v o l u m e f i v e

Si – Z

Jane Dammen McAuliffe, General Editor

e

Encyclopaedia of

the Qur�ān

Brill, Leiden – Boston

2006

volume v

Binyamin Abrahamov, Bar-Ilan UniversityCamilla P. Adang, Tel-Aviv UniversityScott C. Alexander, Catholic

Theological Union, ChicagoMohammed Arkoun, Sorbonne UniversityAli S.A. Asani, Harvard UniversityMargot Badran, Northwestern UniversityDaniel Beaumont, University of

RochesterJames A. Bellamy, University of MichiganSheila Blair, Boston CollegeHartmut Bobzin, University of ErlangenMichael Bonner, University of MichiganGerhard Böwering, Yale UniversityPaolo Luigi Branca, Catholic University,

MilanWilliam M. Brinner, University of

California, BerkeleyJonathan E. Brockopp, Pennsylvania

State UniversityDavid B. Burrell, University of Notre

DameAmila Buturovic, York University,

CanadaJacqueline Chabbi, University of ParisMasudul Alam Choudhury, Sultan

Qaboos University, OmanFrederick S. Colby, Miami University,

Oxford, OH

Michael A. Cook, Princeton UniversityPatricia Crone, Institute for Advanced

Study, PrincetonStefania Cunial, Ca’ Foscari University,

VeniceStephan Dähne, Orient-Institut der

Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Beirut

Maria Massi Dakake, George Mason University

Natana J. De Long-Bas, Boston College

Pieternella van Doorn-Harder, Valparaiso University

Dale F. Eickelman, Dartmouth CollegeHerbert Eisenstein, University of

ViennaSalwa M.S. El-Awa, University of

BirminghamJamal Elias, Amherst CollegeAmira El-Zein, Tufts UniversityR. Michael Feener, The University of

California, RiversideReuven Firestone, Hebrew Union

College, Los AngelesErsilia Francesca, Università degli Studi

di Napoli “L’Orientale”Yohanan Friedmann, Hebrew University,

JerusalemDmitry V. Frolov, Moscow UniversityAvner Giladi, University of Haifa

authors of articles

a u t h o r s o f a r t i c l e s viii

Claude Gilliot, University of Aix-en-Provence

Joseph Ginat, University of OklahomaValerie Gonzalez, Dartmouth

CollegeMatthew S. Gordon, Miami University,

Oxford, OHSebastian Günther, University of

TorontoRosalind W. Gwynne, University of

TennesseeShahla Haeri, Boston UniversityGerald R. Hawting, University of

LondonPaul L. Heck, Georgetown UniversityMargaretha T. Heemskerk, Radboud

University, NijmegenMarcia Hermansen, Loyola University,

ChicagoThomas Emil Homerin, University of

RochesterRobert Kevin Jaques, Indiana UniversityAnthony Hearle Johns, Australian

National UniversityDavid Johnston, Yale UniversityGautier H.A. Juynboll, Leiden, The

NetherlandsAhmet T. Karamustafa, Washington

University, St. LouisBustami Mohamed Khir, University of

BirminghamAlexander D. Knysh, University of

MichiganKathryn Kueny, Fordham UniversityScott Kugle, University of LeidenPaul Kunitzsch, University of MunichElla Landau-Tasseron, Hebrew

University, JerusalemJoseph Lowry, University of

PennsylvaniaDavid Marshall, Lambeth Palace,

LondonIngrid Mattson, Hartford SeminaryMustansir Mir, Youngstown State

UniversityRobert G. Morrison, Whitman College

Harald Motzki, Radboud University, Nijmegen

Tilman Nagel, University of GöttingenJohn A. Nawas, Catholic University

LeuvenAngelika Neuwirth, Free University,

BerlinUte Pietruschka, Philipps University,

MarburgMatthias Radscheit, Bonn, GermanyBernd R. Radtke, University of UtrechtWim Raven, University of FrankfurtBassel A. Reyahi, Toronto, CanadaGabriel Said Reynolds, University of

Notre DameAndrew Rippin, University of VictoriaChristian Julien Robin, Centre National

de la Recherche Scientifi que, Aix-en-Provence

Chase F. Robinson, University of OxfordRuth Roded, Hebrew University,

JerusalemUri Rubin, Tel-Aviv UniversityMichael Schub, Trinity College,

Hartford, CNMichael A. Sells, Haverford CollegeIrfan Shahid, Georgetown UniversityMona Siddiqui, Glasgow UniversityKemal Silay, Indiana UniversityPriscilla P. Soucek, New York UniversityDevin J. Stewart, Emory UniversityBarbara Stowasser, Georgetown

UniversityDavid Thomas, University of BirminghamHeidi Toelle, Sorbonne UniversityShawkat M. Toorawa, Cornell

UniversityRoberto Tottoli, Università degli Studi

di Napoli “L’Orientale”Kees Wagtendonk, University of

Amsterdam (emeritus)David Waines, Lancaster UniversityLutz Wiederhold, University Halle-

WittenbergMuhammad Qasim Zaman, Brown

University

Sickness see illness and health

iffīn, Battle of

Battle which took place during the fi rst civil war between the fourth caliph (q.v.), �Alī b. Abī �ālib (q.v.), and Mu�āwiya b. Abī Sufyān, governor of Syria, in afar37⁄July 657. Mu�āwiya, facing removal from his post by �Alī, decided to revive the cause of a recently defeated coalition of Medinan religious elite who had de-manded that �Alī punish the assassins of his caliphal predecessor, �Uthmān b. �Affān(see �uthm�n). �Alī refused to do so, given his ambivalence about �Uthmān’s assas-sination (�abarī, Ta�rīkh, i, 3275-8;Balādhurī, Ansāb, ii, 194-7; Minqarī, Waq�a,31-3, 58, 82; see politics and the qur��n; sh��a). The sources say that after a series of letters exchanged between the two leaders, the battle between �Alī’s predominantly Iraqi army and Mu�āwiya’s largely Syrian supporters was joined on afar 8⁄July 26 at iffīn, located near al-Raqqa along the Euphrates river in northern Iraq (q.v.). The battle lasted, by various accounts, two or three days, by the end of which �Alī had gained the advantage. To avert probable defeat, Mu�āwiya, following the advice of

�Amr b. al-�Ā�, ordered his troops to bear aloft copies of the Qur�ān (or a copy of the Qur�ān) on the ends of their spears — imi-tating a precedent set by �Alī at the earlier Battle of the Camel (Balādhurī, Ansāb, ii, 170-1; Ibn A�tham, Futū�, ii, 315) — and calling for arbitration (q.v.) on the basis of the scripture (Minqarī, Waq�a, 476-82;�abarī, Ta�rīkh, i, 3329-30 [trans. 79-80];Balādhurī, Ansāb, ii, 226-7). �Alī, initially reluctant to submit to ar-bitration, eventually agreed under pressure from some of his supporters, including the Iraqi Qur�ān readers (qurrā�; Minqarī,Waq�a, 489-92; �abarī, Ta�rīkh, i, 3330[trans. 79]; see reciters of the qur��n).The more reliable of the two versions of the arbitration agreement found in the early sources stipulated that an arbitrator be nominated from each side and that the two meet on neutral territory to resolve the dispute on the basis of the Qur�ān and, should no clear directive be found in the scripture, on the “just, unifying and not divisive sunna” (q.v.; Minqarī, Waq�a, 510;Balādhurī, Ansāb, ii, 226, 230; �abarī,Ta�rīkh, i, 3336 [trans. 85-6]). Mu�āwiya named �Amr b. al-�Ā� as his representative. �Alī sought to name one of his equally trusted men but was pressured by infl u-ential members of his camp to name

s[continued]

2

Abū Mūsā l-Ash�arī, a well-respected but neutral fi gure (Balādhurī, Ansāb, ii, 230;�abarī, Ta�rīkh, i, 3333-4 [trans. 82-3]).The arbitrators seem to have met on two occasions — at Dūmat al-Jandal in Shawwāl-Dhū l-Qa�da 37⁄April 658 and later at Adhru� in Sha�bān 38⁄January 659. While the sources sometimes confl ate these two meetings and their outcomes, it seems that at the fi rst meeting, the arbitra-tors agreed that �Uthmān had been killed unjustly. �Amr connected this judgment to q 17:33: “Whosever is slain unjustly, we have given authority (q.v.) to his heir,” and argued for Mu�āwiya’s right to the caliph-ate as the kinsman of �Uthmān (see murder; corruption; kinship). AbūMūsā rejected �Amr’s interpretation and the arbitration was considered a failure by �Alī (Minqarī, Waq�a, 541; Mas�ūdī,Murūj⁄Prairies d’or, § 1705-8, iii, 145-8 [Fr. trans. 668-71]; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, iii, 331).The second meeting at Adhru�, apparently not endorsed by �Alī, ended with a ruse whereby Abū Mūsā was tricked into depos-ing �Alī, leaving Mu�āwiya as caliph by de-fault (Minqarī, Waq�a, 544-6; �abarī,Ta�rīkh, i, 3341-3 [trans. 90-2]). Although the results of this meeting were not widely recognized outside of Syria, �Alī faced growing opposition among his supporters over the terms of the arbitration and its outcome. Many dissenters — including some qurrā� who initially favored arbitra-tion but reversed their opinion upon learn-ing of its terms — had seceded from �Alī’s camp even prior to the meeting of the ar-bitrators, claiming that “judgment belongs to God alone” (lā �ukma illā lillāhi), a slogan that echoes the qur�ānic statement inil-�ukmu illā lillāhi (q 6:57; 12:40, 67). They also demanded that �Alī repent of his sub-mission to a process that placed men in judgment over the Qur�ān (see law and the qur��n). Many of these secessionists,

later referred to as “Khārijīs” (q.v.), per-manently broke with �Alī after the failure of the arbitration and suffered a devastating military defeat at his hands some months later.

