FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Feb99leb

8/9/2019 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Feb99leb

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ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310

Features

Departments

7 Point of View

Empowerment Policing

18 Crime DataCrime Decreases in 1997

ManagingUndercover Stress

By Stephen R. Band

and Donald C. Sheehan

Neighborhood WatchBy Thomas E. Baker,

Jane P. Baker, and Ralph Zezza

The FBI's Critical IncidentStress Management Program

By Vincent J. McNally

and Roger M. Solomon

Due Process and Deadly ForceBy John C. Hall

1

12There are numerous essentialingredients necessary to build asuccessful Neighborhood Watchprogram.

20

27

February 1999Volume 68Number 2

United StatesDepartment of Justice

Federal Bureau ofInvestigation

Washington, DC20535-0001

Louis J. FreehDirector

Contributors' opinions andstatements should not be

considered an endorsement bythe FBI for any policy, program,

or service.

The Attorney General hasdetermined that the publicationof this periodical is necessary in

the transaction of the publicbusiness required by law. Use of

funds for printing this periodicalhas been approved by theDirector of the Office of

Management and Budget.

The FBI Law EnforcementBulletin (ISSN-0014-5688) is

published monthly by theFederal Bureau of Investigation,

935 Pennsylvania Avenue,N.W., Washington, D.C.

20535-0001. Periodical postagepaid at Washington, D.C., and

additional mailing offices.Postmaster: Send addresschanges to Editor, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, FBI

Academy, Madison Building,Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135.

Editor

John E. OttManaging Editor

Kim Waggoner

Associate Editors

Glen Bartolomei

Cynthia L. Lewis

Bunny S. Morris

Art Director

Brian K. Parnell

Assistant Art Director

Denise K. Bennett

Staff Assistant

Linda W. Szumilo

Internet Address

[email protected]

Cover photos

Digital Vision

Send article submissions toEditor, FBI Law Enforcement

Bulletin, FBI Academy, MadisonBuilding, Room 209, Quantico,

VA 22135.

Recent court decisions provide guidanceon how the due process standardapplies to deadly force incidents.

19 Book Review

The Killers Among Us

With careful planning, supervisorscan help undercover officers overcomethe pitfalls associated with undercoverinvestigations.

The FBI developed a comprehensiveprogram to help its employees handlethe emotional aftermath of traumaticexperiences.


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February 1999 / 1

aw enforcement agenciesfrequently rely on under-cover employees (UCEs).

same time, by selecting and trainingthe right people, monitoring theirprogress, and providing for full re-integration to regular law enforce-ment duties, managers can helptheir UCEs avoid the pitfalls associ-ated with undercover activities.

THE NATURE OFUNDERCOVER WORK

Undercover assignments comein many varieties. They include ev-erything from short-term, buy-bustscenarios to longer-term investiga-tions lasting months or years. The

essence of all cases, however, re-mains the same. UCEs develop rela-tionships and eventually betraythem.

UCEs establish relationshipswith criminal suspects and law-abiding citizens alike. Both helpUCEs establish identities and makethe right connections withoutknowing the truth about them.

Many UCEs find this dual betrayala difficult road to walk, addingto the numerous stressors inherentin undercover work. What stres-sors1 do undercover agents most

Managing Undercover StressThe Supervisors RoleBy STEPHEN R. BAND, Ph.D., and DONALD C. SHEEHAN, M.A., P.M.C.

LBy infiltrating criminal organiza-tions, UCEs gather the critical evi-dence needed to dismantle them. Indoing so, they face an array ofunique stressors, from a fear of dis-covery by the subjects to a lack ofunderstanding from supervisors and

peers.Law enforcement managers

who understand the nature of under-cover work can help neutralizethese undercover stressors. At the

PhotoDon Ennis


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2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

frequently encounter and how cansupervisors help them overcomethese obstacles?

Undercover Stressors

Lack of ManagementCommitment

UCEs often believe that manag-ers and supervisors lack commit-ment, support, and sensitivity forthe nature of undercover work.Managers can prevent this misper-ception from crystallizing by

bringing UCEs in ondecisions that affect thecourse and direction of acovert investigation;

providing bulletproofbackstopping (informationcreated to support theundercover role) and falseidentification prior to

initiating the undercoverinvestigation;

assigning a control officeror contact agent whokeeps UCEs well grounded

in their law enforcementidentities and missions; and

holding regular meetings withexecutive managers, whoremain morally and ethicallycommitted to the idea that noinvestigation or any amount ofmoney is more important thanthe physical and emotionalwell-being of a UCE.

Personal Problems

Personal problems emerge dur-ing the course of daily life. Isolatedand away from immediate solu-tions, UCEs working undercovermay develop a personal crisis stateof mind in response to unexpected personal problems. Maladaptivecoping solutions often develop, andUCEs may begin drinking heavilyor behaving promiscuously.

Supervisors can overcome this

stressor by setting priorities beforean investigation starts. The subjectsgo on vacation; they disappear andreappear. In short, they handle theiremergencies. UCEs need the same

option. The persona the UCE por-trays then becomes a real personwho has to take care of personal

business, too. Moreover, by givingthe targeted suspects reason to be-lieve the undercover operative willnot always be around, case man-agers can enhance an undercoverscenario.

Personal Relationshipswith Suspects

Relationships with suspects oc-cur and can cause difficulties if notmonitored. Criminal suspects havegood and bad aspects to their per-

sonalities, and UCEs often see bothsides. UCEs may be especiallyreluctant to make cases against sus-pects with children.

Assigning a control officer orcontact agent to UCEs can go a longway toward avoiding the interper-sonal difficulties frequently en-countered during investigations.Responsible supervisors take stepsto monitor UCEs thoughts andfeelings at regular intervals duringthe course of a long-term case or

numerous consecutive short-termoperations. UCEs who work inter-mittent investigations and comeinto the office regularly still need adesignated contact person.

Overidentification withSuspects/Loss of Personal

Identity

UCEs can suffer the twin un-dercover occupational hazards ofoveridentification with the suspectgroup and loss of identity. Supervi-sors should ground UCEs with thevalues, mission, and happenings oftheir agencies. Regular and, ifnecessary, discreet contact withco-workers and supervisors keeps

Special Agent Sheehan is assigned tothe Behavioral Science Unit at the FBIAcademy and formerly served as coor-dinator of undercover activities in the

FBIs Newark, New Jersey, Division.

Special Agent Band currently servesas the chief of the BehavioralScience Unit at the FBI Academyand formerly served as chief of theFBIs Undercover Safeguard Unit.


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UCEs informed of the latest per-sonal and official business affectingtheir agencies daily operations.

Fear of Discovery

Whether the threat is real orimagined, when undercover offic-ers fear discovery, they experienceemotional discomfort. To defeatthis stressor, law enforcement agen-cies must make a substantial effortto establish aliases or false identifi-cation for the officers involved ineach specific operation. Somehighly sophisticated criminalgroups even hire private investiga-

tors or use the Internet to detectpoorly conceived undercover iden-tification. Although some law en-forcement agencies cannot affordthe luxury of allowing their under-cover officers to slowly establishcovert identities in a new commu-nity, not taking the time to do socould have deadly consequences.IfUCEs live in fear after covertly tar-geting a dangerous criminal ele-ment in the community and reloca-tion is not an option, managers must

come up with a better investigativestrategy.

Technical Difficulties

Working wired constitutes anoccupational stressor unique to un-dercover work. Supervisors canovercome this stressor through proper training. Before the opera-tion begins, UCEs should have theopportunity to rehearse with theequipment, under the supervision ofa knowledgeable technician. Above

all, UCEs should have the absoluteright to veto the use of recordingequipment when the operationalsituation dictates it.

Interagency Cooperation

Working with undercoveroperatives from other agencies

can take a toll on the emotionalwell-being of a UCE. Differences in procedures, as well as objectives,often needlessly frustrate all par-ties. Frequent meetings of all par-ticipants, including the UCEs, be-fore, during, and after jointoperations best neutralize this stres-sor. A firm and clear memorandumof understanding written before theinvestigation begins also can elimi-nate areas of potential conflict.

cultures often discomforts UCEs.Effective backstopping and regularcontact with their agencies can help

manage this stressor. Most impor-tant, supervisors must identify, seekout, and carefully interview the per-son most comfortable operating in aspecific operational setting beforean investigation begins, rather thanaccepting volunteers who mayprove unsuitable for the operation.

Unsuitable Roles

Any employee, regardless of background and qualifications,feels the inherent stress of an under-

cover role. To minimize this stres-sor, supervisors should not allowemployees to portray individualswhose cultural, ethnic, or geo-graphic backgrounds differ substan-tially from their own. UCEs mustadaptmorally, ethically, and withminimal discomfortto what theirroles require. Some individualssimply do not possess the copingstrategies needed to successfully portray ruthless criminals. An ef-fective certification program can

identify those individuals bestsuited to work undercover.

