The Approach of Chinese Foreign Policy in Military Diplomacy:

Spratly Island Disputes Case

ABSTRACTAnalysis of Chinese foreign policy theoretical implications of the past, current foreign policy in regard to Spratly Islands Disputes, and International responses.

Sara ElsadekMIT, International University in Geneva Professor Robin Ramcharan, Foreign Policy, International University in Geneva, E-mail: rramcharan@iun.ch, February 10, 2016

Nations’ first and foremost priority throughout history have been to secure their own

sovereignty and independence. The ways in which they acquire, fight for, achieve, and protect

this sovereignty is embedded in their foreign policies, which have matured and modernized over

the centuries. Foreign policy practices govern the way by which a country conducts itself in an

international setting with its national interests and its counterparts in mind. The principle of the

right of sovereignty has been at the top of countries’ agendas since the Treaty of Westphalia was

signed in 1648. This treaty defined the principles of sovereignty and has set the framework for

sovereign nation-states to this day. However, how nation-states protect this sovereignty with

regard to their customized foreign policy varies among nations and stems from different

theoretical orientations. Since the beginning of time, military force has been included in a

nation’s foreign policy with the intent to secure national interests by the means of force if

necessary. The idea of using such force stems from a realist point of view, however, it can

coincide with a liberalist point of view in that military diplomacy, or using indirect coercive

tactics, can also suffice to secure national interests. A country that exemplifies both of these

theories in their foreign policy is China, especially in regard to their military operations and use

of coercion to achieve their national goals. These theories have been put into practice by China’s

military throughout the years in the region of the resource rich South China Sea. In recent years,

the disputes taking place involving the vital Spratly Islands have amplified, gaining international

attention. Countries have suggested that international military intervention needs to take place to

stabilize the area before the disputes turn into a physical battle between South-Asia nations. The

ultimate question is, what kind of foreign policy is being used by the Chinese in their military

diplomacy in regard to the Spratly Island Disputes? In the past decade, China’s President has

taken an audacious turn in regard to his foreign policy. Can this audacious and militarily-minded

framework of his foreign policy be balanced with cooperation with other states? There have been

many works published on this topic with controversial views as to how China deploys its foreign

policy, on the legitimacy of China’s territorial takeover in the Spratly Islands, and the

international responses. This essay will analyze those area with reference to Chinese history as

well.

A brief introduction to the methodology used in this analysis must be presented which

will take into account the historical and present day implications. The international relations

study of realism in regard to what role military coercion plays in Chinese Diplomacy, especially

in regard to the Spratly Island Disputes, will be used. To counteract this methodology of realism,

the liberalist approach will also be analyzed to depict how it plays a role in Chinese foreign

policy as well and as a possible diplomatic solution. The foreign policy of China is somewhat of

a hybrid between the two theories.

I. Key points in China’s History of Foreign Policy and the respective orientations

China’s foreign policy was much different in the past than the one they deploy now in the

21st century. The orientation of Chinese foreign policy can be tracked back 2,000 years ago when

the Chinese military strategist, Sun Tzu, promoted realist values and practices to secure China’s

identity and territory at a time of war. Sun Tzu argued that moral reasoning was not very useful

to the state rulers of the day, faced with armed and dangerous neighbors. 1 This is a attribute of

realism since the theory does not take into account the ideologies, religions or other cultural

factors2 with which states may justify their actions. He advised rulers to use force to showcase

1 Tzu, Sun, The Art of War: Translated by Samuel B. Griffith (1963) online at: http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/1.1/Sun%20Tzu.pdf (last accessed January 25, 2016) 2

Goldstein,J., Pevehouse, J., (2013), International Relations Brief, 6th edition. [e-book] Pearson. Available at: https://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/hip/us/hip_us_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0205972152.pdf (last accessed January 25, 2016)

their power in order to protect their own interests. States behave in a certain way for the ultimate

goal of achieving their self-interests in a rational manner, a fundamental rational of realism.

