www.kclpolitics.org.uk Autumn 2012

Message from the editorial team:

Welcome to our first issue of Dialogue, King’s College’s first student journal which aims to be truly

international and non-partisan in its pursuit for political analysis and reflection. Please note that all

views expressed in this journal belong to our authors alone, and do not reflect the views of the King’s

College London’s Politics Society.

g In light of forthcoming events, our primary focus in this issue was on the upcoming American elections

and their wider impact on international foreign policy. As pollsters put Obama and Romney unpredictably

close, it is impossible to know for certain who the next “leader of the free world” will be, but undoubtedly

important to reflect on the impact that America’s choice will have on the international community and par-

ticularly the fragile China-US relationship.

g Thank you very much to those who have contributed, your support and hard-work is much appreciated. I

would also like to extend an open invitation to you for international contributions towards the next issue

of “Dialogue” which already promises to be more extensive and diverse than this one.

01 Dialogue | Autumn 2012

Editors Note: Please contact us if you would like a fully referenced copy of any of the articles.

In this issue... Contact us

kclpolitics@gmail.com

kclpoliticsjournal@gmail.com

Webpage www.kclpolitics.org.uk

Facebook www.facebook.com/pages/KCL-

Politics-

Society/267247936669070

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Content editor

Georgie Singer

Creative editor

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Society President

Ramtin Hajimonshi

Whither Clinton, and Whither State Without Her?

g The US-China Relationship: Primed With Identity

Dynamics?

g

The U.S. and China: Playing the Game

g

Russia: Third Time Lucky?

g

British Politics Rise and Fall: Labour’s Rea-

wakening

g

Conservative Leadership: Losing One’s

Voice

g

Europe: Steps Towards Municipalisation

g

Inside Venezuela: The Plight of the Refugees

g

Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood,

and Why the Revolution Continues

Dialogue | Autumn 2012 02

- Welcome notes: ”What is Politics?”

- Notes by KCLSU President, Thomas Clayton,

on the ”Politics of KCLSU” jff - Presenting the KCL Politics Society agenda j

- Complimentary wine reception

27th September 18.30

King’s College London Strand Campus

Anatomy Lecture Hall (K6.29)

A short five years ago, presidential candidate Barack Obama

condescendingly equated his primary opponent’s experience as

First Lady of the United States to only sipping tea with foreign

leaders. One year later, after a bruising primary campaign and

an equally bruising general election battle, Obama asked that

former First Lady for her help in drinking the most important cups

of tea of all: those served to the Secretary of State.

Today, Secretary Hillary Clinton has made her mark in

four brief years as State Secretary: she has visited over a hund-

red countries, and, as PolicyMic’s Lindsay Novic has noted, has

carefully navigated through the WikiLeaks storm, pushed for

democracy in the Middle East, and kept a close eye on human

rights. At the same time, she is the nation’s most-liked woman,

with sky-high approval ratings, and an inspiration for young girls

across America.

Hillary Clinton has done so well at State be-

cause she is Hillary Clinton, an identity that no other can hope to

emulate – she entered State already having fostered relation-

ships with the world’s leaders (that’s what all that “tea” was

about), having established a global identity, and having proved

her prowess on the world stage. Not to mention that she also

has a habit of making history: from her speech at her Wellesley

College commencement, to her election to the Senate as a First

Lady and her historic primary victories eight years later. With

those credentials, it’s not surprising that the same Democrats

that shunned her in 2008, likely due to personal insecurities and

wishful thinking about the alternatives, are now singing her

praise. This, along with a seemingly thin 2012 field for Demo-

crats, may very well put the top job within her grasp in four

years.

However, Secretary Clinton's gaze does not yet

stretch four years ahead, but is focused on this coming year.

Clinton has repeatedly stated that, having no political ambitions

for the future, she looks forward to stepping down from the helm

of State after President Obama’s first term. So, whether Obama

wins or loses this November, one thing is for certain – Clinton

will no longer be the face of America abroad. This development,

which we have known for months was coming, brings up two

questions: why is Clinton leaving State, and what might State

look like for the next four years?

Firstly, Hillary Clinton has a lot of good reasons

for packing her bags and leaving Foggy Bottom. Few people,

other than her supporters, believe her official stance of her need-

ing to escape from what she calls the “high wire of American

politics”. Without over-analysis, it does makes sense: she has

spent decades directly involved in roles of serious national im-

portance, and the next presidential term offers her the chance

for a well-deserved break. However, others believe that Clinton

05 Dialogue | Autumn 2012

A short five years ago, presidential candidate Barack Obama condescendingly equated

his primary opponent’s experience as

First Lady of the United States to

sipping tea with foreign leaders.

WITHER CLINTON, AND WITHER STATE WITHOUT HER?

isn’t calling it quits permanently, and that 2016 is still very much

on her agenda. This is linked to the fact that, according to author

Ed Klein, she turned down the vice presidential spot on Obama’s

2012 ticket. For those who take this scenario seriously, she not

only needs time to rest and recuperate, but to distance herself

from Obama’s polarized presidency. That way, if Obama loses,

she would not be tied through the 2012 ticket to his failures, and

if he wins, she will be able to claim enough of a difference be-

tween her and his policies to establish herself as a unique voice

on the Democrats’ side in 2012.

Regardless of Clinton’s plans and aspirations,

the fact that she is leaving remains the same. But depending on

who then wins this November, we may have two very different

State Departments come next year.

A Republican State Department will likely be

more assertive, more confrontational, and more unrelenting –

the Grand Old Party has grown tired of what they see as

Obama’s four-year “apology tour”. Nevertheless, it is unclear

who would lead a Republican State Department. The Romney

administration will probably want to restore the aura of

“American exceptionalism” on the world stage. However, with

the possible president’s recent underwhelming overseas trip, he

may be advised to follow Obama's lead and tap a familiar face to

global diplomacy who can stand well on his or her own feet.

If Obama is fortunate enough to keep his job,

there are a number of senior American politicians who seemed

eager for the spot in 2008, and who now may once again come

into contention. John Kerry, the Massachusetts senator who ran

for the top job himself eight years ago, seems to be the over-

whelming favorite. With global recognition, as well as years of

experience as a statesman, it seems that Kerry's name is com-

ing up in pundits’ speculations numerous times. A Kerry State

may give us a glimpse of what a Kerry presidency may have

looked like. It would be classically Obama, but State would likely

lose its "chic", unique branding that has come with Clinton’s ten-

ure. It would also perhaps be less exciting, because without Clin-

ton’s celebrity pushing her to the forefront of foreign presses it

would operate at a calmer pace, signifying a slowing down of

Obama’s presidency as he winds down his own tenure.

