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BRADWELL v. ILLINOISFacts of the Case

Myra Bradwell asserted her right to a license to practice law in Illinois by virtue of

her status as a United States citizen. The udges of the Illinois Supre!e Court

denied her application with only one udge dissenting.

"uestion

Is the right to obtain a license to practice law guaranteed by the Fourteenth

#!end!ent to all citizens of the United States$

Conclusion

%o. &hile the Court agreed that all citizens enoy certain privileges and i!!unities

which individual states cannot ta'e away( it did not agree that the right to practice

law in a state)s courts is one of the!. There was no agree!ent( argued *ustice

Miller( that this right depended on citizenship. In his concurrence( *ustice Bradleywent above and beyond the constitutional e+planations of the case to describe the

reasons why it was natural and proper for wo!en to be e+cluded fro! the legal

profession. ,e cited the i!portance of !aintaining the -respective spheres of !an

and wo!an(- with wo!en perfor!ing the duties of !otherhood and wife in

accordance with the -law of the Creator.-

MICHAEL M. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SONOMA COUNTY

Brief Fact Su!!ary. The /etitioner( Michael M. 0/etitioner1( was charged with

statutory rape in California and now alleges that the State2s statute discri!inates

unconstitutionally against !en only.

Synopsis of 3ule of 4aw. # state !ay provide for punish!ent only for !ales to

e5ualize deterrents to teenage pregnancy.

Facts. The /etitioner( at the ti!e of the co!plaint( was a 67yearold !ale who had

se+ual intercourse with a 68yearold fe!ale. Because California2s statute only

cri!inalized such behavior in !ales( the fe!ale involved was not charged with any

cri!e. The /etitioner now alleges that this disparity in the statutory rape laws is in

violation of the 95ual /rotection Clause of the Fourteenth #!end!ent of the United

States Constitution 0Constitution1.

Issue. :oes the California statutory rape statute violate principles of 95ual

/rotection$

,eld. %o. #ppeals Court ruling affir!ed.

*ustice &illia! 3ehn5uist 0*. 3ehn5uist1 does not specifically refer to the application


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of inter!ediate scrutiny. ,owever( *. 3ehn5uist gives great deference to the fact

that the State2s alleged obective was to deter teenage pregnancies.

The !aority states that a state !ay attac' the stated obective directly by

prohibiting the conduct only of !ales. The reasoning behind this assertion is that

fe!ales already have significant deterrence to abstain fro! the behavior( na!elypregnancy itself and its attendant difficulties.

:issent.

*ustice &illia! Brennan 0*. Brennan1 applies inter!ediate scrutiny to achieve the

opposite result fro! the !aority. *. Brennan concedes that preventing teenage

pregnancy is an i!portant obective.

,owever( *. Brennan argues that California still bears the burden of de!onstrating

that the genderbased statute is !ore effective at decreasing teenage pregnancies

than a genderneutral statute. More i!portantly( the State cannot show that a

genderneutral statute would be less effective than the genderbased statute.

*ustice *ohn /aul Stevens 0*. Stevens1 dissents( arguing that since both parties are

e5ually guilty of the conduct( it is perversely partial for the State to only punish a

single party.

:iscussion. It is hard to s5uare the !aority2s decision with the holding in ;rr v. ;rr(


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Conclusion

%o. In a 8D opinion authored by *ustice Feli+ Fran'furter( the Court concluded that

the Constitution -does not preclude the States fro! drawing a sharp line between

the se+es- or -to reflect sociological insight( or shifting social standards( any !ore

than it re5uires the! to 'eep abreast of the latest scientific standards.- The Courtfound that the Michigan legislature( in enacting the statute( could have deter!ined

that allowing wo!en to bartend could -give rise to !oral and social proble!s

against which it !ay devise preventive !easures.- The Court( *ustice Fran'furter

concludes( is in no position to -crosse+a!ine either actually or argu!entatively the

!ind of Michigan legislators.-

School District o A!i"#to" To$"shi% v. Sch&'%%

Facts of the Case

The #bington case concerns Biblereading in /ennsylvania public schools. #t the

beginning of the school day( students who attended public schools in the state of

/ennsylvania were re5uired to read at least ten verses fro! the Bible. #fter

co!pleting these readings( school authorities re5uired all #bington Township

students to recite the 4ord)s /rayer. Students could be e+cluded fro! these

e+ercises by a written note fro! their parents to the school. In a related case

Murray v. Curlett a Balti!ore statute re5uired Biblereading or the recitation of the

4ord)s /rayer at open e+ercises in public schools. Murray and his !other( professed

atheists challenged the prayer re5uire!ent.

"uestion

:id the /ennsylvania law and #bington)s policy( re5uiring public school students to

participate in classroo! religious e+ercises( violate the religious freedo! of

students as protected by the First and Fourteenth #!end!ents$

Conclusion

:ecisionE ? votes for Sche!pp( 6 vote0s1 against

4egal provisionE 9stablish!ent of 3eligion

The Court found such a violation. The re5uired activities encroached on both the

Free 9+ercise Clause and the 9stablish!ent Clause of the First #!end!ent since

the readings and recitations were essentially religious cere!onies and were

-intended by the State to be so.- Further!ore( argued *ustice Clar'( the ability of a

parent to e+cuse a child fro! these cere!onies by a written note was irrelevant


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since it did not prevent the school)s actions fro! violating the 9stablish!ent Clause.

MARSH v. CHAMBERS

Facts of the Case

9rnest Cha!bers( a !e!ber of the %ebras'a legislature( challenged the

legislature)s chaplaincy practice in federal court. This practice involves the offering

of a prayer at the beginning of each legislative session by a chaplain chosen by the

state and paid out of public funds. The district court supported Cha!bers on the use

of public funds. The appeals court supported Cha!bers on the prayer practice. Both

parties appealed to the U.S. Supre!e Court.

"uestion

:oes the chaplaincy practice of the %ebras'a legislature violate the 9stablish!ent

Clause of the First #!end!ent$

#rgu!ent

Marsh v. Cha!bers ;ral #rgu!ent

Conclusion

:ecisionE 8 votes for Marsh( D vote0s1 against

4egal provisionE 9stablish!ent of 3eligion

In a 8toD decision( the Court upheld the chaplaincy practice. In his opinion for the

Court( Chief *ustice &arren Burger abandoned the threepart test of 4e!on v.

urtz!an( which had been the touchstone for cases involving the 9stablish!ent

Clause. In its place( Burger rested the Court)s opinion on historical custo!. /rayers

by ta+supported legislative chaplains could be traced to the First Continental

Congress and to the First Congress that fra!ed the Bill of 3ights. #s a conse5uence(

the chaplaincy practice had beco!e -part of the fabric of our society.- In such

circu!stances( an invocation for :ivine guidance is not an establish!ent of religion.

-It is(- wrote Burger( -si!ply a tolerable ac'nowledg!ent of beliefs widely held

a!ong the people of this country.-

WEST (IRGINIA STATE BOARD OF ED. v. BARNETTE


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Facts of the Case

The &est Girginia Board of 9ducation re5uired that the flag salute be part of the

progra! of activities in all public schools. #ll teachers and pupils were re5uired to

honor the FlagH refusal to salute was treated as -insubordination- and was

punishable by e+pulsion and charges of delin5uency.

"uestion

:id the co!pulsory flagsalute for public schoolchildren violate the First

#!end!ent$

Conclusion

:ecisionE 8 votes for Barnette( D vote0s1 against

4egal provisionE US Const. #!end 6H &. Ga. Code 67D

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