However, Sun Tzu did not always promote violence. In his book, “The Art of War”, he also

suggest using soft power as a means to manipulate and coerce the opponent without the use of

physical force to achieve the ultimate outcome. This is also a realist trait, being that realism does

not always believe in using military power, only when it is necessary. The country has been

through major transformations in many aspects but the more recent transfigurations are to be

addressed.

A. 20th-21st Century Theories

China was in the midst of social revolutions in the mid-nineties and emphasized making

alliances with like-minded communist states. China articulated five principles in their foreign

policy in 1954 when China, with a communist government, was trying to reach out to the non-

communist countries of Asia to form friendly ties with their bordering neighbors. The Five

Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that China bases their peaceful foreign policy on are: mutual

respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each

other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 3 China’s political,

economic, and diplomatic design based off of these principles is a slightly different approach

than that of the Western world’s liberal practices that were heavily being pushed upon Eastern

nations at the time in being that China sees that all states are sovereign and that they have the

right to run their own system as they see fit. China believes that no state has the right to interfere

with the rights of another in any circumstance-an extreme opposite of the Western world’s view.

For a current and relevant example of this non-interference policy, China has deployed the use of

3 Nathan, A., J., Principles of China’s Foreign Policy: Asia for Educators, Columbia University. (2009) online at: http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm (last accessed January 30, 2016)

their veto several times in the United Nations Security Council to prevent military intervention in

sovereign states experiencing a humanitarian crises. According to the MLM Revolutionary Study

Group, China, in their socialist framework, had to constantly defend themselves from political

isolation, economic strangulation and military attack4 in the second half of the 20th century. In

this time, The Chinese Communist leader, Mao Zedong, presented the Three Worlds Theory

which stated that international relations consisted of three geoeconomical worlds: first world

consisting of superpowers, including the United States and the Soviet Union; the second world of

lesser powers; and the third world of exploited nations.5 Zedong’s successor, Deng Xiaoping,

concluded that China was part of the third world. This separation is what gave motivation and

reasoning for China to strongly oppose expansionism by the first world powers, particularly the

United States, and molded their foreign policy framework with emphasis on Marxism and

militarization to combat imperialism and neocolonialism.6 After the WWII and the eventual

dismembering of socialist and communist states, China adopted a new strategy of opening their

once strict, closed-off socialist country to the west which was defined as the strategy of

normalization of relations with over 100 countries that resulted in its admission to the UN in

October, 1971.7 China started to integrate themselves more in world affairs with the liberalist

approach in mind that was well described by Richard Cobden, stating that, “international trade

‘unites’ states, in which states became ‘equally anxious for the prosperity and happiness of

4 MLM Revolutionary Study Group in the U.S., Chinese Foreign Policy during the Maoist Era and its Lessons for Today. (January 2007) online at: https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/cpc-policy.pdf (last accessed January 25, 2016) 5

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, Chairman Mao Zedong's Theory on the Division of the Three World and the Strategy of Forming an Alliance Against an opponent. (2014) online at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18008.shtml (last accessed January 25, 2016) 6 MLM Revolutionary Study Group in the U.S., Chinese Foreign Policy during the Maoist Era and its Lessons for Today. (January 2007) online at: https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/cpc-policy.pdf (last accessed January 25, 2016) 7 Ibid.

both”.8 However, even throughout this period, China was able to remain a socialist country

throughout their revolutionary transformations while maintaining an internationalist orientation.

