FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Jun99leb

ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310

Features

Departments

5 Research Forum Citizen Resistance

16 Book Review Teaching Criminal Justice Ethics

Offenders’Perceptual Shorthand

By Anthony J. Pinizzottoand Edward F. Davis

Blind Reportingof Sexual Violence

By Sabrina Garcia andMargaret Henderson

Policing the Internet By Scott Sullivan

Drug ConspiraciesBy Edward M. Hendrie

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12

Law enforcement officers need torecognize that the nonverbal signalsthey exhibit can impact their survival.

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June 1999Volume 68Number 6

United StatesDepartment of Justice

Federal Bureau ofInvestigation

Washington, DC20535-0001

Louis J. FreehDirector

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Send article submissions toEditor, FBI Law Enforcement

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22 Focus on Investigations Investigative Planning

Victims can report sensitive crimes moresafely and still provide law enforcementagencies with important crimeinformation.

Law enforcement officers need to patrolthe Information Superhighway to keepcitizens safe.

To combat drug trafficking, lawenforcement officers and prosecutorsneed a thorough knowledge ofconspiracy law.

June 1999 / 1

redatory animals alwayshave displayed certain adap-tive behaviors. For example,

its very existence depends on theability to perceive slight weak-nesses in otherwise-unremark-able behavior, a predator’s actionsmust remain definitive, quick, andeffective.

Much like the predators foundtracking the untamed jungles foreasy victims, human predators stalkurban jungles for equally vulner-able targets. Similar to the beasts ofthe jungle, human predators lookinto crowds and search, consciously

or unconsciously, for some weak-ness. Unlike the leopard who killsonly for physical nourishment,however, human predators picktheir prey for a variety of reasons.Law enforcement officers know alltoo well the unpredictability of thehuman predator, but do they realizethat they, the public’s protectors,can become victims through theirown actions?

ANALYZINGTHE RESEARCH

Over the past 10 years, the FBIhas researched various aspects oflaw enforcement safety. From thisresearch and from studies on lawenforcement training, several im-portant issues have emerged. Oneissue relates to the perceptions thatoffenders have of police officers.The research illustrates that the wayoffenders perceive officers impactshow they interact with them.1

To begin with, studies in socialpsychology have indicated that theway humans carry themselves—in-cluding how they walk, speak, ges-ture, move, and look—communi-cates various messages.2 Thesemessages range from signaling theirapparent happiness to their preoc-cupation, at any given time, withwhat they consider “weighty mat-ters.” This preoccupation maymake them appear awkward in their

Offenders’ Perceptual ShorthandWhat Messages Are Law EnforcementOfficers Sending to Offenders?By ANTHONY J. PINIZZOTTO, Ph.D., and EDWARD F. DAVIS, M.S.

Pthe leopard possesses an amazingability to look into a large grazingherd of gazelle and instantaneouslysingle out from this vast gatheringthe one most vulnerable to attack.The leopard may observe a slightlimp, indiscernible to the humaneye, or some other equally suscep-tible characteristic unrecognizableto anyone but a predator. Because

© Mark Ide

2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

footing or hesitant in their move-ments. Whatever is going on with-in the individual is played out inexternal behavior. These internalstruggles may prove easily recog-nizable or well hidden, but theynonetheless affect behavior in someway.

Additionally, criminal justiceliterature has attempted to examinesituations where officers can detectdeception based on the verbal andnonverbal cues suspects and of-fenders exhibit.3 Further, law en-forcement training academies teachofficers to observe the body ges-tures and movements of individualsthey question. For example, watch-ing for potential “runners” whilequestioning suspects alerts officersto those suspects possibly preparingto escape. Through such indicatorsas shifting their feet, moving theireyes, and tilting their bodies, sus-pects may suggest their intentionsto flee. This “perceptual shorthand”gives officers a quick and effective

means of preparing themselves forpotential threats to their safety.

According to the FBI’s researchand studies by other professionals,offenders also engage in perceptualshorthand during the commission oftheir crimes.4 This discovery war-rants closer examination for twomain reasons. First, officers shouldbecome more aware of the nonver-bal signals and messages they sendto suspects with whom they inter-act. Second, a greater degree of in-terest within the law enforcementresearch community may promptadditional study into this importantarea of officer safety. Three majorcases from the FBI’s research illus-trate the need for such scrutiny.

The Articulate Robber CaseThe first murderer of a police

officer to bring this matter of theoffender’s perceptual shorthand tothe FBI’s attention was an articulateyoung man, only 18 years old at thetime of the killing. He had robbed a

convenience store at gunpoint andfled on foot. During the suspect’sescape, a uniformed officer noticedthat he fit the description of the sus-pect given in a radio broadcast. Theofficer called to the young man tostop. The offender stated that theofficer “was not authoritarian, wasvery polite, and did not take controlof me or make any attempt to con-trol my actions.” The offender re-marked that as the officer ap-proached him—a suspected armedrobber—the officer’s gun remainedin his holster. The offender statedthat after ignoring commands fromthe officer to stop and put his handsup, he turned and shot him.

The offender stated that he be-lieved the officer “did not perceiveme as a threat, and so [he] made noattempt to protect himself.” Afterevaluating the officer’s behaviorand tone of voice during this en-counter, the offender decided thathe had the edge, which resulted inthe officer’s death. By his own ad-mission, the offender perceived avulnerability in the officer’s actionsand took advantage of it.

The Voice of God CaseIn another case, an offender

stated that he had “planned to kill anofficer” on the day he actually mur-dered one. This offender was asmall-time drug dealer and a majordrug abuser. He stated that he hadreceived a message from God thathe should kill a police officer be-cause the police were ruining hisdrug business. To accomplish this,he proceeded to a busy intersectionnear his home to find an officerto kill. Because of his degree ofdrug abuse, his plan lacked clear

Mr. Davis is an instructor in theBehavioral Science Unit at theFBI Academy.

Dr. Pinizzotto is an instructor inthe Behavioral Science Unit atthe FBI Academy.

June 1999 / 3

and precise thinking. He neitherconsidered how he would confrontan officer at this particular location,nor did he obtain a weapon to use.

However, arriving at his prede-termined location, he observed auniformed sergeant at a service sta-tion having a tire repaired on hismarked patrol vehicle. By his ad-mission, the offender approachedthe sergeant intending to kill him.However, he stated that “by lookingat him, I could tell that he would betoo difficult to overcome.” Whenquestioned about how the sergeantlooked or what aspects of his ap-pearance or demeanor caused theoffender to believe that he could not“overcome” the sergeant, he wasunable to say anything except “helooked too difficult to take.” Whenquestioned further about his percep-tion of the sergeant’s appearance,the offender stated that he was notparticularly large in size or menac-ing in appearance but “just lookedlike he could handle himself.”

The offender remained at thislocation for approximately 2 hoursuntil a traffic accident occurred, anda one-officer patrol vehicle re-sponded to the scene. The offenderobserved the officer for only a shorttime before he “knew this was myvictim.” Having made that decision,the offender casually walked overto the officer and struck him withhis fist. As the officer fell to theground, the offender removed theofficer’s service weapon and shothim six times.

When asked what criteria hehad used to evaluate the officer, theoffender again had difficulty put-ting his thought process into words.He could recall only that the officerappeared “overweight and looked

easy.” What the offender did notknow was that the victim officer,with 10 years of law enforcementexperience, had refused to wear hisdepartment-issued soft body armorand recently had received a substan-dard performance evaluation. Inaddition, in another incident theyear before, a subject had takenthe officer’s service weapon, butthe officer’s partner had shot andkilled the subject. Apparently, thevictim officer had sent assortednonverbal messages to a variety ofindividuals—officials, fellow offi-cers, and offenders—before hisdeath.

moved through the crowd. After ob-serving the next officer he cameupon, the offender removed his gunfrom his pants pocket and shot theofficer in the head. This officerstated that he saw the offender’sgun “at the last second...just prior tothe shot.” His quick hand move-ment shifted the weapon from be-tween his eyes, deflected the path ofthe bullet, and saved his life.

The first officer never realizedthat the offender had targeted him.Nor did he know that whatever hewas doing—whether the way helooked, the way he walked, or theway he spoke to those aroundhim—had sent a message that hewas in control. Further, the offenderstated that he had no prior contactwith either of these officers beforethe incident. As in the other cases,this offender had difficulty articu-lating exactly what cues he per-ceived from these two officers thataffected his decision.

IMPLEMENTINGTHE FINDINGS

In many of the cases examined,the offenders could not articulatethe exact cues they perceived re-garding the targeted officer’s ap-pearance, gait, or behavior. How-ever, killers and assaulters alikestated that if their victims generallygave the impression that they ap-peared authoritative (not authoritar-ian), seemed resolute, or acted pro-fessionally, then the offenders werereluctant to initiate an assault.5 Thisstatement does not mean that offi-cers should not have a personableapproach with the public or thatthey should not employ communitypolicing practices. It does mean,however, that all officers must

“...nonverbal behaviorsand actions can

communicate theinternal disposition

of an individual.

”The “Dope Boys” CaseThe last incident involves an

individual who assaulted a law en-forcement officer in order to “send amessage to the cops in my city.”He decided to deliver his mes-sage, “quit messing with the ‘dopeboys’,” by killing an officer. Duringa community celebration, the armedoffender approached one of severalofficers assigned to the parade routefor traffic and crowd control, in-tending to shoot him. However, hestated that after looking at the firstofficer he approached, “I knew he’dbe a difficult target,” so the offender


consider the messages that their ac-tions and behaviors send. Also, theymust maintain a high level of vigi-lance and preparedness in carryingout their assigned duties. Two rulesremain true: officers should treateveryone the way they would like tobe treated, and they should protectthemselves so they can continue toprotect their communities.

Moreover, these findings dem-onstrate the need for greater re-search in the area of perceptualshorthand used by offenders whenthey encounter law enforcement of-ficers. Existing research indicatesthat nonverbal behaviors and ac-tions can communicate the internaldisposition of an individual. For ex-ample, a depressed individual oftenexhibits slow body movements, alack of energy, and the inability toconcentrate or focus. These exter-nal behaviors send certain mes-sages, and observers receive thosemessages for good or ill. Anofficer’s casual, “routine” approachto a vehicle during a traffic stopmay communicate to the offender apossible mental or emotional dis-tractibility. Further, the absence ofcertain appropriate behaviors on theofficer’s part also might communi-cate dangerous messages to theoffender. For example, situationsin which officers neglect to followsuspects’ body movements duringquestioning, especially hand move-ments or shifts in body positions,may communicate their lack ofreadiness to act. When receivedby human predators, such messagescould prove deadly to officerswho remain unaware of the impactof their behaviors and actions.Therefore, the law enforcement

community should conduct addi-tional research to find the key tounlock the cues that offendersobserve in officers they choose toattack.

CONCLUSIONJust as predatory animals

search out the weakest prey, humanpredators employ the same tactic.Law enforcement officers must re-member that while they observe

officers no longer fall victim topredatory offenders using percep-tual shorthand to select the mostvulnerable targets.

Endnotes1 A.J. Pinizzotto and E.F. Davis, “Cop

Killers and Their Victims,” FBI Law Enforce-ment Bulletin, December 1992, 9; “Killed in theLine of Duty: Procedural and Training Issues,”FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, March 1995, 1;“Above and Beyond the Call of Duty:Preventing Off-duty Officer Deaths,” FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, April 1996, 1; “Inter-viewing Methods: A Specialized Approach IsNeeded When Investigating Police Deaths,”Law and Order 44 (1996): 68; and U.S.Department of Justice, Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, Killed in the Line of Duty: AStudy of Selected Felonious Killings of LawEnforcement Officers (Washington, DC, 1992)and In the Line of Fire: Violence Against LawEnforcement (Washington, DC, 1997).

2 R.A. Hinde, ed., Nonverbal Communica-tion (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1972); E.E. Jones, InterpersonalPerception (New York: Freeman, 1990); S.T.Fiske and S.E. Taylor, Social Cognition (NewYork: McGraw-Hill, 1991); and W.B. Pearce,Nonverbal Communication (New York: HarperCollins, 1994).

3 C.G. Brougham, “Nonverbal Communica-tion: Can What They Don’t Say Give ThemAway?” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, July1992, 15; J.P. Buckley and P.A. Mullenix, “Useof Behavioral Symptoms in the Search for theTruth: A Tool for the Prosecutor,” Polygraph15 (1986): 40; D.K. Mills, “Deception,”American Probation and Parole AssociationPerspectives 15 (1991): 6; and F.W. Winkel, L.Koppelaar, and L. Greuel, “Police Officers’Beliefs About Cues Associated with Deceptionin Rape Cases,” in Psychology and the Law:International Perspectives, ed. F. Losel, D.Bender, et al. (Germany: Walter de Gruyter &Company, 1992).

