-

-

Theodore Oizer17lctn

ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

IElnl •

Progrm P"bliIhm·J1[oscou·

n " Belial)s/.'Y 1 RIl~~i[ln by MI n '

Tran~latcd from t l('

1 I" dim Kuiesl/Of) J)('siglll'd ly ,

1'. Oii3CPMflll

'\IIAJlElml 'JECI{IW MATgPlIAJl1l3M I 11 llCTOPJlH <l>JlJ10CO<Dlm

J1a a/(MUUCJ\:QM. R3!J11'>t

English translation 'c; Progress Publishers 1982

Printed in th~ Untoll of Soviet SOCialist Republics

0302()()OOOO

CONTENTS

Introduction. . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • • • •

1 PHOBLEMS OF METHOD IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

The History of Philosophy-the Development of Philo­sophical Knowledgo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dialectical Materialism and Hegel's Philosophy of the IIistory of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A Contribution to the Critique of the Latest Pluralistic ConcopL of the History of Philosophy . . . . . . .

Tho Ditdcclical-Materialist View of the Philosophical System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philosophy and Everyday Consciousness. . . . . . .

2

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AND DIALECTICAL IDEAL-

Page 15

17

19

41

62

83 100

IS~1 . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . .. 119 Immanuel Kant and 17th~Century Philosophical Ration~ .Iism """""',""",. Kant's Doctrino of "Things in Themselves" and Noumena Tho Dialectical Idealism of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. . . Hegel's Philosophy of tho Power of Reason. . . . . . Tho Social Meaning of Hegel's Philosophy. . . . . . Dialectical Materialism and the Hegelian Concept of the Universality of Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lenin on the Hegelian Concopt of the Coincidence of Dialectics, Logic and Epistemology. . . . . . . . . Dialectical Materialism, Dialectical Idealism and Contom~ pornry Bourgeois Consciousness (In Lieu of a Conclusion)

BIBLIOGRAPHY, . " ,....,.,',.,.

NAME INDEX, ,

SUBJECT INDEX • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

121 136 154 181 204

221

242

261

276 280 283

3

•

)

J:.ITRODUCTION

The.so ('~says on thp history or pbilosophy dC'al, aho\"l' all with methodology. They also r~xanlin~ world outlook because a Marxist study of the history of philosophy mnst analyze thr !'('Jalion of djalc~ctical materialism to tho phi IQsophy that preceded it.

The Marxist approach to the development of pre-Marx­ian philosophy first of all singles out classical German philosophy, one of the theoretical sources of Marxism. Therefore, this hook poses a number of important although not yet suffiCiently analyzed issues, related to the historical aspect of the emergence and development of dialectical idealism, whose outstanding role as the precursor of dia­lectical materialism was repeatedly stressed by the found­ers of Marxism.

This book supplE'ments my monograph~ Problems 0/ the !listory of Philosophy (Moscow, 1969; English translation published in 1973, German in 1962 and 1979, and French in 1973) and Major Trends in Philosophy (Mo,cow, 1971), and discusses issues that were not sufficiently examined in them. Consequently, this book omits the top­ics which, although very important, were discussed at

length in those monographs. The principal objectiye of this book is to use the study

of certain aspects of methodology and of dialectical ideal­ism to outline the fundamental role t1H' dialC'ctical-mate-l'ialist theory of the history of philosophy plays in shap­ing th e world outlook. A comprehensi\'e analysis of that th eory is certainly rC'lE'Yant, and its importanc~ transcends the bounds of <1 purely historical study of philosophy.

As FredC'l'ick Engels emphasized, the. history of .th(>o retical thinking, and cons,equently the .lw;tory of SCICd'.c(>, are insepill'ahlc fl'OIll the histo~'y of plllloSO,~hY, ~~~or ill~ to EngC'ls, the J'l'jl'ction o[ pllll~sophy. as 1!1,C'. :-<:\t 11('e 0, sciences" that is oppo:5ed to S}leClflc sCiences 1:5 ltl,lparahlc

from a critical evaluation of the legac,y o! philo~ophY, because "the art of working with concept s IS not In~)orn and also is not giYeD _with ordinary ('\'cryclay ('onSCI?lI ~' ne~s but requires real thought, and ... this thought S lTIU ­

larly has a long empirical history, not more a~d not lc!'os than empirical natural scicncc. Only by lea~Dlng to as­similate the results o[ the development o[ phIlosophy dur­ing the past two and a haH thousand years will it rid ilseH on Ihe one hand o[ any natural philosophy standmg apart from it, outside it and aboyc it., and on the otl:or hand also of its own limited mcthod of thought, wInch was its inheritance from English l'mpiricism." (8; 20)

Thcoretical thinking is essentially thinking in concepts, and it develops by perfecting the conceptual scientific sys­tem, by creating new concepts and c,ategol'lcs. Theoret.l­cal thinking opcrates with conccpts that vary greatly 111

quality. Some concepts register spccial qualitic!'o character­i~tic of a certain group of ohjects, the ql1alitirs that arc grasped by sense prrception and ~ingled out by abstract thinking. OthrIs gencralizr proce~ses and rl'lations perccived only through thC'orC'tical thinking. ~till others have a !';trictly hcuristic value · that is, they express operations by t.he p('rceiving subject and not tllC qualities of things or _ tlJ{' gcncoral qualities of ohjC'ctiYC' I'ralily. Such, for nample, is tllC concl'pt of Ih(> infmitC'simal in mathemat­ics. Anotiwr, ('ven mnrr graphic C'xamplc of a hellristic concept--that is, one discharging an operational function ­i~ the id('ntiflcation ahstract.ion in logic. This listing o[ types of concf.'pts is far fl'om complC'lr, TTO\\'('Yf'r, it is (,lIollgh to demonstrate thc conceptual naturc of theoretical thinking and its ilH'yitahlr links with thl' hist.ory of philos-

)l ophy anfl with th(' crl'aliYr conc{'ptual rfrOl'l.

TIlf'or('t.irnl thinking is not conflllC'd 10 rrudy-madr con ­cepts. The actual study pro('('ss depelops c.onccpts: it dif ­fer(~ntjatp~ hrtw('('n Ih('01, hinds. .them lOi.C.lh.c.l:, limits and f'nricllf'~ tlH'm, unite;; thC'm into dC'flllitc systems, coordi ­natt's, 811hordI08(cs, l"xtrapola{('~, gc.n('I;(\Tizr~ and dcyclopc; them, pte, Nor rIoes coglliti\"{' t1H'orl,tical thinking slop IH'rc. Rf'5rnreh discovC'rs IIf'W phrllomrna, laws and objects of ('(Ignition, and it lIu'rf'fol'(' PJ"PSIIPIH1St'S tIll' formulation of ncw ralf.'goril's lIHlI ('YI'Il IH'W ~y~tI'111~ or eatf'g'oril';'; (within a SIlf'ciflr. lipid of ~tl1dy),

) am spcaking her(' ahout the (/rl'ciopnlcllt of cO/lreplS

6

a nrc('ssary logical cxpr('~sion of thC' historical procf'~s of t.hr del'eiopment 0/ knowledge- only bC'causr I am t.rying to dC'fmc t.hf' rolf' of t.he history 0/ philosophy in tlH' age old dl'vf'loplTIrnt of throretical thinking. \Vc know that evC'n t.hr g('f'atC'!';t o[ the pre-Marxian philosophers saw no link bet.wcf'n the dcvrlopml'nt of knowledge and thr deYf'lopmrnl of the ability to think in concepts. For exam­ple, Kant said that the ability to exercise judgment (to make empirical data fit the more general concepts and cat­cgoriC's) was an inborn quality, and that no education .or training could make up for the ahsence of that essC'ntlal tl'ait. Kant's vjl'W fitted perfectly in thr way his system llmlel'C'slimatcd thC' role of the hi~t.ory of sciencc, part.icu­larly thC' history or philosophy. lIad Kantian criticism. becn capahlc of grasping the hcmistic imporlance of the history of knowledge, Kant would probably have concluded that not only the ahility to exercise judgment but also. the 1'1'~­ductiyr POW(>T of the imagination (whose role III cog1l1~ lion hC' l'mphasized) could be conSCIOusly develorC'd onl}, through a critical and systematic ~tudy of the hIstory 01

sciencC'. b I· . I vVhilr admilling that inbol'D intellectual a i llir-: {o

C'\ist, Engrls, unlike Kant, accords prior~ty to the study of thr histol'v of culture, and partICularly to the conscious and· ~ci('ntificany sound study of thr his­t.ory of cognitivc lhinking, especially the, result::; of ~hc two and a half thousand years of philosophy. DC\f.'l­oping this concC'pt in his Dial~ctics 0/ Na~l1re, EI~e\s ~tl'e~ses th at the study of the hIstory or phdosoph,y t: (' IInder~t.ancling of thC' experience ~ccuJ1l\l l atrd 111 t 1('

C0111.SO of philosophy's deyrlopment-1s tl'uly a sch?ol of . . .. " nil"!£'

theMctical thinking, The latter, a~ he pllt It., .l~ an I I <

<,uality only as regards natural capacity. TillS nat.mll eu '. . - I I · d and for ite:: 111l1 11'on'-

pacity must be dryf.' OPf'C, Impro\'e , < ' t I If mrnt there is as yet no othf'l' mrans than the' S \1~ Y (t

. I ·l I" (q. 4?-43) Naturally, onr 1ll1l~t no prevIOUS P 1I osop ly. "i 1 . t tl'·-: whrll natma} losc !;ight of thl' facl Owt ',ngr 5 \~rO ~rt·~;\ll\" Tlrl1rt' hi:' !;cirncf' was still poody dCHloPC'd

l l~od ~·I1('r· ·th(' apl"';1I'­

""'e:: "rt" Thr cf'nturv that haf\ C' ap~r ~I, I .., u. ,f .• . - n'l (' . oj \atllrt' l,\:-; "I

anCf< of .111li lhihril1{{ ,,,nd .. Ifll'~ll('~nd tht'\' h,\\'t' pbyt,d llf'sspd gTl',\t fl(hanc('s In tillS fi11C • I II· 1"·'I'\()SOllhv ;\Ild . tl If'Yl' OllllH'H ( .. , an illlportant IHHt III Il' ( or Ihpol'l'lirnl thinldng in gl'I1(,\"(\1

7

Engl'b described the gn'at di:COH'ril'~ of lI,llnr,,} s(·il'll.<'l' in the mid- HUh c('!llmv (tht' lilsCOH'ry of tlit' nll and It s formation the law or energy transhll'matiull, Ihuwin"s theory or'('yolution) as r!,.\9)u.lion;'r~· Imniug,poiub in Ill!' historical !'haping oTllH~ol'cti('al Jlullll"ill sell'nl't' and as the ~cil'ntinc foundation of dialectical IlMtl'l'ialislll. III this connection Engels [ol'llluiat.ccl the In\\' of liH' <T{,[lli\"(' dl

L

y('topment of materialist. philosophy: "\Vith each opoch making discovery ('YCU in thc sphet'o of natural sciC'llcc it {materialism] has to change its [orm; and after history also was subjected to materialistic treatmen t, a now avcnue of dC'\'cioplllC'nt was opened here 100." (3; 3, 340) In the early 20th century V, 1. Lenin in his Materialism and Em­pi rio-Criticism offered a profound philosophical analysis of the crisis in the methodology o[ physics, caused by the re\"olution in that science, The roots of that crisis were

.. directly relaled to the great theoretical discoveries that in­fluenced the !'haping o[ the world outlook. That explained why Lenin, while de\"eloping Engels' theses about the hcuri~tic role of the history of philosophy (those quoted abo\"e), abo :-itrc:-'sed the heuristic importance of the his-

) ,

( tory of natural science: "The results of natural science are concept!', and ... the art of operating with concepts is not inborn, but is the result of 2,000 years of the develop­ment or natural sc~e~ce and philosophy," (10; /38, 262)

or course, adnllttmg the outstanding heuristic role of the ~lislory o[ natural science does not at all detract fL'om th£' Im~ortanc.e 0,[ the history of philosophy as a school of t1~l'oretLcal th,InkLng. On the contrary, underestimating t he Jllstory ,of s~Jence-and t~lat i,s still true of some scholal's

)

combines Inexorably With d ls?ain, for the history of ph l­a rule, the responsible for im­

studied the histo ry of I ' n ral science and in phi-o~oph.y .. ~he . : of Einstein, Iieisenberg V I' d k'

8nd Tlmlflazev are a case in point. ' e na s ~ Like any historical process, the hi~tor of ' .

