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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19 , 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged withmalpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges againsthim, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his

complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28,

1976,

the Court granted respondent's motionand required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint fordisbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients , namely, Alfaro Fortunado, NestorFortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay allexpenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of theproperty in litigation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143 , wherein Eusebio Lopez,Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel forEusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490; chanrobles virtual law library

3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados , which properties arethe subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143 , while the case was stillpending; chanrobles virtual law library

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him onAugust 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved inCivil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent(50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well thatthe said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the ProvincialSheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of IliganCity; chanrobles virtual law library

5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents purporting tobe true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971"and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection withthe complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant designated as I.S. No.7512936; chanrobles virtual law library

6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client; chanroblesvirtual law library

7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis before theCourt of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City; chanrobles virtual law library

8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by making false

assertion of facts in his pleadings; chanrobles virtual law library

9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a he , hedoes not tell the truth either."

Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18, 1976, denying theaccusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977respondent filed a rejoinder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation ,report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as awitness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits


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"1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the long delay in theresolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedy dispositionof cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988,explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement of scheduledhearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their respective memoranda." [Comment of theSolicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26 , 1988. In

a resolution dated January 16,

1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation withinthirty (30) days from notice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales besuspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the following acts of misconduct:

a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case where theproperties were involved; chanrobles virtual law library

b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land development agreement hadalready been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement; and chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two signatories who had notsigned the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed their signatures [Reportand Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].

Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) forinvestigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intendsto submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally , on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer thiscase to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.

I.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's contention that thepreliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the determination of whether or not there issufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrativecomplaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-Bprovides that:

This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENTOR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor Generalshall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation anddisposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been substantiallycompleted.

The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim, reference to the IBP ofcomplaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v.

Gonzales,

G.R. No. 80578,

October 7,

1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under theterms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court mayconduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for investigation to the SolicitorGeneral or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case , the report and recommendation ofthe investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case onthe report and recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties during theinvestigation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1 , 1988] theinvestigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-Bprovides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of theSolicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated evenbefore the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General

terminated the investigation on November 26,

1986,

the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion toDismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already made a thorough andcomprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only induplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the presentcase which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of the case to the IBP.Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunity to presentevidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural dueprocess. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11)


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documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a witnessagainst him.

II.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of misconduct alleged bycomplainant Bautista.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General , the Court finds

that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinarypower.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by the Fortunados onAugust 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCTNo. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration ofhis legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed , respondent knew that the abovementioned propertieswere the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since hewas acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint , p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executingthe document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibitinga lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of hisprofession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interestin litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go

Beltran v. Fernandez,

70 Phil. 248 (1940)].chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer shouldnot purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the newCode of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is voidunder Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code ofProfessional Responsibility.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold theConstitution,obeythe laws ofthe landandpromote respectforlawandlegalprocess" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of thePhilippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath , a lawyermay be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore

the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is arepulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case , respondent, having violated Art.1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtual law library

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from purchasingthe property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified fromacquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights,as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasizethe nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client andhe shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shallhold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence , notwithstanding the absenceof a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in

relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of hisclient's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought againsthim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented, because the land developmentagreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rightsthat the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the landdevelopment agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:

... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES , Filipino, married to LiliaYusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, wehereby, by these presents,dotransferandconveytothe saidATTY. RAMONA. GONZALES,his heirs,successor,andassigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the abovedescribed property, together

with all the improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].

It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to be absolute andunconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement wasimplemented.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time the land developmentagreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The landdevelopment agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30,1971.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library


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Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the complainant in an anti-graftcase filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and was understood to be onlyprovisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact thatthe land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was dulyannotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as constructive notice to complainant so thatthere was no concealment on his part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the

negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing,

respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethicsof the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant wasnot a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important factpertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement ,respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so that the latter could make aproper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer shouldobserve honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him[Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to be true copies of anaddendum to the land development agreement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Based on evidence submitted by the parties,

the Solicitor General found that in the document filed by respondent with theCourt of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement namely, RamonA. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautista-were made to appear ashaving signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names.However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2)and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edithand Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24 , 1973, asking them tosign the said xerox copyattached to the letter and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp.4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phoneto sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's SupplementalMotion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines , p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged truecopy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of QuezonCity, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and NestorFortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistentwith the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d) ,Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of ProfessionalResponsibility].chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed by respondent inentering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation , p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court,however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:

We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defrayall expenses, for the suit, including court fees.

Alfaro T. Fortunado

[signed]Editha T. Fortunado[signed]Nestor T. Fortunado[signed]

CONFORME

Ramon A. Gonzales[signed]

[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].

is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with aclient to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04 , Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyermay in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreementbetween respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expensespaid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights ischampertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especiallywhere, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain tohave part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co. , et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution ofthese contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incuradministrative sanctions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library


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The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez , Jr. inCivil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez , Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidencepresented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of theFortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent whenrespondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of therecognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to thedual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of First Instance and theFiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case , Civil Case No. Q-18060 was stillpending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S.No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Reportand Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaintsfor libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060 , considering that it wasstill pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent toharass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of FirstInstance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General,

and accordingly holds that there is no basis for holding thatthe respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to harasscomplainant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above discussion on the othergrounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law and the rules governingthe conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law ,he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva , Adm. Matter No.1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of theoffenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspendedfrom the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct, the Court Resolved toSUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Letcopies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in thepersonal record of Atty. Gonzales.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6424. 'March 4, 2005]

CONSORCIA S. ROLLON, complainant, vs. Atty. CAMILO NARAVAL, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latter's money or other property coming into the former's possession should bedeemed to be held in trust and should not under any circumstance be commingled with the lawyers' own; much less, used bythem. Failure to observe these ethical principles constitutes professional misconduct and justifies the imposition ofdisciplinary sanctions.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a letter-complaint against Atty. Camilo Naraval , filed by Consorcia S. Rollon with the Davao City Chapter of theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 29, 2001. The Affidavit[1] submitted by complainant alleges thefollowing:

