, conflicting,or a combination thereof. OfficialRussian reports have estimated that3,000 to 5,000 criminal groups existin that country.3 Applying a nar-rower definition of organizedcrime, the FBI estimates that ap-proximately 80 major organizedcriminal groups operate in Russia.4

Notwithstanding the lack of areliable assessment of its constitu-tion, ROC unquestionably causesextensive harm in Russia. Thisdamage results partly from tradi-tional crimes, such as extortion,drug trafficking, gambling, prosti-tution, and fraud schemes. Morethreatening, ROC, in concert withcorrupt government officials andbusinessmen, has been plunderingRussia’s assets and moving billions

“

”

...organized crimehas proliferated inRussia and nowhas expandedfar beyond theconfines of theformer Soviet

borders.

Special Agent O’Neal is an instructor in theInvestigative Training Unit at the FBI Academy.

May 2000 / 3

of dollars out of the country. Thisconcerns law enforcement becausemany financial institutions andbusinesses throughout the worldhave become money-launderingcenters for this stolen capital andother illicit profits.

The influence of ROC in Rus-sia, for political and security rea-sons, significantly impacts the in-ternational community. However,the spread of ROC outside the bor-ders of the former Soviet Union rep-resents the main concern of law en-forcement in many countries,including the United States.

ROC in the United StatesIndividuals who belong to ROC

groups in the United States arrivedamong two recent waves of immi-gration. The first influx began in the1970s near the end of the Cold Waras a gesture of detente on the part ofthe Soviet Union. The second wavebegan in the early 1990s after thefall of the Iron Curtain, the collapseof the Soviet Union, and the open-ing of its borders.

During the 1970s and 1980s,the Soviet government allowedmore than 100,000 refugees to mi-grate to America.5 Similar to otherimmigrant groups, the refugeessettled first in New York City andother major metropolitan cities. Asmall number of criminals emergedfrom this first wave of émigrés.Dubbed “fraudsters” by lawenforcement, these individualsoperated independently or formedloose-knit criminal networks. Theirpredominant crimes included a vari-ety of confidence and other white-collar schemes, which originallytargeted mostly their own immi-grant communities. From this group

emerged leaders who devised andcoordinated complex, sophisticatedwhite-collar fraud schemes.

In the first 6 years of the secondwave (1991–1996), approximately340,000 émigrés from the formerSoviet Union arrived in America.6

In addition, tens of thousands of in-dividuals entering with temporaryvisas remained illegally. Many“professional” criminals came tothe United States in this secondwave.

established organizations—are in-volved in all of the above.

ROC Fraud SchemesSome experts predict that

white-collar crime will serve as thebenchmark for ROC in the UnitedStates.7 Though the larger, well-connected and well-financed for-eign-based ROC groups may repre-sent the greatest potential threat forlaw enforcement, to date, domesticROC groups have caused the mosteconomic damage in the UnitedStates. White-collar fraud hascaused most of that damage. Themore sophisticated ROC fraudschemes include fuel scams, healthcare fraud, bank fraud, and stockmarket manipulation. In these andother schemes, ROC members havedemonstrated an aptitude for cir-cumventing or exploiting the bu-reaucracy, rules, and procedures ofgovernment agencies, financial in-stitutions, insurance companies,and other businesses.

For example, fuel frauds havecaused the loss of hundreds of mil-lions of dollars in tax revenues inseveral states. By creating labyrin-thine chains of “burn corporations”8

and falsifying tax forms, ROCgroups have deprived state and fed-eral governments of substantial taxrevenues. Other fuel frauds includeblending fuel, rigging fuel pumps,and selling low-grade fuel as pre-mium. The large profits derivedfrom these schemes caught the at-tention of four of the five LCNfamilies in New York City; to con-tinue their operations, ROC groupspaid a “mob tax” on every gallon offuel sold in LCN-controlled areas.

Health care fraud represents themost costly crime in America, and

“...these criminalspossess skills and

moral principles thatpose an exceptional

threat to society, bothin the United States

and abroad.

”Career criminals more prone toviolence and less sophisticated thanfraudsters, the professionals oftenband into gangs. These gangs varyin their criminal activity and in thedegree of their affiliation with otherdomestic and foreign-based orga-nized groups. Their criminal actsinclude providing illicit services(prostitution, gambling, extortion-ate credit, etc.) and committing anassortment of violent and propertycrimes. Some of these groupsoperate on their own. Others havemuscled in on the schemes offraudsters. Some coordinate withforeign-based groups to launder il-licit funds from overseas opera-tions. Still others—larger, more


ROC is taking its cut. ROC groupscontinue to innovate and perpetuatecomplex health care fraud schemesthat defraud Medicare, Medicaid,and private insurance companiesthrough false and inflated medicalclaims. ROC schemes, such asstaged auto accidents and “rollingmedical labs” (mobile labs that con-duct unnecessary tests), often in-clude in the conspiracies doctors,pharmacists, medical supply com-panies, and attorneys.

ROC also commits a variety ofbank fraud schemes. In addition tostandard schemes—such as checkkiting, credit card fraud, and bank-ruptcy fraud—ROC has innovatednew methods of bank fraud. For ex-ample, an Armenian ring in Los An-geles devised an automated tellermachine (ATM) card fraud schemethat employed electronic surveil-lance equipment and computers.The subjects, who included bankand service station insiders and acomputer expert formerly em-ployed by a national research labo-ratory, used computer-operated de-coding devices and hidden videocameras to steal the magnetic codesand personal identification numbersof thousands of cards.

In addition, ROC advanced the“pump and dump” stock fraudschemes for which LCN figureshave received much of the attention.Russian fraudsters developedsophisticated schemes in whichthey disseminate false informationto entice investors into buying astock and to artificially inflate thevalue (the pump). Then, thefraudsters sell for a profit the sharesthey had purchased prior to thefraudulent promotion (the dump).LCN figures, sensing money as they

did in the fuel tax scams, in-formed the Russians they wouldbe working as “partners” in theschemes.

ROC AlliancesLCN members may contend

that they made significant contri-butions in the fuel tax and stockschemes by providing protection

committed first appeared to be ran-dom acts. Investigators handledeach crime reactively, case by case.As Russian crime groups organized,law enforcement investigations ac-cordingly required more planningand resources. However, becausethe structures, affiliations, andmethods of operation of ROCgroups vary widely and, to somedegree remain unknown, the result-ant intelligence gaps inhibit the de-velopment of uniform investigativemethods.

To disrupt ROC activity, lawenforcement agencies must coordi-nate with one another, sharinginformation and conducting jointinvestigations. Many successfulROC investigations— such as thoseinvolving fuel tax, ATM, and othercomplex schemes—have includedmultiple agencies. Increased par-ticipation of local, state, federal,and foreign police agencies in thedevelopment of ROC profiles, jointinvestigations, and task forces re-mains fundamental. The 1996 con-viction of Vyacheslav Ivankov, oneof the most powerful Russian crimeleaders to migrate to the UnitedStates, illustrates the effectivenessof international law enforcementcooperation. Along with five of hisassociates, Ivankov was chargedwith conspiracy for his attempt toextort $3.5 million from Wall Streetbrokers. The successful resolutionof the investigation dependedlargely on information contributedby Russian law enforcement and theRoyal Canadian Mounted Police.

In addition, investigators andprosecutors must use money laun-dering and asset forfeiture laws toattack ROC at its economic source.Focusing on the ROC’s lifeblood,

“Some expertspredict that white-collar crime will

serve as thebenchmark for ROCin the United States.

”and settling disputes. More accu-rately, they muscled in on ongoing,profitable schemes. Whatever thearrangement, LCN and ROC con-tinue to cooperate in similarschemes, as well as in other crimes,such as trafficking in drugs and sto-len cars.

ROC groups also have formedalliances with Colombian drug traf-fickers to import cocaine intoRussia, possibly transshippingthrough the United States. The twogroups have traded Colombiandrugs for Russian weapons. Fur-ther, Colombian drug traffickershave acquired Soviet-designedmilitary aircraft for their drug-run-ning operations.

ROC InvestigationsIn the 1970s and 1980s,

the crimes new Soviet émigrés

May 2000 / 5

money laundering, can disruptthe expansion of these criminalenterprises.

Conclusion

The United States is a nation ofimmigrants, many arriving to seektheir fortunes. While most took le-gitimate avenues, others followedless virtuous routes to economicsuccess. Criminal entrepreneursfrom the former Soviet Union, inparticular, quickly established areputation for the sophisticationand range of their illicit operations.

Indeed, Russian organized-crime groups have a level of knowl-edge and experience in working thesystem that sets them in a criminalclass by themselves. As they be-come more acculturated, learningmore about business and govern-

ment systems in this country, thechallenge they present to law en-forcement will grow. Moreover, thelack of a distinct structure and thecontinuous change many groups un-dergo often make it impractical toemploy traditional proactive inves-tigative strategies to disrupt anddismantle these criminal enter-prises. By combining efforts—through communication, coopera-tion, and coordination—local, state,federal, and international law en-forcement agencies can counter thethreat posed by Russian organizedcrime.

Endnotes1 The FBI officially refers to these groups as

Eurasian Criminal Enterprises.2 Quoted in Hedrick Smith, “The Russian

Character,” The New York Times Magazine,October 28, 1990, 31.

3 William H. Webster, Russian OrganizedCrime, Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies, Global Organized Crime Project(Washington, DC, 1997), 24-26.

4 The FBI defines an organized-crimeenterprise as a self-perpetuating, structured, anddisciplined association of individuals or groupscombined together for the purpose of obtainingmonetary or commercial gains or profits whollyor in part by illegal means, while protectingtheir activities through a pattern of violence andcorruption.

5 U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 1981, 102d ed.(Washington, DC, 1981), 87; and U.S. Bureauof the Census, Statistical Abstracts of theUnited States: 1998, 118th ed. (Washington,DC, 1998), 11.

6 Ibid., vol. 1998.7 James O. Finckenauer and Elin J. Waring,

The Russian Mafia in America: Immigration,Culture, and Crime (Boston, NortheasternUniversity Press, 1998), 69.

8 Burn corporations are shell corporationscreated using fictitious names and addresses forthe purpose of disrupting a paper (or electronic)trail that would identify the beneficiary of anillicit financial transaction.

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nformants can provide valuable information, butif not handled appropriately, they can createI can suffer irreparable damage. Agencies that use

informants will always remain susceptible to litiga-tion; however, through continued training and a highdegree of professionalism, police agencies can helpreduce problems for their department.

MAINTAINING THE RELATIONSHIPWhen working with informants, officers must

maintain a strictly professional relationship at alltimes. Officers always must treat informants withdignity and respect, including keeping promises,telling informants the truth, and safeguarding theirconfidentiality.

