DOES SPOILS SYSTEM SPOIL GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NEPAL

Shiva Hari Adhikari

Nepal Administrative Staff College

Introduction

Establishes and promotes informal governance (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002)

Greater risk of despoiling the public fund for personal purpose (Friedrich, 1937)

Applies rules with partiality and some citizens get preferential treatment

Effective in implementing the decisions of government

Introduction

Creates unauthorized transactions: developed or, even, in not fully developed spoils system

Establishes patron-client relation/network

Holds control over policy decision and implementation

Encourages favouritism, nepotism and corrupt practices

Spoils system

Governance

Patronage

Chooses public

officials on a political and not on

a merit basis

Works for mutual

material advantag

e

Creates establish

ed relation

or networks

Nepal

Recently experienced political and socio-economic changes

Governance has dual character: (In)formal

They are less easily separable Chakari: originated during Rana

regime Public Service Commission,1951,

Anti-Corruption Act, 1952, Civil Service Act, 1957, and Commission for Controlling Abuse of Authority, 1977

Nepal Norwegian Agency for Development

Cooperation, 2011 Informal practices more prevalent Corruption Bureaucratic and legislative norms to

clientelism and patronage Dix, Hussmann, and Walton, 2012

Patronage system is apparent in society, economy and politics

Corruption

Objectives

The primary objective of this study is to test the relationship between spoils system and governance. The objectives are: to seek the relationship between spoils

and corruption, and to evaluate the effect of spoils in the

governance system.

Research Question/Hypothesis

R.Q.: Does spoils system spoil governance?

Hypothesis 1: Spoils system has positive significant relation with corruption

Hypothesis 2: Spoils recruitment and promotion worsens the governance

Data and Model

Challenging task to measure governance and corruption

For more precise measure controlling for behaviour and attitude is needed.

Research Design: descriptive as well as explanatory

Sample size (N) = 273: 106 (public officials), and 167 (students)

Peer review and pretest of questionnaire

Data and Model

Data collection and processing: 380 distributed, 324 returned (51 have quitted or incomplete), 273 fully complete and usable, 85% return rate, 72% response rate

Data analysis: Factor analysis, reliability test and regression analysis

Summary of Variables

Type of variable

Name of variable Number of items included

Measurement

Dependent Poor governance (newly created)

5 Five response Likert Scale

Corruption (newly created) 4 Five response Likert Scale

Independent Spoils system (newly created) 4 Five response Likert Scale

Control Experience of bribery Yes/no question Nominal (Yes =1)

Future intention of bribery Yes/no question Nominal (Yes =1)

Political affiliation Yes/no question Nominal (Yes =1)

Family member a government employee

Yes/no question Nominal (Yes =1)

Family member a politician Yes/no question Nominal (Yes =1)

Variables and Their Descriptions

Variable Statements incorporated to create new variable and its index

Spoils system Top executives are appointed as per personal connections with political leaders.

Top executives are promoted as per personal connections with political leaders.

Personal relationship matters in promotion.

Appointments to key positions are influenced by politics.

Poor governance

Service receivers get poor service with less choice.

Service delivery mechanism is biased to benefit only a few.

Government regulations and procedures are not transparent.

Citizens do not get proper and timely services that they are entitled to.

Government agencies are not accountable for the application of regulations and procedures.

Corruption Corruption is widespread in our country.

Salaries are supplemented with bribes and kickbacks.

Civil servants involved in corrupt practices are not punished.

Corruption is reinforced by culture and tradition.

Statistical Analysis Results

DV: Corruption DV: Poor governance

Standardized coefficients

Sig. Standardized coefficients

Sig.

t t

Spoils system*** .458 8.41 .000 .534 10.245 .000

Experience of bribery [Yes=1] .060 1.097 .273 .071 1.342 .181

Future intention of bribery [Yes=1] .109 1.968 .051 .085 1.608 .109

Family member government employee [Yes=1]

-.021 -.370 .712 .013 .250 .803

Family member a politician [Yes=1] .026 .437 .662 .058 1.031 .304

Political affiliation [Yes=1] -.009 -.158 .875 -.028 -.510 .610

R-Square .237 .302

Adjusted R-Square .220 .286

F Value 13.783 (p < .0001) 19.191 (p < .0001)

Durbin-Watson value 1.689 1.611

Interpretation and Discussion

Curbing corruption and improving the governance: Local, regional and global agenda

Good governance: extremely important but not possible if there is spoils recruitment and promotion.

Although the spoils system causes corruption, the adoption of spoils system might be effective in implementing the decisions of government.

Positive effect of spoils in corruption and poor governance should be carefully interpreted.

Interpretation and Discussion

The governance system in Nepal is not satisfactory

Other loopholes causing corruption and poor governance regarding the spoils system Formal vs informal governance Legal mechanisms vs implementation/rule

of law Purely merit based vs spoils within merit