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O = University of Nigeria, Nsukka
OU = Innovation Centre
Agboeze Irene E.
SOCIAL SCIENCES
POLITICAL SCIENCE
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT’S URANIUM ENRICHMENT
AND STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
EZE, STANLEY NNAEMEKA PG/Ph.D/06/41712
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IRANIAN GOVERNMENT’S URANIUM
ENRICHMENT AND STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
BY
EZE, STANLEY NNAEMEKA PG/Ph.D/06/41712
A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA, IN FULFILLM ENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY (Ph.D) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)
SUPERVISOR
PROFESSOR OBASI IGWE
DECEMBER, 2014
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APPROVAL PAGE
This Thesis written by Eze, Stanley Nnaemeka (PG/Ph.D/06/41712), has been approved for the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka
By
………………………. ………………………….. Professor Obasi Igwe Date Supervisor
……………………..…… ………………………….. Professor Jonah Onuoha Date Head of Department
……………………………. ………………………….. External Examiner Date Professor Aja Akpuru-Aja
Director of Studies National Institute of Policy & Strategic Studies
……………………….. ………………………….. Professor I.A. Madu Date Dean, Faculty of The Social Sciences
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DEDICATION
I most humbly dedicate this work to the Almighty God for making it possible for me to
complete this study despite all odds. I also want to dedicate this work to my lovely family;
my dear wife, Juliet and my God sent children, Ugochukwu, Chioma and Chinonso.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I give the Almighty God the glory for making it possible that I will successfully
complete this programme despite all odds. Without His divine grace on me, all I have
achieved would not have been possible.
My special thanks goes to a great man, my supervisor, Professor Obasi Igwe, for his
support, guidance, immeasurable advice and the time he took to ensure that I finish the Ph.D
work. Indeed you are a great scholar of our time. May the Almighty God continue to bless
you and your family, and grant you success in all your endeavours.
My sincere gratitude also goes to these academic icons, Professor Aloysius Okolie
and Professor Ken Ifesinachi. Without your unquantifiable assistance, the completion of this
thesis would not have been possible. I also want to remember one of my great motivators,
Late Professor Miriam Ikejiani-Clark, who unfortunately passed away and could not see me
complete this course. I want to put it on record that it is because of this great lady and my
supervisor that made me to continue with the course after I abandoned it for some years. May
her gentle soul rest in peace.
To all my distinguished lecturers and non-teaching staff of the Department of Political
Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, I say thank you all for enlightening me with your
wealth of experience. I most sincerely want to appreciate a great gentleman and a workaholic,
Udoh Ogbonnaya, for tirelessly being there anytime I came calling and ensuring I complete
my thesis. I also want to appreciate my colleagues in the military such as Maj Gen CO Ugwu,
Brig Gen AB Abubakar, Col HPZ Vintenaba, Col JJ Ogunlade, Lt Col KO Ukandu and Maj
TO Onyeogu (rtd), for always encouraging me to complete this course and become a standout
professional soldier.
Finally, my special thanks go to my dear wife, Mrs Juliet Chiamaka Eze, for
arranging the home front in proper shape and my national team, Ugochukwu, Chioma and
Chinonso Eze, and also, to my parents, Nze and Mrs Francis Eze, who kept on reminding me
that I need to complete this course, to be a great person. Thank you for your moral support,
endurance, prayers and understanding that I have to combine my military duties with
academic studies. May the good Lord bless you all.
Colonel Eze, S.N. Department of Political Science University of Nigeria, Nsukka
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page…………………………………………………………………………………...….i Approval Page…………………………………………………………………………………ii Dedication…………………………………………………………………………………….iii Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………...iv Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………………. v List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………….. vii List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………… viii List of Appendices……………………………………………………………….................. ix Acronyms and Abbreviations………………………………………………………............... x Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………….. xiii CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 1.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………… 1 1.2 Statement of the Problem….………..................……………………………………… 8 1.3 Objectives of the Study………………………………………………………………. 11 1.4 Significance of the Study……………………………………………………………...11
CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review 2.1 Literature Review……………………………………………………………………...13 CHAPTER THREE: Theoretical Framework and Methodology 3.1 Theoretical Framework of Analysis.…………………………………………………..35 3.2 Hypotheses…………………………………………………………………………….45 3.3 Esearch Design………………………………………………………………………...45 3.4 Method of Data Collection ………………………………………………………….. 48 3.5 Method of Data Analysis…………………………………………………………......
50 3.6 Logical Data Framework………………………………………………………………51
CHAPTER FOUR: Iranian Government’s Uranium Enrichment and Strategic Balance in the Middle East 4.1. Introduction……………………………...…………………….………………………54 4.2 Geo-Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Policy Posture.………………………………………..56 4.3 Iranian Quest for Nuclear Capability ……...…...………………………………..........57 4.4 Influence of Outside Powers in Middle East Strategic Balance…………………........60 4.5. Combat Readiness of Iran and Israel………………………………………………… 61 4.6. Consequences of the Nuclearization of the Middle East……… ……………..……... 65 CHAPTER FIVE: United States Unilateral Enforcement of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Balance of Power Relations in the Middle East 5.1. Introduction….………………………………………..……………………………… 69 5.2. History of Global Nuclear Enlightenment…….……..…………………………….….69 5.3. International Safeguards……………………………..………….……........................ 76
5.3.1. Arms Control…………….………………………..………………………... 77
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5.4. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty………………………..…….……………............. 81 5.5. Nuclear Black Market……………………………………..………………………. .102 5.6. Nuclear Energy Development in the Middle East…….…...…………………......... 107
5.6.1. Egypt.…………………………………………………..………................. 108 5.6.2. Gulf Co-Operation Council………………………………..………….........109 5.6.3. Jordan………………………………………………………….…...............110 5.6.4. Iran………………… …………………………………………………….. 111 5.6.5. Israel……..………………… …………………………………………….. 113 5.6.6. Turkey……………………………………………………………………....115 5.6.7. Other Arab Nations…………………………………………………………116
5.7. Politics of Containment of Iranian Quest for Nuclear Technology………………….116 5.7.1. The Arabs…………………………………………………………………...117 5.7.2. Israeli Position……………………………………………………………...119 5.7.3. The United States and the Western Nations……………………………… 121
CHAPTER SIX: United Nations and Iran’s Nuclear Programme: an Evaluation of Non-Proliferation Treaty 6.1. Introduction…….……………………….…………………..…………………........123 6.2. Reinforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Nuclear Crisis
in the Middle East………………………………………………………….……….123 6.3. United Nations Negotiation Instruments/International Efforts at Resolving the Iran
Nuclear Imbroglio.....……….……………………………………………………....126 6.3.1. Prospects of Resoluving Iranian Nuclear Problem ……….….…………… 128 6.3.2. Establishment of a Nuclear Free Zone in the Middle East.…………….......129
6.4. United Nations Negotiation Platforms………………………………………………131 6.5. United Nations Diplomatic Efforts Through The P5 + 1……………………………135
SEVEN: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 7.1. Summary……………………………………………………………………....……139 7.2. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………....…. 140 7.3 Recommendations………………………………………………………….….……142 BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………….………..………………………...………144APPENDIXES ………………………………………..…..………………………………..155
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LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
1.1: Comparison of Iran and Israeli Military Capabilities………………………….. 55
4.1: Comparison of Iran and Israeli Military Capabilities……………………………63 5.1: Growth in the Number of Nuclear Powers………………………………………71
5.2: Estimated Nuclear Weapons Produced by Israel……………..…………........…114
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LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
1.1: Geo-Political Map of the Middle East Region……………………………...... 7
4.1: Political Map of the Islamic Republic of Iran……………………………….. 56
5.1: The Location of Iranian Nuclear Facilities……………………………….......113 5.3: Map of Major Iranian Nuclear Facilities in Regional Context………………119
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LIST OF APPENDIXES
APPENDIX PAGE
1. List of Treaties and Conventions Related to Arms Control…………………….. 155
2. States Parties to the NPT, as of 15 April, 1995………………………………..... 159
3. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons……………………… 164
4. UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran………………………………………. 172
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS AIOC - Anglo-Persian Oil Company
A-Bomb - Atomic Bomb
AEOI - Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
ABM - Anti- Ballistic Missile
APC - Armoured Personnel Carrier
AQ Khan. - Abdul Qadeer Khan
BMD - Ballistic Missile Defence
BWC - Biological Weapons Convention
CISADA - Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Disinvestment Act
CPPNM - Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT - Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
CWC - Chemical Weapons Convention
DPRK - Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea
EC - European Commission
EU - European Union
E3 - Germany, France and the UK
FEP - Fuel Enrichment Plant
FMCT - Fissile Material Cut-out Treaty
GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council
GICNT - Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
GP - G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
H-Bomb - Hydrogen Bomb
HEU - Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM. - Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
IND - Improvised Nuclear Device
Int Rep - Intelligence Reports
ICSANT - International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
INF - Intermediate Nuclear Forces
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INFCIRC - Information Circular
IRGC - Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRI - Islamic Republic of Iran
KICA - Korea International Cooperation Agency
LEU - Low-Enriched Uranium
MAD - Mutually Assured Destruction
MDS - Missile Defence Systems
MENWFZ - Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
MIRV - Multiple Independent Targetable Re-entry Vehicle
MOP - Massive Ordnance Penetrator
MW - Megawatt
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC Weapons - Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons
NDC - National Defence College
NNWS - Non-Nuclear Weapons States
NIIA - Nigerian Institute for International Affairs
Nukes - Nuclear Weapons
NPT - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC - National Security Council
NSG - Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSS - Nuclear Security Summit
NWFZ - Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
NWS - Nuclear Weapon States
OPCW - Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PAL - Permissive Action Links
PKK - Kurdistan Workers Party (Translated from Turkish Language’s,
‘Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan’)
PSI - Proliferation of Security Initiative
P5 +1 - China, France, Russia, UK, USA and Germany
RDD - Radiological Dispersion Device
RED - Radiation Emission Device
R & D - Research and Development
SAA - Small Arms Ammunition
SALT - Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
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SDI - Strategic Defense Initiative
SINOPEC - China National Petroleum Cooperation
TNW - Tactical Nuclear Weapons
TNRC - Tehran Nuclear Research Centre
TNT - Trinitrotoluene
TRR - Tehran Research Reactor
UAE - United Arab Emirates
UF6 - Uranium Hexafluoride
UI - University of Ibadan
UK - United Kingdom
UN - United Nations
UNIDIR - United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNSC - United Nations Security Council
UNSCOM - United Nations Special Commission on Iraq
UNSCR - United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSCOM - United Nations Special Commission
URENCO - Uranium Enrichment Corporation
US - United States
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD - Weapon of Mass Destruction
WTO - World Trade Organization
WWII - World War II
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ABSTRACT
This study examines the nature, character, dynamics and motivating forces behind Iranian quest for uranium enrichment and balances of power relations in the Middle East. On this account, the objectives of our research is geared towards evaluating the link between Iranian uranium enrichment and strategic balance in the Middle East; United States unilateral enforcement of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and nuclear enrichment crisis in the Middle East; United Nations multilateral intervention in the Middle East nuclear confrontation. Our study derives its analytic and theoretical foundation from the Balance of power at multipolarity theory, the qualitative method of data collection, and ex-post-facto research design. Using Ex post facto research design, qualitative method of data collection and qualitative descriptive method of data analysis, our study found out among other things that Iran’s uncooperative attitude to the United Nations-backed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, verification and enforcement mechanisms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) casts doubts upon the credibility of the Iranian nuclear programme. Our research methodology reveals that the lack of interpersonal trust by the West and Israel on the one side, and the Iranian government on the other side, plays a critical role in the diplomatic row generated by Iranian government’s quest for nuclear weapons development. Majorly, the study recommended among other measures that the United States should open up direct talks with Iran, while the Iranians themselves should ensure that their quest for nuclearization is basically for civil-power generation purposes.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
Nuclear weapons are explosives designed to release nuclear energy on a large
scale. Prior to 1945, wars were basically fought by conventional weapons that derived
their power from the rapid burning or decomposition of some chemical compounds,
leading to the release of limited amounts of energy, which caused limited degrees of
damage. However, the development of the first atomic bomb (A-bomb), which was
tested on 16 July, 1945, at Alamogordo, New Mexico, United States America,
completely changed all known concepts of modern warfare. The A-bomb gained its
power from splitting, or fission, of the atomic nuclei in isotopes of plutonium or
uranium, causing the release of a massive amount of energy in a very short time. The
strength of the explosion created by an atomic bomb is on the order of the strength of
the explosion that would be created by thousands of tons of Trinitrotoluene (TNT).
(Microsoft Encarta, 2009). We will interchangeably use the phrase ‘atomic bomb’,
‘nuclear weapons’, or ‘nukes’ in the course of this writing.
There are two basic types of nuclear weapons: those which derive the majority
of their energy from nuclear fission reactions alone, and those that use nuclear
reactions to begin nuclear fusion reactions that produce a large amount of total energy
output. The weapons whose explosive output is exclusively from fission reactions from
the nucleus of the atom are commonly referred to as atomic bombs or atom bombs.
The other basic type of nuclear weapon produces a large amount of its energy through
nuclear fusion reactions by using the energy of a fission bomb to compress and heat
fusion fuel. Such fusion weapons are generally referred to as thermonuclear weapons
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or hydrogen bombs (H-bombs), as they rely on fusion reactions between isotopes of
hydrogen (deuterium and tritium). However, all such weapons derive a significant
portion, and sometimes a majority, of their energy from fission. This is because a
fission weapon is required as a “trigger” for fusion reactions, and the fusion reactions
can themselves trigger additional fission reactions. All thermonuclear weapons are
considered to be much more difficult to successfully design and execute than miniature
fission weapons (Muller, 2009).
There are other types of nuclear weapons as well. For example, a boosted
fission weapon is a fission bomb which increases its explosive yield through a small
amount of fusion reactions, but is not a fusion bomb. Some weapons are designed for
special purposes, such as the neutron bomb. Neutron bomb is a thermonuclear weapon
purposely designed for explosive yields lower than other nuclear weapons. This is
because neutrons are absorbed by air, so a high-yielding neutron bomb is not able to
radiate neutrons beyond its blast range and so would have no destructive advantage
over a normal hydrogen bomb. It is sometimes referred to as ‘weapons of reduced
collateral effects’. Neutrons bombs could be used as strategic anti-ballistic missile
weapon or tactical weapons intended for use against armoured forces. It was originally
conceived during the Cold War by the United States (US) military as a weapon that
could stop Soviet troops from overrunning Allied nations without destroying the
infrastructure of the Allied nation (Barrriot, 2008; Muller, 2009; Microsoft Encarta,
2009).
The first A-bomb to be tested (Trinity bomb) was a sphere of plutonium about
the size of a baseball, which produced an explosion equal to 20,000 tonnes of TNT
(equivalent to the bomb load of 2000 United States B-29 bombers). Brigadier General
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Thomas Farrell (United States Army) in his report to the United States government on
the destructive nature of this new bomb in 16 July 1945 stated that, “the effect could be
called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous, and terrifying. No man-made
phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects
beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light with the
intensity many times that of the midday sun ….” (Nuclear Files Report, 2011:2). The
A-bomb was developed, constructed and tested by the Manhattan Project, a massive
United States enterprise that was established in August 1942, during World War II
(1939-1945). The Manhattan Project which was headed by United States Army
Brigadier General Leslie R. Groves worked in various locations at Los Alamos, New
Mexico under the direction of American Physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer.
The Manhattan Project developed two bombs, codenamed “Little Boy” and “Fat
Man” which was dropped at two Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9
August 1945 respectively. These two bombing resulted in the death of approximately
200,000 Japanese people - mostly civilians from acute radioactive injuries sustained
from the explosions and after-effect of radiation (Wikipedia, 2011). This ultimately
changed the specter and dynamics of international relations. The end of World War II,
forced the major powers then to adopt a nuclear warfare strategy which is a policy
based on preventing an attack by a nuclear weapon from another country. This
deterrence policy triggered off massive nuclear arms race between the West led by the
US and Eastern bloc countries led by the Soviet Union, culminating in the Cold War.
The advent of this weapon of mass destruction (WMD) including chemical and
biological agents, was summed up by the late British military strategist, Basil Liddell
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Hart as, “with the advent of atomic weapons, we have come either to the last page of
war or the last page of history” (UNIDIR, 1993:12).
The possession of atomic weapons by the United States since 16 July 1945 and
their subsequent use against Japanese cities precipitated the mad rush for possession of
nukes amongst the major powers, and formation of strategic alliances. The Americans
aided the British and French to acquire their nuclear weapons while the Soviet Union
assisted the Chinese (Guilmartin, 1996). These countries emerged as the “Big 5” and it
dictated the various political, defence and strategic policies of the Cold War era, thus
leading to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
Warsaw Pact strategic alliances. The combat doctrine of these alliances during the cold
war was based on a strategy of nuclear deterrence which oscillates between “massive
retaliation” (1950’s), “flexible reaction” (1960’s) “realistic threat and containment”
(1970), “direct confrontation” or “mutually assured destruction (MAD)”(1980’s),
“strategic defense initiative (SDI)” (also known as star wars) in the late 1980’s and
currently “reduced reliance”(Wikipedia, 2011 & Bundy, et al, 1987: 164).
The changes in the NATO and Warsaw Pact combat doctrines were occasioned,
at least in part with the changes in the other part of the strategic alliance. The United
States and the Soviet Union amongst the Big 5 had maintained large stockpiles of both
conventional and nuclear arsenals which include thermonuclear weapons in
the megaton range, neutron bombs, tactical nuclear weapons, and suitcase nukes.
Fortunately for all sides, an all-out nuclear World War III between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact alliances did not take place, till the end of the Cold War in early 1990s.
However, several proxy wars did occur as witnesses in Afghan-Soviet War (1979-
1989), Arab-Israeli Conflicts (1948-present), Angolan Civil War (1974-2002),
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Guatemalan Civil war (1960-1996), Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Korean War (1950-
1953), Nicaraguan Civil War (1979-1990), Vietnam War (1957-1975), Cuban Missile
Crisis (1962) and so on (Lowe, 1988; Wikipedia, 2012).
The fall of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev led to the end of the
Cold War and the world thus became what political scientist like Samuel Huntington
described as a‘unipolar world’ with the United States maintaining hegemonic influence
over all other nations (Huntington, 1996). The United States thus changed its policy
from arms race to arms containment and reduction, while NATO downgraded its
concept in 1991 from “flexible response” to “reduced reliance” on nuclear weapons
(Microsoft Encarta, 2004). The United States thus adopted various unilateral, bilateral
and multilateral measures to contain the proliferation, as well as reduction of this
WMD. Some political observers are however of the opinion that the United States
actions are premeditated on the fact that it want to be the worlds’ dominant power, and
should solely decide who should possess the WMD.
The Cold War era had only Britain, China, France, Soviet Union and United
States, as having the nuclear weapons. The nuclear crisis in the Far East in May 1998
added India and Pakistan to the nuclear club, while the third pre-supposed nuclear
power outside the big 5 is Israel. Israel though not officially acknowledged, has been
credited with clandestine nuclear arsenal since 1973. The Israeli nuclear arsenal in
1979 became a global issue when a former nuclear technician at Negev Nuclear
Research Center, Mordechai Vanunu revealed the extent of Israel nuclear programme
to a British newspaper, The Sunday Times of London, 5 October 1986 (Microsoft
Encarta: 2009: Wikipedia, 2012). The last member of the nuclear club is North Korea,
officially known as Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The North
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Koreans officially announced in 2005 that it has acquired a nuclear weapon and went
ahead to conduct underground nuclear test (though contrary to NPT treaty) to buttress
the fact that it had entered the exclusive nuclear club (Wikipedia, 2009; Massad, 2011).
It is however estimated that about 23,000 nuclear weapons still exist, and held by the
nine countries, with the United States and Russian Federation possessing by far the
largest number. The nuclear arsenal of Soviet Union reverted to Russian Federation
control at the end of the Cold War, after Ukraine and Kazakhstan relinquished the
weapons in their countries to Russia (Rydell, 2011).
Our study considers the Middle East to consist of some countries that lie in
Northern Africa, Europe and Central Asia. These countries include Bahrain, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. This study will further include other Arab/
Islamic countries such as Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Sudan, as part
of the Middle East. Most recently, the ‘free world’ has been concerned with the
growing quest of some nations with unpredicted leadership, especially in the Middle
East, to acquire nuclear weapons (nukes). In spite of our position on what the Middle
East is, below shows the Google search engine depicting the geo-political map of the
Middle East region (Figure 1.1).
There is also a greater concern of nuclear bomb materials or technology finding
their way into the hands of terrorists, religious extremists and unstable governments
within the region. It is on this premise that this study will endeavor to establish the
linkage between Iranian government’s quest for uranium enrichment and how it
hampers balance of power relations in the region; how United States foreign policy
thrust in the Middle East has deepened the nuclear crisis, and the relevance of the
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United Nations (UN) diplomatic channels and international efforts in resolving the
possibility of United States-Iranian nuclear impasse.
Figure 1: GEO-POLITICAL MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST REGI ON
Source: www.google.com.ng/images/mapmiddleeast
In this light therefore, this study situates the discourse within the centrality of
the state-led nuclear weapons development in the Middle East vis-à-vis the dynamics
22
of Iranian nuclear technology; the diplomatic row generated by Iranian nuclear
development between the United States and its Western Allies on one side and Sino-
Russian Alliance on the other side; its effect on strategic balance of regional and global
flow of forces especially in the Middle East. Specifically, the situating of this study
under the above-stated discourse will largely help us to focus on reconciling the
connection between Iranian government quest for uranium enrichment and balance of
power relations in the Middle East. This is what the study intends to achieve.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Understanding the balance of power and quest for nuclear weapon technology
especially in the Middle East revolves on one hand around the orientations of
American grand strategy and its ability to coordinate with its Western allies in its anti-
terror war. On the other hand, it involves its co-opting and acceptance of other state
partners, so as to ensure that it does not bear disproportionate costs for winning
agreements on its demands. Also, it reserves for the United States the right to
cooperate on functional matters without sacrificing political legitimacy at the altar of
unsavory practices (Boyle, 2008). As pointed out by Cirincione (2006), the most
important issue about the proliferation pursuit is not the nuclear reactors, but the input
and output into the reactors. This is because the same facilities that enrich uranium to
low levels for fuels can be utilized to enrich uranium to high levels for bombs. The
fuels and bombs can be respectively be produced when the same infrastructure that
reprocess used reactor fuel rods for disposal can be used to process plutonium for
weapons.
Ironically, there is no rule of international law that deals squarely on the legality
and use of nuclear weapons. Although, the general principle of Article 22 and 23 (a)
23
and (e) of the Hague Regulations governs the prohibition of nuclear weapons, neither
customary International Law nor Conventional Law basically contains any
comprehensive law on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In this sense, the
question on how to contain nuclear weapons proliferation arises and this is created out
of the global awareness and significance of the destructive track of nukes and its effect
during the World War II. The destructive tracks are reflected in the United States
atomic bombing of the two Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945,
the post - World War II arms race between the United States and Soviet Union, the
Soviet city of Chernobyl (now in Ukraine) nuclear reactor explosion of 1986, constant
nuclear tests (both surface and underground) by the nuclear armed countries and the
March 2011 tsunami cum flood induced nuclear reactor explosions at Japanese
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station (Agwu, 2011; Kluger, 2011).
The possession or quest for nuclear weapons or nuclear technology by states in
the Middle East and by non-state actors has created absolute insecurity in the presence
of enmity. This has created deep fear and common irrationality among desperate states
and their leaders angling for nuclear weapons. The quest to create a global nuclear
weapons balance has raised challenging questions on the need for an effective
international law and policing of potential nuclear states so as to guarantee nuclear
proliferation and security, such that the safety of commercial and civilian nuclear
technology development of material diffusion is guaranteed, thereby averting the
harmful dangers and effects of unregulated strategic competition among states and
non-state actors (Brodie, 1946; Walker, 2007).
Scholars such as Hager (2004) contends that the Western nations led by the
United States has a self-acclaimed belief in its ability to contextualize or de-
24
conceptualize the perception of the truth of whom, how and when state and non-state
actors should possess WMD. This position has been one of the motivating factors for
states and non-state actors in the Middle East to seek for the acquisition of nuclear
technology. Martin (1973) recognizes that strategies are built on credible capacity to
ensure deterrence. He views an effective deterrent policy as one that is dependent not
only on threatened destruction against the enemy, but also on credibility.
Hassner (2007) adds that the post-Cold War period is experiencing a nuclear
order that is centered on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 which he
classifies as discriminatory and barricading nuclear weapons development, thus
generating disagreement and supremacy fight within the permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United Nations and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on what an appropriate sanctions for violations should
be. Lavoy (2009) reveals that nuclear weapons development and strategic balances
creates awareness for nuclear myths and myth makers to practically and orally expand
their nuclear influence through public statements and policy debates. He adds also that
the concealment of weapons-related research and development activities by states
creates room for tension in the international system, and increases procurement efforts,
scientific training and education on weapons-related activities and fields.
Basically, these intellectual debates and responses above, do not by any means
exhaust the subject, but has furnished points of departure for further reflections on
Iranian government nuclear weapons production and strategic balances in the Middle
East. More so, notwithstanding the foregoing inquiries and scholarly positions, the
existing body of literature has suffered from important shortcomings. To question the
25
foregoing gap in literature, the understated research questions are raised to guide the
study:
1. Did the Iranian government’s quest for uranium enrichment undermine the
balance of power favourable to Israel and the US within the Middle East?
2. Did the US unilateral enforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) escalate the nuclear enrichment crisis in the Middle East?
3. Did the United Nations multilateral intervention provide a diplomatic settlement
to the US-Iran nuclear weapons development confrontation?
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
Broadly, this study evaluates the overall impact of Iranian quest for uranium
enrichment and balance of power relations in the Middle East. The specific objectives
include the following:
1. To critically examine if the Iranian government’s quest for uranium enrichment
undermines the balance of power favourable to Israel and the US within the
Middle East.
2. To determine whether the United States unilateral enforcement of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) escalates the nuclear crisis in the Middle East.
3. To determine if the United Nations multilateral intervention can provide a
diplomatic settlement to the US-Iran nuclear weapons development
confrontation.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
In this regard our significance of study will be both on the theoretical levels and
practical levels. Theoretically, this study seeks to highlight and widen scholarly
perceptions of Iranian, United States and its Western allies, Russia-China foreign
policy thrusts on nuclear weapons development in the Middle East, its effects on
26
nuclear weapons proliferation and balance of forces in the region. It is our hope that by
interrogating the global nuclear weaponization and foreign policy instruments of these
states, the inherent loopholes and interests in the international nuclear order and laws
will be established. Thus, our study will be a response to the intellectual challenges
involved in enhancing an understanding of the unending but continually and changing
new forms of international political economy and social relations. More importantly,
the study intends to critically examine the various efforts by nuclear watchdogs such as
the IAEA, the inter-governmental organizations such as the UN, European Union
(EU), United States, Arab league and other non-state stakeholders to curb the
inordinate desire for nuclear weapons acquisition, especially in the Middle East region.
It is our hope that our work will act as useful documented reference point of political
science contributions to the expansion of academic horizon on the flow of international
politics of nuclear weapons development and strategic balances in the Middle East.
Practically, our study significantly examined the Iranian nuclear build-up and
the dangerous threat it poses to international relations- regional and global security;
balance of power relations in the Middle East. It is also our hope that this study will
articulate the issue of nuclear safety, the demonization of nuclear weapon development
and production by state and non-state actors, to largely attack Western interests and
security, and perceived regional enemy states. The added practical dimension of our
study will serve as a logical response to compliance challenges and implications.
Basically, it is our belief that this study will be of vital importance to scholars on
Middle Eastern affairs, strategic and security studies researchers and the global reading
public, and as such serve as a further take off point for future inquiry in the study under
review.