4 B.A. Jacobs, “Undercover DeceptionClues: A Case of Restrictive Deterrence,”Criminology 31 (1993): 281 and “CrackDealers and Restrictive Deterrence: IdentifyingNarcs,” Criminology 34 (1996): 409.

5 Supra note 1.

nonverbal messages from the indi-viduals they question, these indi-viduals also gather informationfrom them. Subtle nuances that oth-ers would not view as weaknessesbecome opportunities for humanpredators to exploit. Law enforce-ment officers must protect them-selves against such individuals whosearch for easy prey and strike withlittle or no warning.

The law enforcement commu-nity must ban together to make of-ficers aware of the importance ofunderstanding how their behaviorsand actions impact their survivaleven when performing the mostbasic, and sometimes mundane,official duties. Only then will

“ ...researchillustrates that

the way offendersperceive officersimpacts how theyinteract with them.

”

June 1999 / 5

Assessing the Patternsof Citizen ResistanceDuring ArrestsBy Darrell L. Ross, Ph.D.

Research Forum

hether it entails stopping a speeding car,moving a group of rowdy youths on a

4) Was the suspect attempting to evade arrest byflight?

5) Was the suspect actively resisting arrest?1

Recognizing the importance of these factors andusing the fifth factor as the basis for research, theauthor analyzed various types of citizen resistanceagainst officers during common types of arrestcircumstances. Officers define resistance as verbal orphysical behavior that opposes, hinders, prohibits ordiminishes the capacity of the officer to verbally orphysically control that individual during a lawfularrest. During an arrest, citizens may manifest a rangeof overt resistive behaviors, including verbal abuse;hostile and threatening demeanor; passive actions(such as actions taken during a protest); actions thatallow the suspect to escape the officer’s physicalcontrol; and physical actions of assault, includingserious bodily injury or death.

Research on the use of force has increasedsignificantly over the last two decades. Past research-ers primarily focused their efforts toward deadly forceand firearm issues due to their high profile, potentialfor liability, and more accurate record-keepingcapabilities that simplified data collection.2 In com-parison, limited research exists on the nature andextent of less-than-lethal police force.3 Even lessresearch has been conducted into the dynamics ofpolice-citizen encounters and the types of resistivebehavior police officers routinely confront duringarrest.4 Identifying common types of resistance mayenhance an officer’s ability to better assess an arrestsituation and an individual’s demeanor in order todetermine and justify the appropriate degree of force.

METHODOLOGY

Instrumentation and Data CollectionIn order to analyze the variables found in police-

citizen encounters, the author designed a subjectresistance inventory (SRI). The author used thisinventory to collect data on the citizen and the officerand to address three research questions, specifically,during what type of arrest circumstance most officerscan expect resistance, what types of resistanceofficers encounter in these arrest circumstances,and whether the citizen was under the influence or

Wstreet-side, quieting a family dispute, or arresting adangerous felon, police work frequently involvesactual or potential resistance. In seconds, officersinterpret the behavior of the individuals they confrontand select an appropriate level of force in response.Deciding whether the use of force is objectivelyreasonable requires careful balancing of the nature ofthe intrusion on the suspect’s Fourth Amendmentrights against the countervailing interests of the stateto maintain order. Noting that no precise definition ormechanical application for this test of reasonablenessexists, the U.S. Supreme Court established fiveimportant factors to evaluate the facts in alleged casesof excessive force.

1) What is the severity of the crime at issue?

2) Was the suspect an immediate threat to theofficers or others?

3) Were the circumstances tense, uncertain, andrapidly evolving?

© Mark Ide


suspected to be under the influence of alcohol ordrugs during the arrest.

The author used six components of subjectresistance to identify the types of resistance encoun-tered during arrest. Designed to assist police inassessing citizen resistance during arrest,5 a forcecontinuum gives officers a clearer picture of the forcethat they lawfully may use in a given situation, whichthey cannot glean by reading statutes or case law.6

B. K. Siddle designed a resistance continuumusing six generic levels of subject resistance. Thiscontinuum assists police administrators in designing ause of force policy and guidesofficers in making justifiabledecisions regarding appropriatelevels of force. The resistancecontinuum also recommendsvarious types of control measuresto employ, ranging from verbalcontrol to lethal force. This studycompared the FBI’s eight arrestcircumstance variables7 with thefollowing six variables of the SRI:

1) Psychological intimida-tion—nonverbal cues fromcitizens that indicate theirbehavior, appearance, bodylanguage, and physical readi-ness (e.g., stance, arms folded across chest,clenched fists, etc.).2) Verbal noncompliance—verbal expressions orresponses that indicate the suspect’s unwilling-ness to comply with the officer’s commands.3) Passive resistance—physical actions that donot prevent the officer’s attempt to control (e.g.,sitting in protest, becoming physically limp, etc.).

4) Defensive resistance—physical actions thatattempt to prevent the officer’s control withoutharming the officer (e.g., pulling away from theofficer’s grip, twisting away, running away, etc.).

5) Active aggression—physical actions of assaultwith the intent of harming the officer physically(e.g., assaults using personal weapons).

6) Aggravated active aggression—actions in-tended to cause serious bodily harm or death tothe officer (e.g., attacks usually involving aweapon).

The police departments participating in this studyused this resistance continuum as a matter of practiceand policy to help officers select a level of force ineither an arrest or confrontation. All patrol officersand their supervisors received at least 4 hours ofannual training by certified instructors in the forcecontinuum for 2 years prior to the study. Officerscompleted a use of force form when they employed

force during an arrest. These formslisted the six levels of resistancefrom the resistance continuum,and reporting officers checked theappropriate level of resistance onthe form, as well as provided anarrative description of the forceincident.

The SRI used these six typesof resistance to identify types ofcitizen resistance. A supervisorfrom each department transferredthe information from the use offorce report to the database. Thisinformation included citizen andofficer characteristics, all types of

resistance encountered by the officer, the circum-stances under which the arrest occurred, and whetherthe citizen appeared to be under the influence ofalcohol or other drugs.

The reporting officers, due to their perceptions,may have reported some arrests in a biased manner.Additionally, for similar reasons, the individualsentering the information could have coded it in abiased manner. Therefore, the findings reflect re-ported arrest or resistance situations based on theofficer’s perception of the incident, the reportingaccuracy of the arresting officer(s), and the level ofaccuracy ensured by the individual entering theinformation. At the end of the study, the authoranalyzed all of the submissions from each of thedepartments.

“

”

The use of forceby the police

remains a criticalissue for boththe police and

the public.

June 1999 / 7

Other VariablesIn 1995, the FBI reported eight common types of

circumstances in which officers are assaulted.8 Theauthor used these eight arrest circumstances as thevariables in which the six types of resistance wereexamined. The FBI’s eight circumstances includearrest situations (i.e., both misdemeanor and felonyarrests); disturbance calls; traffic stops; suspiciousperson calls; calls involving individuals who arementally unstable; prisoner handling, transport, andcustody; ambush situations; and civil disorder. Theauthor also analyzed the variable of chemical influ-ence (i.e., under the influence or presumed to beunder the influence of alcohol or other drugs) todetermine its relationship betweenthe type of arrest circumstance andthe type of resistance.

SampleFifty police departments use

Siddle’s resistance continuum as amatter of policy. The authorselected a random sample of 25 ofthese agencies to participate in thestudy and sent a letter to eachdepartment explaining the natureof the research and requesting theirvoluntary participation. Seventeenof the agencies agreed to partici-pate, including 12 municipalities, 4 county sheriff’soffices, and 1 state police agency. Geographicallydispersed, these agencies employ from 100 to 1,000sworn patrol officers with a majority of the depart-ments employing 326 officers.

FINDINGS

Characteristics of Patrol OfficersAnalysis revealed that white officers who are

male and have served an average of 7.6 years aspolice officers remain more likely to experienceresistance as compared to other officers. Additionally,white officers accounted for approximately 76 percentof the incidents reported, compared to 22 percentinvolving black officers and 2 percent involvingHispanic officers. In approximately 68 percent of the

incidents, one officer encountered one citizen; in 24percent of the incidents, two officers encountered onecitizen; and in 8 percent of the incidents, three ormore officers encountered one citizen.

Characteristics of CitizensAnalysis showed that patrol officers encountered

resistance predominately from male citizens approxi-mately 22 years old. In approximately 89 percent ofthe incidents, the officer encountered citizens underthe influence, or suspected to be under the influence,of alcohol or drugs. Fifty-one percent of the resistingsuspects were white, 43 percent were black, and 6percent were Hispanic. One officer encountered more

than one individual in fewer than10 percent of the incidents.

The study found that officersexperienced defensive resistancemore than any other type. Resis-tance during handcuffing andactive aggression, where citizensmade physical contact with theofficer, accounted for othersignificant types of resistance.The most common form of activeaggression toward the officer wasa punch, followed by a push and akick. In approximately 46 percentof the incidents, the subject

confronted the officer with verbal noncompliance tothe arrest orders.

The data indicated that during an arrest, an officermay experience more than one type of resistance withno order or pattern. At any time during the arrest, theofficer may confront resistance, and depending on thedynamics of the arrest, the resistance may escalate inseverity or de-escalate into complete cooperation.

Resistance and Arrest AssociationsThe author also analyzed the relationships

between the arrest circumstance, the six types ofresistance, and the influence of alcohol or drugs. Theresults show that five of the resistance types areassociated with six of the eight arrest circumstances.In 27 percent of the arrest circumstances, misde-meanor arrests (e.g., disorderly persons, moving

© Mark Ide


“

”

The influence, orsuspicion of influence,

of either alcohol ordrugs was strongly

associated withcitizen resistance.

violations, etc.) remained the most common types ofarrest circumstances in which patrol officers encoun-tered resistance. The study revealed that the secondmost common type of arrest circumstances weredisturbance calls (24 percent), which can involve barfights, domestic disputes, person with a gun, and thelike, followed by traffic stops (15 percent) and felonyarrests (14␣ percent). These four arrest circumstancesaccounted for 80 percent of citizen resistance.

The author excluded resistance in the form ofpsychological intimidation from the analysis becauseit was reported in only eight of theincidents. Disturbance callsproved the strongest correlationwith verbal resistance, defensiveresistance, and active aggression.This combination suggests thatofficers will encounter an escala-tion from verbal statements tohigher forms of physical resis-tance when responding to thesecalls. The research also revealedstrong associations betweendefensive resistance and verbalnoncompliance and misdemeanorarrests, disturbance calls, andtraffic stops. A moderate associa-tion existed between these types of behavior andfelony arrests.

The study found that people who are mentally illfrequently do not resist verbally but exhibit higherlevels of physical resistance. This type of arrestcircumstance involved defensive resistance, activeaggression, and aggravated active aggression andrevealed a moderate association with alcohol or druginfluence. Felony arrests showed higher levels ofphysical resistance, including active aggression andaggravated active aggression.

The influence of alcohol or drugs affects thenature of citizen resistance during arrest. Disturbancecalls and traffic stops represent two of the mostcommon types of arrest circumstances associatedwith alcohol or drugs and resistance. Investigatingsuspicious persons or circumstances also may beassociated with subjects under the influence, particu-larly when the subject exhibits defensive resistance

and active aggression. While alcohol and drugsshowed a significant relationship with several types ofresistance and arrest circumstances, these findingswere based on the perception of the reporting officer.Officers seldom administered a blood or chemical testto measure the actual amount of substance in thebody.

DISCUSSIONThe influence, or suspicion of influence, of either

alcohol or drugs was strongly associated with citizenresistance. This factor becomesimportant because in 68 percent ofthe incidents of resistance, onepatrol officer encountered onesuspect, and the likelihood ofpotential resistance increases.Strong relationships existed be-tween responding to disturbancecalls, conducting traffic stops, andinvestigating suspicious persons orcircumstances and the citizen’sbeing under the influence ofalcohol or drugs. These three arrestcircumstances accounted for 47percent of the arrest situationswhere severe forms of resistance

(defensive resistance and active aggression) occurred.Not only can these types of arrest situations

produce higher levels of physical resistance, but theyalso can necessitate higher forms of control measuresthan other arrest circumstances. Therefore, patrolofficers should remain aware of the arrest environ-ment and citizen behaviors under these circumstances,cuing in on the demeanor of the suspect.

Resistance also may occur when officers confronta sober person. On many occasions, sober individualsoffer resistance, and officers must remain cognizantof their demeanor, stance, and proximity, as well.