Since 1980, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China has pursued the strategy of

independent foreign policy of peace.9 The integral aspirations of this foreign policy are: to

preserve China’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and also to create a

favorable international environment in accordance with China’s reformation of modernization

along with their dialect of a promoting a “harmonious world”. The current status of China’s

foreign policy in the 21st century begins in this context with the inauguration of current President

Xi Jinping, whom came into office at a potentially historic time for China in terms of its re-

emergence as a global power. President Xi Jinping’s common use of the theme: “the great

resurgence of the Chinese nation”, or more officially referred to as the “Chinese Dream”, have

raised initial questions pertaining to how the progressive president will gauge the priority of

political talks and how he would alter China’s foreign policy that has been in practice for

decades. The question was raised by authors Kai and Huiyun, “Given China’s ‘assertive turn’ of

diplomacy since 2009, a more concrete question is that of whether or not Xi will maintain this

assertive orientation or steer China’s foreign policy in a more cooperative direction.”10 To

examine this speculation, some background needs to be presented along with historical

implications to analyze Chinese diplomacy and the Spratly Islands Disputes themselves.

8

Kosandi, M. Conflicts in the South China Sea and China-ASEAN Economic Interdependence: A Challenge to Cooperation. ASEAN-Canada Research Partnership Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 7 (April 2014) online at https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/NTS/resources/db/uploadedfiles/Meidi%20Kosandi%20-%20Conflict%20in%20the%20SCS%20Challenge%20to%20Cooperation.pdf (last accessed February 5, 2016) 9 Center for Strategic and International Studies, what are the main tenets of china’s foreign policy?: Chinese Balance Sheet (date unavailable) online at: http://csis.org/files/publication/091019_china-bal_26-Chinese-Foreign-Policy.pdf (last accessed January 30, 2016) 10 Huiyun, F. and Kai, H, Xi Jinping’s Operational Code Beliefs and China’s Foreign Policy: Chinese Journal of International Politics (2013) online at: http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/3/209.full (last accessed January 29, 2016)

B. China’s Current Status

China has been transforming itself from an isolated and autonomous society into a modern

economic powerhouse with a global agenda to secure its own national interest (realist

perspective) while also maintaining diplomatic relationships with its allies abroad and starting to

engage in multilateral cooperation (liberalist perspective). In order for China to keep up with the

rapidly globalized and interdependent world, Chinese foreign policy has become more active,

pragmatic, and flexible in the past few decades. The Center for Strategic and International

Studies introduces China’s Balance Sheet, which conceptually lies out China’s foreign policy

initiatives along with their respective implications. China uses the term “Harmonious World”, as

previously mentioned, to describe its current foreign policy strategy. The term was first publicly

introduced by Hu Jintao at the World Summit and 60th General Assembly of the United Nations

in 2005. While the exact meaning and policy implications of “harmonious world” is undefined,

the slogan is meant to demonstrate China’s commitment to global peace and stability, and to the

goal of a more just and equitable international system. 11In the opinions of many scholars and

experts in the field of International Relations, or more specifically, in regard to foreign policy

analysis of China, is it quite appropriate to question if Xi Jinping will strictly follow his assertive

take on China’s foreign policy within his presidency or take a more cooperative approach to

international integration.

II. The Case of the Spratly Islands and Military Presence

Through the current territorial acquisitions taking place in the South China Sea, or more

specifically, the Spratly Islands, one can argue that China’s foreign policy is weighing heavily on 11 Center for Strategic and International Studies, what are the main tenets of china’s foreign policy?: Chinese Balance Sheet (date unavailable) online at: http://csis.org/files/publication/091019_china-bal_26-Chinese-Foreign-Policy.pdf (last accessed January 30, 2016)

the role of military strength, intimidation, and overall presence in strategic and disputed regional

areas. China has been building artificial islands and building upon small atolls in the area to

establish their physical presence. The military defense on the Spratly Islands and the imminent

threat of force contradicts key principles of China’s Peaceful Coexistence model in regard to

their peaceful rise/peaceful development. However, China gives claim to these areas with certain

controversial justifications.