Clinton’s departure from State, though it opens

exciting possibilities for her own career and future role in her

country, puts America at a highly unpredictable position as to

the tone diplomacy will take for the next four years. Whether

Romney or Obama wins will not only determine whose portrait

hangs in embassies and consulates worldwide, but also whether

America's newest top diplomat will be able to successfully re-

store the country's reputation in the eyes of a growingly cautious

and skeptical world. Tea or no tea, Secretary Clinton will be hard

to replace.

HUMZA BOKARI is a student at Harvard College and a writer for the Harvard Political Review’s

Electoral Politics column.

Photo curtesy of thedailynewsegypt.com 06

WITHER CLINTON, AND WITHER STATE WITHOUT HER?

07 Dialogue | Autumn 2012

It should come as no great surprise that foreign policy has

been relegated to the outskirts of the US presidential elec-

tions. After all, domestic economic hardships and disenchant-

ment with the military entrapment in Afghanistan provide little

opportunity to rally the American public around foreign involve-

ments. Even the much-touted rise of China has so far – with

the partial exception of Mitt Romney’s Wall Street Journal edi-

torial back in February – not really agitated the presidential

candidates, let alone generated the kind of China-bashing

statements that might be expected during an election year.

However, there are a number of reasons why especially

the US-China relationship is likely to dominate the White

House agenda in the coming years, irrespective of the hue of

the coming house steward. While most pundits usually point

either to the multifaceted interdependence of the US and Chi-

nese economies or to the growing threat posed by China’s

military modernization, there is a tendency to overlook what is

likely to become a key driver of US-China relations: identity

dynamics. Indeed, crucial aspects of each country’s self-

understanding may easily spur these dynamics.

Firstly, the American polity has from its very inception

displayed a strong urge to engage in identity dynamics with its

outside world. On the one hand, this urge has taken the

“positive” form of a missionary impulse to shape the world in

the image of America, `a chosen nation´ with a `Manifest Des-

tiny´ to expand and propagate `the American Creed´. Ameri-

can evangelists of liberal democracy did run their heads

against the Chinese wall in the nineties, but the secular, capi-

talist, and increasingly individualist spirit of Chinese society

should provide fertile ground for another ideological campaign,

especially now that the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are

no longer tying up all the resources.

On the other hand, this `American urge´ has

been accompanied by an equally strong desire to identify,

confront and ultimately eradicate what identity scholars usually

label “The Other”. That is, the un-American elements – like

Nazis, Communists or radical Islamists – that pose an existen-

tial threat in a material and ideological sense. To be sure, the

United States is not alone in confronting its “Others”. Yet, in

light of its heterogeneous ethnic fabric and its lack of deep

historical roots America may be regarded as the `imagined

community par excellence´, deriving its internal cohesion from

an outward-looking, exceptionalist mind-set fed by ongoing

missionary and confrontational practices.

Interestingly, with the War on Terror on the

wane and despite the projected downsizing of the US military

(500 billion USD in 10 years), the United States is actually

already redirecting its strategic attention elsewhere. The so-

called “pivot to Asia” may not appear as a dramatic strategic

shift in terms of military resources, adding 2500 marines to

northern Australia, a sixth aircraft carrier group and 10% extra

warships in the Asia-Pacific region, new missile defense inter-

ceptors and a projected long-range bomber. But if one in-

cludes Washington’s proposal of a new Air-Sea-Battle concept

and its recent efforts to step up military cooperation with sev-

eral southeast Asian countries to orchestrate what looks like

an alliance of China-skeptics, then the “pivot” evokes a more

clear-cut picture of American mobilization towards […]

07 Dialogue | Autumn 2012 Photo Curtesy of AP/Charles Dharapak 08

[…] `the Middle Kingdom´.

Importantly, the rise of China provides a

much stronger point of reference for American identity

politics than the one-off, non-state Al Qaeda jihadists

provoking the War on Terror. Not only is the potential

China-challenge of an entirely different material magni-

tude, it also represents a far more viable non-Western

identity model: the so-called “Beijing Consensus”, which

epitomizes top-down politics, a state-propelled economy

and absolute state sovereignty. Yet, it takes two to tan-

go, and so far Beijing has been determined to downplay

any notion of ideological rivalry, stressing instead the

peaceful and harmonious nature of China’s ascend-

ance.

Still, China – just like the United States –

is infused by its own heavy dose of an exceptionalist

mentality, which is likely to have a greater impact on US

-Chinese identity dynamics than the notion of a “Beijing

Consensus”. This exceptionalism (or `Sino-centrism´) is

based on China’s ethno-cultural heritage and includes

four more or less distinct discursive elements: Confucian

moral philosophy, ancient civilizational uniqueness, dy-

nastic tributary centralism and Han-ethnocentrism. As

Sino-centrism seems to be gaining prominence in Chi-

nese society – partly supported by the legitimacy-

craving communist leadership – one may argue that it is

only a matter of time before Beijing reverses its cautious

identity profile internationally.

In this post-9/11 decade, most Chinese as well as

American observers view the rise of China as a new

defining moment in international affairs. However, as

long as Beijing and Washington consciously refrain from

accentuating their mutual differences, they need not

revert into the game of oppositional identity dynamics

that seemed to be in the making prior to 9/11. In that

sense, the rhetorical restraint characterizing the US

presidential race so far is indeed laudable.

ANDREAS BØJE FORSBY is a PhD Candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies.

09 Dialogue | Autumn 2012

In 2012, Washington has yet to figure out what to do with a rising China. Perhaps

a few optimists in Capitol Hill have joined the rank of critics who are counting

down the days until Beijing’s inevitable dissolution from within. Then - voila!

Washington can get away without a solution and continue to remain on top of the

world.