Keeping PromisesOfficers must keep the promises they make to

informants. Law enforcement has a reputation touphold, even among those informants who are knownor suspected criminals. Police officers who break

problems for agencies that use them. A properlyimplemented program can guide officers whileholding them, and the informants, accountable fortheir actions.1

Once law enforcement agencies have set in placethe necessary rules and regulations to govern theactions of informants, how do they actually operatethem in a meaningful and productive manner? Be-cause using informants poses certain risks, policeadministrators must ensure that certain safeguardsexist and that officers always exhibit professionalconduct when dealing with informants and theirinformation.

No agency can predict the fallout that may resultfrom unprofessional or inattentive conduct by policeofficers when dealing with informant sources. Rep-utations, for both the officer and the department,

Focus on Operations

Working with InformantsOperational RecommendationsBy James E. Hight, M.P.A.

May 2000 / 7

promises will find it difficult to gain the cooperationof future sources. Officers should exercise great carewhen making any promises to an informant, whetherthey concern money, protection, relocation, or otherbenefits. In situations where the informant will testify,officers should consult the prosecutor prior to discuss-ing promises or offers of assistance of any type withthe informant.

Telling the TruthOfficers always should tell the

truth to informants unless itbecomes necessary to protect theintegrity of a case or to safeguardthe confidentiality of othersinvolved. Officers should notunderestimate the informant’sability to detect deception, nomatter how well disguised. If itbecomes necessary to withholdinformation from informants,officers should explain that theysimply do not have a need for theinformation. The informantsalready may know the information and may haveinquired just to test the officer’s truthfulness. Ifinformants cannot trust officers on simple matters,then they may find it difficult to trust an officer’sword on matters directly related to more importantissues (e.g., their safety). Once informants decide thatthey cannot trust an officer, they may stop or slow theamount of significant information they give thatofficer.

Safeguarding ConfidentialityThe confidential relationship of an informant with

the law enforcement agency remains essential to theinformant’s long-term and continued use, especiallywith a very productive informant with unique accessto information. The agency must ensure that it doesnot disclose the relationship. Officers should refrainfrom needlessly commenting around other individualsabout the identity of the informant, the informant’sactivity, or the nature of the information provided bythe informant. Also, because subjects of investiga-tions may have the resources to access an informant’s

telephone records, departments should use a “hellophone,” which may further serve to protect theconfidentiality of the informant.2 Informants who getinjured, either personally or professionally, due to anunauthorized disclosure of their identities or of theinformation they provided, may sue the departmentand create further unnecessary problems.

At the same time, officers should encourageinformants to keep the relationship confidential.

Police officers, of course, cannotforce informants to do so, but ifthe informant’s identity andcooperation become known, itremains essential that the informa-tion did not come from the officeror the agency. Although a disclo-sure may hamper the investigation,in all likelihood, the agency willnot be held responsible for theinevitable problems such a disclo-sure will create.

AVOIDING RELATIONSHIPPROBLEMS

Officers must avoid certain circumstances thatmay jeopardize the officer-informant relationship.These include forming business partnerships, accept-ing gifts or loans, making unprofessional comments,and meeting informants in inappropriate places.

Forming Business RelationshipsOfficers never must use the specialized knowl-

edge or expertise of the informant for personal profit.By entering into a business relationship with infor-mants, police officers place both themselves and theiragencies in an untenable situation. While someinformants may offer such information to gain favorwith the officer, others may do so in an effort tocompromise the officer and gain control of therelationship. Whatever the reason, officers alwaysmust remember that the details of the relationshipwith an informant eventually will become publicknowledge and that the department’s professionalreputation may suffer if officers must defend theiractions either in a criminal prosecution or an internalaffairs investigation.

“

”

When working withinformants, officers

must maintain astrictly professional

relationship atall times.


Accepting Loans or GiftsOfficers never should borrow money from

informants, even for incidental expenses, such aslunch. If the relationship with the informant becomesstrained or otherwise difficult, the informant’s storymay vary from the officer’s on the circumstances ofthe loan. The officer and police agency can sufferneedlessly over such behavior, especially if themoney borrowed comes from a payment from theagency to the informant.

The acceptance of giftsrepresents another area that, if nothandled properly, can createdifficulties for an officer. Thoughit may seem harmless at the time,receiving anything from an infor-mant can create an atmosphere thatsome may perceive as improper.For similar reasons, officers nevershould lend money or give gifts toinformants. Yet, in some cultures,the informants may perceive therefusal to accept gifts as a personalaffront. In these rare situationswhere officers deem it best toaccept gifts, they must carefully document the circum-stances under which they received them, then log theitems in the police property room. In cases involvingjewelry or other items an informant would expect tosee an officer wearing, the officer can retrieve themfrom the property room prior to each meeting with theinformant and, after the meeting, promptly check theitems back into the property room for safekeeping. Byappropriately documenting the situation, officers canadequately answer any questions of propriety thatmay arise from their accepting gifts.

Making Unprofessional CommentsOfficers should avoid language that informants

may perceive as offensive (e.g., being called snitchesor squeals), which can damage an already-delicaterelationship. Careless remarks or jokes made by a lawenforcement officer in the presence of an informantoften can boomerang with severe consequences. Off-color remarks containing sexual, racial, or otherbiases may result in fallout, ranging from public

embarrassment to litigation. Under questioning in acourtroom, unprofessional comments may serve toundermine the officer’s credibility with a jury and theagency’s credibility with the public, as well.

Additionally, officers must never assume thatinformants will not provide information to others.With today’s technology, informants can covertlyrecord their conversations with officers with littleor no difficulty and then use these recordings toinfluence the professional relationship or, ultimately,

the career of the officer. Therefore,police officers always must usecaution in their communicationswith informants.

Meeting in Inappropriate PlacesPolice officers should choose

the best-suited locations formeeting and debriefing informants.For example, hotels help keepanonymity, provide multipleentrances and exits, and generallyare conveniently located. How-ever, officers should avoid meetinginformants of the opposite sex in

hotel rooms without another officer present. Theinformant and the officer should feel comfortablewith any meeting location. Both should dress appro-priately for the debriefing, taking into accountwhether casual or more formal dress attire conformswith a particular meeting place.

VERIFYING INFORMATIONOfficers should make every effort to verify and

substantiate through independent means all informa-tion the informant provides. Failure to do so canresult in negative consequences, not only for the lawenforcement agency but for innocent civilians, aswell. For example, acting on information frominformants, law enforcement agencies have servedsearch warrants at the wrong addresses. Often, thiserror results from a miscommunication betweenofficers and informants or occasionally from infor-mants with alternative, more corrupt motives. What-ever the cause, officers must verify the informationprovided by informants through such means as utility

“

”

Officers mustavoid certain

circumstances thatmay jeopardize theofficer-informant

relationship.

May 2000 / 9

Special Agent Hight serves in the FBI’s Tulsa, Oklahoma,resident agency.

records, commercial databases, public documents,physical surveillance, or even other informantsources.

Even when police use audio recordings to consen-sually monitor criminal activities, they should notsolely rely on the recording without attempting toverify its authenticity. For example, if the voice onthe recording is someone other than the individualspecified by the informant, an agency’s credibilitywould suffer greatly.

CONCLUSIONAside from the many regulations designed to

control the actions of criminal informant sources, anofficer’s conduct can make the difference between thesuccess and failure of a case. Officers must avoidsituations and issues that others may construe asinappropriate. By doing so, they can enhance thecohesiveness of the officer-informant relationshipwhile producing the necessary information essentialto successful investigations.

Although improper officer-informant relation-ships rarely occur, the conduct of police officers willremain subject to greater scrutiny than that of infor-mants. Because allegations can seriously damage thecredibility of a law enforcement agency, officers whooperate informants must remain aware of potentiallydisastrous situations and their consequences. Bymaintaining a strictly professional relationship withinformant sources, the officer and the agency canlimit those situations that could damage both personaland professional reputations, help avoid litigation,and allow law enforcement to continue the use of thisvital investigative resource.

Endnote1 For information on establishing informant guidelines, see James E.

Hight, “Avoiding the Informant Trap: A Blueprint for Control,” FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, November 1998, 1.

2 A hello phone is a telephone line in the police department that iseither unlisted or listed to a fictitious subscriber and that officers cananswer without identifying themselves or their agency.

Wanted:Photographs

he Bulletin staff isalways on the lookoutT

for dynamic, law enforce-ment-related photos forpossible publication sin themagazine. We are interestedin photos that visually depictthe many aspects of the lawenforcement profession andillustrate the various taskslaw enforcement personnelperform.

We can use either black-and-white glossy or colorprints or slides, although weprefer prints (5x7 or 8x10).Appropriate credit will begiven to contributing photog-raphers when their workappears in the magazine. Wesuggest that you send dupli-cate, not original, prints aswe do not accept responsibil-ity for prints that may bedamaged or lost. Send yourphotographs to:

Brian Parnell, ArtDirector, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin,FBI Academy, MadisonBuilding, Room 209,Quantico, VA 22135.

March 8, 1997, Winter Haven,Florida: “The male allegedly fled intonearby woods, and the officer, whowas wearing body armor, pursuedhim on foot. Backup officers arrivingon the scene moments later heardgunshots and immediately began asearch of the area.”1 They found thevictim officer several yards awaywith a fatal gunshot wound to theface.

July 20, 1997, Portland, Oregon:“Recognizing the individual as thesuspect they were looking for, theofficers both gave chase into theovergrown backyard of the resi-dence where they became sepa-rated by a hedge. The victim officerwas shot at close range with a .380-caliber semiautomatic handgun inthe hand, leg, and fatally in thesternum, just above the collar of hisprotective vest.”2

B oth of these officers diedwhile pursuing suspects onfoot. Many more have sus-

only policies and procedures butalso training.4 Why?

DEFINING THE PROBLEMFirst and foremost, pursuing

fleeing suspects constitutes a basicfunction of law enforcement offic-ers. Because officers do this activityevery day, they often become com-placent about the dangers inherentin chasing suspects on foot and de-velop a false sense of security.5 Forexample, officers make arrests,break up fights, and chase and catchsuspects on a daily basis and rarelyget hurt. This can blur their vision tothe threats that actually can occur intheir everyday work.

Moreover, FBI research hasshown that a significant number ofofficers assaulted during foot pur-suits had no plan of action other


tained serious injuries while chas-ing fleeing violators.3 While vehiclepursuits have garnered much mediaattention and caused many law en-forcement agencies to rethink theirpursuit policies, foot chases and theresultant injuries and deaths to of-ficers appear to have received littleconsideration.

In fact, today’s law enforce-ment officers have manuals andpolices and procedures that covervirtually everything—wearing uni-forms, testifying in court, parkingpolice cruisers, qualifying with fire-arms, supervising employees, andeven pursuing suspects in vehicles.However, when it comes to footchases, officers seem to lack not

Establishing a Foot Pursuit PolicyRunning into DangerBy SHANNON BOHRER, M.B.A., EDWARD F. DAVIS, M.S., and THOMAS J. GARRITY, JR.

