Epistemic Game of Thrones - Srce

OriginalpaperUDC165:141.113(045)doi:10.21464/sp32115

Received:November8th,2015

Iris VidmarUniversityofRijeka,FacultyofHumanitiesandSocialSciences,Sveučilišnaavenija4,HR–51000Rijeka

[email protected]

Epistemic Game of Thrones

AbstractThe aim of this paper is rather modest: I want to provide an account of some of the most recent developments in epistemology, characterized by a certain shift that has been going on for some time now. This shift is best explained as the abandonment of traditional, monistic picture (according to which knowledge is the only important achievement in our attempt to cognitively grasp the world), and the acceptance of pluralism (according to which there are other important cognitive achievements we should strive for, most notably understanding and wisdom). One of the crucial aspects of this shift is the question about which cognitive state inherits knowledge as the prime epistemic value, and this is the aspect I will be mostly interested in. I will claim that the pluralistic picture fits much better into our cognitive engagement with the world, with other people, and with ourselves. In that sense, rather than rooting for one value as the holder of the epistemic throne, we should acknowledge the irreplaceable contribution that each has for our attempts to come to terms with who we are and with our experience of the world.

Keywordsknowledge,epistemicmonism,epistemicpluralism,understanding,wisdom

1. Epistemic aims and values: monism vs. pluralism

Writing about the task epistemology has traditionally been committed to,MarianDavidsays:

“Epistemologistsofallpersuasionstendtoinvokethegoalofobtainingtruthandavoidingerror.Thisgoalseemstobeofspecificinteresttoepistemology.Noothergoalisinvokedasfrequentlyasthisone.Noothergoalisgivenasmuchweightoristreatedwithasmuchrespectasthisone.”(David2001,p.151)

Davidhereexpressesthetraditional,monistviewonwhatisourepistemicgoal:reachingtruth.Whetheritisthequestionofwhatismorallyrightorwrong,ofwhethertherearedoorsinfrontofmeorwhetherthereisacatonthemat,onceweposethesequestions,wewanttogettotherightan-swer.Incaseyouwonderwhy,explanationsaremany.Philosophersoftheancienttimeswouldtellyouthatwesimplycannotlivealifeofhappinessandtranquillity,orgoodlife,withouthavingtheknowledgeofreality,andall of its portions.Descarteswould tell you that our inquiringmindsde-mandofustoexamineourknowledgeandseewhatwecanknow.Aristotlewouldhaveusconvincedthatwearesimplydrawntoaskingquestionsandwewanttoknowtherightanswers.Truthisinthissenseintrinsicallygoodanddesiredforitsownsake,whetherithastodowithlisteningtothelatest

https://doi.org/10.21464/sp32115

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA63(1/2017)pp.(215–234)

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gossipaboutcelebrities,countingthegladesofgrassinone’sbackground,inquiringaboutthenatureofbeautyortryingtodecideontherightcourseofaction.Ofcourse,tryingtogettothetruthalwaysbringsinthepossibilityoffailinginone’sattempts,forvariousreasons.Scepticswornusabouttheimpossibil-ityofeverdisprovingscepticalscenarios,butevenwithlesserdemandsonus, itstillseemsweareconstantlyfallingbehindourdesire toreach truth.Wemightbetiredorinahurryandthereforefailtoseeorconsiderarelevantpieceofevidence,wemightbedeceivedbydishonestinformerwhonever-thelessseemsreliable,wemayerrduetobebadluckregardlessofallofourbesteffortstobethebestcognizerswecanbe.Thismeansweareconstantlyopen toerrors. In fact, the fact that thegoalof reaching truth implies thatofavoidingerror,thetwocomehandinhand.WayneRiggscallsthisTwinGoodsView:

“Thereareexactlytwogoodsthataredistinctlyandpurelycognitiveorepistemic.Theyare(1)havingtruebeliefsand(2)avoidingfalsebeliefs.”(Riggs2002)

Giventhewayourepistemicgoalisdefined,alltheepistemologicalassess-ments(whetherofindividualbelief,setsofbelief,believersorprocesses)willonlytakeintoconsiderationhowwhatisbeingevaluatedfareswithrespecttothisgoal.Ultimately,eventhevalueofknowledgehastobederivedfromthevalueofhavingtrueandnothavingfalsebeliefs.Admirableasthismightbe,seriousreasonshavebeenofferedforresistingthemonistview.Firstofall,RiggsarguesthatTheTwinGoodsViewiswrong.Hisreasonsfor thatclaimhavetodowithadiscussiononthevalueofknowledge,asopposedtothevalueofitscomponents;formypurposehere,wedon’tneedtotakeuponthis.1Butavaluablelessonisthat,ifwefocustoomuchonthe(valueof)truthandknowledgeandpraisetheseachievementsontheirown,welosesightoftheactiveroleofacognizer.Suchreasoningismoti-vatedbydrawingtheanalogieswithwhatwepraiseinthedomainofmoralbehaviour:

“Wevaluemorallyrightactsbecauseweareresponsibleforthegoodoutcomethatresults.Wearecorrectlygrantedcreditforthegoodoutcome.”(Riggs2002)

Thissamereasoningappliestowhatwevalueinepistemology.Onecangettothetruthbyluckycoincidence,orjustbychance.Inthiscase,cognizerreachedthetruth(andavoidederror),butsomehowtheintuitionis,thisisnotenoughtomakethisachievementepistemicallyvaluable.Thus,Riggsconcludes,inadditiontovaluingthegoalsofgettingtothetruthandavoidingerror,we

“…valuethepropertiesofhavingreliableprocesses,epistemicvirtues,truth-directedmotiva-tions,andsoforth.But,inaddition,wevaluebeingresponsibleforthesatisfactionofourcogni-tivegoals.Suchresponsibilityrequiresatleastthatthegoalsarereachedbywayofourveryownepistemicallyvaluableproperties.”(Riggs2002)

Firstlessonfromthisobjectiontomonistepistemologyistoacknowledgetheimportanceandsignificanceoftheresponsiblecognizer.Anotherreasonforabandoningtheepistemicmonism(andtheepistemicpri-macyoftruth)isthefactthatsuchaviewdoesn’tdifferentiatebetweengood,bad,andpointlesstruths.IndiscussingtheproblemofpointlesstruthJonath-anKvanvigismoreconcernedwithshowingthattruth(andknowledgeandunderstanding,whosevaluederivesfromtheirconnectionto truth)hasun-qualifiedanduniversalvalue,butsuchaviewhastoexplainforthefactthatwefindsometruths(thenumberofthesandgrainsonthebeachorthenumber



ofgrassbladesinone’sbackyard)trivial.2Butifourmainepistemicgoalisbelievingtruths,thenevenpointlesstruthsseemtobeofimportance,andweshouldaimatknowingthem.Ifnot,onehastofindacriterionfordifferentiat-ingbetweenthosethatdoandthosethatdon’t.Onewayfordoingsoistoin-vokethenotionofthosetruthswhicharepragmaticallyimportant:ifhavingacertaintruthcanhelpusfurthersomepracticalgoal,thenbeinginpossessionofthattruthisimportant,andthetruthinturnisvaluable.Notice,however,plausibleasthismightbe,thatitdoesnotsolveourproblem:themonisthastostaydeeplycommittedtotheviewthatalltruthmatters,always.Thushecan-notacceptanykindofdivisionbetweentrivialandimportanttruths.Yet,ourepistemicpracticestronglyfavourstheviewaccordingtowhichsometruthsmattermorestronglythanothers.Weareverydiscriminatorywhenitcomestoinvestingourresearcheffortsandwedon’twantourtimeandenergybespentonthingswhichwillultimatelyhavenovalueorimportanceforus.Regardlessofthat,Iwanttosuggestanotherreasonwhysometruths,thoughnotpracticalinthestrictsense,maystillbeimportant.ItisatleastplausibletosuggestthattruthsabouthowtocureAlzheimerhavemorepracticalim-portancethantruthsaboutthelogicalimplicationsofdoublenegationorthattruthsabouthowtojustlydistributegoodssuchashousingandeducationaremoreimportantthantruthsaboutVenetianRenaissanceart.Yet,forsomerea-son,wevalue(stronglyandpassionately)truthsaboutdoublenegation,andtruthsaboutVenetianRenaissanceart.WewouldbeveryhappyifAlzheimerwerecured,thehungryfed,andthehomelesssheltered,butnevertheless,weinvest our time and resources into studying double negation andVenetianRenaissanceart.3Thismightbebecausewearenaturallycuriousandinquisi-tive,butitmightalsobebecausewefindsomethingvaluableinthesethings.Inhis2003,WayneRiggsofferedanotherargumentforabandoningtheTwinGoodViewofwhatmatters inepistemology.According tohim,oneworrythatsuchaviewraisesisthattryingtofulfilthegoalofreachingtruthandavoidingerrormightintheendbecounterproductive.Givenhoweasyitistogetthingswrong(thatis,howharditistoknowwithcertaintythattruth,ratherthanerrorhasbeenreached),cognizermightenduprestrainingfromepistemic pursuit and suspending their judgements even in caseswhen nosuchsuspensionisnecessary.Thatmightseriouslyundermineourepistemicpursuitaswellaslowertheamountofthingsweknow.Onepracticalconse-quenceofthisistheacceptanceofscepticalposition.AnotheroneisinsisteduponbyMirandaFricker(2007),thoughinaslightlydifferentcontext.Fric-kerclaims thatourability tohaveknowledgeandpass iton toothers isadistinctivesignofourrationality,andinthelongerrun,ofourhumanity.Thusthevaluablemonistinsistenceontruthmightintheendmakeusdestroywhatwemostlyaimat.Themorewestrivetowardsthetruth,thefurtherawayfromitweare.Elusiveknowledgewouldsoonbecomeunreachableknowledge.