27
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review examines the correlation between Iran’s quest for uranium
enrichment and balance of power relations in the Middle East in order to familiarize
ourselves with the position and opinions of scholars on the research questions. We
shall examine the dimension of relationship between nuclear weapons and strategic
balances in the Middle East. To broaden our literature review, we shall examine the
different perspectives of scholars based on their views on socio-economic and political
realities, regional considerations, personal biases and international representation on
global issues. Therefore, the thrust of our review shall be divided into these parts so as
to reflect the research questions posed and finding the gaps in the literature. The works
of scholars such as Agwu (2011), Venter (2007), Yost (2007), Walker (2007), Hassner
(2007), Pilat (2007), Chipman (1995), Eze (2005), Dunn (2007), Keeny (2005), Krause
(2007), Ruhle (2007), Sultan (2003), Sokolski (2007), Bundy (1987), Igwe (2005),
Rees and Aldrich (2005), Ashafa (2006) and so on will be reviewed. Based on the
statement of the problems, the viewpoints of these scholars are presented in a thematic
form:
1. Iranian Government’s Quest for Uranium Enrichment and Balance of power relations favourable to Israel and the US within the Middle East.
2. The US Unilateral Enforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and escalation of Nuclear Enrichment Crisis in the Middle East.
3. United Nations Multilateral Intervention and Provision of Diplomatic Settlement to the US-Iran Nuclear Weapons Development Confrontation
28
Iranian Government’s Quest for Uranium Enrichment and Balance of power relations favourable to Israel and the US within the Middle East
Igwe (2005:298) describes nuclear weapons as “atomic weapon, any bomb or
other destructive material, often considered together with the appropriate means of
delivery, obtained through the manipulation of the enormous power contained within
the atomic nuclei, a fundamental power of the universe, releasable through nuclear
fission and absorbable through fusion, the latter, as with the hydrogen bomb, which is
obtained in fusion process transforming the hydrogen nuclei into a helium nuclei”.
Both descriptions by the authors idealizes the content and destructive effect of nuclear
weapons, but they failed to bring to the fore comprehensively the increase diplomatic
row generated by the perceived development of nuclear weapon countries such as Iran,
which is balanced by a shrouded development of nuclear weapons by Israel.
Specifically, Igwe’s analysis of nuclear weapons is conceptualized as too historical and
not reflecting the dangerous realities of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Agwu’s
description is viewed as legalistic and idealistic.
According to Walker (2007) the issue of nuclear weapons is intended to liberate
man from fear, through opening up discussions on the challenges of deterrence, non–
proliferation regime, disarmament and international nuclear order. He asserts that the
exceptional nature of nuclear weapons beckons for an exceptional type of cooperative
politics, that is free from degraded international politics, international superiority
display, violent outburst and threats, United States hegemonic capacity of the
constitutionality of NPT. This assertion by Walker does not exhaust the subject or our
topic study completely, but provides well-furnished points of departure to understand
the idealistic pursuit of nuclear stability by scholars. His work fails to understand that
that the signature element for an enlighten understanding of nuclear pursuit by Middle
29
East states is in the non-glorification of United States values and the non-acceptance of
the strategic relevance of Israel by states such as Iran, Syria, Iraq, and non-states actors
such as the Al-Qaeda, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah,
and other independent and smaller terrorists sleeper cells in the Middle East.
According to Masse (2010), the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran has
developed a regional and global belief among conventionalist that Iranian nuclear
capability has increased nuclear weapons proliferation, regional civilian nuclear
weapons programs development, increased nuclear terrorism risks, and regional
destabilization. On the other hand, skeptics believe that Iranian nuclear development
may not necessarily lead to cascading nuclear proliferation and that extended
deterrence and positive United States security guarantees might preclude proliferation
and ensure stable regional deterrence. The IAEA contends that the beliefs of the
conventionalists and skeptics are insufficient to support their various assertions
(http://www.iaea.org/Newscenter/Focus/Fuel-Cycle/Key_events.shtml). Also, the
Iranian nuclear weapons development resurrects the importance of the IAEA and the
UN. Both agencies have become avenues for concerts of power by the members of the
international community to converge and manage the diplomatic row generated by
Iranian nuclear build-up (Walker, 2007).
Moreover, Kamarava (2010) asserts that Iranian possession of nuclear plants
within the Middle East has militarized domestic and regional security. This assertion
has been sustained by factional religious and political groups such as Islamic
Republican Guard Corps (IRGC), whose influence in Iranian politics manifested after
the Iran-Iraq war of the 80s and growing tension and bellicose statements emanating
from the United States and Israel. To equalize the growing United States and Israeli
30
threats, the Iranian state consciously cultivates fear to ensure popular political
obedience, popularly called “mukhabarat state”. The author’s assertion reduces Iranian
and Middle East regional peace and security to emotional attachment of religious and
political leaders, as well as the diplomatic statements of the West and Israel.
Harold (2011) contends that the obvious diplomatic row over nuclear weapons
development is fallacious and diversionary. That the real contention and driving force
of the global nuclear politics is in the quest to establish an international nuclear order
that legitimatize the rising role of China, thus negotiating new political and economic
paradigm shift that is unfavourable to dictates and antics of the United States. Rees and
Aldrich (2005) discovers that the quest to develop nuclear weapons and hatch strategic
balances among states emanates from a strategic culture. He describes strategic culture
as an ill-defined and underutilized concept, which is based on the understanding that
“States are predisposed by their historical experiences, political systems and culture to
deal with security issues in a particular way”. These assertions clearly elucidate why
some nations react to security concerns or situations in various ways. Neustadt and
May (1986) adds that historical experience and strategic culture are often connected
through an analogical that is championed by the decision makers who tend to focus
largely on the commanding levels of their past strategic experiences. Remarkably, Rees
and Aldrich (2005) view the quest to establish regional stability and strategic culture in
the Middle East as having creating an enabling environment for the United States
military power to be sustained and used, thus given her a self-acclaimed and sole
responsibility of tackling international terrorism and linking it to other network of
threats so as to attain its quest of hegemonic rule. These views by the above authors
31
confirms the position of Hans Morgenthau (1993) that international politics like all
politics, is a struggle for power and the ultimate aim of politics is power.
Furthermore, Holt (2005) reveals that the accelerated quest to develop nuclear
weapons by Iran originated after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and
former President George Bush’s declaration of war on terror, which has created a
consciousness among Arabs, and other Muslims to be defensive about identity and
radicalized Islamist movements. She concludes that ultimately, the war on terror is
championing authoritarianism both by the United States and the Middle Eastern
countries. Interestingly, the Pew Research Centre Report (2005) credits the buildup of
nuclear weapons by some Middle Eastern States as bordering on the credibility of
United States support for authoritarian regimes in the region and the support it lends to
the Israelis against the ‘legitimate rights’ of the Palestinian people. Gibbs and
Dickerson (2004) succinctly expresses that the fight by the United States to prevent
nuclear acquisition and create economic autonomy in Iraq has created an enabling
environment for a psycho-analytical disposition to make, enrich and entrench United
States hegemonic hold on the oil rich and economically Middle East region. This takes
us to our literary treatment of our second question:
The US Unilateral Enforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and escalation of Nuclear Enrichment Crisis in the Middle East
The New York Times Newspaper (2003:15) presents the United States as a
country that believes that it has a divine call to ensure that humanity is protected. This
is reflected in former President George Walker Bush Jnr 2003 State of the Union
Address, where he remarked that “The liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the
world, it is God’s gift to humanity……we do not know, we do not claim to know all
the ways of providence, yet we can trust in them, placing our confidence in the loving
32
God behind all of life, and all of history….we have found our moment and we have
found our mission”. Going by the above remarks by President Bush, it could be seen
Klein (2011) that even now that President Obama’s speeches and United States allies
carries with it the moralist rhetoric that is irresponsive to any other international
opinion or belief. On the contrary, Klein’s position is in contradiction to Venter (2007)
who opined that United States self-imposed responsibility over humanity has elevated
massive reaction and unopposed revolution among states and non-states actors or
terrorist groups to blend propaganda and education, with faster indoctrination
procedures of their own interest, so as to fine-tune future mindset and world view. He
continues by stating that this situation is exacerbated by the United States devaluation
and de-legitimization of Islamic regimes, leaders, religious authority and institutions.
All this he called a “clash of civilization”. This neglect by the United States on
perceived Islamophobia enabled extremists Islamist militants to find solace in the
fertile grounds of Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine. Both writers above failed to understand
that the international force is regulated and maintained by unpreventable and consistent
series of conflict.
Furthermore, Eze (2005) outlines that the control of nuclear arms proliferation has
been one of the centerpiece of the United States foreign policy since the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991. He states that as the only superpower the United States has
adopted different strategies towards tackling the threats on her interest, her allies and
global security. As such the United States adopts different strategies in her relations
with the “new” nuclear power nations such as India, Iran, Israel, North Korea and
Pakistan. He further stated that most of these unstable and unreliable countries such as
33
Iran and North Korea have to be prevented from possessing this WMD in order to
avoid it from falling into the hands of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or the like.
Unarguably, Boyle (2007) counteracts by submitting that he doubts the ability of the
United States in using its strategic nuclear superiority to prevent the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by the state and non-state actors or terrorist groups. This assertion is
hinged on the fact that United States foreign policy apparatus is corrupt, dysfunctional
and broken with its bureaucracies checkmated by harsh partisan policies that stifle
serious criticism and ‘unpleasant’ information.
Walker (2007: 750) asserts that the NPT is a disarmament treaty in which non-
nuclear weapons states (NNWS) entered into with a sovereign decision to dispel
nuclear weapons under international law. Critically and as it concerns our study, the
issue of international law carries with it the legality of armed conflict, nuclear,
biological and chemical (NBC) weapons development, international treaties, judicial
precedents and legality of judgments, violations of international human rights and so
on. As argued by Balyis, Writz and Gray (2010) that international law suffers from an
inability to accept that global society is transiting from modernity to post-modernity.
They judge international law as refusing to accept that military responsibilities are
neglected to private actors or terrorist groups (emphasis mine). Orford (2004) criticizes
the overwhelming ability of feminist and legal scholars to accept totally the
postulations espoused by western states as rising and creating a situation in which the
revolutionary potentials of human rights and international law has given away its
appropriation by states to conservative and aggressive ends. Her thesis raises several-
principle questions about the structural flaws which are inherent in international law
and establishing a nuclear order.
34
Bryan (2010) sees the United States in-roads into the affairs of other countries
as engineered by the need to domestically and internationally legitimize United States
foreign policy and contain threats to her ability to maintain its sovereignty and
legitimacy in future. The United States is threatened by the need to fashion the status
of international law and norms, in addition to fonts of legitimacy and when to
transgress sovereignty. Significantly, the drive of the United States and its Western
allies, and slightly Russia and India on nuclear proliferation is driven by need to
influence the threat perceptions of other states and luring them into real or spurious
belief of the transnational character of nuclear terrorism and the risk it poses if fissile
or radioactive materials find its way into the hands of non-state actors or terrorists
(Bowen, et al, 2012). On the contrary, conventionalists believe that the non-nuclear
regulatory instruments, such as a sound national and international law enforcement and
intelligence are useful in combating nuclear weapons/technology proliferation and
nuclear terrorism, while skeptics believe that there are numerous openings for a
multilayered system of defence to disrupt a nuclear terrorism attack (Muller, 2008). It
is note worthy to state that under Article IV of the NPT, all parties to the treaty have
inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes in conformity with other articles of the treaty. This Treaty has been backed up
by the IAEA with a call for a nuclear fuel bank to be regulated by them
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Fuel-Cycle/Key_events.shtml). The National
Academy of Sciences Report (2009) criticizes the NPT as adequately providing for
unintentional and/or unauthorized transfer or securing fissile material from entering
into the hands of terrorist groups.
35
Ironically, Cirincione and Leventer (2007), Onuoha (2009), all see the United
States exhibition of itself as carriers of global values of right conduct as contradictory.
It is contradictory, because the main drive of United States’ and Western Allies foreign
policy thrust in the Middle East region is to ensure the uninterrupted flow of its oil
interest. Nuclear weapons development has become a forum for the dramatization of
the quest by Western countries to make strategic gains and alliances and empower its
demanding weapons industry that yearns for a market. Notably, it is the United States,
the British, French and Germans that supplied the advanced nuclear technology and
trained nuclear manpower, nuclear shelter and invented viruses and bacteria, such as
anthrax and bubonic plague used in the development of NBC weapons in Iraq.
Particularly, during the Iran/Iraq war (1980 - 1988), the United States and its Western
Allies used Iraq as a proxy country to fight Ayatollah’s Iran for its backing of the 1979
Iranian students protest against America and subsequent occupation of its Embassy.
Also, in the 1960s it was the United States that basically encouraged and provided Iran
(under Reza Shah Monarchy) with the nuclear expertise to build the first nuclear
reactor in University of Teheran which is still in use. These agreements were reflected
in signings of senior United States officials like Henry Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld,
Richard Cheney, and Paul Wolfowitz.
Agwu (2011) Krause (2007) Sokoloski (2007) all maintain that the injustice
international law does on nuclear weapon is the right of self-defence but that does not
exist for a victim state, except that it has the rare ability of ‘second strike capability’.
Article 51 of the UN Charter, provides that the right of self-defence can only be
exercised by a state in event of an armed attack occurring. The implication is that the
fear of a state becoming a sitting duck is genuine, being not entitled to pre-emptive or
36
anticipatory self-defence, even when faced with a periculum in mora. Sadly enough,
the quest for possession and proliferation of WMD arising from the technological
revolution, has challenged the existing UN Charter. Ironically, most of the proliferation
have used the call on nations in the NPT to ‘share the benefits of the applications of
peaceful nuclear energy’ to help justify their own nuclear activities. This has happened
even though a large number of the government subsidized civilian nuclear projects
have proved to be financially unprofitable, and have transcended the capacity of IAEA
to safeguard against military diversions as required by NPT. What these authors have
failed to concur with is the argument that law is a sum total of political compromise
and a superpower such as the United States have the resources to ensure that its vital
interest is not compromised. On this, Bryan (2010) maintains that the history of
international legal regimes illustrates how international law serves the desire of the
major powers, thus the United States derives immense benefits from a system where
power is to some degree codified into a legitimating instrument.
Cirincione and Leventer (2007:17) asserts that even King Hussein Abdullah II
of Jordan admitted the impotency of United States and international law to maintain
nuclear order, when in a January 2007 interview with The New York Times, he said
that, “the rules have changed on the nuclear subject throughout the whole region after
this summer everybody’s going for nuclear programs” . His statement stems out from
the perceived evidence of nuclear Iran’s growing clout during the war in Lebanon in
2006 between Israel and Hezbollah. Critically, king Abdullah lacks the intellectual
savvy to recognize that the multiplicity and diversity of regional actors render the
region highly vulnerable to external influences, especially given the relative proximity
to Southern Europe, the states of the former Soviet Union, Pakistan and India, coupled
37
with the United States self-adopted role as a regional actor which guides her ability to
utilize its cold war dynamics to propel global reach and declared interests.
However, the most important ideological myth of the liberal arms control
school is the notion that the NPT was in essence not a non-proliferation treaty but a
disarmament agreement. The NPT is revealed to be an agreement among nuclear
weapon states (NWS) and NNWS, which allows the latter to disarm first with the NWS
following later. The Hans Blix Commission Report of 2006 simply put it as, “the
original ‘bargain’ of the treaty is generally understood to be the elimination of nuclear
weapons through the commitment by NNWS not to acquire nuclear weapons and the
commitment by five NWS to pursue nuclear disarmament (Krause, 2007; The
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006). This contention by these authors is
not only wrong in terms of historical evidence; it is also dangerous, since it ignites a
logic which tends to undermine the entire nuclear treaty regime.
Therefore, as expressed above, the favoritism of the NPT makes it difficult for
the United States and its Western Allies to ask Iran to suspend its nuclear programme
development ambition. For as Cirincione and Leventer (2007) had nicely illustrated
that over thirty countries have nuclear power reactors, and very few of them make their
own fuel. Most of these countries purchase a significant amount of fuel rods and
enriched uranium from one existing international consortium, the Uranium Enrichment
Corporation (URENCO). URENCO members are China, France, Germany, Japan,
Pakistan, Russia and the United States. The Germany, Netherlands, United States and
United Kingdom jointly produce nuclear fuel rods in facilities owned by URENCO and
it supplies nuclear power stations in about 15 countries with enriched uranium and
nuclear fuel (www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urenco_Group). The author’s analysis above
38
shows East-West collaboration to market nuclear materials, thus given an indirect
approval to Iranian’s nuclear development and the possibility for a nuclear race and
crisis to erupt. Krause (2006) unravels that contention over the NPT is unilaterally led
by the United States, as such it creates room for divided demands by Non-Aligned and
neutral states such as Australia, Canada, Sweden, Brazil, Argentina, India, South
Africa, Nigeria, and so on. He continues that the wording of the NPT especially Article
VI as remaining vague and raises pertinent questions such as;
Is there a linkage or conditionality between nuclear disarmament and general disarmament? Would complete nuclear disarmament be envisaged only as part of general and complete disarmament, or should it be pursued independently?
The only wording that was agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet
Union was embarked under the heading ‘strategic arms limitation talks' (SALT), but
glossed over the differences and ideological battles with wording that are not going to
have any operational value, thus creating an enabling environment for a nuclear crisis.
The possibility of a nuclear crisis and the fallacy of the NPT is that it is a treaty
that was agreed upon as a measure to stop horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation,
but not vertical proliferation, as such, it has never been a disarmament treaty. It is an
intimidating treaty whose international adherence by NNWS finds broad base because
the large majority of states know that without this treaty their security would be
hampered, thus, it is also an unfair treaty with unequal obligations. It is an unfair and
unequal document because there is no clear distinction between the nuclear haves on
the one side and the have-nots on the other side. As a result of the inadequacy of the
NPT, the NWS are immensely split. The United States are truly interested in nuclear
non-proliferation as its foreign policy entails, while the United Kingdom was following
them reluctantly. Furthermore, the Russians (former Soviet Union) have its own
39
agenda which is guided by her territorial nuclear deterrence, while France and China
are more or less adamantly opposed to the treaty.
Agwu (2011: 77-79) had argued that,
It is difficult to say with any measure of precision that the use of nuclear weapons can violate the existing legal framework prohibiting the use of unlimited means and methods against the enemy, emphasizing that it is doubtful whether the condemnation and renunciation in a solemn international treaty, of the use of the atomic weapon would constitute a beneficent addition to international law unless accompanied by previous effective agreements prohibiting its production. This is coupled with a strict international supervision and the resulting substantial sacrifice of state sovereignty in this sphere … the point still remains that within the context of Article 23 (a) and (e) of the Hague Regulations (1899 and 1907), Article 35 of Protocol 1 (1977), and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, all which emphasizes the prohibition of the use of projectiles that diffuse asphyxiating or deleterious gases with widespread and long term damage to humans and the environment, the use of nuclear weapons is ipso facto impermissible in international law.
Williams (2008) reveals that viewing security as a commodity might have
worked in the past and the codified approach to security are not workable because
when it comes to conflict outside the cultural context of theory, theory and law has
little explanatory content and ability as they basically misinterpret the situation to suit
its own cultural values. Secondly, the dominant approach to security within
international relations tend to glorify the existing order and fail to recognize how
supposedly detached theorization actually leads to the continuation of politics within
the framework. Also, the impermissibility of the use of nuclear weapons in
international law is contended again by Krause (2007) because, one, non-nuclear
NATO, West European States, South Korea and Japan are dependent upon United
States for nuclear guarantee, and as such want to avoid any negative impact on that
guarantee by NPT, and as well guard their security and vital economic interests.
40
Secondly, Non-Aligned threshold States, such as India, Brazil, Argentina, who want to
keep their own nuclear plants (weapons) options believe that a strong disarmament
commitment for the NWS on their own nuclear armaments efforts is imperative.
Thirdly, the silent majority, that is, those states that for different reasons are rooted in
their limited human, economic and technological resources, cannot even ponder
nuclear weapons options of their own; thus, view any effective non-proliferation
regime itself as a boon. Crocker (2011) reports that global contentions and fears of
nuclear weapons development, originates from a lack of effective conflict management
system that proposes the intervention in conflict, in ways that making ongoing conflict
on nuclear weapons development less damaging to all sides.
Ashafa (2006) voids Agwu’s argument by explaining that the elevation of
international nuclear agreements and laws to highest standard is inadequate,
sentimental and exhibits a protective global competition and crisis among super
powers. He adds that the focus, orientation, ideological content, empirical sensitivity
and more importantly the contradictions of the control of nuclear weapons
development in the Middle East can be located in the Chinese position and preference
to caution and diplomacy. On the contrary, these authors above failed to analyze that
the globalizing factor and the inadequacies of international law on nuclear weapons
proliferation emanates from the contradictions between the NWS led by the United
States and the Western nations and NNWS over nuclear proliferation, sustains rash
political economy/policymaking, creates tension and uncertainty within the
international system. Therefore, from the above academic contentions, we conclude
this sub-literature review by arguing that the fight against nuclear proliferation cannot
be curbed because the international system is perceived as a bargaining field where
41
favoritism, suspicion, uncertainty and interest are displayed and sustained through
direct or subtle threats. This ultimately brings us to our final statement of problem
treatment which is:
United Nations Multilateral Intervention and Provision of Diplomatic Settlement to the US-Iran Nuclear Weapons Development Confrontation
According to Walker (2007:748-750) nuclear history has been marked by, “the
struggle to establish an order, and to mobilize support for a persuasive conception of
order, that will be effective, legitimate and trustworthy despite unavoidable disparities
in states’ access to and usage of the technology, and that would enable nuclear
technology to be diffused for civil purposes without constantly spawning security
dilemma…, with nuclear order marked with two managed system of “deterrence” and
“abstinence”. The former United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan had argued
that United Nations multilateral intervention in settling the possibility of nuclear
confrontation between the United States and Iran is inspired by need to stem the tide of
widespread death and destruction of lives and property and plug the collapse of world
economy and degeneration to poverty (http://english.safe-democracy.org/keynotes/a-
global-strategy-fighting-terrorism.html).
Indeed, to put the United Nations as channels of multilateral intervention
requires an understanding and channeling of the issue of strategic balance of force in
the right perspective requires an understanding of the Iranian nation and the Israel
factor. Khan (2010) unveils the Iranian nation as a country that exudes political
unpredictability, instability, a factionalized elite that contend for power and see the
nuclear build-up as a source of legitimacy and support. He further described the Iranian
political elites as divided into the pragmatic/conservatives, the accommodationalists/
reformists and the ideological/confrontationalists, with each of them having its own
42
viewpoint on how the Iranian nuclear ambition should be pursued. The viewpoints
ranges from whether to use the Iranian nuclear pursuit as a bargaining instrument to
secure Iran’s “legitimate and vital interest” in the Middle East or to use it as an
equalizer to contend or negotiate with the West in particular and as well normalize
relations with the world in general. Cirincione (2006: 29) discusses the centrality of the
intervening variable of the Israeli factor in the quest by Iran to acquire nuclear
weapons. He writes that, “the hard-line government of President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad of Iran (former President of Iran), further complicated the issue with
harsh rhetorical insistence on proceeding with the nuclear development plans and
pointed threats to the annihilation of the state of Israel”. The author concludes by
stating that the Iranian nuclear development is not in parallel with some countries that
want nuclear weapons, because state nuclear weapons pursuit is driven by the quest for
security, prestige, and domestic political pressures. Both Khan and Cirincione analyses
are apt, because they show the common domestic and international community shared
and unshared threats, concerns and values of nuclear weapons development
programme in the Middle East in the 21st century.
Alabi (2011: 206) adds that, “the mere fact that the five permanent members of
the UNSC are military powers helps to reinforce the logic of conventional security
doctrine, and also to give an indirect approval to the pursuit of armament build-up. The
attendant arms race between the two blocks and alliances further gave expression to the
centrality of military capability in the definition and pursuit of national security
objectives”. Furthermore, Walker (2007) asserts that the UN platform and nuclear
history have knowingly and unknowingly made provisions for the nuclear pursuit to
flourish with favouritism.
43
Ashafa (2006) comprehends that the quest by Iranian government to acquire
nuclear weapons as emanating from the need to extricate them from the United States
imposed ideological cum civilization impositions, thus creating room for a powerful
Sino-Middle East relations. He further continues that the driving force of the nuclear
build up in the Middle East is to make ‘nonsensical’ of the Western national interest
and keep the spirit of nuclear rationale floating in the region. Nuclear capable countries
such as Iran see their nuclear weapons development exercise as a rallying point for
reducing political unrest, social divisions, national pride and exhibiting their self-
acclaimed ‘God given rights to produce’ (Venter, 2007).
The ability of the United Nations to enforce the proliferation of nuclear
materials and weapons has been questioned by Powell and McGirk (2005) and the
Economist Magazine (2012) as a mirage. He admits that some allies of the United
States such as Pakistan are given state backing to nuclear weapons influence, inter alia
nuclear confrontation. They gave an example with Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan, the
father of Pakistani nuclear bomb, whom they reported established a hidden but large
profitable enterprise for the sale of high-speed centrifuges materials used to enrich
uranium and equipment to manufacture atomic bombs to countries which the United
States under President George W Bush Jnr, on 31 January 2002 declared as, ‘Axis of
Evil’, namely Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Armstrong and Trento (2008) equally
deduced that the series of failed US foreign policy in the Middle East was responsible
for creating what has become an opening point for nuclear terrorism and nuclear
confrontation between the United States and Iran. They assert that every US
administration since Dwight Eisenhower has placed short-term foreign policy concerns
ahead of a commitment to curbing nuclear weapons. This has allowed Pakistan, as part
44
of a Cold War effort to counter the Soviet Union's influence, to first develop, and then
sell, WMD. Armstrong and Trento claimed that the US actually armed Islamic
extremists and these extremist groups later became the Taliban and Al Qaeda. They
feared that the world today is far more dangerous than in the Cold War. Despite
President Bush's claim to have stopped the AQ Khan network, most of its members are
now free. They further stated that there is evidence that Pakistan's nuclear proliferation
and smuggling continues, so opportunity exists for religious extremists and rogue
regimes to acquire WMD. Because of this misguided US foreign policy strategies, the
world exist where it is possible for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons, thus creating
"the new balance of terror”. Analytically, upholding the nuclear weapons enforcement
mandate of the UN is difficult because the nuclear environment has been polluted by
United States dominance which makes non-sense of the United States enforcement
principles.
Sultan (2003) doubts the ability of the UN to act as a buffer for nuclear
proliferation to the total unwillingness of the United States to cut its own stockpiles of
nuclear weapons. He reveals that the United States is now embarking on new kinds of
atomic weapons with the development of low yield special purposes atomic weapons-
bunker busting bombs for blasting deep underground military structure such as NBC
weapons factories. There are also new satellite guided missiles, with weapons to fit
them, for the new Missile Defence Systems (MDS) adopted by the US. Sultan further
stated that according to the United States authorities, the nuclear arsenals that the
United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Israel, possessed were
legitimate, while the rest of other countries were evil. He further pointed out that the
United States is determined to invest more on building many smaller new nuclear
45
weapons (of low yield more suited to the requirement of modern battlefields) than the
large scale destructive A-bomb. He also stated that the United States by its policies is
determined not to allow any other state to surpass it either in the military or economic
sphere. Even the Israeli Defence Department (2012) adds that the United States has
recently introduced a Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bomb into operational use:
the GBU-57B, dubbed “bunker buster”, intended to penetrate heavily fortified targets.
Hilsman (1999) alludes to the developments in weapons by the members of the
nuclear club. He stated that the Russians, Chinese and European Union members have
adopted several nuclear strategies, which includes scenarios of nuclear war and nuclear
Armageddon. He further gave an insight into the history of arms control and nuclear
forces for the short-term stop-gap. Critically, the academic revelations of Sultan and
Hilsman suffer from analytical problems of assessing international nuclear order as a
subset of a wider question of international political order.
Zakari, (2011) highlights the efflorescence of anti-United States sentiments as
having increased with non-state actors such as the Al-Qaeda terrorist networks,
Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Muslim Brotherhood and other co-networks spreading
ideological message of opposition and defiance amongst over a billion Muslim
faithfuls the world over. They strategized to ensure the disgraceful withdrawal of the
United States from Middle East, so as to destroy America’s backing of ‘authoritarian’
Arab regimes in the region. Undoubtedly, America’s fear is portrayed by Spannier
(1981:42), who establishes that the primary distinguishing character of a state system
or nuclear proliferation is in its decentralized nature for as he further puts it:
Each state in its external environment can work for the protection of its potential independence, territorial integrity and national prosperity. More specifically, we may say that states
46
living in an area in which none can acquire absolute security are bound to feel insecure and are therefore driven to reduce their sense of insecurity by enhancing their power. As with human beings in the Hobbesian state of nature, so is it with the states in the state system. They (the US, Iran, Syrian, Israel, North Korea and so on, emphasis mine) are haunted by continuous fear and danger of “violent death.