UNDERCOVERCERTIFICATION PROGRAM

Not everyone has the attributesrequired for undercover work,which places unique demands on itspractitioners.2 Years of experiencehave proven that constant deceptionin a hostile environment stresseseven the best UCEs. Those mostsuited for undercover work have the

resilience to overcome undercoverpitfalls.

It is highly unlikely that in re-sponse to an immediate, unfolding

UCEs who workintermittentinvestigations andcome into the officeregularly still need

a designatedcontact person.

Lack of Recovery Time

Lack of time for proper rest inorder to emotionally and physicallyregroup frequently stresses UCEs.Proper planning in the early stagesof an investigation eliminates thisproblem. Allowing time for recov-ery between encounters with tar-geted suspects can avert potentialtragedies.

Lack of Context

Distance from home with expo-sure to new geographic areas and


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...law enforcementmanagers...shouldexhaust otherinvestigative methods

before extendingprecious human

resources incovert situations.

critical incident, a supervisor wouldrandomly pick officers to beSpecial Weapons and Tactics

(SWAT) team members. Histori-cally, SWAT team membershave been specially screened,tested, selected, trained, equipped,and rehearsed. Yet, undercover op-eratives often do not garnerthe same attention, despite thefact that they face criticalincidents as threatening as SWAToperators.

Too often, supervisors assumethat the officer whose ethnic, racial,or cultural background matches the

criminals represents the optimalofficer for a particular undercoverassignment. Unfortunately, thismistake frequently leads to personaland operational tragedy. Law en-forcement managers can avoid thisissue by using only experiencedvolunteers.

In addition, undercover workrelies upon relationship building. New recruits have yet to developrelationships with their agenciesand new law enforcement associ-ates. Why risk a promising careerby exposing a new officer to complex relationships and potentialbonding with criminals?

Supervisors should conduct re-search to determine their agenciesundercover personnel needs andcreate programs to develop certifiedundercover operatives who havepsychological attributes to meet thechallenge of undercover work. Cer-tifyingthat is, formally testing,

selecting, training, and monitor-ingthe right people to work un-dercover determines, to a large ex-tent, the probable success ofinvestigations.

Ten Most Wanted Attributes

Employees most capable ofworking undercover fit a certain

profile and possess specificqualifications.

mental strategies and copingskills for operating in hostileenvironments while maintain-

ing firm bonds and commit-ments to the missions of theirlaw enforcement agencies.

5) They possess moral andethical values that dovetailwith their undercover mis-sions. Officers operating inother than their true identitiesmust conduct themselvesappropriately and lawfully.The lawful use of the under-cover investigative techniquerepresents a sacred trust

between law enforcementagencies and the people of afree society. If law enforce-ment agencies violate this trustby engaging in inappropriateundercover conduct, the publiccould stop supporting the useof this important technique.

6) They are highly proficientand comfortable at portrayingidentified roles.

7) They demonstrate high

levels of self-confidence and aself-perception of effective-ness operating against specificcriminal elements.

8) They are decisive people,flexible enough to workindependently, yet extraordi-narily capable of being teamplayers when called upon todo so.

9) They are not situationallydistracted with personal life

stressors and vulnerable toanxiety or depression.

10) They have personalityattributes to facilitateinteraction with suspects

1) They are seasoned investi-gators, who volunteer to workundercover because they be-lieve the techniques work, notbecause they are looking forpersonal glory. Additionally,these individuals are neither

running toward undercoverwork, believing it is somethingit is not, nor running awayfrom an unpleasant workassignment or life situation,believing they can find refugein undercover work.

2) They have demonstratedperseverance and resourceful-ness in the face of complexmatters.

3) They are comfortable andcapable of acting within theiragencies undercover policies,procedures, and guidelines.

4) They remain capable ofacting on well-rehearsed


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without incurring physical oremotional stress-relatedillnesses.

Psychological assessment,counseling, and realistic role-playscenarios can effectively screenundercover candidates. Newlycertified undercover personnel ben-efit from interaction with experi-enced mentors and formal trainingopportunities prior to going opera-tional. During undercover investi-gations, law enforcement-orientedmental health professionals andhighly experienced undercover per-sonnel can provide ongoing moni-

toring to observe and maintain UCEwellness and readiness. Control of-ficers or contact agents who aresupportive and trained to recognizestress reactions should contactUCEs at least once every 24 hours.Upon completion of the covert phase of an investigation, post-operational debriefings can ease theUCEs transition back to traditionalovert responsibilities.

REINTEGRATION ISSUES

Bringing a UCE, particularly afaltering one, back into the law en-forcement fold may take some cre-ative engineering. Often, retrainingopportunities aid the UCEs transi-tion back to traditional law enforce-ment duties. Specifically, supervi-sors can have UCEs do someteaching as a component of theirdebriefing process. Requiring a re-turning UCE to provide an over-view of undercover work to a new

recruit class has proven a highlysuccessful reintegration technique.The spontaneous standing ovationthat usually comes at the close ofthe presentation can successfully,and often tearfully, reintegrate the

UCE into the law enforcement fam-ily. At the same time, it providesappropriate recognition for a job

well done.Reintegration may prove diffi-cult because UCEs may experienceproblems with the issue of accep-tance, often feeling separate anddistanced from their fellow employ-ees. Frequently, the UCEs feelingof alienation results from thedistorted perceptions associatedwith highly stressful situations,

take active steps to ensure thatUCEs are fully reintegrated into theorganization. Ideally, this includes

recognizing, debriefing, and re-training UCEs, as well as advisingother members of the organizationwhat the UCEs have accomplished.

ASSIGNMENT DURATION

The operation duration factormerits some discussion. Working aseries of short-term operations backto back, day after day, for a fewyears has the cumulative effect andposes the same difficulties as work-ing one long-term investigation for

the same amount of time. Short-term UCEs should receive the sameattention as those who work long-term assignments.

No specific response or any one policy can address the question,How long should someone be al-lowed to work undercover? Aftercompleting a covert operation and prior to assuming another under-cover assignment, a certified UCEshould have an opportunity for re-spite to debrief, regroup, and return

to overt duties. In fact, if an effec-tive and regimented support systemregularly monitors and safeguardsthe operatives wellness, readiness,integrity, and personal concerns, acertified UCE can work undercoverindefinitely.

Some law enforcement agen-cies select, train, and field a time-limited undercover team. Ten to 20officers support each other for 1 to 2years for the purpose of conductingall undercover and backup activityduring their tours of duty. Afterthe assignment is completed,management selects, trains, andfields a new team to take the placeof the outgoing team.

although, sometimes, a factual basisexists. Fellow employees may re-sent UCEs because they get specialattention. Co-workers observe whatappears to be UCEs living the goodlife: staying out all night, wearingexpensive or exotic clothes andjewelry, spending large amounts ofsomeone elses money, drivinggreat cars or motorcycles, andseemingly working fewer hoursthan everyone else.

Whether UCEs feelingsof alienation are the result of theirown misperceptions or actualresentment by overt investigativepeers, undercover supervisors must

PhotoDon Ennis


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Wanted:Photographs

heBulletin staff isalways on the lookoutT

for dynamic, law enforce-ment-related photos forpossible publication in themagazine. We are interestedin photos that visually depictthe many aspects of the lawenforcement profession andillustrate the various taskslaw enforcement personnelperform.

We can use either black-and-white glossy or colorprints or slides, although weprefer prints (5x7 or 8x10).

Appropriate credit will begiven to contributing photog-raphers when their workappears in the magazine. Wesuggest that you send dupli-cate, not original, prints aswe do not accept responsibil-ity for prints that may bedamaged or lost. Send yourphotographs to:

Brian Parnell, ArtDirector,FBI Law

Enforcement Bulletin,FBI Academy, MadisonBuilding 209, Quantico,VA 22135.

CONCLUSION

The glamorous depiction of un-dercover work in books, movies,

and popular culture does not ad-equately portray the harsh reality ofundercover work. Experienced lawenforcement managers know thatmany investigative techniques yieldpositive results, and they should ex-haust other investigative methods before extending precious humanresources in covert situations.

If the use of undercover investi-gative techniques becomes neces-sary, law enforcement managersmust develop programs to support

UCE wellness and readiness. An ef-fective program identifies the right personnel, monitors their well-be-ing during the course of an opera-tion, and provides postoperationaldebriefing to enhance their success-ful transition back to overt investi-gative duties. The advantagesgained by understanding the stres-sors confronting UCEs and givingundercover operatives a high levelof support will go a long way tofoster the necessary environmentfor UCEs to do their jobs and pro-fessionalize their important roles indefeating dangerous criminals.

Endnotes1 I. John Vasquez, M.Ed., and Sharon A.

Kelly, M.B.A, Managements Commitment tothe Undercover Operative: A ContemporaryView,FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,February1989, 3-12.

2 Neil S. Hibler, The Care and Feeding ofUndercover Agents, inPolice Psychology intothe 21st Century, ed. Neil S. Hibler, I. KurkeMartin, and Ellen M. Scrivner, (Hillsdale, NJ:

Lawrence Eribaum Associates, Inc., 1995),299-317.