"hilo:-'ophy) can be studied by lwo essen~all sJ!ence (and C)rganically inlerconnected methods: 'the h' t" Iffl'rent but

\ Ingi~H1. The hi~torical method aims lo ;'ep~~~lJcal and lhe e$;):l III qu(,~tion in all~·ts Y('nl'raJ Lv' I I

Hce the proc"

I I TI I . ' . .to • 11 pica all< UUiqll" r

1If('~. .Ie oglcal me lOd, based on the sum '-' ea-rf'sull~ JO a speCific historical s[lldy total of llw . IJllrsu"S ' dOff ' .. d I erenl

(

nhjl'din: thai of I'P\'f'lllln.s thl' law..., thal gOHrn the dewl oPIIII'1l1 of IIIP ginll 8Lim total of phrnomena in a drfinih~ hi~IOI'i('al fralllt'work laid dO\\"n In Ow study TIll' lattt'}' (,iI:-it' i!' t.h\J!~ iI logieal n'collslrllttion of the procrs!' in qups · LiOJl, had \lal'.\'s Capital ig a da!'sic ('xamplr,

According to Erlgl'ls, th£' logical method "is indt'eri noth Lng but tht' historical method, only stripped of the hi~torical y form and c1ivl'l'ting chancr occurrenc£'s. The point whC're this histOL'y })('gimi must also be the starling point of the train of thought., and its furt.h£'r progress will he simply the rcflection, in abstract and t.heoretically consi!'tf'nt form, of the histol'ical cours!'. Though the l'£'flection is cOI' I'C'ct{'d, it is rOIT('cted in accordance with laws pl'O\'idrd hy the actual histol'icaJ course, since each factor can be cxamin('d at the stage of development where it reaches its full matlll'ity, its classical form," (G; 225) Since the study X of the history of philosophy is regarded essential for dc· nlojJing llieorrtical thinking, it should not be merely an empirTca1-Tiislorical study but also, and above all, logical. theoretical, theol'elically general, and epistemological. In Engels' words, the point i~ t<!, undeN,tand. the results!!1 the development oj philosophy over the past tu'o aiia a hall tlwusand years. Dialectical materialism considers this theoretical summing up of the history of philosophy (and science) as a special task of epistemology, a branch of philosophy studying the development oj knowledge takrll in its more genel'al form defined in the major philosophical

categories, I n h is Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin mapped out il

program of fundamental epistemological studies bast'd ?n a t heoretical int('l'prelation and generalization of the !\ls, tory o f vario us sc iences (the history of thC' mental deve! opmen t of an imal s, the history of technology, lan~lIage, etc.) and the hislory of knowledge !n general. L.f'I1IIl, ac­corded priority 10 the task of sumIDlIlg up tl~e !lIstorlc~l­philosophical pl'ocess ui1l1ed at f\lfth~r deve!op'!lg the epLS­temology of dialectical materialism, (10; 38, ,3.)1) Method· ologicaUv, Ihat is a point of tremendous Imror~ance: Il expressly indicates t.he (lrg~nic relationship of dl~I(,CILC,~: mat('J"ialislll to I Ill' ('nUl'£' p!lIlnsophy that pr~c~d('d II. ... Th~_ re lationship has [\ bNlfing not only 011 the, orlglll ands ,JIll:1 ing of dialectical llIatt'rialislll but also on Its I~rob~em" 1'°'1 1I'1l1 Illid dl'H'loPIlH't1t. Thai l'\IHIins whr Le!1ln, III compl

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ing his noles on Hegel's [. eclllre.~ on the Ilislory 0/ Philoi> o hi and Th e Science of !,oglc, :-:i ngl('d 011 1 1'('\'(' 1' <1 ) ex t~~('lY import.ant tenets of philo:-:ophy: Fflil uft' to.5!'1' tht'lll precludes any compfchensiY(, pva~l1tlt wn of 1. 1 'I,I II1 ~. S~l~gt: in the deye!opment of Marxist . phtlMOI~h y . It ahiu (~pl(\In~ Engels' following asses~m('nt 01 the ~tt.Jtu ~ll' or .. ~! a r ~I~~ pill l050phy to the 2,OOO-ycfll' hi st.ory of l.dcnhsm: j' or It IS by no means a matter of s imply throwmg o\'C'rhoarcl til(' {'H

tire thought content of thosC' two thou~and Yl'ars, but of criticism of it of extracting the l'('suits that had bC'en won within a form that was false and idealisti c but w hi ch was inevitable for its time and for the course of ('volution itself - from this transitory form. " (9; 198-99)

Each school of philosophy is in some way connect('d with the previous history o[ phi losophy. It is imposs ible to understand a particular system o[ philosophy without studying the history o[ phi losophy as a whole, wit.hout critically analyzing the val'ioll s philosophical schools, ap­proaches, hypotheses, achie\'ements in all field s, including those that later turn out to he... spurious. Tt is an antinomy of sorts between the whole and its part: und er standing a part presupposes knowledge of the whole, but the latter is impossible without knowledge of the parts. This dialectical antinomy is solvable, because understanding a part m eans, to a certain degree, understanding the whole, and knowl­edge of the whole 11resupposes a certain knowledge of its constituent parts.

Thus it would be an error to believe that the h istorical (or , to be more precise, historical-philosophical ) way lead­ing to the truth is only rel c\'ant inasmuch as tbe tru th has not yet been reached; that once the truth is reached the way to it can be Jorgotten. In actual fact, e\'erythi~g is much more complicated because the l l'lIth is the process of the development of knowledge, and the arrival at t h is or that truth .. reveals the epistemological significance of the road cogmtlOn has taken.

Philosophy is essentially a deeply controversial s b" t F h " " k' 1I Jee . . ae pomt It rna es IS not only an affirmation \) t 1

"bl\' " nasoa negatlOn, ot 1 t leSlS and antIthesIs '-'u\)stant " t" I " l' . ,:) . la mg t lC matC'na 1St world outlook means reJ'ecting ideal " A

t d d" r \. Ism. cor-rr c \In erstan mg 0 the (Ialectieal method of t l b . sens~ precepts of the dialectical -materiali st 'theOl' 10 [a~le flect ion, of the fundaolPntals or the material',s t " Yt 0 1 (' -In e!,()l'e ta-

10

,

I. l fln of h !!torv" S mro~"';~1 1" without 'llgaHon, f llat s, Wlthnll~ ,I .sc cntJr(co.!liy ound criteal att:tudr tn nlt'laphy!'! JCill t linking, :) 19nosl C sm, :he a priori approach, l3ub (0('11\ m, th ... ull'aii .0 1(, IDte;ppl'ltion or the li[e of sf)cil'tv,

dC', ";:(,'I'flt fit philt orlli(,HI critlcic.n is. in. he fmal 8nll i v

sis, pO!iitjn. E'rror is'r!ganleri as an epiltemoiogir'lT phe 1IOm/'IIOIl, anti , !!cierll 'ic undf"r:-:tandinj;,! doC's not lIlerr.i" .. ('('orrl Ilin f'[fOr a~ such it presuppO!es the study of tile hi~ t{JJ'i{'a ll y Irfluc;:i('nl w(,f'!"sity of that I':rror, its gno...;jo\ol{ ic"l roots, and C(Jn~f'( I Upnt\y, of the rea l content (a corre­lilt£' of Ih(' tl'u th) of 11](· philosophical error. This apIJroach to ph ilosophica l <llJll ly:::is- an approach not only If-'I{i t illla tl' bil L Il I ~o nh\'io ll S' ly n / 'c(':-~ary to a certain drgrr .... · larj;,!(' ly (' J imjnll l{'~ \.III' distin('tion hrtween study of tiH' prnhl (, l11 ~ of dialC'c t iea l mat(1 )' ia l isrn and a ~I arxist :--tudy of t lit, h i:--· tory of phi losophy. Engels' Anti-Diihring and Leni n 's Ma· terialism and Rmpirio-Criticism are good examples.

The nillllr" of critici:,m depends to a crrtain d('gn:'c 01\ the object o[ cri ti cism. This hook examines the relation of .dialecti cal material iS'm to the le[acy of cla~siea l l!hilo..:o­ph y, partIcularl y cJasmatwman ideaITsm. TIie history o f Marxism bears out that any critique of the latter crea­t ivel y ass imilat rs it~ profound insights. That is what pos i­t in dialec ti cal -materialist negation is all about. Lenin de­scr ibed it a~ follows: "::'\ot empty negation, not futi le nega­t ion, not sceptical negation, vacillation and doubt is char­acter is t ic and e:-~cntia l in dialectics,-whieh undoubted ly contains the clement of negation and indeed as ib most important. element -no. but negation as a moment of con­nection, as a m om ent of denlopment, retaining the posi. ti ve, i.e. , without any vaci ll ations. withou t any eci £'c ti c­ism" " (10; 38. 226)

Each philosophical doc tr ine is essent ially d is ti ng ll i:- hed by ils ['elat ion to thC' ph ilosophical legacy. The is::i ues ra ised by fln y doc t r ine arc born of defin il C' h is torical circum­stances and arC' t.h eoret icall y linked to the iss u£'s trea ted by the philo~o p hy that prC'cf'dl'd it. It re\' iews these i::;S lIl\S , int.erprets th em differe ntly , £'nriche::i Ilnd f.!enrrally d£' \'el ops them. TllI' l'£' i~ a (' onll'ad ict ion in t hl' \Ini ly of C'a~h philosophi ca l doc lr'i n(' :lIlt! till' ,Philosophy .Ihllt ,1l['£'c£'ded It. A par t frolH I'l' \;lli oll s of h i:-;i<)['l ca l $IH'CC':-.";IOIl, It. 111 ~ () COIll ­pl'i !'> t' ~ :-; !l'lIggit' aga in :-! Ih l' doc trines Ih~1 wC'~' £' II :' th t'Ol'el iCll l ~ources. For £'xum pl(', Spinoza, whli e directly foll ow-

It

I J

,

ing DeRcartes, was also a d(ldirntrd nppnnrnt nf dllnli~l1l, p~ychophy::;icnl Jlar31leli~m, tlH' fl'l'l' :'ill ('ollnpl, 111'1::;/11 and other fundamentals of HI(' Cnrh'slHH IIodl'lIlt' ,

FurthermorC' tlH' units is 1'l'lnliH, 11 is nlwi\Ys i\ d(lli nitC'ly orirntc(\' unity, it~ !'ocial and philosophiral hii\~ I,le

r()untin~ for its :;:(lll'cthily, Thi$ phi\osoplllrni s(ll('c,I.I\'I1.y a~sC'~s('~ diITC'l'cnt prrdpccssol'S diffl'I'l'ntly, i\nd rhoosl'R til(' ('onccpts that fit it.s principlcs. For {''\ nlll ph', Spinozll, lI.n lik(> othrr mat(>I'iaiist philosophC'fs, turll N\ tn tht' pnnth C'IRI and rationalist tradition in philosophy. obviously nndl'l"l'R ' timnting (hr impOl'tance of philosophic"i l'mpiricism ancl empiric,,1 natural SCiC'llCC,

BC'cause of thC'ir distinctive content nnd social grflvita t.ion, philosophical doctrines diITC'1' subst antially in th oir ability critically to analyzc t.hc results of the preccding drH'lopmrnl of philosophy. This rofutrs liegcl 's assertion that sincr thc latrst philosophical doctrine is th C' l'C's lllt of I'H'Q,thing prn'iollS philosophies ha\'c achicvcd unlil thC'H ,

y it "mnst thell contain tho principlC's of all; it is th erefore, whC'n it il') a philosophy, the most dcvclopcd, thc richcst, and th(' most concrete". (64; 6, 21) That linC' of l'C'aSOll­ing would mean that since Bcrkclry and Hllme came after Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Lockc and Hobbes, tlll'ir doctrines were a synthesis of the principles laid down IIY their predeccssors and lhry built fullcr and morc dpyC'loPl'd philosophical systrms. Obviously, this was not so. lIegC'1 C'xamined BcrkelC'y and 1[UI11(" harshly criticized their subjC'ctivc idealism and skepticism, and showed how far remo\'C'd those outstanding philosophers were from any cr~tical assimilation of c\'crything philosophy had aCCOIll ­plu.;hed . before them. Berkele~ and Hume were by their natu.re IOcapabl~ of su~h assimilation; their philosoph ical lea,mngs, ,lllstol'lca~ chOice and relation to Lh o prcccding philosophIcal doctr1l1cs wcrr clearly one-sided.

" TTegC'l's. rrr?r is ~onne~tcd with the fllndnml'ntals of /" al1solulr Idcallsm winch plcturcs pl~ilo:~ophy as de\'cloping

on two planes. On the one hand, It IS an c.\tr3.lcmpOl'al Jlr/)c(':-<~ III Ihe realm of .thC' "~bsoill l~ idea". ITC'gcl describes Ill(' la~tf'r. as authentIc philosopillcal thinking, In this ~tlJlrahlsl(JI')('a l sph~re wherl' ~clllal histol'icni dc\'clopmC'nt 19 rl'pla('('(1 by ]ogu'al stlc('es~lOn, hy tll(' sr}f dcvl'10

11menL

or tlip Con:ppl, ('~ch SlicceSSIVe stagl' lH1CC'ssarily incilHh's Ihl' pn'cNllJIg logl('al stagrs and sllbordinatl's them to 1\

t2

n .. w 1\/111 Hlfll'(, lIHlIIlliugflli IJlldanlf'lltlil prl'fept 011 till' flthl'l' hllllcl, lill! ;1I:tual history of phjJ()sol'hy whieh IIl'gt'l fiOl's nnt. III. ill! Igllllrrt dI'VI'Jl)P~ "11 a t<'Jllporni planf'. withill 1111' fl"illll/lwfJl"k~ flf 1'8!Cllti,dly different hi~torical UJ,W::I, '\!Hi Oil till," pl'llIl! MId IIf'gel fully admits and sys­tOlllalicully fiOIlIfHlstriit/!s that thern is no such one-sided ilull dirf'cl 1'I,laliolllllllp hdw('cli tlil! pfI!cedil.lg anrl follow ing phiio!'ophil"uJ "YStNfI.'3,

Thr thl'ol'l'til'ul intl'rpn'lati()n /)f the actual hj~tory of philosophy show:-. that 1IJallY {Jut~tanding philoso"IIf'r~ could not urrive at any positive l,\'"luution of t.heir Jm!­deccssoJ's' doctrines ('ven tJwugJJ they followed and devel· oped the latteJ' (usllally. /lot rV(,!/l quite consciously), Enn Hegel, who unlike oLher CJ'l'<ltOfs of philosophic.al sY~lem::; considered his doctrine the result of the preceding Juslory of philosophy, failed to _ctJ'J'iyc . ..at .a .. CQrrc.ct. .f.yalua.tio.n. .of Lhe historical role of materialist philosophy. sensatlOnaIJ:4 upls[emology, 'natural scirnce and the general1y nonphil.os oph ical methods of research that had a tremendous bearmg on all the philosophy of the .\cw .\ge. .

The revolution in philosophy brought about by .Mar:usm is often described as a radical break with all the preced~ ing philosophical doctrines. .. .

Such an assessment of the Mar:ust relation to the phllo~ sophical legacy refers only to one aspect of t~e comple,x and contradictory historical process of the n~gatt~n of phi­losophy in the old sense of the term. True, ~lalecb~al mate~ rialism differs radically from all other philosophical .doc~ trines, including progressive ones. But. it. was precl~e.lY dialectical materialism that critically aSSimilated, creatl\e­ly revised and developed the accomplishments of all the preceding history of phi10S0P~lY, and this much mor~ thaI: any other philosophical doctrmc. An ~dequa~e refle~tlOn 10 _

the Mal'xisL revolution in phi1osoph~ IS preCIsely thIS rec~_ tion to the preceding philosophy Wh,ICh, free J~om any ~ tarian nal'l'ow-mindedness, is. re\:olutlOnary-cnttcal, creatIVe, partisan and scientillcally obJective. d

I b' Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin stresses an sys-temnaticl~IY explains that dialcctical idealism i~ddloSCI: tiD

. .' I t I ysical anti la ec Ica , dialectical materIal ism t lUll Mme np I , ti,e history of .. (10' 38 274) y essays on

materlahsm. '.' I 'ng classical Cerman philosophy, especlnl.ly thoso ~n.n ~~portant tenet which idealism, explain tillS extreDle) j

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leads t.o the conclusion that diAll'cti{~ al llIal(' ri nli sm (uHd only dialectical materiali sm) offl'rs th l' llH' th Ol lnlogind foundation for a trllir sCicll ti/ic his tory of Jlh iltl~(l phy

h.anl crcatiYl:'ly posed the i s~ u e (I f Il'ildlier :;cit'ulllic theoretical knowledge is possible. Accord ing to Ka nt, the existence of pure mathematics and pure (that is, theorclical) natural science is an obvious faeL hCCi\U Sl' t.h ose sc iences comprise truly apodictic and universal judg mcnLs . I'<lllt believed that the theory of knowledgo was to explain how puro mathematics and pure natural science were poss ible. A still more important and central issue in Critiqlte 0/ Pure Reason, the work Kant cons idered a fund a mental introdu~tion to his ph ilosophica l sys te m, po::;;cs a ll even more Important problem: how is metapilys ics (phi ­losophy) possible as a deflllitc intellectual occupation? Can metaphysics be a science? \Vhat arc the conditions a nd wa.ys of transition from nonscientific philosophizing to philosophy as a true science?