A. History of the Spratly Islands and China’s Justifications of Territorial Claims

The rocky territory of the South China Sea was once regarded as a useless, dangerous place

to stay away from. 12 China’s justification for taking over these islands lies within their history

dating back to the Xia Dynasty, 21st-16th century B.C., when they claimed their people were

present on these islands.13 China claims that they have detailed maps depicting the area, ancient

coins found in the area, and also the islands were featured in many of their historic writings of

the period. Furthermore, China’s historical interpretation of its sovereign rights of claiming all of

the islands in the archipelago of Spratly ignore current international law. China have been

continuously defending their claims by using the "nine-dash line", first drawn up by the

Nationalist government of China in 1949, which goes beyond the provisions of international law

in that China is claiming the entirety of the South China Sea. China is not helping its territorial

claim of being legitimate under this basis because for almost seven decades, they have refused to

completely clearly define on what maritime jurisdiction it is claiming with its nine-dash line. 14

More interest arose by many surrounding nations to explore the possibility of natural resources in 12 Ambassador Freeman, C.W., Diplomacy on the Rocks: China and Other Claimants in the South China Sea: Remarks at a Seminar of the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University (2016) online at: http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/speeches/china-and-other-claimants-south-china-sea?print (last accessed February 5, 2016) 13 Ibid. 14 Austin, G. China’s Lawful Position on the South China Sea: The Diplomat (January 2015) online at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-lawful-position-on-the-south-china-sea/ (last accessed February 5, 2016)

the area in 1982 when the United Nations conferred rights to exclusive economic zones (EEZs)

on habitable island. The EEZ gives nations the legality and sovereign rights of conducting

maritime activities, including maritime exploration of resources and the establishment and use of

artificial islands, installations and structures, 200 nautical miles from their coastline. 15 With this

law in mind, The Spratly Islands do not fall into China’s EEZ, but rather into The Philippines’s

EEZ. 16 Another issue that needs to be clearly defined is what actually constitutes as an island.

According to Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an island is,

“a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. Rocks

which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive

economic zone or continental shelf.”17 The accessibility to obtain these resources became

possible through technological advances and the justification given by China came from a realist

point of view as a means to secure their economic interests through the possession of these

islands. In their history, the Spratly Islands have been claimed by The United Kingdom in 1877,

with the annexation of two of the islands; by France in 1933, claiming them as a part of French

Indochina; then by Japan in 1938; and then came the occurrence of multiple states claiming the

islands, just as we are currently still experiencing today. Many states have tried to integrate the

principle of sovereignty for the justifiable claim to these islands by placing settlers there.

Currently, three of the claimant states, Vietnam, the ROC and the PRC, base their claims on

15 United Nations, UNCLOS (1994) Part V. Article 66. Online at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm (last accessed February 7, 2016) 16 Mortensgaard, L.A., The Spratly Islands Dispute – A Discourse Analysis: E-International Relations Students. ( July 2015) online at: http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/19/the-spratly-islands-dispute-a-discourse-analysis/ (last accessed February 2, 2016)17 United Nations, UNCLOS (1994) pg. 66, Article 121. Online at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (last accessed February 7, 2016)

historical ‘facts’ while the three other states, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia, refer mainly

to international law and conventions when justifying their claims. 18

B. The importance of the Spratly Islands and how the United States is responding

The area of the South China Sea suffers from extremely complicated governance in the

area due to the vital shipping lanes that include high volumes of goods that travel through the

area each day. It is estimated that $5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea

annually19 and the ongoing disputes in the area could disrupt this commerce and alter the whole

trading scheme. China wishes to acquire the crucial Spratly Islands for a few key reasons: they

claim the islands will act as a trading post to help get their goods to the west but moreover, the

islands sit atop a substantial amount of oil and gas deposits. With the rapid growth of their

population, infrastructure, and business in China, there has been a realization that China cannot

meet demand growth for oil with their domestic energy sources. The Chinese government is

looking for new sources or locations to secure energy, such as the oil and gas rich Spratly