Venter (2007) further captures the fears of the Western nations on non-state
actors as terrorist groups exploding a radiological dispersion device (RDD) in one of
the West’s pre-eminent business centres like the Wall Street or London’s banking
centre. The RDD (also known as the “dirty bomb”) is designed to spread radioactive
material over a large area by combining radioactive material with a conventional
explosives resulting in instant deaths, widespread panic and renders buildings in the
affected areas unusable. Therefore, the resulting effects of nuclear proliferation is
mutual fear and corresponding suspicion between NWS and NNWS on one side and
between NWS, IAEA, UN and non-state actors or terrorist groups, especially in the
Middle East, such as Al-Qaeda (including its affiliates in Iraq, Arabian Peninsula and
Islamic Maghreb), Taliban’s (in Afghanistan and Pakistan), Hezbollah, Hamas, al-
Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Al-Shabaab militias and so on, on the other side.
Brown (2004) sees Western policy thrust as contradictory and aggravating the
problem of WMD so that it suits their conceptual mindset. Lehrer (2004) adds that few
United States policymakers have the political capital, intellectual background to
fashion out an efficient and sustained approach and response. Martel (2010) doubts the
strategic nuclear ability of the United States to maintain the strategic balance of forces
in the Middle East, because United States foreign policymakers basically manage
problems, when they should be opening up and executing a new grand strategy of
‘containment’. He attributes the inability of the United States policymakers and
47
strategists in the past twenty years to adopt bedrock principles that will help organize
United States role in the world to the haphazardness and self-defeatist nature of its
policies. He further reveals that United States foreign policy is presently bedeviled
with the problem of containing Iran; curtailing China’s increasing political, economic,
military power and influence; and Russia’s growing assertiveness, which is fuelled by
its energy revenues that has created immense anxieties in Eastern Europe.
Martel (2010) further states that the United States foreign policy is complicated
further by the rising instability in nuclear armed Pakistan, which possesses dozens of
nuclear weapons; the war/sectarian strives in Iraq and upsurge in Taliban activities in
Afghanistan. In all, Martel reveals that since the Cold War, both scholars and
policymakers have unsuccessfully failed to adopt an effective and workable successor
grand strategy to ‘containment’. Critically, Martel’s analyses lack the capability to look
beyond the inabilities of the United States policymakers into how party affinities have
been influential to United States foreign policy thrust. As Toby (cited in Bowen, et. al.
2012: 357) doubts the potency of United Nations multilateral intervention because
“nuclear security cooperation is complicated by the lack of appetite on the part of
many developing countries for new instruments that impose additional obligations
related to the use of nuclear energy”. This perceive ‘failed’ United States strategic
foreign policy calculations and the constant wars from many fronts and its attendant
security implications, has complicated the US government multilateralism in
maintaining a firm grip on post-Cold war era. Consequently, a careful study of these
literatures revealed that a yearning gap was established in the course of the study.
Gap in Literature:
48
A critical look at the literatures by scholars such as Agwu (2011), Venter
(2007), Yost (2007), Walker (2007), Hassner (2007), Pilat (2007), Chipman (1995),
Eze (2005), Dunn (2007), Keeny (2005), Krause (2007), Ruhle (2007), Sultan (2003),
Sokolski (2007), Bundy (1987), Igwe (2005), Rees and Aldrich (2005), Ashafa (2006)
and so on above, all show that the quest to control nuclear weapons and strategic
balances has served as a means to sustain United States and its Western allies
legitimacy over existing governments in the Middle East. Thus minimizing domestic
opposition and increasing social instability, given allowance to terrorist groups or non-
state actors to adopt unorthodox means of survival such as suicide bombing, terrorism,
kidnappings, killings, quest to acquire nuclear weapons, and so on.
In conclusion, what seems to emerge from our review, is that scholars
emphasized that the current trends to control nuclear arms proliferation is located in
international system, international law, regional security with ironies of intended and
unintended consequences, range of provocations and graduation of threats, but these
scholars did not validate the scientific researchability of political science to define the
unfathomable drives of political interest, arrogance of power (Persian/Arab
nationalism) and the concept of instinctual behavior as a factor that motivates the
Iranian government’s nuclear weapons development and strategic balance in the
Middle East. It is therefore these noticeable gaps in the existing literature that have not
been satisfactorily filled by scholars that this study seeks to address.
49
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
3.0. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we shall explore the method of research adopted for this study.
The methodology used in conducting this study starts with the theoretical framework
for analysis which is the balance of power at multi-polarity theory. It contains the three
hypotheses designed to be tested by the study, the method of data collection which is
the quantitative method of data collection, and the research design which is the single
case design or the ex-post facto research design. It also contains the method of data
analysis which is qualitative method of data analysis. The chapter ends with the table
of logical data framework for the study.
3.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Attempts by scholars in international relations to develop a universally
acceptable theoretical framework in the explanation of global issues such as nuclear
weapons and strategic studies have resulted in paradigmatic contentions and
contradictions. Some of these contentious theoretical frameworks include the systems
theory, political economy framework, complex inter-dependence theory and so on. An
analysis of some of these contending theories shows that the realist theory believe that
the external behaviour of a state is shaped, influenced and determined by the traditional
elements of national power. The systems theory conceives the international system as a
unique, peaceful and stable environment where binding decision and authoritative
allocation of values are achieved. This theory has been confused for consciously
neglecting the chaotic situations and anarchies of the international system. The
political economy framework is seen as an intellectual attack on colonialism, neo-
50
colonialism, imperialism and inequality in the polity which are seen to be critical of the
complexities, distortions and inequality in the global distribution of power in the
international system. This approach has been criticized as elevating economics above
other variables of measurement. The complex inter-dependence theory views the
militarization of the international system as gradual dissolving, but economic co-
operation increasing. We criticize this theory as failing to realize that the sustenance of
economic strength is dependent on military strength, protection and cooperation
(Kaldor, 2003; Igwe, 2005; Asobie, 2000; Akinboye and Ottoh, 2007).
In order to further strengthen and guide our study on Iranian Government Quest
for Uranium Enrichment and Balance of Power Relations in the Middle East, our
analysis will attempt a defensible blend of multi-polarity approach and the balance-of-
power theory. Multi-polarity is a distribution of power in which more than two nation-
states have nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, and economic influence. Multi-
polarity argues that world order is most likely to occur when varied systems of power
rely on interdependence, interconnection, and cooperative interaction. Therefore, the
multi-polarity theory is characterized by pro-democratic arguments based on economic
coordination, international law and international cooperation. Multi-polarity argues
that various powerful nations should counter-balance each other’s influence while
establishing order in their respective spheres. The multi-polarity approach as
exemplified includes discussions over the North/South economic gap where wealthy
nations in the North are encouraged to integrate poor economies from the South into
the “core” of stable systems. Our use of the multi-polarity approach results from our
conviction that it will give credence to the advocacy for a departure from the US-led
unipolar power configuration to multilateral set-up that accommodate other emerging
51
power configurations (www.hks.havard.edu/cchrp/research/Conceptof theWorldOrder_
Moselle.pdf; www.en.m.wikpedia/wiki/Polarity_international.htm).
In applying the multi-polarity approach to our study, we discovered that the
enlightened understanding of nuclear pursuit and acquisition by states such as Iran,
Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, North Korea, Pakistan, India and so on expresses a
multiple equilibria, each preferred by some actor (s) as the UN permanent members as
the United States, Russia, China, France and Britain simplifies the choice between
status quo and salient alternatives. Particularly, the quest for possession of nuclear
weapons by Iran has developed a regional and global standpoint among conventionalist
that Iranian nuclear capability has increased nuclear weapons proliferation, regional
civilian nuclear weapons programs development, increased nuclear terrorism risks, and
regional destabilization. On the other hand, skeptics are convinced that Iranian nuclear
development may not necessarily lead to cascading nuclear proliferation and that
extended deterrence and positive United States security guarantees might preclude
proliferation and ensure stable regional deterrence (Masse, 2010). For these reasons,
the familiarity with this power and multi-polar designs breeds acceptability and
balance of power. Two, the multi-polarity approach gives credence to the need for
power diffusion and innovations in world politics. Three, the multi-polarity theory will
help understand the pathways and agents to the nuclear energy development pursuit.
Basically, the multi-polarity approach provides the platform for understanding
the activities of state and non-state actors engaged in the nuclear race. Although the
approach recognizes the varied systems of interdependence, interconnection, and
cooperative interaction, it bereft of specifying the cause and implications of this power
52
relations and stability. This gap was however addressed by the balance-of-power
theory.
The balance of power theory is a realist theory facilitated through the
description of basic power configurations that has existed in the past 150 years and is
exclusively determined in the traditional study of international relations by strategic
military relativities (Jones, 1997). The realist sees the propelling force behind the
activities of states in international politics as the aspiration for power, which raises
anarchies of competition and conflict within the international system (Asobie, 2000;
Akinboye and Ottoh, 2007).
Jones (1997: 202-205) provides a comprehensive definition of balance of power
as:
an analytical concept for exploring the practical effects of the equilibrium and disequilibrium in world politics and for assessing the consequences of power shifts. It becomes an analytical device rather than a form of advocacy, prescribing no particular model(s) for world peace. Instead it searches out the conditions of order and disorder in international relations, concentrating on the source and consequences of balance and imbalance…The balance of power is concerned mainly with the balance of mobilized power…Early historians of the balance-of-power system assumed that the adjustment process (equilibrium or disequilibrium) was automatic…An existing equilibrium (a) is upset (b) by the addition of a new participant or by a major technical development that adds to the weight of one coalition. In (c) equilibrium is restored by the transfer of one state of alliance to the other. Later historians, however rejected the automaticity theory, arguing that the process was, as best, semiautomatic, and conducted through such as vigilance, alliances, intervention, mobility of action, reciprocal, compensation, preservation of participants, coalitions, diversion into colonial expansion, and war.
Akpuru-Aja (2006a) credits Palmer and Perkings with reporting that the great
period of the theory and practice of balance of power began shortly after 1500. The
53
Balance of Power theory played out classically from 1648 until the end of the
Napoleonic era in 1815. This theory reflected in Europe a state-centered system that
ensured that no single European national power or coalition of powers had the
monopoly of power of influence to the destabilization of others. He adds that the
balance of power theory curtails the preponderance of power on one side through
making room for constant shift of alignment of coalition.
Igwe (2002) postulates that the balance of power theory embodies balance in
state systems that were better used to explain the maintenance of alliances and re-
alignments by various states in Europe. According to Morgenthau (1965:170), the
balance of power theory is a term that is used “without quantification to refer to an
actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with
approximate powers”. Inwardly, the Balance of Power theory sees international politics
as power politics and as such is an ephemeral phenomenon that is coincident with a
past age of war or totalitarian aberration (Morgenthau, 1946).
Therefore, the balance of power theory asserts that the key to conceptualizing
international politics is in understanding the connection between interest defined in
terms of power, strategic and economic capability. This theory view the use of power
as primarily determined by interest and maintained by the political, cultural and
strategic environment it operates (Burchill and Linklater, 2001). Our use of the balance
of power theory is attributed to its ability to take into cognizance the stages of power
readiness and the extreme utilization of mobilized power.
Application of the Theory
The relationship between Iranian Government Quest for Uranium Enrichment
and Balance of Power Relations in the Middle East is explained in the light of the
54
Balance of power theory. In applying and relating the theory to the topic under study,
the central position of the power theory basically explains the contentions, struggle and
alliances by the United States to police the proliferation and quest for acquisition of
nuclear arms in the 21st century. The United States hopes to realize this through careful
mathematical calculations, taking into account the capabilities of the other players
(states and non-state actors) which have corresponding wherewithal which they intend
to deploy to realize similar objectives.
Accordingly, the balance of power theory aids an understanding of the sub-set
of the analytical problems involved in assessing international nuclear order as located
in vigilance, alliances, interventions, mobility of action, reciprocal compensation,
preservation of participants, coalitions, diversion into colonial expansion and war
(Jones, 1997).
The defining character of the Iranian state is her use of state power to
perpetuate itself both at the domestic and international front. Kamarava (2010) asserts
that Iranian possession of nuclear plants within the Middle East has militarized
domestic and regional security. Remarkably, Rees and Aldrich (2005) view the quest
to establish regional stability and strategic culture in the Middle East as having creating
an enabling environment for the United States military power to be sustained and used,
thus given her a self-acclaimed and sole responsibility of tackling international
terrorism and linking it to other network of threats so as to attain its quest of
hegemonic rule. These views by the above authors confirms the assertions by Hans
Morgenthau (1993) that international politics like all politics, is a struggle for power
and the ultimate aim of politics is power driven by national interest.
55
More broadly, the revival of previous attempts to deepen alliances, mobility of
action and preservation of participants can be seen in the 2005 Russia signing of a
number of lucrative agreements with Iran on technical assistance and co-operation over
its nuclear facility and activity at Bushehr, Iran. During the period of 2006 - 2008,
Russia increased its relations with the Iranian military spheres, to compensate for the
draw backs when it signed the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement with the US in 1995,
which mandated her to stop implementing contracts on export of military munitions to
the Islamic Republic. The economic gains of Russo-Iranian Relations thus shaped the
basis of Russian policy in the region, which goes contrary to the Western policy
relations in the region. The Kremlins also favours a constructive dialogue as the
solution to the Iranian nuclear programme, which it views as not representing a serious
threat, although, it is unacceptable to Moscow for an Islamic regime to possess WMD.
Some scholars are of the view that Israeli efforts to ensure that Iran does not go
nuclear at any cost is based on the antecedents of Iran and the rhetorics of her former
President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has called for total annihilation of Israel and
also openly denied the existence of holocaust. As such a nuclear Iran could transfer a
WMD to her willing partner, Hezbollah to help it achieve its ultimate goal against
Israel. This thus underlines the dangers inherent in a non-state actor like Hezbollah’s
alliance with a country aspiring to acquire a nuclear technology (Emerson and
Himelfarb, 2009). Therefore, the above analysis shows that Iranian government’s
quest for uranium enrichment undermines the balance of power favourable to
Israel and the US within the Middle East.
The second proposition of the theory presents the coordinated willingness by
United States to deepen its vigilance and coalition with Israel. The theory reveals
56
further that the US efforts at ensuring a nuclear free Middle East is hinged on the fact
that the Iranian acquisition of this weapon will ultimately alter the strategic nuclear
enrichment balance in the region that is favourable to its eternal ally, Israel (Green
Peace Briefing, 2007). In this way, our second proposition further subscribes to the
thoughts of Rees and Aldrich (2005) that views United States foreign policy thrust in
the Middle East as propelled by identifying and destroying the complex network of
international terrorism and unstable states quest for WMD. These authors also
attributes United States foreign policy dynamics in the Middle East as emanating from
the conflict of interest; a belief in the superiority of its political, military and moral
values, and its ability to ensure the deterrence and destruction of nuclear technology
trafficking networks that service state actors such as Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya and non-
state actors like Al-Qaeda and so on. Additionally, it is heaped on the premise that the
West lead by the United States is using their nuclear superiority to ensure that its ally,
Israel is protected at all cost, at the expense of other Arab/Islamic countries.
The fear of a WMD being in the hand of the Iranian government has made the
US to be in the fore front of efforts to prevent Iran from getting the ultimate weapon.
The US and its western allies have seriously implemented the international sanctions
placed on Iran by the UN for its role in clandestine nuclear activity. The US
government view of preventing an Iranian bomb is evidence from the pronouncements
by its top government functionaries. The former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza
Rice, has severally maintained that the US has tabled all options, including military
option in stopping Iranian quest for nuclear bomb. Additionally, Hillary Clinton, who
is Rice’s successor, has maintained in several fora that, “the US has all options on the
table for Iran including the military”. The US hard-line stand on the Iranian nuclear
57
issue is toned down by the P 5 + 1 (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, US and
Germany) that has favoured a political and diplomatic solution to the Iranian problem.
Germany a leading P 5 + 1 member has undertaken several steps at bringing the
Iranians to a roundtable discussion on ending their nuclear activities by offering to
process their recycled fuels. These efforts have so far not yielded any results (Encarta,
2009; Aljazeera, 2012, www.youtube.com, 2008;
still4hill.com/2012/09/14/Hillary_Clinton_ statement_on_Iran/). On this account, the
analysis above shows that the US unilateral enforcement of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) escalates the nuclear enrichment crisis in the Middle
East.
The third proposition of the theory for nuclear proliferation emanates from the
total unwillingness of the United States to cut its stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It has
been discovered United States is now embarking on new kinds of atomic weapons with
the capacity to succumb to low yield special purposes atomic weapons-bunker busting
bombs for blasting deep underground military structure such as NBC weapons
factories (Sultan, 2003). However, the acceptance Iran as a regional power is anathema
to Israel. At severally forums, past Iranian leaders have publicly called for the
annihilation of the Jewish state (Nuruzzaman, 2013).
The efforts of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China,
France, Russia, UK, US and Germany (P5+1) to dissuade Iran from producing LEU
and UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 for use in the manufacture of fuel for Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR), which is used to produce medical isotopes ended in a
deadlock. However, France, UK, and US has presented evidence to IAEA of the covert
development of uranium enrichment in Qom with the IAEA inversely providing
58
evidence of the conduct of engineering work on a new payload chamber for a re-entry
vehicle for its Shabab -3 missile, while the agency assessed the configuration as “able
to accommodate a nuclear device”. The configuration aids the conversion of uranium
dioxide in UF4, a compound or ingredient required in the processing of uranium,
popularly called project 5/13. Evidence also exist of military related organizations and
defence industry firms involvement in providing procurement assistance for nuclear
research and for making nuclear-related components notably centrifuge parts (Bowen
and Brewer, 2011; http://www.pub.iaea.org/ MTCD/publications/PDF/te-1555-web.pdf).
The above analysis glaringly reveals that the United Nations multilateral
intervention provides a diplomatic settlement to the US-Iran nuclear weapons
development confrontation.
As evidenced from our analysis above, our conclusion and theoretical
standpoint is guided by a belief that the balance of power theory captures the broader
difficulties and questions of nuclear technological development not only in Iran, but
among other states in the Middle East. The theory also captures how state and non-
state actors raise several principal questions of what an acceptable definition and vision
of a post-Cold War nuclear order ought to be or is, the relevance and structural flaws of
international law on nuclear weapons development, the arguments in favour of tactical
nuclear weapons, the signature elements of the UN and its five permanent UNSCs’
policies and strategies in the Middle East. In this vein, Akpuru-Aja (2006b) has
unconsciously noted that contemporary reality of analyzing nuclear enrichment and
balance of power is located in understanding the background, contested notions and
defiance by Iran on actualizing her nuclear weapons enrichment programme; the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Provisions; the United States perception of
59
Iranian nuclear enrichment and the Israeli dimension; the strategic values over Iran’s
Nuclear programme motivated largely by Islamic solidarity and Persian/Arab
nationalism.
Unarguably, the employment of this theory best understands the flow chart
behind the global and regional nuclear weapons development, especially in the Middle
East, the technical barriers to global nuclear weapons proliferation and politics of
agreements, sanctions and violations. It is within this context that the inverse
relationship between Iranian Government quest for Uranium Enrichment and balance
of power relations in the Middle East is explained in the light of the balance of power
theory.
3.2 HYPOTHESES
This study will be based on the following hypotheses:
1. Iranian government’s quest for uranium enrichment undermines the balance of
power favourable to Israel and the US within the Middle East.
2. US unilateral enforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
escalates the nuclear enrichment crisis in the Middle East.
3. United Nations multilateral intervention provides a diplomatic settlement to the
US - Iran nuclear weapons development confrontation.
3.3. RESEARCH DESIGN
The relevance of a research design is its ability to measure the variability,
authenticate research questions and test hypothesis. In this study therefore, we shall
utilize the Ex Post Facto Research Design. This form of research design according to
Asika (1991), involves a descriptive process, in which an independent variable has
already occurred, then a researcher commences with the observation of a dependent
60
variable, and then analyzes the independent variable in retrospect for its possible
relationship to and effects on the dependent variable.
Moreover, Cohen and Manion (cited in Obasi, 1999) estimate that the Ex Post
Facto research design or after-the-Fact research design involves the evaluation of the
independent and dependent variables, after the events have taken place and the data
already in existence. In utilizing the Ex Post Facto research design in our study, the test
of the hypotheses involves examining the independent variable (X) and the dependent
variable (Y) or series of Y are observed either before, after, or concomitant to the
observation of X, thus a hypothesis which is X, is a contributory condition of Y, which
would mean that Y should appear in more cases.
Asika (2006) represents the Ex Posto Facto or Single Case design as follows:
R B1 B2 B3 X Y A1 A2 A3
Where:
0 = Observation
R = Random assignment of subjects to experimental Groups and random assignment of experimental treatment to experimental groups.
X = Independent experimental variable which is experimentally manipulated
Y = Independent experimental variable
B = Before observation
A = After observation
Again, Asika (2006:35) views the single case research design as having a series
of ‘before’ observation and one case (subject) and a series of ‘After’ observation. It is
a reflection of quasi-experimental design that has neither a control group nor a
61
variation group. A rationalized analysis of the series of ‘Before’ and ‘After’
observations of the Iranian nuclear weapons development is in understanding the
relationships that exist between Iran and America; Iran and Israel; Iran and other gulf
Arab countries, especially Sunni-led countries such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain,
UAE, Qatar.
The evidence relevant to testing the causal inference of the Ex Post facto
analysis as: evidence of concomitant variation that is, that (x) – the assumed causal or
independent variable and (+) (y)-the assumed effect or dependent or criterion variable,
are associated in the way predicted by the hypothesis. Thus, a hypothesis which is X,
is a contributory factor to the conditions of Y. This would mean that whenever (x)
occurs, there the possibility that (y) will follow suit (Sellitz et.al 1977). In applying the
single case ex post facto design to our study, the test of the hypothesis involves
observing the independent variable (Iranian government’s nuclear weapons
development) and dependent variable (strategic balance in the Middle East) at the same
time because the effects of the former on the latter have already taken place before this
investigation.
On account of the foregoing, this study is based on three hypotheses which seek
to discover if there is a correlation between:
• Iranian government’s quest for uranium enrichment undermines the
balance of power favourable to Israel and the US within the Middle
East.
• US unilateral enforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
escalates the nuclear enrichment crisis in the Middle East.
62
• United Nations multilateral intervention provides a diplomatic settlement
to the US-Iran nuclear weapons development confrontation.
3.4. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
The importance of a method of data collection as explained by Ikeagwu (1998)
is that, the method of data collection makes it possible that facts are pieced together
and examined indiscriminately to give results which, when translated into meaning,
suggest hitherto undiscovered truth and search for knowledge. The process of method
of data collection involves a holistic scientific process of identifying problems,
gathering data, postulating tentative hypotheses and interpreting the results. When
research goes through this comprehensive scientific process, troubling problems and
unanswered questions are unraveled and solved.
Particularly, the use of the secondary source of data collection is based on, its
rich intellectual tradition in the social sciences, its provision of opportunities for
replication, its cheapness, its ability to help increase the number of observations that
could lead to a more encompassing generalization (Sellitz 1959; Nachimas and
Frankfort-Nachimas, 1992; Akaweh,1994).
According to Dyke (1960: 219) methods involves a process of identifying and
defining the terms and type of operations that happens in the process of obtaining the
data. These methods may involve the following processes; quantitative, qualitative,
documentary, inductive, deductive, scientific, comparative, and so on. To further guide
and prove our hypotheses, we shall use the qualitative method of data collection which
relies heavily on documentary sources. By document(s) we mean any written materials
whether handwritten, typed, or printed that was already in existence, which was
63
produced for some other purposes than the benefit of the investigator (researcher)
Nwana, cited in (Obasi, 1999).
We choose the qualitative method of data collection for this study because we
consider the method as having the analytical capacity to strengthen our understanding
of the problem study. This method of data collection helps to define and explain useful
information from documents. Hence, this study adopts the qualitative method of data
collection which relies heavily on documentary source because it will help us draw
important data that gauge the political impulses of not only past and contemporary
Iranian, regional and world leaders, but also intergovernmental organisations such as
the UN, IAEA; OPCW, among others on the dynamics of nuclear weapons
development and containment in the Middle East.
To a significant degree, the qualitative method of data collection will
instructively explore the orientations of Iranian government’s nuclear weapons
development, the orientations of her foreign policy as it fits, supports and reflects its
increasing status as credible force in the Middle East, capable also of regional
leadership, and the constraints that militates against the full realization of her nuclear
weapons development ambition. Therefore, the qualitative method of data collection
shall focus among all other issues on gathering materials on Iranian nuclear weapons
development, strategic balance in the Middle East; the interface, as well as the conflict
between UN-IAEA led and US-led interventions to resolve the diplomatic standoffs
emanating from Iranian nuclear weapons build-up.
Hence, the method of data collection to be utilized is the documentation
method, which involves the utilization of secondary sources of data collection of
books, journals, magazines, conference presentations, official government documents,
64
internet materials and so on from, places like the libraries of Nigerian Institute for
International Affairs (NIIA), University of Ibadan (Ul), National Defence College
(NDC), 2 Division Nigerian Army, Ibadan and 82 Division Nigerian Army, Enugu.
3.5 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS
To analyze the quantum of data generated in the course of this research work,
we relied on qualitative descriptive analysis. However, Devine (2002) views the
qualitative analysis as stressing the dynamic relationships, processes or narratives of
social realities and peoples construct. The aim of the qualitative method is to make
logically deduced theories and variables verifiable. Although, it places emphasis on
statistical data and the use of such to test hypothesis it uplifts political science to the
extent that political science is continuously experimenting, reconstructing and
adjusting itself to a continuously changing social environment. Also our reliance on the
qualitative and quantitative descriptive analysis is based on its ability to help us collect
and interpret our observations and give credence to our secondary sources of data
collection.
Qualitative descriptive analysis, as Asika (1991) observes, means summarizing
the information generated in the course of research verbally. This entails extracting
meaning and making logical deductions from the already documented mass of data.
The adoption of the foregoing analytical method is necessary because the study mainly
relied on secondary sources of data. More so, statistical tables, charts and figures
would be used where and when necessary to enhance clarity of understanding and
presentation (For summary see logical data framework below).
65
LOG ICAL DATA FRAMEWORK
Research Questions
Hypotheses Variables Main Indicators Data Sources Method of Data Collection
Method of Data Analysis
(1). Did the Iranian
government’s quest for uranium enrichment
undermine the balance of power favourable to the Israel and the US within the Middle
East?
Iranian government’s quest
for uranium enrichment
undermine the balance of power favourable to the Israel and the US within the Middle
East.
(X) Iranian
government’s quest for uranium
enrichment.
� Nuclear production policy; � Number of active nuclear
production sites; � Domestic availability of
nuclear production materials;
� Level of Dependence on multi-national companies (MNCs) for enhanced nuclear weapons production capacity;
� Level of dependence on indigenous nuclear weapons technological expertise;
� Consistency of nuclear production plans with international best practices.
� Libraries of National Defence College (NDC), Abuja; 82 Division Nigerian Army, Enugu; 2 Division Nigerian Army, Ibadan and University of Ibadan.
� Text books, magazines and journal publications;
� Conference Proceedings
� Internet sources
Qualitative method Ex-post facto research design; Games theory;
Qualitative descriptive analysis.
(Y) Balance of
power favourable to the Israel and the US within
the Middle East.
� United States Foreign Policy Objectives and its Allies Vital Interest in the Middle East;
� Middle Eastern States nuclear and military capabilities;
� Regional Implications of Nuclear Weapons Build up;
� Alliances and Deterrence in the Middle East;
� Politization of the Nuclear Weapons development.
� Libraries of National Defence College (NDC), Abuja; 82 Division Nigerian Army, Enugu; 2 Division Nigerian Army, Ibadan and University of Ibadan.
� Text books, magazines and journal publications;
� Conference Proceedings
� Internet sources
Qualitative method Ex-post facto research design; Games theory;
Qualitative descriptive analysis.
66
(2). Did the US
government’s unilateral
enforcement of the Nuclear Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) escalates the nuclear enrichment
crisis is in the Middle East?
The US
government’s unilateral
enforcement of Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) escalates the
nuclear enrichment crisis in the Middle
East.