Obviously. the problems that Kant rai sed and fa iled to ans,~·er in a scieJ:.ltific-philosophical way have also a direct bearm~ on the iustory of philosophy as a science. How is t1~e sCience of the history of philosophy possible? In other "~rds, ? what are the philosophica l requis ites of that sC ience. The skeptics would not accept that definition of tl:e ~:fblem. They. would pose it differently : is the history 1 p \ os?phy pOSSible as a science at all? Appar ently this

ormu atlOn also mer~ts attention, because there 'exis t ra.ny I?utually exclUSive philosophical doctrines each of­.erlng ItS own-whether materialist or idealist 'metaph s­Ica.1 or phenomenalist ic- interpretation of the' his t ' Y f hl11!OS~hh'y- ror. cx~mpl e.' the followers of Henri B~~~soon a'c clr Istlnctlve View of t he history of 1 ·1

which underlies their approach to all h i! f·11 osoPhY

1 ~rines, they gauge everyth ing by il'ra tio! .OSOl~ 1.lcal . doc­Ism. A neopositivist hi storian of philos a} m tUltlve Jdeal ­cords priority to representatives of 1 '1 op ly . natUl'all y ac-ly idealist - empiricism agnosticism P ~I OSOpllical - especia l_

A dialectical-materialist study or' I"he

, , ' Phy s b t t· e lIstory of ph ilo . . u s an lates and uses a radicall d.ff . so-cal-1l!aterialist approach to philosophIcal I dfen~, dlalect!­rcl~hon to one another, etc. Naturall t octr lnes,. then' to.flan of philosophy, the dialeclical -':~te~i i. bou: geols h is­history of philosophy would appear bias d

a 1st View of the

e too, because it

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n'jl't·' 1111" Jdeoli t, lJIi'laphYBicnl interpretation Ind pclec· lici. III. oH1'1i pil aill'lI liS • fJhjccll .. ·ely" taking inlo f'onsid ,'ratioll all vil'wj)fJl[iI!I, as I ynthetic approach, ptc. HuL ill ,"ad, tiJi!;; "Illit " is .. consistent ficiclltiJic appruaf"h 10 tli,' hj~tflry flf philosophy Obviously, it prc:;upl'o::ocs 1111

CU lJl promisillH .~jccJ,lOn of ~l!Y ullscientiflc intl.'fl'rI·taliou. T ltt, sll"uggll' aJ{ainst idealism wliich, In the eyes fir l\

bOllrgl'oi! historian of phi losophy who considers himself 10 he ahovp the "'{'.\tn'fIll''' viewpoinl:-l. i!; a fau lt of dialec­ti ra l ma l!'ria lisrn, is a Ilec~sary cxpre~:;ion of scirntific consis tell cy in a stud y or the history of philosophy. Ac cO I'di ng to Leonid Hrpzhnev, "Th~re is no room for lH'lI

tr a li ~m or eom jlromise in tli~ struggle hetween tli(' two id eolog ies." ( 11 ; 8~) -!JO)

A d ialcctica l-ma tpriai ist, partisan approach to idrali~IIl, fat, from im pedi ng scientific a5se:-sment oJ thllJolr J.llayed by idealistic ph ilosophy, offers a consistent methodological bas is for such assessment. The Holy Family by ~l arx an(1 Engels is s ignificant in this regard. Here the authors both consis ten tl y expose idealist speculations and slrc.'"' s that their outlook is materialist , "which has now been per­rected by the work of speculation itself'. (1; 4, 125) This mea ns tha t Marxist ph ilosophy materialistically revises and criti ca ll y ass imilates all the genuine accomplishment .... of ideal ist ph ilosophy. \Vhich explains why dialectical ma­teri ali sm, accepted as the theoretical basis for ~tlldy of the his tory of philosophy, is the scientifically sound cen· tral avcnuc o[ research into the history of philosophy. The only scientifi c philosophical out look, which the philosophy of the New Age pr ocla imed as its goal, is dialec tical·ma­terialis t. That is borne ou t not only by the creath'c dC\"I' I ~ opment of Marx ist ph ilosophy bu t also by Ihe record 01 bourgeois philosophy in the 20th century. Co~te~n pol'il I'Y ideali s t 11h ilosophy fl'j l'c t!" both dialect ical Ill<"ltl' l'w li !i1ll il nd the very notion of a scientific-philosoph ical outlook. :\ c­Luallv, all non-Marxist (including contemporary). phJlo­sophical doctrines re ject the concept of t he pr~ccd l ng de· velopment of philosophy. An. exam ination of pl~~I.osop l?Y .. a ~ it emerges and changes is ali en to all non-Man: ]:. t pl;J! o: 0

I)hical doctrines for they are not, nor caD be, deve Op!"g

, , t r " ]osophy as someti))n'" systems. They v iew t le pas 0 P II . ., I ' I ;-

P·etrifJ(~d. it either fully belongs to an lrretkrl e"rRbb )" . oSl' , ,t ·~ the Wor ·o n13n his lorical era or, on t Ie COD rary, I::>

t5

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minds unaffected by the march oC timl'. Roth thr!'e ap­proaches exclude the past of philosophy from thl' actual and mally-~id('d social history,

Dialectical materialism, a philosophiC1l1 theory uf devcl opmellt, is itself a developing system of philosophical knowledge and, thereCore, though cfratrd Ovrf a hundrrd years ago, it remains the philosophy of today, Critically !'umming up the preceding development oC philosophy, dia lectical materialism also answers questions posed by to­d<\y's philosophical doctrines, Marxist philosophy offers theoretical interpretations and scientific solutions not only to its own philosophical problems; its outlook sums up the most important accomplishments in all fields of funda ­mental research, practical activity, and mankind's histori­'Cal experience, The fundamental diffCl'ence of dialecLical and historical materialism from all non-Marxist philosoph· ieal doctrines, its organic links with all progressive tradi· lions in philosophy, its dedication to the future and un­compromising rejection of anything that defends social op­pression and exploitation-all that makes the scientific­philoso~hic~l outlook of Marxism tho only possible basis [or a sClentlfic theory of the history of philosophY,

• •

1

1

PROBLEMS OF METHOD

IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

TilE IIISTOIlY OF I'I1ILOSOPIIY Til E 1)(;\ ELOI'.\lI-:\1'

OF I'll I LOSOI'JlIC.\L K\OWLEUGE

It appear::;, at least at first glancp, t.hat the subject of th e history of philosophy is definite and clear. Its nallll'

speaks for itself. Still, WI:' must not accord too lllllCh iIll­pOl"Lance to that, becau~e the subject is DOt fully revealed. This point becomes obvious if we compare the history of philosophy to that of science or art. For examplp. thl' history of mathematics reproduces the progre:,." of that science, where each new accomplishment i:-. rooted in P<I.'t achievements. It presents the hierarchy of the deyelop­ment of mathematical knowledge, with the historical !'tages imperatively related to one another. The history of art as a special science reproduces the actual emergence of outstanding works of art which, of course, are not inde­pend ent of olle another. Bllt their interrelationship differs greatly from the historical connections between scientific theories.

Even t.hose opposing the theory of den'iopment do not deny that the study of the history of science dors haH' its p urpose. As to art, it is a debatable point of methodology. Apparently, tho same is true of the history of philo~)Ophy, Adherents or ideali~m among toda~/s hi~tOl'ians of phi los­ophy often say tltat phi losophical ~Y5tellls arc like great \Vol'ks of .ut becau50--.l)hilosophy is the po(>it'Y of concrpt..-, That analogy colnpTMB.y igriOl'cs thr es~ential diffel'ellC'{, between tho titeOl'l'licHI Ill'pcepls of philosophy and inHlgr." of art. Torla y, lIollH.'I"s /find is still largely an unattain able model of Jll'rf{'ction. BuL today's reader, while enjoying that great epic, dOt'S uot lH'gue with Homer oy{'r the gmb of Ancirnl GJ'l'eel" tllt'il' l'l'lations with one another and with m Ol'tal s, Ptc. On the otlwr hand, while fPading Ari· s totLe Ol' Plato tha t Mnl(> reader ine"itably respond~ to • their doct.rines, analyzes t.hem and striYes to separate tht' rational in them £l'om what is fal se or 110 longer I'denlll!.

Only Shakespeare could write Othello, No one else could

,. 1!1

have done it. But t.he picture is diffl'l'e ll ~ wit h regard to Plato's or Aristotle's docldnC'.s . OU~C I' pl \llu~o.I'I\Cl's would have YDiced their ideas, although, 01 ('n \l r~ p , dlff{'l"('nti,Y. Tn this the history of philosophy is. ::) iJ1lil a ~' t(~ the ilislOl'Y of natural science. It is true that dIscoverIes Ill, say, pl~ys -ics are the work of certain scientists and bear t~c ~m­print of their personality. Nevertheless, if those SCIentist!'; had failed to make them, others would have made those discoveries in due course. Therefore, it is completely ) wrong to draw a parallel between a historian of philos­ophy studying the doctrine of Leibniz or Feuerbach and an art historian specializing in Tolstoy or Byron. The h is­tory of philosophy differs fundamentally from the history of art.

The word "history" (the Greek historia) still r etains its original meaning of an account, a narration. History as a science emerged precisely as an account of past events (a historian is not an eyewitness ) that are of interest for the present.

Hegel stressed the twofold meaning of the word " his to-1''1'': " In our language, the word 'history' has both objec­tive and subjective aspects, both as hisioriam rerum gest­arum and as the res gestas themseh 'Bs; it denotes both wha~ hap~ened and the historical narrative. We must rec­og~uze thIS combination of both those meanings as some-

\ thmg more sig.nificant t?an .merely an outward coincidence; -rne ~ust .adm~t that hlstor.lOgraphy emerges simultaneous-

• y wIth hlsU?r~ca{ acb.ons anae'(Tents per se: there exists a eomilIon "mternal basis that generates them." (63' 164) ~~I.ll . w;, must admit ~hat in the ancient times th~ term

IstOry, already acqUIred a broader meaning. For exam ~ pIe, Aristotle used the term to donote an ae I t' (conseq e tl d" cumu a IOn r ,u. n y. a escrlptIOn) of information on actual ,acts, whlcb he set apart from theory research and I . I mferences. ,oglea

. This polysemantic meaning of the word "hi t " vl\'ed for many. centuries. Up to the end of the

S ~~~h sur­tury natural sCience which remained ad" cen· pli~e that collected .~nd ,classified facts rec~~~:lat~e disci­~:tl~~, was called. hlstOrLa rlaturalis to difierentiateYito~ser­the t )~to~ °If natIOns. Theoretical natural science repl rornd a 0 V10~ Y obsolete term with a more ace natural sCience. According to Engels, ' One:

natural

20

~cif'n('f' lip to the end of the last century was predominant· Iy fI r:ollerlillg 8cienCf', ,) Hicncc of finished things, in OUl"

rrnll1rv it is t> ~ ('nfHllly .1 . ystematising science. a sci ('ncC' of till' pror.(" 'f'~, or t ~lC origin and development of 1Ilf'5[> thillgS and (11 the interconnection which bjnds a ll th('~(' naiurni l'rocf' :;ses into one great whole." (3; .1, :1(;:1)

Onr' Ciln rlraw nn <.IIwlngy between the history of philos­oph y <Ill!! tite hi~tory or natural science: the former has also evolvNl from a description merely summing up facts to an orderly study, becoming a science about the crner· genee and development of philosophy. But this analogy m ust uot oh<cure the fact that the history of philos­ophy d iffe r, substantially from the history of natural

• sCience. The h istory of philosophy, too, was born as an accounl

of remarkable and even surprising developments in man's intellectual lifc. For example, Diogenes Laertius believed th at philosophers and their doctrines were a wonder. His t rea t ise On the Lives. Doctrines and .Maxims of Famolls Philosophers can be considered the first study of the histo­T'y of philosophy. While Plato's or Aristotle's remarks about lhe v iews of their predeces-50rs are of great Impor­t ance for the history of philosophy, they arc not, strictly speaki ng , exercises in the history of philosophy. As L . Braun aptly remarks, Plato failed to regard his pred~­cessol'S as th inkers of the past. In his dialogues, Parmem­des, P l'otagoras and other philosophers participate in the disCllss ion on a par wi t.h Socrates, Plato's teacher. True, Ari stotle doC's d iff C'r from Plato in this regard. But his ex­amination of th C' ea rlier doctrines is fixed on presenting his own system, a nd hC' uses biased cr iticism of other philos-ophers' theories to prove h is own. .

W hile Diogenes Laert ius' t reat ise is obVIOusly a. mC'fC

compilation it is based on a definite concept of the hIstory of philosophy (although the author h im,elf is not fully awarc of it): h e attempts to single ou t and cont: ast d?g­malism and sk C'pticism , in h is opinion, ll~ e two ma,Jor plll~O­sophi cal trends.':' T hC' descri ption of phIlosophers theorl(>5

... All ~kl' p t i (': philo;:oph~r~ wh~ fo~l ow('.d .DiOg'en('s. ,ndoptcd h~~ vie wpoint FVl' n 1\an l ronsldC'rt:'d It Ill ~ 1111 :::51On to 0\( rCllnH' thOi , major (bllt, in lib opinion, bia::;c d) .ph,i1osopl~ica l tr('n d~. On tlC conceptua l (Iu nlity of Diogencs Lae rtlUS treatise seo ( I ).

\

ren'ais such great discrrpanrirs l11n,1 it 1f'!l,rIs to an ohyif)ll~ I · tl,·," ar!' as lll'lIlY pllll()!'i()plHt'~ H." 1Il!'1'1"' aff' cone 11510n: ~- ,,"' < • ". I I I ..