Maria Massi Dakake

BibliographyPrimary: al-Balādhurī, A�mad b. Ya�yā, Ansābal-ashrāf, ed. M. al-Firdaws al-�A�m, 15 vols., Damascus 1996-; Ibn Abī l-adīd, Shar� Nahj al-balāgha, ed. M. Abū l-Fa�l Ibrāhīm, 20 vols., Cairo 1959-64; Ibn A�tham al-Kūfī, Kitāb al-Futū�, 7 vols., Hyderabad 1968; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, 12 vols., Beirut 1979; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāya,ed. �A.M. Mu�awwa� and �Ā.A. �Abd al-Mawjūd,8 vols., Beirut 1994; Khalīfa b. Khayyā, Ta�rīkh,ed. A.D. al-�Umarī, Najaf 1967; Mas�ūdī, Murūj,7 vols., Beirut 1966-79; Fr. trans. Ch. Pellat, Lesprairies d’or, 5 vols., 1962-97; al-Minqarī, Na�r b. Muzā�im, Waq�at �iffīn, ed. �A. Hārūn, Cairo 1962; �abarī, Ta�rīkh, ed. de Goeje; id., The history of al-�abarī. xvii. The fi rst civil war, trans. G.R Hawting, Albany 1996; Ya�qūbī, Ta�rīkh,ed. �A. Muhannā, 2 vols., Beirut 1993.Secondary: M. Hinds, The Siffi n arbitration agreement, in jss 17 (1972), 93-129; W. Madelung, Succession to Mu�ammad. A study of the early caliphate, Cambridge 1997; C. Petersen, �Alī and Mu�āwiya in early Arabic traditions, Copenhagen 1964.

Sight see vision and blindness; seeing and hearing

Signs

Indications or portents, foreshadowing or confi rming something. The concept of sign, one of the most commonly exhibited concepts in the Qur�ān, is expressed mainly by the word āya (pl. āyāt ) in almost four hundred instances and by the word bayyina (pl. bayyināt ) in approximately sixty cases. Several other words also convey the principal idea or some nuances of āya, for example: lesson (�ibra, q 12:111), pattern (uswa, q 60:4), fact, story, discourse (�adīth,

s i g n s

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q 45:6), example (mathal, q 43:57; see parable), proof (q.v.; burhān, q 4:174),proof (sul�ān, q 30:35), signs (sha�ā�ir,q 22:36), signs (āthār, q 30:50; see genera- tions; air and wind; geography), sign (dalīl, q 25:45). The word āya (sign) has no root in Arabic and is very probably a loan-word from Syriac or Aramaic (āthā; see foreign vocabulary) where it indicates not only the ideas of sign and miracle (see miracles; marvels), as in biblical and rabbinic Hebrew (ōth), but also the notions of argument and proof. (Arab philologists who have tried to fi nd a stem and a form of this word have arrived at different solu-tions; either the word is derived from a-w-yor from a-y-y and its form is either fa�ala or fa�la or fā�ila; cf. Lisān al-�Arab; see gram- mar and the qur��n.) The word occurs in pre-Islamic poetry (see poetry and poets)in the meaning of a sign or token and in this meaning it also appears in the Qur�ān(q 26:128, “as a sign for passers by”). In the Qur�ān, āya also often denotes argument and proof. These shades of meaning can be explained in the light of the polemical character of parts of the Qur�ān which are infl uenced by Mu�ammad’s struggles with the unbelievers, the Jews and the Chris-tians (see polemic and polemical lan- guage; belief and unbelief; jews and judaism; christians and christianity).

Expressions of signsThe scripture attests to the numerous and diverse signs which exist in the earth (q.v.) and in humankind: “In the earth are signs for those having sure faith (q.v.), and in yourselves; what, do you not see?” (q 51:20-1; see seeing and hearing; vision and blindness). These signs are so obvious that one cannot ignore them. Being produced by God (q 6:109; 7:203;29:50) and only with his permission

(q 13:38; 40:78), such signs can be detected in all spheres of life. Both animate and inanimate objects provide signs (Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī [d. 606⁄1210] makes a distinction between signs in man, dalā�ilal-anfus, and signs in the world, dalā�il al-āfāq; Rāzī, Tafsīr, xxv, 111), as in “O my people, this is the she-camel of God, to be a sign for you” (q 11:64; see camel; ��li�)and “And it is God who sends down out of heaven water (q.v.), and therewith revives the earth after it is dead. Surely in that is a sign for a people who listen” (q 16:65; cf. 30:24; see heaven and sky; hearing and deafness). God’s providential design is demonstrated through his acts in nature and in human beings (see nature as signs; grace; blessing). A typical sign-passage is q 13:2-3:

God is he who raised up the heavens with-out pillars you can see, then he sat himself upon the throne (see throne of god); he subjected the sun (q.v.) and the moon (q.v.), each one running to a term stated. He directs the affair; he distinguishes the signs; haply you will have faith in the encounter with your lord (q.v.). It is he who stretched out the earth and set therein fi rm moun-tains and rivers, and of every fruit he placed there two kinds, covering the day with the night (see day and night). Surely in that are signs for a people who refl ect (see reflection and deliberation; agriculture and vegetation).

Sustenance (q.v.) and dress are given to humankind by God as a sign of his providence:

Children of Adam! We have sent down on you a garment to cover your shameful parts (see clothing; modesty; nudity),and adornment (rīsh); and the garment of godfearing — that is better; that is one of

s i g n s

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God’s signs; haply they will remember (q 7:26; see remembrance).

Have they not seen that God spreads out the provision to whom he wills or is sparing [with it]? Surely in that are signs for a peo-ple who believe (q 30:37).

To these signs are added the variety of hu-man languages (see language) and colors (q.v.) and their differentiated activities by night and day (q 30:22-3). God also inter-venes in historical events by punishing wicked peoples; this intervention serves as a sign for those who fear the punishment of the last day (q 11:102-3; see last judg- ment; history and the qur��n; chas- tisement and punishment; punishment stories; reward and punishment). In like manner God prevents the enemies [of Muslims] from injuring them (q 48:20) and he causes some people, especially prophets, to overcome others to prevent their cor-rupting of the earth (q 2:251-2; see proph- ets and prophethood; corruption).According to the context of q 3:58, what has happened to the prophets are signs. Mary (q.v.), Jesus’ (q.v.) mother, became a sign because of her chastity (q.v.) which caused God to breathe into her something of his spirit (q.v.; q 21:91).

Functions of signsHaving examined some of the objects which serve as signs, this discussion can turn to the functions of āyāt. Most of the signs in scripture have the purpose of call-ing on humankind to thank God (e.g. q 16:14; 30:46; 36:73; see gratitude and ingratitude) and to worship (q.v.) him (cf. q 10:3). Considering the frequent occur-rence of words denoting signs in the Qur�ān (see, for example, the beginning of q 45 in which the word āyāt occurs in al-most every verse), it is possible to state that Mu�ammad regarded signs as the best

means to call people to believe in God and his messenger (q.v.), a means preferable to frightening them with the horrors of the day of judgment. Āyāt are miracles done by God for the sake of people. Signs in “ask the Children of Israel (q.v.) how many a clear sign we gave,” (q 2:211) are inter-preted to mean the splitting of the Red Sea, and the bringing down of the manna and the quail (see animal life). The aim of these miracles was to compel the Children of Israel to believe in God, but they refused to believe. Those who deny God’s miracles are doomed to suffer God’s severe punishment (q 3:11; 4:56). Miracles also aim at causing people to believe in prophets (q 58:5); Moses (q.v.) tried to per-suade Pharaoh (q.v.) that he had been sent by God (q 7:103-6). Muhammad’s proph-ecy is not proved directly by āyāt; rather it is proved through legitimating his message by āyāt. When the message is demonstrated to be genuine, the messenger is a true prophet. Through the use of analogy the Qur�ān attempts to convince people to be-lieve in certain tenets of Islam, such as the resurrection (q.v.). According to q 2:259, a man passed near a ruined town and asked how shall God give its dead people life. To show this man his power, God put him to death and revived him after one hundred years. The aim of this personal miracle is to show God’s ability to resurrect the dead (Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, i, 558). The miracle here serves as proof based on analogy: just as God put this man to death and then re-stored him to life, so can he put all people to death and then revive them on the day of judgment (see death and the dead).Resurrection is also demonstrated through God’s creation (q.v.) of the world. If God’s ability to create extends to such an enor-mous act, the more so his ability to revive the dead: “Have they not seen that God who created the heavens and earth, not being wearied by creating them (see

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sabbath), is able to give life to the dead?” (q 46:33; cf. 75:38-40). Another proof is learned from the rain sent by God. Just as the rain revives the earth, causing plants to sprout, so can God restore the dead to life (cf. q 35:9).

From the contents and context of q 3:13 it is obvious that an āya is also a lesson (�ibra):There has already been a sign for you in the two companies that met [at the battle of Badr (q.v.)], one company fi ghting for the sake of God and another unbelieving; [the unbelievers] saw [the Muslims] twice the like of them, as the eye sees, but God supports with his help whom he will. Surely, in that is a lesson for the wise (see wisdom; ignorance; teaching).

The lesson God conveys here is that he can make a few people overcome many. Again God’s power and his help for man are proven (see victory; power and impotence; trust and patience).Whereas in q 2:259, mentioned above, the analogy is to be learned by stages, here the conclusion from the story is directly in-ferred. That God punishes evil people is a widespread idea throughout the Qur�ān(see good and evil). Sometimes the Qur�ān points out that whoever fears the punishment of the last judgment should take a lesson from God’s previous punishments:

Such is the punishment [literally “seizing,” akhdh] of your lord, when he punishes [the evildoers of] the cities; surely his punish-ment is painful, terrible. Surely in that is a sign for him who fears the chastisement of the world to come… (q 11:102-3; see also q 15:77; 25:37; 26:103, 121, 139, 158, 174,190; 27:52; 29:35; 34:19).

The lesson to be learned is not only from God’s punishment but also from his reward

to the righteous: God saved Noah (q.v.) as he did the people and animals that were in Noah’s ark (q.v.; e.g. q 29:15; 54:15). The history of a family such as Joseph (q.v.) and his brothers serves, too, as a lesson (q 12:7;see also brother and brotherhood; benjamin). A lesson can also be learned from a parable (q 2:266). Sometimes a sign serves as a trial (q.v.) for a people, whether they will believe or not (q 44:33). Another aim of the signs is to show that God acts for the benefi t of humans in many spheres of life such as sustenance or transportation (q 16:5-18; see vehicles). Finally, a sign may function as a metaphor (q.v.), its ex-planation being given by exegetes (see exegesis of the qur��n: classical and medieval); good and bad land are similes for the believer and the unbeliever respec-tively ( Jalālayn, ad q 7:58; cf. 10:24).