Islands. There are 5 billion tons of proven and unproven petroleum reserves in this area

according to the United States Geological Index.20 This is the main reason China wishes to

obtain these disputed areas and is currently doing so by building energy extraction

infrastructure, but more controversially, they are building up their military presence in the area to

reinforce their claims. To support this, the statistics show that China has demanded for an

increase in military spending of 10.1 per cent in 2015, $145 billion, 21 which can also aid in 18Mortensgaard, L.A., The Spratly Islands Dispute – A Discourse Analysis: E-International Relations Students. ( July 2015) online at: http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/19/the-spratly-islands-dispute-a-discourse-analysis/ (last accessed February 2, 2016) 19 Glaser, B.S., Armed Clash in the South China Sea: Council on Foreign Relations (April 2012) online at: http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883 (last accessed February 5, 2016) 20 Guoqiang, L., China Sea Oil and Gas resources: China Institute of International Studies (2015) online at: http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-05/11/content_7894391_2.htm (last accessed February 5, 2016) 21 Gady, F., Confirmed: China’s Defense Budget Will Rise 10.1% in 2015: The Diplomat (March 2015) online at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/confirmed-chinas-defense-budget-will-rise-10-1-in-2015/ (last accessed February

bolstering an image of self-confidence and that they have the ability to defend national interests.

There have been confirmations that China is in fact building military outposts in the South China

Sea, including three military-length airstrips on the islands.22 The government’s justification for

doing so is to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary or Chinese

national interests are undermined. This justification epitomizes a realist sense of foreign policy

because realists assume that the world is anarchic and made up of sovereign states that have

national interests that they must protect through mechanisms of self-help.23 However, China

states that over the past two decades, Chinese foreign policy has been to promote an image of

China being a cautious and pragmatic power inclined to adopt “soft power” and responsible

behavior as the best means to accrue regional and global influence.24 In this essence, China could

rightfully state that they are acting in a liberalist sense in that this theory provides the possibility

of abolishing war and conflict through trade, diplomatic ties, and through intergovernmental

organizations25, such as the WTO that China joined in 2001 and ASEAN Plus Three agreement

signed in 2002. To comment on the international reaction, a professor from the Geneva Graduate

School of Governance, Mr. Osvaldo R. Agatiello, argued that, “The US views these territorial

takeovers as aggressive but China assures that they are a means to expand their sphere of

influence to place products and compete with the west.”26 The fear from the US is that China will

5, 2016) 22 Phillips, T, South China Sea: Beijing 'not frightened to fight a war' after US move: The Guardian (October 2015) online at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/28/china-not-frightened-fight-war-south-china-sea-uss-lassen (last accessed February 6, 2016) 23 Mortensgaard, L.A., The Spratly Islands Dispute – A Discourse Analysis: E-International Relations Students. ( July 2015) online at: http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/19/the-spratly-islands-dispute-a-discourse-analysis/ (last accessed February 2, 2016)24 Rigby, R. and Tow, W., 2011. China’s Pragmatic Security Policy: The Middle- Power Factor: The China Journal, [Jstor] No.65, pgs. 157-178. Available through Jstor at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25790562?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (last accessed February 5, 2016) 25 Mortensgaard, L.A., The Spratly Islands Dispute – A Discourse Analysis: E-International Relations Students. ( July 2015) online at: http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/19/the-spratly-islands-dispute-a-discourse-analysis/ (last accessed February 2, 2016)26 Agatiello, Osvaldo, R. “The TPP and balance of Power”. Interview by Author. October, 2015

use these islands as military bases to assert control over navigation in the South China Sea. The