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Empowerment PolicingBy Michael S. Reiter, M.S.

Point of View

Assistant ChiefReiter serves with

the Palm Beach,Florida, Police

Department.

he benefit of empowerment in law enforcementorganizations has been the topic of many

organizational model served the law enforcementcommunity well, partially because a large portion ofpolice officers had served in the military and found

comfort and order in this approach.However, in paramilitary or bureaucratic lawenforcement organizations, first-line supervisors oftenhave limited authority and a narrow view of theorganization. As a result, top-level supervisorsbecome overburdened with too much to do, and otheremployees just wait for orders.1 This system mayresult in compliant employees, but it proves ineffi-cient and overly demanding of those in upper-levelpositions.

ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN

Based on their pyramid-shaped organizational

structures, typical paramilitary organizations strictlyadhere to the chain of command. They also tend toaddress problems by growing, becoming more com-plex, and adding specialized units whenever newproblems arise. Those new units typically requireadditional support personnel and more supervisorsall of which require more sets of rules, more steps forapproval, and checks and countercheckscommonlyreferred to as red tape. This approach creates new andmore complex places to hide problems and placeblame. Also, because power and privilege reside onlyat the top of the organization, those in the middlebecome lost and often question their own purpose.2

Trecent discussions among police managers. Mostpolice executives would agree that employees who aretrusted, allowed to make their own choices, and takeresponsibility for their actions will remain committed

to their work and feel that they play an important partin their organizations. Community Oriented Policing(COP), todays dominant policing philosophy, isbased on concepts of empowerment and teamwork.Nevertheless, organizational structures and otherfactors, such as individuals who resist change, standas barriers to achieving the full benefits of empower-ment and the COP movement. However, a change inorganizational structure and leadership philosophycan remove these barriers to success.

THE PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION

Paramilitary organizations have an abundance of

rules and a rigid command structure. They useprimarily one-way communication from themanagement to the line function, passing throughvarious levels of hierarchy, with the power anddecision making vested at the top. In the past, this

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The need to reduce costs has resulted in a forcedflattening of the hierarchy in many paramilitary orbureaucratic organizations. In other words, middle

management is shrinking. While removal of organiza-tional layers does not automatically eliminate bureau-cracy, this movement to flatten the hierarchy oftenincreases communication by eliminating unnecessaryfilters of information often found in the middle levelsof the organizational pyramid. The flatter adepartments hierarchy, the more its leadership musttrust and rely on the judgment of line-level officers,who directly provide service to the community and dothe bulk of the work.

By inverting the organizational pyramid, lawenforcement agencies take a bold and symbolic steptoward becoming empowered. In a traditional para-

military law enforcement hierar-chy, the chief executive standsalone at the top of the organiza-tional chart with the police officersfound toward the base of thepyramid. Inverting the pyramidand placing the chief at the bottomand the police officers at the topsymbolizes that the chief servesthe organization and is responsiblefor its leadership. In this invertedpyramid organizational structure,the officers gain responsibility and

the task of leadership becomesresponsive to them.3 Under such aphilosophy, authority comes from within an organiza-tion, and its employees become valued because theyare a contributing part of the organization, not be-cause of the positions they hold.

THE EMPOWERED ORGANIZATION

Typical leaders of empowered organizationsremain unsatisfied with the status quo and never usethe phrase because we have always done it thatway. They continually seek to shift authority,control, and decision making to the individuals doingthe core work of the organization.4 As a result ofencouraging innovation and placing trust and belief inemployees, a sense of commitment and ownershipdevelops that becomes evident by high performance

and a positive outlook. Trust bonds an organizationtogether.5 An empowered leader realizes that all elsebeing equal, employees prefer to work in a pleasant

environment over an unpleasant one. While apleasant work environment does not always equalhigher performance, employees who view their workas drudgery create a great barrier to sustainedperformance.

However, in every law enforcement agency, timesexist when the paramilitary model is the appropriateleadership style. For example, a civil disturbance mayrequire that a force of police officers act together incontrolling a crowd. During such an incident, strictcontrol and immediate obedience to orders wouldprevail over allowing employees to make their owndecisions. Commanders should focus on safety,

discourage risk-taking, and pro-vide little room for experimenta-tion in such situations.

An empowered organizationallows for this departure from thenorm in extreme circumstances,but a paramilitary or bureaucraticorganization experiences greatdifficulty switching to an empow-ered approach when circumstancesdictate.

Autocratic leaders mayinterpret empowerment as disloy-

alty to their departments andconsider it the abandonment of the

core beliefs of the paramilitary model. Whereasempowerment emphasizes flexibility, an autocraticbureaucracy emphasizes rigid structure and adherenceto the rules.

TODAYS ENVIRONMENT

Todays culture brings instability, uncertainty,and change. Information remains paramount, andpolicing has become an information business. Theparamilitary model worked well in a stable environ-ment of performing largely similar tasks repetitively.However, as policing has moved from this largelystable environment to a dynamic and increasinglycomplex one, the paramilitary organizational modelhas become dysfunctional.6

An empowered leaderrealizes that...

employees prefer towork in an pleasantenvironment over an

unpleasant one.


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In paramilitary organizations, officers often makedecisions based on strict compliance with the rules.However, modern law enforcement agencies cannot

rely on detailed sets of rules because the changingenvironment often causes these rules to becomeobsolete quickly. Thus, officersmust make decisions that oftenconflict with existing rules. Be-cause todays police officers arewell trained and highly equipped tomeet these challenges, theirmanagers should value theirjudgments and decision-makingabilities.Relying on detailed rulesinstead of the judgment of indi-viduals may display a lack of

confidence and could lowermorale.

FACTORS INFLUENCINGEMPOWERMENT

Generation X Police Officers

The greatest percentage of new police officerscome from a group of 52 million Americans bornbetween 1963 and 1977 referred to as Generation X.7

Generation X police officers began their careersamidst organizational reengineering, unprecedentedchange, and uncertainty within their departments.

They grew up in a time when society could not relyon the promises of institutions. Prior to Generation X,individuals usually achieved success by making long-term commitments to one organization and avoidingrisk. Many Generation X officers watched theirparents spend their careers working for one or twoorganizations and making great personal sacrifices,only later to become the victims of downsizing orcorporate buyouts resulting in unfulfilled promises ofsecurity. Generation X police officers realize that thepaternalistic organizational philosophy of pay yourdues, be patient, and you will be taken care of hasbecome obsolete.

Because Generation X police officers grew up inthe middle of a firestorm of technology and informa-tion, they may prove better suited to the policing ofthe future. Only an empowered leader who allows

employees to participate in decision making canmotivate them and keep them from moving to thosefields where empowerment has become the standard.

When Generation X police officers think that theirsupervisors do not trust their judgment or do not puttheir talents to best use, most oftheir abilities, creativity, andintelligence lie dormant, andpolicing becomes just a job tothem.8 As a result, their motivationfades more quickly than any othergenerations. Management ofparamilitary law enforcementorganizations often characterizeGeneration X police officers ashaving given up and label them

underachievers.However, Generation X police

officers are not inherently lazy,arrogant, or materialistic as

popularized by the mediamanagement alwaysshould value all employees based on the skills andpotential they possess. It remains the organizationsresponsibility to provide an environment that allowsthem to reach their potential. The paramilitary modelof policing frequently fails in this regard.

Accreditation

The accreditation movement in law enforcement,

based on standardizing rules and practices, maycontribute to maintaining the paramilitary model.Accreditation efforts usually encourage autocraticleadership and bureaucratic structure and generallyrequire strict compliance to adetailed set of rules.Rule compliance serves as the basis for awardingaccreditation to applicant law enforcement agencies.Accreditation bodies require that agencies havewritten directives to show compliance with a specificset of standards. Administrators wishing to ensuretheir organizations accreditation often write detailedand voluminous sets of rules and regulations toprovide unquestionable proof of compliance with thestandards of the accreditation body. This overreactionfurther removes decision making from the lineofficers and sends a clear message that the agencydoes not trust in the judgment of its officers but rather


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Trust is theessence of

leadership in anempowered

organization.

in sets of very detailed rules and regulations wherestrict compliance is expected. The emphasis of aparamilitary organization is not on people but on

control, systems, and structure. While the accredita-tion process has many benefits, the requirement toproduce detailed and voluminous sets of written rulesis not one of them.

Community Oriented Policing

The COP movement is a profession-specificexample of empowerment theory. COP embracesmany of the concepts of the empowerment model andvalues people over most other elements in the organi-zation. Empowerment in COP not only allows lineofficers to solve problems but also gives them thetrust and involvement of the entire community. The

police and community partnership found in COP isclearly antibureaucratic and should be the focus ofevery law enforcement leader.