Reactions to signsReactions to signs, proofs and miracles differ — some people believe in them (q 6:54, 99) while others do not, or they display a negative attitude toward them. Some people are obstinately reluctant to draw conclusions from God’s acts aiming at the preservation of the world: “We set up the heaven as a roof well-protected; yet still from our signs they are turning away” (q 21:32; cf. 6:157; 15:81; 36:46). Refusing to recognize God’s signs is regarded by the Qur�ān as the gravest wrongdoing: “And who does greater evil than he who, being reminded of the signs of his lord, turns away from them…” (q 18:57; 32:22).These rejecters consider signs to be witch-craft: “Yet if they see a sign they turn away, and they say: ‘A continuous sorcery’ ” (q 54:2; cf. 27:13; 46:7; see magic). In addition, Mu�ammad suffered from the mockery (q.v.) of his opponents (see opposition to mu�ammad): “Say: ‘What, then were you mocking God, and his signs, and his messenger’?” (q 9:65; cf. 18:56,

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106; 30:10; 45:9, 35). The most common example of such negative reactions is that of evildoers who disbelieve in God’s signs: “We have sent down to you clear signs, and only the evildoers disbelieve in them” (q 2:99). Other evildoers (see evil deeds)are identifi ed with those who killed proph-ets (q 3:21; see murder; bloodshed). In the qur�ānic view, the refusal to recognize God’s signs is connected to rejection of his messengers who point to those signs (see sin, major and minor; ethics and the qur��n). Whoever questions God’s exis-tence and power is an evildoer, and vice versa, those who fear (q.v.) God and give alms believe in God’s signs (q 7:156; cf. Birkeland, Interpretation, 13-29; see almsgiving; piety). The verb kadhdhaba(he accused someone of lying, or discov-ered someone to be lying, or regarded something as a lie, or denied something; see lie) is used to indicate another kind of reaction to the signs considered by the Qur�ān as the gravest act (q 6:21). “(Their way is) like the way of Pharaoh’s folk and those before them; they denied the signs…” (q 8:54; see also q 5:10, 86, where in both verses kadhdhaba comes along with kafara, he disbelieved; cf. q 6:21, 39, 150;10:95; 7:176-7, 182; 20:56). In q 6:33 it is emphasized that Mu�ammad’s opponents, the unbelievers, did not accuse him of lying but they denied ( ja�ada) God’s signs. The verb ja�ada and its equivalents, ankaraand �alama, appear several times in the qur�ānic text as expressions of the reaction to God’s signs (q 7:9; 11:59; 29:49; 31:32;40:63, 81; 41:15; 46:26). In two verses the verb istakbara (he became haughty) occurs with the verb kadhdhaba, as in “Those who regard our signs as lies and display haugh-tiness (see arrogance; pride) toward them shall be the inhabitants of the fi re (q.v.; see also hell and hellfire) forever” (q 7:36 and q 7:40), and without kadhdhabain other verses (q 7:133; 10:75; 45:31). In

one place the unbelievers’ arrogance and mockery are depicted as a deception (q 10:75). Another kind of negative reac-tion to the signs is disputation ( jidāl) which is associated with unbelief: “None but the unbelievers dispute concerning the signs of God…” (q 40:4; see debate and disputation). But the unbelievers have no proof to support their dispute which de-rives from their arrogance (cf. q 40:35, 56).In several verses the opponents’ disputa-tion is expressed through mockery; they accuse Mu�ammad of telling ancient sto-ries (q 6:25; 8:31; 68:15; 83:13). Twice, the unbelievers are regarded as heedless of the signs (q 7:136; 10:7). They also defame the signs (q 41:40) and oppose them (q 74:16).In sum, the unbelievers express their reac-tion to God’s signs in several ways — de-nial, mockery, contestation, opposition and heedlessness. As a text characterized, inter alia, by polemics, the Qur�ān frequently refers to its opponents, and naturally em-phasizes their negative attitude toward the signs.

Signs as linguistic communicationThe word āya, apart from connoting non-linguistic communication between God and man (Cf. Izutsu, God, 133), also con-tains the additional meanings of a basic unit or a passage of revelation, namely, linguistic communication (see revelation and inspiration; verses). In the Qur�ānitself there is no indication as to the length of these units or passages. q 2:106 reads: “And for whatever unit of revelation (or passage, āya) we abrogate or cast into obliv-ion, we bring a better or the like of it…” (cf. q 16:101; 24:1; see abrogation). Also when the Qur�ān states that “Those are āyāt of the wise scripture” (q 10:1; 12:1;13:1, in several beginnings of sūras [q.v.]which constitute a fi xed formula), it seems to point to a basic unit of revelation or to passages, although the meaning of signs

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cannot be ruled out altogether. Āyāt are mentioned in the context of interpretation (ta�wīl), a fact that alludes to linguistic com-munication (q 3:7). Similarly, it is more probable that āyāt mean units of revelation when appearing with the verb talā (he re-cited): “The People of the Book (q.v.) are not all alike. [Among them is] a righteous community who recite God’s āyāt in the hours of the night…” (q 3:113, and q 19:73; 33:34; see vigils; recitation of the qur��n). According to some interpret-ers of the Qur�ān, the plural word āyāt also means the Qur�ān itself (e.g. Jalālayn, ad q 27:81; 29:23, 49; 31:7; 34:43). It is, how-ever, possible to conclude from the con-text of some verses that āyāt are identifi ed with the scripture, as in “Our lord, send among them a messenger, one of them, who shall recite to them your signs, and teach them the book (q.v.) and the wis-dom…” (q 2:129; cf. 2:151; 10:15). Accord-ing to q 3:2-4, not only is the Qur�āndesignated as āyāt but also the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament (see torah; gospels). A further extension of the meaning of āya, one with legal connotations, is cer-tainly discernible from q 2:231:

When you divorce women, and they have reached their term, then retain them hon-orably or set them free honorably; do not retain them by force, to transgress [this law]; whoever does that has wronged him-self. Take not God’s laws (āyāt) in mock-ery… (see marriage and divorce; boundaries and precepts; law and the qur��n).

The word āyāt also occurs in the context of God’s giving ordinances (q 2:187, 221;24:58, 61). And there is another stylistic phenomenon which proves the notion that āyāt may also be used as a term for laws. The formula “in such a manner God

makes clear to you his āyāt (signs)” is found both after a sentence which speaks about God’s graces, namely, his help for and saving of the believers (q 3:103), and after a sentence which talks about the expiation of oaths (q.v.; q 5:89; see also breaking trusts and contracts; contracts and alliances). Just as in the former example āyāt seems to mean signs, so in the latter āyāt seems to mean laws. Our suggestion is that the above-mentioned formula refers to the sentences which precede it. To sum up, āyāt has the following basic meanings: signs, miracles, proofs, basic units or pas-sages of revelations, the Qur�ān and other holy books, and laws.

Structure of sign-passagesMost sign-passages (i.e. groups of sign-verses) are characterized by introductory as well as concluding formulas (see form and structure of the qur��n). The introduc-tory phrase presents God’s acts and the concluding sentence emphasizes the fact that these acts are signs for people who refl ect, or understand. q 13:2-3 reads:

God is he who raised up the heavens with-out pillars you can see, then he sat himself upon the throne. He subjected the sun and the moon, each running to a term stated. He directs the world (literally: the affair) [and] he makes the signs clear so that you will be certain of the encounter with your lord. It is he who stretched out the earth and set therein fi rm mountains and rivers, and of every fruit he placed there two kinds, and covered the day with the night. Surely in that are signs for a people who refl ect.

In some sign-passages the fi rst words are: “And of his signs…” (q 30:20). There are, however, sign-passages in which the word “signs” is absent (q 6:141; 13:12-15; 16:3-8,80; 30:48-51; 32:4-9). On the whole, the

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sign-passages have no uniform internal order, except that there might be a special division and a hierarchy of the signs in some places, as indicated by exegetes (see below Later development). Most of the verbs connected with signs indicate the mode of their arrival to hu-mankind: “to bring,” atā bi, ātā, jā�a bi (cf. q 2:106, 211; 43:47), “to bring down or to reveal,” nazzala, anzala (e.g. q 6:37; 10:20),“to come,” atā (e.g. q 6:158), and “to send,” ba�atha bi, arsala bi (e.g. q 10:75; 11:96).Some verbs (bayyana, �arrafa, fa��ala) indi-cate that the signs are explained or made clear (q 5:75; 6:46; 7:174; 9:11), and some others (e.g. dhakkara, qa��a) indicate that the signs are mentioned, told and recited (q 6:130; 8:31; 10:71; see narratives). In the light of the polemical character of many parts of the Qur�ān, it seems that these verbs are intended to deliver the mes-sage that God’s signs not only exist but are brought down to people, they are transmit-ted by recounting or recitation and, be-yond that, they are made clear in order to convince humans of God’s power and providence, so that they will worship him. Without the Prophet’s explanation, signs remain a “means of non-linguistic com-munication” (Izutsu, God, 133-9), which humanity is obliged to decipher. In ad-dition, there is the phenomenon that some signs are depicted as clear signs (āyātbayyināt, q 2:99; 3:97; 17:101). We do not know the difference between āya and bayy-ina (as a noun), the latter literally meaning “clear sign.” In q 20:133 and q 7:73, the identifi cation of āya with bayyina is trans-parent, and in other places bayyina applies to the same sign which is expressed else-where by āya (q 7:105). Āyāt bayyināt, how-ever, seem never to be applied to natural wonders, rather only to historical or super natural signs (Rahman, Majorthemes, 72).