1

Thisinitself isabook-longdebate, thusforthereasonsoflimitedspacewewillnotenga-geinit.Valuableandinsightfulcontributionsto the problem are found inKvanvig 2003,andPritchard,Millar,Haddock2010.

2

See:Kvanvig2008.

3

Itmightbearguedthatthesetruthsalsohavepractical implication given that they make

those who study them happy. But then itseemsthatalltruthsareimportantinthattheyhelppromotesomeothergoods.Idon’tthinkthis is a problem for me. I simply want toshow(thoughnotmuchrestsonthis)that,incertainsenseatleast,itisathinlinebetweenthe number of blades of grass, the numberof houses available for homeless, and thenumber ofTizian’sworks.This is preciselywhatthemonisthastoexplain.


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Riggs’ownsolutiontobalancingthesegoalsistorecognizetheepistemicim-portanceofagoalthatsupersedesthetwo,andthatispursuitofunderstand-ing.We’llturntothisshortly.Abandoningmonistpictureofepistemicaimsandvaluesbringsaboutachangeinhowweunderstandepistemology.Riggscharacterizessuchanapproachtoepistemologyasthevalueturninepistemology,giventhatthedefiningaspectofitistherecognitionofothercognitivevaluesbesidetruthandconsequently,anexpansionofourepistemicgoalssoastoincludethesevalues.Riggscallsthis‘new’kindofepistemologyavalue-drivenepistemology,andseesitasexpandingthedomainofepistemologicalenquirybeyondthatdeterminedbythetraditionalmonisticviewaccordingtowhichepistemologywasdefinedastheoryofknowledge.AccordingtoRiggs,

“…perhapsthegreatestpotentialeffectofvalue-drivenepistemologyisitsopennesstonewepistemological investigations thatarenot tied toaccountsofeitherknowledgeorepistemicjustification.Asimportantasthoseconceptsaretoepistemology,theydonotexhausttherangeofepistemicevaluationsthatareworthyofstudy.”(Riggs2008)

Therearevariousdevelopmentswithinepistemology itself thatbroughtonsuchachangeintheepistemologicalenquiry.Certainlyoneofthemostin-fluentialwastheincreasinginterestinthequestionofthevalueofknowledgeasopposedtothevalueoftruebelief,aquestionthatwas,atleastaccordingtothetraditionalreading,developedinPlato’sMenobutremainedneglectedthroughoutepistemologicaldiscussionsinfluencedbyDescartes.Ofparticu-larimportancetothedevelopmentofvalue-drivenepistemologyaretheoriesdevelopedbyvirtueepistemologists,particularlythosethatansweredtothevalueproblembyinvokingtheepistemicagencyandintellectualvirtuesorskills of cognizers.4Generally speaking, such theories seeknowledge as akindofcognitiveachievementthatspringsfromcognizer’sabilityandthere-foredeservescredit.There isa lot that isvaluable in thevirtueepistemologyprimarilybecauseitrecognizestheimportantplacethat individualcognizerandhiscognitiveapparatusandintellectualcharacterholdinthehumanpursuitofknowledge(andotherepistemicaims).Thatdoesn’tmeanhowever that these theoriesarenotentwinedwiththeirownproblemsandinconsistencies,butit isnotmyaimheretodiscussthem.ThelessonIwanttotakefromthemistheim-portanceoftheactiveroleofthecognizer,whoisaskedtoreflectnotonlyonwhathethinksheknows,butalsoonhiscognitiveskillsandbeliefformingprocesses,onhisepistemiccharacter,cognitiveaimshefindsworthyofpur-suing,andonhowhisknowledgeandothercognitivebenefitsofhispursuithelphim in leadingagood life.Beforeweelaborateon thisconnection inmoredetails,let’sturnbrieflytoseehowepistemologyhasmodifieditselfinordertoaccommodatethesenewconsiderations.

2. Epistemology: A wider conception

Ifthefocusofepistemologyisnolongeronknowledge,thenwhatisiton?HereishowKvanvigseesit;theextentofthequoteonlytestifiestotheex-pansionofepistemologicalconcerns:

“Atthemostgenerallevelofcharacterization,epistemologyisthestudyofcertainaspectsofourcognitiveendeavours.Inparticular,itaimstoinvestigatesuccessfulcognition.Withinitspurview, then, are various kinds of cognizing, including processes such as thinking, inquir-ing,andreasoning;eventssuchaschangesinone’sworldviewortheadoptionofadifferentperspectiveonthings;andstatessuchasbeliefassumptions,presuppositions,tenets,working



hypothesisandthelike.Alsowithinitspurviewisthevarietyofcognitivesuccesses,includingtruebeliefsandopinions,viewpointsthatmakesenseofthecourseofexperience,tenetsthatareepistemicallyadequate,knowledge,understanding,theoreticalwisdom,rationalpresupposi-tions,justifiedassumptions,workinghypothesislikelytobetrue,responsibleinquiryandthelike.”(Kvanvig2005,p.286)

Whatweseehereisanexpansionofthedomainepistemologywastradition-allyoccupying.5Thechallengeforusnowistoseewhythiswiderconceptionofepistemologyfitsbetterintoourcognitiveengagementwiththeworld.InordertogivesomekindofaframeworktohowIseethisengagementtakesplace,Iwillconsidertwowaysinwhichwemightreachknowledgeandothercognitivegains.Onesuchway,traditionallyacceptedbymonistepistemol-ogy,isthroughthewordsofothers,i.e.testimony.6Anotherwayisthroughengagementwithart.Philosopherswhoclaimthatartisasourceofcognitivegainsoftenclaimthatitisnotnecessarilyknowledgebutunderstandingthatartgivesus.Giventhatartisticcreationisnotguidedbydesiretoreachtruth,monistepistemologycannotseeartasavaluablesourceofknowledge,andgiven that it doesn’t recognize the importance of understanding, it cannotexplain(or,moreimportantlyvalidate)theratherintuitiveview(traditionallydefendedbyaestheticcognitivistssinceAristotle)thattherearemanythingswelearnfromart.7

LetusstartwiththefirstaspectfromKvanvig’slist:epistemologicalresearchincludes various kinds of cognizing, including processes such as thinking,inquiring,and reasoning.Obviously, thinking, inquiring,and reasoningareallinvolvedintheveryprocessofrespondingtosomeone’stestimony.Ifoneistomakesenseofacontentthattheinformerisdelivering,onehastopayattentiontowhatisbeingsaid,meaningonehastotrytoconstructastoryofwhathappenedandwhatkindsofinformationarebeingtransmitted.Ideally,the listeneralsomakesanattempt to incorporatenewpiecesofknowledgeintohisexistingwebofknowledge.Similarly,thinking,inquiring,andrea-soningareinvolvedinreadingaliterarywork.Theprocessofunderstandingaworkinvolvesfilinginthegapsnotexplicitlygivenandaskingaboutfictionaltruth:theseprocessesofnegotiatingbetweenfictionalworldandrealworldwould be impossible unless the reader engages in thinking aboutwhat heisreading,inquiringintotheconnectionsbetweencharactersandreasoningabouthowtheepisodeswithinthenovelarestructurallyconnectedandde-penduponeachother.Butmoreimportantlyforhowwelearnfromliteratureistoseethatreadingaliteraryworkinvitesthinking,inquiringandreasoningabouttherealworld.Atleastoneaspectofthereadingprocessistryingtodeterminehowwhatisdescribedfareswithrespecttohowthingsareinthe

4

Seeforexample:Fairweather,Zagzebski(eds.),2001.