Unfortunately, with each day’s new dawn, China seems to be going no-

where. Despite a gamut of domestic problems, China continues to be touted as a

rising power with a market with infinite potential while the U.S., well, is on the de-

cline. After the financial crisis in 2008, the U.S. is slowly recovering, but the un-

employment rate remains at an unpleasant figure of 8% (August 2012). While the

dollar continues to be regarded as the dominant global currency, Washington’s

extremely high deficit and its series of quantative easing have many experts be-

ginning to think otherwise.

Under such difficult economic time, perhaps also feeling insecure with eco-

nomic chaos at home that is threatening America’s global status, Washington has

elevated its suspicion against Beijing, the rising star, and adopted a series of

measures in an attempt to seduce China into showing its true intentions behind

its rise. Since 2008, the Obama administration has made several moves that

have intensified Sino-U.S. relations and challenge the benevolent image Beijing

tries to establish.

Not long after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s groundbreaking visit

to Asia in 2009, President Obama made a speech in Japan confirming U.S. posi-

tion in Asia and announced the initiation of the Transpacific Strategic and Eco-

nomic Partnership (TPP). President Obama followed up with a personal Asia tour

as well, visiting Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and India, and consolidating rela-

tions with these traditional allies. In Southeast Asia, Washington joined the East

Asia Summit and offered to serve as the protector of peace in the South China

Sea. In 2010, Washington made its presence felt in Asia by conducting joint mili-

tary exercises with both Korea and Japan.

China’s reaction? Alarmed and frustrated. From Beijing’s perspective, the Bush

administration’s policy focus on the Middle East provided a gap for China to con-

11 Dialogue | Autumn 2012

solidate its influence in Asia. With Washington making headways into the Pacific

again, the Beijing leadership is forced to watch out for the strategic game the U.S. is

playing, a game that would certainly disrupt China’s plans to become a great power.

The TPP is merely an example of the delicate interaction between Beijing and

Washington. From a strategic point of view, the U.S. is essentially challenging the

benign international image China has been trying to establish in recent years.

Through close interactions with ASEAN and the pronouncement of concepts such as

“harmonious worldview” and “good neighbor policy”, China has shaped Asia around

itself. So far, the TPP has managed to attract the interest of more than half of

ASEAN members and traditional U.S. allies such as Japan; it is clear that the U.S. is

trying to regroup influence around itself in the Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, Wash-

ington has not made any objections to Beijing participating in the TPP. Yet the Chi-

nese leadership is left with a dilemma: joining the TPP would mean acknowledging

U.S. presence in the region, while not joining would inevitably arouse more suspicion

against China’s intention behind its rise. China has reasons to be frustrated.

Whether President Obama wins the election in November or not, one thing for

certain is that the U.S. will continue to deal with China, and Sino-U.S. relations will

continue to dominate international affairs for years to come. If President Obama suc-

ceeds in office, not much would change in current U.S. policies except more pres-

sure for China to show its hand as a threat or a peacemaker, a move that Beijing

may simply choose to ignore. If President Obama succeeds in office, not much would

change in current U.S. policies except more long term pressure for China to show its

hand as a threat or a peacemaker, a move that Beijing may simply choose to ignore.

If a Republican candidate steps into office, the U.S. may quickly increase the press-

sure on China, as the Republican Party has traditionally adopted a strong stance

against China. Regardless of who runs away with the election in November, the fu-

ture of Washington’s China policy will be grounded in the answer to two questions:

how much pressure and how fast. Meanwhile, politicians and pundits continue to

fiercely debate.

TONY TAI-TING is a PhD candidate at the Graduate Institute of

International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan.

Photo Curtesy of www.chinaglobaltrade.com 12

In May 2012, Russia welcomed the new (old) President Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin. At the

age of 59, his presidential term in office is his third six-year term, and follows his second

stint as Prime Minister. Previously Putin’s popularity among Russians was unyielding, but

his questionable success at once again taking office has raised eyebrows at home and ab-

road, hindering the country’s progress towards modernisation and stability.

The Russian economy may not be on the brink of the economic abyss like her European

neighbours, but the economy lurks not far from precipice. Putin’s move to gain Russian

membership into the World Trade Organisation (August 2012) is an important step towards

a stronger economy and embracing BRIC status. Membership of the World Trade Organi-

sation should increase competitiveness and draw more foreign investment where it is

currently the lowest amongst the BRIC nations. Membership also has the potential to pro-

vide a kick-start to the Russian manufacturing industry; where new factory-friendly policies

are expected to create 25 million skilled jobs. However, inherent economic problems remain

unresolved.

Putin has ordered a new wave of spending which many analysts believe Russia is unable to

afford. Public spending is already an incredible 40% of GDP, which is possibly set to rise by

a further $160 billion if Putin keeps his pre-election promises for further domestic spending.

Similarly, military spending has already increased by 33% in 2012 alone, and is set to

increase by a further 60% by 2013. Oil remains Russia’s biggest export and most important

source of revenue, but as prices continue to fluctuate and public spending continues to

increase, the budget deficit could dramatically increase if Putin does not balance his books,

ultimately tipping the Russian economy over the brink.

Putin must also strive for a balance in his belligerent foreign policy, not since the days of the

Cold War have the ties between America and Russia been so fraught with political tension.

As a true former KGB member, Putin has always freely spoken of his mistrust and dislike for

America which, amongst petty spats and snubs, have been recently demonstrated by his

refusal to cooperate with the US on finding a solution in Syria. It would seem that regardless

of the US election outcome, it is unlikely that relations will improve and may in fact be ag-

gravated if Romney is given the power to exercise his hard-line foreign policy. Instead Putin

13 Dialogue | Autumn 2012

Photo Curtesy of www.rugrad.eu 14

looks again to China to find companionship against

American hegemony. According to recent Chinese and

Russian press reports, relations have significantly

strengthened between President Hu and President

Putin, reaching an “unprecedented high” as transport,

trade and cultural exchanges are reinforced.

Nevertheless, Putin’s blatant disdain for the West’s

governance may cause Russia far greater long term

damage than the satisfaction of giving America the

cold shoulder. China is indeed on the rise, but America

still successfully dominates the international gover-

nance systems, and therefore has the potential to

increase the pressure on Putin’s unpopular regime to

breaking point. However, if recent events in Russia are

any indication, the regime’s breaking point may be trig-

gered from within.

