Energy, Technology and Climate Change

Energy, Technology and Climate Change

The Joint Global Change Research Team

May 25, 2010

Cosmos Club

Washington, DC

A Common Thread in this Half of the Talk

The world is heading toward regionally heterogeneous commitments

and policy structures, and towards a world with a combination ofmarket-based, regulatory, and sectoral policy approaches.

At the same time, many world leaders are aligning themselves with

aggressive long-term climate goals such as a 2oC increase in global mean surface temperature.

Are these consistent?

Are these nth-best policies in the near-term on a track toward the aggressive climate goals?

What are the implications of this nth-best world? What are the indirect effects on nth-best policies?

How and how quickly must they evolve to stay on track for our long-term goals?

HOW LOW CAN WE GO?

It is “possible” to bring concentrations to levels 350 ppmv CO2-e.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095

ppmv

Reference

350 Overshoot

CO2-e Concentrations

But it would require pretty big changes to the global energy system.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095

EJ/yr

m geothermal

l solar

k wind

j hydro

i nuclear

h biomass w/ccsg biomass

f coal w/ccs

e coal

Electricity Generation

2300

Nuc

lear

Power

Plant

s

3 m

illion

1M

W

turb

ines

These sorts of energy technology deployment levels occur eventually in every stabilization scenario –what differs between is the timing.

Full Delay

Not-to-

Exceed

Not-to-

Exceed Overshoot

Not-to

Exceed Overshoot

Not-To-

Exceed Overshoot

Not-to

Exceed Overshoot

Not-To-

Exceed

1 ETSAP-TIAM + + + + + + + + + XX2 FUND + + + + + + + XX XX XX3 GTEM + + + + + XX + XX XX XXIMAGE + + + + + + XX XX XX XXIMAGE-BC -N/A- -N/A- -N/A- -N/A- -N/A- -N/A- + XX XX XXMERGE Optimistic + + + + XX XX XX XX XX XXMERGE Pessimistic + + + + + + XX XX XX XXMESSAGE + + + + + XX + XX XX XXMESSAGE - NOBECS + -N/A- + + -N/A- -N/A- + XX XX XXMiniCAM Base + + + + + XX + + + XXMiniCAM LoTech + + + + + XX + XX XX XX

8 POLES + + + + + XX XX XX XX XX9 SGM + + + + + + XX XX XX XX10 WITCH + + + + + + XX XX XX XX

7

Model

4

5

6

450 CO2-e

Full Delay Full Delay

650 CO2-e 550 CO2-e

Which scenarios were EMF 22 modelers able to provide?

Full Delay

Not-to-

Exceed

Not-to-

Exceed Overshoot

Not-to

Exceed Overshoot

Not-To-

Exceed Overshoot

Not-to

Exceed Overshoot

Not-To-

Exceed



7

Model

4

5

6

450 CO2-e


650 CO2-e 550 CO2-e


Full Participation: All Begin Reductions Immediately

Group 1: Annex 1 (minus Russia)

Group 2: BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China)

2012 2030 2050 2070

Group 3: Remaining Countries

Delayed Participation: Regions Enter the Global Coalition over Time

2012 2030 2050 2070

The delayed participation case explores the potential impacts of a one single

possibility for delay in non-Annex I participation – it does not represent any real

policy proposal. Mechanisms such as offsets may lead to policy structures that lie between the two cases explored in this study.

Group 1: Annex 1 (minus Russia)

Group 2: BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China)

Group 3: Remaining Countries

Full Delay

Not-to-

Exceed

Not-to-

Exceed Overshoot

Not-to

Exceed Overshoot

Not-To-

Exceed Overshoot

Not-to

Exceed Overshoot

Not-To-

Exceed



7

Model

4

5

6

450 CO2-e


650 CO2-e 550 CO2-e


Participation and concentration pathway all influence the ability to achieve low stabilization levels.

8 2 2 012 6

Full Delay

Not-to-

Exceed

Not-to-

Exceed Overshoot

Not-to

Exceed Overshoot

Not-To-

Exceed Overshoot

Not-to

Exceed Overshoot

Not-To-

Exceed



7

Model

4

5

6

450 CO2-e


650 CO2-e 550 CO2-e

Technology also influences the ability to meet low-stabilization levels.