Later developmentThe natural phenomena that appear in the Qur�ān serve Muslim scholars as corrobo-ration for the argument from design. The teleological argument is used to prove the existence of God, his unity, wisdom, and rule of the world through the wonderful design observed in the world (see sover- eignty; kings and rulers; god and his attributes). Although this argument is found in Greek philosophy (Socrates, Aristotle, the Stoics) and in Christian thought (Augustine [d. 430], Boethius [d. 524] and, in the Muslim era, John of Damascus [d. ca. 143⁄750], Theodore AbūQurra [d. ca. 210⁄825] and �Ammār al-Ba�rī [d. ca. 210⁄825], who very probably infl uenced Muslim theologians; on the early interactions between Christian and Muslim theologians, see e.g. Griffi th, Faith and reason), one cannot ignore the numer-ous examples of the argument in the Qur�ān (cf. Gwynne, Logic), which certainly induced Muslim theologians to employ it. It seems that Mu�tazilī theologians fi rst used the argument from design (Hishāmal-Fuwaī [d. ca. 229⁄844], al-Na��ām[d. bef. 232⁄847], al-Jā�i� [d. 255⁄869]; see mu�tazil�s). This argument then passed to other theologians, whether they belonged to mainstream Muslims, such as al-Mu�āsibī (d. 243⁄857), to Ash�arī theo-logians like al-Ash�arī (d. 324⁄935),al-Bāqillānī (d. 403⁄1013) and al-Ghazālī(d. 505⁄1111), or to sectarians, such as the Zaydī Imām al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm (d. 246⁄ 860; see heresy). Even the Aristotelian philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 595⁄1198) states that he prefers arguments for God’s ex-istence that appear in the Qur�ān to specu-lative arguments (see theology and the qur��n). His form of the teleological ar-gumentation (see cosmology), the argu-ment from God’s providence, which shows that the design of the world aims to benefi t

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people, is one that is much cited in the Qur�ān. The exegetes of the Qur�ān naturally placed much importance on God’s signs and the conclusions derived from them concerning God’s power and his rule of the world (�abarī, Tafsīr, ad q 30:24; Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, ad q 30:21). Generally, how-ever, al-�abarī (d. 310⁄923), Ibn Kathīr(d. 774⁄1373) and other traditionalist ex-egetes did not investigate sign-passages as a whole, nor did they analyze the inter-con-nections between signs. Such examinations were carried out by rationalist exegetes such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606⁄1210),who divides sign-passages according to their functions, the connections between them, and their hierarchical structure (Rāzī, Tafsīr, ad q 30:22-7). q 30:22-5 reads:

And of his signs is the creation of the heavens and earth and the variety of your languages and colors… and of his signs is your slumbering by night, and your seeking by day after his bounty… and of his signs he shows you lightning (see weather), for fear and hope, and that he sends down out of heaven water and he revives the earth with it after it is dead… and of his signs is that the heaven and earth stand [fi rm] by his command…

Al-Rāzī divides these signs into necessary accidents (a�rā lāzima), namely, accidents which are part of the essence of a thing, and those which are transitory (a�rā

mufāriqa), some departing quickly, such as redness of the face as a result of shame, and others slowly, such as youth (cf. Jurjānī,Ta�rīfāt, 153-4; see youth and old age).First the Qur�ān points out two examples of necessary accidents (the various lan-guages and colors of people), and then two examples of a�rā mufāriqa (sleep at night and the search for means of subsistence

during the day; see pairs and pairing).God makes the a�rā mufāriqa of the last two verses which deal with heaven and earth come before their a�rā lāzima, for heaven and earth are stable and changes are more marvelous in them than in humankind. Thus, al-Rāzī organizes signs according to their characteristics. q 30:8reads: “Have they not refl ected on them-selves? God did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them save with the truth. . . .” Al-Rāzī notices that in this verse signs in people (dalā�il al-anfus)precede signs in the heavens and earth (dalā�il al-āfāq), whereas in q 41:53, “We shall show them our signs in the horizons (al-āfāq) and in themselves…,” signs in the heavens and earth take precedence. The solution to this contradiction lies in the distinction between the agents of the verbs mentioned in these verses: when the agent is human, the signs stated are easy to per-ceive, for they are in humans themselves and people cannot ignore them, while the signs which God mentions about the world are more diffi cult to perceive, for they are remote from humanity. What God men-tions last is understood by people fi rst be-cause they progress in knowing God’s signs in stages (Rāzī, Tafsīr, xxv, 99, ad q 30:8).Such sophisticated interpretation occurs neither in classical nor in modern exegesis (see exegesis of the qur��n: early modern and contemporary; philosophy and the qur��n). Scientifi c exegesis, which searches for elements and terminology of science in the Qur�ān, does appear in classical texts, but is not as wide-spread as it has become in the modern era ( Jansen, Interpretation, 36-8; see science and the qur��n). Modern exegetes tend to deal not only with separate words in a verse or with a complete verse but also with whole sign-passages, paraphrasing their ideas and

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drawing conclusions from them. q 10:5-6reads:

It is he who made the sun a radiance, and the moon a light (q.v.), and determined it by stations, that you might know the num-ber of the years and the reckoning. God created that only with the truth, explaining the signs to a people who know. In the alteration of night and day, and what God has created in the heavens and the earth, surely, there are signs for godfearing people.

Mu�ammad Rashīd Ri�ā (d. 1935), whose interpretation of the Qur�ān follows the teachings of his master, the great Muslim reformist Mu�ammad �Abduh (d. 1905),states that these two verses direct the Muslim to God’s cosmological signs which prove his power to revive the dead and to reward man (cf. Darwaza, Tafsīr, vi, 287).According to Rashīd Ri�ā, these signs also show God’s wisdom and the regular design in creation, and, characteristically of mod-ern exegesis, he points out that they stimu-late man to study astronomy, a science which the ancestors favored because of the guidance of the Qur�ān (see planets and stars). Furthermore, study of the cosmo-logical signs proves that Islam is a religion based on knowledge (see knowledge and learning) and science (dīn �ilmī), not on blindly following authority (q.v.; taqlīd ).The scientifi c discoveries of the secrets of light in this generation prove God’s sagac-ity (Rashīd Ri�ā, Manār, xi, 301-5). In �Abduh’s work, the jinn (q.v.) are identifi ed with microbes ( Jansen, Interpretation, 43).Extensive scientifi c exegesis (tafsīr �ilmī) is found in Mu�ammad Farīd Wajdī’s (d. 1940) al-Mu��af al-mufassar, “The Qur�ānInterpreted” ( Jansen, Interpretation, 46-7). A typical modern discussion of sign-passages is found in Sayyid Qub’s (d. 1966) inter-pretation of the beginning of q 30 (vv.

1-32). In his view, sign-passages do not stand apart; there is a close connection between what happens to humans and the natural phenomena, and this is expressed through the notion that God is the source of all things (Qub, �ilāl, vi, 436). The function of the signs is to prompt humans to believe in God (ibid., 448-9). Whoever makes such signs, Qub emphatically states, is the same one who sends messen-gers to humankind, restores people to life, and so on (ibid., 463), as in the second part of the sūra (vv. 33-60). The notion that all future scientifi c dis-coveries are mentioned in the Qur�ān,whether directly or indirectly, is a common modern notion. Mu�afā Kamāl Ma�mūd(b. 1921), an Egyptian physician, writer and a qur�ānic exegete, is very fond of scientifi c exegesis. He fi nds allusions to recent sci-entifi c discoveries in the qur�ānic descrip-tion of creation (Ma�mūd, Mu�āwala,ed.1970, 51, 60-4; cf. Rippin, Muslims, 95-7).He partially accepts Darwin’s theory of evolution, claiming that God is responsible for the evolution of the species in stages (Ma�mūd, Mu�āwala, ed. 1970, 59-60; ed. 1999, 67-8). Among the various natural phenomena which support the scientifi c knowledge found in the Qur�ān, he points to the state of the embryo (q 39:6;Ma�mūd, Mu�āwala, ed. 1970, 65-8; see biology as the creation and stages of life). Some modern exegetes regard the scientifi c contents of the Qur�ān as proof of the veracity of Mu�ammad’s prophecy and consequently the truthfulness of the qur�ānic ideas. According to these scholars, the scientifi c elements attest to a miracle that is even greater than the miracle of the literary supremacy of the Qur�ān (see inimitability; language and style of the qur��n). The scientifi c interpretation, however, has not gone unchallenged. Muslim scholars themselves have charged the adherents of scientifi c exegesis with

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failing to pay proper attention to the con-text of the verses discussed, to philological considerations and to the fact that the Qur�ān was addressed to Arabs (q.v.), speaking in their language and informing only of the sciences known in the Prophet’s era (see occasions of revelation; s�ra and the qur��n; pre-islamic arabia and the qur��n). Moreover, they insist that the Qur�ān presents an ethical and religious message (see virtues and vices, commanding and forbidding; escha- tology) and that a limited text cannot contain the ever-changing views of sci-entists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Hussein, Commentaire; Jansen, Interpretation, 47-54).

Binyamin Abrahamov

BibliographyPrimary: M.�I. Darwaza, al-Tafsīr al-�adīth, 12vols., Cairo 1381-3⁄1962-4; Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr,7 vols., Beirut 1385⁄1966, repr. Beirut 1389⁄1970;al-Jurjānī, �Alī b. Mu�ammad, Kitāb al-Ta�rīfāt,ed. G. Flügel, Leipzig 1847, repr. Beirut 1978;Lisān al-�Arab, 15 vols., Beirut 1955-6; ed. �AlīShīrī, 18 vols., Beirut 1988; Qub, �ilāl; RashīdRi�ā, Manār; Rāzī, Tafsīr, 16 vols., Beirut n.d.; Suyūī, Itqān; �abarī, Tafsīr, 12 vols., Cairo 1323-9⁄1905-11, repr. Beirut 1986-7; �anāwīJawharī, al-Jawāhir fī tafsīr al-Qur�ān al-mushtamil �alā �ajā�ib badā�i� al-mukawwanāt wa-gharā�ib al-āyātal-bāhirāt, 26 vols., Cairo 1350⁄1930.Secondary: B. Abrahamov (ed.), al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm on the proof of God’s existence, Kitāb al-dalīlal-kabīr, Leiden 1990; �Abd al-Bāqī; A.J. Arberry, The Koran interpreted, Oxford 1983; H. Birkeland, The interpretation of surah 107, in si 9 (1958),13-29; W.A. Graham, “The winds to herald his mercy” and other “signs for those of certain faith,” in S.H. Lee, W. Proudfoot and A. Black-well (eds.), Faithful imagining. Essays in honor of R.R. Niebuhr, Atlanta 1995, 19-38; S. Griffi th, Faith and reason in Christian Kalām. Theodore AbūQurrah on discerning the true religion, in S.Kh. Samir and J.S. Nielsen (eds.), Christian Arabic apologetics during the Abbasid period (750-1258),Leiden 1994, 1-43; K. Hussein, Le commentaire “scientifi que” du Coran. Une innovation absurde, in mideo 16 (1983), 293-300; Izutsu, God; J.J.G. Jansen, The interpretation of the Qur�ān in modern Egypt, Leiden 1974; Jeffery, For. vocab.;

M.K. Ma�mūd, al-Qur�ān mu�āwala li-fahm �a�rī,Beirut 1970, Cairo 1999 (rev. ed.); Neuwirth, Studien; M.M. Pickthall, The meaning of the glorious Koran, New York 1953; M. Radscheit, “I�ǧāz al-Qur�ān” im Koran, in Wild, Text, 113-23;F. Rahman, Major themes of the Qur�ān, Chicago 1980; A. Rippin, Muslims. Their religious beliefs and practices. ii. The contemporary period, London 1993;A. Schimmel, Deciphering the signs of God. A phenomenological approach to Islam, Albany 1994;Watt-Bell, Introduction.