US has the option to use diplomacy to isolate China but the distance and geography make that

suggestion difficult to enact. Recent threats were given by the Chinese to US surveillance

aircrafts and ships that were deployed to this area. However, according to the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea, the US, along with other countries, can insist upon freedom

of navigation in international waters.27 Since the United States’ new foreign policy initiative

known as “The Pivot to Asia” which began in 2010, the determination has been to curtail, or in

other words, contain the rise of China's power along its periphery. 28 However, the intention of

the United States should be to lessen military tensions between the nations of the South Pacific,

and essentially between China and the United States to assure diplomatic relations, but by no

means to keep tensions stagnant or even escalate them. Author Kai and Huiyun advised that,

“Other states, especially the United States, need to review and revise their foreign policy on

China should they have adopted, or intend to adopt, a containment policy towards the PRC,

because although a rising China may not be a threat, an angry China indeed will be.”29 However,

the mentalities of China and other South Asian nations need to be accepting of US engagement

rather than containment by not assuming that the United States has ulterior motives in their

diplomacy and peace keeping presence in the South China Sea. Ambassador Chas W. Freeman,

Jr. articulates that, “China and its neighbors should see and use American power as backing for

peaceful efforts to resolve their disputes, not as an excuse for deferring or avoiding settlement of

27 Mirski, S., The Trans-Pacific Partnership: China, America and the Balance of Power: The National Interest (July 2015) online at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-trans-pacific-partnership-china-america-the-balance-13264 (last accessed January 25, 2016) 28 Ambassador Freeman, C.W., Diplomacy on the Rocks: China and Other Claimants in the South China Sea: Remarks at a Seminar of the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University (2016) online at: http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/speeches/china-and-other-claimants-south-china-sea?print (last accessed February 5, 2016)29 Huiyun, F. and Kai, H, Xi Jinping’s Operational Code Beliefs and China’s Foreign Policy: Chinese Journal of International Politics (2013) online at: http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/3/209.full (last accessed January 29, 2016)

their differences.”30 The United States signed a U.S-ASEAN strategic partnership pact and is

currently working closely with the countries in their efforts to intervene more forcefully in the

South China Sea through freedom of navigation operations.  

III. Attempt to solve the disputes through ASEAN Multilateral Negotiations

ASEAN countries have been concerned about China’s illegal claims to the Spratly Islands

since the association’s formation in 1967, but even more so recently with the rapid militarization

of the islands by China. Many ASEAN countries are disputing over the territorial sovereignty of

the area while laying claim to the Spratly Islands, such as Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and

Vietnam. However, all these countries have attempted to justify their claims based on their

coastlines and the provisions of UNCLOS, unlike China. China has had a significant role in the

ASEAN Plus Three agreement ever since they fulfilled a crucial economic stabilizing role after

the Asian Financial Crisis of 1996/1997, so the ASEAN countries wish to keep close ties with

them. While ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms have proven successful regrading many

regional disagreements, the South China Sea dispute, with specific regard to China’s

militarization of the Spratly Islands, have left the regional bloc severely divided. The ASEAN

countries are now accepting diplomatic advice and allowing for aerial surveillance by the United

States in the area to gather information as to what China is doing on the islands. Author David

Martin Jones states that, “Evaluating ASEAN’s role in managing the problem in the South China

Seas reveals that far from addressing this evolving conflict over international rights of free

passage on the high seas, its weak multilateral approach only further stirs already troubled

30 Ambassador Freeman, C.W., Diplomacy on the Rocks: China and Other Claimants in the South China Sea: Remarks at a Seminar of the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University (2016) online at: http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/speeches/china-and-other-claimants-south-china-sea?print (last accessed February 5, 2016)

waters.”31 ASEAN and China entered into a free trade agreement in 2002, on the basis of

benefitting from regional free trade but also to build solid, concrete and peaceful diplomatic

relations with one another. In recent years, this has not been the atmosphere in the South China

Sea. In 1994, ASEAN implemented the ASEAN Regional Forum to manage and attempt to

constrain China’s regional aspirations by deploying collective diplomacy. However, China has

thus far abused the forum by using it as a means to advance its own national interest since the

forum showcases weak multilateral discourse. Albeit China’s attendance at the ASEAN Regional