© S

pence Stephens

May 2000 / 11

than arresting the suspect.6 The re-search also revealed that officersgiving chase often do not recognizethat suspects can turn threatening orthat suspects could lead them intoprearranged traps. None of the of-ficers in the study had received anytraining or guidance from their de-partments about when to chase asuspect on foot or what action totake during the chase or after catch-ing the suspect.

Additionally, few statistics ex-ist on the number of officers killedor injured while pursuing suspectson foot. For example, the FBI’s an-nual Law Enforcement OfficersKilled and Assaulted publicationpresents numerous statistics—suchas type of weapon, time of day, typeof assignment, and circumstances atthe scene of the incident7—relativeto line-of-duty officer deaths andassaults. However, the publicationcontains no statistics on the numberof officers killed or injured in footpursuits. Because the FBI does not

policies and procedures. While of-ficers may instinctively pursue andattempt to overtake fleeing sus-pects, they need to realize that spe-cific guidelines and procedures maynot only improve their success ratebut also save their lives.8

ONE DEPARTMENT’SEXPERIENCE

The Collingswood, New Jer-sey, Police Department developed afoot pursuit policy as a result of anannual safety committee review in1997. While examining the types ofinjuries sustained by its officers, thedepartment discovered that severalhad occurred during foot pursuits.This prompted the department tolook at previous years’ injuries,which revealed similar patterns.About the same time, investigatorslearned that area drug dealers hadbooby-trapped many vacant resi-dences in the city so they could lureofficers into these specific build-ings and not only evade capture but

compile this information, readersmust examine the individual sum-maries of officers killed to deter-mine how many officers died duringfoot pursuits. For example, in thetwo incidents at the beginning ofthis article, one of the officers diedafter responding to a disturbancecall and the other after making atraffic stop, but both also were in-volved in foot pursuits that ulti-mately resulted in their deaths. Lawenforcement agencies and research-ers would benefit from knowing notonly the circumstances or calls forservice during which officers losttheir lives or sustained injuries butalso if these violations led to footchases that subsequently resulted inthese deaths or injuries.

Finally, both officer compla-cency and the lack of accurate sta-tistics on the number of officerskilled or injured in foot chases re-veal the need for law enforcementagencies to consider developingand implementing foot pursuit

Mr. Davis serves as an instructor inthe Behavioral Science Unit at theFBI Academy.

Mr. Bohrer is the range masterand a firearms instructor with theMaryland Police and CorrectionalTraining Commissions inSykesville, Maryland.

Chief Garrity leads theCollingswood, New Jersey,Police Department.


also injure officers. For example,suspects had cut holes in the floorsor placed wires or ropes in variouslocations throughout the buildingsto cause officers to trip and fall ontobroken glass, nails, or other injury-producing items. The departmentbegan to realize that it needed tofind alternatives to “running downthe suspect.”

Developing the PolicyThe Collingswood Police De-

partment wanted to develop a footpursuit policy that would secure abalance between protecting thelives of its officers and the publicand upholding its duty to enforcethe law and apprehend violators. Tothis end, the department based itspolicy on the many factors that of-ficers must consider when they ini-tiate foot pursuits. These includethe nature of the offense or call forservice, the location and surround-ing area involved, the type andavailability of communication, thepresence of physical danger, thephysical condition and abilities ofthe officers involved, and the safety

Commission, and currentlyemployed by a public safetyagency;

• a supervisor is a law enforce-ment officer who, by virtue ofrank or assignment, directs orsupervises the activities ofother officers;

• a violator includes any indi-vidual who a police officerreasonably believes hascommitted an offense or posesan immediate threat to thesafety of the public or otherofficers;

• the team concept describesthe practice of having two ormore officers work togetherduring a foot pursuit. Theofficers work in unison viadirect or indirect communica-tion to coordinate their efforts,remain aware of the locationof officers and suspects, andkeep abreast of the status ofthe pursuit.

Establishing the ProceduresThe Collingswood Police De-

partment clearly understood that apolice officer has the authority, atall times, to attempt to stop any in-dividual suspected of committingany criminal offense, violation, ortraffic infraction. However, the de-partment also realized that while theofficer initiates the stop, the viola-tor provokes the pursuit by fleeing.Therefore, the department wantedits officers to base their decisionson whether to pursue a fleeing sus-pect on the degree of risk to them-selves or others.

To aid officers in making suchdecisions, the department devel-oped five criteria that restrict the

of the officers and the general pub-lic. Because unique situations arisein law enforcement, the policycould not address all possible cir-cumstances. Therefore, the depart-ment intended that the policy wouldguide its officers’ decisions aboutinitiating, continuing, or endingfoot pursuits.

Defining the TermsAfter developing the primary

purpose of the foot pursuit policy,the department set out to define theconcepts and individuals involvedin foot chases. The department de-termined that—

• a foot pursuit means thephysical attempt by anofficer(s), without the aid of avehicle or other motorizeddevice, to detain, arrest, orotherwise take physicalcustody of an individual whoattempts to flee on foot;

• a law enforcement officerdefines any individual swornto uphold the law, certifiedby the Police Training

Officer Injured During a Foot Pursuit

While on vehicle patrol, the victim officer and his partnersaw two individuals in an automobile. After determining thatthe pair matched the description of two suspects wanted forpossessing a handgun, the officers stopped the vehicle. Thepassenger immediately fled on foot, and the victim officerchased him for several blocks. After the victim officer lostsight of the suspect, he began searching an area in front of abuilding. The suspect, hiding in nearby bushes, opened firewith a small-caliber handgun and wounded the officer in thehead and legs, causing extensive injury. The assailant escapedfrom the scene but surrendered to authorities 2 days later. Thevictim officer survived the attack but could not resume hisduties and retired from the department.9

May 2000 / 13

use of foot pursuits. While the de-partment did not want to stop itsofficers from capturing fleeing sus-pects, it did want them to considerthe possible consequences of suchactions. Therefore, the departmentdetermined that its officers shouldnot conduct foot pursuits—

1) into vacant or occupiedbuildings, structures, confinedspaces, or wooded/isolatedlocations without using theteam concept or withoutsupervisory authorization,except in the event of extremeurgency, such as the immedi-ate threat to the safety ofthe general public or otherofficers;

2) if they believe that thedanger to pursuing officers orthe public outweighs thenecessity for immediateapprehension;

3) if they get disarmed or losepossession of their serviceweapons;

4) if they lose contact withtheir fellow officers or thedepartment’s communicationcenter; or

5) if they lose visual contactwith the violator and becomeunsure of the suspect’s where-abouts or continued directionof travel.Along with these restrictions,

the department established proce-dures for reinstating pursuits andconducting interjurisdictional pur-suits. Accordingly, officers shouldreinstate any previously terminatedfoot pursuit consistent with the au-thorization criteria for initiating anew pursuit. In interjurisdictional

remedial training of individual offi-cers or specific areas of emphasisin agencywide training on footpursuits.

Conducting TrainingTwice a year, all of the

department’s officers attend foot-pursuit training in conjunction withuse-of-force training and the fire-arms requalification process. Thesein-services cover applicable legalstatutes, department policies andprocedures, and decision-makingskills, while providing an opportu-nity for officers to ask questions,air their concerns, and offer sugges-tions for improving the policy andprocedures.

ResultsAlthough the Collingswood Po-

lice Department has had its footpursuit policy in effect for only 2years, it has seen several notablechanges in how its officers handlefoot pursuits and fewer injuries toits officers. For example, since thepolicy’s inception, officers contact

pursuits, the original pursuing juris-diction should provide timely noti-fication of a foot pursuit in progressto any other jurisdiction that thepursuit enters.

Finally, the department set outprocedures for primary officers, su-pervisors, and communication per-sonnel. Primary officers should ad-vise communication personnel assoon as possible about the situation.If other officers are on the scene orarrive shortly afterward, primaryofficers should communicate withthem to set up a perimeter in thearea to contain the violator. If su-pervisors receive prompt notifica-tion of foot pursuits from communi-cation personnel or officers at thescene, they should decide as quicklyas possible whether to continue orterminate the pursuit.

Reviewing the IncidentsThe department reviews foot

pursuits for compliance with appli-cable policy and operating pro-cedures. It also examines theseincidents to identify the need for

Officer Killed During a Foot Pursuit

After responding to a domestic abuse call, the victimofficer saw a man fitting the suspect's description run into afield. The officer exited his patrol vehicle and chased the manthrough some tall weeds. During the pursuit, the suspectturned and fired a .380-caliber semiautomatic handgun,striking the officer in the wrist, twice in his protective vest,and once just above the vest. The victim officer returnedgunfire, striking the suspect twice in the torso. The pursuitcontinued until the suspect fatally wounded himself in thechest. The officer died later at a local hospital.10


the communication center more of-ten before engaging suspects in footpursuits. They also maintain com-munication with the center and re-quest backup assistance more fre-quently. Further, officers generallyuse the team concept of setting up aperimeter around the pursuit arearather than just chasing after fleeingsuspects.

Moreover, the department sus-pected that many of its veteran of-ficers might resist the policy be-cause they had chased and caughtsuspects for years and received fewserious injuries. However, becausethe department solicited feedbackfrom its officers and included theirinput in policy revisions, even vet-eran officers have begun to embracethe concept of following an estab-lished procedure when chasing flee-ing suspects. Overall, the depart-ment has accomplished its main

Collecting statistics that accu-rately reveal the number of officerskilled and injured during foot pur-suits would raise officer awarenessand encourage agencies to traintheir officers in effective and safemethods of chasing fleeing sus-pects. Law enforcement profession-als should work together to com-pile, analyze, and publish suchinformation on a national level anddetermine policies and proceduresthat would help officers enforce thelaw without unduly endangeringthemselves.

To this end, the Collingswood,New Jersey, Police Department de-veloped and implemented a footpursuit policy. While not an attemptto eliminate foot pursuits, the policysets forth basic elements that offic-ers should consider when facedwith fleeing suspects. The policyhas brought the hazards of foot

Tips for Surviving Foot Pursuits

• always radio their dispatchers to advise oftheir location, the reason for pursuing thesuspect, and the direction of the chase;

• always ensure that suspects who flee fromvehicles do not have accomplices in the carwho may attack from behind;

• always take their vehicle keys with them toavoid having suspects return to the sceneand flee in police units;

• always wait for backup if they believe thatthe suspect is armed;

To minimize the risk of injury or death, officers should heed some time-proven techniques thatveteran officers have used to safely capture fleeing suspects. During foot pursuits, officers should—

• always try to follow the same general pathas the suspects so that the suspects discoverany hidden obstacles—such as clotheslines,wires, cables, holes, and sprinkler heads—first; and

• always remain cautious, in control, and alertfor additional threats and other changes inthe situation.

Source: Gerald W. Garner, Surviving the Street:Officer Safety and Survival Techniques (Spring-field, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1998), 57-61.

objective of encouraging its officersto consider the risks and benefits offoot pursuits when circumstancesindicate a high probability of injury.