5

Itisworthpointingoutthatthisisnottheonlyway inwhich contemporary epistemologiststhinkofepistemology.Anothernewapproachtoepistemology is theonepursuedbyRob-ertsandWoodswhohaverecentlydevelopedanaccountofwhattheycallregulative epistemology (see their 2007). See also: Prijić-Samaržija,Bojanić2012.

6

Duetothelackofspace,Icannotgointode-tails regarding the nature of testimony and

conditions that have to be fulfilled for it tosuccessfully transmit knowledge. Suffice tosaythattestimonyhastodowithpeopletell-ingusthingstheyknow,orthinktheyknow,orarereliableabout,withoutknowinglyandintentionallydeceivingus.Inthatsense,Iad-vocatewhatisknownas“TheBroadViewofTestimony”(see:Fricker2007).

7

See:Vidmar2013fortheconnectionbetweenart and cognitive gains pertaining to plural-ism.



world.This is capturedbywayof creatingnewpatternsof thinkingabouttherealworldsituations,whichareinspiredbythespecificitiesoftheworkandbywhatismadesalientinthework.Thusinmanyways,thecognitiveprocessesweengageinwhenwelistentothetestimonyandintheprocessofreading,canbeevaluatedpositivelybyepistemicprocessesKvanvigseesaspertainingtoepistemologicalresearch.Thenextimportantaspectofepistemologyisevaluationof“eventssuchaschanges in one’sworld viewor the adoption of a different perspective onthings”.Both,testimonyandliteraryworkscancontributetothesekindsofcognitiveprocesses,particularly ifwe see themas sourcesof experiences.Myfriend’stestimonyonheradulterousrelationshipcanhelpmeunderstandwhypeopleengageinsuchbehaviourinthesame(orat leastsimilar)wayasreadingaboutEmaBovaryorAnaKarenina.ValerieTiberius(2005)hasargued that this kind of change in perspective can result in acquisition ofwisdom.Ifmyfriendtellsmeaboutherexperienceoflivingwithcancer,yetremainspositiveandoptimisticaboutthepossibilityofstillhavingavaluable,fulfilledlife,thenwhatsheistellingmecaninfluencehowIseetheworldandtheprospectsoffulfilledlifeandcanbringaboutachangeinmyperspec-tiveonhowtodealwithhardshipsoflife.Manyphilosophersemphasizetheabilityofliteraturetocauseachangeinperspective,mostoftenintermsofhowoneseestheworldmorally.8Asaresultofreading,readerscandevelopnewevaluativeanddescriptivepatternsthroughwhichtheythinkabouttheirexperience, theycan realize that theirpreviouslyheldviewwas lacking indepthorwastoosuperficial,notsensitivetowardscomplexitiesthatmakeourexperience.Next,epistemologyconcernsitselfwith“statessuchasbeliefassumptions,presuppositions,tenets,workinghypothesis”.Atthispointofcourseitisnotyetclearhowsuchstatesleadtoanyrecognizablyvaluablecognitivegoods,butatleastitisrecognizedthattheydohavearoletoplayinourattempttoreachcognitivegraspofourworld.Knowingthatpisalwaysbetterthanas-suming(evenifcorrectly)thatp.However,itiswrongtoclaimthathypoth-esisandassumptionhavenoepistemicvalue.Theyareofgreatimportanceforthescientificresearch.Whythenshouldn’tweclaimtheycanalsobeusedbyindividuals,intheirdailyattemptstoreachknowledgeandgainawidercognitivegrasponvariousaspectsofreality?Beliefassumptions,presuppo-sitions,tenetsandworkinghypothesisarenotimportantonlyfromtheper-spectiveofhowacognizerorganizesherownresearch,butalsoforhowthetransmissionofknowledgeandotherepistemicbenefitstakeplaceinasoci-ety.OnedevastatingwayinwhichassumptionsandpresuppositionsaffectthecognitivetransferofknowledgeinthecaseoftestimonywasdemonstratedbyMirandaFricker(2007)inheranalysesofthewaysinwhichprejudiceagainstwomenlowertheirstatusasreliableinformers.Finally,Kvanvinginsertsvarietyofcognitivesuccessesonhislist,includingtruebeliefs andopinions,viewpoints thatmake senseof the courseof ex-perience, tenets thatareepistemicallyadequate,knowledge,understanding,theoreticalwisdom,rationalpresuppositions,justifiedassumptions,workinghypothesislikelytobetrue,responsibleinquiryandthelike.Puttingknowl-edgeaside,givenitstraditionalimportanceforepistemology,letusfocusontheseothercognitivesuccesses.Ifallofthesecountascognitivesuccesses,thenallofthesearestatesweshouldstrivetowards.Thisispreciselywhatpluralistepistemologyclaims.Inadditiontoknowledge,twomorecognitivesuccessesaresaidtobeimportant:understandingandwisdom.Let’sturntothesenow.9



3. Knowledge, wisdom and understanding: Friends or foes?

Wesawthattheabandonmentofmonisticpictureofepistemologymeansrec-ognizingthattherearemoreepistemicgoalsweshouldbestrivingtowards.AccordingtoKvanvig,thispluralityofepistemicgoalsincludes“knowledge,understanding, rationality, justification, sense-making” (Kvanvig 2005, p.287).Moreorless,thislistexhauststhekeynotionsofcontemporaryepis-temologicaldebates,withtheadditionofwisdom.Oncetheepistemologiststurnedtheirattentiontowardunderstanding,itdidnottakeitlongforittowintheepistemicthroneandreplaceknowledgeas thechiefcognitivesuccess.DuncanPritchard,JonathanKvanvig,WayneRiggs,CatherineElgin,LindaZagzebski,andGeorgeGardinerallprovideargumentsthatshowthatunder-standingismorevaluablethanknowledge.10Themostrecentdevelopmentsin epistemology suggest that the next epistemic battle betweenvalues andgoalswillbetheonebetweenunderstandingandwisdom.Severalphiloso-phersnowseemtobegivingprecedencetowisdomandprovideaccountsofitthatarebasedonthefactthatreachingwisdom,thatis,becomingwise,iswhatallepistemicagentsshouldstrivetowards.Indiscussingthevalueturnandthechangesitbroughtabout,JasonBaehrclaimsthat“whateveritsotherqualitiesmaybe,wisdom iswidely regardedas amajor–perhaps the su-preme–epistemicgood”(Baehr2010,p.82).Inordertodecidewhetherthisbattleisnecessary,thatis,whichepistemicgoodshouldbeseenassupreme,letusseeinmoredetailsthenatureofeachofthem.Iwillnothavemuchtosayaboutknowledge,giventhatmonismhasbeengivingititsdueattention.HereIwanttoelaborateabitonunderstandingandwisdom.

3.1. Understanding

Despitetheconstantlygrowinginterestinthenotionofunderstanding,therearestillmanygreyareaslefttoexplore.Isunderstandingtobeunderstoodasaprocess,wherebythecognizercomestounderstandsomething,orisittobeunderstoodasastate,quitelikeknowledge,whereacognizercansay‘Iun-derstandthat’or‘Iunderstandhow’.Aquestionthatprecedessuchconsidera-tionsiswhatitisthatcanbeunderstoodinthefirstplace,i.e.whatistheob-jectofunderstanding.Thisisparticularlyproblematicfortworeasons.First,ifanalogiesbetween‘knowingthat’and‘understandingthat’arebroughttooclose,thenonehastoexplainwhatisitthatisultimatelydistinctiveofunder-standingthatmakesitdifferentfromandsuperiortoknowledge.Couldn’twejustclaimthatunderstandingisakindofknowledge,perhapsinthesensethattheonewhounderstandssimplyknowsmore,namelyknowsthereasonswhysomething (rather than some other thing) happened?11This is the heritage

8

MatthewKieranhasinsistedonthis,see:Kie-ran1996.

9

Short terminological clarification: to claimthatsomethingisepistemicorcognitive(herethetwoaresynonymousinthesensethatepis-temology,inpart,hastodowithourcognitiveeconomy)successimpliesthatitisalsoagoalweshouldaimtoreach.

10

See: Pritchard 2010 (in Pritchard, Millar,Haddock2010);Kvanvig2003,2005,2008;

Riggs 2003, 2008; Elgin 1996; Zagzebski2001;Gardiner2012.