Sometime in October of 2000, I went to the office of Atty. Camilo F. Naraval together with my son, Freddie Rollon, to seek hisassistance in a case filed against me before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 6 , Davao City entitled 'Rosita Julatonvs. Consorcia S. Rollon for Collection of Sum of Money with Prayer for Attachment;


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After going over the documents I brought with me pertaining to the said case , Atty. Naraval agreed to be my lawyer and I wasrequired to pay the amount of Eight Thousand Pesos (Php 8,000.00) for the filing and partial service fee, which amount waspaid by me on October 18, 2000, a copy of the Official Receipt is hereto attached as Annex 'A to form part hereof;

As per the instruction of Atty. Naraval, my son, Freddie, returned to his office the following week to make follow-up on saidcase. However, I was informed later by my son Freddie that Atty. Naraval was not able to act on my case because the latterwas so busy. Even after several follow-ups were made with Atty. Naraval, still there was no action done on our case;

Sometime in November 29, 2001, I decided to withdraw the amount I paid to Atty. Naraval, because of the latter's failure to

comply with our mutual agreement that he will assist me in the above-mentioned case;

My son Freddie Rollon went to Atty. Naraval's office that same day to inform Atty. Naraval of our decision to withdraw theamount I have paid and to retrieve my documents pertaining to said case. Unfortunately , despite our several follow-ups, Atty.Naraval always said that he cannot return the documents because they were in their house , and that he could not give usback the amount we paid him (Php 8,000.00) because he has no money;

Having failed to obtain any response, I decided to refer the matter to Atty. Ramon Edison Batacan, IBP President of DavaoCity and to Atty. Pedro Castillo, the Commissioner on Bar D[i]scipline;

x x x x x x x x x.

In an Order dated March 12, 2002,[2] the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Director Victor C. Fernandez,directed respondent to submit his answer to the Complaint. The same directive was reiterated in the CBD's May 31, 2002Order[3] issued through Commissioner Jovy C. Bernabe. Respondent did not file any answer despite his receipt of theOrders.[4]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Not having heard from him despite adequate notice, the CBD proceeded with the investigation ex parte. Its Order[5] datedNovember 11, 2002, issued through Commissioner Bernabe, required complainant to submit her position paper within tendays from receipt thereof, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainant's Position Paper[6] on December 10, 2002.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation dated October 16, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco recommendedthat respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for neglect of duty and/or violation of Canons 15 and18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Report reads in part as follows:

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication,competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him , and his negligence in this regard rendershim administratively liable x x x.

In the case at bar, the deplorable conduct of the respondent in misrepresenting to the complainant that he will render legalservices to her, and after receiving certain amount from the latter as payment for 'filing fee and service fee did nothing inreturn, has caused unnecessary dishonor to the bar. By his own conduct the respect of the community to the legalprofession, of which he swore to protect, has been tarnished.

x x x x x x x x x

In fact, complainant claimed to have been shortchanged by the respondent when he failed to properly appraised her of thestatus of her case which she later on found to have become final and executory. Apparently , the civil suit between RositaJulaton and the complainant have been decided against the latter and which judgment has long become final and executory.However, despite full knowledge by the respondent of such finality based on the documents furnished to him , respondentwithheld such vital information and did not properly appraise the complainant. Thus, respondent violated the mandate inCanon 15 x x x.[7]

IBP Board of Governors' Resolution

On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-64 upholding the above-quoted Report.The Board recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years for violation of Rules 15and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the restitution of complainant's P8 ,000.

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.


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Respondent's Administrative Liability

Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any person who may wish to become theirclient.[8] They may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry it outeffectively or competently.[9] But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of ProfessionalResponsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.[10]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to theclient's cause.[11] Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of

importance.[12] The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:

CANON 17 ' A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed inhim.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shallrender him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time tothe client's request for information.

Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can efficiently handle.[13]Otherwise, their clients would beprejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with dedication and care. If they do anyless, then they fail their lawyer's oath.[14]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P8,000 as filing and partial service fee,respondent failed to render any legal service in relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeatedfollowups from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his client's cause, in brazen disregard of hisduties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of thecase that had been entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise entrusted to him.

Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent should have given her a candid, honest opinion on the merits andthe status of the case. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and complainant had been decided against the latter.In fact, the judgment had long become final and executory. But he withheld such vital information from complainant. Instead ,

he demandedP8,

000 as 'filing and service fee and thereby gave her hope that her case would be acted upon.Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their candid and best opinion to their clientson the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether acase would have some prospect of success is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part of lawyers.[15] If theyfind that their client's cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit , ratherthan to traverse the incontrovertible.[16] The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic undertaking constitutes a violation of hisduty to 'observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with hisclients.[17]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently refused to return the money of complainant despite her repeateddemands. His conduct was clearly indicative of lack of integrity and moral soundness; he was clinging to something that didnot belong to him, and that he absolutely had no right to keep or use. [18]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their client's money and property that may come into their possession.[19] As

respondent obviously did nothing on the case of complainant, the amount she had given -- as evidenced by the receiptissued by his law office -- was never applied to the filing fee. His failure to return her money upon demand gave rise to thepresumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby betrayed the trust she had reposed in him. [20] His failure todo so constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legalprofession.[21]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the courts,[22]but also mandates theutmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciaryrelationship.[23] Respondent clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a member of the bar. His inability to properlydischarge his duty to his client makes him answerable not just to her, but also to this Court, to the legal profession, and to thegeneral public.[24] Given the crucial importance of his role in the administration of justice, his misconduct diminished theconfidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the profession. [25]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTYof violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of two (2) years , effective uponhis receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he isORDERED TO RESTITUTE,within thirty (30) days from notice of thisDecision, complainant's eight thousand pesos (P8,000), plus interest thereon, at the rate of six percent per annum , fromOctober 18, 2000, until fully paid. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, as wellas the National Office and the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC


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A.M. No. 1437 April 25, 1989

HILARIA TANHUECO, complainant,

vs.