This research has found that the types of resis-tance police commonly encounter occur in combina-tions or patterns, although not in any sequential order.The most common pattern of resistance involvesverbal noncompliance, escalating to defensive resis-tance, and proceeding to active aggression. Thisbehavior pattern occurred in approximately two-thirds

June 1999 / 9

of the arrest circumstances. The influence of alcoholor drugs increases the possibility that a citizen willresist physically, challenge verbally, or use profanityagainst the officer prior to, during, and/or after theofficer makes the arrest. Combining these four factors(i.e.,␣ verbal noncompliance, defensive hostility, activeaggression, and intoxication) in an arrest circum-stance will require that the officer escalate the amountof force needed to control the resistant individual.However, not every arrest circumstance will progressin this fashion. Officers may encounter active aggres-sion or other forms of resistance in any manner asdifferent variables enter the arrest circumstance.Officers must realize that the nature of resistance is

dynamic and rapidly evolving and involves variouscombinations of resistance in a significant percentageof incidents. Therefore, justifying the most appropri-ate course of action must start with the nature of thearrest, the actions of the suspect, the perception ofthreat by the officer, and the resources available to theofficer to make the arrest. Principles of escalation andde-escalation of force—including verbal diffusion andrestraint techniques and the use of proper equip-ment—remain instrumental to the officer in control-ling various forms of resistance.

Interestingly, veteran officers may be more likelyto encounter resistance from a citizen under theinfluence of alcohol or drugs. It appears that over

Psychological intimidation 1.4 (8)

Verbal noncompliance 46.2 (262)

Passive resistance 19.6 (111)

Defensive resistance 65.3 (370)

Active aggression 47.6 (270)

Punch 28.1 (76)

Push 24.4 (66)

Kick 21.5 (58)

Slap 17.0 (46)

Headbutt 6.3 (17)

Attempt to disarm 2.6 (7)

Aggravated active aggression 8.6 (49)

(The percentages do not total 100 because one incident could involve different types of resistance.)

Types of Resistance and Forms of Active Aggression

Resistance Type Percentage of Incidents (N=567)


time, some veteran officers have become somewhatlax in recognizing and remaining alert to certain bodylanguage manifested by suspects prior to physicalresistance. In slightly fewer than 50 percent of theincidents, subjects physically attacked officers priorto arrest. Patrol officers who encountered resistancepredominately worked alone and may have deviatedfrom established patrol and arrest procedures, whichcould increase the vulnerability of the officer in themind of the resisting individual. Citizen resistanceand officer seniority also may reflect different pa-trol assignments and may result from an officer’sability or inability to defuse a potentially resistantencounter.9

Although incidents of handling a suspect with amental illness accounted for 12 percent of the resist-ing circumstances, officers morelikely encountered more severephysical resistance—such asdefensive resistance, activeaggression, and aggravated activeaggression—with such suspects.Drugs or alcohol can have asignificant influence in theseencounters, as well. Patrolofficers working alone whorespond to calls of this naturemust remain alert to the behav-ioral cues of the person andrequest backup when practical.These types of arrest situationsremain unpredictable due to theemotional state of the individual, the potential forhigher levels of physical resistance, and the presenceof alcohol or drugs.

RECOMMENDATIONSUpon initial contact, officers should keep a safe

distance between themselves and the suspect in orderto determine the behavior of the individual and todecide a proper course of action if the suspect sud-denly attacks them. Due to the unpredictable nature ofsuspects under the influence and the likelihood thatresistance may occur, paying attention to the behaviorof the suspect and the dynamics of the arrest circum-stance becomes paramount for officer safety.

The development or revision of use of forcepolicies remains a significant concern for the policeadministrator. Administrators should develop policiesthat direct officers to use reasonable force based onthe resistant behavior of citizens. Police administra-tors can redesign their current use of force policy byintegrating a resistance continuum into the policy. Awritten policy cannot cover every situation an officermay face, but this study revealed that officers willencounter combinations of resistance patterns invarying arrest circumstances. By integrating a resis-tance continuum into a force policy, officers canrecognize types of resistance that will guide themtoward the appropriate force response in an arrestsituation. This type of policy also can assist in settingthe standard for administrators to use in evaluating

proper decision making whenofficers decide to use force.

Beyond policy implications,study findings demonstrate thatveteran officers should receiverefresher training in departmentalforce policy that emphasizesresistance, threat recognition, andappropriate force methods forcontrolling resistance. Adminis-trators, as a matter of policy,should conduct annual or bian-nual training for all veteranofficers (in a resistance con-tinuum) that will enhance offic-ers’ perceptions of resistance and,

in turn, direct them toward appropriate force decisionmaking. Police trainers should design classroomtraining based on prior arrest reports or actual video-taped confrontations, using this material to evaluateand recognize various types of arrest resistancepatterns. Trainers, at a minimum, should structuresafe role-playing exercises around resistance encoun-tered during traffic stops, disturbances, and misde-meanor or felony arrests. This type of realistictraining will enhance officers’ abilities when respond-ing to resistance situations, allowing them to applyobjective, reasonable force measures based on thesituation. Instructors should videotape the trainingfor later evaluation and discussion in the classroom.

“

”

...an officer mayexperience more thanone type of resistance

with no order or patternduring an arrest.

June 1999 / 11

CONCLUSIONThe use of force by the police remains a critical

issue for both the police and the public. Inappropriateresponses by the police to perceived resistance haveled to deaths, citizen and officer injuries, riots, awidening gap of distrust between communities andpolice agencies, and an increase in criminal and civilliability. Officers must base their use of physical forceresponse on verbal threats and physical behaviorsdemonstrated by the suspects theyencounter.

By implementing a forcepolicy that integrates a resistancecontinuum and by providingregular training for their officers,departments provide guidance toofficers. This two-prongedapproach can enhance lawenforcement officers’ abilities toidentify types of citizen resistanceand determine appropriate forceoptions. By developing applicablepolicies and training programs,departments demonstrate theirconcern for their officers’ safetywhile preparing them to make thebest choices possible.

Endnotes1 Graham v. Conner, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).2 A. Binder and L.A. Fridell, “Lethal Force as a Police Response,”

Criminal Justice Abstracts 16 (1984): 250-280; A. Binder and P. Scharf,“The Violent Police Citizen Encounter,” Annals of the AmericanAcademy of Political and Social Science 452 (1980): 111-121; J.J. Fyfe,“Shots Fired: An Examination of New York City Police FirearmsDischarges,” (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York, 1978); J.J. Fyfe,“Administrative Interventions on Police Shooting Discretion,” Journal ofCriminal Justice 7 (1979): 309-323; J.J. Fyfe, “Police Use of DeadlyForce: Research and Reform,” Justice Quarterly 5 (1988): 165-205; W.A.Geller, “Deadly Force: What We Know,” Journal of Police Science andAdministration 10 (1982): 151-177; W.A. Geller, “Officer Restraint in theUse of Deadly Force: The Next Frontier in Police Shooting Research,”Journal of Police Science and Administration 13 (2) (1985): 152-171; D.Jacobs and D. Britt, “Inequality and Police Use of Deadly Force: AnEmpirical Assessment of a Conflict Hypothesis,” Social Problems 26(1978): 401-411; and K. Matulia, “A Balance of Forces,” (Alexandria,VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1982).

3 E.B. Croft, “Police Use of Force: An Empirical Analysis,” (Ph.D.diss., State University of New York, 1985), abstract in Dissertation

Abstracts International 46 (1985): no. 2449A, University MicrofilmsNo. DA8-519744; D.H. Bayley and J. Garofalo, “The Management ofViolence by Police Patrol Officers,” Criminology 27 (1989): 1-27; R.J.Friedrich, “Police Use of Force: Individuals, Situations, and Organiza-tions,” Annals of the American of Political and Social Science 452(1980): 82-97; J. Garner, et al., “Understanding the Use of Force by andAgainst the Police,” Research Brief (Washington, DC: National Instituteof Justice, 1996); R.E. Worden, “The Causes of Police Brutality: Theoryand Evidence on Police Use of Force,” in And Justice For All: Under-standing and Controlling Police Abuse of Force, ed. W.A. Geller and H.Toch (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 1995).

4 D.H. Bayley and J. Garofalo, “Patrol Officer Effectiveness inManaging Conflict During Police-CitizenEncounters,” in the Report to the New YorkState Commission on Criminal Justice and theUse of Force, New York State Commission onCriminal Justice, 1987, 3, B1-88; R.G.Greenleaf and L. Lanza-Kaduce, “Sophistica-tion, Organization, and Authority-SubjectConflict: Rediscovering and UnravelingTurk’s Theory of Norm Resistance,”Criminology 33, no. 4 (1995): 565-585; J.D.Hirschel, et al., “The Relative Contribution ofDomestic Violence to Assault and Injury toPolice Officers,” Justice Quarterly 11 (1994):99-117; V.␣ McLauglin, Police and the Use ofForce: The Savannah Study (Westport, CT:Praeger Publishers, 1992); A. Reiss, Jr., ThePolice and the Public (New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press, 1971).

5 G. Connor, “Use of Force Continuum,”Law and Order, March 1991, 30-32; J.C.Desmedt, “Use of Force Paradigm,” Journal of

Police Science and Administration 12, no. 2 (1984): 170-176; FederalLaw Enforcement Training Center, 1990 Use of Force Model: OrientationBooklet, (Glynco, GA: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center,1990);K.␣ Parsons, The Confrontational Continuum (Appleton, WI: KevinParsons and Associates, 1980); R. L. Parsons, “Police Use of ForceMatrix,” (Lansing, MI: Michigan Law Enforcement Officer TrainingCouncil, 1984); B.K. Siddle, Defensive Tactics Instructor Manual(Millstadt, IL: PPCT Publications, 1984).

6 V. McLaughlin, Police and the Use of Force: The Savannah Study(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992).

7 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, LawEnforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (Washington, DC, 1995).

8 Ibid.9 M. Blumberg, “The Use of Firearms by Officers: The Impact of

Individuals, Communities, and Race,” (Ph.D. diss., State University ofNew York, 1983); and V. McLaughlin, Police and the Use of Force: TheSavannah Study (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992).

Dr. Ross is an associate professor in the criminal justiceprogram at East Carolina University in Greenville, NorthCarolina.

© Mark Ide


magine a woman having cartrouble. She accepts a ride witha man, and he rapes her. Af-

What if she never tells anyoneabout the assault? What if the as-sailant rapes again? Indeed, up to 84percent of all sexual assaults go un-reported,1 leaving victims with un-resolved trauma, assailants unac-countable for their crimes, and lawenforcement officials uninformedabout the complete picture of sexualviolence in their communities.

Now imagine that she has anoption that allows her to sharecritical information with law en-forcement without requiring her to

sacrifice the confidentiality she de-serves. In fact, an anonymous re-porting system enables law enforce-ment investigators to gaininformation about crimes of sexualviolence that likely otherwise willgo unreported, while it allows vic-tims an opportunity to gather legalinformation from law enforcementwithout having to commit immedi-ately to an investigation. Victimshave a chance to find out what theprocess is like, what chance theyhave of filing successful charges,

Iterward, she feels foolish, hurt,ashamed, vulnerable, and fright-ened. She questions her judgment.Perhaps the rapist threatened to hurther if she told anyone; perhaps shefears the reaction of her friends orfamily if they find out about it. Per-haps she has followed enough rapecases in the media to know that vic-tims often are revictimized by thelegal and judicial processes.

Blind Reportingof Sexual ViolenceBy SABRINA GARCIA, M.A., andMARGARET HENDERSON, M.P.A.

© Don Ennis

June 1999 / 13

and what it will be like to work withthe investigator. In the long run, vic-tims, investigators, and the commu-nity all benefit from blind reporting.

Benefiting from aBlind Reporting System

According to the FBI, only 16percent of sexual violence victimsreport the crime to law enforce-ment.2 Victims of stranger rape re-main more likely to report the crimethan victims who get raped bypeople they know. Even victimswho report the crime often choosenot to report the circumstances ofthe assault, the identity of the assail-ant, or the nature of the violence. Asa result, when law enforcement of-ficers review the reported incidentswithin the community, the numbersreflect only a fraction of the vio-lence that actually occurs. Law en-forcement may not have the mostimportant information about localoffenders’ patterns of behaviors orthe characteristics of emerginghigh-risk situations or locations.Therefore, law enforcement ben-efits from accepting blind reportsbecause investigators have a clearerpicture of sexual violence in theircommunities. Moreover, when in-vestigators can pinpoint dangerousscenarios, they can better educatethe public, thus improving commu-nity relations and possibly garner-ing information on other neighbor-hood crime problems.