Jlhilo~oph('f5. It folIo,,:, that thE' III:-;tory of ~J.'f ~.:nl"!1 ,'" ,iI

I · r hilosophie~' Ih(' COIlCt'pi of 111(' Iw;t()J~ of (Ihdn~ . 11510ry 0 P "... I)'" J l' oplw as a single pr()('r~:-; IS iMPlgn tn tfIg( 1H'~ .,1\('1' '",s. stili. he does admit that nil philosopht'l'," arC' lInalllm~l\IS III

their pursuit of truth, hut ,11011(, of thrill call. fC'ach It llnd their paths di\'erge incrl'tl.slI1gly. ,\!though DlOgrJlrs ,LnC'r tius was dose to EpicHrC'anislll, his c()J1('rpt of t.hr JlIstO!'},

of philosophy is rss('ulially skc-plicisl. 1 am cOllyinced that philosophical :-.krplicism was the

first. c\'er theory of the history of philosophy, and its im­pact is still felt in contcmpol'nry non-Marxist philoRophy. The starting point in this theory, as in skepticism in gen­eral, is a negative undel'standing of philosophy as an "excrcise in wisdom" which can ne\'c1' arrive at the trllth since philosophy does not and cannol offcr a criterion :-cpal'ating truth from errol'. Tn the eyes of skeptics, what philosophers term truths arc merely opinions and beliefs. Hence the skeptics' disdainful charge of dog­matism lcwled at any philosophy maintaining that it is true.

~kept~cism combi?e~ a negativc attitude to all philoso­pilles With the ~on\'l.ctlOn that it is thc only correct philos­ophr becau.s~ It re~ects. all positive philosophical postu­lat(':-. ~kephc~sm claims It knows the true \\'oL,th of any and a~l. philosophies: they cannot be trusted. Therefore skep­tl?sm appears not as a philosophical doctrine abo~lt the ,~orld and ~no\\'ledge but as a philosophy of philosophy

lor a me~ap~llo~ophy. This amhiguous attitude toward phi-osophy IS J.!!stdied I)', 11)e da' tl I .

- -- ~- __ • ..l" ____ ., Im la ll<;,ga_t1.ng the correct-ness of any pllllosoplHcal thesis docs not mea ·· . its antithesis as_correct. According to the sk t~ acctPtll).g losophers differ in their opinions and ref t ep IC!i, a I plll­therefore one must refrain fl'om ('XCI' . ,n e on? another; judgment; The facl that ske>pl icism 'is c~~lng pl.lIlosophic~l ~osop}H'rs arg~ment!i and, like> othcl' ltif~cnt ~n lhe phl­Its oPl~onents, IS simply ignored. ! sopllLes, refutes

Tn ,I~S analysis of certain philosophical ' . ~kPrllcl:-m (and this is trill' of lhr ~kp \' . ISsues, anclCnt .. \gr to an ('ven gl'('al('r degl'('e) d'id P !(,Ism of the New ('ontradiction~ inhercnt ill know}ed ~llJlgle out certa in to ' g(' all( thlls c t·1 a more creative approach to epis\em 1 " on I', )utcd

22 o oglcaJ proLlems,

Bill. IIII' I'k"ptiC'isl concept of tlw "i~lf)rY" of pllllnSflphy W,I!! wrong, and f.hilrf'" JIlllrh of the pr~judic('s of t'nrytiay CflrISl'io1l5f11'SS. Skl'ptil'!! nl'\""r raised slIch flllldallll'nl.dly illlportallt i~Sllf·g ;l~: do philosophical doctrinE'S rf'i1lly rp· full' '"II' aflotlJl'r' Do diff4'rt'lices betwPI'n IIII'IIl r("(lily Jl1E-lln that Ihft iSS11f'S pO."I'd by philo~ophy arf' f'sspntially 11f1.'~ol\"ahJf'? Uo th(' slliJst;lfltial diffl'rf'nf'l's lind cOlltriHlic tiolls SPIHll'iltillg philoSfll'hil's rf,<tlly rule' l)]It significant quali{i<'s thut ,HI' CIHTlfllflll to the'm all? DOb tlw COIIII'I1· ti on l)/'t\\"<'1'1i phil()sOflhi!'~ really han no positive signirl canc('?

Skeptics 11f'\,(']' probed til{' cpistemological nature of phil~ osophica l CITOI', they ncver saw its real, although miSllllder­slood, content. But no matter how much philosophl'rs erred, we must credit them with Ringling out that content. Skeptics knew absolutely nothing about the dialectics of tl'uth and error. Truth (it is not merely a statement of something easily perceived and generally known) and error (of course, if it at least indirectly points to !'ignincant and previously unknown facts) are not diametrically OPPos(·d. That is why the history of philosophy, even as a history of error, of brilliant error, is of tremendous cpistemolog­ical importance. And that not only because it outlines, al­beit indirectly, the correct way of deYeloping knowledge: the history of philosophy cannot be regarded merely as a history of errors: it is also a history of brilliant, although far from universally accepted, discoveries . The iact that philosophy, as a rule, does not contain precepts :shared by all philosophel's does not at all rule out the existence or genu inely philosophical precepts. Dismissal of that f~ct is among the theoretical sources of the concepts holdIng that the history of philosophy is not development of philos* ophical knowledge.

Tho discovcry of the law of the tl'ansformation of encrgy provided thcol'ctical and cxperimenlal natural science with proof that the fundamental matcrialist prccepts about thl.' unity of motion and malleI' (self*molion of matter) and the indcs truclibilily of motion were correct. Accor(ling to Engels, " Ih(' unit.y of all Illotion in natur(' i~ n~ longer ,~

"philOSophical - tlRS(,I--;tion, but a natural-sclenllftc ract, (f1; Hl1) -"On th(' othr-l' hand, "proposition.s which \\'('re ad-vtlnct'li in pliilosophy c('nturies ago, wlilch often cBough hnvc long hccn dispo.5('d of philosophically, arc frequently

.,0 .. ,

put forward by t.h ('oris ing llntural !'Ic i t'n ti sl s <l~ !:rand new wisdom and {'w'n become fas IH OJl<lhh' for a will ie. (0; 1\3)

Thus e\"en thos(' I)hilosophicnl pf{'r('pb thnt arc fully borne out by speci[t l scientific :4mlies do not gHill llujIJer­sal acceptance among philosophers. l\ a tural scienti sts have' long since accepted that cOllsci oll~ I1l' S::; is a quali ty of highly organized matter. But id eali st~ s till dispute (31 though usually with reservations) that fundamental pre­cept of materialist philosophy.

Despite the fallacy of their negat i\,i s t interpretatio n of the history of philosophy, skepti cs arc acknowledged to ha\'c discovered one of its key qualities. Unlike other fie lds of knowledge, philosophy comprises a great many conflicting trends, doctrin('s and concepts , and many are mutually exclusive. But the fact that philosophers (at any rate, prominent philosophers) have cliffel'ent opinions of key issues does not mean that philosophical tr uths are n.onexistenl. The only obvious thing (and that is the sa­hent feature of the history of philosophy) is that the truths affirmed by some philosophers are denounced as utterly erroneous by their opponents , On the other hand many philos?phical errors are alleged to be basic truth~. This so~etlI?eS occurs in other theoretical sciences too. But wlule It happens only occasionally in science it is the ~s ual thing in philosophy, and may be described as it.s mtellectual climate. I ~his cxp~ains ,why skeptics, and even philosophcL's who la\e nothl~g l,n common with skepticism, admit the ~)oundlcss dl,:ersl~y of confli cting philosophies and regard It as so~etll1ng mherent in philosophical knowledge and ~l~c ~r:g.lous obstacle hampering the eventual arrival at

!n the 18th century, ELienne BonnoL de C d· ph llosopher who reJ'ected skep" . on lilac, a I [ olClsm examined 'hat t . I

sate 0 philosophy. In his Treat· ' ' S " yplca "lIow many systems have ahead

tse b on ys~ems hc wrotc:

~norc will be built? If only one r~un~en bUilt.? How many mterpreted more 01' less uniformly b ~t Iea~ t one that is nut can one rely on systems th t y ad of Its exponents! changes while passing through

a t1~1ll ergo thousands of hands;. on systems that, whimsical a~~~ands .. of different and disappear in the f' ame manner, and ca l.lrIClollS, appear Ihat they can be ll !->{'(I equally II ale so unreliable

. we to both defend and

n, f lllt,'J" (11; 21) llnlih Ih(' :<;ktoptics, C":ondillac Iwli!.wd i l hlllll pflH. iltl,. alld 11I'('("~5'nry to oV(>rrOlllf> th .. "(illl' of pli ilf)!'ftl'hy liS h" dl'~erjbed it Ity erputing a -;y,.:If>1ll of phi Iflsophy 11<1.0.;1"11 IJlI !'!cielltiticitlly \"{'rifw!Jlp datil, Cllndil lili IIi" 1II111'b (0 fll'\'f'lojl "f'JI~illionaTil:it f'pislelllf,I(j~y. ,\!HI, .t! though III' failf'd to soln the prohlem, his work IIlltllluht Nll y hrought l1l1' SOllltifJll closer.

TO/lay, mO)olt th!'oretical st1ldies of the history of philosf) IIhy MI'!'!'!s tilE' increasing differences among ph ilosophica l doctrint'!'!. For f'xamplc, the French historian of philosophy C. J. Ducassc 1>('li(,\"C5 that analysis of the cxislf'nce of so many mutllall y exclusi\"e philosophies mahs it 1)()ssiblE' to grasp the ess('nc(' of philosophy. In his words, "",I\('n one C'xamincs ti l(' history of phi losophy. one is amAzet! by the contrast between the trend toward agrcl'ffi('nt inert'as ingly ('\'idcnl in the natllral sciences and the facl that a sim ilar tr('nd is less perceptible, if not completdy abs{'llt, in philosophy". (46; 2(2) Unlike philosophers of the irn. tiona list trend, who insist that philosophy and sciencl' arl' incom patible, Ducasse regards philosophy as a !<ci('ncc sui gClleris, Still , the facts that are the subject of philo!<ophy d iffer rad ically from those that are the subject of any other science. In philosophy, facts are propositions, and thus "all the problems of philosophical Iheory are essen­tially sema nt ic, but not all semantic problems arc nec('s sari ly philosophical". (46; 282) Of course, this essentiall y fOl'ffia li stic in terpretation of the nature of philosophy can· not show the way to a scientific solution or phi losophical Jlroblems.

While study of the history of philosophy b d ifficu lt , unders tandi ng the history of philosophy as a process of developing philosophical k nowledge is even more di fficu lt. Hcgel was the firs t to pose this problem. That, apparently, "'as why Marx s t.ressed t.h a t. IIegel was "the fi rst to under­s tand the his tory of philosophy as a whole" (4 ; 29, 5·'t9) dC'spite his id ('ali sti c in terpretation of that disc ipline,

.\bo\"e all , lI egel rejec ted th(' skeptica l view of philo­sophical doctrin('s as being totally opposed to onc a notiwr, a vjew rooted in ancient skeptici sm, l1e aJl pl icd ,his~ d ia l ec ~ical . int t' l'pl'l'.tal ion ~f d.iITere n('c '~~ ,COIll\I~ i s[ng ~':,se n .Ii.~ l ulentlty to In s. ('omparatn'l' nnnl ysis of P 1l10.:'oplllCal !'i}.~ lems, Thill W;l ~ how Il egel viewed di ffl'l"cll ccf'; among plll l osophicnl systelll s, includ ing those that e\'olw d inlo COil

' 5

\

lradictioDS. Tn his words, "the. history 0.1 pilil?sophy ~h ows , first, that till." s('C' mingiy (lIffrrC'nt. pllll~soJllllrs arc IIwrC'ly olle philosophy at di ll (, I' (,~l t .st.ngC's of Its dC'\"C'i?p­l11('nt; second , that particu lar principles, ('aeh U1HIeriYlng one parti cular system, arc merely branches of Ol1t' and the ~am (' whole" , (64; 6, 21)

Hegel's di a lect ics of di ffe rence a nd id('n l ity attJ'ibutes pri macy to the la tt rl', s inc(' it is interpret ed as u niLy, and \ ~!.! L·u;_i g ~f!-'ity of OJ?lJOsi!cs. Hegel holds that i t is pre­clsil yThe idcntitiorbcing and thought t.h at forms the sub­stance of all that exists. Hence hi s incl ination to underes­timate' t.he differences among phi losophical systems: he r e­ga rded them all as consecutive stages in the d evelo pment of a single philosophy, with its essence unchanged in all timC'. Hcfl1ling t.he skepti ca l claim th a t all p hil oso p hies were false, Hegel was rather inclined to r ecognize t h e op­pos ite \"i ew: tha t all phil oso phies w ere tru e, a lbei t only as stages of a single deve loping philosophy interpl'e led as a mrans of the authentic self-ex press ion of the " absol ute idea" . T he latter all egedl y gained self-aware ness in t he cour~e of human hi story, aboye all in the course of the devcl?prn e.nt of ~hilosophical knowledge over the ages.

ThiS p~mt of ~' I e~,' al !'? means that no sys tem of philoso­phy cOIl!'.ldered In IsolatIOn from the enlire hi s tory of phi -

)( lo~ophy IS true. Truth is a process and thi s a pplies fll'st and fo~('m ost t o 'philosopl.li ~ al truth 'as a unity of diffe l'ent a n<.1 ('\ en ~Pllos lte. dcfLllIlion s . Thcr('fore H('gel also op­I,l ()~(, ~\ ~he \ le\~' which, allhollgh it rejected skepticism, was l qna J fal~a C lOl1 S because it held that all philosophies ~·.(' r ~' tr."{' In their Own di!.;tincl wa ys, despite lhe contra­i nl C lJ~h\ thi\ separ~t('d th(,lll. According to lIegel, recogniz -

I g . a p II osophu~s are essentially different yet cq \\ally

.ru(' I~ an as"-urnpt' tI t d . < !HI l11 a ttr r ho~\' cornl~~tinlga "I o('s not mel'lt serious attention

II I may appear egel thus proved that the I' . .

111'\"('loprn cnt passing from one t~l~ry of phi losophy was nt' '" t , high er Ic\"cl and Jrobin c~e of .knowledge to the tiJl' natme of thin <; I I) . g IncreaSingly decpcl' into I'li ilr).(;ophy , de!'crib~d ' byn F.~\{jectll~~S 011 the lIistory 0/ l il:tnt works" (2 ' 41) Il "' gl s. as one of his most hl'il ­()I phil (J~ ophy as' mO~io'n il~g~ I' l .nt:fJ~:NS thc. development !..U ('S ~ia \"f'd in "omn ,,"a-yO - 1. 1 ~r.lI.::, ~ lnC(~ Ilhdosophical is-II I " < It Olle' 1('\"(>1 a I '

Ie a te r d/' \" clollmonl 01 \1 'I I < rr I'ansfol'med b y . 1 lJ O~()I"Y ac ' , ' qUIi'e new content ,

;1nil rl'ilrh H nrw nnd higher philosophical II'\'el ns proh-1l'TIls Ihnt ill'!' ypt tn }I(' soln·fi; a n{'w appronch to t111'~{, pl'oblrms lr'nrl ~ to conclusions that enrich the philo~ophical \lnd('l'~tnnding of r('ality.