JUSTINIANO G. DE DUMO, Respondent.

A.M. No. 1683 April 25, 1989

HILARIA TANHUECO, complainant,

vs.

JUSTINIANO G. DE DUMO, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I ON

PER CURIAM:

On 24 February 1975, complainant Hilaria Tanhueco filed before the Court a Petition for Disbarment (docketed asAdministrative Case No. 1437) against respondent Justiniano G. de Dumo for having violated the Canons of ProfessionalEthics by his (a) refusal to remit to her money collected by him from debtors of the complainant; and (b) refusal to returndocuments entrusted to him as counsel of complainant in certain collection cases.chanrobles virtual law library

In his Answer and Counter-Petition 1 filed on 3 April 1975, respondent denied the charges. Complainant filed a Rejoinder[should be Reply] to Answer with Counter-Petition, on 18 April 1975. By a Resolution2 dated 16 June 1975, the Court referredthis case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.chanrobles virtual law library

A year later, on 25 June 1976, one Jose Florencio N. Tanhueco claiming to be the nephew and representative of thecomplainant, addressed a sworn letter complaint to Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos against the respondent for (a) refusal to remit themoney collected by respondent from debtors of complainant's aunt, Mrs. Hilaria Tanhueco Vda. de David; (b) refusal to

return documents entrusted to him in his capacity as counsel in certain cases; and (c) abandonment of cases in respect ofwhich his professional services had been engaged. On 24 August 1976, the letter complaint was forwarded by the thenPublic Information Assistance Staff, Department of Public Information, to this Court for appropriate action (and docketed as

Administrative Case No. 1683). After respondent had filed his Answer, the Court, by a Resolution3 dated 9 December 1976,referred this case to then Acting Judicial Consultant Ricardo C. Puno for study , report and recommendation.chanroblesvirtual law library

Since Administrative Case No. 1683 and Administrative Case No. 1437 involved the same parties and the same subjectmatter, Hon. Ricardo C. Puno referred the former case to the Office of the Solicitor General for consolidation with the latterone.chanrobles virtual law library

The Office of the Solicitor General held two (2) hearings, one on 3 December 1975 and another on 18 April 1988. In the firsthearing, respondent de Dumo was absent although he had been notified thereof. At the end of the first hearing, continuation

of the hearing of the case was set for 14 January 1976. The records show that the second hearing took place on 18 April1988 but do not indicate the reason for the 12-year interregnum. By then, complainant Tanhueco had died. There was noappearance at the second hearing by complainant Jose Florencio Tanhueco but respondent de Dumo was thenpresent.chanrobles virtual law library

The report of the Solicitor General, dated June 15, 1988 in Administrative Case No. 1437 summarized the evidence for thecomplainant in the following manner:

EVIDENCEFORCOMPLAINANT

Complainant HilariaTanhueco testified that she secured the legal services of respondent to collectindebtedness from her different debtors. Although she offered to execute a document evidencing theirlawyer-client relationship, respondent told her that it was not necessary. She nonetheless offered to give him

15% of what he may be able to collect from the debtors (pp. 4-7. tsn, Dec. 3, 1975).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Complainant also declared that respondent borrowed from her P2,000.00, Pl,300.00, and P3,000.00 on threeseparate occasions, but she could not remember when she gave those amounts. Respondent did not paythose loans (pp. 8-9, tsn,Id.).chanrobles virtual law library

She confirmed that respondent filed cases against her debtors and that one of them, Constancia Maoscapaid P12,500.00 to respondent. Informed of such payment by Maosca herself, complainant confrontedrespondent but the latter denied having received payment from any of her debtors. Complainant thenbrought the matter to the attention of Malacaang which referred her to Camp Crame. Notwithstanding


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subsequent demands of complainant for the money, respondent had refused to give her the amount (pp. 11 -15, tsn,Id.).

The Solicitor General then summed up the evidence for the respondent in the following terms:

EVIDENCEFOR RESPONDENT

RespondentAtty. JustinianoG.de Dumo testified that complainant indeed secured his legal services tocollect from her debtors, with the agreement that he gets 50% of what he may be able to collect. He thus

filed collection cases against Tipace Maosca Morena,

Jr.,

and others,

and was able to obtain favorablejudgment in the cases against Maosca, Tipace, and Leonila Mendoza. The initial payments made by thesejudgment-debtors were all given to complainant. With respect to Maosca respondent obtained a judgmentfor P19,000.00 although the debt was only P12,000.00 (pp. 3-9, tsn, April 18, 1988).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Respondent also declared that complainant, who was then already old and sickly, was influenced by herdebtors, who were also her friends into distrusting him. Ultimately, because complainant filed a complaintagainst him with Malacaang which referred the matter to Camp Crame , he terminated his relationship withcomplainant and demanded his attorney's fees equivalent to 50% of what he had collected. Complainantrefused to pay him, hence, he did not also turn over to her the P12 ,000.00 initial payment of Maosca whichhe considered, or applied, as part payment of his attorney's fee (pp. 9-19, tsn.,Id.). Respondent estimatedhis attorney's fee due from complainant in the amount of P17,000.00 (p. 20, tsn,Id.)

Respondent denied having borrowed the amounts of P2,000.00, P1,300.00, P3,000.00 and P1,000.00,pointing out that complainant did not even have money to pay him so that he handled the cases for her oncontingent basis (p. 17, tsn, Id.) He also denied having received documentary evidence from complainant.What evidence he had were all gathered by him on his initiative (pp. 4-7, tsn,Id.).