8 2 2 012 6

Full Delay

Not-to-

Exceed

Not-to-

Exceed Overshoot

Not-to

Exceed Overshoot

Not-To-

Exceed Overshoot

Not-to

Exceed Overshoot

Not-To-

Exceed



7

Model

4

5

6

450 CO2-e


650 CO2-e 550 CO2-e

BioCCS is not the only

reason that models could

or could not produce particular scenarios

No BioCCSLegend:

REGIONAL ENERGY,

EMISSIONS AND

TECHNOLOGY

-120%

-100%

-80%

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

Change in CO2 Emissions Relative to 2000

ETSAP-TIAM

FUND

GTEM

IMAGE

IMAGE-BECS

MERGE Optimistic

MERGE Pessimistic

MESSAGE

MESSAGE-NOBECS

MiniCAM - Base

MiniCAM - Lo Tech

POLES

SGM

WITCH

2000 Emissions

Zero Emissions

650 CO2-e 550 CO2-e 450 CO2-e

Full

N.T.E.

Delay

N.T.E.

Full

N.T.E.

Delay

N.T.E.

Full

O.S.

Delay

O.S.

Full

N.T.E

.

Delay

N.T.E.

Full

O.S.

Delay

O.S.

How can a single country determine whether it is taking actions consistent with long-term goals.

Scenarios that could not be modeled under criteria of study.

80 Percent Reduction Below to 2000

50 Percent

Reduction Below 2000

U.S. Mitigation in 2050 from EMF 22

587 CO2-e peak

530 CO2-e peak

502 CO2-e peak

523 CO2-e peak

There is a real difference between actual reductions and commitments that could be met through offsets.

-120%

-100%

-80%

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

Change in CO2 Emissions Relative to 2000

ETSAP-TIAM

FUND

GTEM

IMAGE

IMAGE-BECS

MERGE Optimistic

MERGE Pessimistic

MESSAGE

MESSAGE-NOBECS

MiniCAM - Base

MiniCAM - Lo Tech

POLES

SGM

WITCH

2000 Emissions

Zero Emissions

650 CO2-e 550 CO2-e 450 CO2-e

Full

N.T.E.

Delay

N.T.E.

Full

N.T.E.

Delay

N.T.E.

Full

O.S.

Delay

O.S.

Full

N.T.E

.

Delay

N.T.E.

Full

O.S.

Delay

O.S.

Scenarios that could not be modeled under criteria of study.

U.S. Mitigation in 2050 from EMF 22 These are actual

fossil and industrial emissions in the U.S.

Other countries are mitigating at the

same price as the U.S.; in some cases,

with explicitly equal prices on land carbon.

Decreasing U.S. emissions through

fossil and industrial offset purchases

would result in higher prices outside

of the U.S. than inside it.

Real-world policies may be real-complicatedAn illustrative multi-track regime: Targets + Policy Commitments

Electricity Transportation Industry Buildings

Australia/New Zealand,

Canada, Europe, Former

Soviet Union, Japan, United

States

Economy-Wide Carbon Constraint

CO2 emissions relative to 2005

(80%, 50%, 20%)

Africa Power Sector Carbon Intensity

Relative to 2005

(NA, 70%, 25%)

Biofuels Target: Share of refined liquids

(NA, NA, 10%)

Fuel Economy Standard

Increase in mpg over 2005

(NA, NA, 40%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, NA, 65%)

China Power Sector Carbon Intensity

Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy

Efficiency Constraint

Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)

India Power Sector Carbon Intensity

Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(NA, 5%, 15%)



(NA, 20%, 90%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, NA, 80%)

Korea Power Sector Carbon Intensity

Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(30%, 50%, 90%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(20%, 40%, 100%)

Latin America Power Sector Carbon Intensity

Relative to 2005

(NA, 70%, 25%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)

Middle East Power Sector Carbon Intensity

Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)

Southeast Asia Power Sector Carbon Intensity

Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(NA, 5%, 15%)



(NA, 20%, 90%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)

Africa, China, India, Korea,

Latin America, Middle

East, Southeast Asia

Crediting

% of emissions reductions sold to developed world

(50%, 25%, 0%)

Exploring “multi-track” pathways to long-term goals.