CONCLUSIONLaw enforcement officers risk

their lives every day in the perfor-mance of their duties. The dailystruggle to safeguard their fellowcitizens exacts a heavy toll in of-ficer deaths and injuries every year.Chasing fleeing suspects on footrepresents an instinctive but inher-ently dangerous activity for law en-forcement officers. Whether be-cause veteran officers becomecomplacent after many years of in-jury-free pursuits or because no na-tional repository exits to compilestatistics on these incidents, the lawenforcement community has not fo-cused on this important officersafety issue.

May 2000 / 15

Unusual Weapon

Flashlight GunAn officer with the Indianapolis, Indiana,

Police Department advised that this concealedgun is currently manufactured in the UnitedStates. The weapon, a single shot .380, resemblesa mini-mag flashlight. The gun is unscrewed nearthe center where the round is inserted. The endcap serves as the safety. Once the end cap isunscrewed, the gun can be fired by pulling thetrigger, which is a small peg at the base of theweapon.

The weapon retails for approximately $300.A lens can be added to cover the muzzle of thegun to further give the illusion that the gun is aflashlight.

Submitted by the Indianapolis, Indiana, PoliceDepartment.

pursuits to the surface and shownofficers that they must temper theirinstinctive reaction of chasing flee-ing suspects and consider the poten-tially life-threatening consequencesof rashly running into danger.

Endnotes1 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of

Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killedand Assaulted, 1997 (Washington, DC, 1998)46.

2 Ibid, 57-58.3 For a detailed examination of assaults on

law enforcement officers, see Anthony J.Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, and Charles E.Miller III, U.S. Department of Justice, FederalBureau of Investigation, In the Line of Fire:A Study of Selected Felonious Assaults on LawEnforcement Officers (Washington, DC, 1997).

4 For 2 years, Mr. Bohrer taught a course onthe use of deadly force for FBI NationalAcademy students. During this time, he askedover 250 officers from around the country iftheir departments had a policy on foot pursuits.While most of these officers agreed that such apolicy could reduce injuries and possibly deathsto police personnel, to date, only Chief Garrityhas said that his agency has a policy on footchases.

5 For a general discussion of overcomingofficer complacency, see Samuel G. Chapman,Cops, Killers and Staying Alive (Springfield,IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1986), 58-60.

6 Supra note 3.7 These circumstances include responding to

disturbance calls, making arrests, quelling civildisorders, handling prisoners, investigatingsuspicious persons or circumstances, confront-ing ambushes, dealing with individuals withmental illness, and pursuing or stopping trafficviolators.

8 For additional information on foot pursuittactics, see Gerald W. Garner, Surviving theStreet: Officer Safety and Survival Techniques(Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1998), 57-61; Donovan Jacobs, Street Cop: InnovativeTactics for Taking Back the Streets (Boulder,CO: Paladin Press, 1993) 47-58; Jason Harney,“Control 3 Mary 1, Foot Pursuit!!! Survivingand Having Success in a Foot Pursuit ComesDown to Defensive Tactics and PhysicalFitness”; available from http://geocities.com/~halbrown/foot_pursuit.html; accessedSeptember 29, 1999; Foot Pursuit produced bythe Los Angeles, California, Sheriff’sDepartment, 16 min., Coronet/MTI, videocas-sette; and The Calibre Press Street SurvivalNewsline located on the Calibre Press Web siteat http://www.calibrepress.com.

9 Supra note 3, 59.10 Supra note 1, 43-44.

hrough Citizen PoliceAcademies (CPA), policeofficers can maintain this

communiity-oriented policing strat-egies. Further, the President hascommitted approximately $1.3 bil-lion for a new 21st Century PolicingInitiative that includes funding forcommunity-based partnerships,such as CPAs. Law enforcementagencies can obtain information re-garding CPAs from a variety ofsources.2 However, establishing asuccessful CPA remains a substan-tial task.

HISTORY OF THE CPAThe concept of a CPA evolved

from efforts of the Devon and

“Police, at all times, shouldmaintain a relationship with thepublic that gives reality to thehistoric tradition that the policeare the public and the public arethe police; the police being theonly members of the public whoare paid to give full-time attentionto duties which are incumbenton every citizen in the interestsof community welfare andexistence.”1

—Sir Robert Peel, 1829

Trelationship with the public by in-volving citizens in crime preventionefforts. CPAs provide the publicwith a working knowledge of theirlaw enforcement agency’s mission,operation, policies, and personnel.They also create mutual trust andcooperation between the police andresidents. An increasing number oflaw enforcement agencies have re-alized the enormous benefits ofCPAs to their communities andhave incorporated them into their


The Citizen Police AcademySuccess Through Community PartnershipsBy GIANT ABUTALEBI ARYANI,TERRY D. GARRETT, andCARL L. ALSABROOK

© K. L. Morrison

May 2000 / 17

Cornwall Constabulary in GreatBritain to acquaint citizens with lo-cal law enforcement and its organi-zational structure. “Police NightSchool,” which began in 1977, metonce a week for 10 weeks. Theclasses quickly revealed that mostcitizens knew little about the opera-tions and organizational structuresof law enforcement agencies.3

In 1985, the Orlando, Florida,Police Department became the firstlaw enforcement agency in theUnited States to organize a CPA.4

Classes met one night each week for10 weeks. Participants discussed lo-cal police organizational structure,and citizens received a hands-onlook at law enforcement opera-tions.5 Due to the overwhelmingsuccess of the program, the CPAconcept spread throughout thenation.

The Missouri City, Texas, Po-lice Department brought the CPAconcept to Texas in 1986, eventu-ally extending it to an 11-weekcourse format.6 The Rockwall,Texas, Police Department adopted

the concept in 1987. Initially de-signed as a 5-week course, due to itssuccess, this program expanded to12 weeks. The success of the initialCPA classes in Rockwall resulted inthe CPA Alumni Association andthe Citizens On Patrol programs,which provide continued training inemergency services.

PROGRAMIMPLEMENTATION

CPAs represent a shortenedversion of law enforcement acad-emies. Like the police academy,success of the CPA depends on theadministrative support, the strengthof the curriculum and staff mem-bers, and the selection of students.

Administrative SupportMembers of a law enforcement

agency seeking to initiate a success-ful CPA program must obtain thesupport of their administration.7

Law enforcement administratorsshould actively participate in theiragency’s program.8 The agencymember proposing the implementa-

tion of a CPA should present theprogram’s concept to the chief andthe command staff. Ideally, thatmember also should provide admin-istrators with information aboutprograms from other agencies.When a department implements aCPA, the chief and the administra-tive staff should stay involved in theprogram, and agencies should keepthem informed of CPA activitiesand progress.

Further, CPAs need supportfrom the community.9 Through con-tacts with citizens, police officerscan provide residents’ feedbackabout the CPA to the agency’sadministration.

Strength of the CurriculumCPA programs should cover di-

verse police topics, and agenciesshould provide a basic overview ofeach subject. Course topics shouldpresent information appropriate tothe particular community. Forexample, curriculums can includesuch topics as professional stan-dards, legal issues, and information

Sergeant Garrett serves ascommander of the CommunityServices Division for the Rockwall,Texas, Police Department.

Mr. Aryani is a Vibhooti ShuklaFellow at the University of Texas’School of Social Sciences inDallas.

Officer Alsabrook serves asthe ombudsman for theRockwall, Texas, PoliceDepartment.


regarding patrol procedures andradar operations. In conjunctionwith lectures, instructors should usedemonstrations, facility tours, andhands-on activities (e.g., role-plays,ride-alongs) when possible—aswell as additional aids, such asvideos, slides, audio cassettes,overheads, and posters.10

Instructors should develop les-son plans based on the overall CPAcurriculum and share experienceswith citizen-students. Additionally,instructors should allow time for aninteractive learning environmentbased on citizen-student questions.They should emphasize the patroldivision—considered the backboneof most law enforcement agen-cies—because officers in this divi-sion have the most contact withcommunity residents. Additionally,this emphasis helps to ensure con-tinued citizen interest.

Strength of the StaffProper selection of a CPA pro-

gram coordinator and instructorshelps ensure agency acceptance andcommunity support. After decidingto implement a CPA, the agencyadministrator should appoint a co-ordinator who maintains direct con-tact with residents and representsthe department.

Generally, a senior police of-ficer serves as the coordinator. Thisofficer has established a good rap-port with the public and fellow of-ficers and has experience in mediarelations.11 Coordinators must havethe authority to effectively operatethe program, recruit or assign in-structors, and make decisions asto curriculum and scheduling. An-other responsibility includes select-ing a suitable location for the

class—such as a school, civiccenter, department training facility,or academy. The size of thelocation—neither too big or toosmall—and its convenience to thecommunity and officers shouldaccommodate students, staff, andactivities.

students will represent the policedepartment and form the nucleus ofthe CPA alumni program. There-fore, to minimize potential risks andliabilities, agencies should care-fully select the first class. Membersof this class should include commu-nity and religious leaders, mediarepresentatives, and citizens in-volved in crime prevention pro-grams. Such members maximizepublicity, resulting in future CPArecruitment. The class should in-clude men and women from variousethnic backgrounds, age groups,and professions in order to reflect across section of the community.12 Ingeneral, applicants should be atleast 21, live or work in the commu-nity, and pass a background check.CPAs should exclude applicantswith a prior criminal record. Prior toconducting a background check, de-partments should obtain signedwaivers from the citizens for theircriminal history. Additionally,when organizing a CPA, agenciesshould consider the citizens’ needswith regard to time and day ofclasses to accommodate studentswith family, career, and communityobligations. A positive educationalexperience for the citizen-studentswill allow the agency to reap thelong-term benefits of the program.Educated citizens can serve as asource for new ideas to better edu-cate the public, resulting in a safercommunity.13

BENEFITSCitizen police academies ben-

efit agencies and participants. Inthe short term, they provide abetter understanding of the missionand operation of the law enforce-ment agency through informed

“...departments canlimit CPA programcosts to fit within

their budgets.

”Law enforcement agenciesshould recruit CPA instructors froma variety of backgrounds, depend-ing on the subject. For example,agencies should use employeesfrom within their department, a co-operating agency, or from a special-ized task force for law enforcementmatters. District attorney represen-tatives, city attorneys, and proba-tion and correction officers canpresent legal issues. Speciallytrained citizen volunteers, CPAalumni, individuals from emer-gency services, and employeesfrom federal and state agencies canserve as an additional resource poolfor instruction. Instructors shouldbe motivated, willing to share re-lated experiences, and maintain aprofessional appearance. CPAs in-troduce citizens to the law enforce-ment agency; therefore, the major-ity of the instructors should workfor the particular agency.

Selection of Citizen-StudentsThe inaugural CPA class sets

the tone for future classes. Citizen-

May 2000 / 19

CPA graduates. This understandingreduces suspicions and misconcep-tions about the agency, creating co-operation and mutual trust betweencitizens and police officers. Sub-sequently, the number of citizencomplaints against officers de-creases almost immediately. Fur-ther, agencies can reap benefits byencouraging graduates to join CPAalumni associations, which keepgraduates in touch with the depart-ment and give them opportunitiesfor continued education in emer-gency services.14 These benefitsmaterialize because trained alumni

can pool resources to formvolunteer organizations (e.g., crimewatch groups), which reduce de-mands on the agency15 and can in-crease the number of reported of-fenses. Overall, graduates can serveas the nucleus for establishing en-hanced community ties, leading to asafer environment.