However, the paramilitaryorganizational design represents apowerful detriment to the COPphilosophy. No sets of writtenrules exist that can systemize andmanage what some police depart-ments have accomplished throughCOP initiatives. Trust and risk areinherent in most of those success-ful programs. The best achieve-

ments from COP initiatives oftenhappen when an officer doessomething not covered in anywritten rules and that has neverbeen done before. Practitionersknow that thinking outside the box, a concept thatthe paramilitary model punishes, remains critical toCOP. Many police leaders today remember the oldsergeant who illustrated the embodiment of theparamilitary model and believed officers were notpaid to think, just to do what they were told.

EMPOWERED LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY

Trust is the essence of leadership in an empow-ered organization. Empowered leaders push decisionmaking down to the officer level because they haveconfidence in their officers abilities and believe thatmany decisions are best made at that level. Innovation

and creativity normally include some level of risk.Leaders automatically do not punish failures becauserisk remains inherent, and failures provide valuable

learning experiences. All learning involves somefailure.9 This does not suggest that leaders shouldpermit failure in all arenas of policing.

In professions such as law enforcement, failurecan result in different consequences. For example, anafter-school program for at-risk juveniles with lowparticipation can have much different consequencesthan an unjustified use of deadly force. Creativity,innovation, and experimentation become appropriatein law enforcement only in those areas where theramifications of failure do not place the safety orwelfare of the community or organization at risk.Empowerment philosophy easily adjusts to those

narrow areas of policing that require structure andstrict rule compliance, providing leaders make therules and their purpose well known.

Leaders must focus on rewardsand not discipline, and they shouldencourage dissonant informationand individual opinions. Addition-ally, they should consider hiringemployees from divergent back-grounds and viewpoints as astrength. Hiring employees withsimilar backgrounds and experi-ences encourages organizational

inbreeding that hampers creativityand innovation.10 Above all, lawenforcement executives must startby embodying empowermentdynamics in themselves. While

empowerment can grow spontaneously, sparked byenlightened leaders at any level of the organization, itmust do so covertly if management does not offer fullsupport.11 In these circumstances, any substantialfailure based upon empowerment likely will result inharsh punishment.

CASUALTIES OF THE TRANSITION

Empowerment can evoke a mixed response insome agencies where autocratic leadership remains atthe core of the organizational culture. In such organi-zations, some police officers may not want increasedautonomy and may find comfort in high structure and


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January 1999 / 11

predictability. Yet, others will test the limits of theirauthority. Because organizational cultures vary withindepartments, each transition will present different

risks, problems, and successes.Empowerment may not work for every lawenforcement agency. In a government where auto-cratic leadership remains the norm, empowermentmay be a dangerous undertaking that threatens thesystem and its most basic beliefs.Leaders who consider this transi-tion must differentiate betweencourage and suicide. Only thosewho can appreciate the benefits ofsuccess and the losses of failureshould attempt such a transition.While leaders can apply empower-

ment techniques in any organiza-tion, it becomes an all-or-nothingchoice of how an organizationviews its people; otherwise,empowerment risks being aleadership fad in a cosmeticattempt at appearing progressive.12

Leaders of paramilitary law enforcement agenciesconsidering the change to empowerment should firstask themselves if they are satisfied that paramilitarypolicing is successful in their agencies. If agenciesemploy Generation X police officers, who generallyexperience fewer problems and respond quickly and

appropriately to new challenges, then a change toempowerment may not be needed.

CONCLUSION

Trusting todays educated, independent, andinnovative police officers to make the best decisionsand take responsibility results in higher performance,greater commitment, and a sense of ownership in theorganization. This methodology may be the only wayto keep police officers of the future stimulated. Policeofficers do not want to spend the best days of theirlives in a career that denies their abilities and talents.They would like to think of themselves as actors inthe system rather than being helplessly acted upon. Asa result, empowered police officers make real differ-ences in improving communities.

Law enforcement organizations that value confor-mity, consistency, and compliance to the rules ignore

the changing and unpredictable environment foundthroughout organizations today. By trying to play byrules designed for past problems, the paramilitary

model is simply too inflexible to serve the future ofpolicing. One effective way leaders can make deci-sions for solving new problems is to trust in thejudgment of the police officers who can solve them ina way that no set of rules or rigid command structure

can attempt.Leaders face immense chal-

lenges relative to the future ofpolicing. Leaders that implementan organizational design andphilosophy that encourage trustand enhance officers judgmentand skills will provide an environ-

ment conducive to the type ofinnovation, commitment, andpersonal satisfaction necessary toaddress the problems of the future.The empowerment policing modelcan help achieve greater successesin the next century of policing.

Endnotes1 G. Pinchot, Creating Organizations with Many Leaders in The

Leader of the Future, ed.F. Hesselbein, M. Goldsmith and R. Beckard,(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996), 27.

2 P. Block, The Empowered Manager(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,

1987), 20-62.3 K. Blanchard, Turning the Organizational Pyramid Upside Downin The Leader of the Future, ed. F. Hesselbein, M. Goldsmith and R.Beckard, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996), 85.

4 Supra note 2, xv.5 W. Bennis and B. Nanus,Leaders: The Strategies for Taking

Charge (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), 153.6 D. Guyot,Policing As Though People Matter(Philadelphia, PA:

Temple University Press, 1991), 67.7 B. Tulgan, The Managers Pocket Guide to Generation X(Amherst,

MA: HRD Press, 1997), 3.8 S. Covey, Three Roles of the Leader in the New Paradigm in The

Leader of the Future, ed.F. Hesselbein, M. Goldsmith and R. Beckard(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996), 153.

9 Supra note 5, 75.10 Supra note 2, xiv.11

P. Senge, Leading Learning Organizations in The Leader of theFuture, ed. F. Hesselbein, M. Goldsmith and R. Beckard, (San Francisco:Jossey-Bass, 1996), 42.

12 P. Hersey and K. Blanchard,Management of OrganizationalBehavior: Utilizing Human Resources (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993), 176.


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xperience and re-search reveal thatcommunity institu-

have received much attention overthe past 10 years. However, expertsrarely discuss the steps that lead totheir successes. Many police departments have implemented Neighborhood Watch programswith much success; however, somehave difficulty initiating and sus-taining the groups. Unfortunately,this proves particularly true in thosecommunities that most need assis-tance. Middle-class communities,with the least to fear, seem to sus-tain the effort. On the other hand,

NeighborhoodWatchA LeadershipChallengeBy THOMAS E. BAKER, M.S., M.Ed.,JANE P. BAKER, M.S., and RALPH ZEZZA

Etions are the first line of defenseagainst disorder and crime.... Thus,it is essential that the police workclosely with all facets of the com-munity to identify concerns andfind the most effective solutions.This is the essence of communitypolicing.1

Frequently implemented undercommunity-oriented policing plans, Neighborhood Watch programs


PhotoPhotoDisc

low-income communities have adifficult time maintaining commu-nity-based groups, even in the pres-ence of severe crime rates.2

Indeed, developing programsand maintaining community participation in Neighborhood Watch programs remain difficult leader-ship challenges. The average lifeexpectancy of a NeighborhoodWatch group is rather short, and the program itself, problematic. Themost successful watches recruitnew members a few times a year.


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February 1999 / 13

Ongoing recruitment nurtures the program by involving new, moti-vated members. These fresh indi-

viduals replace those who feel theyno longer need to participate be-cause they either have become dis-enchanted with the program or feeltheir concerns have been addressed.

Despite the difficulties associ-ated with establishing a successfulcommunity program, experts rarelydiscuss the steps that lead to suc-cess. Although police agencies in-terested in obtaining specific detailson starting a group can do so easily,material on broad leadership issues,

such as group dynamics and mainte-nance techniques, remain undevel-oped areas. Such information wouldhelp organizers facilitate and main-tain these successful supporting programs. In short, communitiesneed information on how to main-tain Neighborhood Watch pro-grams, not just on how to start them.

Without citizen trust and coop-eration, police officers work in aninformation vacuum and lack the

criminal intelligence needed to per-form their basic duties. Identifyingthe fundamental causes of crime de-pends, to a great extent, on citizenswho make observations and reportillegal activity. Police executivesmust reward these efforts and takeappropriate steps to encouragecontinued citizen support andcooperation.

The philosophy of shared com-munity crime prevention holdsgreat promise but requires a great

deal of leadership on the part of both the citizens and the police.Some administrators approachthose programs involving citizenparticipation with apprehension andcaution. Those police leaders, con-cerned with power and control, maybe the most reluctant to support citi-zen involvement. They may fear

loss of control over their depart-ments more than they fear the actuallevel of crime.

FIVE STEPS FOR SUCCESS

Adequate preparation, plan-ning, and training for citizen in-volvement can reduce confusionand create opportunities for bettercommunication and increased co-operation. To achieve some degreeof success, departments need toconsider five steps during the devel-opment and maintenance of Neigh-borhood Watch programs. Withoutthe proper foundation, the programs

become disorganized. These stepsset the stage for enhanced participa-tion, cooperation, and retention ofNeighborhood Watch members.