Sijjīn see book; heavenly book; angel

Silk

Lustrous fi ber produced by insect larvae frequently used in fi ne materials. The terms �arīr and sundus, “silk,” are attested fi ve times in the Qur�ān (q 22:23, 35:33,76:12, and 18:31 and 44:53, respectively). These terms appear exclusively in passages dedicated to the description of paradise that, with the fi re of the hell promised to the unbelievers, draws a central binary theme in the qur�ānic discourse focused on an eschatological perspective (see para- dise; hell and hellfire; eschatology).Therefore, the luxury of silk constitutes one of the paradigmatic elements of Islamic heavenly ontology (q 55 and q 56provide the most detailed developments on the theme paradise⁄hell; see pairs and pairing). Depictions of the qur�ānic para-dise (also called al-khuld or dār al-salām) rest upon three major categories that refl ect the traditional conception of the ideal life-style in Arab society. The fi rst category is obvi-ously the heavenly landscape comprising bucolic gardens (see garden), live springs of pure water (q.v.), rivers of milk (q.v.), honey (q.v.) and wine (q.v.; see also intoxicants; springs and fountains),and trees producing the most delightful fruits (see agriculture and vegetation; tree(s)). The second concerns creatures of two kinds, symbols of beauty and sensual

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happiness, namely immortal male young-sters and virgins with large eyes (�ūrun� īnun)that will accompany and serve the re-warded in the afterlife (e.g. q 55:72; 56:17, 22; 76:19; see reward and punishment; houris). The third category, to which be-longs the mention of silk, consists of an array of precious items, accessories and furniture that embellish the heavenly scen-ery as the most comfortable and beautifully equipped, something humans would dream of enjoying. Two main materials, textile and metalwork, contribute to idyllic images of the paradise that allow an easier com-prehension of the ineffable concepts of eternity (q.v.) and life after death (see resurrection; death and the dead).Clearly referring to the cultural context of the qur�ānic revelation, a recurrent image presents the rewarded as garbed in silk or other fi ne fabrics and wearing valuable jewels (q 22:23; see metals and minerals; pre-islamic arabia and the qur��n).This image appears in radical contrast to that of the ordinary life in this world whose practical necessities require wearing utili-tarian clothes made of rough material, as indicated in q 16:80: “He has given you the skins of beasts for tents, that you may fi nd them light when you shift your quarters, or when you halt; and from their wool and soft fur and hair has he supplied you with furniture and goods for temporary use” (see equally q 16:81; see hides and fleece). A range of other heavenly works of tex-tile, supposing both an artistic savoir-faireand a high material value, complete the rather realistic picture of a wealthy home (see house, domestic and divine). These include cushions carefully disposed upon ordered sets of beds, spread carpets and rugs (q 88:13-6), some of them displaying rich adornment on the edges (q 55:54).Occasionally, the Qur�ān describes these

accessories as green in color (q 55:76; see colors), adding another degree of heav-enly attribute. In addition to costly furnish-ing and clothing, the righteous will eat and drink delicious food and beverages in silver and gold dishes and cups (q 43:71; 76:15-16,21; see cups and vessels; food and drink; gold). q 18:31 delivers a kind of representative summary of the whole topic: “Decked shall they be therein with bracelets of gold, and green robes of silk and rich brocade shall they wear, reclining therein on thrones.” As a result, in addition to its marvelous and supra-natural aspect, the qur�ānic paradise offers all the advan-tages of sensible beauty and pleasure, even luxury. Its aesthetic strongly evokes earthly enjoyments. Therefore, the question of interpretation of this eschatological theme raised many discussions among the ex-egetes, theologians, philosophers and mystics (see exegesis of the qur��n: classical and medieval; ��fism and the qur��n; philosophy and the qur��n;Sourdel and Sourdel, Dictionnaire, 656-7[Paradis]). Whereas the traditionists ac-cepted the literal qur�ānic description of paradise, in accordance with the manifest meaning of the text, the Mu�tazilīs (q.v.) did not accept certain aspects of it that challenge reason (see intellect). The lat-ter interpreted these passages at a second level of meaning, attributing to them a second signifi cation (see polysemy).Similarly, the philosophers understood the promised delights as a metaphorical or allegorical proposition, fully comprehen-sible only by the wise and knowledgeable (see metaphor; literary structures of the qur��n) while maintaining that the colorful qur�ānic narrative is intended chiefl y for the common people. The Ash�arīs stand between these two opposing trends, arguing that the heavenly enjoy-ments belong to another order, although

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these enjoyments do display features that are analogous to earthly ones. The ūfīsalso found in these verses allegorical sig-nifi cation but without rejecting the literal meaning; they consider the Qur�ān a cog-nitive construction with multiple layers. Some other theologians, like al-Ghazālī (d. 505⁄1111), proposed an alternative to these various ideas, asserting that the believer himself should interpret the nature of the ultimate reward according to his own intel-lectual faculties and spiritual qualities. Silk became an important part of Islamic culture that developed both the arts of tex-tile fabrication and the economy linked to them. The social and political context of Islam in the middle ages, with sumptuous courts fl ourishing in the great cities of the Muslim empire and a wide network of trade roads stretching from the Atlantic ocean to India, central and eastern Asia, fostered the manufacture and sale of pre-cious objects in general, and silk items in particular (Sourdel and Sourdel, Diction-naire, 535-7 [Marchandes, activités]). The ancient trans-Asian trading corridor, known as “the silk road,” which was re-vived in the seventh⁄thirteenth century under the Mongol empire, stimulated the trade of this fi ne material through com-mercial centers populated by Muslim merchants who were spread across the whole landmass. Silk was used to make lavish court robes in offi cially controlled workshops designated by the Persian noun �irāz, located in palaces (Sourdel and Sourdel, Dictionnaire, 806, �irāz). These luxurious garments were distributed as honorary gifts during princely ceremonies. Silk was also, as it still is, a component of particularly fi ne carpets and rugs of the Islamic world (see material culture and the qur��n).

V. Gonzalez

BibliographyPrimary: Bukhārī, �a�ī�; al-Ghazālī, Abū āmidMu�ammad b. Mu�ammad, al-Munqidh min al-

alāl, Damascus 1956; Ibn al-�Arabī, Tafsīr,2 vols., Beirut 1978; Ibn al-Jawzī, Funūn; �abarī,Tafsīr.Secondary: E. Ashtor, Levant trade in the later middle ages, Princeton 1983; Böwering, Mystical; K.A.C. Creswell, A bibliography of the architecture, arts and crafts of Islam to 1st Jan 1960, Cairo 1961, and suppl.; Gardet and Anawati, Introduction;Gimaret, Jubbā�ī; G.E. von Grunebaum, Themes in medieval Arabic literature, London 1981;M. Lombard, Les textiles dans le monde musulman,Paris⁄The Hague 1978; Mir, Dictionary; Nwyia, Exégèse; D.S. Richards (ed.), Islam and the trade of Asia, Oxford 1970; S. Qub, al-Ta�wīr al-fannī fīl-Qur�ān, Cairo 1989; �A. Shalaq, al-�Aql fī l-turāthal-jamālī �inda l-a�rāb, Beirut 1985 (esp. “al-Jamālwa-l-�usn fī l-Qur�ān” and “al-Jamāl fī l-�adīthal-nabawī”); D. Sourdel and J. Sourdel, Diction-naire historique de l’Islam, Paris 1996.

Silliness see mockery; laughter

Silver see gold; metals and minerals

Simile

The comparison of two things, made explicit — and distinguished from meta-phor (q.v.) — by the use of “like” or “as.” “Zayd fought like a lion” is a simile. In Arabic rhetoric (see arabic language; rhetoric and the qur��n; literary structures of the qur��n), “simile” or tashbīh has the same general sense, and the same general distinction is made between simile and metaphor (isti�āra). The “like” or “as” in the simile is usually made with the particle ka, though a locution using the noun mathal may substitute. Early works on rhetoric placed great emphasis on simile; al-Marzubānī (d. 384⁄994) in al-Muwashshamade simile one of the “four pillars of poetry” (see van Gelder, Tashbīh; see poetry and poets). Not surprisingly, pro-ponents of the doctrine of the inimitability

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(q.v.) of the Qur�ān, like al-Rummānī(d. 384⁄994) and al-Bāqillānī (d. 403⁄1013),listed its excellent similes among the rhe-torical qualities that make it inimitable. Al-Bāqillānī (I�jāz, 263-8) compared them favorably with the outstanding similes found in poets like Imru� al-Qays and Bashshār b. Burd. From a rhetorical stand-point, the interest in qur�ānic simile culmi-nates in the work of Ibn Nāqiyā (d. 485⁄ 1092) entitled al-Jumān fī tashbīhāt al-Qur�ān. Although similes are common in the Qur�ān, the word tashbīh is not found there. The term mathal, however, sometimes clearly means “simile.” At the same time, it must be said that mathal is also used to mean short narrative passages that we would be more likely to call “parables,” and it seems no clear distinction is made between these two forms by the Qur�ān,nor, for that matter, by some of the rhetori-cians (see parable). They are taken to be the same sort of rhetorical device, mathal.Perhaps that word is best rendered by the similarly comprehensive term “analogy.” Two passages show this. In q 56:22-3 the plural form, amthāl, introduces a simile: “The houris (q.v.) whose eyes are like hid-den pearls” (wa-�ūrun �īnun ka-amthāli l-lu�lu�i l-maknūni), whereas q 18:32-45, which is also termed a mathal, clearly exceeds the bounds of what is usually called simile: “Coin for them an analogy (wa-rib lahum mathalan) of two men, unto one of whom we had assigned two gardens of grapes and we had surrounded both with date-palms and put between them tillage (see garden; date palm; agriculture and vegetation). . . .” It goes on to relate a parable about two farmers, one pious, the other disdainful and proud; as one would expect, the former is rewarded and the latter punished (see reward and punishment; pride; insolence and obstinacy; piety).