Economy-wide targets

Policy-based commitments

National-level sectoral targets/standards

Sectoral agreements

Sector-specific policies applied across regions

Funds for adaptation and technology

0

5

10

15

20

25

1990 2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095

Fossil and Industrial CO2 Emissions (GtC/yr)

Reference

Cost-Minimizing 550

Cost-Minimizing 450

450 ppmv CO2 Overshoot

Objective: visualize and assess

illustrative “multi-track” architectures

integrating different types of mitigation commitments

Real-world policies may be real-complicatedAn illustrative multi-track regime: Targets + Policy Commitments





States



(80%, 50%, 20%)


Relative to 2005

(NA, 70%, 25%)


(NA, NA, 10%)



(NA, NA, 40%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, NA, 65%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(NA, 5%, 15%)



(NA, 20%, 90%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, NA, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(30%, 50%, 90%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(20%, 40%, 100%)


Relative to 2005

(NA, 70%, 25%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(NA, 5%, 15%)



(NA, 20%, 90%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)




Crediting


(50%, 25%, 0%)

Real-world policies may be real-complicatedAn example from our work on multi-track regimes





States



(80%, 50%, 20%)


Relative to 2005

(NA, 70%, 25%)


(NA, NA, 10%)



(NA, NA, 40%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, NA, 65%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(NA, 5%, 15%)



(NA, 20%, 90%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, NA, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(30%, 50%, 90%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(20%, 40%, 100%)


Relative to 2005

(NA, 70%, 25%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(NA, 5%, 15%)



(NA, 20%, 90%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)




Crediting


(50%, 25%, 0%)






States



(80%, 50%, 20%)


Relative to 2005

(NA, 70%, 25%)


(NA, NA, 10%)



(NA, NA, 40%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, NA, 65%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(NA, 5%, 15%)



(NA, 20%, 90%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, NA, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(30%, 50%, 90%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(20%, 40%, 100%)


Relative to 2005

(NA, 70%, 25%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(NA, 5%, 15%)



(NA, 20%, 90%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)




Crediting


(50%, 25%, 0%)






States



(80%, 50%, 20%)


Relative to 2005

(NA, 70%, 25%)


(NA, NA, 10%)



(NA, NA, 40%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, NA, 65%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(NA, 5%, 15%)



(NA, 20%, 90%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, NA, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(30%, 50%, 90%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(20%, 40%, 100%)


Relative to 2005

(NA, 70%, 25%)


(5%, 7.5%, 20%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)



(20%, 45%, 150%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)


Relative to 2005

(70%, 50%, 18%)


(NA, 5%, 15%)



(NA, 20%, 90%)

Industry Carbon

Constraint

Reduction from BAU

(NA, 30%, 75%)

Building Energy


Increase over 2005

(NA, 20%, 80%)




Crediting


(50%, 25%, 0%)

0.00%

0.05%

0.10%

0.15%

0.20%

0.25%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20%

Emissions Reduction (Fossil and Industrial CO2)

Costs (Fraction of GDP)

Multi-track regimes lead to less efficient allocation

of emissions mitigation, across regions, sectors, and technologies.

2020

First-best(fully efficient)550650

450

Targets+ Sectoral Agreements

Targets+ Policy Commitments

Targets+ Policy Commitments+ Sectoral Agreements

Inefficient

policies are ….inefficient.

The devil is in

the details of

the policy itself.

Inefficient

policies are ….inefficient.

The devil is in

the details of

the policy itself.

0.00%

0.05%

0.10%

0.15%

0.20%

0.25%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20%



2020


450




Multi-track regimes lead to less efficient allocation

of emissions mitigation, across regions, sectors, and technologies.