Blind reporting also providesother benefits. In the immediate af-termath of a trauma, a victim simplymay not have the emotional orphysical capacity to make a com-mitment to a full investigation and acourt trial. The victim may equate

talking to an investigator with los-ing control again, a repeat of whathappened during the sexual assault.Having evidence collected, riskinga breach of confidentiality, beingdisbelieved or criticized by others,or enduring a cross-examination bya hostile defense attorney all mayblend together as one potentialthreat to the victim. Yet, if the pro-cess feels safe to victims, they willbe more likely to cooperate with aformal investigation. Blind report-ing lets victims take the investiga-tive process one step at a time, al-lowing time to build trust betweenthe investigator and the victim andmaking the whole process feel moremanageable.

Describing the assault to a lawenforcement professional gives thevictim an opportunity to affirm thatthe assailant did, in fact, commit acrime, which helps in the personalprocess of healing from the traumaand can help build the victim’sconfidence in filing charges againstthe rapist. At the same time, the

investigator gains the opportunityto provide the appropriate commu-nity services of sharing informa-tion, answering questions, and mak-ing referrals for services to suchagencies as health clinics or rapecrisis centers.

In some states, victims who fileblind reports can receive rapevictim’s assistance, which providescompensation for the costs associ-ated with an emergency rape exami-nation or other related expenses.3

Some victims may be reluctant tohave medical evidence collected be-cause they cannot afford the $600–850 expense for the emergencyroom or because they do not wantthe treatment to show up on insur-ance and billing records.

Even victims who decide not topursue legal charges alone maycome forward willingly to supportother victims of the same assailant.Victims who initially hesitate to filea formal report at the time of theassault may change their mindswhen given the option of supporting

Ms. Henderson serves asexecutive director for the OrangeCounty Rape Crisis Center inChapel Hill, North Carolina.

Ms. Garcia serves as a crisiscounselor for the Chapel Hill,North Carolina, PoliceDepartment.


or being supported by other victimsof the same assailant. The testi-mony of a prior victim can help theinvestigator build the case and thedistrict attorney prove it by estab-lishing a pattern of behavior by theaccused.

Establishing a BlindReporting System

A blind report requires thesame sensitivity and patience fromofficers that a formal police reportdoes. Investigators achieve success-ful reporting by granting victims therespect and dignity given to anycrime victim and, in this case, ano-nymity, as well. To develop a suc-cessful blind reporting system, lawenforcement agencies should

1) establish a policy ofconfidentiality. The key to asuccessful blind reportingsystem is building trustbetween the rape victim andthe investigator, who mustunderstand that the assailantbetrayed the victim’s trust inpeople. The law enforcementagency must define clearly anduphold unconditionally itspolicy of confidentiality.

2) accept the amount ofinformation offered. Investiga-tors must allow victims todisclose as little or as muchinformation as they desire. Byasking victims to clarifyparticular points, investigatorslet them choose to do so. Incontrast, putting pressure onvictims to convey moreinformation than they wantmay cause a breakdown.Any amount of informationgiven, even if less than the

investigator prefers, representsmore than would otherwisebe available and may proveuseful in building othercases.

3) accept the informationwhenever the victim mightoffer it. A delay in disclosureis not an indicator of thevalidity of the statement.Rather, feelings of self-blame,shame, isolation, fear, ordenial may motivate victimsto remain silent about theirassaults. Yet, when victimshave support from peoplewho validate that the assaultwas, in fact, a crime, theybecome more likely to choose

may be so afraid of losingconfidentiality that they willdisclose information onlythrough a third party, such asa rape crisis center or batteredwomen’s shelter. This optionallows the victim to maintaina comfortable distance fromthe law enforcement processwhile still conveying informa-tion to the appropriateofficials.5) clarify options for futurecontact. Victims may prefer tobe contacted again underspecific conditions or not atall. For example, if the of-fender later is charged withanother assault, would thevictim want to be notified toconsider filing a formalreport? Would the victim offeradditional clarification ifdoing so became critical foranother case? On the blindreport, investigators shoulddocument where, how, andunder what circumstancesthe victim may be contacted.The report should specifyclearly whether officerscan leave messages on answer-ing machines or with otherpeople who may answer thephone.6) maintain blind reports inseparate files. The blind reportis not an official police report.Keeping it in a separate filewithin the investigativedivision or with a designatedsexual assault investigatoravoids inappropriate use of theinformation it contains andmaintains the confidentialitypromised the victim. The blind

“ The key to asuccessful blind

reporting system isbuilding trust betweenthe rape victim and the

investigator....

”to report the assault immedi-ately. Otherwise, victims maywait until they begin to healor until they gather the per-sonal strength necessary totrust law enforcement withtheir disclosures. Other victimsmay come forward only whenthey hear of a similar crimeoccurring or of the sameassailant hurting someone else.

4) accept information fromthird parties. Some victims

June 1999 / 15

report should not becomeavailable to the recordsdivision until the victimchooses to file a formal report.Until that time, only officersassigned specifically to sexualassault cases should haveaccess to the blind report.

7) categorize the informationcontained within the blindreport. Analyzing the informa-tion in the report helps theinvestigator identify specificcase and offender characteris-tics—such as names of perpe-trators, locations and times ofassaults, types of lures, traitsof offenders, and processes ofvictim selection—and catego-rize this information in a waythat eases retrieval and helpsmatch case aspects to otherinvestigations.

Overcoming Resistanceto Blind Reporting

Law enforcement agencies ini-tially may feel inclined to dismissthe benefits of establishing a blindreporting system solely because ofthe time investment it requires. Yet,the 1 hour or so that it takes to talkto a victim and complete a 2-pagereport pales in comparison to thepotential benefits. Sex offenderstend to be repeat offenders. De-pending on the typology of the of-fender, behavior may escalate in in-tensity and frequency over time.Building a case against an assailantbecomes much easier when officershave information about threeincidents instead of one or if of-ficers recognize that the actions ofa nameless stranger seem similarto those described by another

victim who provides identifyinginformation.

The following real-life exampledemonstrates how a blind reportmay aid an investigation of thistype. Law enforcement becameaware of a series of rapes in town.The assailant selected his victimscarefully. He preferred white, blondcollege students in their 20s. Climb-ing through windows in theirhomes, he assaulted the womenwhile they slept. After overpower-ing the victims and raping them, hewiped away his seminal fluid withany towel available, then orderedthe victims to shower, keeping theirfaces directed away from him,while he supervised the process.The victims identified him as a manin his late 20s to mid-30s.

The time of the assaults (5 to 7a.m.) suggested that the rapist didshift work. His careful actions toremove bodily fluids and hair indi-cated that he had knowledge of evi-dence-collection techniques, sug-gesting a background in a medicalfield. The personal mannerisms and

verbal expressions he used indi-cated he had spent time in the mili-tary or law enforcement.

About the same time, the victimof an acquaintance rape came in tomake a blind report. She was afraidto prosecute, primarily out of fear ofretaliation from the assailant, butalso because she did not want herfamily to learn that she had useddrugs with the assailant. She madethe blind report, providing identify-ing information on the suspect, in-cluding his name and where heworked.

He did shift work in the medicalfield, his background included astint in the military, and his age fellwithin the range suggested by theserial rape victims. He had no crimi-nal record. Police officers did nothave a photograph of the subject, sothey took one of the serial rape vic-tims to the suspect’s place of em-ployment, and she picked him out inthe parking lot during a shiftchange. Police then brought thesuspect in for questioning. Hedenied committing the rapes.

• builds trust between officers and victims, who may decide toproceed with a full investigation;

• provides information about the patterns of behavior of repeatoffenders, which can be used to identify assailants or buildcases for court;

• presents a better view of the degree of sexual violence in thecommunity by providing more information on more assaults;

• may help prevent crime by educating the public about high-risk scenarios or locations gleaned from both blind and fullreports; and

• garners trust in the community, possibly allowing officers togain vital information on other cases.

The Benefits of Blind Reporting—


Unfortunately, insufficient DNAexisted to confirm or deny a matchand not enough other evidence wasavailable to support prosecution. In-terestingly, the rapes stopped afterthis confrontation, despite the lackof confirmation that he was, indeed,the assailant. Although this suspectgot away, the blind reporting pro-cess can help capture others in asimilar manner.

ConclusionSexual violence cases require

special handling. Victims may behypersensitive to real or perceivedthreats to their safety or their confi-dentiality. At the same time, inves-tigation and prosecution invitethreats to confidentiality and thephysical and emotional safety of thevictim, and victims who disclosetheir experience open themselvesup for additional violations. As aresult, many victims choose to fo-cus on their own healing rather thanon trying to achieve justice in sys-tems that historically have not beensupportive of victims of sexual vio-lence. To overcome the threat thatreporting represents to victims, of-ficers have to work harder to makethe reporting process feel safe.

In addition, ensuring the safetyof the community represents theprimary goal of law enforcement.Law enforcement agencies that re-main ill-informed about the truecrime picture in their communitiesare ill-equipped to provide appro-priate services. In order for the legalsystem to hold criminals account-able for their actions, it first mustdiscover the crimes that they havecommitted. Blind reporting cangive victims of sexual violence, andother sensitive crimes, a safe haven

to file a report at the same time thatit removes that refuge from theirassailants.

All officers want to close outtheir cases, both for their own satis-faction and to meet the depart-ment’s need to document its work-load. Investigators who work in anenvironment in which effectivenessis measured only by immediatequantifiable gain may be reluctantto institute a blind reporting system.In reality, they will spend time tak-ing blind reports that will not resultin anything more than witnessingthe victims’ accounts of their as-saults. Not only is it of no immedi-ate benefit to them, but the experi-ence may disturb them as much as itdoes the victim.

However, some blind reportsbecome full reports and lead to in-vestigations and successful pros-ecutions. Others provide useful in-formation for investigation in othercases. All of them help officersbuild relationships and gain a truepicture of sexually violent crimescommitted in the community.

Officers who accept the poten-tial for delayed gratification maybecome the most ardent supportersof blind reporting systems. The pay-off for the effort eventually will bedemonstrated through improvedcommunity relations and, over time,more effective investigations andprosecutions.

Endnotes1 U.S. Department of Justice, National

Crime Statistics (Washington, DC: 1993).2 In J. Timberlake, “Profile, Congress-

women, and the New Bills,” Women’s Self-Defense, May 1994, 48.

3 North Carolina Assistance Program forVictims of Rape and Sex Offenses, 1981.

Teaching Criminal Justice Ethics:Strategic Issues, edited by John Kleinigand Margaret Leland Smith, published byAnderson Publishing Co., Cincinnati,Ohio, 1997.

The results of a recent InternationalAssociation of Chiefs of Police needsassessment regarding the perceivedjustification for and effectiveness of ethicstraining for law enforcement officersindicated that significant interest exists inthe topic. Yet, some critics of ethicstraining express the belief that “tigerscan’t change their stripes,” or they wonderwhy law enforcement agencies hiresupposedly ethical individuals thenpresume to teach them ethics.

The editors of Teaching CriminalJustice Ethics: Strategic Issues addressthese and related questions and concernsusing relevant research and academicanalysis. Many of the questions addressedand answered—often from both sides ofthe issue so that readers may choose—remain important for law enforcementpractitioners, academy trainers, andexecutive managers alike. Some of thequestions addressed include: why teachethics to individuals hired to police ranksbecause, among other reasons, back-ground investigations show them to havereputations for ethical behavior? Does asufficient distinction exist between basicmorality and law enforcement ethics tojustify expenditures of time, money, andeffort by already-burdened agenciestoward an understanding and genuinepractice of the latter? Will such emphasismake a difference? Once adapted withincurricula, how should law enforcementethics be structured, what should be pre-supposed and emphasized, and to whatend?

Admittedly, Teaching CriminalJustice Ethics analyzes most of these

June 1999 / 17

Book Review

issues from the point of view of college/university departments that have a bit moreluxury of time and reflection than fast-paced,results-oriented law enforcement academyprograms. The issues and proposed resolutionsare nonetheless extremely well reasoned andexplicated and, therefore, should be reviewedby managers and practitioners within lawenforcement academies.

The editors set the tone for this collectionby stating that “a well-executed course [in lawenforcement ethics] could provide measurablyheightened sensitivity, improved reflection,and better performance” (emphasis added).This is precisely what the public rightlydemands of its officers and agents, what themedia and oversight groups pounce on if theyfail, and what the contributors to this editionprovide with varying degrees of success. Forexample, although law enforcement reliesheavily on informants, some of whom havecriminal backgrounds, officers cannot merelyuse and discard them or otherwise violate theirdignity. Although this book does not draw theline between such important performanceissues and the more significant moral concernsof informant handling, it can help practitionersbetter understand how to structure policeethics courses so that students, officers, andagents will come to know, for example, whatconstitutes appropriately aggressive, produc-tive, and ethical informant development.