The controversial imprisonment of the Pussy Riot band

members for two years in August 2012 has been met

with international outcry and condemnation at the

Kremlin’s underhand intervention in the verdict. This

intervention signals a harsher response to the growing

domestic protests that had been gaining momentum

since Putin announced his candidacy in March 2012.

According to a report by Chatham House from early

2012, Russian society is at the level of “deep-reaching

atomization” where increases in alcoholism, suicide,

murder and abortions reflect a society in a state of

deep depression. If domestic unrest is to decrease,

Putin must start taking steps down the path of human-

rights liberalisation which will not only make him more

appealing to the Russian people, but significantly

increase Russia’s reputation on the world stage.

Putin’s six-year term has just begun, but as oil prices

fluctuate, ties with the West strain against a leader who

is rapidly losing his support at home as well as abroad.

Russia is certainly a country that deserves careful di-

plomacy, but it should not be allowed to continue to

abuse its own people and block the humanitarian

efforts of the international community. This time round,

Putin might find himself the exception to the rule of

“third-time lucky”.

GEORGINA SINGER is a second year

BA International Politics student at

King’s College London.

15 | Photo Curtesy of www.tripadvisor.com Dialogue | Autumn 2012

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL ECONOMY g

at King’s College London is a unique multi-disciplinary enterprise – it is the only academic department of its kind in the UK.

“Teaching and research in the department is informed by an understanding of the interdependence of economic and political institutions.”

BRITISH POLITICS RISE AND FALL: LABOUR’S REAWAKENING

British politics is at a crucial juncture. The Conservative Party

has found itself aimless and drifting further to the Right, and the

Liberal Democrats have been led into the political abyss by Dep-

uty-Prime Minister Nick Clegg, with their support inexorably

crumbling. The economy is entering a double dip recession

thanks to Chancellor George Osborne’s failure to understand

simple economics, and incompetent Minister after incompetent

Minister has pointed out just how unsuited they are to running

the country.

There is a million dollar question facing Ed Miliband:

what is the point of the Labour Party when there is no money

left? If we can answer it, we will win the next election. The Party

is replenishing itself, and is drawing on a variety of ideological

strands, some of which are seen by the Conservative Party as

strong challenges to the prevailing orthodoxy.

A promising addition to the bank of ideas Labour can

draw from over the next three years comes from a young Aus-

tralian thinker, Tim Soutphommasane. He re-imagines patriot-

ism as a sentiment of democratic renewal and national belong-

ing, a chance to make the emotional case for citizens to support

those they will never meet through the welfare state. The Right,

he argues, has kept tight hold of patriotism and used it to appeal

to its own agenda.

The idea that the Left can regain control of patriotism in

public discourse has excited Jon Cruddas, the head of Labour’s

policy review, and Ed Miliband. Both have met Mr Soutphom-

masane to discuss how his ideas can translate to re-establishing

the idea of a State that appeals not to the standard nationalistic

catalogue of clichés – monarchy, military and aristocracy – but

to a renewed sense of community and an acknowledgement

that as a people, the British have fought the greatest battles not

on foreign blood-soaked soils, but at home, where working peo-

ple have fought to establish a nation that has a powerful social

conscience and a collective duty to one other. The concept of

‘Blue Labour’ has somewhat fallen by the wayside in recent

months, but Soutphommasane’s ideas are influential in the lead-

er’s office.

Some prefer to focus on more conventional economic

concepts in the battle for Labour’s soul. Ed Miliband’s latest I

17 Dialogue | Autumn 2012

dea; which he fleshed out in a September speech to Policy Ex-

change, is ‘predistribution’. His message is that rather than com-

pensating for poverty pay through redistributive handouts, the

poorest people in society must surely prefer having their own

money in their hands. Whether Miliband is planning to adopt a

full prices and incomes policy remains to be seen; the last time

we saw such a policy in a mainstream political party was under

Jim Callaghan in 1979.

So is Labour for equality of opportunity or for overall

equality of outcome? Is Labour for a safety net so that those at

the bottom do not become trapped there? Or is it for a full prices

and incomes policy, tinkering with the whole of the economy?

We will see in the coming years.

The current Government’s complete economic

failure, means that whoever next occupies Downing Street will

still face a large deficit. Labour’s approach must consider the

issue that has rarely faced it in government; how can social pro-

gress be achieved when there is very little money to use? The

often-overlooked redistribution of the last Labour government

relied on revenue that the next Labour government will not have.

Increasing tax credits in the way we did during our last period in

power will not be possible.

Labour’s priority for the coming years will be to

articulate a vision of a better Britain that is not reliant on a plenti-

ful supply of tax revenue. It will not be easy. But to do so we will

draw together the various strands of thought in the Party. We

need to show that austerity without a credible plan for growth is

not the answer. We need to show that a new patriotism is com-

patible with modern liberalism. We need to show that modern

Toryism is not the acceptable face of capitalism – it is a vacuous

creed promulgated by a small cabal in the hands of the City.

Public opinion is on the side of Ed Miliband’s

Labour Party on every major issue. The deficit is growing every

day because of the Chancellor’s inability to recognise that he

needs to change his austerity mantra. Internal Conservative dis-

cipline is in disarray. A government has not been this incompe-

tent in decades, and the Labour Party is well placed to capitalise

on it. It will not be easy – but Opposition never is.

TOM WILLIAMS is a second year BA War Studies and History student at King’s College London

and the chair of KCL Labour Society.

Photo Curtesy of wikipedia.orb 18

19 Dialogue | Autumn 2012

CONSERVATIVE LEADERSHIP:

LOSING ONE’S VOICE

A llegedly “reinvented” by party leader David

Cameron, the Conservative Party won back

power for the first time since 1997 in the 2010

election. While this should have been a trium-

phant victory, the formation of a bittersweet coalition has

arguably generated more problems than it has addressed,

and one can now begin to truly question the longevity of

both the coalition as an entity and Cameron’s ability as a

leader. Nevertheless the Conservative Party, despite an

unpopular legacy from the 1980s, has indeed made some

notable achievements; particularly if compared with the

actions of the recent Labour Party, the reverberations of

which are still felt from Ireland to Iraq.