Uses and examplesIn the Qur�ān the simile is often made sim-ply with ka: q 7:179 “Those are like cattle” (ūlā�ika ka-l-an�ām) but quite commonly a qur�ānic simile is made with a character-istic pleonasm, ka-mathal. As Ibn Nāqiyāshows through numerous examples, qur�ānic similes make use of the same im-agery found in Arabic poetry, both pre-Islamic and later (see symbolic imagery).The fi rst simile (q 2:17), using the pleonasm ka-mathal, compares the hypocrites (q.v.; al-munāfi qūn; see hypocrites and hypocrisy) to someone who blunders in the dark (see darkness) after having briefl y enjoyed the light (q.v.) of a fi re (q.v.): “Their likeness is the likeness of one who lit a fi re (mathaluhum ka-mathali lladhīistawqada nāran), and when it illuminated his surroundings, God took away their fi re and left them in darkness. They do not see (see vision and blindness).” This simile is soon followed by another: “Or like the rain clouds in the sky with darkness and thun-der and lightning in it (see weather), they put their fi ngers in their ears against the thunderbolts” (q 2:19; see hearing and deafness; seeing and hearing). Aspects of God’s creation (q.v.) provoke a number of similes. q 36:39, “And for the moon (q.v.) we have devised stations until it returns like an old, withered palm stalk,” i.e. curved and small; q 55:14, “He created man from clay (q.v.) like crockery”; q 55:24, “His are ships (q.v.) that sail on the sea like mountains.” Heaven and hell (see hell and hellfire) are the subject of col-orful similes. The houris of paradise (q.v.), for example, are described thus: “And with them are ones who lower their eyes, pure as the hidden eggs [of ostriches]” (q 37:48-9). Likewise, the painful features of hell are also described through similes. The liquid given to the damned is like mol-ten lead (see food and drink; hot and

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cold): q 18:29 “And if they call for help, they will be given water like molten lead scalding their faces, an evil drink.” A fairly limited number of peoples, places and events probably account for most of the similes in the Qur�ān.Recourse to simile is especially frequent in the case of various “enemies (q.v.) of God” (a�dā� Allāh), most prominently the unbe-lievers (al-kāfi rūn; see belief and unbe- lief; gratitude and ingratitude), the polytheists (al-mushrikūn; see polytheism and atheism) and the aforementioned hypocrites. q 7:176 compares an unbeliever to a dog (q.v.): “He is like the dog, if you chase him away, he pants, and if you leave him alone, he pants.” Two memorable sim-iles compare the futile acts of unbelievers to ashes (q.v.) and to a mirage (see also transitoriness). q 14:18: “Those who disbelieve in their lord (q.v.), their deeds are like ashes which the winds blow on a stormy day” (see good deeds; evil deeds). And q 24:39: “Those who disbe-lieve, their deeds are like a mirage in a des-ert. Someone thirsty reckons it to be water (q.v.) until he reaches it and fi nds nothing in it.” q 13:14 tells us that the polytheist who prays to idols (see idols and images) is “like a man who stretches his hands to wa-ter for the water to come to it, but the wa-ter does not come.” q 29:41 compares the refuge the polytheist seeks in his idols to a spider (q.v.) web: “Those who take other protectors besides God (see clients and clientage; protection) are like the spi-der who takes a house — truly the spider’s house is the fl imsiest of houses!” q 63:4compares the hypocrites to blocks of wood: “And when you see them, their persons please you, and if they speak you listen to what they say. [Yet] they are like blocks of wood propped against each other.” Two particular events, judgment day (see

last judgment) and the destruction of wicked peoples (see punishment stories; chastisement and punishment), are fre-quent subjects of similes, e.g. the anni-hilation of the people of �Ād (q.v.) in q 54:19-20: “We sent upon them a roaring wind (see air and wind) on a day of un-relenting calamity which snatched them away as though they were the trunks of uprooted palm trees.” q 69:7 says that the same people after their destruction seemed “as though they were the hollow trunks of palm trees.” q 55:37 describes the appear-ance of the sky on judgment day (see apocalypse): “And when the skies are split open, they will be red like stained leather.” q 70:8-9 has: “A day when the sky will be like molten brass and the mountains will be like tufts of wool.” q 101:4 describes the commotion of the resurrected people (see resurrection) thus: “… a day when the people will be like moths scattered about.” In sum, similes vary greatly in tone, some are majestic, some homespun — as q 2:26says, “God does not disdain to make a si-militude of a gnat” (inna llāha lā yasta�yi an yariba mathalan mā ba�ūatan). Sometimes a sardonic tone is struck (see language and style of the qur��n). A memorable sim-ile in q 62:5 concerns Jews (see jews and judaism) and the Torah (q.v.): “The like-ness of those who were given the Torah to carry and then ignored it is that of a don-key carrying books (asfār).” In addition to their illustrative, semantic role, similes often seem to have a rhetori-cal, emphatic role in the organization of qur�ānic discourse. Similes not infrequently open or close a subsection of a sūra (q.v.; see also form and structure of the qur��n). For example, the rather ordinary simile in q 11:24 which compares believers and unbelievers to the seeing and the blind, respectively, is followed immediately by stories of the prophets (see prophets

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and prophethood) Noah (q.v.), Hūd (q.v.) and āli� (q.v.), and the “vanished peo-ples” to whom they were sent — the heed-less people whom God destroyed. Similarly, the famous or infamous comparison of Torah-bearers just cited, q 62:5, introduces a discussion of the Jews. The similes in q 54:20, 57:20, 69:7 and 105:5 offer tart summations of the preceding passages. The Qur�ān, in its characteristically self-conscious way, tells us that the simile is one of God’s favored rhetorical devices for ed-ucating people (see knowledge and learning; teaching; intellect): wa-la-qad �arrafnā fī hādhā l-qur�āni lil-nāsi min kulli mathalin, “We have put in this Qur�ānevery sort of similitude for people” (q 18:54) and wa-la-qad arabnā lil-nāsi fīhādhā l-qur�āni min kulli mathalin la�allahumyatadhakkarūna, “We have coined for people in this Qur�ān every kind of similitude. Perhaps they will take heed” (q 39:27; see warning). Indeed, the Qur�ān even goes so far as to use simile to comment on simile⁄analogy itself. Interestingly enough, the chief characteristic of good rhetoric is stability, that of bad rhetoric instability:

Have you not seen how God has made an analogy? A good word is like a good tree (see trees). Its roots are fi rm and its branches are in heaven. It gives its fruit in every season with its lord’s permission. God coins similes for people that they may refl ect. The analogy of a bad word is with a bad tree, uprooted from the earth, pos-sessing no stability (q 14:24-6).

Commentators on simileCommentators devote considerable at-tention to these and other similes (see exegesis of the qur��n: classical and medieval). Often their concern is simply to elucidate the obscurity of the simile. For example, in q 2:17 it is the free mixture of

singular and plural pronouns referring to the same party; while in q 2:19 the entire basis of the simile seems at fi rst confused since, as one reads, it becomes apparent that the hypocrites are not being compared to the rain clouds, despite ka-�ayyib, but rather to people frightened by a thunder-storm. As might be expected, commentators, depending on their outlook and interests, offer a wide range of interpretations of such similes. To take the example of q 14:24-6 cited above, al-�abarī (d. 310⁄923) says, “Interpreters differ on the meaning of ‘a good word’ (kalima �ayyiba).Some of them say it is the faith (q.v.) of the believer” (Tafsīr, xiii, 135; see also speech; word of god). He goes on to say that some specifi cally equate it with the shahādatlā illāha illā llāh, it being fi rm (thābit), mean-ing the shahāda is fi rmly fi xed in the heart of the believer (see witness to faith). A very early exegete, Mujāhid (d. 104⁄722),tells us that the good tree is a date palm. Others say a good word means the believer himself who is on earth (q.v.) and who works and speaks on earth and so his deeds and his speech reach heaven while he is still on earth. Yet others say the tree in this simile is a tree in heaven but al-�abarī considers it more likely to be a date palm. Al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538⁄1144), a Mu�tazilī (see mu�tazila), tells us that “good word” means the word taw�īd, the oneness and unity of God (see god and his attributes). Al-Rāzī (d. 606⁄1210),who rejects the necessity of the tree being a date palm, devotes four and a half pages to explicating the “tree” and its four attributes, its goodness, its fi rm roots, its lofty branches, and its constant supply of fruit. On the other hand, we learn from the Shī�ī commentary of al-Kāshī (d. ca. 910⁄

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1505) that the imām (q.v.) Ja�far al-ādiq(d. 148⁄765) said of the good tree: “The Messenger of God is its root, the Prince of the Believers (�Alī) is its trunk, the imāmsamong the descendants of both are its branches, the knowledge of the imāmsconstitutes its fruit” (Gätje, Qur�ān, 243).Not surprisingly, al-Kāshī tells us that the bad tree is the Umayyads (see sh��ism and the qur��n; politics and the qur��n; �al� b. ab� ��lib). Two other similes also address the topic of fi gurative language in the Qur�ān. The fi rst is q 2:26, mentioned above, “Verily, God does not disdain to make an analogy with a gnat…” This al-Rāzī tells us is meant as a rebuke to the unbelievers who had falsely claimed that mention of such humble creatures as the bee, the fl y, the spider and the ant was unworthy of divine discourse (see animal life). Wrong, al-Rāzī says, because God has created both great and humble things,

and the little weighs upon him no less than the big, and the great is no more diffi cult for him than the small… and it is perfectly apposite to mention fl ies when God wishes to show how ugly is the polytheists’ wor-ship of idols… or to make an analogy with a spider web in order to show how trifl ing and fl imsy their religion is (Rāzī, Tafsīr, ii, 134-5).

The other simile, in q 13:17, is yet more complicated since it encloses one simile within another:

He sent down water from the sky and the river beds (awdiya) fl owed with it. But the fl ood carried away the scum fl oating on its surface — and like it is the scum which comes from that which they heat with fi re seeking to make jewelry and tools — like-wise, God shows what is true and what is

false. The scum is cast away with distaste, while what benefi ts people remains on this earth.