Some of the book’s more abstract discus-sions may be of little benefit to the academyinstructor. However, without exception, thethematic articles warrant close review.Michael Davis’ “Teaching Police Ethics: Whatto Aim At?” offers particular insight into suchissues as what the FBI (borrowing from theAustralians) refers to as the “golden thread”approach to teaching ethics, which requiresweaving an ethical emphasis or scenario,practicum, or something of the sort into eachinstructional component. This “pervasivemethod,” as Davis calls it, coupled with afreestanding ethics course, represents a dual

approach that the FBI and other agencies haveadopted already. In addition, Professor Joan C.Callahan’s important contribution to thiscollection provides insight for those setting upor refining academic ethics components in theiracademies.

Many recent law enforcement ethicsinitiatives, to include those structured by theFBI, U.S. Customs, and the New York PoliceDepartment, are developing instructionaltechniques and curricula in concert withbehavioral science perspectives and findings.Teaching Criminal Justice Ethics speaks, albeitindirectly, to this trend. Serious police manag-ers who want the best results from their integ-rity initiatives should read carefully ProfessorElizabeth Reynolds Welfel’s “Psychology’sContribution to Effective Models of EthicsEducation in Criminal Justice.” Her treatmentof mistakes by professionals, especially those inlaw enforcement, is excellent: “Truly ethicalprofessionals will not be perfect persons, butthey should be equipped to take responsibilityfor their mistakes.” On first reading, a truism,perhaps, but Welfel chooses her words care-fully and then unpacks them. How does lawenforcement “equip” its ranks to tell the truthand to understand the limits of dedication andloyalty, while not “denying or running awayfrom their problems?”

Indeed, this collection examines what areperhaps the two most important factors thatcontribute to ethical conduct in law enforce-ment, how agencies ethically equip theirpersonnel and how they ethically structure theirorganizations. Law enforcement administratorsowe it to the profession to seek out and putinto practice much that this timely releaseoffers.

Reviewed bySpecial Agent Frank L. Perry, Ph.D.

Unit ChiefLaw Enforcement Ethics Unit

FBI AcademyQuantico, Virginia


hildren grow up hearingthe warning “Don’t talkto strangers,” and as adults,

potential exposure to Internet crimeincreases.

When computer users connectto the Internet, they link their com-puters to a server’s computer,which, in turn, connects to thou-sands of other servers. These com-puters provide the framework of theInternet. As millions of users signon to their respective servers andtransmit and receive bits of infor-mation, they create a maze of con-nections comparable to a web. Fromthis analogy comes the concept ofthe World Wide Web.

From a criminal’s point ofview, the Web offers anonym-ity and a buffer from gettingcaught, which, in turn, creates anopportunity for the “perfect” crime.Indeed, the Internet has become abreeding ground for crime. Thievestransfer funds from victims’ bankaccounts to their own. Vandals sendcomputer viruses to destroy com-puters. Pedophiles exchange childpornography with others or chatwith minors, building their trust sothey can set up meetings under falsepretenses. These offenses represent

Cthey usually remain wary of peoplethey do not know. Yet, every day,adults and children alike invitestrangers into their home. By sign-ing on to the Internet, they givestrangers the opportunity to crashtheir computers, access and misusepersonal information, manipulatetheir finances, and threaten theirsafety. Moreover, as the Internetgrows and becomes more a partof individuals’ daily routines, their

© D

igitalVision

Policing the InternetBy SCOTT SULLIVAN, J.D.

June 1999 / 19

merely a few of the crimes currentlybeing committed on the Internet.Media headlines such as “The Pi-rates of the Internet,”1 “ProsecutorsPut Sting into Online Search forPedophiles,”2 and “Defense DropsBombshell in Cybersex Case,”3

serve as evidence of the peril com-puter users face daily. The perpetra-tors are men and women from allwalks of life. All they need to com-mit their acts is a computer, anonline service, and a victim.

As history has proven, freedomand technological and societal ad-vances usually come with a price.For example, the advent of the auto-mobile offered a new freedom oftravel and connected the nation likenever before. However, along withthese advantages came many new,unforeseen risks and dangers. Toaddress these problems, the govern-ment created volumes of laws andregulations and a myriad of com-missions and bureaucracies.

Similarly, the popularity of theInternet has spawned online dan-gers not previously foreseen. Whilethe debate continues on whethernew laws and commissions shouldaddress Internet crime, law enforce-ment does not need to wait. Instead,law enforcement agencies can at-tack new high-tech crimes with fa-miliar, well-established laws.

COMBATINGINTERNET CRIME

Based on a common belief sys-tem, state and federal criminal lawsoften overlap and complement oneanother. Accordingly, every statepenal code and many federal stat-utes address most crimes. Whilecrimes differ in name, threshold, or

degree of punishment, the culpablebehavior remains the same.

For example, larceny repre-sents a crime in every criminalcode. Accordingly, whether the ob-ject of desire is a car, money, or anarticle of clothing, the theft repre-sents a violation of a larceny statute.But what if the thief steals moneyfrom a bank account using theInternet? Vladimir Levin did justthat when he used the Internet toaccess Citibank customers’ identifi-cation codes and passwords andtransfer $10 million dollars to hisown accounts.4

Although no criminal statuteexpressly prohibits Internet larceny,the FBI investigated the crime andtracked down Levin. Federal pros-ecutors for the Southern District ofNew York indicted him under acriminal statute that long predatesthe Internet—bank robbery. Afteran international effort to bring himto justice, Levin was extradited tothe United States from Great Britainand pleaded guilty.5

When the federal bank robberystatute does not cover Internet lar-ceny, federal prosecutors canchoose from an arsenal of appli-cable criminal statutes. For ex-ample, the federal Wire Fraud Actproscribes using the wires to furthera fraudulent scheme.6 This statuteapplies to most Internet larcenies.Although the interstate nature ofInternet crime usually lends itself tofederal prosecution, federal pros-ecutors still may decline to pros-ecute. When they do, state prosecu-tors need to take the lead in fightingInternet crime.

Congress has created manylaws designed to protect organiza-tions engaged in interstate com-merce, and federal law enforcementuses its resources to investigate andprosecute criminals who violatethese laws. With the advent of theInternet, federal law enforcement’sresponsibilities have increased sig-nificantly. And, increasingly, thefederal government has had to pro-tect itself from cyber criminals. For

“

”

Many lawenforcement

agencies haverecognized the

increasedresponsibility that

the Internet hasbestowed on them

Patrolman Sullivan serves with the WestchesterCounty, New York, Police Department and also is

an associate with a private law firm in White Plains.


example, in February 1998, the U.S.Department of Defense admittedthat unclassified computer net-works had been under attack bycyber hackers. The deputy secretaryof defense characterized theserecent cyber assaults as “the mostorganized and systematic attack thePentagon has seen to date.”7

As the number and types ofcrimes committed online and facili-tated by the Internet continue togrow, state and local law enforce-ment must join the fight againstcyber crime. Like their federalcounterparts, state and local offic-ers can apply their penal codes toprosecute Internet criminals. Insome cases, applying these laws tothe Internet becomes simply a mat-ter of creative analysis. For ex-ample, a crime such as criminalmischief, which prohibits a personfrom intentionally damaging an-other person’s property,8 does notspecifically address electronicmeans. Still, online vandals whosend individuals viruses that dam-age their computer hardware orsoftware are guilty of criminal mis-chief, with the value of the com-puter or the extent of the damagecaused determining the extent ofculpability. Just as the law wouldhold a person responsible forsmashing someone’s computer witha sledgehammer, it would do thesame if someone destroyed a com-puter with a virus—the equivalentof an electronic sledgehammer.

On the other hand, some lawsapply directly to Internet crime. Forexample, the crime of harassment,in its most basic form, proscribesintentional harassing, annoying,threatening, or alarming behavior,9

and legislators have provided for

increased sentences where the ha-rassment occurs electronically.10

Although such laws predate theInternet, they can be applied toonline harassment. When individu-als receive online threats, they canfile harassment complaints with thelocal police. If the threats are seri-ous and credible, the police, if theyhave Internet capabilities, can in-vestigate the source of the threatand charge the perpetrator with thecrime of aggravated harassment.Unfortunately, in jurisdictionswhere departments are unpreparedto handle Internet crime, offendersremain unpunished.

Many law enforcement agen-cies have recognized the increasedresponsibility that the Internet hasbestowed on them. At the sametime, they find that they can use theInternet as a tool for fighting notonly Internet crime but othercrimes, as well. The law enforce-ment Web page represents perhapsthe best and most common exampleof this trend. Online users can con-nect to the Web page to report bothInternet and other criminal activity.In turn, law enforcement agenciescan post public safety informationand communicate with online users.Moreover, law enforcement’s vis-ible presence on the Internet en-hances public safety awareness andmay deter crime.

Internet officers also can usetraditional law enforcement tools toconduct Internet crime investiga-tions. Search warrants can serve asan effective means to track downonline users. Commercial Internetproviders keep records of all onlinetransactions that come through theirservers. So, when one user sends ane-mail message to another user, theservice provider of each user willhave a record of where the e-mailcame from and where it was sent.Depending on the law in theirstates, officers can obtain consentfrom the sender and/or the recipientor obtain a warrant or grand jurysubpoena to access the records. Inone case, both the prosecutor andthe defense attorney sought accessto e-mail messages to support theirarguments. The prosecutor wantedto use the e-mail to help prove thatthe defendant sexually assaulteda Bernard College student. Thedefense wanted to use the e-mail toprove consent.11

“...in jurisdictionswhere departmentsare unprepared to

handle Internetcrime, offenders

remain unpunished.

”Patrolling the InternetOfficers on the beat do a great

deal more than merely make arrests.They take and investigate com-plaints and reports of suspicious ac-tivity, provide public safety infor-mation, and act as deterrents againstcrime. Accordingly, the Internetneeds beat officers. Contrary to theOrwellian image of Big Brother, of-ficers on the Internet would act asthe liaison between the online pub-lic and the law enforcement agency,policing the Internet in much thesame way as they police the streets.

June 1999 / 21

In some states, Internet ser-vice providers are obligated bylaw to turn over records to lawenforcement upon request or whenthey become aware of online crimi-nal activity.12 Either way, Internetofficers can rely on a number ofmethods to track down the perpetra-tors of illicit Internet activities.

In addition, Internet officersmust patrol the Information Super-highway, and a number of agenciesare doing just that. Still, accordingto one source, only federal law en-forcement agencies and the NewYork City Police Department“maintain squads of investigatorsto ferret out computer crimes.”13

These full-time units investigateand surf the Web for crime 24 hoursa day.

Child pornography and pedo-philia represent a mere sampling ofthe crimes that these squads target.In one instance, investigators fromthe district attorney’s office inWestchester County, New York,posed as young teens in online chatrooms. Their interaction with adultsled to solicitations and arrangedmeetings. As a result of this onlinelaw enforcement effort, investiga-tors arrested four pedophiles andare investigating more.14

CONCLUSIONLaw enforcement is springing

into action to fight Internet crime.Federal agencies have set the tone,with the FBI , U.S. Secret Service,and U.S. Customs Service headingthe Internet crime-fighting initia-tive. Many state and local agenciesare joining in by implementingInternet programs and giving theirpersonnel online law enforcement

training. However, the true effortcomes from agencies that havededicated resources to maintainingonline crime-fighting units. Theyhave acknowledged that law en-forcement must enter the 21st cen-tury as an online force.

The future of the Internet holdsmany uncertainties. Who, if any-one, will control it, how online us-ers will pay for their access, and towhat degree society will incorpo-rate the Internet into everyday liferemain unclear. But one thing is cer-tain, Internet crime represents a realand serious threat to the well-beingof the public. Ultimately, the extentof the threat posed by Internet crimewill be measured by the abilitiesand successes of the officerscharged with combating it.

Endnotes1 Adam S. Bauman, “The Pirates of the

Internet,” Los Angeles Times, November 3,1994, [newspaper online]; available from http://www2.arnes.si/home/piracy.html; Internet;accessed February 24, 1998.

2 Bruce Golding, “Prosecutors Put Sting intoOnline Search for Pedophiles,” The Daily Item

(Gannett Surburban Newspapers), April 13,1998, 1.

3 Ann V. Bollinger, “Defense DropsBombshell in Cybersex Case,” New York DailyNews, February 16, 1998, 16.

4 “Internet Robber Sentenced,” February 24,1998, [online article]; available from http://cnnfn.com/digitaljam/9802/24/robber; Internet;accessed February 25, 1998.

5 Ibid. See also United States v. Loney, 959F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1992) (defendants guilty ofwire fraud for adding unearned frequent flyermiles to their accounts electronically).