11

Kvanvig calls this (and argues against) thecommonassumptionaboutthenatureofun-derstanding: “Though the nature of under-standing is not often addressed, it is none-theless commonly assumed that knowledgeandunderstandingbearadirectandintimateconnection,fortheassumptionisthatunder-standingofthetheoreticalsortisaspeciesofknowledge.The assumption is that the kindofunderstandingatissuewhenregardingour



lefttoepistemologistsbythephilosophersofscience,whosawunderstand-ingasaspecialkindofknowledge,namelyknowledgeofthecauses.Withinphilosophyofscience,understandingwasseenastheresultofthesuccessfulprocessofexplaining:ifwewanttoknowwhycertainstateofaffairs,A,tookplace,weneedanexplanationofwhyA,ratherthanBorC,andthecrucialpart of such explanationwasknowing the reasons (causes)whichmadeA(ratherBorC)develop.Secondworryisthatonemightendupexplainingwhatunderstandingisbyproviding an exampleof it: understanding iswhat it is involved in under-standinga sentence,or amathematicproof.Though this is agoodpointertowardshowto thinkofunderstanding, it is radically toonarrowanddoesnotallowforafullimpactthatunderstandingascognitivesuccessbears.Oneof the reasonswhy some philosophers are so sceptical over the epistemicsignificanceofunderstandingistheirinabilitytorecognizevariouswaysinwhichunderstandingisimportantforourcognitiveeconomy.Swirski(2007)claimedthatoneproblemwithitisthatitisunclearwhetheritisaprocessorastate.Butthefactthatunderstandingcanbeagradualprocessaswellasastateshouldnotbeinterpretedasanegativeaspectofunderstanding.Thereisavaluableinsightcontainedin“wearecomingtounderstandbetterandbettertheimpactsthatsocialnetworkssuchasFacebookhaveonsocialconnectionschildrenmakewiththeirpeers”.Thereasonwhysuchanunderstandingisaprocessisthefactthatnewaspectsoftheseimpactsarerevealedwithtime,aspectswhich couldn’t have been taken into consideration before.On theotherhand,“AchildunderstandsPythagoreanTheorem”impliesastateshereached. It can bemanifested in her ability to solve variousmathematicaltasksinwhichPythagoreanTheoremisused.Butnoticethatasshestartstoengagewithmoreandmorecomplexcalculations,herunderstandingofPy-thagoreanTheoremdevelopsandcanagainbeseenasaprocess.Inorderforthechildtobeabletosuccessfullyperformthesecalculationsitisnotenoughtoknowthecorrectformula.Sheneedstounderstandthewayitfunctionsandtheimplicationsithas.These kinds of considerations lead RichardMason, whoseUnderstanding Understanding(2003)isoneofthemostinsightful,elaborated,andsystem-aticcontributiontothisproblem,toclaimthatcriticaltheoryofunderstandingcannotbebasedonthecriticaltheoryofknowledge.Analysingvariouswaysinwhichwemightthinkoftherelationbetweenknowledgeandunderstand-ingandthepriorityofoneovertheother,heclaimsthat“thereisnoreasontosupposethatunderstandingneeds‘conditions’ofakindthatwouldmirrorthoseinatheoryofknowledge”(Mason2003,p.48).AvaluableanalysisofunderstandingisfoundinRiggs,Zagzebski,Pritchard,andKvanvig,allofwhomexplainunderstandingintermsofgraspingcertainaspectsoftheobjectofunderstanding.AccordingtoRiggs,

“What is involved inhavingunderstandingmaywellbeevenmoreobscure thanwhat is in-volved inhavingknowledge.But it seemsclear enough that it includeshavinga truegraspofsomesignificantpartof realitywithoutbeingdeeplydeceivedabout it.Thusachieving itrequiresachievingourtwotraditionalgoals…Understandingsomepartoftheworldrequiresanappreciationfororder,fit,andpattern.Itrequiresthatone‘see’howthingsfittogetherandwhytheyarethewaytheyare.”(Riggs2003,p.350)12

LindaZagzebski (2001) retains this basic idea.According toZagzebski, itwasalreadyinPlatothatunderstandingwasgivenepistemicprecedenceoverknowledge,butsomehowepistemologistslostthisfromsightbecauseoftheirconstantunyieldingfocusonjustification.Butunderstandingcanbetterfur-



therourepistemicgoalsofobtaining ‘cognitivecontact’with structuresofreality.According toher, thereare threeelements that figure in theunder-standing.First,

“…understandingisastategainedbylearninganartorskill,atechne. Onegainsunderstandingbyknowing howtodosomethingwell,andthismakesoneareliablepersontoconsultinmatterspertainingtotheskillinquestion.”(Zagzebski2001,p.241)

Personwhounderstands(whythecarisn’tworkingincircumstancesC1)isabletosolvetheproblemnotonlyinC1,butinalltherelevantcircumstancesinwhichthecarmightbreakdown.Ontheotherhand,apersonwhoknowshowtofixthecarinC1butlacksunderstandingofwhythecarbrokedowninthefirstplace,willnotbeabletorepairitinanyothercircumstances.SecondfeatureZagzebskiidentifiesasrelevanttounderstandingisthat

“…understandingisnotdirectedtowardadiscreteobject,butinvolvesseeingtherelationofpartstootherpartsandperhapseventherelationofparttoawhole.Itfollowsthattheobjectofunderstandingisnotadiscreteproposition”(Ibid.,p.241).

WehaveseenthisideaalreadyinRiggs,andasitstandsitisoneofthemostemphasizedaspectsofunderstanding.ThirdfeaturethatfiguresinZagzebski’saccountofunderstandingisthatit

“…representssomeportionoftheworldnonpropositionally.”(Ibid.,p.242)

Zagzebskiseestheworldascomposedofvariousstructuresandfindsit

“…unlikelythatpropositionalstructureexhauststhestructureofreality.”(Ibid.,p.242)

Therefore,themannerinwhichwecometograspthesestructuresisthroughunderstanding:

“Iproposethatunderstanding is the state of comprehension of nonpropositional structures of reality.”(Ibid.,p.242)

ThemostinfluentialaccountofunderstandingisprovidedbyJonathanKvan-vig.His interest is in two senses of understanding:whenunderstanding isclaimedforsomeobject,thatis,subjectmatter,andwhenitinvolvesunder-standingthatsomethingisthecase,whichcoversunderstandingwhy,when,where and what. On a first approximation, knowledge and understandingarebothfactive.Oneimportantdifferencehoweveristhatinsomecontexts,knowing(BillClinton)doesnot implyunderstanding(him).Notehoweverthat from understanding (a body of information) follows that one has theknowledge(oftheinformation).Thissuggeststhatunderstandingisnotiden-ticalwithknowledge,whichimpliesthatunderstandingaddssomethingthatknowledgeitselflacks.HereishowKvanvigaccountsforit:

cognitivesuccessandachievements is sometypeofdeepandcomprehensiveknowledgeconcerning a particular subject, topic, or is-sue.”(Kvanvig2003,p.188)

12

Riggs believes that accounting for under-standinginthiswayallowsustosurpassthepracticalandtheoreticallimitationsthattradi-tionalepistemicgoalsofbelievingtruthandavoiding error impose on us. Namely, fromthe theoretical point of view, our epistemicdesire to acquire as much truth as possible

might be restrained by our fear of gettingthingswrong.But ifwe aim at understand-ing,andunderstandingcanbereachedeveniftherearesomeerroneouscomponents in thewider system, thenonecan stillgaincogni-tive benefits that might be unreachable ifwewerecarefulnot tomakeamistake.TheclaimthatunderstandingcanbeattainedeveniftherearesomeerrorsinthewidercognitiveconstructionisnotuniquetoRiggs,aswe’llsee.



“Thecentralfeatureofunderstanding,itseemstome,isintheneighbourhoodofwhatinternalistcoherencetheoriessayaboutjustification.Understandingrequiresthegraspingofexplanatoryandothercoherence-makingrelationshipsinalargeandcomprehensivebodyofinformation.Onecanknowmanyunrelatedpiecesofinformationbutunderstandingisachievedonlywheninformationalitemsarepiecedtogetherbythesubjectinquestion(…)Whereasknowledgecanhaveasitsobjectindividualpropositions,understandingmaynot.”(Kvanvig2003,p.192)

Thus,whatisofcrucialimportancearevariouselementswithinone’scogni-tivegraspandthewaytheyarerelatedtoeachother.Thisrelationmaybeexplanatory,logical,probabilisticorofsomeotherkindthatbringsaboutacoherenceandunityamongthem.Whatiscrucialforunderstandingis thatthecognizerseeshowtheserelationsamongelementsareheldtogetherandhowtheyinteracttooneanother,producingastateofaffairthatistheobjectofunderstanding.Kvanvigcallsthis‘theoreticalunderstanding’andwhatisimportantisthatitisnotdirectedatparticularpropositions,butatthewholetheycreate.Oneofthecrucialdifferencesbetweenknowledgeandunderstandingisthefactthatunderstanding,unlikeknowledge,comesindegrees.Thismakesun-derstandingdifferentfromknowledge,anditalsomakesitpossibleforustotalkintermsofunderstandingsomethingbetterorwithagreaterdegree.ThisisoneofthereasonswhyKvanvigeventuallyrejectstheviewaccordingtowhichunderstandingisaspeciesofknowledge.Thefundamentaldifferencebetweenthetwoisrevealedinthefactthatknowledgeisprimarilydirectedattheworldandtherelevantconnectionisthatbetweenthemindandtheworld.On the other hand, understanding is directed at the connections of beliefswithinthemind.ThefinalrequirementthatKvanvigputsforwardforunder-standingisthatthegraspingoftheserelationsbepsychological:

“Thewayinwhichalltheinformationfitstogethermustbepartofwhatthepersonisawareof.”(Kvanvig2003,p.202)

Theideahereisthatonecannotunderstandsomethingwithoutbeingawareofit.Someonemightobjecttothisbyclaimingthatifunderstandingisonlyamatterof internal connection, then it cancompletely fail tograsp thingsin theexternalworld.Itcanbefalse, inotherwords,or itcanmissoutonhowthingsareintheworld.Yetthiswouldbewrong.AccordingtoKvanvig,bothknowledgeandunderstandingarefactiveandinthatsensetruth(ofwhatisunderstood)matterstounderstanding,butthedifferencebetweenthewaytruth isconnected toknowledgeandunderstanding is in the role that truthplaysinGettier-likecases.Whileinstancesofgettierizedtruebeliefarenotconsideredknowledge,KvanvigsuggeststhatunderstandingisnotvulnerabletoGettier-likecases.Giventhecognitiveeffortonthepartofthecognizertoreachunderstanding,onecannotcometoitbyluckorbyaccident.13

RobertsandWoodpointtowardanotherwayinwhichunderstandingcanbeevaluatedwithrespecttotruth:

“Somethingliketruthistypicallyaconditionforunderstanding.”(Roberts,Wood2007,p.43)

Thiscanbefurtherexplainedintermsofadequacy:

“Understandinganythingtypicallyhastobemoreorlessadequatetowhatitisabout.”(Ibid.,p.43–4)

ThereisonefurtheraspectofRobertsandWood’s theorythat isappealingandthatisthewaytheyconnectunderstandingtotheactiveengagementofthecognizer:



“Understandingoftenemergesonlywithconcertedintellectualactivitieslikeexploring,testing,dialecticalinterchange,probing,comparing,writing,andreflecting.”(Ibid.,p.50)

Noticethatnoneoftheseintellectualactivitiesisnecessaryforgainingsimpletruths(andthusknowing)thatthereisaglassinfrontofme.Soatleastinsome sense, knowing involves less activities andmentalwork thanunder-standing.14

ThemostdevelopedaccountofunderstandingistheonebyCatherineElgin,inherbookConsidered Judgment.Thebookitselfisdeeplyconcernedwithhowwegetfromindividualpropositionsandbeliefstomorecoherentanden-compassing,fulldevelopedtheories.Indevelopingsuchaview,ElginreliesontheRawlsianmodelofdeliberationsindomainofpoliticsandhercentralnotionisthatofreflectiveequilibriumandcoherentistaccountofhowwegettoknowsomethingandjustifyit.Suchacoherentsystemincludesnotonlybeliefsofwhichitiscomposedbutalsovalues,rules,categoriesandmethodsofjustification,allofwhicharesubjecttoconstantrevisionandreconfigura-tionasthenewbeliefs,newvalues,newaims,etc.comealong.Thisisradi-callyoversimplifiedretellingofElgin’saccount,butitgivesusenoughtogoby.HereIaminterestedinheraccountofunderstanding,andtheroleitplaysinourcognitiveeconomy.Elginbeginsheraccountofunderstandingbynotingthat:

“Cognitiveprogress is nopiecemeal accretionof separately established facts but a dynamicinterplayofnovelproposalsandentrenchedcommitments. Integrationofnewmaterialoftenrequires reconfiguration of commitments already in place, revision or repudiation of earlieradoptions.”(Elgin1996,p.122)

What iscrucial is that shedoesnot take the resultof suchaprocess tobeknowledgebutunderstanding.Inaccountingforsuchaview,heraccountofunderstanding and the crucialways inwhich it differs from knowledge isrevealed: knowledge and understanding do not share the same conditions.Knowledgeis“apermanentachievement,itsjustificationunconditionaland[it is] insensitive to the changes in epistemic clime” (Ibid.).However, un-derstanding,asanepistemicachievementthatisaccomplishedonlywithinawiderstructureofreflectiveequilibrium,isaresultofvariouselementsfallingintoplace(elementssuchasvalues,rules,categories,methods)whichguidetheresearchandthesecannotbeevaluatedwithrespecttosomepermanenttruth.Thisallowsforthepossibilitythatafalsehoodisinsertedintothesys-

13

Ofcourse,intuitionsvaryhere.Someoneakinto anti-luck epistemology might claim thatthesourceof informationhas tobe immunetoallkindsofGettierlikescenarios,evenifSstillmanagedto(orwasluckyenoughto)‘choose’ right, inwhich case hewould sideagainst Kvanving on this. Had it been tooeasyforStogowrong,then,evenifheinfacthadn’t, this still isn’t good enough to granthimunderstanding.My intuition ismoreontheKvanvigside.

14

This isparticularly so for thosewhodefendexternalistaccountsofknowledgeand justi-fication, according towhich all that is nec-essary for knowledge is reliable belief-for-mation process. In fact,Goldman, themaindefenderofsuchaview,rejectstheneedfor

acognizertowonderaboutthereliabilityorjustifiability of such process, which meansthatonthisreading,reflectiveorintellectualactivitiesofthekindthatRobertsandWooddescribearenotnecessary.Though Idonotthink reliabilism is enough for justification(inthesensethatjustificationhastoincludeinternalist component), it has to be admit-ted that in many instances when cognizersbelieve theyknow, theydonot subject theirbeliefstoanykindofinternalisttest,yetthereisasensethattheyhaveknowledge(forex-ample,uponenteringaroomwithonetable,a cognizer automatically forms the justifiedbelief‘thereisonetableinthisroom’andwearereadytoascribeherthatknowledge,evenifsheneverconsideredthescepticalscenarioasarealtreattoherstatement.



tem,whichcannotbethecasewithknowledge.However,Elginurges,false-hoodscanhaveavaluableroleinadvancingunderstanding.Herexampleisthelawofgravity,which“…isnotstrictlytruesinceitneglectsthegravitationalattractionofeverythingexcepttheEarth.Still,itprovidesgenuineinsightintothebehaviouroffallingbodies,contributestoageneraltheoryofterrestrialmotion,connectsobservationsandmeasurementswithphysicallaws,andclosely approximates thevastlymore complicated truth. It is plainly epistemicallyvaluable,evenifitsfalsitydisqualifiesitasknowledge.”(Elgin1996,p.123)

Itisimportantheretoemphasizethatonthisaccount,understandingisnotrestrictedtofactsanditdoesnothavetobe“couchedinsentences”but“lo-catedinaptterminology,insightfulquestions,effectivenonverbalsymbols,intelligentbehaviour”(Ibid.).Nevertheless,itrepresentsavaluablecognitiveachievement,onewhichis“morecomprehensivethanknowledgeeverhopedto be” (Ibid.), given that it extends to domains and objects that cannot becapturedbyknowledge.Theseincludeunderstandingrules,reasons,actions,passions,objectives,obstacles, techniques, tools,forms,functions,fictions,facts, pictures,worlds, equations, patterns.What is important is that theseare“notisolatedaccomplishments;theycoalesceintoanunderstandingofasubject,discipline,orfieldofstudy”(Ibid.).Finally,Elgin,aswellasKvan-vig,ZagzebskiandRobertsandWodd,seesunderstandingassomethingthatcomesindegrees.Ratherthanwonderingaboutthedifferencesbetweentheseaccountsofun-derstanding, letusbrieflyconsiderwhat thelackofunderstandingconsistsin.Atthefirstapproximation,lackofunderstandingoverasubjectmatterisevidentwhenapersonlacksappropriaterecoursesinhercognitiveeconomyto see the subjectmatter as awell-supported, coherent system that leavesnoroomforuncertaintiesandunresolvedissues.Apersonwhounderstandssomethingwillnotbeinneedofanyadditionalinformationorjudgmenttobeabletoseetheconnections,andtograspthesituationinallofitscomplexi-ties.Shewillalsohavenoneedtorelyonotherstosolveherproblems.Inthatsense,understandingsomething implies thepositionofepistemicauthorityoverasituation,ratherthanthepositionofepistemicdependence.Alackofunderstandingmayalsobevisiblewhenone’sperspectiveonthesubjectmat-terisincomplete,andthecognizer’sbeliefsareindifferentanddisconnected.Thismightbemanifestedinone’sinabilitytocomeupwithanaccounthehimselfisreadytooffertoothersortoaccepthimself.Restrainingfromjudg-mentwhenjudgementisdemandedmightbeasignofconsiderableholesinone’sgraspofsituationorcircumstances.