Hpg'('l's /,eriure.t; on the Ifi.t;tory 0/ Philosophy comhinf' Ih(' historicAl method of presentation that ~ums UJl all facts r('latNI 10 philosophical systems and lh{'ir ('m('rgrncl' wit.h Ul(' logical method that traces the principal stnge~ a nd laws in the (lc\"{'lopment. of philosopllical know lpdg('. ] n Ihis Itr follows his principl e of the unity of t.hr hi~ t Ol'i­cal ancl lh r logical. According to this principle, the h is tOl'Y of ph ilosophy gC'neJ'all y reproduces the logical dC'velopm~nt of majo1' phi losoph ica l catC'gories; the systC'm of cat('gorles forms th(' fina l stage of phil osophical deniopment,. the ::;ystC'm of absolulC' idealism. "The developm{'nt of phtloso· phy in history must correspo~d to. the developm~nt of, logical philosophy; but th{'~e wI.ll st.lll be p.a~sages I~, th~ latter which are ahs('nt III 11lstorlcal d{,H>lopme~t. 1 Quot ing this postulat(' of Hegel, Lenin transform~ It on a m atcrialif;l basis and stresses that the actual d{,Hlopm{'nl of phi losophical concepts- -the discoyerr. of that yrocess must incontestably he credited to Hegel-IS dpter~lned h.y condi t ions that are broader than the content of pilllosoplll cal con f;c iousness: " H ere there is a \"ery profo\.llld an? cor­rect essen tiall y materialist thought (actual. history IS the baSi's, t h o fOllndation, the ~Being, which l~ /ollou'ed by

conSCiousness)," (\0; 38, 260), 'TI Tn 11is Phenomenology of Spirit and {'speCially Ie

Science 0/ Logic H egel tried to theoretical.ly feJlr~dllc(, th~ actual h istory o[ ph ilosoph y as a pl'ogl'essl\"e mO\elllC'll.t 0

1 phi l osoph icnl know}('dg('. E\"('I'yd ay conscious ness, .e~n nll.n('( in the i)(' g in n illg o f Ih e Phenomenology 0/ Spm l , I'l se~

from immcdiate sensory ycrificntion t.o the int {' Il ('(,~ lI n l nn­dl'rst.anding of natural laws do",,('d In :;\'!I:-;l' PI'IT!'.p ! 1011 ,1Iul.

flnallv to absolute k now}rdgl" to till' 1I ll dl'r ~ ta lHhllg of IIII' rlhsollite as the crratin' has i.'i nf nil t.lwl ('~is l ~, iHh'qllatt'ly manifesting itself in human hi story. T h is mOW IIH'nt or cognition from cYC'ryday (''XperiC'ncr to llhsolu{c kllow}rilgC' parallcl~ tl\(' socio-cultural (\l'n'l opllll' nt o f man and man­kind from the initial (in HegC'] 's \i('w) mas t,rl' -,sl :w(' rela­tionship to a legal systCJll thai ('nS lll'{'S fl'(' C'dolll and ('q ual· ity for its citizens in the bOllrgrois-drHlOCI'ati(', sens i' . 'rIms, ) Hegel idealistically interpret s t.he' history of philos­ophy as the }Jasis and moti\'{' force of all social den'lop­

m!'nt. The Science of Logic of£('rs an ontological view of th e

d{'Yclopmcnt of philosophy fl S an objective, immanent log­ical process that oecms in the l'('alm or the " absolute idea". Philosophical systemg flr C' d('scribcd as the princi­pal stages, categories of that process, of the emergence of a~l absolute philosophical system which int{'gratC's the prin­clJll.es ?f ap earlier systems, freed from the rigidity of their hlstoncal existl'l1ce and incorporated into the hierar­ch~' of c~ncepts of dialectical logic. This means that each ~1?soplll,ca~ sys~e!!l __ c.£ntains the idea in a disthld forin , l.r. I~ a hmltcaexpression of thc· .... ·absolutt' idea". The lat­!er acquires its aaequate and - e\'C'rlas ting exjJreSS iOD only In the system of absolute idealism that sums up the entire process. Philo:ophical systems "are nothing other than ~\lndamental differences of the idea itself; it is what it is only 1J1 th!'m, they are consequently important for it and make up the content. of tlle idea. The content full' d J d thm: h(lcomes the form" (64· 13 48) , ) ep oye ,

hyFot!'\Oa!rl its dbril1i anr t l. i n~i~ht~, I~'aterial istically transformed . •.. oun ers 0 n1arxlsm Hegel' I .

opm!'nt of philosophical k~o\~'led .s .ogle of Ul e devel-

l sis, invalid since it proceeds fr~~l 1~ll~n the final ana.Iy ­of the .~elf-development of 1 '1 1 false assumptIOn which, according to Hegel .~ l~hoSOP ly. The ah~olute spil'it thc "ah!'olut(l idea" is th~~ th e sup:eme mamfestation of phil~~oJlhy, .a subSla~tial ~r('a~\,~PI~lt of I~hilosophy, and pr(,(,I:-rly thIS typC of concr t \\' orc!'. Engels opposed rlf'~·.(.lopmf'nt ?f philosophy i~ thf'h~ I,ll' w~.ot~ ahout the tillS long PNIOd from Drscartes l' (1\\ Age. But during 1)('8 to Feucrbach the philo"on!\· U 11 ('g(ll and from lToh-

, .~ I' (Irs Wrre I )y no means im

•

pf,J\pd , "s thoy though , they were M lely. hy tl L~ forc(l or PLlP ' I"l'll'HIII. Oil till' contnl) \Vh .ll re_ By p"S"lI' ti th f' 1Il 1"0 1"\\ ,I rtl Ill( .... 'n T H' 10 ·(·rfll antT t'\ el' nlOrt 1,I.l! lI lly o nrush ing l!rfJ~ (·1 latu 81 WIl(,n J.c... nJ u<.; try ... •

(:l; .1, ;1--17 18) S illCl! ,liJ:-<l)l lltf! l(h~alisnl !<i:U')SldDt ates )hilosoph ical

thinking', I1 f!gt~1 Ignorc13 tho Import.ant role or nat ural Hci r- nee and soeio-iJistoricdl pradlce in the development of Jl hil ()~(JJl h il:ill kt\4J\\· I (~dge. In his view, twery1..hing nonph il u­sophi cl.Il is a P)'f)dllct o( Ihilo~ophy. The contf<lsti ng of philosophy to uo n pbilosophical study and act ivi ty is ty pi cal o[ id eali s t ph ilosophy, and here Hegel's philosophy is an oxtre mc cas co 1"01' t'xa mple, lIt'gel holds that pli ilf)soph y. as the s u preme manifestation of suLstantial th inki ng, al ienates everyt h ing that is not pure thought dnd tllllS rel ies for its content soldy on itself. But lIegel"s ~ y !'= tem comprises issues that arc the subjects of natural science, anthropology, psychology, civil history, the history of art . etc. S till , all t hose fields of philosophical study are described as subjects of applied logic . Hegel categoricall y sl a tes that " what a n y knowledge and any science cOD~irlers (IS

true and m ean ingful can unly merit that name if it 1:-'

born of philosophy : other sciences, no matter how much they try to reason withou t rt~::;orting to philosophy, can have neither life nor spirit nor truth without it". (64;

2, 53-54) Thus , despite its dial ectics, Hegel's ideali:-;t concept of

development oUers a one-sided and inadequate i":terpreta­Lion of that complex and variegated process wInch even mathematics docs Dot interpret as only a log ical devclop­ment of concepts. One has to ~~~m~t •. ho~\·e\·er, that in He-~Q!) lifetime 1l0 'Tleld of SClCntiflc knowledge bad ye! pro·

c!.uC/lU anY concept 01 ucvclopmOllt. It is Dot easy for the researcher to apply the Ci.ltegory

of den'lopment to the history of philosophy. It would 11<­naive to belio\'c that the general t.h eory of de\'clopllwnt, the essencc of materi.llist dial ec tics , is directly applicable to each special branch of knowledge, including the history of philosophy. The lattel'· ·like biology, geology and the liko- calls for a special theory of denlopment b~sed on n (lialectical.matNialist interpretation of the sU~Ject at hand. Darwin's theory is a good cxample of a spcclal theo­ry of developmcnt comprising both the categoncs that de-

29

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• J,

x

)(

, I 'J , , ~ \ • , , , I • , -. ~ ,

" f - / .. , , • , "

, , , ~ •

'b d ,I "nL ,'n genenl I\lHi !lH' cOIICl' pl s 1't'lalt't1 only sen C C\C OJHlh.. ' . I" I I " . "'J'c'cl l'I'l'<"C"; Chl' llI ls t !'\' 11<1I I H';1 N'nn!llll\', to I ll' gn ell M l} • ". , __ ' .. ..

ilntl ::;ot'ioiogy study funlianll'nl.\ l1 y d dll' rt ' lI l I) Pt'S of tin n'iOJlllll'ul. l\lal ' :\' ~ Capital IlJ~l'M' llt S hoth a l-{ t'II.l'nd Ihl'Ol:Y of dl'yl'lopIllcnl and a spec"ll theory of S(lI'IO-I'r()IlUIlIlI~ dl'yrlopmcnt.

Features shared by all d C'ycloplIIl' nl p.n ll'.l'SSl'S tU:" Iht· iITc,-ersibiliLy of change, its di rection W 11,111 11. til l' 11'<11111'­work of a specific cycle of changes, qU l\!ll all \,t' tl'nn:-;fOl' malions, negation, succession, the ClllC'l'gl' Ilce l~nd ('::i tah lishmcnt of a new s tl'llcllll'L', CO IlH'l's ioll , 1I11' 1I1l1ty o[ l'C p ·

('tit ion (reproduction) and ulliqtl{l n L'S~ , the ri se of th e new, ll. nd renewal. Progress js_ the highC'sl forlll of, dpyplopnH'nl ; i~ _ i£ _tr<!.n~jtioJl~to a higher _s tage (lcwl) of c1 cyclop mC'llt that enriches content and impro\"Cs· f01'111 , Development is thus- t11e unIty of qualilath-ely different proccsses, each of them not yet the process of deyelopment itseH but its nec­essary constituent clement. For example, i1'l'c\' crsibillty is a concomitant of the functioning of eyerything liying ; there­fore this process should not be identified with develop­ment. Mo\-ement a_net ~aDg! by themseh 'cs_ are not devel­opment! _ but_ . the lat.te_l' takes -place ,Precise1y through movement and change.

A nal~'si s of the history of philosophy ma kes it possi­ble to slllgie out all those common features typical of de­yelopment. !lowe\-er, analysis also reveals certa in trends that r~n cou~ter to those listed: abstract negation of the prece~lllg pllll~sophy, return to historically obsolete phil­osoplHcal doctnnes, and struggle of opposites which often rules out mut~al tranSition, ~nterdependence and unity.

, A comparison of the history of philosophy with the llistor~ o[ ,thc natural sciences immediately pOints to the essential difference betwcen them mcnl,'onod' II b ' . [h· lJl 10 egln -,IDg 0 t IS ~ssay. ~he forward motion in the history of ~I~:t n~~~~a~Os~~iennUci~s IS ~r~ketn ver~ rarely, despitc the fact

I , ' , y an . III ClTUptlOU arc typical of it As a ,ru e, SClcntlflc accomplishments· are not forgott ,'I (~Xlstence of mutually cxclusivc Conce lts i ' en, ,t 1e (?Ithough permanently recurring) feat~re ';h a ~ranS ICI~t filffcrent in philosolJhy' coex'st . e Picture IS

. ' - I cnce and struggle I t varIOUS schools doctrines and t d . >e ween history. {;nlik~' discussions in ortlcn s ryn all through its , , d leI' sCiences tile ' mcreasmg iuergence of opinion' I' ' ,rc IS an

III p lilosophical argu-30

,

, j'.

I

, -., , \ I, -,

/ - , .I \ , ,

i , , - , /'

1111'111. TILl' ("lid n"t 1'l'lW"(HI .If'h tr'~nC ,1~ r;.t](lJIali·QIl 111111

('I I II"rll'l~ IlL. r Ili"II.II. III nit! irl,lliulL.li Ill, 1lIllJl'il l i~1II 111111

f;piritLlali. III Ull'l.lpliy II' und plll'nolOl'lIf'l III shows tiwi dil"f"I"!'III'('S lu'l\\I'('1I plli\"",,,,,llil's turn Inl', OPP":iltion. \\ Irieh i:i ;d~1I typical of tile 11101'1' gCJII~ral and illtl'J,{l"al fO]"lll5 of Ilrll dl!vtl(JIIIIH~lll 'Jf philosophical knlJw"~dl.{(t. HI'­s ilil'S, (';H'b of til" ""pf)~it(~ trl'rld'! t(~lld~ tf) hecolllfJ (lolarizl'd: rationa l 1IIi11('rialj~1II OppfJ:-)CS idPolist ratiouali~lII, idpal· is t {'lIIpi l'iei:HlI (JJl IJfJSl'S 1II;lt(~ri;di~t I'rnpirici.<;In, etc.

Th us, d('sJlite till! ,l.(n'al Yilril'ly of pililos()phi('!; it file! not to 1)(' ignored, IhfJlIgh it 81mlelinu's is ill JI(JplIl .. !' \\ oJ'k s 011 the history of piliif)sfJphy- -mat('J'iaii~1lI ;lI1d ideali s m arc tJlC two major COJIIJlI"I..·l!cClsl\"c and contr<ldic toi:y- -sys tems, T iwir op position lias ncen hrought about by a radical polal'ization of philosophies . .\'(:verthelb:-'. IIll'Y arc not absolute opposites: their oppo:;ition exists (allf l deepens) wi th in the framework of the general philosophic~l fi eld of study. That is an important point to 5tr(':o;5 If only because most idealists regard materialism as a non-philosophical outlook, _ '

The struggle between materialism and Idealism do~'~ not rule out relations of succe~sion, but naturally not In the sense that materialists assimilate idealist yiews and yice versa. Marxist philosophers regard succession ~s di~lectical negation, and its positin character has n?thlDg, III com­mon with an eclectic mixture of incompahble Ylew:" Th.e attitude of dialectical materialism to classical German plll-10sophy is a ycry good example of thi.s d~alectic~l .succe~ s ion that works according to the sCIenhfic pflnclple of partisanship in philosophy. . ' .