First Step: Plan Strategies

In the first step toward commu-nity involvement, organizers shoulddevelop strategies for dealing with

Now retired, Mrs. Baker served as

an assistant director of studentdevelopment services for theMarywood College CounselingCenter in Scranton, Pennsylvania.

Lt. Col. Bakerpreviously served

in the U.S. Army Reserve MilitaryPolice Corps and is now anassistant professor of criminaljustice at the University ofScranton in Pennsylvania.

Officer Zezzaserves with the

West Pittston, PennsylvaniaPolice Department.


15/34


crime patterns and form appropriatecommunity and police interventionstrategies. A well-constructed stra-

tegic plan may ease some of theanxiety and fear associated withcommunity participation. Problem-oriented policing and crime-spe-cific planning remain essential tothe tactical planning process. Thesealso will help minimize costly mis-takes and enhance the opportu-nity for a successful collabora-tion between citizens and policedepartments.

In many cases, police depart-ments blame citizen apathy for the

failure of Neighborhood Watch programs. However, more oftenthan not, the lack of appropriate planning, group maintenance, andsupport activities causes the failure.Crime prevention initiatives tend todisintegrate when police leaders failto provide timely, ongoing guid-ance and support to citizens.

Second Step: Train Officers

Neighborhood Watch programsrequire well-trained crime preven-

tion officers to assist citizens. Theseofficers must possess the expertise,training, and personal qualities tosuccessfully initiate and maintain acrime prevention program. Depart-ments must carefully select theseofficers, who will provide special-ized training to citizens. Crime pre-vention officers need motivation,perseverance, creativity, and enthu-siasm in their assignments. Theywill become role models for the

departments crime prevention ini-tiatives and have considerable impact on the success of Neighbor-hood Watch programs.

Third Step: AssessCommunity Needs

The third step involves an ef-

fective assessment of communityattitudes and opinions concerningpolice services and specific Neigh- borhood Watch programs. All toooften, officers assume that they areperforming effectively without sur-veying citizens. Fortunately, manyprogressive departments attempt tomeasure, evaluate, and improvetheir quality of service by seekinginput from the community.

providing local crime statistics mayhelp determine community needs.In addition, addressing overlapping

areas of interest may enhance rap-port and citizen support.

Fourth Step: Selectand Train Volunteers

The identification and selectionof an appropriate watch coordinatorremains one of the most importantinitial decisions. Although allneighborhood participants usuallyvolunteer for the positions, watchleaders need to possess excellentleadership, organizational, and

time-management skills becausethey will have an enormous impacton the enthusiasm for, and successof, the program.

Police leaders should providethorough training for Neighbor-hood Watch programs. Depart-ments should offer training periodsmore than once and at convenienttimes in order to provide all blockleaders an opportunity to attend. Inreturn, the block leaders ultimatelywill become primary trainers of the

Neighborhood Watch members.Clearly, watch administratorsshould not underestimate the neces-sity of an adequate training programfor volunteers. The training processstrengthens the program and helpsguard against confusion, poor deci-sions, and costly mistakes.

Fifth Step: DevelopMeaningful Projects

Unfortunately, members oftenlose interest after a crisis ends or the Neighborhood Watch has ad-dressed their primary concern. Citi-zens need involvement that satisfies

At the same time, needs assess-ments lay the foundation for defin-ing goals, setting objectives, anddeveloping work plans. More important, needs assessments rallycitizen interest and focus on crimeprevention initiatives. For example,the community may identify signifi-cantly different issues from those ofthe police. The police may be con-cerned with the drug problemwhile citizens may focus on the pos-sibility of child abduction and mo-lestation. Because citizens tend to perceive or fear crimes that maynot, in reality, present a problem,

Neighborhood

Watch programsrequire well-trained crime

prevention officersto assist citizens.


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February 1999 / 15

and rewards. Moreover, they pos-sess unique skills, interests, and ma-terial resourcessuch as home

computers, cellular phones, or citi-zen band radiosthat may be usedby the group. Others may express aninterest in repairing playgroundequipment, painting over graffiti, orperhaps developing a picnic area forchildren or elderly residents. Lead-ers should survey the members in-terests and abilities, encourage cre-ativity, and allow them to createopportunities for involvement. Thisapproach will help maintain inter-est, motivation, and community

pride.One activity leaders might en-

courage is publishing an anticrimenewsletter, which can providecrime prevention tips, local crimenews, citizen recognition, and in-formation on community events. A Neighborhood Watch newsletterbecomes an excellent way to informthe neighborhood about crimetrends that may affect them. Keep-ing citizens informed of accurateinformation may reduce their fearof crime.

ESTABLISHING THE TONE

Neighborhood Watch leadersshould not underestimate how thetone of the meetings will impact theparticipation and retention of groupmembers. Leaders must ensure thateveryone gets treated with respectand that inappropriate behavior willnot be tolerated.

Some individuals can dominate

meetings by talking incessantly andinterrupting others. Leaders mustensure that everyone has an opportunity to speak without inter-ruption and should not tolerate

inappropriate remarks or sarcasm.The meeting tone should encouragepositive interaction, respect for di-verse opinions, and active listening.Establishing a positive, respectfultone will enhance interaction and

the possibility of accomplishinggoals.

Meetings must not linger ondiscussions that do not lead toproblem-solving solutions. Produc-tive meetings encourage thosein attendance to participate fur-ther. Neighborhood Watch leadersand members should leave meet-ings glad they attended and feel-ing inspired to continue theirparticipation.

Credibility Gap and RetentionPolice officers must actively

listen to community concerns, sug-gestions, and complaints. Depart-ments then must be prepared to in-tervene appropriately. Failure to doso creates a credibility gap for thosecommunity members who havevoiced concerns. If the programdoes not address citizens concerns,apathy and disintegration of theNeighborhood Watch program willfollow. Moreover, group membersmay conclude that the police department is not concerned. There-fore, police involvement becomesespecially important when the

department can easily and inexpen-sively implement remedial action.Citizens evaluate the work accom-plished by attending meetings and participating in crime preventionactivities. Citizens want to see their

concerns addressed and their con-tinued participation may hinge onthe accomplishments they see.

Additionally, crime preventionofficers must help citizens defineand set reasonable goals and thensupport the achievement of thosegoals. The accomplishment of onegoal enhances mutual cooperationand progression to another one.When leaders address the concernsof citizens and treat them as part-ners in crime prevention, inter-est remains high and participationcontinues.

Police and Citizen Roles Defined

The relationship between citi-zens and crime prevention officersincreases qualitatively with theclear definition of respective roles.The motivated citizen works with,rather than for, the crime preven-tion officer, who is much more aresource available to the citizenthan the reverse. Within lawful lim-its, citizen crime prevention activi-ties are in no way directed by po-lice. The one cannot be subser-vient to the other; instead, both

1. Plan strategies

2. Train officers3. Assess community needs

Steps to a SuccessfulNeighborhood Watch Program

4. Select and train volunteers

5. Develop meaningfulprojects


17/34


must collaborate as partners. Thus,where citizen participation strate-gies are correctly developed, there

is no need for conflict over the issueof program control.3

When watch administrators de-fine roles in early planning stages,conflict decreases. When roles arenot clearly defined, confusion andmistrust can develop, and programmembers may lose interest. Policeofficers need a specific agenda foreach meeting and should encouragecitizens to voice their concerns.

Group Dynamics

One of the most difficult tasksof implementing a successful neigh-borhood-oriented policing philoso-phy involves meeting the expecta-tions of diverse community groups.Officers who participate must un-derstand basic leadership principlesand group dynamics.

Group members may attendmeetings for numerous reasons.Some attend to address safety con-cerns, discuss crime trends, or share personal problems, while others

may have a social agenda. Somecome with the hope of solving spe-cific neighborhood problems thathave not been addressed throughother avenues or approaches.

The amount of cohesivenessamong group members determinesthe level of cooperation and com-munication within the group and ul-timately helps achieve specificgoals. The number of members andthe leaders style influences the co-hesiveness of informal groups.Small, informal work groups withstrong leaders historically prove themost effective.

FOUR STAGES OFGROUP DEVELOPMENT

Police leaders tend to become

discouraged in the initial stages of Neighborhood Watch programs.They often comment on groupmember apathy or anger, which isthe most difficult part of starting aNeighborhood Watch program. Po-lice officers need to overcome theseinitial feelings and listen to thegroups complaints. If officers re-main patient, these problems shoulddissipate.

Group development has fourstages: 1) forming, 2) storming,3) norming, and 4)performing.

Neighborhood groups that achievehighest productivity levels movethrough each of these stages. Theduration of each stage depends ongroup leaders, group members, andtask complexity.4 Watch organizersmust first form the proper founda-tion, or the group may not evolvebeyond its initial stages. Therefore,Neighborhood Watch leaders mustmonitor their groups, clear up mis-understandings, and avoid rushingthrough developmental stages.