3.2. Wisdom

Wesawthatanepistemictheoryofunderstandingisstillaworkinprogress,and things are similarwhen it comes to a theoryofwisdom.Someof thequestionsregardingwisdomarethesameasregardingunderstanding:whatexactlyistheconnectionbetweenknowledgeandwisdom,andaretherecon-ditionsofwisdom,suchthat,ifonesatisfiesthemthenoneiswise.However,itseemsthatmostoftheattemptstocometoatheoryofwisdomstruggletoincorporateseveralfactors.Firstofall,theheritageofSocrates,andhisideathatwisdomhastodowithknowingthatonedoesn’tknowanything.Second,andmoreinfluentially,Aristotle’sdistinctionbetweensophiaandphronesis,whichismostlyvisibleinthefactthatmostoften,wisdomissaidtohavetwokinds,theoreticalandpractical.Thirdly,thefactthatwisdomcanbepracticalsuggeststhatbeingwisehastodowithhowonelives,notonlywithwhatis



goingoninhiscognitiveeconomy.Inthatsense,wisdomisbroughtincon-nectionwith‘knowinghow’,notonly‘knowingthat’.Andfinally,a lotofthingssaidaboutwisdomseemtorelyonandsetouttoincorporatewhathasbecomeoneofthemostfamous(evenifnotparticularlyunified)notionofwisdomexpressedbyNozick:“Wisdomisnotjustonetypeofknowledge,butdiverse.Whatawisepersonneedstoknowandunderstandconstitutesavariedlist:themostimportantgoalsandvaluesoflife–theultimategoal,ifthereisone;whatmeanswillreachthesegoalswithouttoogreatacoast;whatkindsofdangersthreatentheachievingofthesegoals;howtorecognizeandavoidorminimizethesedangers;whatdifferenttypesofbeingsarelikeintheiractionsandmotives(asthispresentsdangersoropportunities);whatisnotpossibleorfeasibletoachieve(oravoid);howtotellwhatisappropriatewhen;knowingwhencertaingoalsaresufficientlyachieved;whatlimitationsareunavoidableandhowtoacceptthem;howtoimproveoneselfandone’srelationshipswithothersorsociety;knowingwhattrueandapparentvalueofvariousthingsis;whentotakealong-termview;knowingthevarietyandobduracyoffacts,institutions,andhumannature;understandingwhatone’srealmotivesare;howtocopeanddealwithmajortragediesanddilemmasoflife,andwiththemajorgoodthingstoo.”(takenfromMiščević2012,p.130)

Letusbrieflygothroughsomeofthesetheories.15

ThefirstoneisinspiredbySocrates’insistenceontakinganattitudeofhumil-itytowardsone’sownknowledge.Thisviewisknownasepistemic humility viewandaccordingtoit,wisdomconsistsinacknowledgingone’signorance.Someonewhoacceptssomeaccountofhumilityviewmightclaimthatawisepersonknowsthatknowledgeisfallibleandthatthereforeoneshouldalwayshavetheattitudeofhumilityratherthanofarrogance.Itcanalsobeclaimedthatawisepersonknowswhichthingssheknowsforcertain(i.e.whichofherbeliefsarejustifiedandtrue)andrestrainsfromclaimingtoknowanythingthatfallsoutofthedomainsheknowswell.Insisting on epistemic humility is praise worthy, particularly if contrastedwithepistemicarrogance.Epistemichumilityisimportantasacharactertrait,inthat itmakesonecautiousinhowoneexercisesone’sepistemicagency.Beingopenmindedaboutotherpeople’sviewpoints,argumentsandevidenceratherthanarrogantlyassumingthatoneisalwaysrightcertainlyinvitesnotonlyepistemicbutethicalpraiseaswell.Itisalsoimportantintheepistemol-ogy,inthatitmakesonemorecarefulinformingjudgments.PeterUngerhaswarnedusagainsttakingdogmaticattitudetowardthingsandtheattitudeofepistemichumilityisnicemodus operandionhowtoachieveit.But,itishardtoseehowepistemichumility(whetherasacharactertraitorasanattitude)isinitselfsufficienttomakesomeonewise.IfAandBareepistemicallyhum-ble,butAhasallsortsofknowledgeaboutvariousareasoflifeandknowshowtolivewell,andBisignorantonmostthingsandhasnoclearconceptionofhowlifeshouldbelivedwell, intuitionsaysthatA’scognitiveeconomyandhiswaysofexercisinghisepistemicagencyaresomehowbetterthatB’s.Thoughbotharehumble,BlackssomethinganditisprobablethatwhatBlacksiswisdom.Ontheotherhand,itisatleastpossiblethatonecanbewiseevenifoneisnothumble.Let’ssaythatonewasalwaysluckyinasensethathisviewpoints,arguments,andevidencereallyweregoodandcorrect,perhapsbecausetheywereformedreliablyorbecauseonesimplyisextremelysmartandcompetentin reaching knowledge.Then, had he been humble and perhaps restrained

15

A nice overview was provided by SharonRyan(2012);Iwillrelyonherclassificationhere.


I.Vidmar,EpistemicGameofThrones22�

fromstickingtohisknowledge,hewouldendupnotknowing.WecanthinkhereofthecharacterofdoctorHousefromthefamoustelevisionshow.Leav-ingasidethequestionofwhetherhewaswise,thefactremainsthathewascompetentandreliableinhisknowledge(whichwastheresultofwhatPritch-ardwouldcallone’sability)andhewasactinguponittosavelives.Hadhebeenhumbler,andlistenedtothosewhoobjectedhim,certainlysomeofhispatientswoulddie.Sotheattitudeofarrogancecansometimesbeabetterwaytogo.Theproblemthenis,howtoknowwhichsituationsaskforhumilityandwhichforarrogance.Knowingwhentobehumbleandwhentosticktoone’sgunmightjustbeoneimportantaspectofwisdom,ratherthanbeinghumbleallthetime.Beingwisecanalsomeanknowingalot,accordingtothewisdom as knowledgeview.Thisknowledgemayconsistinhavingtheoreticalknowledge(asexplainedbyAristotle’saccountofsophia)orinhavingpracticalknowledge(as capturedbyAristotle’sphronesis).Theoreticalknowledge in this senseincludesself-knowledge,knowledgeoftheworldandotherpeople,aswellasknowledgeofwhatistrulyimportant.Somephilosopherswouldalsoincludehereunderstanding,specifiedasknowledgeofthecasualconnectionsthatex-istintheworld,aswellasunderstandingofsomefundamentalphilosophicalconcerns.Onthisview,ourHousecharacteriswise:hehasextensiveknowl-edgeaboutpeople,medicine,religion,psychologicalreactionsofpeople,heunderstandshowthingshang togetheraswellaswhypeopledowhat theydoandhowtheyreacttothings,giventheircharacter,motivations,beliefs,preferences,etc.Whatismostoftenobjectedtothisviewisthelackofanyad-ditionalcondition,besideknowledge,forbeingwise.Inthepreviouschapterwesawthatsomearewillingtonegatethedistinctivevalueofunderstandingbecause itwasn’tclearhowitdiffers fromhavingmoreknowledge; in thecaseofwisdomaslotsofknowledge,itisevenmoreproblematic.Therefore,theideais,somethingneedstobedonewiththisknowledge,inthesensethatitisputtogooduseforthepersonwhohasit.AgaininspiredbyAristotle,somephilosophersclaimthatbeingwiseiscloselyconnectedtolivingwell,tomaking one’s life good.Therefore, any theory ofwisdom, on the thirdview,shouldnecessarytakeintoconsiderationtheintuitiveideathatwisdomissomehowconnectedtothepracticalsideofus:decidinghowtoliveandwhattodo.Ryantermsthisaswisdomasknowledge and living well view:“Manypracticaltheoriesofwisdomfocusonnotonlyknowinghowtolivewell,butonhowweapplywhatwenowandhowweactuallyliveoutourlives.Whenwedoitwell,bytakingthelongviewonthings,knowingwhatisworthworryingaboutandwhatweshouldjustshrugoffandmoveonfrom,knowinghowbesttospendourtimeandeffort,etc.,weachievewisdom.”(Ryan2012,p.103)

Itseemsthatanytheoryofwisdomissomehowdividedbetweentakingintoconsiderationtheoreticalaspectofwisdom,andtheideaofbeingpracticallywise.Ryan suggests that the problemwith philosophical construction of atheoryofwisdomisinnotbeingabletobalancethetwo,inthatoneeitherendsupputtingtoomuchemphasisontheoreticaloronpracticalaspect.Onherlatestview