From 2007 and 2008, Dylan Jones (editor of GQ

magazine) repeatedly interviewed David Cameron for his

book Cameron on Cameron, which portrayed what could

be seen as the unbridled determination and drive of a man

who knew he would become Prime Minister. Holding a

string of professional jobs since his time at Oxford, there

should have been fewer men more qualified, and fewer

more confident, indicating that Cameron is clearly more

than capable of running the country. So where has he

gone wrong? Facing an increasing number of criticisms –

both from the public, the opposition, as well as his own

coalition, Cameron is becoming increasingly unpopular

and arguably ineffectual. Leaving us with the beguiling

question – why does David Cameron appear unable to

drive the conservatives forward in the way that past lead-

ers have been able to?

Firstly, one must examine Cameron’s own political

stance. Surely to rise to becoming the youngest Prime

Minister since the 1812, one would think that Cameron

must have a distinct and clear set of ideals and an agenda

that he would be unwilling to stray from. Once hailed by

the media and political commentators - not to mention

Cameron himself - as a “compassionate conservative” and

the “heir to Blair”, the man who stands beside the dispatch

box today is almost unrecognisable. However a biography

of Cameron titled ‘Practically a Conservative’ which was

published in 2009, shows how even before the coalition,

his political agenda and ideology was already under ques-

tion. New Statesman writer Jason Cowley argues that

Cameron is incapable of truly leading his party, as he is

more concerned with his portrayal in the public image: “He

is non-ideological and pragmatic” , reinforcing the criticism

that rather than being concerned primarily with his political

stance, Cameron’s main priority is his image.

Moreover, while not a hugely popular figure in the

present climate, Rupert Murdoch once described how

Cameron “doesn’t believe in anything other than trying to

construct what he believes will be the right public image”.

This preoccupation with public image acts as yet another

constituent that Cameron has to placate in his dealings in

parliament. Not only is he held accountable to those in his

constituency, party and coalition, but he appears to hold

himself accountable to the general public. While some ar-

gue that this is quite right – after all, the Prime Minister is

supposed to lead the country - it does mean that Cameron

has limited the scope of his actions.

‘The central party appears unable to truly shake the traditional

stereotypes of upper class “English buffoons”’

The second major factor which has

clearly limited Cameron as a leader is

the stereotypes that the party is still

forced to confront. A classic example of

this could be seen in the BBC’s recent

critically acclaimed Wonderland pro-

gram; ‘Young, Bright and on the Right’.

Following the airing of the program, both

the press and social media exploded,

neither of which endorsed favourable

impressions of the people involved in

the program, nor the party itself. Tales

of debauchery, faction and class con-

flict; not to mention crises of cheese and

biscuits, proved little help to the reputa-

tion of the Cameron and the Conserva-

tives.

Furthermore, shamelessly en-

compassing Conservative stereotypes,

the loveable yet comedic Boris Johnson

is viewed by some as the Conserva-

tive’s biggest asset and by others as its

greatest hindrance. In line with Boris’s

unequivocal success at the 2012 Olym-

pics, the media continues to speculate

the chance of Johnson taking over as

leader once Cameron leaves, the

thought of which is arguably undermin-

ing Cameron’s own leadership. Current-

ly preferring to adopt a more placid and

reserved nature, the central party ap-

pears unable to truly shake the tradition-

al stereotypes of upper class “English

buffoons”, which in turn limits them from

being able to drive forward their own

agenda.

It is therefore clear that Cameron faces

two major injunctions with in his leader-

ship: the first is his delicate issue with

accountability, his role in the coalition

and ties to constituents and public

leaves him politically torn and unable to

follow his own agenda. The second is-

sue lies in confronting the stereotypes

that continue to haunt the party, while

also tackling the unpopular legacies of

Thatcher’s miners and Blair’s North Ire-

land. In this context, and as the New

Statesmen also argued, it would certain-

ly appear that Cameron’s leadership

style is making his own voice “…less

and less distinctive as he seeks to ac-

commodate and compromise”.

RUTH REEKIE is a third year BA History student at

King’s College London.

Photo courtesy of www.number10.gov.uk 20

During the very recent years the major developments of

European integration have been driven by crisis – finan-

cial, economic or Euro crisis. However, we should not

overlook that European integration can be more than the

outcome of decisions and negotiations between national

governments. As integration continues, it becomes incre-

asingly important that the EU reaches its demos. At least

some member states, where local government takes a

strong political role, cities, counties and municipalities can

provide a key link between citizens and European gover-

nance – given that there is a link between the local and

the European level.

The following offers some sketches how to understand

European integration from a local government per-

spective. Is the relationship between the EU and local

authorities just a matter of Europeanisation of local go-

vernment? Or has the European engagement of local

actors modified the patterns of integration and thus led to

a ‘municipalisation’ of European governance? What are

adequate perspectives to look at European integration of

local government and how does the notion of multilevel

governance relate to the local level? Notwithstanding the

role of formal polity provisions and constitutional develop-

ments, this analysis suggests that local-supranational

relations are primarily subject to interactive policy styles

amongst institutions and actors from multiple levels.

Since the early 1990s with the completion of the single

market, the European integration process has significant-

ly affected local governments across Europe. The imple-

mentation of EU legislation and the EU’s Regional and

Cohesion Policy have led to Europeanisation processes

at the local level. As local authorities became increasingly

aware of the EU’s influence on their practice, some ad-

apted their politico-administrative structures. At the same

time, EU membership has also provided local authorities

with windows of opportunity that changed local decisions

and encouraged municipal entrepreneurship to promote

local concerns at the European stage. Although this might

be described by the notion of multilevel governance, the

European engagement of local actors has not empo-

wered local governments across all member states. Con-

flicts of interest, power constellations and resource de-

pendencies between different levels set structural limits to

the formation of multilevel governance. Hence, interaction

between local and European level develops largely

through patterns of ‘loose coupling’ and cognitive (instead

of political) processes without relying on binding manda-

tes or formal decision-making. In other words, the EU’s

‘multilevel compound’ represents a ‘complex set of over-

lapping and nested systems of governance involving

European, national, regional and local actors, and

networks’.

There are formal provisions which indicate a growing ack-

nowledgement of local government within European go-

vernance. Whilst the Maastricht Treaty already introduced

subsidiarity and the Committee of the Regions (CoR),

which provided local representatives with direct access to

EU policy-making, the Lisbon Treaty has been a further

major achievement of municipal lobbying. Under Article

4.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), for the first

time the EU time acknowledges the right to local self-

government, and Article 5.3 explicitly extends subsidiarity

to the regional and the local level. The right to defend

subsidiarity before court potentially creates greater

mutual awareness and cooperation between the local and

the European level.