6 18 U.S.C. 1343.7 Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre,

in Associated Press, “Pentagon ComputersTargeted by Hackers,” February 26, 1998,[newspaper online]; available from http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/ctc202.htm;Internet; accessed August 3, 1998.

8 See New York State Penal Law, Section145.00.

9 See New York State Penal Law, Section240.25.

10 See New York Penal Law, Section240.30.

11 Supra note 3.12 See New York State Penal Law, Section

250.35.13 Daniel Wise, “Local Agencies Get Tough

on Cyber-Crime,” New York Law Journal(October 1997): 1.

14 Supra note 2.


Focus on Investigations

ew individuals would feel comfortableconstructing a building without blueprints or

take a polygraph and interviewing the suspect’sboyfriend, who is rumored to have received moneyfrom the suspect. The statute of limitations finallytolls on the crime.

Another detective has spent 6 months investigat-ing an insurance fraud case. She has interviewedhundreds of victims of an unscrupulous insuranceagent. She has written up many of the interviews,while others remain in dictation, and still others onlyexist as her rough notes. Unexpectedly, she dies, andthe case gets assigned to another detective. Beforeproceeding, the new detective first must determinewhat records still need to be examined and who needsto be interviewed. The investigation is delayed severalmonths during this transition period.

A third detective investigates a kickback case. For3 months, he interviews witnesses and examinesfinancial records. He writes a final report and refersthe matter for prosecution. He subsequently receivesa call from the prosecuting attorney, who notes thatwitness interviews and financial records examined do

Fplans. This holds particularly true when the structureis complex, will take years to construct, and will beexpected to stand the test of time. Constructionexperts know that without thorough planning, theymay miss or unnecessarily repeat important steps.

Ironically, many law enforcement officers haveno qualms about hastily building cases with little orno planning, expecting their investigations to weatherattacks by defense counsels and survive years ofappellate review. And, given their complexity, white-collar crime cases especially require thorough,documented investigative plans.

THE NEED FOR AN INVESTIGATIVE PLANConsider the following scenarios:A detective receives an embezzlement allegation

from a company’s officers. He promptly submitssuspected checks for analysis. Over the next 2 years,he directs his efforts only at getting the suspect to

Investigative PlanningCreating a Strong Foundationfor White-collar Crime CasesBy Arthur L. Bowker, M.A.

June 1999 / 23

not fully substantiate the major offense cited in thereport. The detective must reinterview all witnessesregarding the unsubstantiated issues.

Had these fictional detectives devised writteninvestigative plans, many of these problems couldhave been minimized, if not eliminated entirely.Documented plans provide a frame of reference forthe investigation to ensure that all aspects of the crimeare covered in a timely manner. Specifically, aproperly formulated plan

• focuses the investigative process to ensure thatall offense elements are addressed;

• limits unnecessary proceduresand step duplication;

• coordinates the investigativeactivities of numerous person-nel on large cases;

• provides stability to theinvestigation if staff changesoccur;

• enhances communication withprosecuting officials byproviding an outline of theinvestigation and identifyingstrengths and weaknesses inthe case;

• provides a framework for the final report; and

• becomes a training aid for inexperienced staffmembers.It takes no special skill to create and follow an

investigative plan; rather, investigators must have aworking knowledge of the statutory elements of thecrimes under their agency’s purview; any specialpenalty enhancements for certain offenders, offenses,or victimizations; and basic investigative techniques.Investigators must keep the plan objective and notreflect that they already have established the suspect’sguilt.

COMPONENTS OF ANINVESTIGATIVE PLAN

A written investigative plan contains four basiccomponents. These are the predication, elements toprove, preliminary steps, and investigative steps.

PredicationAn investigative plan must include a predication,

or brief statement justifying why the case initially wasopened. Predications have three features: the basicallegation, the source of the allegation, and the datethe allegation was received. For example, afterreceiving an embezzlement allegation, the investigatormight write this predication: “On June 1, 1998,received information from ABC Union Auditor JaneSmith that she discovered that former bookkeeperTom Roberts had written $20,000 in unauthorizedchecks to himself during 1997.”

In short, predications clearly identify whatparticular offense(s) may havebeen committed. This initial stepgives investigators a foothold forthe elements they must prove inorder to establish that a criminalact has occurred.

Elements to ProveThe plan must reflect all of the

elements that the investigatorneeds to prove for the case to beprosecuted successfully. Thiscomponent must clearly reflectwhat is needed to establish acriminal violation, thus focusing

the investigation and providing a framework for thesteps that follow. At a minimum, this componentshould contain all of the statutory elements and anyspecial jurisdictional issues, such as venue andstatutes of limitations. Special penalty enhancementsrepresent another area that this component mightinclude, particularly for federal offenses.1

The following example illustrates the possibleelements to prove for a federal investigation of unionembezzlement.2

1) The victim was a labor organization as definedby the Labor Management Reporting and Disclo-sure Act of 1959 (as amended).

2) The suspects were officers and/or employeesof the labor organization.

3) The suspects unlawfully took funds and/orassets belonging to the victim.

“

”

...a properly formulatedplan focuses the

investigative processto ensure that alloffense elementsare addressed....


4) The suspects converted the assets or fundstaken to their own, or someone else’s, personaluse.

5) The violation was willful.

6) The violation occurred within the last 5 years.The plan must clearly reflect the issues that must

be proven but remain fluid enough to change if theinvestigation leads in another direction. Thus, anymodification to the initial plan should not be a majoroverhaul but merely should represent a refinement asthe investigation develops.

For cases involving multiple violations, investiga-tors should outline only the most serious offenses andrefer to the others as violations that also may beconsidered during the investigation. In any case,delineating the elements to prove and other importantissues, such as sentencing enhancements, helpsinvestigators identify the steps they need to take tocomplete the investigation. These steps encompasstwo types: preliminary and investigative.

Preliminary StepsPreliminary steps represent the methods the

investigator will employ to obtain basic backgroundinformation on the victim, the complainant, and thesuspects. These include such procedures as reviewingfiles on prior allegations or investigations; conductingan in-depth interview of the complainant; obtainingand reviewing public records, such as incorporationpapers or financial reports filed with governmentagencies; and conducting a criminal backgroundcheck of pertinent parties. Typically, step completion

under this component does not require a great expen-diture of time or personnel.

Investigative StepsThe investigative plan also must include the steps

necessary to resolve the issues and complete theinvestigation. These investigative steps lay out thegeneral parameters needed to establish that a crimehas occurred and include who will be interviewed andwhat records will be obtained and examined. Investi-gative steps should parallel the elements that need tobe proven. For example, in an embezzlement case, theinvestigator would need to examine bank records andinterview bank tellers to prove that the suspectconverted agency funds to personal use. For otherinvestigations, a partial list of applicable steps in-cludes interviewing victims; serving subpoenas;obtaining and serving search warrants; gaining accessto financial records; examining records; identifyingand interviewing key witnesses; obtaining exemplars;forwarding questionable documents for analysis;identifying and interviewing suspects; briefingprosecuting officials; and preparing a final report.

In large cases involving multiple investigators,individual steps could be assigned to specific indi-viduals, who become responsible for their completion.In addition, when investigators need to interviewnumerous witnesses, they can compile an itemizedlist, keep it separate from the investigative plan, andmerely refer to the list in the plan. Specifically, theinvestigative step would read “identify and interviewkey witnesses (see list).” As a general rule, the planlists the steps to be completed in generic terms

Functions of an Investigative Plan—

• enhances communication with prosecutingofficials by providing an outline of theinvestigation and identifying strengthsand weaknesses in the case;

• provides a framework for the final report;and

• becomes a training aid for inexperiencedstaff members.

• focuses the investigative process to ensurethat all offense elements are addressed;

• limits unnecessary procedures and stepduplication;

• coordinates the investigative activities ofnumerous personnel on large cases;

• provides stability to the investigation if staffchanges occur;

Mr. Bowker is a U.S. probation officer for the NorthernDistrict of Ohio in Cleveland.

without including such specifics as names. However,the investigator could modify the plan later to incor-porate such information.

HELPFUL HINTSInvestigators should seriously consider keeping

copies of investigative plans on computer. Once theydevelop a plan for a particular case, they can continueto use it as a model, or boilerplate, for similar cases.Good boilerplate plans greatly reduce the initial timeneeded to develop new plans for offenses investigatedfrequently. Storing the plan on computer also allowsinvestigators to easily note when they complete ormodify steps or procedures.

Still, a hard copy of the plan should remain in thecase file. By consulting the plan on a periodic basis,the case officer keeps the investigation on the righttrack. As important, anyone reviewing the file candetermine the status of the investigation.

CONCLUSIONThe word “routine” is fast disappearing from the

law enforcement lexicon. Even investigations thatonce seemed simple are growing increasingly com-plex, especially in the area of white-collar crime.

Without a frame of reference, investigators mayfind themselves becoming overwhelmed by theseoften-complicated investigations. Documented plansfocus an investigation from the start while providing ablueprint for investigators to follow. Using writtenplans, law enforcement officers provide a firmfoundation for the investigation and prosecution ofwhite-collar offenders.

Endnotes1 Felony sentencing in the federal system is governed to a large extent

by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Each offense has a base offense levelassigned to it, with points being added or subtracted for aggravating ormitigating circumstances present in the offense conduct. For example,pursuant to section 3B1.3, two points are added to the base offense levelfor offenders who violate a position of trust during the commission oftheir crimes. The higher the offense level, the more severe the penalty theindividual faces. The second part of the equation factors in criminalhistory. Also, the more points assigned for criminal history, the harsherthe penalty.

2 Union embezzlement violates 29 U.S.C. § 501(c).

Wanted:Photographs

he Bulletin staff isalways on the lookoutT

for dynamic, law enforce-ment-related photos forpossible publication in themagazine. We are interestedin photos that visually depictthe many aspects of the lawenforcement profession andillustrate the various taskslaw enforcement personnelperform.

We can use either black-and-white glossy or colorprints or slides, although weprefer prints (5x7 or 8x10).Appropriate credit will begiven to contributing photog-raphers when their workappears in the magazine. Wesuggest that you send dupli-cate, not original, prints aswe do not accept responsibil-ity for prints that may bedamaged or lost. Send yourphotographs to:

Brian Parnell, ArtDirector, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin,FBI Academy, MadisonBuilding 209, Quantico,VA 22135.

June 1999 / 25

Legal Digest


n agreement between twoor more people to commit acrime constitutes a con-

and prosecutors must recognize andproperly charge drug conspiracies.

Sincere AgreementMost states follow the federal

rule that in order for suspects tobe properly charged with a drugconspiracy, they must sincerelyagree with each other to violate the

drug laws.1 Where there is anap-parent agreement between a po-lice informant and a suspect to vio-late the drug laws, such an agree-ment will not constitute aconspiracy because the informant isnot being sincere.2 In that case,there is not a true meeting of theminds between the informant andthe suspect; the informant actuallyis trying to thwart the criminal en-terprise. There must be at least twosuspects who have criminal intententering into an agreement in orderfor that agreement to be a con-spiracy.

If a suspect is involved in a con-spiracy and then decides to cooper-ate with the police, perhaps becausehe or she has been arrested, the pre-arrest agreement with the other sus-pects would constitute a con-spiracy.3 Any future agreements, onthe other hand, between the newlycooperative informant and anysingle suspect would not constitutea conspiracy but could be used asevidence to prove a past or presentconspiracy between the suspect andother conspirators. Increasinglythough, states are enacting unilat-eral conspiracy statutes that allow asuspect to be charged with con-spiracy if the suspect agrees with aninformant or undercover agent tocommit a crime.4

ImpossibilityDrug traffickers can be charged

and convicted of conspiracy eventhough they have not completed thedrug crime they agreed to commit.This is true even if the police, by

Drug ConspiraciesBy EDWARD M. HENDRIE, J.D.

Aspiracy. Illegal drug traffickingcommonly involves the agreementof several people working in con-cert to manufacture and distributedrugs. In order to best address theproblem of drug trafficking, police

©Don Ennis

June 1999 / 27

arresting the conspirators, make itimpossible for them to completethe offense. The courts have de-fined two types of impossibility—factual impossibility and legalimpossibility. A crime is factuallyimpossible if the conspiratorswould be thwarted by the prior in-tervention of the police. It is not adefense to conspiracy that the crimethat the conspirators agree to com-mit was factually impossible tocomplete.5

A crime is legally impossible tocommit if the planned conduct ofthe conspirators is not a crime. Thegeneral rule is that legal impossibil-ity is a complete defense to a chargeof attempt. There is a split in thecourts, however, as to whether legalimpossibility is a defense to con-spiracy.6 Of course, it would be amanifest injustice if a court con-victed someone of conspiracy foragreeing to do something that is nota violation of the law.