(X) The US
government’s unilateral
enforcement of Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
� Interface between US foreign policy posture and nuclear balancing/policing posture;
� Level of diplomatic cooperation between the US Political leaders and international organisations, such as the UN, IAEA;
� Level of US political determination of the enforcement of NPT;
� United States Perceptions of the Iranian Nuclear Threats.
� Libraries of National Defence College (NDC), Abuja; 82 Division Nigerian Army, Enugu; 2 Division Nigerian Army, Ibadan and University of Ibadan.
� Text books, magazines and journal publications;
� Conference Proceedings
� Internet sources
Qualitative method Ex-post facto research design; Games theory;
Qualitative descriptive analysis.
(Y) Nuclear
Enrichment Crisis in the Middle East.
� Nuclear weapons
proliferation tension; � Growth in the number of
nuclear powers; � Inter-State clashes; � Politicization of
nationalistic, ethnic and religious differences.
� Libraries of National Defence College (NDC), Abuja; 82 Division Nigerian Army, Enugu; 2 Division Nigerian Army, Ibadan and University of Ibadan.
� Text books, magazines and journal publications;
� Conference Proceedings
� Internet sources
Qualitative method Ex-post facto research design; Games theory;
Qualitative descriptive analysis.
67
(3). Did
United Nations multilateral
intervention can provide a diplomatic
settlement of US-Iran Nuclear
Weapons development
confrontation?
The United Nations
multilateral intervention can
provide a diplomatic
settlement of US-Iran Nuclear
Weapons development
Confrontation.
(X) United Nations
multilateral intervention
� Inter-governmental
involvements such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and European Union (EU) nuclear talks;
� United Nations Security Council (UNSC) diplomatic involvements;
� Appointment and involvement of special envoys;
� Appointment and involvement of nuclear weapons monitors;
� Imposition of sanctions;
� Libraries of National Defence College (NDC), Abuja; 82 Division Nigerian Army, Enugu; 2 Division Nigerian Army, Ibadan and University of Ibadan.
� Text books, magazines and journal publications;
� Conference Proceedings
� Internet sources
Qualitative method Ex-post facto research design; Games theory;
Qualitative descriptive analysis.
(Y)
Settlement of United States-
Iranian Nuclear Weapons
development confrontation
� Frequency of diplomatic exchanges and talks;
� Involvement of Western interest in Iranian nuclear weapons sites;
� Partnerships in Military exercises;
� Reduced global and regional tension.
� Libraries of National Defence College (NDC), Abuja; 82 Division Nigerian Army, Enugu; 2 Division Nigerian Army, Ibadan and University of Ibadan.
� Text books, magazines and journal publications;
� Conference Proceedings
� Internet sources
Qualitative method Ex-post facto research design; Games theory;
Qualitative descriptive analysis.
68
CHAPTER FOUR
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT’S URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND BALANCE OF
POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The acquisition of the technology for the production of a nuclear bomb by Iran
will have far reaching implications for the regional strategic balance and global
security. The chapter will discuss the implications of the possession of a nuclear
weapon by Iran. Therefore, this chapter among all other issues will from different
perspectives examine one, the fundamental issues by which the geo-political location
and military capabilities of Iran guides and supports its actions towards developing its
nuclear weapons facilities. Two, this chapter will illustrate the political safety valves
and legitimacy devices erected by the Iranian government to sustain and ensure the
actualization of its nuclear development programme. Three, this chapter will endeavor
to evaluate the central disagreements and foreign policy sensitivities within and outside
the Middle East to Iranian nuclear weapons programme.
Finally, the examination of the inter-related perspectives inherent in the socio-
economic and political character of Iran will bring to light the ideological, institutional
and organizational interests that influence the actions of state and non-state actors
towards Iranian nuclear development programme. Therefore, this work will attempt to
use past experiences in the Middle East to evaluate the future risks, scenarios of
potential threat, complexities and uncertainties of the current Iranian nuclear weapons
development journey. This chapter will address various issues under these five
headings: the geo-politics of Iran; Iranian military organisation and combat readiness;
69
Iranian quest for nuclear capability; implication of Iranian nuclear development on
global security and influence of outside powers in the Middle East strategic balance.
4.2. GEO-POLITICS OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR POLICY POSTURE
Iran officially is known as the Islamic Republic of Iran (See Fig. 2 below). It is
a country in South Western Asia, located on the northeastern shore of the Persian Gulf.
However, this study classified it as Middle Eastern because of its strategic location in
the region. It has a land area of about 1,635,999 sq km with a population of about
67,037,517 people (2010 estimate). With its capital in Tehran, Iran is bordered by
Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan. Iran’s
population, while ethnically and linguistically diverse, is almost entirely Muslim. The
country has for centuries been the centre of the Shia branch of Islam. Archaeological
records exist to point to the fact that for centuries the ancient civilization known as
‘Persia’ in the present location of Iran. The ancient nation of Iran was historically
known to the west as Persia until 21 March, 1935, when Reza Shah Pahlavi formally
changed the name of the country to its native name, Iran, which means ‘Land of the
Aryans’ (Encarta; 2009; Nigerian Army Information Brief, 2011).
Though not officially colonized by the Western powers, Iran was greatly
influenced by the commercial activities of the British in British India archipelago and
later to direct interference in the Iranian Political cum economic 1834-1946. The
discovery of commercially valuable quantities of oil in southwestern Iran in 1908 led
to the formation of Anglo-Persian Oil Company (AIOC). The AIOC was granted an
exclusive 60 year concession to explore Iranian Oil and from then on behaved
increasingly like a sovereign power in Southwestern Iran. The Russians were also
involved in the quest for the colonization of Iran. The Russians withdrew from Iran
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after the 1917 Revolutions, retained neighboring Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan that
were later annexed into the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR),
formed from the Russian Empire in 1922 (Microsoft Encarta Premium, 2009).
Figure 4.1: POLITICAL MAP OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IR AN
Source: www.mapsofworld.com.
Iran regained full sovereignty over its territory by 1947, but by 1953, Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi had made Iran as the US number one ally in the Middle East.
Under the US protection, Iran became a regional power in the period leading up to the
Islamic revolution in 1979. The autocratic monarchy of Pahlavi was replaced by an
Islamic Jurists, (“Velayat-e Faqih”), where clerics serve as head of state and in many
powerful government roles. The leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic
Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, became Iran’s supreme leader until his death
in 1989 (Nigerian Army Information Brief, 2011).
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4.3. IRAN’S QUEST FOR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
The Iranian quest for nuclear technology dates back to the early 1960s during
the reign of the Shah. The Shah had personal interest in developing nuclear energy.
The Shah’s plan was facilitated by the US due to his personal relationship with
Washington at that time. As part of Atoms for Peace Programme, the US offered
Shah’s Iran nuclear research facilities and training. It was part of its assistance to its
cold war allies in exchange for commitments from them not to develop nuclear
weapons. This was followed by a US-Iran nuclear cooperation agreement in 1957,
which culminated in the supply of a basic five-megawatt (MW) light-water research
reactor and related laboratories, commissioning of the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre
(TNRC) in 1967 (Khan, 2010; Nigerian Army Information Brief, 2011).
Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, and this made Iran to come
under the full-scope safeguards of IAEA. In 1974, the Atomic Energy Organisation of
Iran (AEOI) was established and it planned to generate 23,000MW of nuclear energy
within a 20 year period, as well as acquire full nuclear fuel cycle including facilities to
enrich uranium, fabricate fuel, and reprocess spent fuel to obtain plutonium for civil
fuel purposes, Iran further signed nuclear agreements with Germany, France and the
US and obtained 22 reactors as part of its ambitious plan of generating 23,000MW of
nuclear energy. These Western nations thus assisted Iran to lay the foundation and
develop a comprehensive nuclear programme, with the understanding that the
programme will not be used for nuclear weapons or military purposes (Khan, 2010;
Nigerian Army Information Brief, 2011).
The extent of the Shah’s nuclear programme development was, however, not
known, because Iran was a Western ally then. The US thus became more suspicious of
72
Iran’s massive nuclear programme that it could be for dual purposes as from 1975. It
became clearly evident after the US disagreement with Iran over where the later
plutonium (uranium) would be processed. Iran wanted the plutonium processed in
Tehran while the US preferred the materials be processed in the West to ensure that the
IAEA guidelines were being followed in the enrichment process. In 1976, Iran became
more dedicated to pursuing the quest for nuclear enrichment technology through the
government policies. It increased its budget for the AEOI from $30.8 million in the
fiscal year 1975 to more than one billion dollars for the fiscal year 1976 (US Energy R
& D Admin, 1976). It was equally stated that in the same year, 1976, Iran reached out
to the Apartheid South Africa for its further clandestine nuclear programme. The South
Africans were to supply $700 million worth of yellowcake to Iran, while the Iranians
were to finance a nuclear enrichment plant in South Africa. By late 1970s, the US
received Intelligence Reports (Int Rep) that Iran has set up a very ambitious
clandestine nuclear weapons development programme. This led to the US government
resentment of Iranian requests for technical assistance such that its veto of Iran’s quest
for reprocessing a US supplied nuclear power fuel in 1975 and request for reprocessing
and enrichment activity in 1977 by the US former President Jimmy Carter’s Regime in
the US was opposed, unless Iran abides by the IAEA guidelines. The Iranian
Revolutionary leaders thus inherited a clandestine nuclear programme started by the
Shah’s regime whose motivation for a dual-purpose nuclear technology remained
unchanged till date. However, the dexterity of the present day Iranian government
pursuant of the military use of the nuclear technology is more pronounced, well known
and more dangerous (Nigerian Army Information Brief, 2011; Spector, 1989; Khan,
2010).
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The Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, led to the Iraqi destruction of Iranian nuclear
reactors and research centre at Bushehr. The end of the war led to increasing demands
for significant electricity expansion. This made Iran’s President Hasheni Rafsanjani to
review their government policy and continue with its nuclear- energy projects. The
Iranian government sought for international technical assistance and joint
collaborations from Argentina, Spain, Germany, Poland, and Italy to complete its
nuclear programme, but these attempts were all prevented by the US as part of its dual-
containment policy and the clandestine policy of Iran in the past. This forced the
Iranian government to resort to secrecy after the US pressured the international
governments not to co-operate with Iran through international sanctions. The Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad argued that the sanctions were “illegal” and
imposed by “arrogant powers”. The President went on to state that Iran will continue
with a peaceful nuclear programme through “its appropriate legal path”. The Iranian
government thus resorted to internal development of its nuclear technology though its
scientists, in collaboration with Russian scientists. However, to address the
international concerns over its nuclear programme, Iran has repeatedly reassured the
world that its nuclear quest is only for civil energy purposes. The US, EU and the UN
in a bid to make Iran suspend its enrichment-related activities passed United Nations
Security Council Resolutions (S/RES/1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1935, 2105, 1929, 1984,
2049 and 1887) and series of economic sanctions that will be discussed in subsequent
paragraphs (Nigerian Army Information Brief, 2011).
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4.4. INFLUENCE OF OUTSIDE POWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAS T STRATEGIC BALANCE
The “balance of power” setting in the Middle East cum Persian Gulf region has
always been based on a zero sum (win-lose) game situation by the rival actors. The US
has been the major power in the strategic equation in the region calculated to maintain
a favourable balance of power to protect its national objectives. The US Middle East
policy objectives and national interest have always been based on two strategic aims:
securing the free flow of oil to the West and protecting Israel’s national security. In the
1960s - 70s, the constant Soviet - American rivalries, Arab-Israeli conflicts and ever
present fear of Soviet proxies coming to power in the region, were perceived as the
main sources of danger to the Western influence in the region and it dictated its
policies in the region. This position was replaced at the end of the cold war due to the
threat posed by Islamic Revolution in Iran and Iranian support for the hard-line Islamic
movements in the 1980s.
Aside the US, Russia is the next major foreign player in the strategic equation
in the Middle East region. The Russians are involved in Middle Eastern regional
politics because of its historical ties with the Arabs and the Persians, and for economic
reasons. In 2005, Russia signed a number of lucrative agreements with Iran on
technical assistance and co-operation over its nuclear facility and activity at Bushehr,
Iran. During the period of 2006-2008, Russia increased its relations with the Iranian
military spheres, to compensate for the draw backs when it signed the Gore-
Chernomyrdin agreement with the US in 1995, which mandated her to stop
implementing contracts on export of military munitions to the Islamic Republic. The
economic gains of Russo-Iranian Relations thus shaped the basis of Russian policy in
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the region, which goes contrary to the Western policy relations in the region and
maintenance the balance of power relations in the region. The Kremlin also favours a
constructive dialogue as the solution to the Iranian nuclear programme, which it views
as not representing a serious threat, although it is unacceptable to Moscow for an
Islamic regime in the volatile Middle East to possess WMD.
The present situation in the region is filled with myriad of problems, ranging
from sectarian conflicts in Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian problem, political instability as a
result of the Arab spring “uprising”, Iranian pursuit of nuclear technology, rise of
erstwhile dormant Islamic groups, and the on-going war on terror. Contending with
these issues has lead to growing hostility towards United States involvement in the
Middle East and Persian Gulf. Some observers are of the view that the United States
political, economic and military presence in the region is the major reason for the
exacerbation of Islamic extremism and terrorism. Despite these challenges, it is a sine
qua non for the United States to sustain the balance of power relations to its favour and
achieving the above-mentioned two strategic goals (U.S. Council for Foreign
Relations, 2008; Barzegar, 2013).
Furthermore, the US plans to establish anti-missile defense system in Eastern
Europe against a possible attack by Iran and North Korea was opposed by the Russia,
despite the US assurances. The Russian government policy in this region is based on
the fact that it had to protect its economic interest above any Western concerns
(Kozhanov, 2012).
4.5. COMBAT READINESS OF IRAN AND ISRAEL
The crisis generated by the Iranian nuclear programme has become the most
controversial contemporary discourse, not only in the Middle East but the world, while
76
Tehran insist that its nuclear programme is for peaceful, civilian purposes, the US,
Israel and some European countries alleged that Iran aims to secretly build nuclear
weapon as its own strategic deterrence, to compliment its conventional arms. The
Arabs on their own part are uncomfortable with a nuclear Iran, and have expressed
reservations about Iranian nuclear programmes in several fora. As the logjam continues
over the Iranian nuclear technology acquisition, the possibility of a military
confrontation or pre-emptive air strikes on Iranian nuclear sites looms nonetheless.
Israel seems to be the most likely party to attack the Iran having adopted a “first-strike
policy” in the face of any envisaged suffering by the Jews that could be reminiscent of
the WWII holocaust.
Another view held in the West is that there might not be a direct army-to-army
combat any time soon, but the Iran and Israel may end up squaring off in a bitter
conflict via proxies in the Gulf or Mediterranean states. However, any direct
confrontation between Israel and Iran will definitely not be fought by ground forces but
by long-distance aircrafts, long-range ballistic missiles, air-defense missile system and
sea-borne attacks. Kamran Bokhari, Vice-President of Middle Eastern and South Asian
Affairs with Stratfor, in an interview with Aljazeera TV in 2012, admitted that despite
the fact that the two countries may appear too far from each other in the map but in
reality, they are not too far to engage each other when armed with the above named
military capabilities. Although, Israel has more sophisticated and technologically
advanced military system than Iran, but the Iranians are more worried about the Israelis
than US. Bokhari reiterated this view to Aljazeera, that “Iranians know that, and aren’t
concerned about the US… with all military hardware (even underwater) very close to
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the Iranian borders. Table 4.1 below compares Iranian and Israeli military capabilities
in a tabular form.
Table 4.1: Comparison of Iran and Israeli Military Capabilities
Military Data
Iran Israel
Total population 78.9 million 7.5 million
Males 16-49 23 million 1.8 million
Active forces 545,000 187,000
Reserve duty 650,000 565,000
Defence budget $9.2 billion $13.5 billion
Army Weaponry
Iran Israel
Tanks 1,613 3,501
Towed artillery 2,010 456
Self-propelled guns 865 620
Multiple rocket systems 200 138
Mortars 5,000 750
Anti-tank weapons 1,400 900
Anti-aircraft weapons 1,701 200
Logistical vehicles 12,000 7,684
Naval Power
Iran Israel
Total navy ships 261 64
Merchant marine 74 10
Major ports/terminals 3 4
Aircraft carriers 0 0
Destroyers 3 3
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Graphical Comparison of Iran-Israel Military
Sources: Aljazeera.net/English, contributions from, Reuters, CIA Factbook, and
Jane's Defence Weekly Journal and Global Firepower.
The above table shows a comparison of Iranian and Israeli military capabilities
in a possible scenario of confrontation between both countries in the Middles East. The
analysis shows that Iran has more population than Israel, as such can afford to commit
Submarines 19 3
Frigates 5 0
Patrol craft 198 42
Amphibious assault craft 26 0
Missile Arsenal
Iran Israel
Short-range Shahab-3 (1,280km) Jericho-1 (1,400km)
Medium-range Ghadr-1 (1,600km) Jericho-2 (2,800km)
Long-range Sajjil-2 (2,400km) Jericho-3 (5,000km)
Note: The total aircraft includes aeroplanes, helicopters and drones. .
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large number of active combat troops for a military campaign, even outnumbering the
population of the Israel. This is however going to be impeded by distance between both
countries and sophistication of the modern warfare which will not allow for the
deployment of large number of combat troops. On the part of the Israelis, they have
more defence budget which it spends on modern sophisticated military weapons.
Additionally, the table above shows that Israel has more aircrafts, tanks and armoured
personnel carriers (APC) because of their adaptability and mastery of desert and tank
warfare. Furthermore, the Israelis have learnt valuable military lessons in their past
conflicts with the Arabs, where they also perfected that combat doctrine of mobile tank
operations and complete aerial dominance. In a case of direct confrontation between
both countries, it is clear that the Israelis have longer military reach than Iranians. The
need to maintain a form of parity, made the Iranians to upgrade the range of their
missile Shihab-3 to cover all part of Israeli territory. It is however important to note
that to counter the Iran missile range, Israel has equally improved the defense of their
homeland territory by upgrading of its patriot defense missile system. Consequently, it
should be noted that based on Israeli military expenditure, its modern weaponry and
lessons learnt from past Arab-Israeli conflicts, confers on Israelis strategic advantage
in conventional warfare over the Iranians.
4.6. CONSEQUENCES OF THE NUCLEARIZATION OF MIDDLE EAST
There are two main piece of conventional wisdom held by observers on the
effects of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. Firstly is the reasoning that possession of a
nuke will significantly make Iran to be more aggressive and troublesome in the Middle
East. This assumption is basically held by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and
the West. The main concern of the West lies in the nuisance that Iran would create in
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the straits of Hormuz and the economic implication to this important sea route that
allows the transportation of the bulk of world’s wide oil supply. This would further be
more complicated in the event of an air strike on its nuclear sites by either Israel or the
US. On the part of the GCC countries it would view any Iranian nuclear bomb as a
triumph of the Shia over the Sunnis. This ultimate Iranian goal must be stopped by the
GCC countries by all means possible, even if it will entail working with the Israelis.
The second reasoning is that the advent of an Iranian weapon would trigger an
unprecedented wave of further nuclear proliferation in the region. The three big Arab
countries of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey who have an expressed interest in nuclear
technology are taunted to most likely tow the same line of Iran. Although none of these
countries have the technology and infrastructure to make a nuclear weapons
programme in the foreseeable future, but they would have also to worry about the
reactions of the US and the international community. The idea of the proliferation of
the nuclear weapons in the Middle East in the advent of an Iranian bomb is held by
political analyst based on the past historical events. This notion is also held by US
strategic thinkers that normally view events/foreign threats assume the geographic
spread of a phenomenon from one neighbouring country to another. This point of view
is the basis for the different domino- effect theories. In the immediate past the neo-
conservatives in the United States had envisaged the spread of western styled
democracy from a Saddam-less Iraq to other Arab states. During the Cold war period,
another prominent US Cold war domino-effect theory was the calculation that the fall
of South Vietnam to the communists would lead to a succession of her Asian
neighbours falling to the communists. This ultimately led to the US military
intervention in the Vietnam in the 1960s. In spite of these domino-effect theories, no
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one is certain that if Iran goes nuclear, it could trigger an unprecedented proliferation
of nuclear arms in the Middle East (Pillar, 2012).
In an event of Iran developing a nuke, the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
turkey, will first consider what a nuclear weapon could or could not do for their
respective countries. Despite the fact that Iran is not a direct military threat to the
Arabs, they also have the fear of Iran over its growing influence in the region,
popularity of its “impending military success” and support for extremist groups such as
Hezbollah and Hamas. Anti-nukes analysts actually believe that there are not a lot of
useful things possession of nuclear weapons can do. This is based on the fact that
despite Israeli’s possession of these bombs in their bunkers for decades, it may not
have enhanced its national security. In the view of this scared-chicken fixation on
possible threat from nuclear proliferation, the possible resolution of this impasse lies in
the return to implementation of the Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone (Pillar,
2012; Khan, 2010).
From the above analysis, it is clear that Iranian nuclear weapons programme is
largely creating an enabling environment for a near or total anarchy within the
international system that may result to a nuclear war or the third world war. Iran’s
serial concealment of its sensitive nuclear activities dissatisfies not only Israel and
United States’ strategic interest in the Middle East, but Western interest and inter-
governmental organization standard such as the UN and the IAEA. Iran’s disregard for
these power points and interest stems from its ambition to widen regional influence and
strategic interests, broaden friendships, prestige and undermine United States and
Western influence in the Middle East. Also, Tehran’s status as a non-nuclear signatory
to the NPT is exploited by her as an avenue to continue its nuclear development.
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Therefore, the above stand points validate our hypothesis that the Iranian government’s
nuclear weapons development undermines the balance of power favourable to Israel
and the US within the Middle East. This is because Iranian nuclear development is
suspiciously viewed by most countries of the world such as-Israel, the West, the UN,
the IAEA, the Middle East especially Gulf countries of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain,
UAE who are Sunni-ruled as exceedingly not in their interest and that Iranian touted
reason of expanding her domestic electricity supply through nuclear development is
fraudulent. On this account and in the following chapter and among all other issues, we
will endeavor to unravel whether the UN multilateral intervention will provide a
diplomatic settlement for the averting/or sustaining US-Iran nuclear weapons
development conflagration.
83
CHAPTER FIVE
UNITED STATES UNILATERAL ENFORCEMENT OF NUCLEAR NON -PROLIFERATION TREATY AND BALANCE OF POWER RELATIONS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
5.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter evaluates United States’ led enforcement of the NPT and the crisis
it generates in the Middle East. Therefore, this chapter will commence with the
examination of the history of the nuclear enlightenment and how it has created room
for nuclear proliferation. If we are able to prove that it created room for nuclear
proliferation, then we will attempt to view the global flow chart of the nuclearization
build-up, the various strategies by which various countries in the Middle East has
sustained their nuclearisation. More so, we will attempt to examine the numerous steps
taken by world governments, the West led by the United States, regional bodies, inter-
government organizations such as the United Nations, the IAEA, and so on to curtail
the threats posed by the ‘perceived’ nuclear weaponization ambition by Iran. We will
also endeavour to discover how Iranian nuclear weaponization ambition serves its
interest within and outside the region. More importantly, this chapter is divided into
such sub-headings-history of the nuclear enlightenment; international safeguards,
nuclear energy development, and so on.
5.2. HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENLIGHTENMENT
Nuclear weapons have played an important role in the international system,
even though they have not been used in war time since 1945 attack on two Japanese
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nuclear history therefore, is marked by the struggle
to establish an order, and to mobilize support for a persuasive conception of order, that
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would be effective, legitimate and trustworthy despite unavoidable disparities in states
access to and usage of technology, and that would enable nuclear technology to be
diffused for civil purposes without constantly spawning security dilemmas. Nuclear
order comprised two managed systems of deterrence and abstinence. In the cold war
era, both the United States and the Soviet Union built large and diverse nuclear
arsenals which included a mix of many different types of weaponry and delivery
systems. During this period, academics and policy makers struggled with many
different issues relating to these weapon types, but in the United States and other
NATO countries, special attention was paid to deterrence, particularly the use of
nuclear weapons to deter the Soviet Union from launching an invasion of any western
and central European NATO countries. Therefore, one, it will be rightly put that the
cold war was the use of nuclear weapons to prevent superpower war, either nuclear or
conventional.
The First Nuclear Age in the world history lasted approximately from 1945 to
1991(the fall of the Soviet Union). During this period, the two superpowers each built
enormous arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and strategic nuclear weapons.
The distinction between the two types of weapons is somewhat artificial, but as a rule
of thumb, TNWs are delivered by means such as tactical aircrafts, artillery, or short-
range ballistic or cruise missiles. The United States and Soviet Union built tons of
thousands of strategic and tactical warheads with an enormous variety of yields that
ranged from less than one trillion to tens of megatons. In many cases, several warheads
were placed on a single delivery vehicle. The American MX Inter-Continental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM), first deployed in the 1970’s, for example, was designed to carry up to
ten multiple independent targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRVs) warheads.
85
At this period, global influence and power were dominated by the Soviet and
American superpowers, which first tested their nuclear weapons in 1945 and 1949,
respectively. Three other countries also became declared nuclear powers during the
first nuclear age (Great Britain, France, and China), while three other polities (South
Africa, Israel, and India) became undeclared (later acknowledged except Israel)
nuclear states. Pakistan was later to complete the pack to maintain a balance of power
with India in the South East Asia Region. The details of when the countries
possessed/acquired their nuclear weapons are contained in Table 2.1. However, all the
arsenals of these new NWS are considerably too small to be compared to the two
superpowers (US and Russia).
TABLE 5.1: THE GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR POWE RS
Serial Nuclear Weapon States
Date of First Test Still Possess Nuclear Weapon
1. United States 16 July 1945 Yes 2. USSR (now Russia) 29 August 1949 Yes 3. United Kingdom 3 October 1952 Yes 4. France 3 December 1960 Yes 5. China 16 October 1964 Yes 6. Israel 2 November 1966 Yes (But not officially
acknowledged) 7. India 18 May 1974 Yes 8. South Africa 22 September 1979 No 9. Belarus N/A
N/A N/A
No 10. Kazakhstan No 11. Ukraine No 12. Pakistan 28 May 1988 Yes 13. North Korea 9 October 2006 Yes
N/A: not available
Source: Dale (2010).
It should be noted that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945,
created an immediate global awareness of the nuclear weapon’s significance: its
Inherited WMD from Soviet Union arsenal
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efficacy as a killing machine, the power acquired by its possessors, and the dangers
that every person, society, and state would face if the technology were widely adopted
in warfare. Consequently, political actors therefore made attempts in the second half of
the twentieth century to create an international order which would limit the dangers of
nuclear attack, while exploiting in controlled ways their capacities to discourage war
itself came to possess hallmarks of a grand enlightenment project, the particular child
of the United States, embraced both deterrence and non-proliferation. International
diplomatic efforts quickly focused on how to exercise effectively control: how to
establish an international body with unchallenged authority over the technology’s
development and diffusion, verify states renunciations of nuclear weapons, and
respond to “breakouts”. It began to founder in the mid to late 1900s, just as it seemed
capable of approaching a further realization of its goals. Its zenith was marked by
completion in 1994 of the political reconstructions of a nuclear superpower, the USSR;
and by the decision taken in 1995 to give indefinite life to the NPT, the text containing
the nuclear orders foundational norms and rules, and to embark on a more ambitious
non-proliferation and agenda (Walker, 2007).
Therefore, the workability of this project was tested in the turbulent decades
after, by the shambles of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the quest for nuclear
weapons by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, which clearly shows the disarray in which the
project has fallen Political analysts believe that the project ran into difficulty partly
because it could not satisfy its own expectations, overcome inherent flaws or provide
satisfying responses to challenges after the end of the cold war, among them India’s
and Pakistan’s ‘breakouts’ and the clandestine weapons programmes pursued by North
Korea, Israel, Iran and Iraq (Walker, 2007). The first nuclear age was equally and
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always characterized by the ever-present fear of US-Soviet apocalypse, that at least
could have marked the end of modern civilization, at least in the Northern hemisphere.
Political analysts also are of the view that the next nuclear age could involve smaller
nukes instead of the tonnes of the nuclear arsenal that characterized the cold war era.