“Awideanddeepvarietyofwell-grounded,rationalbeliefsinbasicacademicsubjectssuchasphilosophy,science,literature,history,etc.areessentialforwisdom.Someonewhohasnothadtheprivilegeofawell-roundededucation[bywhichshemeansbeingexposedtoandunderstandthebigideasandquestions]maybequiteintelligent,mightbelivingwell,andmaywellbeapersontoadmireandconsultonwidevarietyofissues,butheorsheisnotinformedenoughtocountaswise.”(Ryan2012,p.103)



Practicalwisdomisnotenough,Ryanargues,becauseitneglectstheeffortonehastoputintoachievingwisdom:“Wisdomisdifficulttoachieve,inpart,becauseofalltheinvestigation,reading,thinking,stud-ying,analyzing,andlearningitrequires.”(Ibid.,p.104)

Becauseoftheactiveinvolvementonthepartofthecognizertoachievewis-dom,itisclaimedthatwisdomistheprimeepistemicgood,themostvaluablestateonecanreach.Baehrcharacterizestheoreticalwisdompartlyas“akindofpersonalintellectualabilityorcompetencethatisaimedat”(Baehr2012,p.89).Thissuggeststhatanactiveengagementonthepartofthecognizerisnecessaryforwisdomtobeachieved.Italsosuggeststhatwisdom(i.e.thedesire,andtheeffortputintobecomingwise)isalifelongprocess,andlikeunderstanding,wisdomisasortofachievementthatcomesindegreesandissusceptibletoconstantgrowthandimprovement.Beingwiseisanepistemicgood;butitisalsoavirtue.Infact,outofmanydifferentproposalsonhowexactlytoclassifywisdom,itseemsthatthemostpromisinglineistoseewisdomasakindofintellectualvirtue,achiefintel-lectualvirtuethatgovernsourintellectualconduct.RobertsandWood(2007),Ryan(2012),andMiščević(2012)areamongphilosopherswhoofferedsuchaccounts.Ryanclassifiesherviewas“DeepRationality”theoryofwisdomandclaimsthatitincorporatesthefollowingthreeconditions:(1) Shasawidevarietyofepistemicallyjustifiedbeliefsonawidevarietyof

valuableacademicsubjectsandonhowtoliverationally(epistemically,morally,andpractically).

(2) Shasveryfewunjustifiedbeliefsandissensitivetohisorherlimitations.(3) Sisdeeplycommittedtoboth:

(a) acquiring a wider, deeper, and more rational beliefs about reality(subjectslistedincondition1)

(b) livingrationally(practically,emotionally,andmorally)16

InspiredmostlybyErnestSosa’stheoryofknowledge,NenadMiščević(2012)offers themost elaborate theoryofwisdom, a “Virtue-TheoreticProposal”,accordingtowhichunderstanding(definedasa typeofknowledge,namelyknowledgeofcasualdependencies)isanimportantelementofwisdom.Unfor-tunately,IcannotgointodetailsregardingMiščević’saccount,butIstronglyrecommendit,giventhatIthinkitisthemostpromisingwayinwhichtothinkoftheconnectionbetweenknowledge,understanding,andwisdom,andinthatitoffersacoherentviewonthevalueofknowledgeandthewayitconnectstoepistemicvirtues.AnotheraspectofMiščević’stheoryisthewayinwhichheincorporatesNozick’saccountintoamoreelaborateandrefinedaccountofwhatitmeanstobewise.Here,however,itisimportanttonoteatwolevelaccountofwisdomheoffers.Thefirstlevelofwisdom–basicwisdom–“…encompassesprimarilyphronesisgeneratedmotivationand,onthefactualtheoreticalside,casual-dispositionalknowledgeofoneselfandofotherpeople,inparticular,group-focusedandgeneral,andasmuchinformationabouttheworldasisneededfor thegoodlife.”(Miščević2012,p.135)

Thesecondlevel–reflectivewisdom–isthoughtofasakindofmeta-ethicallevelwhereoneisaskedtoreflectonthefirstlevelcommitmentsandtotryto

16

Ryan 2012, p. 108. Ryan’s account is spe-cific in that shedoesn’t seeknowledgeas arequirementforwisdom,onlythatpersonhas

justified beliefs. Condition (2) captures thekeyelementsofepistemicvirtueofhumility.



balancethemout,andtoadjustthemtonovelsituations.Itisherethatmorepracticalaspectofwisdomisrevealed,theoneconnectedtohowonelivesandcomportsinhislife,ratherthantowhatoneknows.OnefinaltheoryofwisdomthatIfindparticularlyrevealingistheonepro-posedbyJasonBaehr(2012),whoprovideselaborateaccountsoftheoretical,aswellaspracticalwisdom.BothheandMiščevićarecloseinclaimingthatwisdomincorporatesaspecialkindofunderstandingofrelevantsubjectmat-ters,andtheybothclaimthatwisdomisinvolvedinmakingtherightchoicesin the courses of one’s life,where these are enabled by one’s understand-ingoftherelevantaspectsofsituations,choices,dilemmas,charactertraits,etc.AccordingtoBaehr’sclassification,theoreticalwisdomincorporatestwofurtherdistinctions.Itcanbethoughtofasanidealepistemicstatecharacter-izedbydeepexplanatoryunderstandingofepistemicallysignificantsubjectmatters,andasacompetence,thatis,apersonalintellectualabilitytoreliablyidentifychoice-worthyends.Similarly,practicalwisdomalso includes twoaspects.Traitconceptionclassifiespracticalwisdomasknowinghowtolivewell,wherethisinvolveswillingnesstoconductinthatmanner,aswellastheknow-howconception,according towhichacognizer isgoodatbalancingcompetingvaluesandapplyingmoralprinciplestonewsituations.Plentyofissuesareleftforepistemologiststoanswerregardingwisdom.Atthemoment,aratherinterestingdebateisgoingonconcerningwiththeclaimthatbeingwiseimpliesbeingethicallygood–somephilosophershaveraisedinterestingpointsregardingwithwiseyetmorallycorruptedpeoplewhoactonlyfortheirowninterests.Anotherrelevantdiscussionisfindingtheproperbalancebetweenintellectualandethicalaspectsofwisdomanditsmotiva-tionalforce.Doesknowingwhatisgood,whatshouldbedone,whatiswisetodoautomaticallymakedemandononetodoso?Isthereroomforweak-nessofwill,orforintentionallymakingamistake?Andfinally,givenhowstronglyepistemologistsinsistontheconnectionbetweenbeingwiseandliv-ingagoodlife,moreneedstobesaidaboutwhatgoodlifeis.Alwaysdoingtheright thing(asRyan’saccountseemstosuggest)might leaveonewise,perfectlymoralandcompletelyunhappy;epistemologistsneedto(inco-op-erationwithpsychologistandmoralphilosophers)provideanexplanationoftheconnectionbetweenwisdomandhappiness.Butwhatisimportantforourdiscussionhereisthatwisdommakesaspecialuseofself-knowledgeandI’dliketoinsistonthisaspect.Beingwisemeansknowinghowtolearnfromone’sexperiencesandhowtoprotectoneselffromlife’shardships.Italsomeanslearningfromtheexperiencesofothers,soastoavoidmakingmistakesthatothershavedone.Inadditiontoknowingwhentoletgoandwhennot,wisdom,Isuggest,incorporatesagreatdealofself-knowledgeandself-understandingnotonlyintermsofone’sdesires,interestsandmotives,butalsointermsofcopingwiththeconsequencesofone’sac-tions.Macbethmightbeausefulexamplehere;onethingthathelackedwasknowledgeofwhathecan’tlivewith.Goingmadisatleastpartlyaresultofhisnotbeingabletopredicthowkillingofakingwillaffecthim.