Overt ActsIn most cases, persons involved

in a conspiracy will take steps tocommit the agreed-upon crime. Thecommon law rule, however, is thatit is not required that the govern-ment prove that the suspects com-mitted an overt act in furtherance ofthe conspiracy in order to prove thecrime of conspiracy. If a conspiracystatute does not expressly require anovert act, then a court likely willfollow the common law rule that anagreement alone will be sufficientto prove the conspiracy. For ex-ample, the federal drug conspiracystatute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, simplyprovides that those who conspire toviolate the federal drug laws are tobe punished to the same degree asthey could be for the drug crime

they agree to commit. In UnitedStates v. Shabani,7 the U.S. Su-preme Court ruled that because§ 846 does not expressly requireevidence of an overt act in order toprove a drug conspiracy, the U.S.Congress intended to codify thecommon law standard that an agree-ment alone is sufficient to proveconspiracy. The general federalconspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371,on the other hand, expressly re-quires proof of an overt act in fur-therance of the conspiracy. Regard-less of the language in a particularstatute, as a practical matter, overtacts are the most convincing evi-dence of the sincerity of an agree-ment. It would be a rare conspiracyprosecution that did not involveovert acts in furtherance of theconspiracy.

Wharton’s RuleAs a general rule, individuals

can be charged and convicted ofboth conspiracy and the completedcrime that they agreed to commit.There is, however, an exception tothat general rule. The exception,known as Wharton’s Rule, provides

that a conspiracy cannot be chargedif the commission of the substantiveoffense requires concert of actionbetween two people.8 For example,in order to distribute illegal drugs,there must be both a deliverer and arecipient of the drugs. UnderWharton’s Rule, if two people en-gage in a one-time sale of a smallquantity of an illegal drug, thebuyer and seller cannot be chargedwith conspiracy.9

There is, however, an exceptionto Wharton’s Rule. If an additionalparty who is not necessary for thecommission of the offense is in-volved in the transaction, then therule will not preclude a conspiracycharge.10 For example, if a drug traf-ficker employs another to assist himin a drug sale to a buyer, Wharton’sRule would not preclude the assis-tant from being convicted forconspiracy.11

Another way to defeat aWharton’s Rule defense is to estab-lish sufficient evidence that thebuyer and seller have a long stand-ing criminal relationship that in-volves repeated sales of large quan-tities of illegal drugs. Such facts

“

”

Drug traffickers canbe charged and

convicted ofconspiracy eventhough they havenot completed the

drug crime theyagreed to commit.

Special Agent Hendrie, DEA, is alegal instructor at the FBI Academy.


would be circumstantial evidencethat there is an agreement beyond asimple one-time transaction. Con-sequently, the buyer and sellercould be charged with conspiracy inaddition to the substantive drugcharge.12

Some courts do not applyWharton’s Rule at all to drug cases;they permit a buyer and seller to beconvicted of conspiracy eventhough there is not a third partypresent or any other exception to therule.13 Those courts rely on the U.S.Supreme Court decision of Iannelliv. United States,14 in which theCourt stated that Wharton’s Rule ismerely a judicial presumption thatis to be applied in the absence oflegislative intent to the contrary.For instance, in United States v.Bommarito,15 the U. S. Court of Ap-peals for the Second Circuit deter-mined that because the federal drugconspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846,provides that it is a violation to con-spire to commit any of the crimesunder Title 21, the U.S. Congressdid not intend that conspiracycharges under § 846 were to be lim-ited by Wharton’s Rule.

Circumstantial EvidenceIn order to prove a conspiracy,

it is not necessary to have directevidence from a witness who waspresent and actually heard thecriminal agreement. A conspiracycan be established through circum-stantial evidence. For example, inUnited States v. Iglesias,16 the de-fendant handed a white object to aperson on a dry docked boat as oth-ers on the boat craned their necksand looked around. A later searchof the boat by U.S. Customsagents found that it contained 521

kilograms of cocaine wrapped inwhite burlap bags. The court foundthat sufficient evidence existed tosupport the defendant’s convictionfor conspiracy to possess with in-tent to distribute cocaine.

In United States v. Alvarez,17

the entire bench of the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit ruledthat, based on circumstantial evi-dence, the defendant, Alvarez, wasguilty of conspiracy to import mari-juana into the United States. An il-legal drug supplier arrived in Miamifrom Colombia and stayed at

them. The Alvarez court ruled thatabsent Alvarez’s head nod, therewould have been insufficient evi-dence that Alvarez was involved inthe conspiracy. His agreement,however, to be available to off-loada plane at a remote airfield indi-cated that he knew of the illegalenterprise and was a willing partici-pant.

Those courts that followWharton’s Rule ordinarily wouldnot permit a single act of purchasingor selling illegal drugs to be thebasis for a charge of conspiracy un-less there is some additional cir-cumstantial evidence from which itcan be inferred that the actor is partof a larger conspiracy. The addi-tional evidence must establish thatthe suspect had knowledge of thelarger conspiracy and intended tojoin it.18 For example, in UnitedStates v. Barlin,19 the defendant wasfound in possession of approxi-mately 1/4 kilogram of 86 percentpure cocaine and $5,000 in cash.She had just left an apartment thatserved as the center of a drug distri-bution network and her name wasfound on a list of names of people inthe network prepared by one of herfellow conspirators. The court heldthat sufficient evidence existed, inaddition to the possession of co-caine, to infer that the defendantwas part of a larger conspiracy.

A key fact in determiningwhether a single transaction is anisolated purchase or actually part ofan established conspiracy to distrib-ute illegal drugs is the quantity ofthe drugs involved in the transac-tion. The larger the quantity ofdrugs, the more reasonable it is toinfer that the transaction is not anisolated sale, but an act that is part

“Mere presenceduring conspiracy

discussions isnot sufficient to

implicate a personin the conspiracy.

”Alvarez’s house. Alvarez arrivedwith the supplier at a meeting withundercover DEA agents. AsAlvarez was loading some appli-ances onto the undercover plane,one of the DEA agents askedAlvarez if he would be present at aremote landing strip to help unloadthe plane when it returned. Alvareznodded his head indicating that hewould be there. The plane was toreturn with the marijuana from Co-lombia, but no mention of the ille-gal cargo was made to Alvarez bythe DEA agent who asked him thequestion. As Alvarez and the otherswere leaving, DEA agents arrested

June 1999 / 29

of a larger conspiracy. In UnitedStates v. Boone,20 the court ruledthat a single transaction involving383 grams of cocaine along withconversations between the pur-chaser and wholesaler indicatingthere would be future sales wasenough to infer a conspiracy be-tween the buyer and the seller. Suchevidence suggested that the whole-saler had a direct interest in seeingthat the buyer successfully resoldthe drugs.

Mere PresenceMere presence during con-

spiracy discussions is not sufficientto implicate a person in the con-spiracy. On the other hand, it is notnecessary that a person actually sayanything at a conspiracy meeting inorder to be charged with conspiracyif other circumstantial evidence in-dicates that the silent person tacitlyhas agreed to participate in the con-spiracy. For example, in UnitedStates v. Baptista-Rodriguez,21 thedefendant was at several meetingsset up in order to plan a cocaineimportation operation between Co-lombian cocaine traffickers andboat drug transporters. The defen-dant was identified at one of thosemeetings as one of the “boatpeople.” The court affirmed thedefendant’s conspiracy convictionafter making the commonsense ob-servation that “[i]t is highly un-likely that conspirators attempting a500 kilogram smuggling operationwould have tolerated the recurrentpresence of a mere bystander,especially during the operationalstage of the scheme.”22 Even thoughthe defendant never said any-thing during the meetings, it wasreasonable to infer that he was a

participant in the conspiracy ratherthan a mere bystander.

In Baptista-Rodriguez, the de-fendant was found to be a conspira-tor because he was at a meeting ar-ranged for the sole purpose ofplanning the crime. If, on the otherhand, a suspect is present with drugconspirators, but there is a plausibleinnocent explanation for his pres-ence, then his mere presence wouldnot be enough to infer that he is partof the conspiracy. For example, inUnited States v. Pantoja-Soto,23

five subjects were in a gas stationafter business hours. DEA agents

the service bays. The court ruledthat the three subjects who had noprevious dealings with the infor-mant merely were present in the sta-tion and were not guilty of con-spiracy. There was no evidence thatthey had agreed to assist in the de-livery of the drugs. The court feltthat there was no evidence that thethree even knew that the drugs werein the station, even though two ofthe three tried to run when theDEA raided the garage to make thearrests.

Mere KnowledgeEven if the suspects in Pantoja-

Soto knew that the drugs were in thestation, that knowledge alone wouldnot be sufficient to prove either con-spiracy or possession. In order toprove a conspiracy charge, theremust be some evidence, either di-rect or circumstantial, that the per-son joined in an agreement withothers to violate drug laws. Mereassociation with criminals withoutagreeing to assist in the commissionof a crime is not enough to proveconspiracy. For instance, in UnitedStates v. Vasquez-Chan,24 the de-fendant was a live-in housekeeperwho knew that the homeowner wasinvolved in large-scale drug traf-ficking. The police found approxi-mately 600 kilograms of cocaine inthe house. The housekeeper admit-ted that she knew the drugs were inthe house. The court reversed herconspiracy conviction because theevidence proved only that she was ahousekeeper and there was insuffi-cient evidence that she had agreedto assist in the illegal venture.

In fact, a subject who knowsthat another person possesses ille-gal drugs is not in a conspiracy with

had probable cause to believe thatthere was methaqualone inside thestation. A DEA undercover officerand an informant had previouslynegotiated with two of the fivepeople in the station for the deliveryof 50,000 methaqualone tablets.The informant went into the stationand returned with a sample of threemethaqualone tablets. When theagents entered the station to makethe arrests, two of the subjects triedto run but were caught. The illegaldrugs were found in a box in one of

© Peter Hendrie


the possessor, even if he discussesthe drugs with the criminal pos-sessor, as long as he does not offerassistance or advice on how to dis-tribute the drugs or commit othercrimes. For example, in UnitedStates v. Kelly,25 the court ruled thatan attorney had not conspired withhis client to violate the federal druglaws even though the attorney knewthat the client had a kilogram ofcocaine and advised him not to meetwith others who wanted to take de-livery of it. The attorney feared thathis client was being “set up” to bearrested.

The court felt that once the at-torney in Kelly knew about the co-caine, he was in a Catch-22. If hetold his client to deliver the cocaine,he would be guilty of conspiracy;but if he told him not to deliver it, hecould be (and he was) accused ofconspiring to assist the client inconcealing the substance from thegovernment. The court also ruledthat the attorney was not guilty ofaiding and abetting the possessionwith intent to distribute the illegaldrugs. In order for the governmentto prove that a person is in a con-spiracy it is not sufficient for thegovernment to prove that the sus-pect knew of the planned crime oreven that the suspect discussed thecrime; the government must provethat the suspect agreed with anotherperson to play a role in the success-ful completion of the crime.

Individuals who know about aconspiracy and supply commoditiesthat flow without restriction in com-merce to a confederate of theconspiracy would not themselvesbe members of the conspiracy. Forexample, in United States v.Falcone,26 suppliers sold yeast and

sugar to a member of an illegaldistilling conspiracy. The U.S. Su-preme Court in Falcone found that,while the evidence showed that thesuppliers knew that the recipient ofthe yeast and sugar was making ille-gal alcohol, that alone did not putthem in a conspiracy with the boot-legger. While the government mustprove that a person knew of the con-spiracy in order to prove a con-spiracy charge, such knowledge by

small-town doctor in large quanti-ties with great frequency and over along a period of time. The sales con-sisted almost exclusively of mor-phine and had increased to an aver-age monthly quantity sufficient for400 average doses a day. Finally,the drug wholesaler offered specialinducements to the doctor to pur-chase large quantities. The U.S. Su-preme Court ruled that the mail-order wholesaler and the doctorwere in a conspiracy to violate fed-eral drug laws. The conspiracy wasestablished even though none of thewholesaler’s representatives hadpersonal communication with thephysician. The supplier had morethan mere knowledge of illegal ac-tivity; a continuous pattern of con-duct established a tacit agreementbetween the doctor and the whole-saler to illegally distribute a con-trolled substance.

The difference between the Di-rect Sales case and the Falcone caseis that the commodities sold inFalcone were articles of free com-merce, whereas the morphine in Di-rect Sales was a restricted commod-ity that was incapable of furtherlegal use except by compliance withrigid regulations. In addition, theDirect Sales wholesaler was sup-plying a controlled commodity insuch large quantities, and he wasencouraging future large purchases.Circumstantial evidence showedthat the supplier had more thanmere knowledge of the illegal re-sales; the wholesaler actually had astake in the success of the illegaldistribution of the drugs.