Al-�abarī writes that this is an analogy that God makes with truth (q.v.) and false-hood (see astray; ignorance; lie), with faith (q.v.) and unbelief. God is saying that the similarity of the truth in its perma-nence and of error (q.v.) in its evanescence is like the water which God sends down from the sky to the earth. The wādīs fl ow with it, the large ones with large quantities and the small ones with small quantities. The fl ood carries a swelling scum or foam, and this is one of two analogies pertaining to truth and falsehood. The truth is like the water (q.v.) which remains and which God has sent, while the foam which is of no benefi t is falsehood. The other analogy — “and like it is the scum which comes from that which they heat with fi re seeking to make jewelry and tools” — is the analogy of truth and falsehood with gold (q.v.) and silver and brass and lead and iron (see metals and minerals) from which people obtain benefi ts (see grace; blessing), while falsehood is like the scum which goes away without being of any benefi t while the pure gold and silver re-main. Likewise, God compares faith and unbelief, the futility of unbelief and the failure of the unbeliever being a punish-ment, while faith is that with lasting benefi t (�abarī, Tafsīr, xiii, 90). Al-Rāzī sharpens the analogy making the rain the Qur�ānand the wādīs the hearts of believers (see heart), which according to their capacities contain more or less of the truth, while the foam and scum that are carried away and vanish are the doubts and obscurities (see uncertainty) that will vanish in the here-after when only the truth will remain (Rāzī, Tafsīr, xix, 34-5; see also pairs and pairing).

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Probably the most well-known qur�ānicsimile, and also one of the most com-mented on, is the so-called Light Verse (q 24:35). This verse begins with a meta-phor, “God is the light (q.v.) of heaven (see heavens and sky; planets and stars) and earth,” but then quickly switches to simile,

the likeness of his light is like a niche which holds a lamp (q.v.). The lamp is in a glass which shines like a pearl-like star. It is kindled from a blessed tree, an olive nei-ther of the east nor the west whose oil would almost glow forth itself though no fi re touched it. Light upon light. God guides to his light whom he wills. God makes analogies for people. God knows all things.

Al-�abarī, al-Zamakhsharī and al-Rāzīdevote considerable space to mapping out the various parts of this elaborate simile, and al-Ghazālī (d. 505⁄1111) writes an en-tire book about it, Mishkāt al-anwār, draw-ing an analogy between the fi ve elements of the simile: the niche, the glass, the lamp, the tree and the oil, and the senses, the imagination, the intellect, language, and prophecy. (For more on these interpreta-tions, see metaphor.) Similes, with the uncertainties of inter-pretation, could also be the topics of theo-logical debate (see theology and the qur��n). One such exchange took place between the governor of Baghdād and Ibn

anbal (d. 241⁄855) during the inquisition (q.v.; mi�na) on the issue of the createdness of the Qur�ān (q.v.):

Governor: Does not God say, ‘We have made it an Arabic (see arabic language)Qur�ān’ (q 43:3). How could it be made without being created?Ibn anbal: But God says, ‘and He madethem like green blades devoured…’

(q 105:5; see grasses). Does that mean He created them [like green blades devoured]? (Cook, Koran, 110).

More broadly, it can be said that just as there are theological dimensions to metaphor — whence the hasty insistence of commentators to assure us that “God is the light” must be understood as meaning “He is the possessor of light” (Zamakh-sharī, Kashshāf, ad q 24:35) — even so the simile has theological dimensions. For the notion of similitude in relation to God must also be placed in the context of the Qur�ān’s insistence on the absolute oneness and uniqueness of God and the impos-sibility of likening anyone or anything to him (see anthropomorphism). Thus, q 42:11, laysa ka-mithlihi shay�, “There is nothing like him.” In this context, it can be seen that similitude is a defi nitive notion in the qur�ānic universe; similitude is a com-mon quality of God’s creation but since similarity requires at least two objects, similitude is a quality that is found onlyin his creation. This is refl ected in theo-logical debate about anthropomorphism in which the opposed terms tashbīh⁄tanzīhare employed. In such debates tashbīh is the negative term which denotes anthropomorphism.

Daniel Beaumont

BibliographyPrimary: Bāqillānī, I�jāz; al-Ghazālī, Abū

āmid Mu�ammad b. Mu�ammad, Mishkātal-anwār, Cairo 1964; trans. W.H.T. Gairdner, al-Ghazzali’s Mishkāt al-Anwār, Lahore 1952;Ibn Nāqiyā, Abū l-Qāsim �Abd al-Bāqī b. Mu�ammad, al-Jumān fī l-tashbīhāt al-Qur�ān,Alexandria 1974; Rāzī, Tafsīr, Beirut 1981;�abarī, Tafsīr, Cairo 1987; Zamakhsharī,Kashshāf, Beirut 1995.Secondary: M. Cook, The Koran. A very short introduction, Oxford 2000; H. Gätje, The Qur�ānand its exegesis, trans. A.T. Welch, London 1976;G.J.H. van Gelder, Tashbīh (a), in ei 2, x, 341;Pickthall, Koran.

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Similitude see parable

Sin, Major and Minor

Greater and lesser transgressions of the law of God. The Qur�ān promises that God will forgive minor sins if human be-ings abstain from the major ones (q 4:31;53:31-2; see forgiveness). The most com-mon characterization of “major” sins in exegesis and theology is kabā�ir (sing. kabīra;literally the “big ones”), a term that occurs in this sense in the Qur�ān (cf. q 4:31;42:37; 53:32). A common theological char-acterization of “minor” sins is �aghā�ir (sing. �aghīra, as in q 18:49; see theology and the qur��n; exegesis of the qur��n: classical and medieval). All deeds, ma-jor and minor, are recorded, and their reg-ister (kitāb) is to be given to each individual on the day of judgment (see last judg- ment; heavenly book; good deeds; evil deeds), much to the consternation of the sinners (mujrimīn, q 18:49; cf. 54:52-3; see reward and punishment). Terms designating “sin” in the Qur�ān’s vocabulary include: dhanb (pl. dhunūb; e.g. q 3:11, 16, 193; 8:54; 12:29; 67:11); fā�isha(and other terms from the same Arabic root, i.e. f-�-sh; e.g. q 2:169; 4:22; 12:24;17:32; 27:54); �araj (e.g. q 9:91; 48:17); ithm(e.g. q 2:173, 181-2, 219; 4:20, 48, 50, 112;33:58; 42:37; 49:12); junā� (q 2:198, 235;4:102; 33:51); jurm (in the form of various derivatives from the root j-r-m; e.g. q 6:147;7:40; 9:66; 10:17; 11:35; 18:49; 45:31; 83:29);kha�ī�a (and terms derived from the same root, kh-�-�; q 2:81; 4:112; 12:97; 17:31; 69:9;71:25); lamam (q 53:32); ma��iya (pl. ma�ā�ī; cf. q 58:8-9); and sayyi�a (pl. sayyi�āt; q 3:193;4:31; 7:153; 29:7). Whether a particular term denotes a major or a minor sin is of-ten not clear from the Qur�ān itself and the same term might be used to denote major or minor sins. Thus the term sayyi�a

occurs in q 4:31 in the sense of a minor infraction (also in q 3:193) but elsewhere (as in q 7:153; 35:43) it refers to evil deeds of a graver kind (cf. Dāmaghānī, Wujūh, i, 423f., s.v. al-sayyi�āt; also Zamakhsharī,Kashshāf, i, 159, ad q 2:81, where sayyi�a is glossed as kabīra min al-kabā�ir). Many com-mentators do, however, consider terms like dhanb and ithm (as well as ma��iya, a com-mon gloss for ithm: cf. �abarī, Tafsīr, v, 476,ad q 7:33) to refer to major sins and un-derstand lamam, sayyi�a and kha�ī�a to mean minor sins. Irrespective of the actual terms used, few commentators deny that there is in fact a distinction to be made between major and minor sins (cf. Haytamī, Zawājir,i, 11f.); precisely which sins belong in what category is, however, a matter of great un-certainty.

DefinitionsIbn �Abbās (d. ca. 68⁄687), a major early authority in exegetical matters, is reported to have defi ned the kabīra as “every sin that God has stamped with fi re (q.v.), [his] dis-pleasure, [his] curse (q.v.), or with [the threat of his] punishment” (�abarī, Tafsīr,iv, 44, ad q 4:31 [no. 9213]). More vaguely, yet in underscoring the sense of sin as transgression, he held “everything in which God is disobeyed [to be] a major sin” (ibid., no. 9211; see disobedience). Other early defi nitions related major sins not just to acts for which God has promised hell (see hell and hellfire) but also those for which the �udūd, or the legal punishments explicitly prescribed by the Qur�ān and the sunna (q.v.), are to be executed (cf. ibid., no. 9219; see chastisement and punish- ment; law and the qur��n). Such views were elaborated on and systematized in works specifi cally devoted to cataloguing major sins. Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 748⁄1348), the author of one such book, defi nes major sins as anything “in regard to which there is a �add in this world, such as

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murder (q.v.), adultery, and theft (q.v.); or about which there is a threat of [God’s] anger (q.v.) and punishment in the here-after; as well as anything whose perpetra-tor has been cursed by our Prophet” (Dhahabī, Kabā�ir, 6; see adultery and fornication; bloodshed). Ibn ajar al-Haytamī (d. 974⁄1567), whose dissatisfac-tion with al-Dhahabī’s book led him to write what became one of the most in-fl uential works on the subject, gives a broad sampling of both overlapping and alternative views on how to defi ne major sins. Inter alia, the kabā�ir are sins that have been expressly forbidden (q.v.) in the Qur�ān and the sunna or accompanied with dire warnings in these foundational texts; acts that entail the �add-penalties;sins that result in a loss of one’s legal and public standing (�adāla), since they suggest a lack of concern with conformity to re-ligious norms; and, indeed, sins that be-come “major” precisely because they are committed without a sense of fear (q.v.) or remorse (Haytamī, Zawājir, i, 12-17; ii, 425-7; see repentance and penance). Others saw aspects of greater or lesser gravity as inhering in almost all sins. According to al-alīmī (d. 403⁄1012), a minor sin can become a major sin because of the context (qarīna) in which it is com-mitted just as a major sin can, in turn, be-come abominable ( fā�isha) by the circumstances attending upon it. Thus, unlawful homicide is a major sin, but to murder a relative (see kinship; family), for instance, or to do so in the sacred precincts (q.v.; of Mecca [q.v.] and Medina [q.v.]) make it the more abominable because it is not just the sanctity of the victim’s life but also other sacred boundaries that have been violated (see sacred and profane).To steal some paltry object would be a mi-nor sin, not subject to the legal penalty; but this becomes a major sin when the victim of such theft is so poor as not to be able to

dispense even with such an object (alīmī,Minhāj, i, 396-400; paraphrased in Ibn

ajar, Fat�, xii, 227f.; see poverty and the poor). Al-alīmī thought that the only sin that does not admit of degrees of gravity is kufr — disbelief in God (see belief and unbelief; gratitude and ingratitude) — though Ibn ajar al-�Asqalānī (d. 852⁄1449; Fat�, xii, 227) sug-gests in his rejoinder that this cardinal sin, too, can be classifi ed according to its de-grees of abomination. In the end, as al-Haytamī and others rec-ognized, the various defi nitions of major sin are mere “approximations” to the idea, which itself remains elusive. So, too, therefore, does the question of the numberof sins that might be thought of as “major” — with estimates often ranging from four to seven hundred (Haytamī,Zawājir, i, 18). Al-Dhahabī’s work on the subject gives brief accounts of seventy ma-jor sins; al-Haytamī describes no less than 476 major sins, which he proceeds to divide between the “interior” and the “exterior.” Even as they acknowledged the distinction between major and minor sins, the pri-mary interest of those concerned with such matters has tended to be with the major sins, usually leaving the minor ones as the subject of dire warnings about taking them lightly. (Some, like Ibn Nujaym [d. 970⁄ 1563], did however concern themselves explicitly with listing both major and minor sins.)