Forum meetings, the country still adamantly disapproves any multilateral means to settle the

dispute or the code of conduct proposed by ASEAN. In order to further defend its’ claims and to

bolster an intimidation factor in the area, realist China has threatened to use military force

against ASEAN countries to protect its national interests. However, in 2002, liberalist China

signed a non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which

renounced the use of force and strived to build an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.32 To this

extent, liberalists believe that cooperation or policy convergence should serve the best interest of

states because there are incentives for cooperation and costs for defection, including crisis and

losing the opportunity to gain the benefit.33 Onlookers hoped that China has welcomed the fact

that cooperation was in their best economic interest and entailed many benefits. However, this

‘soft-power’ action was only a public relations ploy to encompass ASEAN countries into

China’s sphere of influence while at the same time avoiding United States intervention. So what

is being done now to curtail, or at least wane the threats of military force by China? China’s

31 Jones, M. D, Can ASEAN ever solve the South China Seas dispute through multilateral dialogue?: The Telegraph (November 2015) online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/12012915/Can-Asean-ever-solve-the-South-China-Seas-dispute-through-multilateral-dialogue.html (last accessed February 7, 2016) 32 Ibid. 33 Kosandi, M. Conflicts in the South China Sea and China-ASEAN Economic Interdependence: A Challenge to Cooperation. ASEAN-Canada Research Partnership Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 7 (April 2014) online at: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/NTS/resources/db/uploadedfiles/Meidi%20Kosandi%2%20Conflict%20in%20the%20SCS%20Challenge%200Cooperation.pdf (last accessed February 5, 2016)

uneasy neighbors are finding more dependable ways to defend their interests in the South China

Sea. The Philippines has recently signed new strategic treaties with Vietnam and Australia and

has even taken the matter to an international tribunal in the Netherlands. Japanese Prime Minister

Shinzo Abe announced that Japan would provide the Philippines and Vietnam with naval patrol

vessels.34 In regard to the assurance of security provided by the United States, they have

promised to provide military equipment to Manila while Vietnam has also been strengthening

ties with Tokyo and Washington.35 ASEAN members are lobbying for talks about the proposed

code of conduct to resume in early 2016 to force China into making concessions, or be exposed

as the main obstacle to progress.

IV. Conclusion

Continuous efforts to resolve the disputes over territorial sovereignty of the South China Sea

need to hold strong while gaining international momentum and support. The legality of

conducting military operations and the rightful jurisdiction over the waters in the South China

Sea need to be resolved because the stability of this area plays such a vital role in global

commerce, economics, and overall diplomacy. The United States has considered encouraging

concerned South-Asian countries to take the case to the International Court of Justice or the

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, but China’s non-compliance holds strong. With the

current multilateral bodies at play, there are multiple avenues to aid in the compromise between

disputing countries, but a realist China has upheld their claims to the Spratly Islands. The

international community of peace-keeping actors need to take into consideration China’s foreign

34 Jones, M. D, Can ASEAN ever solve the South China Seas dispute through multilateral dialogue?: The Telegraph (November 2015) online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/12012915/Can-Asean-ever-solve-the-South-China-Seas-dispute-through-multilateral-dialogue.html (last accessed February 7, 2016)35 Moss, T. Asian Nations Look Beyond ASEAN to Solve South China Sea Disputes: The Wall Street Journal (November 2015) online at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/asian-nations-look-beyond-asean-to-solve-south-china-sea-disputes-1448171986 (last accessed February 7, 2016)

policy theories and practices of the past along with their current evolving stance on foreign

policy matters to assess how to deal with the situation. Their hybrid approach of current foreign

policy is a culmination of a realist and liberal approaches which makes it difficult to calculate

their next move. The conjecture between China’s decision to enter into diplomatic negotiations

or instead to build up of military presence in the area to secure their national interests still

remains.

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