With the end of the cold war, the world has entered a second Nuclear Age in
which the number of actors possessing nuclear weapons is progressively increasing
even as the absolute number of nukes is falling. In the Second Nuclear Age, non-
proliferation and counter-proliferation are both terms that relate to efforts to prevent
the horizontal proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Sometimes it is difficult to
distinguish between the two activities, but as a general rule the term ‘non -
proliferation’ is used in reference to international legal arrangements such as the NPT.
Furthermore, the concept of counter-proliferation has become more popular in recent
years, as it is usually used to refer to the enforcement of the NPT and other
international agreements (Walton, 2010; Walker, 2007).
Nuclear weapons are unintended consequence of the scientific enlightment. The
attempt in the second half of the 20th century to create an international order which
would limit their dangers, while exploiting in controlled ways their capacities to
discourage war, itself came to possess hallmarks of a grand enlightment project. It was
permeated by assumptions of and expressions of faith in a ubiquitous rationality and
commitment to reason; the attainability of justice in the face of obvious inequalities of
power and opportunity; the possibility of achieving trust among states on the basis of
international law; the ability of organization to exercise control over complex
technological activities; and the feasibility of progress in escaping a nuclear-armed
chaos and realizing nuclear energy’s economic potential.
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The essential objective of the architects of international nuclear order has
largely been, and should remain, the achievement of mutual restraint and containment,
out of concern in the anarchic international system. Through its emphasis on reason,
containment and mutual obligation, this project, the particular child of the United
States embraced both deterrence and non-proliferation. It began to founder in the mid
to late 1990s, just as it seemed capable of approaching a fuller realization of its goals.
Its zenith was marked by completion in 1994 of the political reconstruction of a
nuclear superpower, the USSR; and by decision taken in 1995 to give indefinite life to
the NPT, the text containing the nuclear order’s foundational norms and rules, and to
embark on a more ambitious non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. A turbulent
decade later, the shambles of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the travails over
Iraq, Iran and North Korea bear witness to the disarray into which the project has fallen
(Walker, 2007).
In the second Nuclear Age, some common held assumptions during the cold
war era may actually prove to be very problematic, such as nuclear-armed powers will
always be ‘reasonable’, ballistic missiles defenses usually undermines deterrence; and
that arms control and disarmament treaties are the best means to counter- proliferation.
In 1971, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty. This treaty barred both countries from constructing comprehensive
national missile defences (however, it did not absolutely ban all missile defences, as it
allowed each power to maintain a very strictly limited Ballistic Missiles Defence
(BMD) Capability. This treaty was representative of a specific vision of deterrence
based on MAD, in which it is assumed if both countries on the event of an attack might
not be able to execute a retaliatory strike. However, the efforts by the US to convince
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Russia to allow for such missiles (Standard Missile-3, SM-3) to be placed in Poland
and Romania to tackle newly emergent threat, has so far proved abortive. The current
United States President Barrack Obama’s approach to Russia is intended to be more
flexible than the Bush administration plan to place Ground-Based Midcourse
Interceptors in Poland and radar in Czech Republic as a response to emerging threats in
the Second Nuclear Age, especially from the North Korea and Iran (Collina, 2012). As
such the deterrence theory of the cold war era entails that major super powers should
possess nuclear weapon as a check against military attack by another. This deterrence
theories that was developed in the United States and the Soviet Union, may actually
prone to be inapplicable to other new emergent powers such as North Korea and Iran in
this new age. Most analysts are therefore of the opinion that the deployment of BMD
will therefore be an important factor in the nuclear decision- making in the second
nuclear age and the future. This assertion is hinged on the fact that an effective
deployment of the BMD’s may discourage countries such as North Korea and Iran,
from attempting to acquire nuclear weapons (Walton, 2010).
A very dangerous dimension to the second nuclear age, are the emergent of
international nuclear technology syndicate following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The harsh economic condition in Russia made the purchase of nuclear weapons
technology from their scientists, relatively easy. Secondly, the nefarious international
criminal syndicate headed by the Pakistani nuclear scientist, AQ Khan, has also been
the greatest nuclear concern for the NWS in this nuclear age. Despite Dr AQ Khan
being a national hero for transferring Pakistan into a nuclear power, he was discovered
to the link in the sale of nuclear research and secrets to Libya, Iran and North Korea.
What is particularly more worrisome about this nuclear era is the fact that the WMD
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could easily fall into the hands of unstable governments, failed states or the die-hard
terrorists Islamic networks that span the whole of the Middle East (Powell and
McGirk, 2005).
Today, Moscow and Washington still possess the world’s largest nuclear
arsenals, but the international political environment now have drastically and
dramatically changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States and
now Russia do not have a particular antagonistic relationship, and the danger of a
massive nuclear conflict in the foreseeable future appears small. However, in other
respects, the international environment is more dangerous now than it was during the
cold war era. The world has transitioned into a second nuclear age, in which these
weapons will proliferate horizontally to more states, including the so-called “very
dangerous” and “instable regimes”. Therefore, it is quite likely that the odds of a
nuclear war occurring in any given year are much greater now than was the case in the
first nuclear age (Baylis, Wirtz and Gray, 2010).
5.3. INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
Historically the first organization to limit the scope in which war was organized
is the Amphictyonic League, a quasi-religious alliance of most of the Greek tribes,
formed before the 7th century BC. The League members were pledged to restrain their
actions in war against other members. For example, they were barred from cutting a
besieged city's water supply. The league was empowered to impose sanctions on
violating members, including fines and punitive expeditions, and could require its
members to provide troops and funds for this purpose. On the other hand, the need to
control arms emerged as result of the destructive effect of weaponry and warfare.
Weapons development and various conflicts in 3,000 years of recorded history have
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witnessed various dimensions and changes, and as such have sustained the folly, waste,
and inhumanity of warfare. Therefore, through treaties, proclamations, conventions and
tacit agreement, the issue of arms control emerged to limit the destructiveness of war
by controlling the acquisition, destructive effect and use of weapons and military
technology. However, few attempts were made to control the spread of new weapons,
because arms technology remained nearly static from the 3rd century BC to the Middle
Ages. In feudal societies, such as those of medieval Europe or Japan, laws and customs
developed to keep weapons a monopoly of the military classes and to suppress arms
that might liberalize warfare. These customs tended to disappear as soon as some
powers calculated that there is a decisive and strategic advantage in the use of a new
weapon (Luttwak, 2009; Wikipedia, 2013).
5.3.1 ARMS CONTROL
The introduction of firearms expanded the scope of war and increased the
potential for violence, as exemplified in the devastation of central Europe in the Thirty
Years' War (1618-1648). This was reflected in the widespread revulsion against the
horrors of that conflict which led to, by formulating conventions for the humane
treatment of prisoners and wounded, and by organizing logistics to end supply by
pillage. These rules prevailed throughout the 18th century, making war a relatively
limited and civilized “game of kings”. The rise of mass armies during the American
Revolution (1775-1783) and Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815) again expanded the scope
of warfare and weaponry. The 19th century saw an increased manufacture and
production of war materiel with technological innovation as rifled artillery, breech-
loading rifles, machine guns, and other weapons (Luttwak, 2009).
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The industrial revolution led to the increasing mechanization of warfare, as well
as rapid advances in the development of firearms; the increased potential of
devastation made Nicholas II of Russia to initiate the First Hague Conference in 1899,
which was convened to control arms development and improve the conditions of
warfare. The conferences was attended by twenty-six nations, were the laws and
customs of land warfare, defined the status of belligerents, and drafted regulations on
the treatment of prisoners, the wounded, and neutrals were codified. It also banned
aerial bombardment (by balloons), dumdum (expansion) bullets, and the use of poison
gas. Most importantly, it established the Permanent Court of Arbitration to arbitrate
international disputes (although this court had no enforcement powers).
The Second Hague Disarmament Conference of 1907 was marked more by discord
than discourse, a sign of the deteriorating world situation. It did further the cause of
mediation and arbitration of disputes by establishing additional courts to arbitrate cases
involving ships' cargoes seized during war and resolution of international debts. A
Third Hague Conference was scheduled for 1915, but sadly World War I (1914-1918)
caused its abandonment. After the carnage of World War I, the international climate
was more conscious of the idea of arms control and during the years between the two
world wars, many formal arms-control conferences were held and many treaties were
drawn up. Hence, the Covenant of the League of Nations established criteria for
reducing world armaments, but the league's lack of enforcement capability, however,
made compliance strictly voluntary (Wikipedia, 2013; Luttwak, 2009; Encarta, 2009).
From 1921 to 1922 the Washington Naval Conference was held to establish
stable relationships among the naval forces of the various powers.
The second treaty focused on arms limitations. A 5-5-3-1.75-1.75 ratio was established
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between United States, British, Japanese, French, and Italian battleships. This implies
that for every 5 United States and British battleships, Japan was allowed 3 and France
and Italy were allowed 1.75. Maximum total tonnage was limited, as well as
specification of a maximum single-ship tonnage of 35,000 tons. A ten-year moratorium
on battleship building (except to fill out the treaty) and a limit on size and armament
were also included. The third treaty was an attempt to accommodate the signatories’
interests in China. In 1925 a convention in Geneva, Switzerland, banned the use of
toxic gas in warfare. By the time World War II began in 1939, most of the Great
Powers, except Japan and the United States, were signatories (Japan signed in 1970
and United States in 1974). This accord has been observed by most of the signatories,
although Italy used gas in Ethiopia in 1936. In 1928 the Kellogg-Briand Pact, initiated
by France and the United States, was signed by 63 nations. The pact renounced war as
an instrument of foreign policy. It made no provisions, however, for enforcing
compliance, and many nations only signed it with sweeping qualifications. It had no
effect on international affairs.
In 1930 a naval conference was held in London to amend the Washington
Conference treaties. Its most important effect was to change the U.S.-Japanese
battleship ratio to 5-3.5. It also extended the battleship moratorium through 1936. In
the naval conference which was held in London in 1936, the United States and Britain
reaffirmed the naval limitation treaties, with an acceleration clause (that is, one
providing for proportional increase in the U.S.-to-British ratio) to counteract any
German or Japanese violations. The Japanese, increasingly militaristic and fearful of
American and British superiority, withdrew from further negotiations. This was the last
major arms-control conference before World War II (1939-1945) (Luttwak, 2009).
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After World War II ended in 1945, considerable support again developed for
arms control and for alternatives to military conflict in international relations.
Empowered by Articles 11, 26 and 47, the UN Charter was designed to permit a
supranational agency to enforce peace, avoiding many of the weaknesses of the League
of Nations covenant. The primary concern of arms control was to reduce nuclear
arsenals and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, but
the development of the atomic bomb by the United States towards the end of World
War II and USSR, the after the end of World War II brought with it the capability of
devastating whole civilizations. Basically, one of the most important agreements on
arms control was the NPT of 1968. Signatories pledged to restrict the development,
deployment, and testing of nuclear weapons to ensure that weapons, materials, or
technology would not be transferred outside the five countries that then had nuclear
weapons (Great Britain, France, China, the United States, and the USSR). In 1995
more than 170 countries agreed to permanently extend the treaty. In the late 1960s the
United States and the USSR initiated negotiations to regulate strategic weapon
arsenals. These negotiations became known as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
The SALT I negotiations produced two important agreements in 1972: the ABM
Treaty, which drastically limited the establishment of defensive installations designed
to shoot down ballistic missiles, and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (Arms Control Association, 2013).
As the world entered the 21st century, both progress and setbacks occurred in
arms control. In 2001 the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush announced
that it would unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty, laying the groundwork for
the deployment of defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. For the first time the
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U.S. government also announced a policy that under extreme circumstances it would
consider using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state that employed biological or
chemical weapons. The Bush administration, however, also pursued an arms reduction
agreement with the Russian Federation, and the two nations signed a treaty in 2002 to
deactivate about 75 percent of their strategic nuclear arsenals.
Under the 2002 agreement, both nations were to reduce their active inventories
of strategic nuclear warheads from about 6,000 each to about 2,200 warheads each by
the year 2012. The agreement, known as the Treaty of Moscow, required ratification
by both the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma (parliament) before it could go into
effect. Once ratified the new treaty was to replace the previous START II treaty
(Luttwak, 2009; Wikipedia, 2013). The list of treaties and conventions related to arms
control are contained in Appendix 1.
5.4. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
The devastation effects of the atomic bombs dropped at Japanese cities and the
invention of the hydrogen bomb with a thousand times more devastating effect than the
a-bomb, created more safety concerns for the world with many countries aspiring to
acquire the ultimate weapon. The cold war further aggravated the fragile relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Additionally, having more nuclear
nuclear-weapon states would reduce security for all, multiplying the risks of
miscalculation, accidents, unauthorized use of weapons, or from escalation in tensions,
nuclear conflict. Hence the need for the establishment of an international order and
controlled nuclear regimes became imperative.
The NPT process was launched by Frank Aiken, Irish Minister for External
Affairs, in 1958. It was opened for signature in 1968, with Finland the first State to
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sign. Accession became nearly universal after the end of the Cold War and of South
African apartheid. In 1992 China and France acceded to the NPT, the last of the five
nuclear powers recognized by the treaty to do so. In 1995 the treaty was extended
indefinitely. After Brazil acceded to the NPT in 1998 the only remaining non-nuclear-
weapons state which had not signed was Cuba, which joined NPT (and the Treaty of
Tlatelolco NWFZ) in 2002 (Wikipedia, 2013).
Some signatories of the NPT have also gone along to dismantle their nuclear
weapons programs. The Apartheid South African government commenced a nuclear
weapons program, ostensibly with the assistance of Israel in the 1970s, and may have
conducted a nuclear test in the Indian Ocean in 1979, but has since renounced its
nuclear program and signed the treaty in 1991 after destroying its small nuclear
arsenal; after this, the remaining African countries signed the treaty. After the collapse
of the USSR, three former Soviet Republics, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan,
destroyed and/or transferred to Russia the nuclear weapons they inherited from the
defunct Soviet Union. The three former Soviet Republics thus joined NPT by 1994.
Furthermore, other successor states from the breakups of Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia also joined the treaty soon after their independence. Montenegro and
East Timor were the last countries to sign the treaty on their independence in 2006 and
2003; the only other country to sign in the 21st century was Cuba in 2002. The three
Micronesian countries in Compact of Free Association with the USA joined NPT in
1995, along with Vanuatu. Major South American countries Argentina, Chile, and
Brazil joined in 1995 and 1998. Arabian Peninsula countries included Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain in 1988, Qatar and Kuwait in 1989, UAE in 1995, and Oman in 1997. The
tiny European states of Monaco and Andorra joined in 1995-6. Also signing in the
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1990s were Myanmar in 1992 and Guyana in 1993 (Wikipedia, 2013). The states that
are parties to the NPT, as of 15 April 1995 are contained in Appendix 2.
Three states – India, Israel, Pakistan and South Sudan – have never signed the
NPT. India and Pakistan are confirmed nuclear powers, and Israel has a long-standing
policy of deliberate ambiguity and deception for the international community. The
South Sudan which became an independent state on 9 July 2011, following a
referendum that passed with 98.83% of the vote, is yet to become a signatory to the
NPT. North Korea ratified the treaty on December 12, 1985, but gave notice of
withdrawal from the treaty on January 10, 2003 following U.S. allegations that it had
started an illegal enriched uranium weapons program, and the U.S. subsequently
stopping fuel oil shipments under the Agreed Framework which had resolved
plutonium weapons issues in 1994. The withdrawal became effective April 10, 2003
making North Korea the first state ever to withdraw from the treaty. North Korea had
once before announced withdrawal, on March 12, 1993, but suspended that notice
before it came into effect. On February 10, 2005, North Korea publicly declared that it
possessed nuclear weapons (Wikipedia, 2013).
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed at
London, Moscow and Washington, DC, on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5
March 1970. The Treaty stipulates as follows:
Article I: Each nuclear-weapons state (NWS) undertakes not to transfer, to any recipient, nuclear
weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to assist any non-nuclear weapon
state to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices.
Article II:
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Each non-NWS party undertakes not to receive, from any source, nuclear weapons, or
other nuclear explosive devices; not to manufacture or acquire such weapons or
devices; and not to receive any assistance in their manufacture.
Article III:
Each non-NWS party undertakes to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the
application of its safeguards to all nuclear material in all of the state's peaceful nuclear
activities and to prevent diversion of such material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.
Article IV:
(1) Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all
the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of
this Treaty.
(2) All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate
in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty
in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other
States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the
developing areas of the world.
Article V:
Each party to the treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures under appropriate
international observation and procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful
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applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states
parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any
charges for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty
shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or
agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of
non-nuclear-weapon states.
Article VI:
The states undertake to pursue "negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament", and towards a "Treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control".
Article VII:
Nothing in this treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional
treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective
territories.
Article VIII:
Any party to the treaty may propose amendments to this treaty. The text of any
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments which shall
circulate it to all parties to the treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or
more of the parties to the treaty, the Depository Governments shall convene a
conference, to which they shall invite all the parties to the treaty, to consider such an
amendment. Any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes
of all the parties to the treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon states party to
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the treaty and all other parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are
members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Article IX:
This treaty shall be open to all states for signature. This treaty shall be subject to
ratification by signatory states and shall enter into force after its ratification by the
states.
Article X:
This article establishes the right to withdraw from the Treaty giving 3 months' notice.
It also establishes the duration of the Treaty (25 years before 1995 Extension
Initiative).
Article XI:
This treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments.
Duly certified copies of this treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments
to the Governments of the signatory and acceding states. The detailed Articles I - XI of
the NPT are contained in Appendix 3.
Despite the fact that the Treaty was signed by almost all the countries,
opponents of the Treaty have a lot of resentment towards it. The NPT’s negotiation in
the 1960’s was seen as a late and largely insincere tactical move by the United States
and Soviet Union to win over non-aligned states, and that the weight subsequently
placed on this Articles has been unjustified and largely detrimental to the NPT’s main
objective, which is to stem nuclear proliferation. The hypocrisy of the nuclear weapon
states stance on the Treaty is that in their desire to rein in nuclear weapons for their
national and collective good. It has become increasingly difficult to persuade non-
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nuclear weapon states to join new initiation of their nuclear activities and further
intrusions of their sovereignty. A notable and distressing example has been the
growing reluctance of states to accede to the additional protocol which was negotiated
in the mid-1990’s to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards system, and the use by some
states of the NWS backsliding as an easy pretext for not coming on board.
The efforts by the NPT to constrain the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons
have lost little of its urgency. It also ran into difficulty because it was becoming too
successful in its encroachment on the strategic interest of some great and aspiring
powers. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 created an
immediate global awareness of the nuclear weapon’s significance, its efficiency as a
killing machine, the power acquired by its possessors, and the changes that every
person, society and state would face if technology were widely adopted in warfare. In
June 1945, the secret Franck Report had argued that ‘the efficient protection against
the destructive use of nuclear power can only come from the political organization of
the world’. This assertion would be repeated in numerous subsequent reports and
statements, including the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch Plan which the US
government published in March and June 1946 respectively. The practice of nuclear
deterrence was absorbed into NSC -68, the cold war’s seminal document, and provided
the foundation of the strategy of containment. NSC-68 emphatically rejected the option
of launching a pre-emptive war to avoid the emergence of a more dangerous nuclear-
armed opponent.
The search for security through international control was revived in the late
1950s and early 1960s. Commercial pressures to allow technologies and materials to be
diffused for civil purposes were also increasing, along with anxieties that the
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proliferation of nuclear weapons might soon extend to Germany, Japan and other
states. The NPT’s constitutionalism also facilitated reconciliation of the contrasting
rights and obligations of the nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, provided a framework for
reconciling norms of sovereignty with the intrusive verification of renunciation, and
offered a means of sustaining hopes of an eventual release from the threat of nuclear
war. It embodied the conviction that the nuclear order was the property and
responsibility of all states, and that they should together strive to make it a just order.
The NPT and associated agreements amounted to a grand political settlement
and contract among states great and small. Yet it was incomplete. Many states
including China, France and India, initially refused to join the Treaty. Furthermore, the
NPT served great powers interests and coercive diplomacy was involved in bringing
states into the fold; it was this quality and prospect that gave the settlement magnetic
authority and legitimacy. Basically, the nuclear cold war effectively ended in October
1986 when the former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald
Reagan met at Reykavik, Iceland, and pledged to end their Cold war confrontations.
The ensuing decade was a golden age of arms control, bringing substantial arms
reductions and a flurry of bilateral and multilateral treaties restricting the development
and acquisition of the weapons of mass destruction.
Three developments were central to the period’s progressive dynamic. First,
while the Gulf war of 1991 revealed Iraq’s duplicity and deficiencies in the safeguards
and export control systems, in the war’s aftermath the nuclear order initially appeared
to be strengthened. The UN Security council acted to disarm Iraq through the UN
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and the IAEA, and the safeguards system
was strengthened through negotiations of the Additional Protocol in the mid-1990s. for
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a few years, there appeared to be some prospect of establishing collective political and
regulatory means for detecting and responding to acts of non-compliance. Second, the
Soviet Union’s political reconstruction into 15 sovereign states, 14 of which joined the
NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, was a remarkable achievement. In important ways,
the need to manage this transition bound the emergent hegemony, the US, into
maintaining its support for international constitutionalism in the early post-cold war
period. Third, the central diplomatic event of the period was the NPT Extension
Conference in April – May 1995. Many states worried that indefinite extension would
give the states that already possessed nuclear weapons eternal license to hold them
while locking others into permanent renunciation. The compromise consisted of four
‘decision documents’,, announcing the Treaty’s indefinite extension; strengthening its
review process; adopting the principles and objectives for non-proliferation and
disarmament’ which elaborated on the Treaty’s norms, rules and aspirations; and
expressing determination to bring all Middle Eastern states, including Israel, into
conformity with the Treaty.
During the second half of the 1990s, many events and developments
contributed to perceptions of cumulative deterioration, amounting to crisis, in the
existing system of nuclear weapons control. They included the demise of the Middle
East peace process, India’s and Pakistan’s explosive testing of nuclear warheads in
1998, and increasingly frayed relocations between Washington and Moscow brought
by, among other things, NATO’s expansion. Most corrosive was the behavior of the
‘rogue states’, Iraq, Iran and North Korea, which exposed serious deficiencies in the
security order and the strategies underpinning it. All three had violated international
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law, were located in unstable regions, and harbored a vigorous animosity towards the
United States and its close allies, Israel uppermost where Iran and Iraq were concerned.
Fears that Iraq would use missiles armed with biological or chemical agents
during the Gulf war of 1991 began the political fusing of nuclear, chemical and
biological (NBC) weapons into the single category of WMD. This trend was confirmed
by the equal priority given to eliminating Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, biological and
missile capabilities in UNSC Resolution 687 of April 1991. ‘WMD’ was replacing the
nuclear weapon as the principal rhetorical signifier of outlandish threat. The system of
abstinence now had to be stretched to encompass all WMD, and fresh prestige was
confirmed on nuclear weapons as deterrents against any states resort to the other
weapons of mass destruction.
The UN Security Council’s unanimously adopted in April 2004 of Resolution
1540, which prohibited states from helping non-states actors to acquire weapons of
mass destruction and obliged them to strengthen internal laws and regulations to inhibit
access, allied to efforts to raise standards of physical security at nuclear sites. Led by
the US, Article IV, openly denied other states other than a favoured few rights to
develop civil fuel cycles. Simultaneously it proposed a new classification of states fuel-
cycle and, by implication, non-fuel cycle states, the latter having to accept dependence
on the former if they were to invest in nuclear power. On the Article VI, it took steps at
the Review Conference, in alliance with France, to detach itself from collective
decisions on disarmament taken in 1995 and 2000. To cap it all, on US insistence
reference to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was removed from the
document issuing from the UN’s world summit from the UN’s world summit in
September 2005.
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After 9/11 twin tower terrorist attack on the United States, it was self- evident
that problems in the international system would have been addressed, more urgently
than at any time in modern history, along and at the intersection of two dimensions.
The horizontal dimension involved the convention-bound relations between sovereign
states, including their conduct and avoidance of regular war. The vertical dimension
involved the interaction among states and non-state actors in a globalizing and
technology-drenched environment. This was the domain of irregular warfare, in which
non-states actors could injure and frighten their opponents by drawing on an ever-
increasing inventory of methods and targets. In order to strengthen order
simultaneously in both dimensions and at their interface, a natural move would have
been to redramatize the existence of nuclear weapons, so as to invigorate their global
restriction and elimination while responding to the particular instances of proliferation.
If the 9/11terrorist attack had occurred in 1995 rather than 2001, this might have
happened. Instead, the US chose to dramatize the presence of certain actors in the
world whose possession of nuclear weapon or weapon-related technologies would be
intolerable. The problem of nuclear order was narrowed to the problem of
proliferation, and further, narrowed to ‘non-compliance with treaty obligations and
preventing weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists. The Iraq
war of 2003, the vicious insurgency, terrorism and civil war that followed, left the
deficiencies of the new grand strategy brutally exposed. The actions of Iran and North
Korea also revealed that a non-or-counter-proliferation policy resting on the threat of
preventive war contained an inherent trap. The threat of preventive war contained an
inherent trap. The external threats leveled against Iran made it appear to play a part in
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the defeat of internal efforts to establish a more liberal policy in Iran, negating the
pursuit of democratization.
The tool of preventive war used against Iran or North Korea has proven to be
untenable given the still more destructive wars and instabilities that would thereby be
unleashed in either region. The United States was therefore drawn reluctantly back
towards a policy of containment, now reliant on the cooperation of other powers. Over
Iran it became involved with the E3 (France, Germany and UK), Russia and other
parties in a difficult and contentious game to impede Iran’s assembly of weapon
capabilities; and it had to concede a central role of information-gathering policy
formulation and political mediation to the IAEA and its Boards of Governors. The
nuclear crisis with Iran intensified after the election of President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad in June 2005. In February 2006 the IAEA referred Iran to the UN
Security Council, leading in December 2006 to the Council’s agreement in Resolution
1737 to impose specified sanctions on Iran if it failed to suspend all enrichment and
reprocessing activity. So far, Iran has defiled the resolution.
The disproof that Iraq’s acquisition of WMD was exaggerated by the US and
the UK placed in question the sincerity of the focus on the problem of proliferation.
Trust was seriously undermined by the deception involved in using the constraint of
WMD and defence of the rule based order as Trojan horses serving special or
revisionist interests. The US therefore appeared to emphasize simultaneously the
legitimacy of the general existence of nuclear weapons and their possession by the
primary holders of nuclear technology. This was a dagger that sank deep into the NPT,
given its basic principle that nuclear weapons are intrinsically illegitimate everywhere
and for all time, to fire nuclear weapon states. The policies pursued by the former
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United States President George Bush Jnr’s administration focused on the problem of
international nuclear order on the problem of proliferation. It relied on NPT and its
rules to mobilize domestic and international action against non-compliant states. Yet
by adopting this exclusive focus, by the manner in which it prosecuted its counter
proliferation policies, and by seeking to release itself from constitutional restraint, it
provoked resistance, weakened the non-proliferation norm and the NPT, and hindered
the coordination of responses to non-compliance.
Three categories of relationship between great powers and proliferating states
have been observed recently; assisted proliferation (e.g. Iran-North Korea, China-
Pakistan); protected proliferation, whereby the protecting and protected state act in
quasi-alliance (e.g. US-Israel, US-India) or the protector shelters the proliferator
against strong interaction by others (e.g. Russia-Iran, China-North Korea); and
combated proliferation, whereby a state or states set out to enforce change by military
or other means. If the dynamics behind these categorizations were allowed to become
firmly established, nuclear-armed states would become agents as well as opposers of
proliferation, a situation that Article 1 of the NPT was designed to prevent (Walker,
2007).
Many learned discussions have considered the cases of Israel (whose refusal to
sign was denounced by some countries and tolerated by others) and of France (which
started by vehemently opposing the treaty only to become later one of its finest
defenders), of Pakistan and India being courted after a brief period of sanctions, of
North Korea leaving the treaty and of Iran playing cat and mouse with it, all show that
some of the attitudes or policies proclaimed by the Bush administration (proliferators
being fought, tolerated or courted according to the nature of their regime and to their
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relations with the US, and proliferation being fought by unilateral, possibly violent
measures) were already present, potentially or in fact, from the beginning.