0.00%

0.05%

0.10%

0.15%

0.20%

0.25%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20%Emissions Reduct ion (Fossil and Industrial CO2)


0.00%

0.10%

0.20%

0.30%

0.40%

0.50%

0.60%

0.70%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%Emissions Reduction (Fossil and Industrial CO2)


It becomes increasingly challenging to use

these policy structures as mitigation becomes more stringent

The 450 ppmv overshoot pathway with

Targets & Policy Commitments could not

be met without either expanding coverage of the multi-track policy or transitioning to a fully-efficient regime

0.00%

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

3.50%

4.00%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%




450




Global Target

2020

2035

2050

The questions about policy structures like these are about tradeoffs and policy evolution.

Decision-makers put different emphases on different criteria.

Environmental Effectiveness

Equity

Economic Efficiency

Political Feasibility

If these are a starting point, how and how quickly must they evolve?

Why might regional actions vary:

different resource bases, different energy systems, different

political structures, different weightings of societal issues, different institutional capabilities to take on action, ……

Note: 190 million households in urban residential and

183 million households in rural residential in 2005

China Buildings’ Energy Use by Fuel (2005)

Space Heating in Rural Residential

Reference Policy

How might rural buildings in China respond to an economy-wide carbon price?

Price effects from carbon policy would push to extend the use of traditional bioenergy.

3,900+ GtCO2

Capacity

2,309 GtCO2

Capacity

1,600 CO2sources emitting 3,890 MtCO2/yr

1,715 sources emitting 2,900 MtCO2/yr

Dahowski, RT, Dooley, JJ, Davidson, CL, Bachu, S and Gupta, N. Building the Cost Curves for CO2 Storage: North America. Technical Report 2005/3.

International Energy Agency Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme. Dahowski RT, X Li, CL Davidson, N Wei, and JJ Dooley. 2010. Regional Opportunities for

Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage in China: A Comprehensive CO2 Storage Cost Curve and Analysis of the Potential for Large Scale Carbon Dioxide

Capture and Storage in the People’s Republic of China . PNNL-19091, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA.

Bottom-up assessments of CCS deployment opportunities for the US (2010) and China (2010).

SECTORAL ENERGY,

EMISSIONS AND

TECHNOLOGY

Studies generally indicate that the electricity sector is more responsive to carbon prices than transportation.

TransportationElectricity

U.S. CO2 Emissions: No Climate Policy

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

GtCO2/yr

ADAGE MRN-NEEM

EPPA IGEM MERGE (opt) MiniCAM (base)

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

GtCO2/yr

ADAGE MRN-NEEM

EPPA IGEM

MERGE (opt) MiniCAM (base)


-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

GtCO2/yr

ADAGE MRN-NEEM

EPPA IGEM MERGE (opt) MiniCAM (base)

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

GtCO2/yr

ADAGE MRN-NEEM

EPPA IGEM



U.S. CO2 Emissions: 287 GtCO2-e


-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

GtCO2/yr

ADAGE

MRN-NEEM

EPPA

IGEM

MERGE (opt)

MiniCAM (base)

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

GtCO2/yr

ADAGE MRN-NEEM

EPPA IGEM





-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

GtCO2/yr

ADAGE

MRN-NEEM

EPPA

IGEM

MERGE (opt)

MiniCAM (base)

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

GtCO2/yr

ADAGE MRN-NEEM

EPPA IGEM




How far much can be done with only an RPS (including bio) and a CAFE standard?

Four Scenarios: a Global Policy Experiment

Reference

CAFE Only

Vehicle efficiency improves linearly to 58 mpg by 2050

RPS Only

97% renewable electricity generation by 2050

CAFE + RPS

Vehicle efficiency improves linearly to 58 mpg by 2050

97% renewable electricity generation by 2050

The policies have their desired sectoral effects….

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

2005 2020 2035 2050

GtC

O2/

yr

Electricity Transportation

Buildings Industry

Land-Use Change

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

2005 2020 2035 2050

GtC

O2/

yr


Buildings Industry

Land-Use Change

Electricity emissions

are driven to zero by 2050

Reference CAFE + RPS

The policies have their desired sectoral effects….