Despite the formal acknowledgement of local government

in the European treaties and the growing influence of the

CoR, the latter’s powers remain comparatively week and

it is not clear how the Lisbon Treaty has brought effective

changes of practice. Therefore, multilevel cooperation

between different levels offers a complementary insight

into local-supranational relations, as certain policy areas

have become subject to the influence of engaged local

government actors: the Regional and Cohesion policy,

the Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020 are direct points of

reference for local governments to engage in EU policies.

With the reforms of the Structural Funds in 1988, the al-

location of funding was decentralised by introducing the

21 Dialogue | Autumn 2012

partnership principle for the implementation of funding

programmes. National governments remained in

charge of the final decisions on the allocation and mo-

nitoring of funds, but they were supposed to work in

partnerships with local and regional authorities.

Despite continuous efforts and initiatives to involve

subnational governments in the delivery of the EU’s

policies, such as the White Paper on European Gover-

nance from 2001, the Systematic Dialogue from 2004,

the CoR’s White paper on Multilevel Governance from

2009 and the Territorial Pact of Regional and Local

Authorities on the Europe 2020 Strategy, the partners-

hip principle often suffers from effective. Hence, the

challenge of partnership-building amongst multiple

level is still present in the very recent discussion about

the Partnership Contracts for the Cohesion Policy post

2013. The measures that are debated to include local

and other stakeholders in the design and implementat-

ion of the 2014-2020 programming period emphasis

the need to build capacities, such as local action

groups, to integrate urban development and commu-

nity-led development (which is only compulsory for the

European Agriculture Fund For Rural Development).

The major hurdle for local government to have a say in

the design of EU policies is their constraint position

within in their countries, since not all member states

have decided to relax the ‘hierarchical command-and-

control form’.And yet, European policy initiati-

ves indicate a growing relevance for local actors within

at least the delivery of EU policies. Whereas so far

subnational actors have struggled to become involved

in the design of the programmes of the Cohesion Po-

licy, the pressure to meet the Lisbon and Europe 2020

objectives has pushed European governance and po-

lity further towards a system of negotiation and cooper-

ation processes involving European, national, regional

and local actors. The implementation of the Cohesion

Policy 2014-2020 within different member states will

show whether a cooperative dynamic between local

and European actors is going to develop further in the

future.

Overall, the relationship between the EU and some

local actors is not just issues of Europeanisation, but

has enhanced the logic of European integration

beyond intergovernmental patterns, at least at an early

stage. Within limited policy areas, a functional ‘fusion’

of different levels into compound policy arrangements

has emerged. With regard to the outlined constitutional

provisions and policy initiatives around partnership,

‘municipalisation’ of European governance is mostly a

matter of policy, modestly of polity and marginally of

politics.

MARIUS GUDERJAN is a PhD candidate

at the Institute of Humanities and Social

Science Research at the Manchester

Metropolitan University.

Photo Curtesy of http://www.intermediachannel.it 22

With a harsh squeak the small government bus sets itself in mo-

tion.Two policemen, detailed to provide our fast and secure

transfer to a refugee village in the foothills of Venezuela’s Andes,

get on their motorbikes and take on their task. Our driver skillfully

steers us through the colonial city centre of San Cristóbal, out of

the urban area, into one of the most notorious barrios of the

state and beyond it, up the heights, where usually no policeman

sets foot. At each intersection our escorts stop the traffic and we

are winked through, much to the outrage of the busy and impa-

tient road users. Our expedition to La Tinta is led by the local

Director of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), W.

Sánchez, who kindly arranged for an international group of jour-

nalists to interview a few of the chiefly Colombian refugees at

this site. We are hosted by the government of the Táchira state,

which during most of Hugo Chávez’ presidency has been, and

continues to be, held by the opposition.

Before we enter the village, which is made up of count-

less wooden and corrugated iron shacks, we are told that neither

photographs must be taken, nor real names used in any inter-

views intended for publication. Many of the refugees have had

traumatic experiences and do not wish to be portrayed in the

media. Some fear they might be recognised by their violent per-

petrators back home. Others worry they might attract unneces-

sary attention from the national Venezuelan government and

face deportation. The great majority of the dwellers here do not

have a legal permit and only few of them have got the lengthy

and bureaucratic asylum application process under way. Their

statelessness exposes the refugees to a number of perils:

Throughout the community there is no official political authority,

no law enforcement, which gives rise to informal power struc-

tures and often violence. Most of the children growing up in La

Tinta have no access to even the most basic form of institu-

23 Dialogue | Autumn 2012

tionalised education, nor to health care. They are not protect-

ed against abuse, exploitation, neglect and discrimination. Run-

ning water and electricity are generally tapped illegally. Many of

the shacks are not at all weatherproof and have been swept

down the hill or suffered severe damages due to heavy rainfalls

recently.

We walk and skid down a swampy hillside, past a num-

ber of wobbly huts and cabins, into the village. Judging from

the stares that we get, we must be a rare sight to the locals and

our presence is only condoned because of our UNHCR es-

corts. We entered without the two policemen, who would likely

have scared away or frightened the refugees. Despite our for-

mer briefing, some of the journalists are too eager to learn

about personal fates and become rather persistent in their in-

quiry. As we interview an elderly lady who had fled from the

more than 300 miles distant Cali, we witness her reliving a trau-

matic memory. Under tears the woman tells us that unidentified

militiamen had killed her son and that the rest of the family had

been threatened with the same destiny. Together with her

daughter and grandchildren, she had hurriedly left her home,

embarking on a journey of fear, uncertainty and insecurity. “I

will never go back”, she tells us “because although Colombia is

my motherland, I must leave the past behind. I am hoping to

build a better future here.”