Advocates of the NPT are normally also advocates of minimum deterrence as a
step towards nuclear disarmament, and of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons as a step
towards their marginalization and as a way to emphasize that their only use is to deter
their use by others, or even their deterrence should operate by their existence alone.
The authority of the west, in particular of the US, and that of the international
institutions it has created but within which its control is increasingly challenged, have
been considerably weakened in the last few years. Conversely, the rise of new centres
of powers outside the west (whether potential challengers like China and India, a
Russia newly powerful thanks to the energy crisis, violent and fanatical or
transnational groups, or armed militias resisting conventional (armies) has given rise to
a general feeling in the rest that they no longer have to accept and follow rules which
they have not created and which they feel are intended to perpetuate a domination
which they feel are intended to perpetuate a domination which belongs to the past. In
the short term, no grand nuclear bargain or blueprint is realistic. Emphasis should be
how to ensure a tighter control of ‘loose nukes’, of trade in nuclear materials and
technology, etc.; second, on strengthening extended deterrence and missile defence
wherever possible for the more exposed potential victims (like Israel and the Gulf
states in the case of Iran), with due regard to the dangers of excessive visibility and of
interpretation, and last but not least, on initiating a change in the political and strategic
atmosphere by actively pursuing tangible progress on regional conflicts and avoiding
escalation and polarization (Hassner, 2007).
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The lists of proliferation “the usual suspects” have been decreasing, with
Argentina, Brazil and South Africa giving up its nuclear programme or weapons. The
NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. Efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards resulted
in the Additional Protocol, which was designated to fix the problem revealed by Iraq’s
illicit programme, and confirmed by North Korea’s, in the early 1990s. The discovery
of the large enrichment facility at Natanz as well as other clandestine activities
revealed two decades of Iran’s non-compliance with its international obligations. North
Korea’s nuclear test and its diplomatic brinkmanship prior to the breakthrough of its
longstanding nuclear and missile programmes and missile exports are the difficult task
of disarmament ahead.
The growing reality of cooperation among rogue states is especially troubling.
The nuclear and missile cooperation between North Korea, Pakistan and Iran has been
examined in the open literature. The question is whether that co-operation was limited
to these and possibly a few other states, or foreshadows an increasingly deadly future.
Clearly, there are a growing number of states that now possess or are developing
nuclear- and missile-related technological capabilities and expertise. Two pertinent
questions are always asked by the opponents of proliferation, which are;
1. Will these capabilities be shared, and under what if any constraints?
2. Will they wind up in the black markets?
In either case, they will erode efforts at export control such as those embodied
in the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). To these country-related concerns may be added
to the following challenges:
(1) Technology diffusion via the internet as well as through loose nukes,
materials leakage and the brain drain in the former Soviet Union, Pakistan and
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other “rogue” states, and through non-state actors like the AQ Khan’s criminal
network;
(2) Concerns about Chinese and Russia non-proliferation commitments and
behaviour, including that relating to exports of nuclear material and missiles,
and;
(3) The security of nuclear and missile technology, materials and expertise in
Russia and other Soviet successor states, as well as in such states as South
Africa, Argentina and Brazil.
Beyond the targets of today’s particular concerns there is a second tier of states
that, it appears, might in the future consider acquiring nuclear or other weapons of
mass destruction, including Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia. Also, the condition under which
one could envision widespread proliferation in the longer term depend on such factors
as globalization, technology diffusion, and the nature of regional and international
security environments (particularly as affected by changes in Russia and China). The
responses to the threat in the nuclear realm have been primarily global in nature,
including the Baruch plan based upon the seminal Acheson-Lilienthal (report), which
failed in the maelstrom of the emerging Cold war and the Atoms for Peace Initiative, a
modest proposal that traded access to civil nuclear technology for restraints on military
applications. The IAEA envisioned in the Atoms for Peace proposal by fostering
nuclear technology, verifying its peaceful use, and enhancing nuclear safety. The
programme has always been dogged by frequent political controversies that have
impeded its smooth technical operations. At the height of the recent debate on Iran,
Mohammed El-Baradei addressed the Board of Governors principally on the need for
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the Secretariat to concentrate on technical matters and avoid any political colouring,
which is not the role of the Secretariat. Despite all these, the initiative has not been a
success due to political challenges (Waller, 2003;
www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/ddgs/2003/waller08122003.html).
In a world fundamentally different from that in which it emerged the NPT-
based nuclear non-proliferation regime is challenged by:
(1) New weapons states, which cannot be accommodated within the treaty and
which affects the views of key non-nuclear weapons states such as Japan and
Brazil;
(2) North Korea withdrawal from the treaty and, more generally, the NPT’s
Article X, which allows states to withdraw;
(3) North Korean nuclear tests and the limited international response, which
nonetheless was greater than what many observers had anticipated;
(4) Iranian programmes, which are not compliant with the treaty’s provisions
and beyond that a point that is directly related to the Atoms for peace bargain
have the potential to create a latent or virtual weapon capability;
(5) Concerns about growing non-compliance and limited consensus on
compliance enforcement;
(6) The growing access of states (and non-state actors) to sensitive materials
and technologies; and the rise of virtual weapons programmes;
(7) The issues of the NPT’s relevance to activities by non-state actors, including
black marketers and potential nuclear terrorists;
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(8) The tensions between re-emerging commercial interest in the civil nuclear
fuel cycle and non-proliferation aims reflected in a revived debate over Article
IV of the NPT;
(9) The increasingly bitter article VI debate, involving the comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT), a fissile material cut-out treaty (FMCT), concerns about
progress in arms control efforts and perceptions of US nuclear weapons policy
(Pilat, 2007).
The NPT is a treaty that was agreed upon as a measure to stop horizontal
nuclear weapons proliferation, but it has never been a disarmament treaty. It is a treaty
with unequal obligations and it might even be called an unfair treaty. But it has found
broad support because the huge majority of states know that without this treaty their
security would be diminished. If the NPT is transformed into a de facto disarmament
treaty, it is on this very basis it will be destroyed. The current crisis over the Iranian
and North Korean nuclear programme is a clear proof not only of how far the debate
about the disarmament obligations of the nuclear weapon states is deviating from the
real problems – states on the verge of breaching core provisions of the NPT – but of
how much it is aggravating these problems by giving President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and Kim Jong Il, the additional arguments to defy the NPT (Krause,
2007; Pilat, 2007).
Iraq acquired all it needed to make nuclear weapons by purchasing a ‘peaceful’
nuclear research reactor and weapons-usable highly enriched uranium fuel from
France. Despite concerns that Iraq was interested in developing nuclear weapons, the
IAEA repeatedly found no evidence suggesting any military diversions. When the
Israelis finally decided to take matters into their own hands and attacked the Osirak
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nuclear research reactor facilities in 1981, the IAEA and most nations actually came to
Iraq’s defence. The IAEA actually detected suspicious activity in North Korea and
requested a special inspection, which Pyongyang refused to allow. Thereafter, North
Korea repeatedly violated its NPT pledges to allow full international inspections of its
nuclear activities (starting with its missed deadline for reaching a safeguards agreement
as required by the NPT in 1987), withdrew from the NPT in 2003, and made and tested
nuclear weapons. After Pyongyang detonated a nuclear weapon in October 2006, the
UNSC finally announced sanctions against North Korea. Then, months later, these and
other US- imposed financial and diplomatic sanctions were eased. In an agreement
reached on 13 February 2007, the US, Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia promised
to normalize relations with Pyongyang and to give it significant energy and food
assistance in exchange for North Korea’s cooperation in eventually disabling its most
offensive nuclear activities. In an immediate action, the US made $25 million in bank
assets available to North Korea, assets there were previously frozen because the bank
in question was found to be laundering counterfeit US currency (Krause, 2007; Pilat,
2007).
These actions and offers of assistance, it should be noted, came after nearly a
decade of substantial food and energy assistance under a similar understanding, the
1994 Agreed Framework, whose pledges Pyongyang also violated. This understanding
was struck after North Korea was found not only to be violating its NPT and IAEA
obligations and its 1991 pledges to the US and South Korea not to make nuclear
weapons-usable fuels, but also to be persistently operating a military plutonium
production reactor. Instead of imposing UN sanctions for this misbehavior, though, the
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US, Japan, South Korea and their closest allies gave Pyongyang billions of dollars’
worth of assistance consisting work and materials.
Iran is yet another case of NPT violator. Iran, like North Korea, has an
uneconomic nuclear programme, insists it has a right under the NPT to make nuclear
fuel, and is being bribed to suspend its efforts to do so. It is now subject to two UN
Security Council sanctions resolutions urging it to ease its nuclear fuel-making effort
to enrich and reprocess uranium and plutonium (the key ingredients needed to make
bombs) for nearly 18 years. Although the UNSC modestly augmented the few limited
sanctions contained in its original December 2006 sanctions resolution, it promised to
shelve the imposition of even these gentle penalties if Iran should heed the UN’s plea
to suspend its nuclear fuel-making activities. In exchange for such action, the US, EU,
Russia and China have already agreed to offer Iran large light-water reactors, a five
year reserve stock of lightly enriched uranium, normal trade and diplomatic relations,
World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, oil and gas extraction investments,
advanced technology and other economic assistance. Most countries, however, fear
that Iran is making nuclear fuel to produce weapons and are upset that it failed to make
all its nuclear activities known to the IAEA. Tehran, though, claims that its failure to
declare all of its nuclear activities was merely an ‘oversight’ and that, in any case, its
nuclear fuel-making is entirely for peaceful purposes and that it must make its own fuel
to ensure that it has a reliable supply.
Iran’s claims are a bit difficult to believe. First, Iran could produce far more
electricity far more cheaply and far sooner simply by using the natural gas that it is
currently burning off than by building or operating any reactors. Second, Iran lacks
sufficient domestic uranium ore to fuel even the one reactor it is building in Bushehr.
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Iran counters that none of these matters. To emphasize the inequality of US and
international efforts to bear down on their nuclear misbehavior, Iranian officials note
that North Korea violated and withdrew from the NPT and was not penalized at all.
They also point to Washington generous treatment of India, a country that joined the
NPT, violated bilateral pledges not to divert US and Canadian nuclear assistance to
make bombs, and continues to make fissile materials for military purposes.
The United States has been careful not to describe India as a nuclear weapons
state for purposes of the NPT, but at the same time has promised to treat India as if it
were an ‘advanced nuclear state such as the US’. Effectively, this means that the US is
willing to overlook India’s past transgressions against the non-proliferation regime.
India imported a good deal of technology for its weapons programme using illicit
means, and even allowed one of its most dangerous nuclear goods to Iran. It continues
to make nuclear fissile materials for bombs and is proposing only to allow a portion of
its reactors to be inspected and then to allow a portion of its reactors to be inspected
and then only when foreign fuel is present. Yet Washington and New Delhi are
insisting that India be allowed access to nuclear technology and goods as if it were a
state in good standing with the NPT or at least allowed all of its nuclear facilities to be
fully inspected by the IAEA. Therefore, India, a non- NPT state partly armed with
nuclear weapons has been granted the same rights to technology as states that have
adhered to the NPT.
Under the current interpretation of the NPT, all state parties are thought to have
an unqualified right to any and all nuclear technology (even uneconomical production
of nuclear fuel, which can bring a state to the very brink of acquiring nuclear
weapons), so long as this technology meets two conditions. First, it must be claimed to
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have some conceivable civil application. Second, IAEA inspectors must occasionally
visit a country’s nuclear facilities, even though such inspections cannot reliably catch
military diversions in time to prevent a nation from building bombs. The danger of
these overgenerous interpretation of the NPT is obvious; it risks creating a world full
of nuclear fuel-producing states which claim to be on the right side of the NPT, but are
in fact only months or even days from having nuclear weapons. In fact, this
interpretation of the NPT is both unnecessary and wrong. The NPT makes no mention
of nuclear fuel-making, reprocessing or enrichment. When Spain, Romania, Brazil and
Mexico all cried in the late 1960s to get NPT negotiators to include an explicit
reference to the entire fuel cycle including fuel-making as an absolute right, each of
their proposal was turned down (Sokolski, 2007).
5.5. NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET
Nuclear black market or sometimes referred as “Nuke Nightmare” has always
presented counter terrorism officials in the West with the ultimate nightmare scenario,
al-Qaeda detonating a nuclear bomb in an American or Western city. The assumption
in the West is that al-Qaeda and other die hard Islamic terrorists groups will view the
acquisition of a nuclear weapon or any WMD as a religious duty, and these terrorists
group will stop at nothing in using such weapon to score political and religious goals
by causing a heavy collateral damage. The biggest obstacle pertaining to the terrorists
getting this WMD requires the terrorists getting enriched, weapon-grade uranium,
HEU. The task of obtaining a HEU includes industrial facilities, top-flight nuclear
scientists/engineers and huge financial resources available to governments, but not to
criminal terrorists groups. These resources for now will make it difficult for the
terrorist groups to acquire such, with the preying eyes of Western intelligence focusing
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on activities of terrorist groups in the Middle East and their sleeper cells in the Western
European countries.
International concerns over nuclear terrorism has steadily increased since 9/11,
prompting a series of formal and informal policy initiatives designed, either
specifically or partially, to enhance multilateral cooperation to prevent it. Key
examples include the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the G8
Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
(GP), United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 and 1540, and the
establishment of an Office of Nuclear Security at the IAEA. The politically most
notable initiative so far has been the US President Barrack Obama’s Nuclear Security
Summit (NSS) of April 2010, which raised international awareness of nuclear terror
threat and sought to strengthen preventive efforts in this area (Bowen, Cottee & Hobbs,
2012).
However, the likelihood of terrorists acquiring and detonating such a weapon is
extremely low, because it would necessitate defeating a state’s command and control
system and, even if this were achieved, most weapons incorporate intrinsic surety
features such as Permissive Action Links (PAL) to prevent unauthorized use. The
UNSCR 1373, adopted immediately after 9/11, requires states to adopt ‘relevant
international conventions and protocols to combat terrorism’ and recognizes the threat
posed by international terrorism and by WMD materials and their trafficking. The
UNSCR 1540, adopted in April 2004, requires all states ‘to refrain from providing any
form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture,
possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their
means of delivery. This resolution focuses on addressing key weakness in the current
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regimes, specifically the lack of effective national export controls in many countries. It
was heavily influenced by the relations that emerged from early 2004 about the
transnational nuclear technology proliferation organized A.Q Khan. The convention on
the physical protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) obligates state parties to apply
physical protection measures to nuclear material during international transport. The
convention has been ratified by 144 states and is the only legally binding instrument
with specific provisions for physical protection of nuclear material. However, the focus
on international limits its scope and after 9/11, this weakness resulted in the
negotiation of an amendment in 2005 to broaden coverage to include the domestic use,
storage and transport of such materials. The amendment is not in force since it requires
two-thirds of the state parties to ratify it and little more than half of this number had
done so by June 2011.
(www.lasg.org/Nuclear_Matters_A_Practical_Guide_DOD.pdf; www.atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/The-ally-from-hell/8730; www.princeton.edu/pia/past-issues-1/2010/Fulfilling-the-prague-promise.pdf).
The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
(ICSANT) which came into force in July 2007 was created with the aim of addressing
gaps in the CPPNM. It was opened for signature in 2005, some seven years after initial
drafting by Russia. ICSANT requires state parties to enact legislation to make
unauthorized possession of nuclear materials, and attacks on nuclear facilities, offences
under national law and punishable by appropriate penalties. Parties must also
implement practical measures, as outlined by the IAEA in documents such as
Information Circular (INFCIRC). The INFCIRC 225 document provides guidance for
countries seeking to establish nuclear security system to protect nuclear and radioactive
materials; to cooperate with one another in preventing, detecting and responding to
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nuclear and radiological terrorism. The ICSANT represented significant progress in
formalizing key aspects of the nuclear security landscape, although it suffers from
limited membership with only 77 state parties, and 115 signatories, as of October, 2011
(www.treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetailsIII.asp).
The IAEA thus defined ‘nuclear security as, ‘the prevention and detection of,
and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious
acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated
facilities. Nuclear safeguards are defined as, ‘an extensive set of technical measures by
which the IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the
completeness of the declarations made by states about their nuclear material and
activities’. The agency negotiates safeguards agreements with state parties to the NPT
to verify that fissile material is not diverted to military use. The key point of departure
from safeguards, then, is the focus of nuclear security on non-state actors and nuclear
terrorism (www.ns.iaea.org/standards/concepts-terms.asp; www.iaea.org/Our
Work/SV/Safeguards/ what.html).
According to Ferguson and Potter (2004), the concept of nuclear terrorism
encompasses four scenarios:
(1) The theft, or illicit purchase, of an intact nuclear weapon from a national arsenal
and its detonation;
(2) The theft or illicit purchase of fissile materials to make and detonate an IND;
(3) Attack on, or the sabotage of, either civil or military nuclear facilities such as
power reactors or spent fuel ponds to release radioactivity; and
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(4) The theft, or illicit purchase, of non-nuclear radioactive materials to make and
detonate a radiological dispersion device (RDD) or to make and deploy radiation
emission device (RED).
The greatest concern of nuclear watchdogs and western powers at the turn of
the century has been the massive scale of undetected nuclear proliferation network
organized by Dr. A.Q. Khan. This black market network commonly called the “Khan’s
network” deals in illegal trading of nuclear technology, and was based in Asian sub-
continent. It took the Western intelligence services until 2004 to discover the Khan’s
network that spanned Malaysia, Pakistan and Singapore, which are not among the
NSG. The Khan’s network under the ‘cover of darkness’, supplied nuclear weapons
related technology, material and weapon designs to Iran, Libya and North Korea. This
nuclear black market became well known after the interception of a ship in the
Mediterranean waters with fissile materials (HEU) meant for a nuclear weapon in
Libya. The extent of the contact and transfer of any nuclear know-how between Khan’s
network and terrorist groups has not yet been ascertained. Although AQ Khan never
met with the terrorists groups overtly but one of his Pakistani nuclear scientists
associates Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood did met with al-Qaeda leader Osman Bin
Laden before Sept 11 attack on America. However, the extent of their discussion on
nuclear partnership is not yet known. This, observes still believe leaves a window open
for an undetected nuclear terrorism in the future (Syed 2010; Albright and Hinderstein,
2004; www.carnegieendownment.org/static/npp/khan_ chronology.pdf).
The Nuke nightmare is not restricted to the acquisition of proliferated HEU
through the nuclear blank market alone. The safety and protection of more than 270
metric tons of HEU in the former Soviet Union is also worrisome. The severe
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economic crisis in the former Soviet Union has resulted reported cases of thefts in
some nuclear facilities in Russia. Since 1991, there have been seven attempted thefts
reported of small amounts of bomb-grade material and more than 700 reported thefts of
unrefined nuclear material. In Chelyabinsk, Russia, in 1998, Russia intelligence
uncovered a plot by employees of a nuclear facility in the region to smuggle out 18kg
of HEU for sale in the black market (Calabresi, 2005). Although, the Russian Defence
Minister Sergei Ivanov have in 2004, dismissed the concerns over the security of the
Russian HEU as “just a myth in the minds of mischief makers”. The US
Administrators are however reining in on the Russia administration to get more
aggressive about securing the nuclear materials in their country (Calabresi, 2005).
5.6. NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ) was an agreement
for the complete abrogation of nuclear programmes in the Middle East. The steps
towards the establishment of the MENWFZ began in 1960s, led to a joint declaration
by Egypt and Iran in 1974 which resulted in a General Assembly Resolution
(broadened in 1990 to cover weapon of mass destruction).
The Middle East remains the greatest concentration of states that are not party
to one or more of the international treaties dealing with WMD. These treaties include
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), and the NPT, as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The Center for Non-proliferation Studies recently stated that some types of WMD
(specifically chemical weapons) have been used in the conflicts in the Middle East.
Additionally, it was also reported that majority of countries in the Middle East region
have some form of WMD-related research, development or weaponization programme.
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This has been attributed to why the region receives the greatest international attention
(Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 2013; US Senate Report, 2008; Jewish Virtual
Library, 2013, Green Peace Briefing, 2007).
Furthermore, it is significant to mention that Israel is the only country with a
nuclear arsenal in the Middle East, though not officially acknowledged by the state of
Israel. Iran is equally another country that has been credited with a long term nuclear
technology development programme. Aside these 2 countries, a host of other Middle
East countries have openly expressed interest in the peaceful use of nuclear
technology. These countries includes, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, UAE,
Jordan, Morocco Tunisia, Turkey, Syria, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman, while two countries
– Yemen and Libya has previously cancelled their respective programmes. Political
analysts further view the growing agitations for nuclear technology by Middle East
countries as part of their geo – strategic calculations in balancing Israeli and Iranian
states influence. The succeeding paragraphs with outline the history of the quest for
nuclear technology development in the Middle East (US Senate Report, 2008; Jewish
Virtual Library, 2013, Green Peace Briefing, 2007).
5.6.1. EGYPT
In September 2006, the Egyptian government announced that it would renew
its’ long time dormant plans of acquiring nuclear energy. Russia and Egypt signed a
co-operation accord in March 2008 as the first step in actualizing this objective. In
2010, Cairo formally requested nuclear energy assistance from the Korea International
Co-operation Agency (KICA). In April 2013, Egypt withdrew from the sessions of the
preparatory committee for the 2015 Review Conference to the treaty on the NPT at
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Geneva, citing dissatisfaction with the level of unseriousness of stakeholders in their
dealings with the issues in the Middle East (Jewish Virtual Library, 2013).
5.6.2. GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was jolted by three major events in the late
1970s. The signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, the Islamic
revolution in Iran that year and the subsequent seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca
by some 250 armed Islamists jolted the Saudi government, heightening awareness of
its vulnerability to external and internal threats. The Saudi Kingdom joined other
countries to found the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, also known
as the GCC, in 1981 to promote solidarity and economic, political, and social
cooperation between the oil-producing nations of the Arabian Peninsula. The GCC
members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) (Microsoft Encarta, 2009).
The 2006 Lebanon War also called the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War (known in
Lebanon as the July War and in Israel as the Second Lebanon War) and the continued
Iranian nuclear activity triggered renewed interest by the GCC countries in nuclear
energy. In 2006, the GCC announced their intension to explore the development of a
shared nuclear power programme. In May 2008, the US and Saudi Arabia agreed to
establish a nuclear co-operation relationship, and this necessitated the Saudi Arabian
government to join the Proliferation of Security Initiative (PSI). This also ensured that
despite the Saudis expressing interest in acquiring nuclear technology, they have not
actually been able to push for it. However, in April 2009, Saudi King Abdullah
reported told the US diplomat Dennis Ross, “If (Iran) gets nuclear weapons, we will
get nuclear weapons”. In February 2011, Saudi Arabia and France also signed a
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bilateral co-operation agreement for the development of nuclear power. The Saudis
took further step toward acquiring a nuclear technology, when King Abdullah signed
an agreement in January 2012 with china for cooperation in the development and use
of atomic energy for peaceful purpose (Jewish Virtual Library, 2013; US Senate
Report, 2008).
The other GCC countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE,
have had their quest for nuclear technology limited to establishment of peaceful
nuclear energy cooperation with the Western nations. The GCC countries nuclear
agreements have been in complete compliance to IAEA guidelines and are very
transparent. The nuclear co-operation agreements are as follows:
a. Kuwait – By Dec 2010, Kuwait had a nuclear cooperation agreement with
USA, Russian and Japan.
b. Oman – In June 2009, Oman signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with
Russia.
c. Qatar – In April 2008, Qatar announced a plan to build a nuclear plant.
d. United Arab Emirates – The UAE signed a nuclear framework agreement
with France for cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful, civilian
purposes. In 2010, the UAE accepted a $20 billion bid from a South Korean
consortium to build four commercial nuclear power reactors, total 5.6 GWe, by
2020 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2013;Wikipedia, 2009).
5.6.3. JORDAN
In mid-2008, Jordan signed an agreement with the Atomic Energy of Canada to
conduct a study on building a reactor using natural uranium fuel for power. In February
2011 Jordan and Turkey signed a nuclear cooperation agreement. Jordan has equally
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signed nuclear cooperation agreements with China, South Korea, Japan, Spain, Italy,
Romania, Turkey and Argentina (Jewish Virtual Library, 2013).
5.6.4. IRAN
The nuclear programme of the present day Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) dates
back to the Shah regime. The Shah of Iran then, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, became a
key ally of the US after the US-UK sponsored coup d’etat against Prime Minister
Mohammed Mossadeq in August 1953. The Shah’s personal interest and closeness to
the US paved way for the Iranian development of nuclear programme. As part of the
‘Atoms for Peace’ programme the US had for its cold war allies, it offered nuclear
research programme to Iran while exacting similar concession (like other allies) that
the programme will not be used to develop nuclear weapons. The Shah’s contribution
to Iran’s nuclear programme cannot be denied, but his aim was simply to see Iran as an
economic power in the region. He believed in the possession of conventional deterrent
weapons and thought that nuclear weapons were less credible deterrents compared to
the conventional weapons. Observers believe that nuclear weaponizaton programme
was not part of the shah’s Iranian government plans but the option remained open for
such plans in the future. While others may contend the fact that Iran sought lesser
enlistment technology and had probably set up a clandestine nuclear weapons group
from the period of shah. This debate and controversies still ranges till date (Khan,
2010).
The Shah was in power until 1979, but from 1975 onwards, the US became
suspicious of Iran’s massive nuclear programme which if claimed had dual purpose -
civilian and military. At this period, Tehran has acquired nuclear fuel cycle capabilities
with dual purpose applications. After shah’s regime, the Iranian nuclear programme
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continued under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini (Iran’s supreme leader), Ali
Khameini, Ali Akbar, Hashemi, Rafsanjani, Mohammed Khatami, and Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. These Iranian leaders consolidated on the two power reactors at
Bushehr, Iran. The reactors were surely damaged by the Iraqi bombings during the
Iran-Iraqi War (1980-88), and were reconstructed with the aid of the Russians after the
1995 agreement between Iran and Russia (Busch, 2004).
The world however became more alarmed of the Iranian nuclear programme
when Iran’s controversial President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced in April 2006
that Iran has joined “the club of nuclear countries’’ by mastering the entire nuclear fuel
cycle and being able to enrich uranium for power stations (The Guardian, 2006). The
US and its European allies calculation is that if Iran could master uranium enrichment
to fuel grade, it is not far off from processing enriched uranium to weapon grade level.
This calculation puts Iran’s ability to produce military grade weapons or nukes
between 3-10 years, especially after it was rumuored that Iran purchased warhead
designs from AQ Khan’s black market operations (Khan, 2010). The Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his last address to the UN General Assembly on 27
September 2012, further reiterated that Iran has crossed the “red line’’ by its
advancement of up to 90% Road Map to building a nuclear weapon. Netanyahu called
on the international community to take immediate action against Iran (UN News
Agency, 2012). The Iranian nuclear sites were reported to be located in Bushehr
(opened on 12 September 2011), Arak, Qom, Yadz, Parahin, Isfahan and Natanz. The
locations of Iranian nuclear sites are depicted in Fig. 3.1 (Wikipedia, 2013).
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Figure 5.1: The Location of Iranian Nuclear Facilities
Source: www.google.com.ng/search?comparison+of+iran+and+israel+military
5.6.5. ISRAEL
The state of Israel began is search for nuclear weapons after its first war with
the Arabs at the inception of the State in 1948, during the reign of David Ben Gurion
and his close friend Earnest David Bergman as the founder. Following the Israelis
participation in the Suez Canal War of 1956 with Anglo-French alliance, France
rewarded it by provision of nuclear expertise and construction of a nuclear reactor at
Negev Desert, South of Dimona, Israel. This facility was meant for large scale
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plutonium production and reprocessing. The US government only got to know about
the facility in 1958. The French operators disengaged from facility in the early 1960s,
leading to massive improvement on the nuclear activities through several cover
operations, until it became fully operational. Between the 1967 (Six-day) and 1973
(Yom Kippur) wars, Israel was estimated to have produced an unspecified large
number of sophisticated nuclear bombs and seriously considered using them. The State
of Israel was also estimated to have developed aircraft deliverable nuclear capability
during the 1967 war (Ben Ami; 2009; Farr, 1999; Cohen, 2010). Table 5.2 below
contains the estimated nuclear weapons produced by Israel.