The Forming Stage

In theformingstage, Neighbor-hood Watch groups usually are dis-organized. Members may demon-strate anxiety and insecurity aboutthe structure of the group. At thispoint, they depend on police leader-ship to provide useful informationand ease tensions. Organizersshould use this period to get ac-quainted and set a positive tone forfuture group meetings. Because

watch members are not yet ready toaddress community objectives,leaders should concentrate on an ef-fective orientation and training pro-gram. These activities will help pro-vide the basic foundation for asuccessful group.

The Storming Stage

The storming stage often in-volves a struggle for power. Con-flict among members for recogni-tion and influence still exists. Asmembers learn to confront othersconstructively, they may even chal-lenge police leaders during this

Participating officers need torecognize when group members areready to venture out into the com-munity. It may take some time forthe members to gain this confi-dence, but without it, they may beunwilling to participate in projects.

Some of the members insecuri-ties may result from inadequatetraining and preparation. Policeleaders and the watch coordinator

must continually assess groupmembers confidence and theirability to perform tasks and achieveobjectives.

Citizens evaluate

the workaccomplished byattending meetingsand participating in

crime preventionactivities.


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February 1999 / 17

stage. This early period of develop-ment establishes how members willhandle conflict in the future. The

group must evolve through thesedifficulties to achieve indepen-dence and successfully accomplishgoals during this state; however,they are not yet ready to work effec-tively on their own. NeighborhoodWatch leaders should remain stead-fast and listen to all complaints.Crime prevention officers shouldnot become defensive because thiswill lead to citizen criticism andpoor communication.

Officers should avoid becom-

ing discouraged with a neighbor-hood groups performance. Activelistening skills and patience shouldcontinue during this stage to en-hance communication. Cooperationhelps the members move forward inthe process of group development.

Police leaders must encourageindividuals to pursue a positive pathand put aside personal issues in fa-vor of community interests. Thisopportunity also helps members ac-cept their share of responsibility forthe direction of the group. Thisshould move the group to the nextstage.

The Norming Stage

The norming stage can becharacterized by the develop-ment of team cohesion. By thispoint, the group members have sur-vived a period of testing, have re-solved conflicts, and have bondedenough to work together closely.

Members should feel more confi-dent and ready to accomplish mod-est tasks and objectives. Cohesionand confidence will greatly impact

the success of the group and itswork.

Watch leaders must monitor theprogress of their group. Moving tooquickly to the performing stage maycreate frustration and groupincohesiveness. Patience, active lis-tening, open communication, andunderstanding enhance the possibil-ity for successful transition.

The Performing Stage

The performingstage is team-oriented; leaders should have estab-lished roles, and members should beready for higher levels of coopera-tion and performance. In otherwords, the group, now a team, pullstogether to accomplish major goalsand objectives.5 However, this stagedoes not end the process. Membersmust continue to evaluate their sat-isfaction and take corrective mea-sures to keep the program success-ful. During this stage, members of

productive Neighborhood Watchgroups feel empowered and secureenough to address concerns andmake meaningful changes.

The climate of trust that re-duces tension, fear, or anxiety in theforming and storming stageswill assist in the transition to thenorming and performing stagesof development. Positive com-munication, accurate information,and the reduction of rumors re-main essential during all stages inorder to encourage positive groupdevelopment.

CONCLUSION

The shift in philosophy toneighborhood-oriented policing re-quires mutual trust and a reliance oncitizen participation. NeighborhoodWatch programs can help build abridge to the community that servesas the foundation for mutual respectand successful crime preventioninitiatives. Working with Neighbor-hood Watch programs requires ex-ceptional leadership skills and agreat deal of patience; however, the

rewards should prove considerable.The success of a NeighborhoodWatch program directly relates tothe departments commitment to

PhotoMark Ide


19/34


establish a strategic plan, train the participants, and encourage opencommunication within the commu-

nity. Yet, starting a NeighborhoodWatch program may prove less dif-ficult than maintaining citizen inter-est and participation. Leaders firstmust define the groups mission inorder to establish direction. Next,by assessing and articulating com-munity needs, they can sustain the programs direction. Finally, theyshould redirect the members to newgoals and objectives once they complete a specific mission. Indeed,citizens who participate in crime

prevention programs must have

adequate support and opportunitiesto help implement positive changesin their communities.

In short, in order to succeed,Neighborhood Watch programs re-quire planning, dedication, and mo-tivated leadership, coupled with en-hanced citizen support of policeagencies. Those departments thatmaintain these essential ingredientswill build a solid program that com- bats crime and addresses citizensconcerns.

Endnotes

1 U.S. Department of Justice, Understand-

ing Community Policing: A Framework for

According to FBI Uniform CrimeReporting (UCR) final 1997 reported crimestatistics, violent crime totals decreased 3percent and property crime totals declined 2percent from 1996 levels. By offense, theviolent crimes of murder and robbery eachdecreased 7 percent in 1997, while aggra-vated assault was down 1 percent andforcible rape showed a slight decline.Property crime decreases included 3 percentfor motor vehicle thefts and 2 percent eachfor burglary and larceny-theft incidents.

These statistics are based on a Crime

Index of selected violent and propertycrimes submitted to the UCR Program bymore than 17,000 city, county, and state law

enforcement agencies throughout theUnited States. The 1997 Crime Index totalof approximately 13.2 million offensesrepresented a 2 percent decline from the1996 total.

Overall, cities experienced a 3 percentdecrease, while crime increased by 1percent in rural areas. Regionally, the southhad 40 percent of the reported crime in1997; the west, 24 percent; the midwest, 22percent; and the northeast, 15 percent.

Complete crime information is con-tained in the FBIs Crime in the UnitedStates, 1997, which is available on theFBIs Internet site at http://www.fbi.gov.

Action (Washington, DC: Bureau of JusticeStatistics, 1995), 5, in George L. Kelling,Police and Communities: The QuietRevolution,Perspectives on Policing

(Washington, DC: National Institute of Justiceand John F. Kennedy School of Government,Harvard University, 1988), 2.

2 D.P. Rosenbaum, The Theory of ResearchBehind Neighborhood Watch, Crime and

Delinquency 33 (1987): 103-134.3 National Crime Prevention Institute,

Understanding Crime Prevention (Boston, MA:Butterworth Publisher, 1986), 201.

4 B.W. Tuckman, Development Sequencein Small Groups,Psychological Bulletin 63(June 1965): 6.

5 Paul Hersey, Kenneth H. Blanchard, andDewy Johnson, Management of Organization

Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources (UpperSaddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996),

366-368.

Crime Data

Crime Decreases in 1997


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February 1999 / 19

Book Review

The Killers Among Us: An Examination

of Serial Murder and Its Investigation bySteven A. Egger, published by Prentice Hall

Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1998.The Killers Among Us seeks to elucidate

information about the relatively rare and elusivephenomenon of serial murder. The author, acriminal justice professor and former homicideinvestigator, attempts to provide readers with anunderstanding of what law enforcement officersknow about the phenomenon of serial murder,what they think they know, and what theysimply do not know, by reducing the blackholeof misinformation erroneously created through

the propagation of numerous myths.The book is divided into four sections.

Section 1 offers an overview of existing serialmurder literature. Definitional issues, estimateson the number of serial killers, and the motiva-tional factors behind serial murder receiveextensive coverage. This section also offerssociological, psychological, biological, andcultural explanations in an effort to familiarizethe reader with numerous theoretical explana-tions for this behavior. The author attacks serialmurder mythology by criticizing and clarifyingreports commonly attributed to serial murderersand their crimes. For example, media portrayalsoften depict serial murderers as mutants fromhell who do not behave like the average citizen.These fallacies become more apparent in thesecond section of the book through an examina-tion of four in-depth case studies. The authorpresents social, familial, attitudinal, and otherlife events for Ted Bundy, John Wayne Gacy,Henry Lee Lucas, and Kenneth Bianchi. Theauthor astutely closes this section with a cross-case analysis that demonstrates the killerssimilarities and differences.

From a law enforcement perspective,sections 3 and 4 contain insightful and usefulinvestigative information. Section 3 dissects theseven obstacles surrounding serial murderinvestigations and delineates the pros and cons

of the most common responses to these prob-

lems. Section 4 outlines the future of serialmurder and proposes a research and policyagenda for addressing this issue.

The author clearly achieves his objectives,especially in the areas of investigating andresponding to serial murders and describes eachof the obstacles commonly encountered duringthe course of an investigation. Foremost amongthese obstacles is linkage blindness, a termpreviously coined by the author to denote thelack of communication between various agen-cies. The failure to commit to an investigationand effectively manage information, as well as

the tendency to submit to media pressure,receives exceptional coverage and providesinsight for law enforcement personnel attempt-ing to overcome these investigative obstacles.

The Killers Among Us also offers an excel-lent commentary on law enforcement agenciesresponses to serial murder cases. The authorpresents 14 different tactics, ranging from taskforces to psychics, with references on their use,either successfully or unsuccessfully, in priorinvestigations. This discussion might signifi-cantly benefit investigators trying to determinethe most appropriate response in relation to thenature of the case, personnel, financial re-sources, and other limitations unique to theirjurisdictions.