The Solicitor General then set out the following:

FINDINGS

There is in the case at barclearadmissions byboth complainantandrespondentofanattorney-clientrelationshipbetweenthem, specifically in the collection of debts owing complainant. Respondentalsoadmitted,inhis answertothe complaintandinhis testimony,havingreceivedP12,000.00fromindebtorConstanciaManoscawithoutturningoverthe amounttohis client, complainantherein,andapplyingitinsteadas partofhis attorney's fees. It has been held that the money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a

judgement in favor of his client held in trust (Aya v. Bigonia ,57 Phil.8;Daroy v..Legaspi 65 SCRA 304), andthat the attorney should promptly account for all funds and property received or held by him for the client'sbenefit (Daroy v. Legaspi,supra; In re Bamberger, 49 Phil. 962). The circumstance that an attorney has alien for his attorney's fees on the money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from theobligation to make a prompt accounting (Domingo l v. Doming[o] G.R. No. 30573 , Oct. 29, 1971; Daroy v.Legaspi,supra). Undoubtedly,respondent's failure toaccountforthe P12,000.00,representingpaymentofthe judgementdebtofMaosca constitutes unprofessionalconductand subjects him to disciplinary action.Nonetheless, it has likewise been recognized that a lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection againstinjustice, imposition or fraud on the part of his client; and that the attorney is entitled to be paid his just fees.The attorney should be protected against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his justcompensation (Fernandez v. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140; Albano v. Coloma, G.R. Adm. Case No. 528, Oct. 11,

1967). This countervailing rule mitigates the actions of respondent.chanrobles virtual law library

As regards the charges that respondent received documents evidencing the debts to complainant and hadrefused to return them to the latter, and that respondent also borrowed some amounts from her, there [is] nocompetent, conclusive evidence to support them. Perforce, such allegations have no factual basis.(Emphasis supplied)

The Solicitor General then recommended that:

For failure to turn over the amount of P12,000.00 to the complainant, and applying it as his attorney's fees,respondent Atty. Justiniano G. de Dumo be severely reprimanded and admonished that repetition of thesame or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

We find the findings of fact of the Solicitor General supported by the evidence of record. We are , however, unable to accepthis recommendation.chanrobles virtual law library

Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client , constitute trust funds and must, beimmediately paid over to the client.4 Canon 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics 5 then in force, provides as follows:

11. Dealingwithtrustproperty.chanrobles virtual law library

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takesadvantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.chanrobles virtual law library


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Moneyofthe clientorcollectedforthe clientor other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyershould be reported and accountedforpromptlyand shouldnotunderany circumstance be comingledwithhis own orbe usedbyhim. (Emphasis supplied)

When respondent withheld and refused to deliver the money received by him for his client , the deceased complainant HilariaTanhueco, he breached the trust reposed upon him.The claim of the respondent that complainant had failed to pay hisattorney's fees, is not an excuse for respondent's failure to deliver any amount to the complainants. 6 It is of course true thatunder Section 37 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, an attorney has-

a lien upon the funds,

documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession andmay retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid , and may apply such funds tothe satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment ofmoney and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of hisclient, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be enteredupon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have causedwritten notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same rightand power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure thepayment of his just fees and disbursements.

The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his client , does not relieve him from his dutypromptly to account for the moneys received; his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 7

In the present case,

what respondent could have properly done was to make an account with his client,

thecomplainant,deducthis attorney's fees due inrespectofthe amountactually collectedbyhim, and turn over the remainingbalance to the complainant. The Court notes that the services of respondent de Dumo were engaged by the complainant ona number of cases and that these were on differing stages of completion. Respondent was not entitled to hold on to theentire amount of P12,000.00 collected by him until all his fees for the other cases had also been paid and received by him.There was not enough evidence in the record to show how much money,ifany, respondent had in fact previously (i.e., otherthan the P12,000.00 from Maosca) collected for and turned over to complainant (thereby waiving his lienthereon) withoutdeducting therefrom his claimed contingent fees in respect of such collections.chanrobles virtual law library

The relationship of attorney and client has always been rightly regarded as one of special trust and confidence. An attorneymust exercise the utmost good faith and fairness in all his relationships vis-a-vis his client. Respondent fell far short of thisstandard when he failed to render an accounting for the amount actually received by him and when he refused to turn overany portion of such amount received by him on behalf of his client upon the pretext that his attorney's fees had not all been

paid. Respondent had in fact placed his private and personal interest above that of his client. Respondent's act constitutes abreach of his lawyer's oath and a mere reprimand is not an adequate sanction.chanrobles virtual law library

There is another aspect to this case which the Court cannot gloss over. Respondent claimed that he charged complainant ,his client, a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the amount collected by him , plus interest and whatever attorney's feesmay be awarded by the trial court chargeable to the other party. In this jurisdiction , contingent fees are notperse prohibitedby law. 8 But when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee are obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorneyupon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must and will protectthe aggrieved party. 9

From the Answer of respondent de Dumo it appears that in three (3) collection cases filed by him for the complainant andwhich were decided in favor of the complainant, the awards totalled P31,390.00. Respondent asserted that he was entitled toattorney's fees amounting to Pl8,840. 00 out of the aggregate total of P31,390.00:

7. That the understanding between Hilaria Tanhueco and me was afifty- fiftyon collectedprincipalandinterests.The lawyerhas the rightto charge attorney's fees tothe otherparty-defendantandthatHilariaTanhueco shallnotinterfere norbe includedinthe computation.

That of the cases filed, the following made payments:

a. Hilaria Tanhueco vs. Constancia Maosca

Amount Collectible (principal)........................................P12,000.00

Interest added from May 1972 o Nov/73 at 1% a month.... P2,280.00

Attorney's fees charged to the defendant and not to be included in the computation................ P 4,720.00

TOTAL and Amount specified in the Compromise Agreement and Subject of theDecision. P19,000.00

b. Hilaria Tanhueco vs. Melchor Tipace et al.