The Direct Sales Court statedthat it made no difference that noexpress agreement existed betweenthe wholesaler and the doctor. The

“The secretive natureof conspiracies often

necessitates thatthe evidence becircumstantial.

itself is insufficient to establish thata person is guilty of conspiracy. Tosustain a conspiracy conviction,there must be evidence of an agree-ment. The Falcone Court statedthat there was no evidence of anagreement between the suppliersand the bootlegger.

In another U.S. Supreme Courtcase, Direct Sales v. UnitedStates,27 the evidence showed that amail-order wholesaler continued tosupply a small-town doctor withmorphine after the Bureau of Nar-cotics warned the wholesaler thatthe doctor illegally was supplyingthe morphine to addicts. In additionto the government warning, the cir-cumstances indicated that the mor-phine was being dispensed unlaw-fully. The morphine was sold to the

”

June 1999 / 31

secretive nature of conspiraciesoften necessitates that the evidencebe circumstantial. It is the fact of theillegal agreement and not the formof the agreement that matters.28

Therefore, where suppliers en-courage the purchase of suppliesthat ordinarily are difficult to obtainand often are used in the productionof illegal drugs, it can be reasonablyinferred that they are implicitly pro-moting the illegal drug enterprise.For example, in United States v.Grunsfield,29 the court ruled that achemist was in a conspiracy withillegal drug manufacturers becausehe supplied large amounts of chemi-cals and equipment on three to fouroccasions to individuals who thechemist knew were illegal PCPmanufacturers. The supplier inGrunsfield, like the defendant inDirect Sales, did more than merelysupply the conspiracy; in fact, hepromoted the illegal enterprise andmade large profits on the sales ofthe chemicals. Unlike the defend-ant in Falcone, the chemist inGrunsfield supplied materials thatwere difficult to obtain and oftenwere used in the production of ille-gal drugs.

Vicarious Guilt (Pinkerton Rule)The criminal jeopardy suffered

by a person who enters an agree-ment with another to commit acrime goes beyond simply thecharge of conspiracy. In Pinkertonv. United States,30 the U.S. SupremeCourt held that if individuals enterinto a conspiracy, they are not onlyguilty of the conspiracy but eachalso are vicariously guilty of theobject crimes committed in further-ance of the conspiracy by any ofthe other conspirators. In addition,

under Pinkerton, conspirators arevicariously guilty of crimes com-mitted by any of the other conspira-tors that are reasonably foreseeableconsequences of the conspiracy.The Pinkerton Rule is the law in thefederal courts and in many statecourts,31 but some states have cho-sen not to adopt the rule.32

If a person joins a conspiracywell after its inception, such a latejoiner is guilty of conspiracy to thesame degree as the early joiners,even if the late joiner only played aminor role in the conspiracy.33 Alate joiner, however, would onlyface vicarious guilt under Pinkertonfor substantive offenses committedby other conspirators after he joinedthe conspiracy.

the major participants in that sameconspiracy.35

The Connecticut SupremeCourt case of State v. Diaz36 pro-vides an example of the applicationof the Pinkerton Rule. In Diaz, thedefendant was one of five street-side drug dealers who opened firewith a hail of 33 nine millimeterrounds and seven .45 caliber roundsat a car that was driving past them.One of the rounds killed a customerwho had stopped to buy illegaldrugs. The Supreme Court of Con-necticut ruled that under Pinkerton,once Diaz and the others enteredinto the conspiracy to murder, all ofthem were guilty of conspiracy tocommit murder, and in addition,each was also vicariously guilty ofthe murder itself, regardless of whoactually fired the round that killedthe victim.

In Diaz, the defendant wasfound vicariously guilty of a murderthat was the object crime of the con-spiracy. What if a conspirator com-mits an unplanned murder duringthe course of a drug crime? Wouldsuch an unplanned murder be a rea-sonably foreseeable consequence ofthe drug conspiracy that could bepinned to each of the drug conspira-tors? In United States v. Alvarez,37

the U.S. Court of Appeals for theEleventh Circuit ruled that the mur-der of an undercover federal agentduring a shootout at a motel drugbust was a reasonably foreseeableconsequence of drug trafficking.While the court limited the liabilityfor the murder under the Pinkertonrule to those members that playedmajor roles in the drug conspiracy,the court ruled that the three de-fendants in that case were, infact, major participants in the drug

One factor in determining theforeseeability of a substantivecrime for which a suspect is to beheld vicariously accountable underPinkerton is the degree of thesuspect’s involvement in the con-spiracy.34 A person who plays a mi-nor role in a conspiracy is less likelyto be held vicariously accountablefor the substantive crimes commit-ted during a conspiracy than would

© K.L. Morrison

Law enforcement officers of other thanfederal jurisdiction who are interested inthis article should consult their legaladvisors. Some police procedures ruledpermissible under federal constitutional laware of questionable legality under state lawor are not permitted at all.


conspiracy. One defendant was anarmed lookout; a second was theleader of the drug conspiracy, whointroduced the agent to the drugsellers; and a third was the motelmanager, who acted as interpreterfor some of the drug negotiations.The court ruled that all threewere properly convicted of theagent’s murder, even though noneof them actually took part in theshooting.

If a suspect is found vicariouslyguilty of an unintended but foresee-able crime, the fact that the suspectdid not participate in the unforesee-able crime would be relevant whendetermining the sentence. InAlvarez, for instance, the shooterseach received life imprisonmentplus 50 years, whereas the armedlookout received 22 years imprison-ment, the drug deal leader received25 years imprisonment, and thehotel manager received 30 yearsimprisonment.

ConclusionDrug trafficking usually in-

volves an agreement between twoor more people to cooperate in anillegal drug enterprise. One effec-tive way to address the drug traf-ficking problem is through the con-spiracy laws. Drug traffickers canbe charged and convicted of con-spiracy, even though they have notcompleted the drug crime they haveagreed to commit. In addition, inmany jurisdictions, a person who isa member of a conspiracy is vicari-ously guilty of any reasonably fore-seeable crimes committed by themembers of the conspiracy eventhough those crimes were not partof the plan.

Endnotes1 E.g., United States v. Lively, 803 F.2d

1124, 1126 (11th Cir. 1986); State v. Gruillon,562 A.2d 481, 484-86 (Conn. 1989); State v.Pacheco, 882 P.2d 183, 185-88 (Wash. 1994).

2 803 F.2d at 1126.3 Id.4 See e.g., New York v. Schwimmer, 394

N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1979) (defendant conspiredwith an undercover officer and an informant tosteal diamonds); Ohio v. Marian, 405 N.E.2d267, 270 (Ohio 1980) (defendant conspiredwith an informant to murder his wife); State v.Null, 526 N.W.2d 220, 229 (Neb. 1995)(defendant was in conspiracy with party whofeigned agreement).

5 United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578,591 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S.1106, overruled in part on other grounds byMathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988).

6 See United States v. Bosch, 951 F.2d1546, 1550 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting legalimpossibility as a defense to conspiracy).Contra, Montana v. Houchin, 765 P.2d 178,180 (Mont. 1988) (legal impossibility is adefense to conspiracy). See generally Jeffrey F.Ghent, Annotation, Impossibility of Consumma-tion of Substantive Crime as Defense in Crim-inal Prosecution for Conspiracy or Attempt toCommit Crime, 37 A.L.R.3d 375 (1971).

7 115 S. Ct. 382 (1994).8 See United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735,

748 (7th Cir. 1969) (conviction for conspiracyreversed because the single crime of purchasingstolen goods required an agreement between thebuyer and seller).

9 E.g., United States v. DeLutis, 722 F.2d902, 905 (1st Cir. 1983); State v. Utterback,485 N.W.2d 760, 770 (Neb. 1992), overruled inpart on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 256Neb. 133, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Neb. 1999). Butsee Johnson v. State, 587 A.2d 444, 452 (Del.1991) (Wharton’s Rule does not prohibit thecharging of conspiracy in addition to a chargeof possession with intent to distribute drugsbecause possession with intent to distributedoes not require concert of action between twopeople in order to commit it).

10 Curtis v. United States, 546 F.2d 1188,1190 (5th Cir. 1977).

11 United States v. Jones, 801 F.2d 304, 311(8th Cir. 1986).

12 See United States v. Moran, 984 F.2d1299, 1302-04 (1st Cir. 1993).

13 E.g., United States v. Philips, 959 F.2d1187, 1190 (3d Cir. 1992); Commonwealth v.Cantres, 540 N.E.2d 149, 152 (Mass. 1989).

14 420 U.S. 770 (1975).15 524 F.2d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 1975).16 915 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1990).17 625 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).18 United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d

172, 176 (2d Cir. 1991).19 686 F.2d 81, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1982).20 641 F.2d 609, 611-12 (8th Cir. 1981).21 17 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1994).22 Id. at 1374.23 739 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1984).24 978 F.2d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 1992).25 888 F.2d 732, 740-42 (11th Cir. 1989).26 311 U.S. 205, 211 (1940).27 319 U.S. 703 (1943).28 Id. at 714.29 558 F.2d 1231, 1236 (1977).30 328 U.S. 640 (1946).31 E.g., State v. Tyler, 840 P.2d 413, 424

(Kan. 1992); State v. Romano, 456 A.2d 746,761 (R.I. 1983); Commonwealth v. Roux, 350A.2d 867, 871 (Pa. 1976); State v. Bridges, 628A.2d 270, 281 (N.J. 1993).

32 E.g., State ex. rel. Woods v. Cohen, 844P.2d 1147, 1151 (Ariz. 1992); People v.McGee, 399 N.E.2d 1177, 1182 (N.Y. 1979);Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 206 N.E. 2d 672,679 (Mass. 1965).

33 United States v. Alvarez, 625 F.2d 1196,1198 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).

34 United States v. Christian, 942 F.3d 363,367 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Johnson,886 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1989); UnitedStates v. Moreno, 588 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d102, 112 (4th Cir. 1990).

35 See United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d761, 766-68 (9th Cir. 1993) (It was a violationof due process to find the defendant vicariouslyguilty of a 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) gun/drugviolation where she played only a slight role inthe drug conspiracy. The court ruled thatbecause of her minor role in the conspiracy, shecould not have reasonably foreseen that theother conspirators would use firearms duringthe drug conspiracy.).

36 679 A.2d 902, 911-12 (Conn. 1996).37 755 F.2d 830, 849-51 (11th Cir. 1985).

The Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face eachchallenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actionswarrant special attention from their respective departments. The Bulletin also wants to recognizetheir exemplary service to the law enforcement profession.

Shortly after midnight, Officer Carl Ingram of the Glenns Ferry, Idaho,Police Department responded to an apartment fire. Arriving before the firedepartment, Officer Ingram entered the building and found the resident uncon-scious and on fire. He rescued her and then reentered the apartment severaltimes to extinguish the fire. The victim suffered third-degree burns over 30percent of her body and had to have one arm amputated. However, withoutOfficer Ingram’s prompt, unselfish intervention, she probably would have died,and the entire apartment complex may have burned, resulting in additionalinjuries.

Officer Ingram

Officer Dronsfield

Durham, New Hampshire, Police Department Officer Thomas Dronsfieldresponded to an assistance call from officers of the Lee Police Department, whowere at the scene of an accident. A motor vehicle had crashed into a utility poleand was submerged in a local pond. Upon arrival, Officer Dronsfield observedone officer in the water attempting to free a man trapped in the window of thevehicle. Officer Dronsfield immediately dove into the cold water and helpedrescue the man. Officers then learned that another man was in the submergedvehicle. Officer Dronsfield repeatedly dove into the murky water, finallylocating the man, but he was unable to remove him. Minutes later, however, theLee Cold Water Rescue Team arrived, and Officer Dronsfield’s efforts enabledthem to locate and rescue the second victim. Without Officer Dronsfield’spersistent and brave actions, both men may not have survived.

Officer Baker

While on patrol early one morning, Officer Mark Baker of the MoonTownship, Pennsylvania, Police Department was stopped by a truck driver.Officer Baker observed an automobile had crashed into the back of a gasolinetanker truck. Officer Baker told the driver to pull his truck off the car, whichwas beginning to burn. Officer Baker found the driver of the car slumped overthe steering wheel still in his seat belt. The officer gained entry through thepassenger door, unbuckled the driver’s seat belt, and removed him from thevehicle. Within minutes, the car became engulfed in flames. Officer Baker’squick, decisive actions saved the man’s life.

Documents

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Jun99leb