The Killers Among Us appeals to a diverseaudience, ranging from college students toseasoned homicide investigators. With itscomprehensive, insightful approach, the bookcan give any reader a greater appreciation for,and an accurate understanding of, the serialmurder phenomenon.

Reviewed by

Douglas L. YearwoodDirector, North CarolinaCriminal Justice Analysis Center

Governors Crime CommissionRaleigh, North Carolina


21/34


ine-of-duty shootings;death, suicide, or seriousinjury of co-workers;

flashbacks and nightmares; intru-sive imagery and thoughts; anger;guilt; sleep difficulties; with-drawal; depression; and stresssymptoms. These represent normalreactions to abnormal situations.

In the 1970s, when little wasknown about critical incidenttrauma, about 70 percent of policeofficers who used fatal force leftlaw enforcement within 5 years.2

Even today, the failure to resolveissues associated with critical inci-dents often leads to a variety of

negative cognitive and behavioralpatterns. Some law enforcement of-ficers may overreact to perceivedthreats; others may underreact toclearly dangerous situations. Someofficers resign or retire prema-turely, while others become disci- plinary problems or develop in-creased absenteeism. Burnout,stress-related illnesses, posttrau-matic stress disorder, and substanceabuse often result from unresolvedissues stemming from traumaticincidents.

Lmulti-casualty homicides; and hos-tage situations exemplify critical in-cidents that often leave law enforce-ment officers feeling an over-whelming sense of vulnerability orlack of control.1 The FBI recognizesthat two-thirds of officers involvedin shooting incidents may experi-ence significant emotional reac-tions. Typical responses includea heightened sense of danger;

The FBIs Critical Incident

Stress Management ProgramBy VINCENT J. MCNALLY and ROGER M. SOLOMON, Ph.D.


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February 1999 / 21

CRITICAL INCIDENTINTERVENTIONS

The FBI has a responsibility to

help its employees constructivelyhandle the emotional aftermath ofcritical incidents. Accordingly, theEmployee Assistance Unit devel-oped the Critical Incident StressManagement (CISM) Program tosafeguard and promote the psycho-logical well-being of FBI employ-ees following traumatic experi-ences. While agents always havereceived training, firearms, andbody armor to help them physicallysurvive critical incidents, they now

can obtain the tools they need tohelp them survive the emotional af-termath of such events.

The CISM Program providesFBI employees with a confidentialmethod of mitigating the adverseeffects of the incidents and promot-ing positive resolution. Team mem-bers are drawn from the EmployeeAssistance Unit, FBI chaplains, theFBI peer support team, and mentalhealth professionals with expertisein police psychology and trauma.Although all CISM team membersdo not have legally sanctioned privileged communication, inter-ventions are considered confiden-tial by policy. Moreover, all FBIteam members receive training onthe importance of maintaining con-fidentiality and supporting their fel-low employees without judging orlosing respect for them.

The program offers a con-tinuum of interventions and ser-

vices, which provides both immedi-ate and long-term support. Theseinclude defusings, critical incidentstress debriefings, family out-reach, manager support, referrals

and follow-up services, eye move-ment desensitization and reprocess-ing treatments, and postcriticalincident seminars.

Defusings

After initial investigative issues(e.g., conducting preliminary inter-views and taking statements) havebeen handled, the CISM team willconvene a defusing.3 This informalsmall group or individual discus-sion with involved personnel beginsa few hours after the incident. These30- to 40-minute interventions pro-mote normalization, reduce tension,and determine future needs.

Critical IncidentStress Debriefings

After the initial defusing oc-curs, the next level of intervention

involves a critical incident stressdebriefing (CISD),4 a structuredgroup discussion for all involved personnel that takes place asthe emotional impact sets in.

Depending on personnel needs, lo-gistical considerations, and legal is-sues (e.g., waiting until investiga-tive statements have been taken),the CISD usually occurs within 24to 72 hours after the incident.

The CISD promotes normaliza-tion and recovery by having in-volved personnel discuss such is-

sues as their roles in the incidents,their thoughts during the events,their emotional reactions, and thestress symptoms they experienced.In addition to educating these em-ployees about coping strategies, theCISD enables CISM team membersto determine who may benefit fromreferrals for further care and to planfor other follow-up support.

Peer or One-on-one Support

Following the debriefing, the

CISM team may meet individuallywith the employees involved in theincident. Often, a team memberwho has experienced a similarcritical incident will provide the

Director of Critical Incident RecoveryResources in Amherst, New York,Dr. Solomon serves as a consultantfor the FBI and an instructor andclinician in the FBIs Critical IncidentStress Management Program.

A certified employee assistanceprofessional, Special AgentMcNally heads the FBIsEmployee Assistance Unit at FBIHeadquarters in Washington, DC.


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one-on-one support. Peer guidance proves particularly effective inhelping FBI personnel normalizetheir reactions to the trauma. Thissupport has tremendous credibilitycoming from a fellow employeewho has been there.

Family Assistance

In the law enforcement profes-sion, an employees most vital support system, the family, often re-mains neglected. Individualsadversely affected by critical inci-dents bring the trauma home to theirfamilies.5 The CISM team providesdebriefings for family members as agroup and one-on-one to help themcope with their reactions to a familymembers involvement in a criticalincident.

Manager Support

The CISM team consults withmanagers about their roles insupportively handling the emo-tional aftermath of critical inci-dents. Managers must coordinatecommunication, timetables for cri-

sis services, appropriate ongoing in-terventions, and other support pro-grams. FBI experience has shownthat recovery occurs more rapidlywhen concerned managers activelynurture their employees following atraumatic event. Moreover, addi-tional traumatic stress may resultwhen employees perceive managersas distant or insensitive.

Additionally, managers mustremember that critical incidents, especially those involving death or

serious injury to coworkers, can sig-nificantly impact the entire office.Appropriate and timely interven-tion by both managers and theCISM team can minimize the

negative consequences for officepersonnel and others affected by theincident.

Referrals andFollow-up Services

For many individuals, defus-ings, debriefings, and one-on-onesupport lead to closure and resolu-tion of the traumatic incident.Through this assistance, the trau-matic incident is processed and be-comes integrated; specifically,negative emotions, thoughts, andimages fade. The individual retainswhat is useful, learns from the inci-dent, and resolves the event.

flashbacks, nightmares, intrusivethoughts, and other posttraumaticsymptoms.7 A central component ofthe trauma can be negative, irratio-nal self-beliefs having to do with anindividuals participation in theevent (e.g., Its all my fault...Imstill not safe...Im helpless). At this point, referral to mental health professionals with specialized experience and training becomesnecessary.

Eye Movement Desensitizationand Reprocessing

Eye movement desensitizationand reprocessing (EMDR) is a component of the FBIs integrated re-sponse to critical incidents. A therapeutic method that must beadministered only by mental healthprofessionals trained in the proce-dure, EMDR frequently acceleratesthe treatment of trauma. Report-edly, EMDR stimulates the brainsnatural information-processingmechanisms, allowing the frozentraumatic information to be pro-cessed normally and achieve inte-

gration.8

Negative images oftenfade; negative emotions subside. Ir-rational thoughts give way to appro-priate, adaptive thoughts and inter- pretations (e.g., I did the best Icould...I survived and I am nowsafe...I can exercise control). WithEMDR, an individual discards whatis not useful (e.g., irrationalthoughts, distressing emotions, in-trusive images), retains what isuseful, and learns from the event, asthe following hypothetical example

illustrates.A male rescue worker at the

bombing of the Federal Building inOklahoma City felt guilty over notfinding some missing limbs of one

...stress-relatedillnesses...andsubstance abuseoften result from

unresolved issuesstemming from

traumatic incidents.

However, for others, these in-terventions represent only a begin-ning. The intense physiological and psychological arousal of a criticalincident can impair their informa-tion-processing mechanisms. Con-sequently, information taken in dur-ing the trauma (e.g., sights, sounds,

emotions, sensations, and beliefs)can be frozen in the brain and not processed normally.6 Rather thanfading, these sensory impressionscan continue to intrude, resulting in


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February 1999 / 23

victim. He felt he had not completedhis mission. Also, he felt guilty thatit had taken several days to recoveranother victim that had been visible but inaccessible. He experiencedintrusive images of the scenes,which evoked significant distress.Given debriefings and counseling,the worker still experienced intru-sive images and feelings of guilt.Two months after the incident, hereceived EMDR. During treatment,the worker realized that no one hadever found the missing limbs andthat he had done all he could. Ap-plying EMDR to the second situa-tion involving the delayed recovery,the worker realized that the victimwas dead, not calling for help, andthat the rescuers had other priori-ties. He then stated that not only hadhe done the best he could but thathe and his fellow rescuers had done

a good job. His guilt was alleviated.Research indicates that afterthree 90-minute sessions of EMDR,84 to 100 percent of individ-uals who had posttraumatic stress

disorder (PTSD) due to a singletraumatic episode no longer met thecriteria for PTSD.9 Consistent withthis research, the FBI has foundEMDR to be effective when usedwith individuals exhibiting symp-toms of posttraumatic stress stem-ming from a specific event.