Principal amount collectible...................... P7,100.00


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Interest at 1 % per month starting June/71 to Sept./74........................2,840.00

Attorney's fees charged to the defendant and not included in thecomputation.......................... 1,450.00

c. Hilaria Tanhueco vs. Estimo

Principal Amount collectible..................... Pl,000.00

SUMMATION OF THE THREE CASES FILED AND AMOUNTS RECEIVABLE

BY THE UNDERSIGNED INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES:

MAOSCA CASE:

Attorney's fees to be paid by Maosca and not to be included in thecomputation................... P 4,840.00

Fifty per cent on the principal amount collectible plus interests......................................... .P 7,080.00


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TIPACES CASE:

Attorney's fees to be paid by Tipace and not to be included in thecomputation............................. Pl,450.00

Fifty per cent on the principal amount collectible from Tipace plus

interests.................................. 4,

970.00

TOTAL AMOUNT RECEIVABLE.............P6,420.00

8. The total amount which I ought to receive as attorney's fees under paragraph seven , sub-paragraph a, b and c is:

Pll,920. 00

P6,420.00

P500. 00

P18,840.00

TOTAL 10

We note that respondent attorney claimed as his contingent fee the following:

1) fifty percent (50%) of the sum of principal and interest collectible from different debtors; and

2) attorney's fees charged to the defendant (presumably under promissory notes or written agreements) and"not to be included in the computation."

Under this scheme, respondent was actually collecting as attorney's fees sixty percent (60%) or more than half of the totalamount due from defendant debtors; indeed, he was appropriating for himself more than what he was, according to him, toturn over to his client.chanrobles virtual law library

We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed was, under the facts obtaining in this case, grossly excessiveand unconscionable. 11Such a fee structure, when considered in conjunction with the circumstances of this case, also showsthat an unfair advantage was taken of the client and legal fraud and imposition perpetrated upon her.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The complainant was an old and sickly woman and, in respondent's own words, "penniless." She was at the time she filedher complaint in 1976, already seventy-six (76) years old. In her circumstances, and given her understandable desire torealize upon debts owed to her before death overtook her, she would easily succumb to the demands of respondent attorney

regarding his attorney's fees. It must be stressed that the mere fact that an agreement had been reached between attorneyand client fixing the amount of the attorney's fees, does not insulate such agreement from review and modification by theCourt where the fees clearly appear to be excessive or unreasonable. InMambulaoLumberCompanyv.Philippine NationalBank, etal.,12 this Court stressed:

The principle thatcourts shouldreduce stipulatedattorney's fees wheneveritis foundunderthecircumstances ofthe case thatthe same is unreasonable,is nowdeeplyrootedinthis jurisdictionto entertainany serious objectiontoit. Thus, this Court has explained:

But the principle that it may be lawfully stipulated that the legal expenses involved in the collection of a debtshall be defrayed by the debtor does not imply that such stipulations must be enforced in accordance withthe terms, no matter how injurious or oppressive they may be. The lawful purpose to be accomplished bysuch a stipulation is to permit the creditor to receive the amount due him under his contract without a

deduction of the expenses caused by the delinquency of the debtor. It should not be permitted for him toconvert such a stipulation into a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor.

xxx xxx xxx

Since then this Courthas invariablyfixedcounselfees ona quantummeruitbasis wheneverthe feesstipulatedappearexcessive, unconscionable,orunreasonable, because a lawyer is primarily a court officercharged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties, andhence,the fees shouldbe subjectto judicialcontrol.Nor should it be ignored that soundpublicpolicydemands thatcourts disregardstipulations forcounselfees,whenevertheyappeartobe a source ofspeculative profitatthe expense ofthe debtorormortgagor(See, Gorospe, et al. v. Gochangco,supra). Andit is not material that the present action is between attorney and client. As courts have powertofixthe fee as


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betweenattorneyandclient,it must necessarily have the right to say whether a stipulation like this, insertedin a mortgage contract, is valid (Bachrach vs. Golingco,supra).

xxx xxx xxx 13

This Court has power to guard a client,14 especially an aged and necessitous client,15against such a contract. We hold thaton aquantummeruitbasis, no circumstances of special difficulty attending the collection cases having been shown byrespondent, respondent attorney's fees should be reduced from sixty percent (60%) to ten percent (15%) of the total amount(including attorney's fees stipulated as chargeable to the debtors) collected by him on behalf of his client.chanrobles virtual

law library

With respect to charges of refusal to return documents entrusted to respondent lawyer and abandonment of cases in whichhis services had been engaged, we accept the findings of the Solicitor General that the evidence of record is not sufficient toprove these allegations.chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved that:

1. respondent is guilty of violation of the attorneys' oath and of serious professional misconduct and shall beSUSPENDED from the practice law for six (6) months and WARNED that repetition of the same or similaroffense will be more severely dealt with;

2. the attorney's fees that respondent is entitled to in respect of the collection cases here involved shall bean amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the total amount collected by respondent from the debtorsin those cases;

3. respondent shall return forthwith to the estate of complainant Hilaria Tanhueco the P12 ,000.00 respondentreceived on behalf of his client less attorney's fees due to him in respect of that amount (P l2 ,000.00 lessfifteen percent [15%] thereof) or a net amount of P10,200.00; and

4. respondent shall return to the estate of complainant Hilaria Tanhueco any documents and papers receivedby him from the deceased complainant in connection with the collection cases for which he was retained. Ifhe has in fact made any other collections from deceased complainant's debtors, he shall promptly accounttherefor to complainant's estate and shall be entitled to receive in respect thereof the fifteen percent (15%)attorney's fees provided for herein.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondentattorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Republic of the PhilipppinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

[CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]

ATTY. AUGUSTO G. NAVARRO, for and in behalf of PAN-ASIA INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES,

INC.,complainant, vs. ATTY. ROSENDO MENESES III, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