4. Conclusion

Ihavepresentedseveralaccountsofunderstandingandseveralaccountsofwisdom, deliberately not choosing ‘my favourite’ among them, and delib-eratelynotgoingintodeepanalysisorcomparisonof them.MyreasonforprovidingonlyanoverviewisthefactthatIwasprimarilyfocusedonpresent-



ingrecenttrendsinvaluedrivenepistemology,withtheaimofshowingtheimportanceoftheshiftfrommonismtopluralism.Monisminepistemologyshouldnotbeacceptedbecauseiftakesawaythevalueofepistemicagencythatwe exhibit.Whowe are as people is to a great extent determined byour cognitive endeavours to come to termswith ourselves, ourworld andotherpeople,andepistemologyhastorecognizethat.Inaddition,Iclaimed,monismcannotexplaincognitivegainthatisevidentincasesoftestimonialexchange(wheremorethanknowledgeisbeingtransmittedandalistenercandeepenone’sunderstandingorchangehisperspectiveonthingsthusbecom-ingpracticallyandtheoreticallywiser)or incaseswhereonefeelsonehaslearned fromart (in the sense that one has come to understand somethingaboutthepsychologicalrelationsbetweenpeopleorsomeotheraspectoftheworldthatartbringsforward).Thuspluralismsimplyfitsbetterandexplainsbetterdifferentcognitiveconnectionswehavewiththeworldanddifferentways inwhichwe feelwehaveobtained somekindof cognitivegain.Byinsistingonthepracticalaspectofwisdomitcanalsoexplainbetterthanmon-ismwhyknowledgematters.Thoughallof theseclaimsneedtobefurtheranalysedandsupportedbymoreelaborateresearch,IhopethathereIhaveofferedreasonstoacceptpluralism.However,andthisiswhatInowwanttoclaim,pluralismshouldnotbeseenasabattlefieldofvariouscognitivegoods.Itisnot‘thewinnertakesitall’story.Even ifwisdomischiefepistemicgood,and themostpraise-worthycharactertraitandintellectualvirtue,there’sstillplentyofworkforknowl-edgeandunderstanding.FromtheaccountspresentedbyMiščevićandBaehr,itseemsobviousthatthethreegoodsworktogether.WhatIwanttosuggestatthispointisthatweshouldnotbeconsideringthesecandidatesasmutuallyexclusive,inthesensethatoneiseitheradistinctiveinstanceoftheother(un-derstandingasaspecialinstanceofknowledge),orthathavingplentyofonesomehowenablesacognizertohavetheother(havingplentyofknowledgeenablesonetobewise).Myproposalistorecognizetheimportanceofeachofthese,relevanttothedifferentareasofresearchanddifferentmotivesandneedswemighthave forconductingourown researches. In somecircum-stances,beingtooreflectivemightcauseonenottoreactatall,whileinsomeothercircumstancesoneneedstoinvestaproperamountofreflectionbeforeonecanmakeone’s‘cognitivedecision’onhowthingsare.Balancingthesetwoextremesisnotalwayspleasant,butitiswhatwearedemandedtodo.IfIhavedoubtsregardingmyhusband’sfidelity,thenIneedtoknow(wherethisimpliesknowingforcertain,havingalltherelevantevidenceandappropri-atelevelofjustification)whetherornothereallycommittedadultery.Ineedtoknowhowthingsare.Ifweareinthemiddleofamaritalcrisis,Ineedtounderstandthereasonsthatbroughtustothispoint.Andifwearecontem-platingadivorce,IneedtobewiseaboutwhetherornotthemarriageisworthfightingfororlettinggoisthesolutionIoughttoembrace,soastoensuremoreprosperous life later on, after theheartache is gone. In the first case(knowingabouthispotentialaffair)Ineedtobeabsolutelycertainabouthisbehaviourandwhereabouts(perhapsevenhisdispositiontoactinthatway)inordertobecertainwhetherornothewasunfaithful.Noticethatinsomeothercircumstancesthedemandstobecertainneednotbesohigh–ifIwanttoknowwhattimeitis,allIneedisareliableinformeroraproperlyrunningwatch.Inthesecondcase,knowingthatweareintroubleisnotenoughtofindthesolution;ideally,weneedtoknowwhyandhowwegottothispoint,i.e.weneedtounderstandwhatbroughtthisonus,howtheinterplayofourcharactersandmotives(needs,desiresandotherthingsthatmightberelevant



forsustainingacompatiblerelation)andexternalcircumstances(demandingandtime-consumingworkschedules,financialissues)workedtogether,andinfluencedeachothertobringustowhereweare.ThemoreIknowaboutthesethingsthebetter,butwithoutunderstandingthisparticularkindofinter-play,Iwillnothaveafullycognitivelysatisfyinggraspofwhyourmarriagecametothispoint.Andinthethirdcase,understandingwhatbroughtthisonisnotenoughtomakeadecisionregardingmyfutureaction,beingwiseinthesenseoutlinedaboveisneededtogoon.Sothepointis,therelationbetweenknowledge,understandingandwisdomisnotthatofdominanceofoneovertheothersbutofcooperationandintegration.17

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Iris Vidmar

Epistemička igra prijestolja

SažetakCilj je ovoga rada skroman: želim ponuditi osvrt na neke od najnovijih razvoja u epistemologiji, okarakteriziranih posebnim pomakom koji se nazire već neko vrijeme. Pomak je najlakše objasniti kao napuštanje tradicionalne, monističke slike (prema kojoj je znanje jedino važno postignuće u pokušaju da spoznajno zahvatimo svijet) i prihvaćanje pluralizma (prema kojemu postoje i drugi važni spoznajni dosezi prema kojima bismo trebali ustrajati, ponajviše razumije-vanje i mudrost). Jedan od najvažnijih aspekata toga pomaka pitanje je koje spoznajno stanje nasljeđuje znanje kao vrhovnu epistemičku vrijednost i taj će me aspekt najviše zanimati. Tvrdit ću da pluralistička slika bolje odgovara našem spoznajnom susretanju sa svijetom, s drugim ljudima i sa samima sobom. U tome smislu, umjesto da navijamo za to da postoji neka jedna vrijednost koja će se nalaziti na epistemičkom tronu, trebali bismo uvažiti nezamjenjiv doprinos svake od tih vrijednosti našim nastojanjima da shvatimo tko smo i s našim iskustvom svijeta.

Ključne riječiznanje,epistemičkimonizam,epistemičkipluralizam,razumijevanje,mudrost

17

The author would like to thank to all theparticipants of the symposium “Integrativ-no mišljenje i nova paradigma znanja”(organized by Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo

[CroatianPhilosophicalSociety]heldonNo-vember28–30,2013inZagreb)fortheirvalu-ablecommentsonthepaperpresented.

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https://doi.org/10.1093/0195128923.003.0015



Iris Vidmar

Epistemisches Spiel der Throne

ZusammenfassungDas Ziel dieser Arbeit ist bescheiden: Ich möchte einen Rückblick auf einige der letzten Entwicklungen innerhalb der Epistemologie halten, die durch eine besondere Verschiebung gekennzeichnet sind, welche bereits seit einiger Zeit durchschimmert. Diese Verschiebung wird am eingängigsten erklärt als eine Abkehr von der traditionellen, monistischen Vorstellung (wonach das Wissen die einzige bedeutende Errungenschaft ist, in unserem Versuch, die Welt erkenntnismäßig zu erfassen) und die Anerkenntnis des Pluralismus (nach dem auch andere belangreiche erkenntnismäßige Leistungen bestehen, die wir anvisieren sollten – zumeist sind dies Verständnis und Weisheit. Einer der wichtigsten Aspekte dieser Verschiebung ist die Frage, welche Erkenntnislage das Wissen als den obersten epistemischen Wert erbt, und dieser Aspekt wird mein Interesse am stärksten erregen. Ich werde behaupten, dass das pluralistische Bild besser geeignet ist für unsere erkenntnisbezogene Begegnung mit der Welt, mit anderen Menschen sowie mit sich selbst. In diesem Sinne, anstatt die Option zu favorisieren, dass es den einen Wert gibt, welcher den epistemischen Thron besteigen wird, sollten wir den unersetzlichen Beitrag jedes Einzelnen von uns akzeptieren, in seiner Anstrengung, sich damit zu versöhnen, wer wir sind und was für Welterfahrungen wir gemacht haben.

SchlüsselwörterWissen,epistemischerMonismus,epistemischerPluralismus,Verständnis,Weisheit

Iris Vidmar

Le jeu épistémique des trônes

RésuméLe but de ce travail est modeste : je souhaite exposer un compte rendu de certains progrès récents en épistémologie, caractérisés par un déplacement particulier qui se profile depuis déjà un certain temps. La manière la plus évidente d’expliquer ce déplacement est de le voir comme abandon de l’image traditionnelle, monistique (selon laquelle le savoir est la seule acquisition importante dans la tentative de saisir le monde d’un point de vue de la connaissance) et d’accepter le pluralisme (selon lequel il existe d’autres significations pour la connaissance sur la base desquelles nous devrions persévérer, spécialement dans la compréhension et la sagesse). L’un des aspects les plus importants de ce déplacement est la question de savoir quel est l’état de la connaissance dont hérite le savoir en tant que valeur épistémique suprême, et c’est bien cet aspect qui va le plus m’intéresser. J’affirmerai que l’image de pluralité convient mieux à notre rencontre avec le monde, avec les autres et avec nousmême d’un point de vue de la connaissance. En ce sens, au lieu d’encourager l’idée qu’il n’existe qu’une seule et unique valeur qui va se trouver sur le trône épistémique, nous devrions accepter l’irremplaçable contribution de chacun de nous dans le but de nous réconcilier avec qui nous sommes et avec comment est constitué notre expérience du monde constituée.

Mots-cléssavoir,monismeépistémique,pluralismeépistémique,compréhension,sagesse

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