The naLmal question to ask is why the his tory of pllll.os­ophy differs so much from , the history. of math ~m~ tJ('s" physics and oUler sciences? 1 he answer, IS ~h a t phJlO~OP~l)_ is boLh a specifIC form of study and a :; pcclfic form of ,0

cial consciousness-an ideology. Obviously, the fact t.h a t soc i~l .consciousncs::> rc ~ ec ls l'~W­

cial being does not mea n that It IS a study of soc l ~ l bu ng or tho l'esHlt o[ such a st.udy, ,!l~Lc~n~cnt. ~~~~Ial c-~l~ : sciousness is. (~dCl·mi _n_ed. by socHil belflg, "~Il~h ~~ =~ °In jecti\'e social pI'ocess Indellendent ,of cou:c~o~n(':~, . cCI:tain histOl'ical circumstances, SOCial con::.c loll sne., :S tC'I~n

, ' e"'" ' c a system of SClcn I IC become scientifIC consclousn ·~ :;, 1. -, .' t. views_ The scientifiC socialist ideology IS a case In pom .

31

, , ,

, I

I

/

horn of a special scientific study, 1t fen('cts historically sprcific social being-tho capitalist ::;y.stl'D1; the place of the working class in that f;yslcm; the IHtercsts, 11('('(I!) and l'fllilOcipation movement of that class. . .

The scientific socialist ideology dIffers radically from the i:ijJontaneOIl$ consci..ous.o..ess. aL the workers t1~at takes ~hape in the course of capitalist development. !"aturally, both the reflection of social being and the refiecboll of na­tUTe in human consciousness differ greatly from a study that. provides a scientific reflection o( its objects. This hook contains a special essay on the relationship of science (,HId philosophy) to everyday consciousness shaped by cveryday experience. Here, it should be JlOted that natural science differentiates between reflection of nature through ('vCl'yday consciousness and data obtained by special stud­it's, although the latter quite often rely on everyday ex-

, pCrlence,

Scicnce docs not merely reflect objective reality, whethcr t'lwironmental or social, in human consciousncss' science is the hi hest form of the theoretical reflection of reality. ~lJS . ivi ing line between reflecting consciousness (any cons.clOusncss, including religious consciousness, reflects re~hty) and reflecting theoretical study is also valid in phllos?p!IY. Here is an example. The French 18th-century ma~crlalism was the scientific and philosophical outlook ?f .ltS age. The substantiation (albeit in a limited mechan. IstlC form) o[ the principle o[ seU-movement of matter was among the greatest accomplishments of that ph iloso­~lhy. ~rench materialists advanced the following principle ~~ sociology,:. man changes as_~i~ ~~ndit~~ns of life change. r arx and Engels stressed the Importance of that ·princip1e or th? later development of socialist doctrines.

I Besld~s, Fr~nch materialism is the philosophy of the ti~~lri~et~ls Enlightenment. a bourgeois ideology reflecting ing feu~~~~~ ne~dd ~f~ ~osition of the bourgeoiSie fight­

princ!pal Phil~soP~icallJ~o~:en~~ a~fu~is c~~n~cted v.:~h its prr~slon. But this fact should' be viewed 1 S speC! . c ~x­(ev('n. spontaneous) reflection of social bei as .an obJectI.ve conscIOusness of that historical d ng lD the SOCial study. era, an not as a result of

( Thcrc.fore, reflection as the cont' ' . theory 15 expressed in two ways' ent of a phtlosopillcal

32 . as a study of specific

• •

J

,

rl'{)lity_ i.l'_ a~ dr-finite ~llhjt'rti\'() (l('tivity, and as an objec tiwly df'It'l'lllilll'd undl'r~lanrling of social being, the kind III' lIntil'r:-;landing wilirh i~ not ,llways and nol (,YCl'ywhl'l"I'

<l cogniliw l'roCl~:;S. Kal\ll'aily. OIlC should not ah .... ays abso­luh'iy oppose r('fll'fting (,OIlSCiOllSIH'SS to n,n(>clillg study But onc mllst not rail into the other extreme: thc contpul )( of philosophi('al dQ(,trines is not to be rcgarded merely as I

the result of study, ignorillg thr objectivc dependl'l1(,p of social consciollsn('ss on social being.

In describing the ideological function of French material­ism, MaL'X and Engels stress that "lIolbach's theory is the historically justified philosophical illusion about the bourgeoisie just then developing in France, '~hose thirst [or exploitation couLd still be regarded as a thirst for the full development of individuals in conditions of intercourse freed from the old feudal fetters," ("1; 5, 410) Of COUl'se, French materialists were not aware of that social content of theil' theory, just as they did not consider themselves ideologists of the bourgeoisie, despite their perfectly con­scious hostilily to the feudal system and ideology: Marx and Engels demonstrated the historically progressl\'e ~a­tUfe of thC' ideology of French materialists and wrote: "Llb­(,!'alion fl'om the standpOint of the bourgeoisie, i.e., com­petition, was, of course, for the eighte?nth century the on­ly possible way of offering the indiViduals a n.e\\' career for freel' development. The theoretical procla.matloo .of the consciousness corresponding to this bourgeOIS pract~cc. of the consciousness of mutual explOitation as the UD!versal Illutual relation of all individuals, was also a bold a.nd open step forward. It was a kind of enlightenment WhlC!l interpreted the political, patriarchal, religiOUS and senll­mental embC'liishment ... the embeUishmen.t corresp~:mdcc} to the form of exploitation existing at that t1.me and. It, ha\ been systematised especially by the theol'clical Wl'ltCIS 0

the abso lute monarchy." (1; 5, 410) . '1 The materialist interpretation of history makes yhl 050-

h a unit of a speci fic form of study .and ~ speCial form ~f YsoCial c~nsciO\lSneSs, ideology. Marxls,? dls~o\'ere~ and

'd d c'entitic basis for a sociologlcal dWtel!SlOn of provi e a sid' ' " .. the I I' t· f philosophy. This new ImenSlon ~ 10."::;

~d~:tit~~~di~~y \~O'afY tl~~il,~:~r~~; ~~~:~~~ tI~~escI:~~\~:~I:l:~l~tI~ll~~ ers an lllg r tl I .'. for lll~

of its -s tll(ly,· wllich, in turn, sen'('s ,1S 1e laSIS

33

doctrine 01 partisanship in phil osophy, of philosophy's rote in t.he ~ocio~historical IH'oct'.' :-; and the ~(lt'l:l l class roots or ph ilo."'ophical theories. . .

\

" The ~cicncc o~ the hblory of ph1i(~~OJl ~I.Y S l,ll ~It {'S .ow de ~ velopmelli of plulosoph» H one c?~::sltlC'l ~ t.h l aho\(' fa.cts,

this definition is anythmg but triv ial. st.l'l cUy speakmg, \Iarxists are the only ODes to accept it., while those oppos-' I iog Marxism are almost unanimous i,D th (' ir cla im t hat phi.

I losophy has a history, but not a lw,;t.ory or d evelopment. r have already stressed that the development of philosophy is a process of differentiation, divergence, polari zation, and struggle between materialism and ideal ism- a struggle that shapes the prerequisites of the dialectical -mater iali st view of the world. A scientific history of philosophy d oes not lose sight of the ideological direction of various doc, trines and records the fact that the development of philos­ophy combines genuine progress with constant reversals h'ading back to earlier historical s tages . This regressive as­pect dominates the idealist philosophy of the latter h a lf o[ th(' 19~h century and the 20th century, where, in the fi nal analYSI S, each new doctrine rC\' ives, and puts a ra di ca l conl-ltrnction on, principles that wcre formulated in the 113st and later refuted. Of course thi s does not m ean that bour.geois philosophy today pose~ no problems worth di s­('I.I!'SI~g. The r~dicalization of old problems renects the new 111!'~orlcal ~ondltions and takes into account the lates t sci­('1I1.lfIC achle\'ement~; it is therefore a distinct form of the de\eIopment of phllo!'ophy. Opposing any simplistic inter ­! ' r!:lal1~n ?[ the. crisis of contemporary idealism the rom­:~t~; .~\,Iet pl~~losoph('r P. I'~edoseyev is perfectly ju~tified in til;' fl~l~h~i f~~:a~ ~~ui~ge~ls phil.osopher~ \~ork ~ruitfully :-ii'lnantics and pragmati

g , ) evelopmg semlOhcs (mcluding

Ih('ir achi(,\'(,nlcnts in t~~JL f~et~uld be unfair to disregard ;~mine all that is valuable hcre'~.' (3~~ should carefully e:;-:-ihould be expressly reaffIrmed ' 132) ~~vertheless, It ( !-\("hool that Ilroduc-cd an csscnti n th~t Malxlsm was the I

"phy frpe from the age-old a y dl[fe~ent type of philos­philosophy is incapable of errorts. willch today's idealist , rl I . correc mg Marx'st hOI

I. a eve opmg sy~t('m organicaU" ' I P I osophy kWJwIedge, to historical expe' y linked to all scientifiC I f fl

. flence and 0

las 11 y overcome the fall ' practICe. Marxism t' aClous oppo 'r

IJ nonpllliosophical study and " Sl ~on of philosophy prachce. Dialectical and his,

toriflll mat{,r111lism i. OJ !icil'ntifu,: philosophical ol1tlook that 1101 only (''Xp\alns Iht' world hilt also shows how to t l'i\lI~

101'111 it. Ili·lining Ihp ~Ilhj('e\. of til!' hi"torico.phiJo:;ophicill sciellc{'

as det'e[{)f1melll of philosophy, olle must shift the accc nt rrom the jll'OCPSS of de\'Clopfficnt and consider th£> $/lbjecl of d c\'c,l?p,rncnt. ~Vh~t ,doe.s de\'elopment of philosophy mean? Ilw; qu('stlon I::; JlIstlftNl by the funda mental diffe r ­ence of phi i()sOI.lhy fl'oll1 olher forms of know ledge. It is tmC' th~t thC' sCJl'nc~s l ha~ hprr are compared with philos­ophy cliffe]' suhs lantlall y Irom onr .. nother. Biology differs from mathomat ics. Social flciences and natural sciences are two d isti nct fi elds of knowledge. Still , t his essay has shown that ph ilosophy d iffers rad ically from all other sciences, and consequen tl y from any t.hing that they may have in common. Phi losophy, including scientific d ialectical-m atc­r i al i~t philosophy, holds a place of ils own in the system of scientific k nowledge. T herefore one is justified to speak of the distinct way philosophy de\'elops.

For s('\, C!'a l cen turi es, unlike knowledge gained fr om ev­eryday experience, philosophy emerged and exist ed a~ theoretical k nowledge. T h i:; u nd ifferenl iated theoretical knowledge contained elements that l ater transcended t he rea lm of philosophy and became independent fields of k nowledge, par ticu lar sciences. But science springs from philosoph y. T hat would be true only of some, mostly fun, dament.a l, fields of science. Most of today's sciences O\\'C thei r hi r th to the development of fundamental science that had alread y h ived off from philosophy, to the increasing soci al diyi sion of labor , scientific and t echnological prog­ress, socio -economic de\' el opment , and the like. The break between philosophy and particular sciences changed the place philosophy holds in the system of scientifi c knowl ­edge. It also changed the subject of philosophical study; it laid the bas is for the development of a scientirlc philo­sophical outlook. All these processes, combin C'd with the special featmes or philosophy d escribed abo"e , impart a distinctive quality to the development of philosophy.

Study of the hi story of l-Ic ie nce shows that the emer­gence of new sciences impli('s th t' disco\'e ry of prC'\, iously unknown laws ; therefore the grea t "ariet)' of science):; points to a great. variety of subs ta ntiall y different laws. For sciences in general and for philosophy in particular, thi~

35 ,.

\';\I'if't" of I ;\w~ po~('~ IIw IIm's tion nl Iht' Illli:y (,f (; vf'l' I) il:-i ('\I;l'(''''~l'd in till' CO ll.f l' pl f~ f uni ~ ,'r ... ,d la \\:'

The laws discoYcrt't1 1Il , 'arJOIl S lipids of :-;CWII('\' df'IC'l'lllilll!

the (':-;:-;ential I'l'iatiollship iw lwl' ('tl pil l' nOIll l'na, and their !'('latiH,ly cons taut and rt't' ulTing illh' rd t'p(' l\(i l' lIt'c Till' pfOg. 1'(''''5 of scientific cognit.ion lll;lh~ it ptl~:-;i h1 0 tn ('\,alllnir not only the relationship of ~il1lultan(,o\l ~ly pxis ti ng ph(,llOIl1 ('na hut also the linkages bclw ('C' 1l (,.lIrrt'n! and fn t.mr proc (')'5(' .... Science probes morc <llltl mOrl' inlo th e' process of

(

development and its laws. Thus thr SUbjl'c t of dialec t ica l materialism- the more general laws of t.he dC'yC'iopmcn t of nature, society and knowledge- is hi storically shupC'd as a summing up and conceptualizat. ion of the history of sc ien-LifIc knowledge.

Of course, the philosophical approach to the issue of un i­yersal laws of development does not at all dC'tract from the importam'.e of the speci~l laws of deyclopment studied by astrophysIcs, geology, bwlogy and other sciences. Marxist philosoph}:. deals with the unity of substantially different l~ws, their common dialectical nature, This becomes ob­\"lOU~ not only during the examination of physical or eco­nomiC laws but also when the analy~is is applied to the more general laws of social development. This mus t al so he remembered when describing the distinct ive quality of the more general laws of cognition. "d Tl~:refore, even the. first alt,~mpt at interpreting the phrase a r\cioPfe.nt of philosophy, a simple statement, rai ses t I~S o. IlUportant questions, because the problem is ~. etermlDe both the specific nature of development in

\ rts~\~~ob~~ ~~~u13e ~~~ect of development, i.e, philosophy radically different' philo~~;~f~s re~fmber tha t there exist ment sho ld b I' , ' 1e concept of develop­ism the u two ebap~ led dlfIcl'en tl y to ma terialism and ideal -

, aslC trends in philo I C the old problem "One is not b sop ly. onsequently, losophy too (as a paradox) onTeh ut .manr" arises in ph i-d

. 0 diverSity of d " oes not rule out philosoph (lb' oc ... n nes

dictory). But this unity sho~ld aals:tl rela,tive and contra­~'ss of development and cspcciall )~ vlOwed as a proc­~ng the approach that contrasts )1~1~~'5 ItS resul t. Oyercom­lcal stu~y and to prdctical acti\~it. ~~p ly to nonpllllosoph­the uillty of. philosophical kno~led ~o~~.t helps achieve ling up of pllliosophy into a multih f' f,lnce the spli t-

t( e a mlltually exclu -

36

SI\I,t lC/drlll!' IS IJl"f1llgill Ilhout :w profound socio 1i!C'o Il nm ic CHlI St'~, tho lr.IIJ"l.(tll.1l tl. cla. Ie. communist ;,ociety IS hOllnd to be u t. in III treme ldl U3 IInportancc for the t' J\l t'J"J{I'nc() of t:J(' tiDily ·f I.h lo~(;ph cal kno\\ ledge, ~atll ra ll y. IlLl'~ wll not C Ifi nr q"nc It 1 .... phl .. osophy, but 11 will ehallgl' il; major a~Ij( .. '{~

Sinn' I reg-pi SlIhstl.ln1 ,11iz(: t:1e spint<lal, :1C ces tllO history of plJilm;ophy as the lic .... c1oplD('nt of idel.llism:'I\lIY ph ilosophy i~ f'5scntiall.v :.deaiiqlo or at least has idealism as its pri lleipll', and tht) question here is only how wrlI it has bee n developed." (fH.; 3, 171) In reject ing this irlea l ist di storti on of th e development of philosophy one fi hollbl no t go to the oth ol' ex treme. The history of ph ilosophy i ~ not the mere h istory of materialism,

Materialism and idealism, the two major phi lo~ophi ca l trends, arc organica lly linked with various doc lrinb ab o s ubject to radical polarization. As Lenin wrote, both Bt~r· keley and Diderot were followers of Locke's semational ism, the for mer in the idealist direction, and the latter in the materi alist. Thus the opposition of malerialism antI idealism is also !lft'sent in doctrines that cannot be dr scr ibed either as fully idealist or fully materiali st.