In the long run, citizen coopera-tion with police officers can bene-fit the agency in lawsuits, jurytrials, witness canvasses, publicperception, and in city councilmeetings, as well in upcoming bondissues furthering the agency’s goals

and needs. Additionally, an actualreduction in offense rates in thelong term provide measurablebenefits of such communitycooperation.

COSTSWith appropriate implementa-

tion, departments can limit CPAprogram costs to fit within theirbudgets. Departments should covermaterial costs, such as binders,handouts, and T-shirts, if not fullyrecovered through tuition and appli-cation fees, which some CPAs maycharge. Materials costs remain

I. Administration and ProfessionalStandards• Introduction and welcome from the

chief• Administrative information and

department overview• Officer selection• Ethics• Internal affairs• History of policing

II. Operations• Field training• Patrol procedures• Communications• Ride-alongs• Traffic law and radar operation• Accident investigations• Officer safety/use of force• Driving while intoxicated enforcement• K-9 operations• Firearms• Tactical demonstrations

III. Investigations• Child abuse/family violence• Narcotics• Criminal investigations

Typical Agenda of a 12- to 13-Week CPA

IV. Legal Issues• Criminal justice system• Juvenile law• Probation/parole• Corrections

V. Crime Prevention• Drug Awareness Resistance

Education/Gang ResistanceEducation and Training Program

• Neighborhood Crime Watch• Citizens on Patrol• Auto theft prevention• Target hardening/insurance

reduction surveys VI. Special Topics

• Federal and state criminal justicesystem and agencies

• Economics of crime• Criminology• Citizen police academy alumni

association information• Forensic hypnosis• Emergency medical services• Special weapons and tactics


minimal compared to labor costs.Labor costs represent hours neces-sary to organize and teach classes,as well as to perform backgroundchecks on applicants. Ideally, offi-cers should volunteer their time forcourse instruction, or a departmentmust decide whether to offer com-pensatory time or overtime. To alle-viate advertising costs from localnewspapers, departments shoulduse city newsletters or press re-leases through their public informa-tion office. One of the most effec-tive and least expensive advertisingtools remains word of mouth.

Further, agencies might incurpotential liability costs from acci-dents during ride-alongs, equip-ment demonstrations, and firingrange segments of the class, despiteliability waivers signed by appli-cants. Providing participants withextensive classroom instructionprior to allowing them to performpractical exercises can minimizesuch potential accidents before theyhappen.

EVALUATIONLaw enforcement agencies

should evaluate their CPA pro-grams. This review helps to deter-mine whether the CPA successfullybenefits the community and the de-partment, or if the program needsimprovement.

City of Rockwall CPAThe Rockwall Police Depart-

ment continuously evaluates itsCPA program through feedbackfrom its police officers and citizen-graduates. Initially, officers hadnegative comments toward theimplementation of the CPA; how-ever, these doubts quickly faded

when the officers experienced thepositive citizen-police interactionin the teaching environment. At thebeginning of the program, agencyadministrators “volunteered” mostof the instructors to teach CPAclasses. For subsequent CPAclasses, officers enthusiasticallyvolunteered to teach. In fact, thepositive teaching experience andthe sharing of common concerns be-tween officers and citizens hashelped the department to curtail the“us-versus-them” mentality oftenfound embedded in the policeculture.

The continued interest in emer-gency services in Rockwall resultedin the formation of the Citizen Po-lice Academy Alumni Association,Crime Watch groups, and the Citi-zens On Patrol. These programsprovide valuable resources to thedepartment. Departments can usethese trained volunteers to assistduring holiday season patrols andparade and special events trafficcontrols, as well as to operate secu-rity for athletic events. CPA volun-teers have sharpened observationskills from their academy trainingand use cellular telephones to reportsuspicious activities to law enforce-ment officers. The patrol and obser-vation efforts from these volunteershave resulted in a number of arrests,from outstanding warrants to nar-cotics and intoxication offenses.For example, CPA graduates pro-vided patrol support in neighboringdistricts during a recent search foran alleged sex abuser.

The successful fund-raisingdrive to create a canine unit and thecommunity support for a successfulpay referendum and bond issue forbetter equipment and more person-nel during budget hearings of thecity council reflect the greaterawareness for the concerns of lawenforcement in Rockwall. Overall,Rockwall’s CPA and its resultingprograms have been a great success.The strict emphasis on educationhas helped Rockwall avoid negativecircumstances, such as accidents orinjuries. The benefits gained by thedepartment and the community faroutweigh the costs.

State of Texas SurveyIn 1995, the Dumass, Texas,

Police Department conducted a

“CPAs provide thepublic with a working

knowledge of theirlaw enforcement

agency’s mission,operation, policies,

and personnel.

”The Rockwall Police Depart-ment asks citizen graduates to com-plete a course evaluation form at theend of the CPA program. Theseevaluations reveal that the partici-pants’ overall impression of thecourse remains extremely positive.Citizens relay that they have a muchgreater appreciation for police of-ficers and that the CPA eliminatedmany misconceptions. The CPAstimulated citizen interest in emer-gency services and provided a bet-ter awareness for the concerns ofpolice officers and the department.

May 2000 / 21

survey of 106 selected law enforce-ment agencies in Texas to studytheir experiences with CPAs.16 Ofthe agencies surveyed, 63 percentreturned the mailed questionnaire.Fifty-eight percent of the respond-ing agencies conduct a CPA in theircommunity.

This study identified that, onaverage, CPAs last 11 weeks, in-clude 3 hours of training per week,and contain an average of 24 stu-dents. Most agencies hold academysessions twice a year. Depending onthe program, total costs range from$0 to $2,000. Agencies budget forthe programs under departmenttraining, special account, crime pre-vention, or administration, or obtainfunds from such sources as alumni,citizen and business donations, orseized drug funds. Expenses rangefrom a low of $10 per student forsmaller agencies to a high of $150per student for larger police depart-ments. Most agency costs fall be-tween $25 and $30 per person.Overtime for officers serving as in-structors represents the highest ex-penditure. Some agencies use com-binations of compensatory andvolunteer time to meet expenses.In general, the survey found thatofficers from smaller agenciescan more easily volunteer theirtime as instructors for communityprograms.

All agencies reported improvedrelations with citizens, leading tothe realization that the benefits out-weigh the costs. According to thesurvey, each agency felt that theCPA strengthened relations withthe citizens and the community.Student evaluations at the begin-ning and end of the academyprovided results for the overall

experience of these agencies. Addi-tional results came from indirectpublic opinion feedback; an in-crease in the number of volun-teers for the agencies; the forma-tion of alumni associations; andan increased participation of citi-zens, alumni, and volunteers at bud-get hearings. CPAs help police of-ficers communicate with theircommunities and residents. CPAsrepresent a partnership between of-ficers and citizens and the agencyand community.

on education and training ensuresthat the long-term benefits ofcitizen police academies willmaterialize for both the communityand the law enforcement agency.These academies bring law enforce-ment agencies and communitiestogether.

Endnotes1 See “New Westminster Police Service—

Sir Robert Peel’s Nine Principles of Policing”;available from http://www.newwestpolice.org/peel.html; accessed November 3, 1999.

2 Such sources include state and local crimeprevention association journals and sympo-siums as well as law enforcement agency homepages on the Internet. Additionally, agenciescan contact directly other law enforcementagencies that conduct CPAs.

3 Ronald E. Ferguson, “The Citizen PoliceAcademy,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,September 1985, 6.

4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Martin Alan Greenberg, “Citizen Police

Academies,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,August 1991, 11.

7 Buck Tatum, How to Start a CPA (City ofGainesville, Texas, Police Department, fall1993); and Steve Wallach, “NTCPA andDuncanville Police Department Host FirstAnnual Texas CPA Symposium,” CrimePrevention (Texas Crime Prevention Associa-tion Magazine) 5, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 65-67.

8 Terry D. Garrett, Theory and Applicationof the Citizen Police Academy Concept inTexas Law Enforcement (City of Rockwall,Texas, Police Department, fall 1990).

9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Supra note 7, Wallach, 66.12 Supra note 7, Tatum, 10.13 Supra note 6.14 Kankakee, Illinois, Police Department,

The Citizen Police Academy—ProgressThrough Community Involvement; availablefrom http:/www.keynet.net/~patrol; accessedFebruary 1999.

15 Robert J. Lidell, “Volunteers HelpShoulder the Load,” FBI Law EnforcementBulletin, August 1995, 25.

16 The discussion of the survey results isbased fully on Russell Don Fuggett, Texas CPASurvey Results (City of Dumas, Texas, PoliceDepartment, October 11, 1995).

CONCLUSIONCitizen police academies repre-

sent a vital part of community-ori-ented policing. CPAs keep the pub-lic involved by making them part ofthe police family. The nontradi-tional setting of a teaching environ-ment curtails the us-versus-them at-titude. CPAs provide a productiveoutlet for the mutual sharing of in-formation and concerns in order tofurther common goals of communi-ties and law enforcement agencies.

Thoroughly implementing thekey pillars of a CPA will help avoidpotential pitfalls. A strict emphasis


ialto, California, a city of 90,000 residentslocated in San Bernardino County, sits

programs, such as Drug Awareness and ResistanceEducation and Gang Resistance Education andTraining. Recognizing that one strategy alone cannoteradicate street-level drug trafficking, the RialtoPolice Department consistently has employed allthree. While this unified response had worked in thepast, in April 1999, the department noted a significantrise in gang activity and street-level drug trafficking.The department needed a new drug suppressionstrategy. Operation Clean Sweep filled that need.

Using the SARA model (scanning, analysis,response, assessment) advocated by problem-orientedpolicing,1 the department’s Street Crime Attack Team(SCAT)2 determined that Operation Clean Sweepshould aim at achieving a major reduction in street-level dealing by developing such strong prosecutioncases that, once arrested, as many dealers as possiblewould receive certain incarceration. To achieve thesegoals, the team would need to ensure the followingessential elements: a target list of dealers; creative useof technology to gather evidence; close liaison withthe district attorney’s office; cooperation with other

OperationClean Sweep

Curbing Street-LevelDrug Trafficking

By Michael A. Meyers, M.P.A.

Rapproximately 60 miles east of Los Angeles. Aworking-class city from which many residents com-mute to nearby Los Angeles and Orange Counties, ithas experienced phenomenal population growth. Overthe last 30 years, the population has nearly tripled.Many of the new residents came in search of afford-able housing and a better quality of life, which theyfound in Rialto, a diverse community with significantAfrican American, Hispanic, Caucasian, and NativeAmerican populations. Still, Rialto faces the sameproblems as other cities. Illegal drugs, gangs, andviolent crime threaten to undermine public safety anderode the quality of life of the city’s residents.