This administrative case against respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses III was initiated by a complaint-affidavit [1] filed by Atty.Augusto G. Navarro on June 7, 1994 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(hereinafter, the Commission), for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. Herein complainant chargesrespondent Meneses with the following offenses,viz.: (1) malpractice and gross misconduct unbecoming a public defender;(2) dereliction of duty, by violating his oath to do everything within his power to protect his clients interest; (3) willfulabandonment; and (4) loss of trust and confidence, due to his continued failure to account for the amount of P50,000.00

entrusted to him to be paid to a certain complainant for the amicable settlement of a pendingcase.[2]chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The complaint-affidavit alleged that Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc., a group of companies which includes PanAsia International Commodities, Inc., through its Administrative Manager Estrellita Valdez, engaged the legal services ofrespondent Atty. Meneses. While serving as such counsel, Atty. Meneses handled various cases and was properlycompensated by his client in accordance with their retainer agreement.[3] One of the litigations handled by him was the caseof People vs. Lai Chan Kow, a.k.a. Wilson Lai, and Arthur Bretaa, pending before Branch 134, Regional Trial Court of Makati.On December 24. 1993, respondent received the sum of P50,000.00 from Arthur Bretaa, the accused in said case, to begiven to therein offended party, a certain Gleason, as consideration for an out-of-court settlement and with the understandingthat a motion to dismiss the case would be filed by respondent Meneses. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary


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Despite subsequent repeated requests, respondent failed to present to his client the receipt acknowledging that Gleasonreceived said amount. A verification made with the Regional Trial Court of Makati revealed that no motion to dismiss or anypleading in connection therewith had been filed, and the supposed amicable settlement was not finalized and concluded.Despite repeated demands in writing or by telephone for an explanation, as well as the turnover of all documents pertainingto the aforementioned case, respondent Meneses deliberately ignored the pleas of hereincomplainant. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The case was assigned by the Commission to Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for investigation. Respondent wasthereafter ordered to submit his answer to the complaint pursuant to Section 5, rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.[4]Two

successive ex

parte motions for extension of time to file an answer were filed by respondent and granted by theCommission.[5] On November 14, 1994, respondent filed a motion to dismiss,[6] instead of ananswer. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In said motion, respondent argued that Atty. Navarro had no legal personality to sue him for and in behalf of Pan-AsiaInternational Commodities, Inc. because his legal services were retained by Frankwell Management and Consultant , Inc.;that Navarro had not represented Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. in any case nor had been authorized by its boardof directors to file this disbarment case against respondent; that the retainer agreement between him and FrankwellManagement and Consultant, Inc. had been terminated as of December 31, 1993 according to the verbal advice of its

Administrative Officer Estrellita Valdez; that the case of Arthur Bretaa was not part of their retainer agreement, and Bretaawas not an employee of Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc. which retained him as its legal counsel; and that thesettlement of said case cannot be concluded because the same was archived and accused Bretaa is presently out of thecountry. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Herein complainant, in his opposition to the motion to dismiss,[7] stresses that respondent Meneses is resorting totechnicalities to evade the issue of his failure to account for the amount of P 50 ,000.00 entrusted to him; that the respondentsarguments in his motion to dismiss were all designed to mislead the Commission; and that he was fully aware of theinterrelationship of the two corporations and always coordinated his legal work with EstrellitaValdez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On November 28, 1994, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez resolved to deny said motion to dismiss for lack ofmerit and directed respondent to file his answer.[8] On January 2, 1995, respondent filed a manifestation that he wasadopting the allegations in his motion to dismiss his answer.[9] When the case was set for hearing on February 9, 1995,respondent failed to attend despite due notice. He thereafter moved to postpone and reset the hearing of the case severaltimes allegedly due to problems with his health. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On the scheduled hearing on June 15,

1995,

respondent again failed to attend. The commissioner accordingly receivedan exparte the testimony of complainants sole witness, Estrellita Valdez, and other documentary evidence.[10] Thereafter,complainant rested its case. Respondent filed a so-called Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to RecallComplainants Witness for Cross-Examination[11] which was granted by the Commission.[12] Estrellita Valdez was directedby the Commission to appear on the scheduled hearing for cross-examination. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Several postponement and resetting of hearings were later requested and granted by the Commission. When the case wasset for hearing for the last time on May 31, 1996, respondent failed to attend despite due notice and repeated warnings.Consequently, the Commission considered him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense and declared thecase submitted for resolution.[13]chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On February 4, 1997, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through its Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez,submitted its Report and Recommendation[14] to the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The

Commission ruled that the refusal and/or failure of respondent to account for the sum of P50 ,000.00 he received fromcomplainant for the settlement of the aforestated case of Lai Chan Kow and Arthur Bretaa proves beyond any shadow of adoubt that he misappropriated the same, hence he deserved to be penalized. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Commission recommended that respondent Meneses he suspended from the practice of the legal profession for aperiod of three (3) years and directed to return the P50,000.00 he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days fromnotice of the resolution. It further provided that failure on his part to comply with such requirement would result in hisdisbarment.[15] The Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the InvestigatingCommissioner in its Resolution No. XII-97-133, dated July 26, 1997.[16]chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On August 15, 1997, the Court received the Notice of Resolution, the Report and Recommendation of the InvestigatingCommissioner, and the records of this case through the Office of the Bar Confidant for final action pursuant to Section 12 (b)of Rule 139-B.[17] It appears therefrom that respondent was duly furnished a copy of said resolution , with the investigating

commissioners report and recommendation annexed thereto. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that respondent Menesesmisappropriated the money entrusted to him and which he has failed and/or refused to account for to his client despiterepeated demands therefor. Such conduct on the part of respondent indicating his unfitness for the confidence and trustreposed on him, or showing such lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of publicconfidence, constitutes a ground for disciplinary action extending to disbarment.[18]chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Respondent Meneses misconduct constitute a gross violation of his oath as a lawyer which,interalia, imposes upon everylawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. He blatantly disregarded Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for orfrom his client. Respondent was merely holding in trust the money he received from his client to used as consideration for


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amicable settlement of a case he was handling. Since the amicable settlement did no materialize , he was necessarily underobligation to immediate return the money, as there is no showing that he has a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should bescrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity andgood faith on his part is exacted.[19]chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is unavailing. Section 1 Rule 139-B of theRules of Court provides that proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by theSupreme Court motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon the verified complainant of any person. The rightto institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury

from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is theproof or failure of proof of the charge. The evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Disciplinesufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish to become his client. He has theright to decline employment[20] subject however, to the provision of Canon 14 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.[21] Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must always bemindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him.[22] Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform hisclient of the status of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his clients request for information. Respondentsfailure to communicate with his client by deliberately disregarding its request for an audience or conference is an unjustifiabledenial of its right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status of its case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On January 7, 1998, the Bar Confidant submitted to the Court a copy of the letter of Atty. Augusto G. Navarro , dated