The main thrust of any ~tudy of the history of phi lo~o­phy is analysis of the struggle between mat rriali:.'>ID and idealism, Naturally, the character, content and outcome 01

that struggle are not changeless. For example, according Lo Engels , ancient materialism "was incapable of clearing up the relation between mind and maUer. But the need to get clarity on this que.:)tion led to the doctr ine of a soul separable from the body, then to the assert ion of the im mortality of thi s soul, and finall y to monotheism. The old ma terialism was therefore negated by idealism." (8; Hi5· 66) In the New Age t.he materialist philosophy of the 17th and 18th ccnturies won an impressiye \' ictory onr the ide· ali st metaphysical systems of Descartes, Leibniz, Malr­branche and their followers. But later, classical German idea l ism revived the I'ationali st metaphysiCS of the 17th century. Vcuerbach'~ anthropological materialism negated t.h o idealism or lIegel nnd his predecessors. Classical Ger­man philosophy culminated in the yictory of materiali~m, Hut FcuC'l'bach ':-; Illi\ll'l'inlism "ilS limited: it:-< negation of idealism WitS ilhstrad ami metaphysical.

l\h' I.U1Whilt" da~siral German ideali ~ 1ll raised real i!"'sul'.':i,

37

and thpir !'.niution pnH'd tIll' WilY to n ~{'il'lIlirlt' philnsopbi,',J]

outlook. . According to Fngcb, the pl'f)gl't'~s of lIatur.d SCLt'IIl'·O and

till' productiyc forct.'~ cllntrihnll'd to I~H'. l'n'ntl~1Il of H 81';1 pnliflc philosophy: "Among till' nH\It'l'Hlh~ls tlll~ was picILI! Oil till' Sllt'faCl', hut thl' illl'ali:-;1 ~y~tt'llI.'i al!'fI hlll,1I 1111'111 spin's more and mOl'l' with a lIIalt'l'illiist ('oull'lIt IIIHI Ht tplllpt('d pant.heistically to n'cOIH'ih' lht· HlllitlH'sis IlI't\\I'I'U mind and maUrr. Thus, ultimately. t.ll(' Ill'~wliall syst.l'1ll fl'·

11I"l'scnl:s llH'rciy a materialism ilil'niislirnlly llll'lH'd upside down in method and content." (:3; :J, :HS).

Crrating a scicntir.c-philo~ophical system and I.hu:-; JIt'­

gating philosophy in the old, traditional sense or t.he term was impossible j[ based on bourgeois ideology, Tho mcLa­phy:;ical opposition of IJhilosophical thought to nonphilo l'iophical activity (both theorelical and Ill'aclical), and t.he "nonpartisanship" ascribed to philosophy by the bourgeois ('on~ciousn('~s rule out ally materialist interpretation or Jlhilo~ophy, The materialism of bourgeois thinkers is in­!'vitaLly contemplative and undecided, In bourgeois philoso­phy dialectics CaD only be idealist.

The hrilliance of the founders of Manism derives above all from the fact that they theoretically grasped and scien­tifically substantiated the need for proletarian partisanship, From a radically ne\v position, they gavo a now, 1'ovolu­tionary critical interpretation of the entire histOt,y of phi losophy and social development, and created dialectical and his~orical materialism, thus ushering in a now uni vcr­:-oal Pra III the development of phi losophy,

~larx said that thf' human anatomy is tho key to the sim iall, 1,~Y, 1h(' ~aJllC token, since dial('Clical and hisLoricai 1:,lal~'~ l ail.:-om solvcs pr?blc~s that had plagued phi iosopJ1Y (,lriJ( 1',' I~, offcrs a, SClcntl fl c undprstanding of its content and sJgnl,hca~ce, l'or exampl e, dialectical matcrialism of ~PI'~ a. :cl~~tlflc phil~soJJhical solution to tho pL'oblcms or lIlIl,ltl ](lhIS, of a pnOfJ fo rms of thinking: ill its doctrin(' of thl' dl'vf'loprrH'nt of cuh"'oril's 'J'I ,,'o 1I',ell'" I L ,., , , ,~ 11(' (oes nO IIII'n,ly. /"I'IIlOV(' those prohh'ms (n('op()sitivi~m, for (:XUIIl

pll', rl'jl'cts thelll out of hand) I'''l """1",1" II' I ' I . . <" 1f'II' I'I'U {'P IS-If'.III./! fJ.I{l,cal contrnt.. 'I'll(' fflr~'lIIost task or thl' Mal'xist- L~'­Illlll:-<t IJlstllry of plJlIII:-o()phy IS hI stlldv II", 1'1 ' I r r I , I' ,: " liS IJr(('O\ orllls

o 11111 ('rw 1:-<111, till' Illslflru'al forms of II', I I' ' I • I' ,1,1 I'C ItS and to

5 uUY t If~ (,Htl'gfJrH's that provide 'HII'll'" I " < ,I (, I'xpn'SS I{)11 to

38

•

llIal,l'l"iuli ~ nl Itlul dioll'l,til', It ~, IlIlwI'H'r, illlperativl' 10 "Nilrn aglLill~t ally simplis tie IIlh'rJlehl;ono;;. ,\farx, word1 do II/It IW'jl1l Ihat I'!l ltilan dc\'ptol'lIIent, t' 1~J11ially hlllllan

fipvi'lop"H'nt. IWnIlISf!, in 1.I11~ Ii rlil I alii/lysis, the forrlll'r I"d 1.0 thll ('1111'1'/(1'111'4' fir IIWII, 'flwllk~ III its inherent $pl'dflC

hislllrirism, lilt! fliull'dical matl'ri ... li5t illt('rpff'tatioll of lin­Vf'lrlIHI1f'1l1. I"ulr'g "lit h'!I'IIII,gy, l)irl'clil)Jl i~ nllt a prnjwrty of dev('!opllIl'lIt in Io{I'rll'r.d, of till' 1)J"/JCl'SS as a wholl': {,(Ieil stnge of (h~VI'loplIll'rlt !Iii"; il s own ,'s!!c'ntial 'pliIlitil'S ;IIHI

its own I.lpprol'rintl' ilir/'ctiofl within a hi~tl)rici.llly drflflitl~ eycle, (~rl1, and so on,

l\lfll'x op"os,~d tho:-o!' JlPlty · I)olIr~WfJis socialists wJIO, [~lil iog to sCiP lltilicllll y slIhslnntii.ltl' Ow concept IJf the l;on,,1 ist rcconsLnl('Uo/l (Jf s()rj(·ty, drrl<lfl'd that p(>oplc had "I· ways wnnted to ('stnhli~h i.l socialist !'ystem, social jllsticf', equality, and til<' Iikf', .~larx said that "the tendency to­wards equality 1)('longs to onr c(,lItm),. To !'ay now that all former centuries, wilh (>ntirf'ly diff(>r£'nt needs, me~Il:-;. or pl'oduction, etc" worked provid(>nt~ally for the reahsatJ/lI~ of equality is, first of all, to stlb~lItute the mean~ anti t.ln men of our cl'ntury for thf' men and the means of carlll'r centurics and to misunderstand the historical movcment by which Ihe !-;ucCt'~sivc g'('IH'ratiflns trans[orme(l t1~:1 I'csult:s acqui,'cd by Ow gCnl'rations that prcccdc(\ thl'm '

<1,6, 173) '11 I Marx's thesis is vcry important mcthodolo~:pca y. alH

should thcrofMc abo be appli('d to thc history o! ph~II~:-\o phy, Tho refefencc I,wn', is to t,he principle ?f .111st.un.('l.~1l1 and its correct application, WIHCh rules aga,ln:;t ascnblng the tasks of the proletariat to the l'mancipatJol~ mo\'{'me~t of rormer exploited classes who lin'd under (bff('rent s~:-;· toms of produetion relations, It is equally wr~n~ to ascrdw qual itics belonging so\C'ly to dial('ctical matel'lailsm to flny lw ior schools of thought. ", , ' •. I

Dialectical and historical nH\tt'nal~slll I,S thC' theor~tl~'\ and Ilwlho{\ological h<lsi .... or a sdC'nt'~lc h,sll,)ry O.f phdo, II

phy th at trnc('s tht' dl'\"l'loPIlH'llt of. pllllosoplll,c~1 k~owle~l;c and assrl'ts thl' hi:-;torical Ilr<'esslty of a ~CH'nl~fic ~ 11

osophica l oullook, Hut it would 1)(' an ObYlOl~S cpaI' ur.r

f1'om tho principle of hisloridsm (clnd fro~l Its c()nCO~I; tanl, tho principlr of tile )ulrlisnnsillp of JlI~I.lOsoph~) ~i1~~­!-;(' I'\. n~ it i~ !-;(IInl'linw~ dom' that the .lll:it~ry 0 P .' ' I ' II (' Ilistorv of dinll'dkai <lnd Ilistorlral matcrlc\l OJlIY IS I · . J

3!1

· Appl'-iog that forJllula to the majority (.If !In' .\!arxlill! Ism.. J I I doctrincs - lllostly idealist hut also s('ho ,lstU'· lUI! mysti-CHI would he' lantamount to t'spou~in!t tht'lll.

The existentialist history of philosophy is adually the history of existentialist philosophy. '1'11(1 pos itivist histOl'Y of philosophy is equa.lIy subjectiYo: it sligh,ls, those think ers of the past who did not share the emplflcal and sub jcctiYcly agnost ic views that werO close to positivis m. Marxist philosophy differs radically from all pro-Marxian and non-Marxist philosophies. The Marxis t-Leninis t histOl'Y of philosophy is a scientifically sound, dialecti cal negat.ion of previous and current concepts of thc hi story of philos­ophy; it critically treats the problems th ey pose and the ~olutioJl~. The more thorough, profound and scientific is the study o[ the history o[ philosophy, the more obvious it becomes that a scientific theory o[ tho development of philosophical knowledge is possible exclusively on the ba­.. is of dialectical and historical materialism.

l)f. \ I. U:T I c. \ I. .\I.\T EI\I.\ LI~~I ,I'll IIE(;E1:S PIlILOSOl'IIY

01' TilE IIISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

'What b the aUiLudu o[ philosophy to the history o[ phi losophy- t hat is, to its past and to the systematic study or this past? This question did not face Plato and Aristotle, the first ph il oi:ioph(lt'~ to analyze their predecessors' doc· trines in order to substantiate their own views. Later, the his tory of philosophy was mostly studied by skeptics who held that true philosophy negates itself.

Immanuel Kant saw only two equally fallacious trends in the philosophy that preceded his own: dogmatic meta· physics and its pointless negation, skepticism, The "jews of Fichte and Schelling on the history of philosophy were, on the whole, equally negative. Manuals on the hist~ry 01 philosophy did appear during their lifetime, but theIr au­thol's were not prominent philosophers. Hegel was the first to study the history of philosophy a~ a science, but ~e put a metaphysical construction on that subject. ..\ccordmg to Hegel, the history o[ philo:)ophy is an authent~c form of development, and its theory is of paramount Ilnportancl.' for his philosophy. This means that Hegel did not ~erely stud y the his tory of philosophy; he interpreted the hlst?ry o[ various philosophies as an inevitable. pro~e=,s of philo· sophical development, with ib necessarily ulterconnccted dil1erent stages and forms.

The ]JI'inci[)le of dc\'c loP IlH' llt that Hegel. applied ~o s tud ~'­illg the past of philosophy is I'ooted ep l::it emol?glcally In

a dialectical interpretation of th e truth. ACCOl',dlllg to E~-gels " Truth the cognition of which is the buslllC~S of plll­

" I aggrega ll' losophy was in the hands of lIegel no anger an . d of f1nisilCd dogmatiC ~tatcnl('nts, which, once dlsco.\'er~ ~ had mcrely to hc Ictlrned by heart. Truth. ,lay. now ,In It 1 ,

process of cog nit.ion it~l'if , ill the long 11I!itoflcal dc\.c lOP mcnt of science, which mounl~ from lower to over Ing ler

.. (3 ., 3'3'1) leH'is or kno\\'h.'dge. ; oJ, ,.