Traditional methods for combating street-leveldrug trafficking focus on three basic strategies: high-profile, proactive patrols, which emphasize aggres-sively stopping and detaining pedestrians and motor-ists; buy-bust operations, in which officers promptlyarrest suspects who sell narcotics to undercoverofficers; and demand reduction and prevention

Police Practice© Don Ennis

May 2000 / 23

law enforcement agencies; strategic use of the media;and an assessment of the results.

Developing a Target ListFirst, SCAT had to identify the

drug hot spots and dealers. Mem-bers of the team compiled andanalyzed information on drug-related calls for service from thedepartment’s computer-assisteddispatch database and from citizencalls to a drug hot line. Meetingwith patrol officers, detectives, andNeighborhood Watch groupsprovided valuable, up-to-the-minuteinsight into activity on the street.The community’s involvement viathese methods proved criticallyimportant. Neighborhood residents often know evenmore information than the best beat officers do; theycan provide important intelligence.

Using New TechnologyTo enhance the operation, the team relied on an

invaluable piece of new technology, a small videocamera capable of filming the participants in a drugtransaction and recording their voices at the sametime.3 After installing the camera in an unmarkedpolice car, the team designed a sting operation tomaximize the results obtained from the new camera.When the drug dealers approached the uncovervehicle (a late-model car not known on the street) tosell their wares, a team member activated the hiddencamera, which filmed the entire illicit transaction.After each sale, the undercover vehicle departed, anda uniformed officer in a marked police car made a“routine” stop or detention to establish the dealer’sidentity. During the detention, the officer took aninstant photograph of the suspect, later showing thephoto to the undercover officer to confirm thesuspect’s identity. The uniformed officer released thedealers after establishing their identities; typically,they sauntered back to their neighborhoods thinkingthey had again beat the system. Meanwhile, theundercover officer was submitting the drugs to thecrime lab for evidentiary analysis and completing theappropriate crime reports.

Establishing Liaison with the District AttorneyThe district attorney’s (DA’s) office is the

gatekeeper of criminal prosecutions. Thus, anysuccessful prosecution necessar-ily requires satisfying the DA’srequirements. Beyond that,experience shows that membersof the DA’s office, law enforce-ment officers, and members ofthe community need to worktogether. To achieve the success-ful prosecutions Operation CleanSweep required, the departmentteamed with a deputy DA (DDA)from the outset, to familiarizehim with the details of theoperation and so that he could

offer advice to enhance the prosecution of the sus-pects. The same DDA would handle all of theoperation’s cases.

After undercover officers had completed buysfrom all identified dealers, processed the evidence,and completed all reports, the cases went to the DA’soffice for prosecution. The DDA decided to employthe complaint warrant process, obtaining an arrestwarrant for each and every suspect.4

Cooperating with Other AgenciesLong before the DA’s office issued the arrest

warrants, the department knew that arresting theoffenders who participated in 89 separate hand-to-hand narcotic buys would require a multiagencyeffort. The arrest plans included 15 other agencies,and for 3 days during September 1999, teams of lawenforcement personnel from police departmentsthroughout the region, as well as the San BernardinoCounty Sheriff’s Department, the California Depart-ment of Justice, the Probation and Parole Depart-ments, and the California Highway Patrol, helpedserve the arrest warrants.

The tactical team assessed the level of risk at eachof the planned arrest or search warrant locations,determining whether the SWAT team would beneeded. Each arrest team held the appropriate war-rants and information files. In addition to serving thewarrants, the teams took advantage of the extrapersonnel and conducted simultaneous compliance

“

”

The media can playan important role in

a department’scrime prevention

efforts.

checks on 400 probationers in Rialto and surroundingcommunities.

Using the MediaThe media can play an important role in a

department’s crime prevention efforts. The RialtoPolice Department worked with the media in severaldifferent ways during Operation Clean Sweep. First,the department invited the media to accompanyofficers during the arrests (mem-bers of the press did not enter thesuspects’ residences). Next, thedepartment held a press conferenceto announce the arrests. The mediareceived video clips of several ofthe arrests, as well as some of thedrug buys, so they could air them(taking appropriate precautions toconceal the identities of the sus-pects and the undercover officers)on the news. Watching individualsget arrested on the nightly newsmight deter others from committingsimilar crimes. Finally, the department asked commu-nity residents to talk to the media during the pressconference. During the interviews, the residents couldspeak firsthand about how Operation Clean Sweephad given them the freedom to enjoy their homes, lettheir children play outside, and walk to the storewithout being accosted by drug dealers.

Assessing the ResultsOperation Clean Sweep resulted in the arrest and

prosecution of more than 100 felons. Officers took 70drug dealers into custody; another 22 fled town orwent underground. The department recovered signifi-cant amounts of drugs, weapons, cash, and stolenproperty and also discovered a clandestine metham-phetamine laboratory. Based on the evidence obtainedduring the roundup, the department obtained 12additional search warrants, with the follow-up inves-tigations yielding even more contraband. Severaloffenders—including a serial rapist who recently hadbeen released from prison—face three-strike enhance-ments and long prison sentences.

The videotapes that documented the drug buysgreatly enhanced and expedited the prosecution of thesuspects. The camera’s high-quality video and sound

left little doubt as to the suspects’ culpability, andmost pleaded guilty when confronted with the evi-dence. The camera’s $1,200 cost seemed little to payfor such worthwhile results.

ConclusionThe techniques Operation Clean Sweep employed

seem simple. Yet, simple solutions are often the mostoverlooked. First, the department realized it had a

problem—street-level drug traffick-ing. Next, it established a strategyto solve the problem: arrest theoffenders and develop iron-cladcases to get and keep them off thestreets. To achieve these objectives,the department worked closely withthe community, the districtattorney’s office, other area lawenforcement agencies, and themedia. The technology it used—aminiature video camera—helpedbuild strong cases against theoffenders and more than paid for

itself by allowing the department to seize largeamounts of contraband and interrupt the activities of amultitude of drug offenders.

Successful undercover operations come in allshapes and sizes, but they don’t have to be complex,unwieldy, or demand huge amounts of resources.Indeed, Operation Clean Sweep proves that withproper planning and the right tools, law enforcementagencies can develop effective strategies to keep theircommunities safe.

Endnotes1 See H. Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing (New York: McGraw-

Hill, 1990).2 A seven- or eight-person team initiated in the early 1990s, SCAT

uses a proactive, problem-solving approach to preventing crime. The teamcan tackle crime problems without pulling patrol officers from calls forservice.

3 Agencies should check with their legal advisors or local prosecutorsbefore employing this technique. The law in some states prohibits the useof surreptitious voice recording without a court order or the consent of allof the parties.

4 The DDA chose this method over the grand jury process, in which allof the suspects get indicted at the same time, then proceed to trial withouta preliminary hearing.

Chief Meyers leads the Rialto, California, PoliceDepartment.

“

”

Operation CleanSweep resulted in

the arrest andprosecution of more

than 100 felons.


May 2000 / 25

Book Review

Police Supervision by Ronald W.Glensor, Kenneth J. Peak, and Larry K.Gaines, published by McGraw-Hill College,Boston Massachusetts, 1999.

Many authors have written books onhow to lead people and manage organiza-tions. Most have centered on varioustechniques for top-level managers. Unfortu-nately, law enforcement administration hasnot received the focus it should in this area.Of particular concern is the lack of scholarlyliterature on first-line police managers, suchas sergeants and lieutenants.

Police Supervision addresses this voidwith a well-written text that focuses on theproblems and concerns of the modern policesupervisor. In preparing this book, theauthors have drawn on their extensiveacademic backgrounds and collectiveexperience, ranging from line officer todeputy chief of a large metropolitan policeforce. Although their text covers supervisorytheory, its primary focus remains on thepractical aspects of a supervisor’s job.

The authors not only focus on thepractical elements of being a police linesupervisor but also cover the legal respon-sibilities and issues of a newly promotedsupervisor. The book contains chapters onsuch topics as ethics, training/professionaldevelopment, and employee evaluationsand performance appraisals. A progressivechapter on stress and employee wellnessalso addresses the need for full-serviceemployee assistance programs that helpofficers with real-life issues such asmarital, psychological, and substanceabuse problems. The authors suggest thatthe benefits of providing assistance forveteran employees to resolve their prob-lems far outweigh the cost of continuallyhiring new employees to replace thoseveteran employees. The authors alsodevote significant time discussing com-munity-oriented policing and problemsolving and future trends and challenges,such as team policing and the use of newtechnologies.

The authors write in an easy-to-followmanner and include case studies in eachchapter that compel line supervisors tothink through particular issues, such as theendless balancing of work quality andquantity. The book serves as an excellentprimer for all new supervisors and a goodrefresher for experienced supervisors, aswell.

Reviewed byArthur Bowker

U.S. Probation OfficerNorthern District of Ohio


Legal Digest

aw enforcement officers usemany different techniquesin conducting criminal in-

The Qualified Privilege toProtect Sensitive InvestigativeTechniques from DisclosureBy Jayme S. Walker, J.D.

such cases, the government mayseek to assert a legal privilege to notdisclose the sensitive investigativetechnique.

Courts addressing the issue ofprotecting sensitive investigativetechniques from disclosure havegenerally recognized the existenceof a qualified privilege. This articlediscusses the rationale behind theprivilege in the context of variouscourt decisions recognizing theprivilege1 and one that rejected it.2

The article also addresses some

practical considerations on how lawenforcement can effectively use thisprivilege.

Privilege RecognizedCourts that recognize a sensi-

tive investigative techniques privi-lege treat it as a qualified privilegebased on the following rationales:1) revealing the technique may en-danger the lives of law enforcementofficers;3 2) revealing the techniquemay endanger the lives of thosewho allow their property to be used

Lvestigations. The public is familiarwith the most common techniques.In certain investigations, however,the government may seek to protectinformation regarding particularlysensitive equipment, surveillancelocations, listening posts, or investi-gative techniques (all hereinafterreferred to as sensitive investigativetechniques) from disclosure duringsuppression hearings or at trial. In

© Peter Hendrie

May 2000 / 27

“

”

Courts addressing theissue of protecting

sensitive investigativetechniques fromdisclosure have

generally recognizedthe existence of aqualified privilege.