Sins in the Qur�ān’s enumerationWithout providing any clear ranking of sins, the Qur�ān does not leave any doubt about what it considers to be the worst of them: the associating of anything or any-one with God (shirk; see polytheism and atheism), a “great sin” (ithm �a�īm) that God will not forgive though he might for-give everything else (q 4:48). q 17:23-38, in cataloguing a number of God’s com-

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mands, mentions several acts that are to be avoided for “their sinfulness (sayyi�uhu) is abhorrent to your lord” (q.v.; q 17:38). In addition to shirk, some of the sins that are mentioned as such or are easily derivable from this list include: insolence towards one’s parents (q.v.; see also insolence and obstinacy); wastefulness as well as miserli-ness; the killing of one’s children (q.v.) for fear of impoverishment (a reference to a pre-Islamic Arabian practice characterized here as a “great wrong” [khi��an kabīra]:q 17:31; see infanticide); wrongful murder of other sorts; fornication (described here as “an abomination and an evil way” [ fā�isha wa-sā�a sabīlan]: q 17:32); usurping the property (q.v.) of orphans (q.v.); dis-honesty in business transactions (see economics; trade and commerce); say-ing things of which one has no knowledge (see ignorance; knowledge and learning); and haughtiness (see pride; arrogance). (Also cf. Izutsu, Concepts, 228;for shorter lists, see, inter alia: q 6:151-2;25:67-8, 72. Some early exegetes also held that what the Qur�ān regards as major sins are to be located in the various prohibi-tions mentioned in the fi rst thirty verses of q 4; cf. �abarī, Tafsīr, iv, 39-40 [ad q 4:31];see lawful and unlawful.) A fuller, though by no means exhaustive sampling of qur�ānic sins would include — besides the �add-penalties (for drinking, adultery and fornication, false accusation of adul-tery and fornication, theft, and brigand-age; see intoxicants; wine) and besides chronic neglect of the fundamental ritual obligations (see prayer; witness to faith; pilgrimage; almsgiving; rama��n; fasting; ritual and the qur��n) — such diverse items as slander (q 24:11; 33:58), undue suspicion (q.v.; �ann)and backbiting (q 49:11-12; also see gossip); lying (qawl al-zūr, q 22:30; see lie)and concealing legal testimony (q 2:283;see witnessing and testifying); practic-

ing usury (q.v.; q 2:275-6, 278-9; 3:130-1); homosexuality (q.v.; cf. q 26:165 f.; 21:74);“hurting” God, his Prophet, or other be-lievers (q 33:57-8); and other individual and collective transgressions against the “limits” established by God. (For various qur�ānic terms evoking the idea of trans-gression, cf. Izutsu, Concepts, 164-77 and passim, esp. 172 f.; also see boundaries and precepts.) In general, as the forego-ing samples indicate, the interest of the Qur�ān is not with providing any detailed, let alone systematic, catalog of sins, but rather with affi rming what Izutsu (Concepts)has called a “basic moral dichotomy” be-tween belief and unbelief, virtue and vice, the good and the bad (see good and evil; virtues and vices, commanding and forbidding). Lists of major sins are more readily accessible in �adīth (see �ad�th and the qur��n), though there continues to be con-siderable uncertainty on precisely which, or how many, fall into that category. A tra-dition reported on the authority of the Prophet’s Companion Abū Hurayra lists the following seven as major sins: associat-ing anyone with God; sorcery (see magic);unlawful homicide; usurping the property of the orphan; usury; fl eeing from the battlefi eld (see expeditions and battles; hypocrites and hypocrisy; fighting);and slandering believing women (Bukhārī,�a�ī�, K. al-Wa�āyā, no. 23; ibid., K. al-

udūd, no. 44; Muslim, �a�ī�, K. al-Īmān,no. 145; Abū Dāwūd, Sunan, K. al-Wa�āyā,no. 2874; Haytamī, Zawājir, i, 18). Again, other lists are much more expansive and Ibn �Abbās is often quoted as saying that the major sins are “closer to 700 than they are to seven, except that no sin is ‘major’ when forgiveness is sought for it, that is when one undertakes proper repentance (tawba), just as no sin is ‘minor’ if one per-sists in it” (�abarī, Tafsīr, iv, 44, ad q 4:31[no. 9208]).

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Sin, repentance, and forgivenessIslam, like Judaism, has no concept of an “original sin” (see fall of man). Every soul (q.v.) bears its own burden (q 6:164;17:15; 29:12; see intercession), though God does not overburden anyone (q 2:286). Sins also have evil consequences during one’s present life, so that whatever harm one is affl icted by is “what your hands have earned” (q 42:30; also cf. Izutsu, Concepts, 227, on the dual meaning of the word sayyi�a as both “misfortune” and “evil deed,” which may perhaps be taken to evoke the idea of misfortune as being at least partly a result of evil deeds). The punishment visited by God upon par-ticular communities is likewise the result of their sinfulness (cf. q 17:16-17; 22:45, 48; see punishment stories). Conversely, sins are removed through good deeds (q 11:114)and, in any case, God forgives a great deal (q 42:30). Indeed, were God to hold people to account for all that they do, no living being would remain on the face of the earth (q 35:45; see mercy). While responsibility for one’s actions lies with the individual, the question whether these actions necessarily determine one’s fate in the hereafter was much debated among the Muslim theologians (see freedom and predestination). The Qur�ān suggests both that each individual will be judged according to his or her own conduct (cf. q 2:286) and that the decision to punish or pardon people for their sins rests ultimately, and solely, with God (q 2:284). All humans being prone to sin (cf. q 12:53), the pious are much given to seeking God’s forgiveness (cf. q 3:193-5; see piety). Indeed, this is a major trait that distinguishes them from the sinners and the unbelievers, who are not only unmind-ful of the consequences of their actions but also too arrogant to repent for them. The prophets (see prophets and prophet- hood) not only seek forgiveness for their

own sins (see below), but also for those of others (cf. q 47:19); and, according to the traditional Sunnī view, they will intercede on behalf of their followers on the day of judgment (cf. Elder, Commentary, 112-14).

q 39:53 holds out God’s promise to for-give all sins (al-dhunūb) and therefore in-structs those who have exceeded the bounds (asrafū �alā anfusihim) not to despair of God’s mercy. Yet q 4:48 states that “God will not forgive the associating of anyone with him, but he might forgive any-thing less than that for whomsoever he wills.” The exegetes tried to resolve the discrepancy between the two verses in dif-ferent ways. Some held that q 39:53 sought to reassure those who had committed major sins, and who feared their damna-tion on account of them even if they were to convert to Islam or, in case of Muslim sinners, even if they were to repent of their major sins. On this view, even the major sins were not “deadly” as long as they were followed by repentance; and this was true even of shirk, the gravest of sins (cf. �abarī,Tafsīr, xi, 14-17, ad q 39:53). A different view saw q 4:48 as not abrogating but de-limiting the purport of q 39:53: while God might forgive any sin he wishes to, he would not forgive shirk unless one has re-pented of it (�abarī, Tafsīr, xi, 17 [no. 30, 188]; also cf. Haytamī, Zawājir, i, 62f.). God’s forgiveness had not always come without a heavy, this-worldly, penalty, how-ever. Those among the Children of Israel (q.v.) who had been guilty of worshipping the calf had to pay dearly for this sin: as described by the Qur�ān, the price of re-pentance in this instance was death for the guilty (q 2:54; and cf. al-�abarī’s commen-tary on this verse, Tafsīr, i, 325-8; see calf of gold). Repentance for the sin of shirkdoes not carry such penalties for the Qur�ān’s own addressees (cf. Haytamī,Zawājir, ii, 190). In the case of sins that are also crimes, however, such as stealing, adul-

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tery, or murder, the exegetes and jurists generally held that repentance ought to accompany but does not, by itself, suffi ce to absolve one of the sin in question (but cf. q 28:15-17, where Moses [q.v.] seeks the forgiveness of God for a homicide and is forgiven). While all sin involves transgress-ing limits laid down by God, the jurists made a distinction between the violation of “the rights of God” and that of “the rights of human beings” (cf. Johansen, Contingency,212-18). The rights of God, to be upheld by the ruler or his representatives, involve the �add-penalties (see kings and rulers; politics and the qur��n). On the other hand, infraction of the rights of human beings, a category that also included ho-micide, was negotiable in the sense that the wronged party might decide to forgo pun-ishment or opt for monetary compensation rather than for physical retaliation (q.v.). Absolution from the sin of violating the rights of human beings required not just the seeking of forgiveness from God but also the legal punishment entailed by the crime in question or forgiveness from the wronged party (cf. �abarī’s discussion of q 5:45 in Tafsīr, iv, 598-604). Juristic clas-sifi cations of the rights of God and of human beings, or what these categories entailed, are not to be found in the Qur�ān,though the combination of the moral and the legal norms that is characteristic of Islamic law is itself fi rmly grounded in it (see ethics and the qur��n).

Theological discourses on the grave sinnerIf God might forgive all major sins —even, as many commentators saw it, the most heinous sin of shirk — if one re-pented of them, does it follow that one who did not so repent was doomed to damnation? And what was the status of the person committing major sins, the grave sinner, in relation to the community of Muslims of which he professed to be a

member? These questions, which lie at the heart of the early development of Islamic theology, arose when many fi rst generation Muslims strongly disapproved of the con-duct of �Uthmān b. �Affān (r. 23-35⁄ 644-56), Mu�ammad’s third successor as caliph (