But how much brighter a future can she and her family

seek in Venezuela’s border region? For now – it seems – they

are safe from their perpetrators in Colombia, which to them is

most crucial. Yet, Venezuela is all but ideal a refugee destina-

tion. With one of the continent’s highest murder rates, impunity

figures beyond 90 per cent, and illicit Colombian armed groups

operating also on this side of the border, their security is far

from guaranteed. Furthermore corrupt policemen and soldiers

may take advantage of the refugees’ vulnerability. Finding for-

mal employment is a frustrating and nearly impossible endeav-

our for many of the refugees, who are denied work despite

proper qualifications and due not only to legal restrictions but

often also because of national discrimination. Therefore, many

of them are forced to accept informal, unattractive, and under-

paid employment. Most of President Hugo Chávez’ flawed so-

cial programmes, the so-called Bolivarian Missions, do not

reach the refugees. When applying for social housing they are

generally told to obtain the Venezuelan nationality first, which

has complicated implications of its own. Waiting lists for such

housing are endless, even for Venezuelans anyway.

Not too long ago the asylum application process in Ven-

ezuela could last up to four years. Thanks to continuous efforts

of the UNHCR to reduce bureaucracy and accelerate that pro-

cess, successful applicants now wait roughly twelve months for

their asylum to be granted. Throughout the years refugees in

Venezuela have been the victims of political cleavages and

clashes of national and bi-national sorts. The hostile stance of

Chávez’ government toward the oppositional Táchira state and

bellicose relations with the Uribe administration in Colombia

have worked to exacerbate the refugees’ woes. The rather dip-

lomatic Juan Manuel Santos seems to introduce a more peace-

ful era both in terms of the Colombian internal armed conflict

and in terms of bi-lateral relations with Venezuela. This could

help past and future refugees alike, as peace with the FARC,

ELN and other violent armed groups in Colombia would likely

stop the flow of refugees and even allow some to return to their

homes. However, much of the asylum seekers’ future might

depend also on the outcome of Venezuela’s presidential elec-

tions due to be held on October 7th, where Mr. Chávez is facing

his biggest electoral challenge so far.

DAVID VALENTIN SCHWEIGER is a second year

BA International Politics student at

King’s College London.

Photo Curtesy of www.elmundo.es 24

Egyptian politics are currently as unpredictable as they are complicated. As outside observers seek to understand the rapidly

changing political landscape, it is important to remember that for many the revolution continues. Change is ongoing and de-

spite the recent success of Mohamed Morsi in the presidential elections, the long-term political direction of Egypt is far from

decided. It would be a mistake for scholars and the international community to use the election results to assume either that

the future of Egypt is assured, or that the country is destined for Islamist leadership. This article argues that although the

Muslim Brotherhood has been successful in the early stages of Egypt’s new democracy, this success was more the result of

circumstance, political maturity and election tactics than a reflection of the will of the people.As Morsi settles into the role of

president, questions about the future of Egypt continue to loom large. Who is in control? To what degree does the Muslim

Brotherhood dominate and what does this mean for Egypt’s foreign and domestic policy? What happened to the non-Islamists

behind the uprising in 2011, and will they reemerge?

25 Dialogue | Autumn 2012

To begin to address some of these issues, insights

gained through interviews with key political actors are

used to identify and briefly explore five key points that

outside observers should bear in mind as they consid-

er the broader implications of the Muslim Brotherhood

ascension to the presidency: 1) the need to contextual-

ize Morsi’s victory in the elections; 2) the questionable

motives of the Muslim Brotherhood’s charitable dona-

tions and the subsequent distrust this has generated

toward the party; 3) the advantage political maturity

and financing provide the Muslim Brotherhood; 4) the

Muslim Brotherhood as both Islamist and capitalist;

and 5) the uncertainty of Morsi’s long-term power and

aims.

1. The need to contextualize Morsi’s victory in the

presidential elections

Morsi’s ultimate victory in the second round of the

presidential race must be taken into context and be

understood not as a sign of widespread support, but as

a rejection of former Mubarak Prime Minister Ahmed

Shafiq and also an indication of the failure of the liberal

candidates to consolidate forces and run under a sin-

gle ticket.

By the June 2012 presidential elections, the

Muslim Brotherhood was increasingly viewed with

skepticism by voters. Election promises made during

the parliamentary elections of November 2011-January

2012, were tossed aside and critics claimed that the

party had hijacked the revolution to consolidate their

own power base and Islamist agenda. As suspicions

grew and the Brotherhood reneged on an earlier prom-

ise not to run for the presidency, many voters drew

away from the Muslim Brotherhood and toward centrist

pro-revolutionary candidates such as moderate Islam-

ist Abdel Moneim Aboul Fatooh and center-leftist

Hamdeen Sabahi. Had these men joined forces prior to

the presidential elections, they would have won.

2. The questionable motives of the Muslim Brother-

hood’s charitable donations and the subsequent

distrust this has generated toward the party.

During the parliamentary and presidential elections the

Brotherhood has been accused of using both its reli-

gious foundation and strong finances to unfairly bias

voters. In both elections, the Muslim Brotherhood pro-

vided voters in poor and rural districts with meat, rice,

and oil in exchange for votes and often drove buses of

voters directly to the polling stations. Critics argue that

this is bribery masked as charity. They contend that

this form of giving creates long-term dependency and

argue that while the distribution of these goods may

provide immediate relief, it provides no long-term

mechanism for the poor to develop skills or provide

services to make this segment of the population self-

sufficient and less dependent on charitable donations.

Tactics such as these have caused many Egyp-

tians to question the integrity and motives of the party

and further supports the argument that the actions of

the Muslim Brotherhood have been carefully focused

on a single aim—assuming power.

3. The advantage political maturity and financing

provide Muslim Brotherhood

In the parliamentary and presidential elections, the

parties created by the revolutionaries of Tahrir

Square were new, highly disorganized, decentralized

and had little financing. In the 11 months between Mu-

barak’s resignation and the first parliamentary elec-

tions, these groups sought to organize themselves as

political parties and simultaneously run for office.

In sharp contrast, the Muslim

Brotherhood was an experienced and mature political

force. With over 82 years of political experience in

Egypt, the organization benefited from a vast […]

Photo Curtesy of AP PHOTO/MANU BRABO 26

network of established supporters in each of Egypt’s

governorates, a well organized and tightly managed

network of leaders, and the ability to generate funds.

These factors gave the Brotherhood a substantial ad-

vantage as they profited from the political immaturity

and upheaval facing their opponents.