Table 5.2: Estimated Number of Israeli Nuclear Arsenal 1967: 13 bombs 2 bombs 1969: 5-6 bombs of 19 kilotons yield each 1973: 13 bombs 20 nuclear missiles and have developed a “suitcase bomb” 1974: 3 nuclear capable artillery battalions each with 12 175mm
Tubes &a total of 108 warheads 10 bombs
1976: 10-20 nuclear weapons 1980: 200bombs 1984: 12-31 atomic bombs 31 plutonium bombs and 10 uranium bombs 1985 At least 100 nuclear bombs 1986: 100-200fisson bombs and a number of fusion bombs 1991: 50-60 to 200-300 1992: >200 bombs 1994: 64-112 bombs @ 5kg /warhead)
50 nuclear tipped Jericho missiles, 200 total 1995: 66-116 bombs @ 5 kg /warhead)
70-80 weapons
“A complete repertoire” (neutron bombs, nuclear mines, suitcase bombs, submarine borne)
1996: 60-80 plutonium weapons, may be >100 assembles, ER variants, variable yields Possibly 200-300 50-90 Plutonium weapons could have well over 135. 50-100 Jericho 1 and 30-50 Jericho II missiles
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1997: >400 deliverable thermonuclear and nuclear weapons
Source: Farr (1999)
In addition to Figure 5.2 above, we additionally add that, the state of Israel
unlike the other nuclear power states has not declared their nuclear status till date.
Israel has maintained a policy of “nuclear opacity’’ or “deliberate ambiguity”, neither
acknowledging more denying that if possesses nuclear weapons (“amimut” in
Hebrew). This policy is based on the formula that it will not be the first nation to
introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. David Ben Gurion described the Israel
nuclear option as the “Samson’s option” or weapon of last resort’’ and a vital strategic
equalizer, permitting “science” to give Israel what nature had deprived it of –
“numbers”. The US has thus used its influence to commit Tel Aviv to keeping the
bomb “in the basement”, which literarily means non-testing and non-declaration (Ben
Ami, 2009; Wikipedia, 2013).
Furthermore, it is noteworthy to mention that Israel is not a signatory to the
NPT, but it has signed the CTBT. However, Israel has refused to sign Fissile Material
Cut-off treaty (FMCT) because it includes verification mechanisms, and it would
undermine its policy of opacity and entire national security strategy. The secrecy
surrounding the Israel nuclear weapons programme was exposed to the global
knowledge through a disgruntled nuclear physician Mordecai Vanunu in the British,
The Sunday Times of 5 October 1986 (Wikipedia, 2013).
5.6.6. TURKEY
In August 2006, Turkey announced plans to have three nuclear power plants
total operational by 2015 and had discussion with Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. In
February 2008, preparatory work began to build a second nuclear power plant in Sinop,
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Turkey. Turkey entered into a civil nuclear cooperation agreements with the US,
Russia, and South Korea between May 2008 and June 2010. In 2011, the Turkish
government announced incentive for three further nuclear power plants with four
reactors each, all to be operational by 2030 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2013).
5.6.7. OTHER ARAB NATIONS
The other countries of Algeria, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia, have limited their
quest for nuclear energy to agreements with basically Russia and France. The
restrictions on the acquisition of nuclear technology have made these Arab countries
not to seek for one, even after expressing interest on civil nuclear energy in the past.
The case of Syria has been complicated by the discovery of its use of chemical nerve
gas in the on-going Syrian civil war. International pressure led Damascus to declare the
chemical weapons and the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) was mandated by the UNSC to destroy it, which is currently on-going
(Jewish Virtual Library, 2013).
5.7. POLITICS OF CONTAINMENT OF IRANIAN QUEST FOR N UCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
The quest for Iran’s Nuclear Programme is presently the most dangerous issue
threatening the Middle East and the West, notably the United States. The issue is
viewed from the fact that if Iran is allowed to acquire this ultimate weapon, nuclear
bomb, it would radically alter the regional dynamics in the highly politicized Middle
East region. Marwan Barshara in his recent presentation of Empire in Aljazeera
Television on 31 March 2013 raised the crucial question regarding an Iranian nuclear
bomb as:
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How would Riyadh, Cairo, Ankara as well as Tel Aviv react if the Iranians crossed the nuclear threshold and go ahead to acquire the nuclear weapons (Aljazeera TV, 2013). The politics of containing the Iranian quest for nuclear technology will
discussed in successive paragraphs by analyzing the Arabs, Israelis and United States
response to a nuclear armed Iran.
5.7.1. THE ARABS
The leadership of the Arabs nay Middle East as of today has been thrust in the
three powerful neighbors of Iran, namely; Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey. The three
states are basically populated by Sunnis Muslims while the Iranians proud themselves
as leaders of Shiite Muslims. Despite the fact that the Middle East is mainly populated
by Muslims, there is great divide between the Sunni and Shiite (sometimes referred as
Shia) sects of Islam. While the Sunnis see themselves as true believers of the Islam,
with the Wahhabis Saudi monarchs as the guardians of the Islamic faith and holy
places in Mecca and Medina, the Shia regards themselves as practicing the pure form
of Islam, the Iranian supreme leader - Ayotallah, as their spiritual head and Karbala as
their sacred holy place of worship.
This extreme religious dynamics has played a great role in the regional politics
between the Iranians and the Arabs, since the Iranian revolution of January 1979 which
toppled the secular government of shah and installed Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini’s
declaration of an Islamic republic, ruled by extreme form of Islamic religious doctrines
or sharia, sharply divided the Arabs/Persians along the two dominant Islamic sects,
Sunni and Shia. The Sunni dominated countries backing of Iraq in the eight years war
with Iran (1980 - 88) was due to this sharp division and suspicion of Iranian religious
leadership. This is coupled with the fact that the Arabs unanimously resolved to nip the
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spread of Iranian brand of extreme form of Islam on the bud and avoid its spread to
other parts of the Middle East. The on-going Syrian civil war with its spill over into
Lebanon, is a classic example of the sharp religious divide between the Sunnis and the
Shiites. The Basher Al-Assad’s Syrian government forces are backed by the Alawites,
Shia militias, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah and Palestinian
fighters, while the Sunni Arabs aids the Syrian opposition (Encarta, 2009; US Senate
Report, 2008; Aljazeera TV, 2013).
The view point of the Egyptian, Turkish and Saudi Arabian governments on
Israel nuclear weapons arsenal is nothing but ‘harmless’ as long as the US guarantees
them that the weapons would remain in the ‘basement’. An Iranian bomb would
definitely be viewed by these three countries as a Shiite bomb. This would ultimate
lead to a quest for a Sunni bomb, or Saudi bomb, and so on. Analysts believe that
Iranian nuclear weapon frightens the Saudis and other Arabs due to the unpredictability
of the religious leaders in Iran and the religious divide amongst the Arabs. Others are
of the view that the Iranian nuclear bomb would definitely translate to an
unprecedented nuclear arms race in the Middle East triggering a nuclear domino effect.
A Kuwaiti MP, Dr. Walid Al-Tabtabai in an Interview with Al-Jazeera Television 30
August, 2006, captured the view of other Arabs when he stated that, “the Iranian
president’s statement is that the nuclear project is not directed against Israel. Iran has
oil and gas reserves to last it for dozens, if not hundreds of years. I don’t think this is
for energy purposes. If the Iranian nuclear project is not directed at Israel, then Iran
wants to use it to intimidate its neighbours” (Al Jazeera Television, 2006). It is further
viewed from the fact that desperation and availability of “petro-dollars’’ amongst the
Arabs, would fast tract such dangerous endeavour. These are part of the reasons for the
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concerted efforts by stakeholders to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. The
achievement of this objective will prevent a bad situation as we already have in the
Middle East from becoming worse. Furtherance to these alternatives, the Arabs could
also request for a nuclear defence pacts from the United States whereby nuclear
umbrellas can be extended to their respective countries for strategic defence of its
territories. A detailed map of major Iranian nuclear facilities in a regional context,
depicting the closeness to her neighbouring countries, is as shown in Figure 5.3. below.
Source: http://www.info.com/nuclear%20sites%20iran?cb=78&cmp=2828
5.7.2. ISRAELI POSITION
Figure 5.3: Map of Major Iranian Nuclear Faciliti es in Regional Context
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Culminating from Figure 5.3 above, the State of Israel particularly views Iran as
‘a grave and gathering danger’. Israel would want to maintain its strategic edge over
Iran and other the Middle East countries in terms of its possession of superior
conventional military arsenal, as well as its undeclared nuclear weapons programme.
Although, Iran does not share borders with Israel but the advancement in modern
technology and development of weapon delivery system, can bring a conventional or
non-conventional weapons on Israeli doorstep. Additionally, the presence of Israeli
eternal enemies, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah in Gaza and Lebanon, could be
exploited by Iran to deliver any bomb into Israel’s territory, as being done on regular
intervals by the Islamic groups firing of Iranian made Katyusha rockets into Israel.
Israel has severally accused of Iran of military, technically and financial support to the
Islamic groups, all classified as terrorist groups by the West. As such Israel will not
allow any Islamic Middle East country to possess a WMD and previous attempts by
the Iraqis witnessed the demolition of the Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981. The
rhetoric’s of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by denying the holocaust and
calling for a total annihilation of Israel is viewed with all level of seriousness in Tel
Aviv. Despite the condemnation of Ahmedinejad’s remarks by notable individuals
such as UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon and the western nations, the Iranian
government has continued with its campaign of calumny against the state of Israeli
(Venter, 2007).
An Iranian bomb or final stages of building a bomb as alleged by prime
Minister Netanyahu, ultimately leaves Israel with 2 possible scenarios, military attack
on Iranian nuclear facilities or accepting the international safeguards for its own
nuclear facilities. The first scenario may or might not attract a wider conflict, but the
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Iranians are surely going to retaliate one way or another. It is either they strike Israel
with its long range missiles or attack the shat-al-Arab waterways used to supply the
majority of world crude oil consumption. Israel has deployed patriot missiles for its
homeland defence and caries out regular national drill in case of an Iranian attack. The
second scenario will open up the Israeli nuclear weapons for international safeguards
and signing of treaties relating MENWFZ. The will translate to both parties having to
acknowledge their possession of the nuclear weapons and it will serve as deterrence to
both. This position would ultimately compromise the Israeli government strategic
national defence policy of absolute protection for the Jews and Jewish homeland. This
option is less likely because since the holocaust, Israel does not want to be taken
unawares by any power nor allow its citizens to suffer in any form.
5.7.3 THE UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN NATIONS
The IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution of 4 February 2006 point out that the
resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis could contribute to the realization of a WMD
free zone in the Middle East. The US effort at ensuring a nuclear free Middle East is
hinged on the fact that the Iranian acquisition of this weapon will ultimately alter the
strategic balance in the region that is favourable to its eternal ally, Israel (Green Peace
Briefing, 2007). The Relations between Iran and the US were severed after the 4
November 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Tehran by Islamic militants and their
subsequent detention for 444 days, thus leading to the death of its citizens.
Furthermore, the US has gathered conclusive evidence of Iranian government support
for extremist groups the American government considers as Islamic terrorists, the
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah. These postures present Iran as a country with a
very unstable leadership. The fear of a WMD being in the hand of such a government
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has made the US to be in the fore front of efforts to prevent Iran from getting the
ultimate weapon. The US and its western allies have seriously implemented the
International sanctions placed on Iran by the UN for its role in clandestine nuclear
activity. The US government view of preventing an Iranian bomb is evidence from the
pronouncements by its top government functionaries. The former US Secretary of
State, Condoleezza Rice, has severally maintained that the US has tabled all options,
including military option in stopping Iranian quest for nuclear bomb. Additionally,
Hillary Clinton, who is Rice’s Predecessor, has maintained in several fora that, “the US
has all options on the table for Iran including the military”. The US hard-line stand on
the Iranian nuclear issue is toned down by the P 5 + 1 (China, France, Russia, United
Kingdom, US and Germany) that has favoured a political and diplomatic solution to
the Iranian problem. Germany that leads the P 5 + 1, has undertaken several steps at
bringing the Iranians to a roundtable discussion on ending their nuclear activities by
offering to process their recycled nuclear fuels. This efforts has so far not yielded any
results (Encarta, 2009; Aljazeera, 2012, www.you tube.com, 2008;
still4hill.com/2012/09/14/Hillary_Clinton_statement_on_Iran/).
Finally, on the strength of the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the US
unilateral enforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has escalated the
nuclear crisis in the Middle East.
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CHAPTER SIX
UNITED NATIONS AND IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME: AN EVALUATION OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT )
6.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to evaluate whether the multilateral framework of the UN
creates room for the peaceful settlement of the Iranian nuclear weapons development
row. It also investigates the dynamic effect of the United Nation’s-led conservative
diplomatic approach at resolving the Iranian nuclear programme impasse. Furthermore,
this chapter will attempt to weigh how a remodeled or reinforced Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) can address the gulf created by nuclear weapons
development not only in Iran, but in Syria, Israel, and other Middle Eastern countries.
Among all other issues, this chapter will look into how the policy orientations and
international efforts of the UN, the US and other Middle Eastern countries fits and
supports the resolution of all contending issues towards resolving the Iranian nuclear
programme gridlock.
6.2. REINFORCEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND IRAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
As defined in the NPT, the term nuclear weapon states (NWS) refers to
countries that have detonated a nuclear device before January 1, 1967. These countries
that did so before January 1, 1967 are the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia,
with China and France joining in 1972. The last two countries were included because
by the time of the NPT, they had also become nuclear possessors. Basically, the issue
of reinforcement and proliferation seeks to cut short the further production of materials
for use in nuclear weapons (highly enriched Uranium and Plutonium) and stop at least
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temporarily the instruction of new facilities for enriching uranium or separating
plutonium (Pfaltzgraff, 2006).
Inherently, the issue of NPT revolves around three tripods. The first is
stemming and controlling nuclear weapons proliferation. Secondly, is cultivating the
peaceful utilization of nuclear, while the third is materializing nuclear weapons
disarmament. Remarkably in history, the NPT has been adjudged as one of the most
bias and discriminatory treaties that ever erupted during of the cold war era. This is
because the treaty divided the world into two halves of signatories, those few that were
known to be nuclear states and the many such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea
(emphasis added) that were not permitted to have nuclear weapons. Notably, only the
five acknowledged nuclear states are given the welcome right to include nuclear
weapons development as part of their national security architecture. The rest of the
world is denied the option of nuclear weapons development or acqusition. However,
the basis of the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) being granted access to peaceful
nuclear technology and nuclear power plants involves submitting their nuclear
facilities to IAEA safeguards, that gives room for open access by international
inspectors (Cirincione, 2006; Pfaltzgraff, 2006).
In 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union, even before the NPT came into
effect had initiated a series of negotiations designed to limit and subsequently reduce
the strategic nuclear weapons and manage the superpower strategic nuclear
relationship. Ironically, the two halves upon which the NPT is divided, that is the
NWS and NNWS, have both contradicted Article IV of NPT, which asserts that all
members have “the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
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energy”. Practically, this entails that a NNWS can come very close to the nuclear
weapons threshold even as a member of the NPT without/with little fear of detection
by legally embarking on vital fuel cycle capacity and concurrently conducting hidden
nuclear weapons research and development. This situation posses an obvious problem
to the NPT premise where a NNWS renounces its nuclear programmes and complies
fully with this commitment, it will gain help under Article IV of the Treaty to develop
peaceful nuclear program (Cirincione, 2006).
Furthermore, Cirincione (2006) posits that the additional protocol of 1991 is
illustrative of another limitation of the NPT. He states it this way;
The protocol strengthens the IAEA’s ability to conduct inspections and requires states to provide detailed information about nuclear-related activities. The protocol increases the number and types of facilities subject to International inspection, and provides authority for the IAEA to conduct short notice inspections at declared as well as undeclared facilities. The additional protocol operates only in the case of NPT members who have specifically agreed to be bound by it.
The additional protocol cannot prevent a state determined to acquire a nuclear
weapons capability from doing so, although it may make such an action more difficult.
He concludes by arguing that because of non- interest by an approximately half of the
more than 180 signatories of the NPT, they have accepted the additional protocol,
hence strengthening the non-nuclear NPT codification. He goes further to criticize the
non-nuclear NPT codification as contradictory, because a state determined to gain a
nuclear weapons capability would simply not sign the additional protocol or perhaps
create a clandestine nuclear weapons ability that eludes IAEA’s inspection radar or
watch.
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Obviously, the aim of the NPT safeguards is to make sure that signatories to the
safeguard treaties expose the existence of all nuclear materials without concealment,
within their borders. However, reinforcing and controlling uranium enrichment by the
NPT is threatened by one, an indication by a number of countries in Asia – Indonesia,
Vietnam, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Thailand. Two, North Korea’s (a new nuclear
power) withdrawal from the NPT treaty. Three, the danger by more states to
developing nuclear weapons, may increase the quest for radioactive materials and
nuclear weapons by terrorists and other non-state actors (Chilaka, 2009).
6.3. UN NEGOTIATION INSTRUMENTS
The essential objective of the architects of international nuclear order dwells
largely on constructing and achieving mutual restrain and containment, so as to avert a
natural or predictable anarchic international system. Also, the weakening of arms
control and proposed introduction of missile defence places doubt about the sincerity
of nuclear armed states commitment to disarmament. For instance, the Russians are
threatening to abrogate the START 1, Moscow Treaty, Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, China’s modernization of its nuclear arms, the open advocacy of an
Indo-US alliance against China, the UK’s not too far decision to replace Trident are
raising fears that the world is walking into a new phase of nuclear armament (Walker,
2007).
Several factors are involved in conceptualizing the international efforts and
politics of nuclear weapons containment in the Middle East region. The United States
believe that if it does not succeed in puncturing Iran’s nuclear weapon development
programme, her unipolar power potentials will be openly be questioned and distanced
from by both friends and foes respectively. On the contrary, Iran views its nuclear
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weapons programme as a defining element of its national interest, identity and policy.
It also views its nuclearization policy as a way of reviving its political fortunes. The
perceived danger of Iran’s entry into the nuclear club is that Iran might subvert its
neighbours and encourage terrorism against the United States and Israel. Another
perceived danger is that Iran entry into the nuclear club may heighten the propensity
for conventional and nuclear war in the Middle East; increased desire of more states in
the region to become nuclear powers; restricting of the geo-political architectural
balance of the Middle East and the strangulation of wider efforts to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons will be mutilated and undermined (Carter, 2006).
However, the concerted diplomatic efforts made through the UNSC resolutions,
the IAEA reports, the threat of military strike against Iran, have not discouraged Iran
from enriching Uranium. This is compounded by the West’s claim that their interest in
confronting Iran’s nuclear weapons development is not only to contain Iran, but to
prevent a situation in which Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and others would seek to
develop nuclear weapons. Despite the actions of the UN and the West, the Iranians do
not seem to actually care what the rest of the world thinks about their image in the
international community. International efforts and politics of nuclear weapons
containment in the Middle East is compounded by the Israeli government’s
calculations and reaction to Iran nuclear activities which Israeli depends on the United
States capability to deter Iran (Carter, 2006; Lindsay and Takeyh, 2010).
Like India, Iran is ultimately angling for nuclear recognition so as to gain
enormous political clout; capture a normal and contemporary place in the diplomatic
world; transcend the nuclear build-up that has placed her in high standing within the
international equation; and jettison its obsolete non-aligned movement stance and
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rhetoric. However, on the home front, Iran works to establish itself as a dominant
power in the region and works towards accommodating the shared ideas of the Iranian
society, reformers and mullahs who view her nuclearization as a good idea (Carter,
2006; Lindsay and Takeyh, 2010).
Finally, the acquisition of a nuclear bomb by Iran seriously affect the Israelis
and the GCC. The contentions among international relations watchers or predictors are
that in a situation Iran nuclearizes, it will heighten Israel’s fears with high possibility
preventive airstrike by Israel. The wealthy GCC countries of Bahrain and Kuwait
might be tempted to nuclearize because they sit uncomfortably close to Iran and have
large Shiite populations. Ultimately, this will damage United States interests and
balance of power relations in the region. It might equally lead to the expulsion of the
US fifth fleet, based in Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirate, and so on.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey may scramble to join the nuclear club so as to
counterbalance Iranian nuclearization. On the contrary, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Turkey’s acquisition of nuclear weapons programmes will put their economic and
security interests in jeopardy. Egypt could jeopardize the annual $1.5 billion in
economic and military aid from Washington, while Saudi Arabia could forfeit the
United States security guarantee of its territorial defence. Turkey could forfeit its place
in NATO and its quest to join the European Union. Additional, Turkey could lose the
missile protection of its territory by NATO, amongst others. Turkey in a bid to defend
itself may reconfigure its missile defences system in Europe from a shorter-range
missile status to a longer-range missile status (Lindsay and Takeyh, 2010).
6.3.1. PROSPECTS OF RESOLVING IRAN NUCLEAR ISSUE
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International efforts at the diplomatic resolution of Iran nuclear programme
present some prospects at peaceful resolutions. It should be noted that within the past
decade US foreign policy thrust in the Middle East has critically oscillated between
former President George Bush (Jnr) ideology of proselytizing about democracy and
liberal deployment of force in world politics and Obama’s adoption of a centrist-realist
approach that is consistent with the dominant US foreign policy orientation.
Realistically, resolving pending issues in the Middle East such as the de-nuclearization
of the region with regards to Israel, final solution to the Israeli-Palestinian question and
so on, are affected by many factors. The top contending factors are one, a United States
styled political culture and behavior which sustains conformity and group think about
Israel and vehemently discourages opposing voices. Two, understanding how countries
from Turkey to Iran-pursue autonomous and assertive policies that constantly collide
with US interest and how and why Israel frequently reflects the dictates of its great
America ally and sponsor. Three, US hegemonic moment in the Middle East is now
checkmated by the global reconfiguring of power which has curtailed America’s
freedom of maneuver and exposed not only US relative decline but Western decline
(Gerges, 2013).
6.3.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR FREE MIDDLE EAST
Understanding this sub-topic is dependent on capturing how countries in the
Middle East has/have tried to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities. For instance,
Israel’s nuclear weapons are shrouded in secrecy and have been variously denied in
different forums as non-existent by Israelis. Ironically, it was revealed in 1986 by
technician Mordechai Vanunu that Israel has a fully fledged, deliverable nuclear
weapons arsenal. As for Iraq, it disastrous attacks on Kuwait in 1990 cut short her near
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complete workable nuclear weapons development programme. However, the IAEA
working hand-in-hand with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
uncovered a well developed Iraqi nuclear weapons development programme in 1991
and completely dismantled it (chemical and biological weapons capabilities).
Critically, Iranian nuclear weapons development programme has over the years raised
long-term concerns by the IAEA and UNSEC on Iranian intentions, technical and
material capabilities. Unfortunately, the IAEA has been unable to provide credible
assurance that Iran’s nuclearization programme is peaceful. In order to checkmate
Iranian nuclearization activities coupled with the freezing of its foreign assets
(http://www.vanunu.com/uscampaign/photos/html; http://www.un.org/sc/ commitees/
1737 ; Lewis, 2013).
Furthermore, the civil war in Syria capabilities and potential case of both
nuclear and chemical weapons (which at the time of research has already been used
according to media reports). Nevertheless, fears over Libya nuclear weapons
programme has abated because of her turning over in 2003 of her embryonic nuclear
programme and chemical weapons capability to the Organization for Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) coupled with Libya’s signing of the Additional Protocol
on 10 March, 2004. On the one side, the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan
and France has encouraged countries in the Middle East such as the United Arab
Emirate, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to follow the route of civil nuclear energy
development. On the other side, the nuclear catastrophe at the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant has made countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait and Oman to
put on hold their nuclearization intentions (Lewis, 2013).
145
The conditions for setting up of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the
Middle East was first presented by Egypt at the UN general assembly in 1963, but the
initial proposal for an NWFZ in the Middle East was put forward in 1962, by the
committee for the Denuclearization of the Middle East- a group of highly regarded
Israeli intellectuals under the leadership of Eliezer Livneh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz.
The committee, sensing the building up of nuclear weapons ‘to constitute a danger to
Israel and to peace in the Middle East’, pushed the UN to intervene to prevent military
nuclear production. Though the proposal was picked up that decade by Shah
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlani of Iran, the NWFZ in the Middle East proposed was
formed in the hope that Israelis establishment of a nuclear weapons capability would
be curtailed and that a non-proliferation regime would take hold in the Middle East,
hence creating room for an improved Arab-Israeli relations. Sadly, in 1974, Iran and
Egypt formally tabled a joint UN General Assembly resolution calling for the
establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East, with the resolution adopted by a
majority of 138 votes, but only Burma and Israel abstained. Worthy of note at this
juncture is that at its current form, the resolution brings together all states in the region
to conform to the NPT, place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards, and-
pending the erection of an NWFZ –not to produce, test, acquire or station nuclear
weapons on their territories, and states that a Middle East NWFZ would greatly
enhance international peace and security’ (http://www.iranaffairs.com/ shared/
image.html?/udaccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ Resolution/Gen/Nro/738/65/IMG/ NRO
738 65.pdf?OpenElement).
6.4. UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATION PLATFORMS
146
In the last decade or so, what dominates the security horizons of the West in the
Middle East region is the denuclearization of Iran and this is encapsulated in the ideals
of the United States government. As Leffler (2003; 1050) vividly portrays it in this
manner;
The history of American foreign policy is not about the struggle between power and ideals, as mingling. America’s ideals have always encapsulated its interests. America’s ideology has always been tailored to correspond with it quest for territory and markets. In short, power, ideology and interest have always had a dramatic and unsettled relationship with one another.
The challenge confronting United States’ foreign policy and any other modern foreign
policy is the need to create an international system which makes it possible for an actor
to follow its own purposes, as well as serve as a veritable tool for propelling and
brokering diversity. Unquestionably, the Middle East region intrudes unexpectedly and
dangerously into the foreign policy agenda of the US and the West. On the one hand,
the challenge confronting United States foreign policy in the Middle East revolves
around dousing the tension created by active and concerned Israeli strategists over the
revolutionary aid extremist insistence of Iran to destroy Israel coupled with Iran’s
sponsorship of terrorist group such as Hamas and Hezbollah. On the other hand, see its
nuclear weapons development as an avenue to cultivate friendships, curtail western
influence and to concretize its strategic position (Hills, 2003; Bowen and Brewer,
2011; Jones and Milton Edwards, 2013; Gerges, 2013).
However, the post 9/11 international environment is preoccupied with the issue
of pursuit of security and power and relegated anti-politics of the 1990’s to the
background. Ideally, it rendered the issue of multilateralism pervasive and the issue of
147
isolation virtually technically unsustainable (Hills, 2003). On this account, dissuading
the Iranians from their nuclear weapons ambitions involves Western nations led the
United States to use the institution of the IAEA which is parented by the UN to push
Iran to voluntarily and peacefully renege its nuclear weapons development ambitions.
The discovery of Iranian covert nuclear programme caused global panic
especially in the West. This made the West to use diplomatic channels. The West
through political negotiations in 2003 led by the foreign ministers the E3 (Germany,
France and the UK), offered Iran business and commercial concessions in lieu for
cessation of enrichment related activities and transparency over its past nuclear
activities. In June 2006 the E3, now joined by Russia, China and the United States
(E3+3) offered new proposals to Iran-EU energy partnership. Iran still remained
undeterred. This led to the UNSC passing of resolution-UNSCR 1696 in July 2006 and
UNSCR 1737 in December 2006. Ingrained in these resolutions are bans on financial
and technical assistance to Iran’s enrichment reprocessing, heavy water and ballistic
missile programme. In February 2007 and March 2008, the UNSEC in collaboration
with (China, France, Russia, UK, US) and Germany (P5+1) passed ‘targeted sanctions
through resolutions – UNSCR 1747 and UNSCR 1803. The targeted sanctions’ were
directed at Iranian business and financial sectors providing direct support to the nuclear
and missile programmes. Also, guided by UNSCR 1929, the US through the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Disinvestment Act of July 2010 (CISADA) and
European Commission (EC) Council Regulation of 961 of October 2010 imposed a
series of draconian and additional unilateral measures targeted at the economy. These
sanctions are focused on energy, shipping and other sectors (Bowen and Brewer, 2011;
148
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel–and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-
profile/middle-east-north-africa/iran).