Most important, only mentalhealth professionals should admin-ister EMDR. While critical incidentstress debriefings and defusings il-lustrate crisis intervention strate-gies, EMDR constitutes treatment,which requires education and skillto administer. Therefore, mentalhealth professionals must have ap-propriate training in EMDR, as wellas knowledge and experience inworking with trauma.

Postcritical Incident Seminar

Critical incident recovery can

prove a lengthy and complex pro-cess. Even after initial accept-ance and resolution of an incident,negative reactions can resurface.Once individuals confront their

vulnerability and mortality, theymust learn to live with that reality.Going through a traumatic incidentis like crossing a road and losingones naivete with no possibility ofcrossing back.10 To minimize long-term difficulties, the CISM teammembers and employee assistancepersonnel make follow-up contacts.Also, they offer referrals for addi-tional help as needed.

To promote resolution andprovide follow-up support, the FBIinitiated a postcritical incidentseminar (PCIS). Employee assis-tance staff members invite employ-ees who have experienced a criticalincident to a 4-day seminar to dis-cuss their reactions in a safe, protec-tive, and confidential environment.Also open to the spouses of employ-ees involved in traumatic events,the seminar usually includes be-

tween 15 and 25 individuals.Through sharing their experienceswith others, participants receivepeer support, which helps normal-ize their reactions. They also learn

Experiencing the death or violent traumaticinjury of a co-worker, spouse, or familymember

Taking a life, or causing serious injury,in a line-of-duty situation

Experiencing the suicide of a co-worker,spouse, or family member

Surviving a major natural disaster orman-made catastrophe (e.g., bombing)

Witnessing/handling multiple fatalities

Examples of Line-of-Duty Critical Incidents

Participating in high-speed pursuit that endsin tragedy

Participating in Special Weapons andTactics (SWAT) operations, where dangersare present

Negotiating with a hostage taking/barricaded suspect

Observing an act of corruption, bribery,or other illegal activity by a co-worker

Facing suspension and/or threat of dismissal


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about trauma and coping strategiesto facilitate healing and recovery.Additionally, peer support training

permits participants to offer con-structive interpersonal support inthe future to fellow employees whomay experience critical incidents.

The PCIS allows participantsexperiencing difficulty to accessprofessional services in a safe envi-ronment. Participants can work vol-untarily one-on-one with clinicianswho specialize in law enforcementissues, posttraumatic stress disor-der, and EMDR. Often the vehiclethat moves individuals who are

stuck in resolving their incidents,PCIS can be illustrated by the fol-lowing example.

While attending a PCIS, anagent experienced distress from aseemingly minor incident.11 Duringthe surveillance of a suspected drugdealer, a high-speed chase ensued.The suspect, realizing he was beingfollowed, drove at speeds in ex-cess of 100 miles per hour. Heeventually pulled over, got out ofhis vehicle, and approached theagent. The agent identified himself,and the suspect surrendered uponcommand.

Despite the positive outcome,the incident still bothered the agent.At the PCIS, the agent talked aboutthis incident and realized his fearstemmed from the accumulation ofseveral past incidents. These in-cluded Vietnam experiences, twoair disasters, and several hostagenegotiations. The agent recognized

the connection between the surveil-lance and these other situationswhere he faced his own mortality.With EMDR, further discussion,and peer support, the agent resolved

these cumulative stress issues. Overthe past 2 years, follow-up contacthas revealed that these gains remain

stable.The PCIS commonly deals withissues of vulnerability resultingfrom such situations as the traumaof witnessing a partners being shot,grief stemming from the suddendeath of a loved one, guilt from hav-ing to use fatal force, or the horrorthat comes from working with masscasualties following a bombing orairline disaster.

The One-two Punch

The combination of eye move-ment desensitization and reprocess-

ing with the postcritical incidentseminar has led to rapid recovery inFBI employees experiencing post-traumatic stress from single-episode trauma. Although EMDRgenerally proves effective in one tothree 90-minute sessions, the FBIsexperience shows that the therapeu-tic gains occur even more rapidlywhen EMDR is used within the con-text of the PCIS.

Though EMDR does not workfor everyone, the FBIs experience

with single-episode trauma revealsthat a 30- to 40-minute session re-sults in a significant reduction of posttraumatic reactions. The safeatmosphere, peer debriefing, andeducational information initiate a positive working-through process,which prepares the employee forfurther intervention using EMDR.

Similarly, employing EMDRsoon after a critical incident stressdebriefing or a one-on-one session,as a one-two punch, has beenfound to be helpful for personnelsuffering from single-episodetrauma who have a stable supportsystem.12 The CISD or one-on-onestructure facilitates an understand-ing of the impact of the event andprovides support and guidance to-ward adaptive resolution.

EMDR appears to have a very powerful and rapid effect aftersuch intervention, perhaps becauseof this initial processing. Not a

one-time therapy procedure, sev-eral EMDR sessions may be need-ed to resolve the incident. There-fore, follow-up contact remainsessential.

The program offers

a continuum ofinterventions andservices, whichprovides bothimmediate and

long-term support.

Since 1986, the FBI has con-ducted 37 of these seminars with900 participants. Many of thosewho have attended a PCIS volunteerto assist others who experiencecritical incidents. Valuable re-sources because they have exper-ienced such incidents, these employees and spouses provideenlightened interpersonal supportto their peers following traumatic

events. The FBI believes that nobetter individuals exist to offer support than those who have experi-enced, and emotionally workedthrough, similar events.


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February 1999 / 25

Most important, EMDR fol-lowing a CISD or one-on-one ses-sion, or used within the context of a

postcritical incident seminar works best for individuals experiencingacute symptoms from a specific in-cident who have stable support sys-tems and living situations. ThoughEMDR is applicable for complex posttraumatic stress reactions orsymptoms due to cumulative stress,a more thorough preparation andassessment should be completed be-fore initiating EMDR. Further, be-cause EMDR sometimes can openup other emotional issues and

stimulate unresolved traumas, itshould be administered by a trainedclinician who can determine the ap- propriateness of the therapy. Fol-low-up contact proves essential toensure treatment effects remainstable and to deal with other emo-tional issues that may arise.

This one-two punch has led toan enhanced role for peer supportpersonnel by increasing their inter-action with mental health profes-sionals. Under the supervision of aclinician, peers often help prepareemployees for the EMDR sessionby discussing the impact of the inci-dent, debriefing employees follow-ing the treatment, and providing fol-low-up contact.

Peers report a greater sense ofsatisfaction because of their closerinvolvement in the healing process.Clinicians appreciate the peer assis-tance because the initial preparationcan save time. The close working

relationship between clinicians andpeers has led to earlier interventionthan conventional referral can af-ford, which ultimately benefits theaffected employee.

CONCLUSION

The FBIs Critical IncidentStress Management Program offersa continuum of integrated confiden-tial services beginning immediatelyfollowing an incident and ex-tending to long-term, follow-upsupport. Along with immediateinterventions (e.g., defusings, criti-cal incident stress debriefings, peersupport, and referrals), the CISM program provides long-term, fol-low-up contact through the post-critical incident seminar. Also, eye

movement desensitization and reprocessing, a therapeutic methodfor the treatment of trauma, is anintegrated component of the FBIsresponse to a traumatic incident.Whether assisting employees incoping with the emotional after-math of such events as the bombingof the Federal Building in Okla-homa City or the TWA Flight 800crash in New York, the FBI hasdemonstrated its commitment to a

comprehensive approach to criticalincident stress programs.These intervention methods

may prove helpful to other lawenforcement agencies faced with

similar situations. The safeguarding

of law enforcement personnel can-not stop at providing officers withonly the weapons and equipment tofight crime but must include givingthese brave men and women thestrategies for coping with the emo-tional aftermath of traumatic eventsthat occur all too frequently in theirprofession.

Endnotes1 R.M. Solomon, Critical Incident Stress

Debriefing in Law Enforcement, inInnova-tions in Disaster and Trauma Psychology, ed.G.S. Everly and J.T. Mitchell (Ellicott City,MD: Chevron Publishing, 1995), 123-157.

2 James M. Horn, Critical Incidents forLaw Enforcement Officers, in Critical

Incidents in Policing, eds. James T. Reese,James M. Horn, and Christine Dunning(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,1991), 143.

3 J.T. Mitchell and G.S. Everly, CriticalIncident Stress Debriefing: An Operations

Manual for the Prevention of Traumatic Stress

Among Emergency Services and Disaster

Workers, 2d ed., rev. (Ellicott City, MD:Chevron Press, 1996).

4 Ibid.5 G.S. Everly, Familial Psychotraumatology

in Emergency Services Personnel, inInnovation in Disaster and Trauma Psychol-

ogy, vol. 2, ed. G.S. Everly and J.T. Mitchell,(Ellicott City, MD: Chevron Publishing, 1995),42-50.


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Documents

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - Feb99leb