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

2005 2020 2035 2050

GtC

O2/

yr


Buildings Industry

Land-Use Change

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

2005 2020 2035 2050

GtC

O2/

yr


Buildings Industry

Land-Use Change

Transportation

emissions are

reduced substantially by 2050


The policies have their desired sectoral effects…. but there are indirect effects.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

2005 2020 2035 2050

GtC

O2/

yr


Buildings Industry

Land-Use Change

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

2005 2020 2035 2050

GtC

O2/

yr


Buildings Industry

Land-Use Change

Emissions in buildings

and industry increase as

the sector substitute for electricity


What is the implication of indirect effects on emissions?

Coverage is critical

to prevent limit

indirect effects.

It is not viable to just

go after high priority

sectors in the long-

term.

The effects of

second-best policies

evolve over time

with the stringency

of the mitigation

goal.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2005 2020 2035 2050

Global CO2 Emissions (GtCO2/yr)

Reference

CAFE + RPSNo Indirect Effects

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095

GtC

/yr

Reference550 w/ Land Price500 w/ Land Price450 w/ Land Price550 w/o Land Price500 w/o Land Price450 w/o Land Price

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095

GtC

/yr

550 w/ Land Price500 w/ Land Price450 w/ Land PriceReference550 w/o Land Price500 w/o Land Price450 w/o Land Price

The implications of excluding land use from climate policy could be substantial.

Land Use Change CO2 Emissions Fossil and Industrial CO2 Emissions

A pulse of land use change

emissions when land use is excluded.

Greater reductions in fossil fuel and

industrial emissions when land use is excluded.

-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

No Offsets Domestic

Offsets

Domestic

+ Latin

America

Offsets

Domestic

+ Tropical

Offsets

Domestic

+ Global

Offsets

Cu

mu

lati

ve

20

05

to

20

50

(G

tCO

2)

-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

No Offsets Domestic

Offsets

Domestic

+ Latin

America

Offsets

Domestic

+ Tropical

Offsets

Domestic

+ Global

Offsets

Cu

mu

lati

ve

20

05

to

20

50

(G

tCO

2)

Did you get what you paid for?

Purchased Offsets(Change in Annex 1 Fossil and

Industrial Emissions)

Change in Land Use Change Emissions from Reference

Note: Negative indicates an decrease in LUC emissions relative to the reference

An experiment based on a 50% reduction in fossil and industrial emissions from Annex 1.

What are the implications of a changing climate on land use change emissions?

-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095

GtC/yr

No Policy w/o Impacts

-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095

GtC/yr


No Policy w/ Impacts

-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095

GtC/yr



500 ppmv w/o Impacts

-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095

GtC/yr



500 ppmv w/o Impacts

500 ppmv w/ Impacts

THE VALUE OF TECHNOLOGY

DEVELOPMENT

42

Energy technology development must consider not

just improvements to existing technology, but also basic science to support mitigation in 2050 and beyond.

The time scale of emissions mitigation is a century or more.

Investments in basic scientific

research in the first half of the

21st century can be transformed

into energy technologies that

can become a major part of the

global energy system in the second half of the century.

Emissions Mitigation 2005 to

2050 and 2050 to 2095

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

750 ppm 650 ppm 550 ppm 450 ppm

2005 to 2050 2050 to 2095

The public goods nature of climate change extends to technology

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Global Abatement Cost

Tri

llio

n 2

00

0$

(D

isco

un

ted

)

Reference

Technology

Advanced Technology

outside U.S. Only

Global Advanced

Technology

Advanced Technology

in U.S. Only

From our Harvard Project paper on delayed participation and technology

The public goods nature of climate change extends to technology

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

US Abatement Cost

Tri

llio

n 2

00

0$

(D

isco

un

ted

)

Reference

Technology

Advanced Technology

outside U.S. Only

Global Advanced

Technology

Advanced Technology

in U.S. Only

From our Harvard Project paper on delayed participation and technology

FRAMING THE DISCUSSION

DISCUSSION

Documents

Energy, Technology and Climate Change