December 18,

1997,

to the effect that although a copy of the aforestated Resolution No. XII-97-133 was personally deliveredto respondents address and received by his wife on October 9 , 1997, he had failed to restitute the amount of P50 ,000.00 tocomplainant within the 15-day period provided therein. Neither has he filed with this Court any pleading or written indicationof his having returned said amount to complainant. In line with the resolution in this case , his disbarment is consequentlywarranted and exigent. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in order. The dispositive portion thereof providesthat:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years andis hereby directed to return the Fifty Thousand Pesos he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days fromreceipt of this resolution. Failure on his part to comply will result (i)n hisDISBARMENT.[23]chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year suspension or disbarment, depending on whether or notrespondent duly returns the amount to complainant. Viewed from another angle , it directs that he shall only be suspended,subject to the condition that he should make restitution as prescribed therein. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the imposition of penalties in criminal cases, it has long been the rule thatthe penalty imposed in a judgment cannot be in the alternative, even if the law provides for alternative penalties,[24] not cansuch penalty be subject to a condition.[25] There is no reason why such legal principles in penal law should not apply inadministrative disciplinary actions which, as in this case, also involve punitive sanctions. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Besides, if the purpose was to extenuate the liability of respondent, the only possible and equivalent rule is in malversationcases holding that the restitution of the peculated funds would be analogous to voluntary surrender if it was immediately andvoluntarily made before the case was instituted.[26] The evidently is not the situation here. Also the implementation of the

penalty provided in the resolution will involve a cumbersome process since, in order to arrive at the final action to be taken bythis Court, it will have to wait for a verified report on whether or not respondent complied with the conditionsubsequent. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rosendo Meneses III is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondentspersonal records in this Court and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines , together with all courts in thecounty. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary


FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4411. June 10, 1999]

JAIME CURIMATMAT, ET AL., complainants,vs. ATTY. FELIPE GOJAR,respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

MELO, J.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary


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On April 25, 1995, respondent Atty. Felipe G. Gojar was administratively charged by his clients, former employees of theUniwide Sales, Inc., with lack of fidelity to his clients' cause. The alleged prejudicial acts of respondent , as alleged in theletter-complaint, are herein enumerated as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. We file a petition for review with the Supreme Court under G.R. No. 113201 entitled Associated Trade Unions , et al. vs.Honorable Bienvenido E. Laguesma, et al. Our lawyer was Atty. Felipe G. Gojar. We had been following it up with our saidlawyer since then and up to the start of this year, 1995. But, we were advised by our lawyer Atty. Gojar that the petition wasstill pending with the Honorable Supreme Court. Lately, we discovered that our Lawyer, Atty. Gojar moved for the dismissalof the petition without our consent and authority. Attached is a copy of the Manifestation and Motion as Annex

A.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2. In the meantime, an Unfair Labor Practice case was also filed with the NLRC, Manila entitled Rex Alfonte, et al. vs.Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, et al. Under NLRC Case No. NCR-00-12-07755-93. This case was dismissed. The decisionwas received by Atty. Gojar on July 14, 1994. He filed an appeal on August 8, 1994 which was beyond the ten (10) dayperiod. However, he stated in his appeal that he received the decision on July 29, 1994, which is not true. Attached is a copyof his receipt of the decision on July 14, 1994.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

3. Also, another case was filed with the NLRC involving money claims. The case was dismissed. Atty. Gojar filed an appeal.The appeal was also dismissed. He told us that he will prepare a petition for review with the Supreme Court. We have beengoing to his office for several times so that the petition for review will be filed. On one occasion , he told us that he cannot yetprepare the petition for varied reasons like: he has volume of professional work; failing health and others but , up to thepresent, the petition is not filed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

4. Another case is likewise filed with the National Labor Relation Commission, Manila NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07-04380-93entitled Aniceta Salgado et. al. vs. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club Edsa et. al. We have been following it up with Atty. Gojarbut, his response was The case is still pending. On February 21, 1995, I, Ines Salgado went to the office of the Labor Arbiter.In the said office, it was found out that a decision was already rendered on September 30, 1994 and Atty. Gojar had alreadyreceived said decision but, he failed to file the necessary appeal. What had been told to us that there was not yet decision. Inshort, Atty. Gojar deliberately hide to us that a decision was already rendered on September 30 ,1994.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(Rollo, pp. 1-4.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On August 31, 1995, respondent filed his Comment vehemently denying all the allegations in the complaint ,thusly:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. Contrary to the false and malicious allegations of complainants in paragraph 1 of the letter-complaint , the Manifestationand Motion dated July 21, 1994 (Annex A of Complaint) in G.R. No. 113201 was filed by respondent after due consultationand with the conformity of the petitioners therein. x x x.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Respondent never misrepresented to the ATU members anything regarding the proceedings in G.R. No. 113201. As thecounsel for the said union and its members, respondent was never remiss in his duties to his clients and promptly informedthem of all proceedings not only in G.R. No. 113201 but also in all other cases filed in behalf of ATU members.

x x x x x x x x x chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Respondent therefore is at a loss as to why the complainants brought an administrative complaint against him for alleged

violation of his oath as a lawyer. Likewise,

it is inconceivable how the withdrawal of the petition prejudiced the complainantswhen the CBA sought to be discertified had already expired in April of 1995.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2. It is not true as falsely claimed by the complainants in paragraph 2 of the letter-complaint , that respondent filed an appealin behalf of complainants beyond the ten-day reglementary period.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The truth of the matter is that, in the case being referred to, NLRC Case No. NCR-00-12-07755-93 (Alfante, et al. vs. UniwideSales Warehouse Club, et al.), the appeal being referred to was not filed by the respondent. The said appeal was filed inbehalf of complainants by Francisco Listana, a National Officer of ATU (a copy of the Appeal is attached hereto as Annex 2).