Furthermore, the European and United States intelligence agencies have been
keeping a close eye on Iranian nuclear activities. A United States intelligence report
estimates that Iran is aggressively pursuing its nuclear weapons programme through
expanding its enrichment programme. For instance, within the last five or six years
Iran has failed to wait for IAEA inspectors before feeding uranium hexafluoride (UF6)
feedstock into gas centrifuge enrichment cascades at its Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
at Natanz in February 2007 with the underlining ambition of producing Low-Enriched
Uranium (LEU). The efforts of the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council (China, France, Russia, UK, US and Germany (P5+1) to dissuade Iran from
producing LEU and UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 for use in the manufacture of fuel
for Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which is used to produce medical isotopes ended
in a deadlock. However, France, UK, and US has presented evidence to IAEA of the
covert development of uranium enrichment in Qom with the IAEA inversely providing
evidence of the conduct of engineering work on a new payload chamber for a re-entry
vehicle for its shabab -3 missile, while the agency assessed the configuration as “able
to accommodate a nuclear device”. The configuration aids the conversion of uranium
dioxide in UF4, a compound or ingredient required in the processing of uranium,
popularly called project 5/13. Evidence also exist of military related organizations and
defence industry firms involvement in providing procurement assistance for nuclear
research and for making nuclear-related components notably centrifuge parts (Bowen
and Brewer, 2011; http://www.pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te-1555-
web.pdf).
149
Strangely, the Iranian nuclear weapons programme is surrounded by a lot of
problem and contradictions. On the one side, Iran’s nuclear weapons development
programme is reported to have been bedeviled by the problem of suspected infiltration
and injection of the Stuxnet virus (believe to be of Israeli Origin and Western
intelligence) which crashed its centrifuges at Natanz in late 2009. Iran nuclear weapons
programme has also been affected by a problem of acquiring advanced centrifuge aids
such as carbon fibre and high-strength steel. With particular reference, the
contradictions that exist on the other side is that China is concerned that any sanction
against its largest trading partner- Iran, will affect her energy-hungry economy and
interest. To prove her point over Iran, China delayed the enactment of the UN
resolutions against Iran through watering them down. Notably, China National
Petroleum Corporation and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC)
are developing the South pars gas field and the Yadararan field respectively for Iran.
This is coupled with sensitive trade with Iran. (Bozorgmehr and Dyer, 2010; Bowen,
Bowen and Brewer, 2011; http://www.ft.com/cms/s/o/f220dfac-14d4-11df-8fid-
00144feab4aa.htmlax221Nn30igco).
6.5. UNITED NATIONS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS THROUGH THE P5 + 1
The recent political efforts by the P5 + 1 to seek for diplomatic solution to the
Iranian nuclear crisis yielded some positive results at the end of last year. At the early
hours of 24 December 2013, Iran and the P5 + 1, signed an interim agreement for a-six
months period over Iran’s nuclear programme. This agreement which was struck in
Geneva, Switzerland, contains the following main points:
1. Iran halts enrichment above 5% and neutralizes stockpile of near-20% within
six months.
150
2. Agreement on no further installations of centrifuges and on Arak plant.
3. Improved access for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors.
4. In return, no implementation of new nuclear-related sanctions during interim
phase.
5. Unfreezing of $4.2 billion in Iranian assets.
6. Suspension of certain sanctions on gold and other precious metals.
As soon as the deal was reached, it was received with mixes feeling and heavy
suspicion. The US Congress condemned it, and called for harsher economic sanctions
and strengthening of the existing ones. The Iranian negotiators were greeted as national
heroes. The deal, though not permanent, creates hope for a congenial diplomatic
atmosphere where Washington and Tehran could talk and mutually negotiate lasting
solutions to the Iran nuclear program. This shared desire to get to that point motivated
the deal, where mutual concessions were made by all the parties (Iran and P5 + 1). The
Iranians hoped it will provide the opportunity to lift international sanctions already
crippling its economy. Iranian commentators, further view this deal as a major political
victory for the new conservative Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (Nuruzzaman,
2013; Langendorf, 2013).
The Israeli reaction was an outright rejection of the deal. Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu strongly criticized the deal, calling it a “historic mistake”, after
his tireless effort to scuttle the deal in Geneva. There were real reasons for the Israeli
Prime Minister to be worried. The acceptance of Iran as a regional power is something
anathema to Israel, because past Iranian leaders have publicly called for the destruction
of the Jewish state at several fora. Tel Aviv prefers to maintain and even further
strengthen the sanctions regime to force the Iranian religious authorities to surrender,
151
which Washington did not view as a viable option. They instead stood firm and
contended that the Iran deal would make Israel ‘safer’. The Gulf Arab States, like
Israel, were dismayed by the Iran interim nuclear deal with the P5 + 1, though
officially they welcomed it in the hope that it would lead to a MENWFZ. The kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf heavyweight, was more vocal against Iran’s nuclear program
and clearly stated that if the deal did not stop Iran from developing the bomb, Riyadh
would either develop its own bomb or obtain the same from Pakistan, in whose nuclear
programme the Saudis have reportedly invested billions of dollars. Back in April 2009,
King Abdullah warned the US that, “If they [Iranians] get nuclear weapons, we will get
nuclear weapons”. The Saudi pronouncement does not, however, match its capabilities.
the Kingdom has enough wealth and money to support a nuclear program but it lacks
technical expertise to develop a bomb. However, the differences in views and
perceptions notwithstanding, there are potentials for Israel and Saudi Arabia to forge a
common platform to respond to their common strategic concern-countering Iran (Press
TV, 2013; Nuruzzaman, 2013; Langendorf, 2013).
Meanwhile, the four page document containing the terms of the interim nuclear
agreement, requires neither Iran nor the US parliaments to get the deal approved. This
was cleverly crafted to beat the hard-line lawmakers, Iranian Majlis and the pro-Israel
hawkish Congressmen, who completely oppose any association with both sides. It
therefore remains to be seen how far the West can push Iran to drop what is nationally
regarded as their inalienable rights. While the situation remains at this stage, the
resolution of the Iran nuclear crisis will require an all inclusive and comprehensive
solution, to avoid any military confrontation (Nuruzzaman, 2013; Langendorf, 2013).
152
Finally, one may be forced to infer from our evaluation and analysis that Iranian
nuclear build-up has created far reaching effects, tensions and contradictions. Iranian
nuclear weapons development has opened up either preceding wounds and created
theatres of collective alliances that will counter the perceived threats of Iranian nuclear
weapons development. On the one hand, the distrust of the Iranian nuclear
development has revealed the unfair nature, dynamic, pattern and character of
international politics. On the other hand, it has also exposed how the diplomatic flexing
of muscles by the UN, the US, Russian, Chinese, Middle East countries’ interests have
dwindled the chances of genuinely resolving the tensions generated by Iranian nuclear
development. Thus, with the foregoing in mind, we reject our hypothesis that the
United Nations multilateral intervention cannot provide a diplomatic settlement to the
US - Iran nuclear weapons development confrontation. However, the most viable
option is for all the belligerents in the Iranian nuclear crisis should sit down and have a
sincere dialogue where all points of disagreements can be amicably be sorted out.
153
CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1. SUMMARY
Essentially, the main aim of this study is to establish the relationship between
Iranian government quest for uranium enrichment and balance of power relations in the
Middle East. Hence, our research objectives were geared towards
1. Critically examining if the Iranian government’s quest for uranium enrichment
undermines the balance of power favourable to Israel and the US within the
Middle East.
2. Determining whether the United States unilateral enforcement of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) escalates the nuclear crisis in the Middle East.
3. Determining whether the United Nations multilateral intervention can provide a
diplomatic settlement to the US-Iran nuclear weapons development
confrontation.
More importantly, for an easy understanding of the dynamics and propelling forces
which shape and determine Iranian government quest for uranium enrichment and
balance of power relations in the Middle East, we situated our analysis within the
theoretical framework of balance-of-power at multi-polarity theory. The balance-of-
power at multi-polarity theory helped us to understand the flow chart behind the global
and regional nuclear weapons development. The employment of this theory also helped
us to understand the power dynamics, technical, legal and diplomatic rows created by
Iranian nuclear pursuits. Beyond our attempted use of the balance-of-power at multi-
polarity theory, we utilized the qualitative method of data and ex-post facto research
design.
154
From our hypotheses, we investigated and found out that Iranian seemingly
recalcitrant nuclear weapons build-up is geared has remained steadfast to the pursuit of
its fundamental goal of ensure that it satisfies national pride of not only its theocratic
democracy, its people and to keep alive the Arab nationalism nay Shia nationalism as
nuclear power that is capable of challenging the West and Israel.
Finally, we discovered the following as our findings in course of our study:
1. We discovered that Iranian recalcitrance over her nuclear weapons development
is guided by a quest to create a new vision.
2. We also discovered that Iranian nuclear weapons development has created
tension among the traditional allies of the West in the Middle East - Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Israel - on the one side; and China, Russia, Iran, Syria, etc, on
the other side, hence, challenging the power equation in the Middle East.
3. We also highlighted how Iranian government’s diplomatic dribbles has
frustrated the efforts of the UN, IAEA, the West led by the U.S. to curtail the
tensions generated by Iranian nuclear development.
4. This study unravels how associated fears, threats and sanctions have created an
unwilling spirit in the Iranians to engage with a divergent, but divided
diplomatic community.
7.2. CONCLUSION
Unarguably and for over a decade or more, relations between Israel and United
States on one hand, and Iran on the other, have been antagonistic with each side
blaming the other side for the continuing nuclear impasse. The Iranian uranium
enrichment programme have created an enabling environment for threats of war
between the United States, Israel, GCC on the one side and Iran on the other side. At
155
the heart of this work is the understanding that the motivations of Iranian uranium
enrichment programme are shaped by its ideas about national identity and national
interest. It is also motivated by the need for strategic leadership to maintain the balance
of power relations in the Middle East. This study therefore argues that Iranian nuclear
weapons development grows out an effort to connect and be recognized in the
international stage as unparalleled regional and global power.
Our chapter two dealt with the literature review, while the chapter three treated
the theoretical framework and the methodology. In our chapter four, we discovered
that Iranian nuclear weapons programme is largely creating an enabling environment
for a near or total anarchy within the international system that may result in a military
confrontation. Also, we unraveled Iranian serial concealment of its sensitive nuclear
activities as dissatisfying not only Israel and United States’ strategic interest in the
Middle East, but Western interest and inter-governmental organization standard such
as the UN and the IAEA. Iran’s disregard for these power points and interest stems
from its ambition to widen regional influence and strategic interests, broaden
friendships, prestige and undermine United States and Western influence in the Middle
East. Also, Tehran as a signatory to the NPT has exploited the lack of unity among the
NWS to continue its nuclear development.
In our chapter five, we understood that Iranian nuclear build-up has defied any
available political and diplomatic solution. On the strength of the foregoing analysis,
that it became evident to us that the US unilateral enforcement of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has escalated the nuclear crisis in the Middle East. Finally,
in our chapter six, we discovered that diplomatic channels were opened by the United
Nations in order to ensure a peaceful resolution of the Iranian uranium enrichment
156
programme. It was revealed that the distrust of the Iranian nuclear development has
revealed the unfair nature, dynamic, pattern and character of international politics
Ultimately, we concluded that the effects and challenges posed by Iranian
nuclear nuclear programme have questioned the values, sincerity, interest and rapidity
of regional and global governments in resolving global issues. The point we attempted
is that the Iranian uranium enrichment build-up has re-generated deepened old rivalries
that reverberated the Arab - Israel conflict; US - Russia “Cold War” era rivalry, Sino -
US rivalry; Iranian - Gulf Arab Country rivalry, Sunni – Shia divides, among all other
rivalries. Again, we concluded that the Western-imposed sanctions have increased the
desperation of the Iranian to weaponize its nuclear development so as to showcase its
ingenuity, resilience and national dignity to the Western powers, as well as to the
perennial Islamic worlds’ albatross “Israeli”.
7.3. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are put forward to ensure amicable resolution
of the Iranian government’s quest for uranium enrichment and balance of power game
in the Middle East.
The United States
a. It should loosen/lift sanctions imposed against Iran as part of confidence-building
measures to the resolution of the Iran’s uranium enrichment programme.
b. It should reform its foreign policy in the Middle East region to be seen to be fair to
all nations in the region, not only to Israel.
c. It should provide security guarantees to the Iranians so that they will feel secured
among the comity of nations.
157
Iran
a. It should provide evidence to show her sincere commitment to quest for nuclear
technology for civil purposes only.
b. It should co-operate with the UN sponsored diplomatic efforts at resolving its
quest for nuclear programme.
c. It leaders should down-tone their anti-Semitic rhetorics against Jews and state
of Israel.
d. It should abide by the NPT and open its facilities to IAEA for safeguards and
monitoring.
d. It leaders should stop giving supports to agents of destabilization and non-state
actors in the region such as Hezbollah, Hamas and so on.
United Nations
a. It should ensure further review of the NPT act of 1968 is necessary to ensure a
non-discriminatory regime thus enforcing compliance.
b. It should through UNSC ensure strict compliance to its directives by defaulting
nations.
c. Efforts should be made through relevant channels to discourage member
nations from laying emphasis on the acquisition of nukes as a means of deterrence or
prevention of nuclear conflict.
158
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX 1:
LIST OF TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS RELATED TO ARMS CONTROL
Some of the more important international arms control agreements includes:
1. Washington Naval Treaty, 1922-1939 (as part of the naval conferences).
2. Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological weapons, 1925.
3. Antarctic Treaty, signed 1959, entered into force 1961.
4. Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed and entered into force 1963.
5. Outer Space Treaty, signed and entered into force 1967.
6. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed 1968, entered into force 1970.
7. Seabed Arms Control Treaty, signed 1971, entered into force 1972.
8. Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), signed and ratified 1972, in
force 1972-1977.
9. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed and entered into force 1972,
terminated following U.S. withdrawal 2002
10. Biological Weapons Convention, signed 1972, entered into force 1975.
11. Threshold Test Ban Treaty, signed 1974, entered into force 1990
12. SALT II signed 1979, never entered into force.
13. Environmental Modification Convention, signed 1977, entered into force
1978.
14. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, signed 1980, entered
into force 1983.
15. Moon Treaty, signed 1979, and entered into force 1984.
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16. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed 1987, entered into
force in 1988.
17. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, (CFE Treaty) signed
1990, entered into force 1992.
18. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed 1991, entered into
force 1994, expired 2009.
19. Chemical Weapons Convention, signed 1993, entered into force 1997.
20. START II, signed 1993, ratified 1996 (United States) and 2000 (Russia),
terminated following Russian withdrawal 2002.
21. Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel land mines, signed 1997, entered into
force in 1999.
22. Open Skies Treaty, signed 1992, and entered into force 2002.
23. Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed 2002, entered
into force 2003, expires 2012
24. International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,
signed in 2002.
25. Convention on Cluster Munitions, signed 2008, entered into force 2010.
26. New START Treaty, signed by Russia and the United States in April
2010, entered into force in February 2011.
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaties
1. Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), signed 1967,
entered into force 1972
2. Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), signed 1985, entered into force 1986.
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3. Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia), signed 1995, entered into force 1997.
4. Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa), signed 1996, entered into force 2009. The
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (ANWFZ) covers the entire African
continent as well as the following islands: Agaléga Islands, Bassas da India,
Canary Islands, Cape Verde, CargadosCarajos, Chagos Archipelago - Diego
Garcia, Comoros, Europa Island, Juan de Nova, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Mayotte, Prince Edward & Marion Islands, São Tomé and Príncipe, Reunion,
Rodrigues Island, Seychelles, Tromelin Island, and Zanzibar and Pemba
Islands.
5. Treaty of Semipalatinsk (Central Asia), signed 2006, entered into force
2008.
Other treaties also envision the creation of NWFZ, among other objectives. These are
the following:
1. Antarctic Treaty, signed 1959, entered into force 1961.
2. Outer Space Treaty, signed and entered into force 1967.
3. Seabed Arms Control Treaty, signed 1971, entered into force 1972.
Pending Treaties
1. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed 1996.
Proposed Treaties
1. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
2. Nuclear weapons Convention.
3. Space Preservation Treaty
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4. Final document in the framework of the United Nations Conference on the
Illicit Trade in Small Arms.
5. Arms Trade Treaty
Export Control Regimes
1. Zangger Committee 1971-
2. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 1974-
3. Australia Group 1985-
4. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 1987-
5. Wassenaar Arrangement, 1996-
Non-binding Declarations
1. Ayacucho Declaration 1974.
Sources: (1) Wikipedia, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_control. Accessed on 13/2/13.
(2) Arms Management Program, Institute for Security Studies.
www.issafrica.org/dynamic/administration. Accessed on 14/2/13.
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APPENDIX 2:
STATES PARTIES TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AS OF
15 APRIL 1995
The dates indicated in table are the earliest dates on which countries deposited their
instruments of ratification, accession or succession, whether it is through the offices in
London, Washington, DC, or Moscow. The designation ‘SA’ in the table indicates that
an IAEA nuclear safeguards agreement is in force as required by the Treaty or
concluded by a nuclear weapon state on a voluntary basis.
States parties to the NPT, as of 15 April 1995, includes:
Country Year Afghanistan 1970 SA Albania 1990 Algeria 1995 Antigua and Barbuda 1985 Argentina 1995 Armenia 1993 SA Australia 1973 SA Austria 1969 SA Azerbaijan 1992 Bahamas 1976 Bahrain 1988 Bangladesh 1979 SA Barbados 1980 Belarus 1993 Belgium 1975 SA Belize 1985 Benin 1972 Bhutan 1985 SA Bolivia 1970 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 Botswana 1969 Brunei 1985 SA Bulgaria 1969 SA Burkina Faso 1970 Burundi 1971 Country Year Cambodia 1972
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Cameroon 1969 Canada 1969 SA Cape Verde 1979 Central African Republic 1970 Chad 1971 China 1992 Colombia 1986 Congo 1978 Costa Rica 1970 SA Cote d’Ivoire 1973 SA Croatia 1992 Cyprus 1970 SA Czech Republic 1993 SA Denmark 1969 SA Dominica 1984 Dominican Republic 1971 SA Ecuador 1969 SA Egypt 1981 SA El Salvador 1972 SA Equatorial Guinea 1984 Eritrea 1995 Estonia 1992 Ethiopia 1970 SA Fiji 1972 SA Finland 1969 SA France 1992 SA Gabon 1974 Gambia 1975 SA Georgia 1994 Germany 1975 SA Ghana 1970 SA Greece 1970 SA Grenada 1975 Guatemala 1970 SA Guinea 1985 Guinea-Bissau 1976 Guyana 1993 Haiti 1970 Holy See 1971 SA Honduras 1973 SA Hungary 1969 SA Iceland 1969 SA Indonesia 1979 SA Iran 1970 SA Iraq 1969 SA Ireland 1968 SA
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Italy 1975 SA Jamaica 1970 SA Japan 1976 SA Jordan 1970 SA Kazakhstan 1994 Kenya 1970 Kiribati 1985 SA Korea, North 1985 SA Korea, South 1975 SA Kuwait 1989 Kyrgyzstan 1994 Laos 1970 Latvia 1992 SA Lebanon 1970 SA Lesotho 1970 SA Liberia 1970 Libya 1975 SA Liechtenstein 1978 SA Lithuania 1991 SA Luxembourg 1975 SA Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Rep. of) 1995 Madagascar 1970 SA Malawi 1986 SA Malaysia 1970 SA Maldives 1970 SA Mali 1970 Malta 1970 SA Marshall Islands 1995 Mauritania 1993 Mauritius 1969 SA Mexico 1969 SA Micronesia 1995 Moldova 1994 Monaco 1995 Mongolia 1969 SA Morocco 1970 SA Mozambique 1990 Myanmar (Burma) 1992 Namibia 1992 Nauru 1982 SA Nepal 1970 SA Netherlands 1975 SA New Zealand 1969 SA Nicaragua 1973 SA Niger 1992 Nigeria 1968 SA
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Norway 1969 SA Palau 1995 Panama 1977 Papua New Guinea 1982 SA Paraguay 1970 SA Peru 1970 SA Philippines 1972 SA Poland 1969 SA Portugal 1977 SA Qatar 1989 Romania 1970 SA Russia 1970 SA Rwanda 1975 Saint Kitts and Nevis 1993 Saint Lucia 1979 SA Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1984 SA Samoa, Western 1975 SA San Marino 1970 Sao Tome & Principe 1983 Saudi Arabia 1988 Senegal 1970 SA Seychelles 1985 Sierra Leone 1975 Singapore 1976 SA Slovakia 1993 SA Slovenia 1992 Solomon Islands 1981 SA Somalia 1970 South Africa 1991 SA Spain 1987 SA Sri Lanka 1979 SA Sudan 1973 SA Suriname 1976 SA Swaziland 1969 SA Sweden 1970 SA Switzerland 1977 SA Syria 1969 SA Taiwan 1970 Tajikistan 1995 Tanzania 1991 Thailand 1972 SA Togo 1970 Tonga 1971 SA Trinidad and Tobago 1986 SA Tunisia 1970 SA Turkey 1980 SA
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Turkmenistan 1994 Tuvalu 1979 SA Uganda 1982 UK 1968 SA Ukraine 1994 Uruguay 1970 SA USA 1970 SA Uzbekistan 1992 Venezuela 1975 SA Viet Nam 1982 SA Yemen 1979 Yugoslavia(Serbia & Montenegro) 1970 SA Country Year Zaire 1970 SA Zambia 1991 SA Zimbabwe 1991
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995.
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APPENDIX 3:
THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The states concluding this treaty, hereinafter referred to as the ‘parties to the
treaty’, considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a
nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a
war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, believing that the
proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war.
This is in conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly call for
the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear
weapons, hence streamlining and facilitating the application of International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities.
The United Nations General Assembly expresses their support for the research,
development and other efforts to further the application within the framework of the
IAEA safeguard system. The principle of safeguarding allows the effective flow of
source and special fissionable materials through the use of instruments and other
techniques at certain points. This principle affirms that the benefits of peaceful
application of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may
be derived by nuclear-weapon states from the development of nuclear explosive
devices, should be made available for peaceful purposes to all parties to the treaty,
whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon states.
In furtherance of this principle, all parties to the treaty are entitled to participate
in the fullest so as to ensure the possible exchange of scientific information for, and to
contribute alone or in co-operation with other states to the further development of the
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application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, declaring their intention to achieve
at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake
effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, urging the co-operation of
all states in the attainment of this objective. Recalling the determination expressed by
the parties to the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer
space and under water in the preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all time
and to continue negotiations to this end. Desiring to further the easing of international
tension and the strengthening of trust between states in order to facilitate the cessation
of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles,
and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their
delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control.
Recalling that, in accordance with the charter of the United Nations, states must
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and
maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least
diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources.
ARTICLE I
Each nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive
devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any
180
non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
ARTICLE II
Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
or of control over such weapons or explosives devices directly, or indirectly; not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.
ARTICLE III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes to accept
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the
International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards systems, for the exclusive purpose of verification
of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this treaty with a view to preventing
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be
applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities
within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control
elsewhere.
2. Each state party to the treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special
fissionable material, or (b)equipment or material especially designed or prepared for
the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-
181
weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material
shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner
designed to comply with article IV of this treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic
or technological development of the parties or international co-operation in the field of
peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material
and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful
purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of
safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty shall conclude agreements with
the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either
individually or together with other states in accordance with the statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence
within 180 days from the original entry into force of this treaty. For states depositing
their instruments or ratification or accession after the 180 day period, negotiation of
such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such
agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of
initiation of negotiations.
ARTICLE IV
1. Nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all
the parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with article I and II of this
treaty.
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2. All the parties to the treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the treaty
in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other
states or international organizations to the further development of the applications of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-
weapon states party to the treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the
developing areas of the world.
ARTICLE V
Each party to the treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in
accordance with this treaty, under appropriate international observation and through
appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications
of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states parties for
the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charges for
research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty shall be able
to obtain such benefits, pursuant t a special international agreement or agreements,
through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-
weapon states. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after
the treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty so desiring
may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
ARTICLE VI
Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
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nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control.
ARTICLE VII
Nothing in this treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional
treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective
territories.
ARTICLE VIII
1. Any party to the treaty may propose amendments to this treaty. The text of any
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments which shall
circulate it to all parties to the treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or
more of the parties to the treaty, the Depository Governments shall convene a
conference, to which they shall invite all the parties to the treaty, to consider such an
amendment.
2. Any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all
the parties to the treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon states party to the
treaty and all other parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are
members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The
amendment shall enter into force for each party that deposits its instrument of
ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a
majority of all the parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-
weapon states party to the treaty and all other parties which, on the date the
amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International
184
Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other party upon
the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this treaty a conference of parties to the
treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this
treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of
the treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the
parties to the treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the
Depository Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective
of reviewing the operation of the treaty.
ARTICLE IX
1. This treaty shall be open to all states for signature. Any state which does not
sign the treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article
may accede toit at any time.
2. This treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory states. Instruments of
ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United State of America, which are hereby designated the
Depository Governments.
3. This treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the states, the
Governments of which are designated Depositories of the treaty, and forty other states
signatory to this treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the
purposes of this treaty, a nuclear-weapon state is one which has manufactured and
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.
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4. For states whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited
subsequent to the entry into force of this treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of
the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding
deposit of each instrument of ratification or of this treaty, and the date of receipt of any
requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments pursuant to
article 102 of the charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE X
1. Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject
matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give
notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the treaty and to the United Nations
Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the
extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the treaty, a conference shall be
convened to decide whether the treaty shall be continue in force indefinitely, or shall
be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a
majority of the parties to the treaty.
ARTICLE XI
This treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments.
Duly certified copies of this treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments
to the Governments of the signatory and acceding states.
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Source: Treaty Series, Vol 729 (United Nations, New York).www.un.org.
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APPENDIX 4
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON IRAN
The UNSC has so far passed ten resolutions on Iran with regards to its continued
processing of nuclear related materials in the different nuclear plants located in Iran.
The UNSCR are as follows:
1. S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006), demanded that Iran suspend its uranium
enrichment activities, invoking chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to make that
demand legally binding on Iran.
2. S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006), imposed sanctions after Iran refused to
suspend its enrichment activities, cutting off nuclear cooperation, demanding that Iran
cooperates with the IAEA, and freezing the assets of persons and organizations linked
to Iran’s nuclear missile programmes. It established a committee to monitor sanctions
implementations.
3. S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007), expanded the list of sanctioned Iranian entities to
include arms embargo and expanded the freeze on Iron assets, and welcomed the
proposal by the permanent five members of the Security Council plus Germany for
resolving issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.
4. S/RES/1803 (3 March 2008), the council extended those sanctions to additional
persons and entities, imposed travel restrictions on sanctioned persons, and barred
exports of nuclear-and missile-related dual-use goods to Iran.
5. S/RES/1935 (27 September 2008), this resolution reaffirmed the preceding four
resolutions, the only one of not to invoke Chapter VII.
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6. S/RES/2105 (5 June 2013), this resolution acting under Article 41 of Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, extended the mandate of panel of experts
until 9 July 2014; and urged all states, relevant UN bodies and other interested parties,
to cooperate fully with the panel of experts by supplying any information at their
disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1737 (2006),
resolution 1929 (2010).
7. S/RES/1929 (9 June 2010), this resolution imposed a complete arms embargo
on Iran, burned Iran from any activities related to ballistic missiles, authorized the
inspection and seizure of shipments violating these restrictions and extended the asset
freeze to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of
Iran Shipping lines. It also established a panel of experts to carry out its mandate and
undertake its tasks.
8. S/RES/1984 (9 June 2011), this resolution extended for a further 12 months the
mandate of the panel of experts established by Resolution 1929. The panel of Experts
was established to support the Iran’s Sanctions Committee.
9. S/RES/2049 (7 June 2012), this resolution renewed the mandate of the Iran
Sanctions committee’s panel of experts for 13 months.
10. S/RES/1887 (24 September 2009), the Council addressed non-proliferation by
seeking for, “a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without
nuclear weapons in accordance with the NPT in a way that promotes international
stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all”. It also called on
countries to adhere to their obligations under NPT, including cooperation with IAEA
and NWS to reduce nuclear arms.
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Sources: (1) Arms Control Factsheets. www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/security-
council-resolutions-on-iran.
(2) United Nations Official Document (2013). www.un.org.