Ms. Walker serves as a legal instructor andattorney for the DEA at the FBI Academy.

for such activity;4 3) once a tech-nique is revealed it will be of novalue in future cases;5 4) disclosureof such information will educatecriminals on how to employ suchtechniques themselves;6 5) law en-forcement officers may have lim-ited surveillance options in certainhigh-crime areas;7 6) law enforce-ment officers may be too wellknown in an area to conduct opensurveillance;8 7) if the location ofthe surveillance post is revealed,citizens who previously allowedtheir property to be used for surveil-lance purposes may no longer con-sent to such use in the future;9 8)nondisclosure of surveillance postsavoids compromising ongoing sur-veillances;10 and 9) the disclosure ofsurveillance posts may encouragecriminal offenders to relocate to anarea that cannot be observed fromthe existing post.11

Courts facing the issue decidecases under existing rules of evi-dence relating to privileges.12 Con-sequently, the requirements for as-serting or opposing the applicationof the privilege vary between juris-dictions. The differing approachestaken by courts include: balancingthe defense’s need for disclosureagainst the government’s need forconfidentiality,13 requiring that thegovernment first demonstrate whythe privilege should be recog-nized,14 requiring that the defensedemonstrate the necessity of obtain-ing the information,15 and requiringthat the defense show why the in-formation is both necessary andmaterial.16

Many courts recognizingthe privilege analogize the protec-tion of sensitive investigative

techniques from disclosure to theprivilege to protect the identity ofconfidential informants from dis-closure.17 Courts making this com-parison cite the U.S. Supreme Courtdecision in Roviaro v. UnitedStates,18 in which the Court con-cluded that the disclosure of theidentity of an informant

calls for balancing the publicinterest in protecting the flowof information against theindividual’s right to preparehis defense. Whether a properbalance renders nondisclosureerroneous must depend on theparticular circumstance ofeach case, taking into consid-eration the crime charged, thepossible defenses, the possiblesignificance of the informer’stestimony, and other relevantfactors.19

The applicability of the privi-lege is determined on a case-by-case basis and is, therefore, highly

factual in nature. One of the earlierfederal cases to recognize the privi-lege provides a good example ofthis. In United States v. Van Horn,20

during the prosecution of a largemarijuana conspiracy case, the gov-ernment used information obtainedvia electronic interception of oralcommunications in an office. Thedefendants argued on appeal thatthe trial court erred in denying theirrequest to discover the type of mi-crophone used and where it washidden. The U.S. Court of Appealsfor the 11th Circuit recognized theprivilege but stated that the “privi-lege will give way if the defendantcan show need for the informa-tion.”21 The defendants argued thatthey needed the information to dem-onstrate that the voices on the tapescould have been distorted.

In rejecting the defendants’ ar-gument and finding that the defen-dants had failed to show the neces-sity for disclosure, the court of


The trial court ruledthat the location of

the surveillancepost did not haveto be disclosed.

”

appeals noted that the trial court hadconducted an in camera hearing re-garding the matter, heard testimonythat the voices on the tape couldhave been distorted by the way themicrophone was hidden, and lis-tened to the agent’s actual voice andhis voice on the tape to determinethe accuracy of the recording. Thedefendants also were allowed to ex-amine the tapes and were told thatthe transmission was by air and notwire. The defendants were allowedto argue the possibility of misiden-tification, and therefore, the juryhad the opportunity to address thequestion of voice identification onthe tape.

Courts recognizing the privi-lege have reached varying conclu-sions as to disclosure based notmerely on the particular test usedbut also on the specific facts pre-sented in the case. For example, ap-plying the same test, the U.S. Courtof Appeals for the District of Co-lumbia Circuit recognized thegovernment’s position to not dis-close a technique in one case whileordering the disclosure of a tech-nique in another. In United States v.Harley,22 the court addressed the is-sue of whether the privilege appliedin revealing the location of a policesurveillance post in a heroin distri-bution investigation. In Harley, anundercover detective drove to ahouse in an attempt to buy heroin.As the detective approached thehouse, the defendant came down thesteps, walked up to the detective,and asked him what he wanted. Thedetective gave the defendant $50for some heroin. The defendantwent back to the house, went inside,came back to the detective, and

gave him a small plastic bag con-taining white powder. Three lawenforcement officers watched thetransaction from a surveillancepost. The officers at the surveil-lance post filmed the transactionwith a zoom lens-equipped camera.The undercover detective returnedto the station after the transaction.Investigators obtained a positive re-sult from a field test on the whitepowder. Additionally, the detectiveidentified the defendant fromamong the 10 to12 photos shown tohim of individuals known to fre-quent the area near the house.

During the cross-examinationof the investigator who performedthe field test, the defense asked thelocation of the apartment used forpolice surveillance. The trial courtruled that the location of the surveil-lance post did not have to be dis-closed, stating that

A defendant seeking to learnthe location of a police surveil-lance post should ordinarilyshow that he needs the evi-dence to conduct his defenseand that there are no adequatealternative means of getting atthe same point. The degree of

the handicap he establishesmust then be weighed by thetrial judge against the policiesunderlying the privilege. Thisis necessarily a somewhat adhoc balancing process so that,as Roviaro said, “no fixed rulewith respect to disclosure isjustifiable.”23

In balancing the interests in thiscase, the court stated that the de-fense made no attempt to demon-strate either a need for the informa-tion or that alternative methods toobtain the information were un-available. The court noted that evenif the police no longer used the sur-veillance post, the safety of theowner of the apartment and the will-ingness of others to cooperate withlaw enforcement in the future were“weighty considerations supportingthe privilege.”24

The court found identificationto be the only issue in question attrial. The detective who purchasedthe heroin from the defendant posi-tively identified him. While the in-vestigator who conducted the fieldtest had never been in the apartmentused as the surveillance post, hewas familiar with the area. Duringcross-examination, the investigatortestified that the surveillance postwas between 20 and 30 yards fromthe courtyard where the transactionoccurred and was approximately10 to 12 feet above street level.The trial court sustained thegovernment’s objection to thedefense’s obtaining the exact loca-tion of the apartment. The Harleycourt stated that this testimony wassufficient information for thedefense and did not require disclo-sure of the exact location.25 The

“

May 2000 / 29

government’s videotape of thetransaction made from the surveil-lance post, while not essential to theprivilege, also indisputably showedthe officer’s unobstructed view ofthe transaction.

In United States v. Foster,26 theU.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-trict of Columbia Circuit consid-ered whether the trial court properlysustained the prosecution’s objec-tions to cross-examination ques-tions into the location of a policeobservation post. In Foster, an of-ficer observed the defendant sittingin the front seat of a car in a parkinglot. The officer watched the defen-dant leave the car after giving some-thing to a person in the back seat.The officer then observed the de-fendant go over to a basketballcourt, obtain money from a person,count the money, and hand over asmall white object. The defendantwalked away, taking two plasticbags from his pocket, putting theminto a paper bag, and dropping thebag over a chain-link fence. Thedefendant proceeded to pick up thebag again, go over to a building, anddrop the bag near another fence.The officer radioed other officerswho arrested the defendant. Oncross-examination, the defenseasked the officer the location of hisobservation post.

The government cited UnitedStates v. Green27 and United Statesv. Harley28 in support of its positionthat the location of the observationpost should not be disclosed. Thecourt stated that none “of the con-siderations mentioned in Harley infavor of the privilege is present inthis case.”29 Unlike Harley, the Fos-ter case turned exclusively on the

testimony of the observing officer,prompting the court to note that“[t]he more important the witness tothe government’s case, the moreimportant the defendant’s right, de-rived from the ConfrontationClause of the Sixth Amendment, tocross-examine the witness.”30 Addi-tionally, the defense in Foster chal-lenged the officer’s observations attrial. Fifteen people were in the vi-cinity of the transaction, and one ofthe responding officers initially ar-rested the wrong person. The courtstated that

[w]ithout knowing the locationof the observation post, thedefense could not effectivelyprobe the officer’s memory orveracity about these subjects.The right of the defense toengage in such lines of inquiryis at the heart of our system ofcriminal justice. The videotapein Harley preserved the right.No comparable substitute wasavailable in this case.31

In concluding the discussion re-garding this issue, the court likenedthe crucial nature of the officer’stestimony in this case to the situa-tion involving the informant inRoviaro v. United States,32 who wasthe sole participant in the transac-tion with the defendant in that caseand whose identity, the SupremeCourt ruled, was essential to thedefense.

Privilege Not RecognizedThe only decision to date in

which the privilege has been re-jected is Weaver v. Common-wealth.33 In Weaver, an informantmade a purchase of $30 worth ofcocaine from the defendant. Justprior to the purchase, a detectivemet with the informant, searchedboth him and his vehicle, placed atape recorder on his person, andgave him $40 to buy the drugs. Theinformant met with the detective af-ter the purchase and gave him thedrugs, a statement, the tape recorder


and $10. At the trial, the informantdenied he had ever been involved inany other drug sting operations. Thedetective contradicted this testi-mony and stated that the informanthad been involved in other drug in-vestigations for which he had beenpaid approximately $500.

During the cross-examinationof the defendant, the defense soughtto obtain information regarding thetype of recording device used eventhough the tape was inaudible. Thedefense argued that a thoroughcross-examination regarding thetape recorder was essential to showthat the recorder could have beenmanipulated by the informant. Thiswould support the defendant’s ar-gument that the transaction neveroccurred and that the informantmanufactured the case in order toreceive $50 from the detective forinforming.

The Kentucky Supreme Courtrefused to recognize the “police sur-veillance privilege” because underKentucky law, recognition of theprivilege would require an amend-ment to the Kentucky Rules ofEvidence.34

Practical Considerations

In jurisdictions where the privi-lege has been recognized, a numberof practical issues should be takeninto consideration. Because theprivilege is qualified and not abso-lute, the trial court has a great dealof discretion in determining thescope of the privilege.35 In review-ing the decision of the trial court asto the extent of the privilege, appel-late courts will examine whether thedefense had adequate opportunityto cross-examine and confront

witnesses on the particular issue inquestion. As illustrated by theHarvey case, for example, the de-fense still should be able to thor-oughly cross-examine witnesses insurveillance-post cases regardingweather or other viewing obstruc-tions without learning the actuallocation.

A trial court making the deter-mination of whether the privilegeapplies may hold some form of incamera hearing regarding thedefense’s need for the informationor an ex parte hearing on thegovernment’s need to protect theinformation.36 An ex parte in cam-era review may even include aviewing of the sensitive investiga-tive technique in question.37

After considering the applica-bility of the privilege, the trial courtmay reach a number of possibleconclusions, including that the sen-sitive investigative technique mustbe fully disclosed, that some infor-mation regarding the techniquemust be disclosed and the defensecan ask certain cross-examinationquestions regarding the technique,

or that no information need be dis-closed. If the court orders disclo-sure, the prosecutor should arguethat the disclosure be made under aprotective order limiting the per-sons with whom the defense mayshare the information and directingthat all materials the prosecutionprovides to the defense during thecase be returned at the end of thetrial.38 In the event that disclosure isordered, the prosecutor may evenconsider the possibility of dismiss-ing the case based upon the natureof the offense, the nature of thetechnique, and the harm that wouldresult should the technique bedisclosed.39

ConclusionLaw enforcement officers

should ensure that they are familiarwith the law in their jurisdictionsand consider the following prior tousing a sensitive investigativetechnique:

• any department policiesthat exist regarding the useof sensitive investigativetechniques;

• any policies or positions of theprosecutor’s office regardingthe use of sensitive investiga-tive techniques. The use of asensitive investigative tech-nique in a case should becoordinated in advance withthe prosecutor;

• the likelihood that the sensi-tive investigative techniquewill be disclose;.