Complainants are making it appear that respondent was remiss in his duties in not appealing on time the decision. Nothing

can be farther from the truth. The complainants deliberately did not disclose to this Honorable Court that the respondent ,immediately upon receipt of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on July 14 , 1994, called the complainants to a meeting to informthem of the decision which was unfavorable to them. Upon being informed of such decision , the complainants discussedamong themselves and after some time, they told the respondent of their disappointment of the outcome of the case and thatthey have decided to get another lawyer to handle their case. Respondent had no choice but to follow the wishes of hisclients and so he informed them to come back the next day to get the records from the National Officer of ATU. Respondentgave instructions to the National Officer to arrange the records and give them to the complainants. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

But the complainants did not come back and respondent was not informed of such fact until sometime in the first week ofAugust 1994, when the National Officer told him. By that time , the reglementary period to appeal had expired. At any rate,the National Officer took it upon himself to file an appeal in behalf of the complainants. Unfortunately , the complainants,instead of being grateful, denied having authorized the National Officer to file the appeal in their behalf.


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In the case adverted to by the complaints (NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07-04380-93) , it is not true that respondent deliberatelyhide to the complainants the fact that a decision had been rendered in that case on September 30 , 1994. How canrespondent hide the decision from complainants when they are very diligent in following up the case with the respondent andeven with the labor arbiter?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Contrary to the utterly perjurious and malicious allegations of complainants in paragraph 4 of their letter, it is not the fault ofrespondent that no appeal was filed in that case. The complainants have no one to blame but themselves. Even before

respondent informed the complainants that he received a decision adverse to them,

the latter had already known from theirsource at the labor arbiter that such a decision had been issued.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The complainants in that case, like those in the first case mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof, felt disappointed at the outcomeof the decision and told the respondent that they secured the services of another lawyer to represent them in their appeal.They never contacted the respondent after their last meeting sometime in the first week of October 1994. Respondent cannottherefore be faulted for it was the complainants themselves who led him into believing that their rights were amply protectedas their remedy of appeal would be carried on by the new counsel of their choice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(Rollo, pp. 38-43.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In a Resolution dated November 22, 1995, the Court referred the letter-complaint to the Board of Governors of theCommission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Hearings were set on October 1 , 1996, November 19,

1996, July 14, 1997, March 14, 1997, May 9, 1997, and June 20, 1997. Respondent was duly notified of all the scheduledhearings but he opted not to appear in any of them. Complainants, therefore, presented their evidence exparte.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On November 5, 1998, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines passed a resolution recommendingthat respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for failure to demonstrate the required fidelity to hisclients cause. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In Gamalindavs.Alcantara (206 SCRA 468 [1992]), we ruled that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and mustbe mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. Failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility (Legardavs.CourtofAppeals, 209 SCRA 722 [1992]). In the case at bar, respondent is alleged to have beenremiss in his duty to appeal on time the adverse Resolution of the DOLE Secretary in Case No. OS-MA-A-6-84-93 affirmingthe dismissal of the unions Petition for Certification Election at the Uniwide Sales Branches; and for having moved for thedismissal of complainants petition for review with the Court against the decision of DOLE Undersecretary BienvenidoLaguesma, et al. (G.R. No. 113201) without their consent. In his Comment (supra), respondent attempted to refute theallegations against him and explained his side of the controversy. He did not , however, substantiate his self-serving claimthat he was not remiss in his duties towards his clients and that he consulted complainants and sought their conformity to thewithdrawal of their case before the Court, which case was thereafter rendered moot and academic due to the expiration ofthe CBA that was sought to be discertified. Worse, respondent chose to ignore the hearings before the IBP where he couldhave shed more light on the controversy. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

We do not, however, believe that respondents shortcomings warrant his suspension from the practice of law. Consideringthat this is his first offense, a reprimand would be in order. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

At this juncture, we would like to remind litigants that lawyers are not demi-gods or magicians who can always win theircases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants may feel about their cause.While lawyers are expected to serve their clients with competence and diligence, they are not always expected to bevictorious. In every litigation, there will always be a winner and a loser, unless the parties agree to settle the controversybetween themselves and to work at a win-win solution to their problems. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, respondent Atty. FELIPE GOJAR is hereby REPRIMANDED with a warningthat any repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary


EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5135. September 22, 1999]

ELSIE B. AROMIN, FE B. YABUT, TIBURCIO B. BALLESTEROS, JR., and JULIAN B. BALLESTEROS, complainants,vs. ATTY. VALENTIN O. BONCAVIL, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary


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This is a complaint[1] filed by Elsie B. Aromin, Fe B. Yabut, Tiburcio B. Ballesteros, Jr., and Julian B. Ballesteros againstAtty. Valentin O. Boncavil for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Complainants allege that their late father, Tiburcio Ballesteros, engaged the services of respondent as counsel in twocadastral cases then pending in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City, to wit: Cadastral Case No. N-14, LRCCAD RMC No. N-475, Lot No. 6576, Pls-119, entitled The Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. Faustina Calibo, Claimant, v.Tiburcio Ballesteros, Claimant, and Cadastral Case No. N-14, LRC CAD. REG. No. N-475, Lot No. 7098, Pls-119, entitledThe Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. Belinda Tagailo-Bariuan, Claimant, v. Tiburcio Ballesteros, Claimant; that despite receiptof the adverse decision in the two cases on August 8, 1991, respondent did not inform herein complainants of the same nor

file either a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal to prevent the decision from becoming final; that respondent didnot file either a written offer of evidence despite the trial courts directive for him to do so; and that it took respondent fouryears from the time complainants father died before he filed a motion to substitute herein complainants in the trial court. Theforegoing acts and omissions of respondent are alleged to be in violation of the following provisions of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS ANDTRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THETRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him , and his negligence in connection therewith shallrender him liable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a

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