4. The Muslim Brotherhood as both Islam-

ist and capitalist

The Muslim Brotherhood are not simply Islamists, they

are also capitalists. Led by successful and dynamic

businessmen such as Khairat al-Shater (the Brother-

hood’s original presidential candidate and a longtime

leader and financer of the organization) the Brother-

hood understands the importance of simultaneously

growing Egypt’s economy to secure its own position of

power through the accumulation of wealth while also

being seen to satisfy the demands of the revolu-

tion. These demands include higher wages, greater

employment opportunities and more equal distribution

of wealth. The Muslim Brotherhood aims to achieve

these objectives largely through free trade, economic

development and attracting foreign direct invest-

ment. To make this possible, a greater degree of eco-

nomic and political stability must be achieved to lure

investors back to Egypt. Morsi’s actions thus far indi-

cate that he remains closely aligned with the Brother-

hood in the pursuit of these goals.

While Morsi and the Brotherhood may differ

from Mubarak by first looking east to the Gulf rather

than west to Europe and the United States in the first

instance as a source of investment, few potential in-

vestors are likely to be dismissed and these astute

political actors will continue to be incentivized to coop-

erate with the international community and maintain

strong relationships with the US and Europe to

achieve their goals. Free and open trade relations will

be a priority. Aggressive foreign policy aimed at Israel

or any other state is unlikely as it would generate in-

stability and run counter to these aims.

5. The uncertainty of Morsi’s long-term power and

aims

Upon assuming office, Morsi’s power and authority

was limited by two primary sources. First, the Su-

preme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) prevented

Morsi from serving as commander-in-chief and main-

tained legislative, military, and budgetary control of

Egypt. Second, the power of the president was further

limited by perceptions that Morsi was little more than a

puppet of the Brotherhood and selected as their candi-

date based on his demonstrated willingness to follow

instructions from key party leaders (including al-

Shater).

While it appeared that the SCAF would signifi-

cantly limit Morsi’s power and authority as president,

his recent actions indicate a focused attempt to cen-

tralize control and authority in Egypt. On August 12,

the president issued a constitutional declaration to

transfer legislative authority from the SCAF to the

president, forced the resignation (retirement) of the

two most senior members of the SCAF among others,

and appointed a new vice-president. While weakened,

the SCAF maintains control of the military and Morsi

and the Brotherhood have said they will continue to

accept the authority of the SCAF on matters of foreign

policy and domestic security. The economic implica-

tions of this are significant given that Egypt is the re-

cipient of $1.3 billion a year from the United States in

military aid and additionally owns as much as one-

third of the nation’s economy through a vast network

of government-owned service and manufacturing com-

panies. It is important to recognize that, while weak-

27 Dialogue | Autumn 2012

ened, the military continues to hold a great deal of

power. Morsi’s actions, however, bring in to question

both the degree of power the military has over the

president and the degree to which the SCAF can—or

would—challenge his authority to block the assump-

tion of additional powers.

The relationship between Morsi and the Mus-

lim Brotherhood also creates uncertainty about

Morsi’s real power. Although the president officially

resigned from the Muslim Brotherhood when he took

office, Morsi is widely seen as little more than a fig-

urehead president who continues to closely consult

Brotherhood leaders and follow their policies, aims

and objectives. One recent indicator of their contin-

ued closeness was seen when Morsi announced the

retirement of the generals. The Muslim Brotherhood

financed the transportation of thousands of Muslim

Brotherhood supporters to Tahrir Square from various

governorates to publically celebrate his announce-

ment.[viii] This level of support indicates the Brother-

hood’s ongoing support for Morsi and their continued

alignment.

Although the SCAF’s influence and grip on

power has apparently lessened in recent weeks, the

personal motives and ambitions of the president re-

main unclear. Close links with the Muslim Brother-

hood are both predictable and evident, but the degree

to which Morsi will continue to operate “under orders”

from the Brotherhood is not yet certain.

Conclusion

While the five factors above are not exhaustive, they

illustrate that Muslim Brotherhood (or Islamist) leader-

ship in Egypt is not a forgone conclusion. The Egyp-

tian people remain uncertain about the political party

best poised to represent their interests. The people

will demand that their wishes be upheld and having

recently deposed President Hosni Mubarak, they will

not tolerate the pursuit of individual- or party-interests

over national interests. The centralization of power by

the president in recent weeks has created worries

among secularists that the reforms, in combination

with recent restrictions on the media, may indicate a

transition toward a more authoritarian form of govern-

ment reminiscent of the Mubarak era.[ix] The degree

to which Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood will be

able to satisfy the populace remains uncertain, and

for many in Egypt, regardless of who is in power, the

revolution will continue.

Dr. AMI J. ABOU-BAKR is an Egyptian-

American lecturer in Politics at King’s Col-

lege London. She is the author of the forth-

coming book, Managing Disasters Through

Public-Private Partnerships, scheduled for

publication by Georgetown University Press

in the spring of 2013.

This article was originally published at: e- Internation-

al Relations (http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/23/

mohamed-morsi-the-muslim-brotherhood-and-why-

the-revolution-continues)

Photo Curtesy of voiceseducation.org 28

The King’s College London Politics Society is entering its second year. It leaves behind a

year filled with progress and achievements and has an ambitious vision for the future. What

started in 2011 as merely a promising project has successfully developed into a distinctive

political society that engages its members in political discussions. In the past year, the soci-

ety organized a series of high-profile conferences and interactive workshops, with speakers

ranging from academics and journalists to diplomats. It continued to be the only student-

lead political society across London, to host complimentary wine receptions to facilitate

networking and discussions between students and experts. While focusing on its members

across KCL, the society has successfully gone beyond the College’s campuses to

cooperate with major political organizations. This was exemplified by the series of debates

on the French presidential and parliamentary elections, covered by mainstream French me-

dia and praised by the French Ambassador to the U.K.

But, our mission does not stop there. Focusing on further engaging you in political discuss-

ions, the Society has ambitiously established its first political journal: Dialogue. Dialogue is

aimed to be a platform for publications on pressing political issues. What distinguishes it

from many of its kind is its diverse and global approach. Accordingly, while presenting a ba-

lance publication, this issue included several commentaries from KCL and international stu-

dents

We are just at the beginning of an exciting path. The Society has developed rapidly, but it is

yet to present many of its upcoming events and projects. Our audiences have always been

the critical center of our development.

Therefore, I, on the behalf of the committee, want to thank you for being supportive of us.