• informing citizens that maybe affected by disclosure;

• if the sole or substantialevidence to be used in the

The use of asensitive investigative

technique in acase should becoordinated in

advance with theprosecutor

”“

May 2000 / 31

prosecution comes from theuse of a sensitive investigativetechnique, it is likely that thetechnique will have to bedisclosed;

• if a sensitive investigativetechnique is used and theprosecutor decides to arguethat it is privileged, officersshould work closely with theprosecutor to more effectivelyarticulate why the techniqueis sensitive;

• if the court allows limitedcross examination regarding asensitive investigative tech-nique, officers should workclosely with the prosecutor tounderstand the parameters ofthe court’s orders;

• if the court orders that asensitive investigative tech-nique be disclosed, officersshould work closely with theprosecutor, who may file amotion for a protective orderor have to decide whether toproceed with the case.Many courts have never ad-

dressed the issue of whether aprivilege exists to protect sensitiveinvestigative techniques from dis-closure. Of the courts that haveaddressed the issue, all but onehave determined that there is aqualified privilege to protect theinformation.

Endnotes1 See, e.g., United States v. Grier, 866 F.2d

908 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Cintolo,818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v.Fernandez, 797 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1986);United States v. Gazie, 786 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir.1986) (unpublished); United States v. Porter,701 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v.

Green, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C.Cir. 1981); United States v.Chimurenga, 609 F. Supp.1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hinesv. Superior Ct., 203 Cal.App. 3d c1231 (1988);Anderson v. United States,607 A.2d 490 (D.C. 1992);State v. Moss, 648 So. 2d206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1994); People v. Criss, 689N.E.2d 645 (Ill. App. Ct.1998); Commonwealth v.Lugo, 548 N.E.2d 1263(Mass. 1990); In the Matterof Chris C., 658 N.Y.S.2d929 (1997); State v. Garcia,618 A.2d 326 (N.J. 1993);Commonwealth v. Jennings,630 A.2d 1257 (Pa. Super.Ct. 1993); Hollins v.Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d397 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).

2 Weaver v. Common-wealth, 955 S.W.2d 722 (Ky.1997).

3 See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 431 A.2d18, 21 (D.C. 1981); People v. Criss, 689N.E.2d 645, 649 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); State v.Laws, 621 A.2d 526, 530 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App.Div. 1993); Commonwealth v. Jennings, 630A.2d 1257, 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).

4 See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 431 A.2d18, 21 (D.C. 1981); People v. Criss, 689N.E.2d 645, 649 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Common-wealth v. Santiago, 631 A.2d 1323, 1327 (Pa.Super. Ct. 1993); Commonwealth v. Jennings,630 A.2d 1257, 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).

5 See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 431 A.2d18, 21 (D.C. 1981); People v. Criss, 689N.E.2d 645, 649 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998);Commonwealth v. Santiago, 631 A.2d 1323,1327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).

6 See, e.g, United States v. Van Horn, 789F.2d 1492, 1508 (11th Cir. 1986).

7 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 571 A.2d1358, 1366 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).

8 See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 618 A.2d 326,330 (N.J. 1993).

9 See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 986 F.2d541, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1993); People v. Criss, 689N.E.2d 645, 649 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998);Commonwealth v. Santiago, 631 A.2d 1323,1327-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).

10 See, e.g., State v. Laws, 621 A.2d 526,530 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993); State v.Garcia, 618 A.2d 326, 330 (N.J. 1993).

11 Id.

12 See, e.g., United States v. Cintolo, 818F.2d 980, 1002 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v.Foster, 986 F.2d 541, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1993);Haider v. Director of Corrections, 992 F. Supp.1192, 1196 (C.D. Cal. 1998); State v. Garcia,618 A.2d 326, 328 (N.J. 1993); Commonwealthv. Jennings, 630 A.2d 1257, 1258 (Pa. Super.Ct. 1993). The constitutionality of the privilegeto protect sensitive investigative techniques hasyet to be addressed. Haider v. Director ofCorrections, 992 F. Supp. 1192, 1196 (C.D.Cal. 1998).

13 See, e.g., Haider v. Director of Correc-tions, 992 F. Supp. 1192, 1197 (C.D. Cal.1998). See also Zana E. Holley, Annotation,Police Surveillance Privilege, 67 A.L.R. 5th149 (1999) (provides an extensive list of casesusing a balancing approach and an excellent,detailed discussion of cases specificallyaddressing the police surveillance privilege).

14 State v. Garcia, 618 A.2d 326, 332 (N.J.1993).

15 See, e.g., United States v. Harley, 682F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1982); State v.Moss, 648 So. 2d 206, 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1994); People v. Criss, 689 N.E.2d 645, 649(Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Commonwealth v.Rodriguez, 674 A.2d 225, 229 (Pa. 1996).

16 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grace, 681N.E.2d 1265, 1267 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).

17 See, e.g., United States v. Cintolo, 818F.2d 980, 1002 n.13 (1st Cir. 1987); United

© Don Ennis


States v. Foster, 986 F.2d 541, 543 (D.C. Cir.1993); United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148,1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hicks v. United States,431 A.2d 18, 21 (D.C. 1981); State v. Moss,648 So.2d 206, 207-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1994); Commonwealth v. Lugo, 548 N.E.2d1263, 1268 (Mass. 1990); Commonwealth v.Rodriguez, 674 A.2d 225, 228 (Pa. 1996);Hollins v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 397, 399(Va. Ct. App. 1994).

18 353 U.S. 53 (1957).19 Id. at 62.20 789 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1986).21 Id. at 1508.22 682 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1982).23 Id. at 1020.24 Id.25 Id. at 1021.26 986 F.2d 541 (D.C. Cir. 1993).27 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1981).28 682 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1982).29 986 F.2d 541, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1993).30 Id.

31 Id. at 543-44.32 353 U.S. 53 (1957).33 955 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1997). In Weaver,

the Kentucky Supreme Court overruled theKentucky Court of Appeals’ decision in Jett v.Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. Ct. App.1993), to the extent it recognized the existenceof a “police surveillance privilege.”

34 Even though the Kentucky SupremeCourt refused to recognize the privilege, thecourt ruled that any error occurring in notdisclosing evidence further identifying the typeof recording device was harmless because thedetective admitted that the informant couldhave tampered with the recorder to prevent itfrom producing an audible recording of thetransaction and that this was the informationthe defense sought to prove.

35 See People v. Criss, 689 N.E.2d 645, 649(Ill. App. Ct. 1998).

36 See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 797F.2d 943, 952 (11th Cir. 1986); Haider v.Director of Corrections, 992 F. Supp. 1192,

1195 (C.D. Cal. 1998); State v. Garcia, 618A.2d 326, 332 (N.J. 1993).

37 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lugo, 548N.E.2d 1263, 1265 (Mass. 1990).

38 See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 530 F.Supp. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (the court ordered thegovernment to identify a surveillance locationto the defendant’s attorney, subject to thecondition that counsel could not disclose thelocation to anyone, including his client, absenta court order).

39 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 571 A.2d1358, 1366 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1990).

Law enforcement officers of other thanfederal jurisdiction who are interested inthis article should consult their legaladvisors. Some police procedures ruledpermissible under federal constitutional laware of questionable legality under state lawor are not permitted at all.

Sergeant Hogman Officer Millard

Sergeant Craig Hogman ofthe Clark County, Washington,Sheriff’s Office and OfficersAdam Millard and LawrenceZapata of the Vancouver, Wash-ington, Police Departmentresponded to the report of a bankrobbery and attempted to locatethe get-away vehicle. SergeantHogman located the vehicle andbegan pursuit. The three subjectsin the vehicle began firing out the

windows, hitting Sergeant Hogman’s car several times. Twice during the pursuit, the subjects set up anambush as Sergeant Hogman turned a corner in a residential neighborhood. During pursuit, thesubjects also opened fire on Officers Millard and Zapata, striking their patrol car and throwing a handgrenade at the officers. The subjects crashed their vehicle while attempting another ambush, fled onfoot through a heavily wooded area, and continued to fire at the officers. The officers returned fire,fatally wounding two of the subjects. Officers apprehended the third suspect a short time later as heran through the ball field of a local school. Investigation revealed that, prior to the bank robbery, thesubjects had planted three bombs at a department store near the bank, which exploded approximately45 minutes before the bank robbery occurred. Investigation at the crime scene discovered anotherbomb and several weapons in the vehicle. Due to the selfless dedication of these officers, innocentlives were saved in this residential neighborhood with several schools nearby.

Officer Zapata

The Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face eachchallenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actionswarrant special attention from their respective departments. The Bulletin also wants to recognizetheir exemplary service to the law enforcement profession.

Officer Shoemaker Officer Bledsoe

Captain Goode

Early one morning, Captain Norman H. Goode, Jr., of the MecklenburgCounty, North Carolina, Sheriff’s Office observed a smoking tractor trailer lyingon its left side on the highway. Captain Goode radioed for the fire departmentand ambulance service. Two men at the scene advised Captain Goode that thedriver was inside the smoke-filled cab. Captain Goode climbed onto the cab’sright side and opened thedoor. Thick smoke pouredout, which prevented himfrom seeing the driver.Captain Goode shouted forthe driver to raise his armstoward the door. He

grabbed one of his arms and lifted him out of thecab to safety. Moments later, the entire cabbecame engulfed in flames. Captain Goode’squick thinking, fast action, and extraordinarystrength undoubtedly saved the man’s life.

Nominations for the Bulletin Notes should be basedon either the rescue of one or more citizens orarrest(s) made at unusual risk to an officer’s safety.Submissions should include a short write-up(maximum of 250 words), a separate photograph ofeach nominee, and a letter from the department’sranking officer endorsing the nomination. Submis-sions should be sent to the Editor, FBI Law Enforce-ment Bulletin, FBI Academy, Madison Building,Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135.

Officers Steve Shoemaker and Jerry Bledsoe of theScott County, Missouri, Sheriff’s Office were dispatchedto a report of a man attempting to hang himself from arailroad trestle bridge. When the officers arrived at thescene, they located a man standing on the bridge with arope tied around his neck. The man said his wife left himand took his children; therefore, he felt he had no reasonto live. Officers Shoemaker and Bledsoe spent over anhour talking to the man. When it was obvious that heintended to jump, the officers began to maneuver them-selves closer, in different directions, making it difficultfor the man to watch them. As Officer Shoemaker

attracted his attention, Officer Bledsoe leaped to the edge of the bridge, grabbed the man by the armand held him until Officer Shoemaker could assist him. The officers struggled with the man as theyhung from the edge of the bridge and removed the rope from the man’s neck. Officer Bledsoe receivedminor injuries during the incident. Later, the man later told Officer Shoemaker that he fully intended tokill himself. Heroic actions by Officers Shoemaker and Bledsoe saved the man’s life.

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