This radically changed aUitud,c to the l)~!' t of philos~phy is a critical standpoint that nClther n~lnll r('s no,l' rOJc~t!i everything about this past. It regards different 11ill lo.50Jlhl{'s not as isolated and independent attempts at studYing tho history of philosophy but as inhcl't:' utly COllu~c tcd. li~ ks in the chain of a contradictory denlopmcnt will ch IS not a. harmless process entailing no struggl.c ,. like the dt'\"C ~OJl' ment of organic life, but hard , ullwdllOg work ag;.\I ll s1 one's own self." (63 ; 1, 152)

In Hegel 's view, philosophy can and must be a sc~cncc in the strict sense of the term. The history of science pre­supposes a continuity of development, that is, progress. This is also true of the history of philosophy. In work ing on a dialectical concept of philosophical development , lIe­gel describes continuity not as a simple accumulation of knowledge but as a contradictory process wh ich derives its momentum from negation and negation of the negation. Continuity does not mean agreement with th e past, a ccept­ance of the past in the present. Hegel reinterprets the con­cept of tradition and says that it is not " just a housekeep­er loyally safeguarding what has been entrusted to h er and thus keeping it safe for posterity ... Tradition is not an immobile statu e: it is alive and it grows the way a pow­erful s tream grows as it mo\'es farther away from its source" . (64 ; 13, 13) Metaphysical reason, which does not accept the unity of opposites, either Simply imitates or to­tally reject~ i?eological legacy. But ideological legacy is rather confllcling than uniform in signiftcance. It is " th e soul of e~ch foll~\~ing generation, its s piritual substance as !)omethmg f~m l har, its principles, pL'ejudice and riches; but the generatIOn who has received this Jegacy reduces it to thl' material at hand t ransCormed by the spiri t". (64; /,1, 14)

I\fctaphysicists beli eve that the divers ity of ph ilosophies rules .Ollt lheil' un.i ty. T herefore they, in Hegel 's words, sec the h.15tory of .phllosophy mel'ely as a " ra nge of opi nions rldu!'owns and mtellectual games" (64' 13 '4) 1'h ' ' fi . I . . '" 1 ]S super­Ic]a \"H'W al!'o domtnates stlldies of huma n history d

the lat~l'r ",~ppears at flr:t glance as a succession of' l~~\ ' ~I (I~. e\('~Ls '. (04; 13, 1/) But world history is differen t . It IS an InevItable forward movement 'I" ~ t ' ' . ..a IS Lnl{' to an (>\"(~n great/'I' degree of the of )hiloso h ' :, appear:; that lIegel contrasts the i. PI Y', l, t "',en o pllOSOp l)'

42

to all nth!'r lti~tOl"iral prOl~I~ s('\ Arrorthnl{ to him, "a close !':\i\mination of hi!'tnry ~hqWM II':: thut men's ac t if>n~ arc rOIl(\it;OII('II Ity till'ir lIePf l ~, Jlassioll~, interc:, ts, th(>ir char attN and talellt; awl th is ill a wily that only those needs, pa!'siolls and inll'rests ilf(' till' lIIf)tivI~ forces in this d ra ma, find nnly thry play the If'l.Iliillg rf!h~". (03; J, 70) T he pic­ture is different in philosophy whefe, accQrrling to Hegel, t.he passion for tr uth !"H lrs 01lt any interests and passions that arc forl'igll Lo it. .

The diwrsi ty of phi losophies, thei r obvious incompati­bility, the str uggle of Ilhi iosophical schools. a~d trends ~re facts tha t s kepti cs usc [IS a l'gllmenls in thei r lDterpretation of th e hi story of ph iloso phy. Hegel interprets them in a totally new way, both dialectical and rationali~t-metaph~s­icaL Diversity ;r it is sign irt cant (and that IS the pomt m ade in tho comparison of ph ilosophical system~) ~oes ~ot exist outside iden ti ty; divcrsi ty is immanent Ill. Idenlt~y. T herefore , tho diversity of rad ically different. phllosop~les pr esupposes their unity, .i.e. their nec:ssar y tnte.rrelall~n­sh ip. Hege l rejects all d lscoursc on d ifferent plulosophles a s pointless a nd empty, as bogged dow n in useles~, ~~st~~c~ notions, a nd as be ing obliv ious of th e Cact that dl\er?lt) is a flow it must by de rlOi t ion be regarded as a mO\"lng, developin'g transient moment:'. (?4: 13, 47) .

The diversity of philosophies ]S thereCore necessar). The movement from the abstract to the specifi~ , ~he essen.c~ of the hi story of philosophy, com'p~ i ses .confl lct lOg defimt~ond of unity. Each of th ese denmtlOns IS abstract, one-Side and th ere fore not true ; trut h is the ir unity. T~e de\'elo~l ­ment of philosophy is thr emerge nce of the uOlty of ,phil ­osophical knowledge which puts a n C'nd to the motle) a ~1 disord erly diversi ty of philosophical statement-s. :-\ccor ­ing to ilegel, diHerent philosophies ar~ "necessanly o~: philosophy that is developing, a 1'o\'l'latlon .of God as [ t know s Ilimself. ' Vherover several philosophIes are pre~eD s imultaneously, they arc different aspec~ of one un er~ lying whole; and becauso they are _OM-Sided we sec on jhilosophy refuting another. " (64; 1J , 686) . I" I According to lIegel, the diffl'r(,llcc!' among plHl?soP Il~~ do not. renect the indi\"ithwl lIniqlll'lH'sS of the philosopllli c<)1 gC'nills: that IIlIiqlll' III' :'S I'i:-; ('S to grasp ~h(' absolntC' alH_

'", . ,}\"I'S in it. Those diITl' I'(, IICI'S m\l~t b(' \I\terpr('t('~ ont.o ;I~g~~a ll ;'; they al'e "fundam('ntal diril'I'l'lIce:, of the Idea It-

43

srlf ; it is only in them that it l' xi:-;I!') - . . Eat'll Sy::;ll'lH (,Xists within one deflllition bu t that dOl'~ not :-;1\)1' ilt'rt,. ,lUll differ' (,IICl'S do not alway::; r e lll a in ll Ubi ti l' (HIP .ulOlhC'1'. TIlt' fllie of those definitions lllus t ('alll(' to IHl,SS, Jl ll'lUling thnt till'\' t\rc united and reduced to the Il'H'l of m OHil'llb", (tli: Ij, 'lB) Hegel views h is philo:,ophy as thl' f!\\I' of t ilt' ahsolll lt­that. ha~ come to pas:-. I'rfl('c ll'li in Ihl' various philosoph i cal ~yst('ms . .i \b~ol u t(' ideal ism i:-> ti l'sl"t'i lil' d i\ S Ih l' SU pl'l'llll' consummation of the histol'r of philosophy which hy its nature presupposes not only the beg inn ing but also t he "absolute destination", (64; 13. 48) That i\::i::icr t. ion ste lll s from the fundamental precepts of llcgC'I's philosophy: phi­losophy is the self-cognition of the absolult:' s pirit. which doC's not remain incomplete, imperfect since that is incom ­patible with the notion of the diyine.

Almost all philosophers proclaimed their doctrines as the last philosophy meaning their personal accomplishment. Unlike his precursors, Hegel regards the consumma tion of philosophy as an ontological process: the absolute spiri t oyercorne~ all its al.ienated forms. "The s truggle of final self ·consclOusness with absolute self-consciousness , wh ich the form~r reg~rded as someth ing bappening outside it, is now ahat w g. Fmai se lf-consciousness has ceased to be final an~1 thanks to th is absol ut e self-consc io us ness has ac~ qllIred ~he power. it has l.acked before. This s truggle is ro­~ccted I~ the entire pre\"lOUS world history, and especiall y '" the hIStory ?[ philosophy," (64; 15, 689,90) . Wlu.le th.e. ~ oung Hegelians and Feuerbach were correct I~ their Cl'ltlclsrn of Hegel for hi s acceptance of the fi n ite nature of the development of philosophy they fa ·led to ~rasp .th~ fac~ th~t this stems from the o~tolo of \he ra ­tlOnalist'ldeal lst IDterpretation of history anJY t I from the exaggerated I· [h no mere y Hegel [or reducing th Ct~s 0 t e .thinker. They blamed of his Own philosoph; ~s ~riI of rhtl.oSophy to the hi s tory phi losophy summed u' tl

U e~e tn.cd to prove that hi s IVI 'I I· P 1e entll·e llislory o[ h'l I

II e II:; predecessors 1· . P I DSDp ly . something radically new C ~Imer t1\at th~li· doctrines were tern adequately expresse'd t~lge ou Y clallned that his sys­"f philosophy and criticall e real 3ontent. of the his tory me.nls. For each new syst{ms~:~I: Ull Its accompli s h­"llllo~{Jphical knowledge cuntin· is rron~ the legacy of of philosophy. Con~cqudntly, ";~~~t\~~l earlier development

y, only the way he

ih've l op~ them" thn ,ll pdlflg i killS] Iwlul1g. 1-1 tiL" rrf'!"\ lor of a Iii'\\' philo.oplue.1i y t(,1l1. (Iii It. 181)

Whilo I"l' p('llflg lIe~tl' ul)\,101i Iy fJlIac:oIIs {,r('{'(lpl

,dllJllt Iho rWi,1! for 111.1 rlllll] jJhilO<;f)jlhy j,J eOIL<:::ulU lI l;.tf! \111' h i5tol"Y of philosophy, 0111' fhOllll1 Hot I()~" Sight of Ihe fad thai 111'1-:1'1'5 tiu!"lri!!I' WH~ 1"1';llly ill a way (ho linal ph ilo!· opliy. That W;l~ pl't'1"i5t'ly what. Ellg .. Is JlII',wl: ",At any !"atf', with IIPg('\ phi losophy rnlll"~ to <tn tilt! [in till' (Ihl SI'IlSI' of tlt (' worll\: Oil thn IlIH' It,Hld, h{'('all~e in hj~ ~y!' l l'm he summed lip it!! whQle dcvplopmfmt in lhe most ~Jllc nd id fas h ion; and on till' other hanli, hf~cause, even though u n, conscious ly he showed \l~ the way out of t l H~ labyrinth of systems to ' real posi tive knowledge o[ the world." (~3; .1, 342) ,

Thus Uegf'l '~ interpretation o[ the development of pllll os­ophy procN'ds [rom OIP rl'cognilion of .the orga?!c li nk between ph ilosophy and the history of philosophy. I.hat rl' lationsh ip d iffers greatly from the one that, say, eXists be twee n the g inn definite l('nl in the dl,veiopment of natural science a nd its preceding devE'lopment. The develop· ment of the natural sciences reyeals new, previously IIn­

known object of study. Xatural science today dOL'S not deal with issues t hat were the order of the day in the 17th or 18th centuries. Those issues are, as a rule, alre~dy ~ohed and are thus of no interest to researchers. The sltuatlOD. IS d ifferen t in ph ilosophy where even resolved issues acqUire a new content and arc thus of interest to the researcher. Philo:=;ophy develops not 50 much by di~c?yering D~W ,?b ­jects as by rev iving, enrich ing and cl'l tJ<:.,ally re\ lew I.n~ problems posed at the dawn of ph ilosophy .. ~ That expl ~ iDS why ITegal wrote th at " the s tudy. of the h istory of philos­ophy is the study of philosophy ItseH, and that caonot be

otherwise". (64; 13, 43) . . . 0 -lIegol does not caro which partJcu~ar ph~losoph ¥" IS U _

der cons i(l eration; in other words, wluch phliosoplucal doc trine the s tudy of the his tory of ph~losophy ~eads t o. Ac·

," to J{egel the answer to that IS self-eVIdent because corulng , < d .1· I · t . a sin the multitude of philosophies recor Cu l~ li S ory IS ' . . ~ gle, integrated and progre5~h·ely deyeloplng whole. It 1:S a

~ The foHowing specifi cally his~orica!. tlOinh

t EngelsfroldadefOipSmessP~f . tl· nrction· t 0 many 0 •

cially important lD l1.s ~on mbryo· i~· the nascent sta te, almost Greek philosophy contatn In (' . id " (S· 39·) all later modes of outlook on tho wor. , ;)

45

, .-, ~

• •

, , ~ , • ,

• I •

• • I , \ , • ,

~ , , • ,

/ , " , '0>-

, , • ~, ,

•

"organic systC'lll, a totalit.y (,llInpl'i ... inJ.:' n wp.d,1I1 fir f;tngf'~ and mOJ}lpnl.<;". (Ii~; 1:1, ·10) Thus Ilt'gl'~ d.ulHS tn hav!! ~ynth('sized ill hh- ~y~il'.m. this "\H,,,lth 01 ~t;\gl'S. '.11111",'1,10

Ulrnts" which arC' dl'hlHllOllS of tilt' ahsolutt' "'plI'Jl 1111 ' last philosophy is, Ih,e n'.:;uil of a~l 111i,\' P~'~'l't'd~':s ,it,~ uoth iDg is lost, all prlUclples arC' r('!;\lnNt. ((H; t.}, h~.))

But if Hegel's system i:- re:dly tlll' l'l'sult. of tl\(' study nnd ,<;umming up of thC' history of philosophy, lIH'o[,l'licnlly that study must proc('('d from 11. drllnilr interpretation of philosophy which, to a certain degree, obviously nntici pales the outcome of the study. It is equally obviolls that this anticipation of the essence of pbilosophy is not the result of the given study of the history of philosophy, even though the study conflrms it Thus the question of prece dence-whether Hegel's system precedes hi s study of the history o[ philosophy or vice vorsa-oversimplifles tho task of the study and makes it impossible.

It would be naive to belie'.'c that liege I first stud ied the history of philosophy and then summed it up and thus set forth his system of philosophy. But it is equally naivc to believe the opposite: that ha\'ing crealed his systcm of philosophy, Hegel applied its hierarchy of categories to ~h~ earlier development of philosophy, that is, interpreted It lD accordance with the requirements of his system. 'Ve know from Hegel's biography that he acted differently and ~hese facts describe the development of his system and not Its ~esults .. Heg?l built his system by idealistically inter­prctlD~ Spilloza s doctrine and relying directly on Kant, ~chelJlllg and, especially, Fichte, It took Hegel almost 20 y~ars to buil~ his system, and he repeatedly turned to the history of pllll~s.ophy. The creation of his sys tem of philos­ophy and a cntical summing-up of the history of philoso­phy were a~pects of a single process. As to fTogel's Lectures ~n the lftstory 0/ Philosophy, they were written when t It syst~m I had .been completed and underlay the inLerpre­a. IOn.? t l~ history of philosophy. The latter like an

eXpoSlt,lOn, differed substantially from the study that )r!-ceded It and whose results could not be k 'j I

Hegel's dialectical id r' . ,nown III ac vancl.'. hi!"tory of philosophy :ja!shm liS a bl'llhant theory of the

W lIC IOWeYCr di st 1 tl I . ry hy reducing it to tI 1: t ' ors lat llSto-this docs not me>an th~~ NS O? ,of idealism. Of course, fought against it. But he I ~ge>1 Ignored materialism: he

alga y regal'lkd materialism as

, ,

, ,. ,

•

, • , , -.J \ , •

, • "

',- , ..

I1IJlll,llil')"1J111Iif'l11 1'\'I'rYllny CI'lIqj,lnllsrle"'~. lit, illll'rpl't'if'd pilillJ.'ifJl'ity (Ihat i!i, idl'nlhm) (IS a Iwgation IJf JlIa'f'riali~lll, ;dlliolluh (J1'I'.lsiollally II!! did r'coJ,{nizl' tlll~ hblori,al ,II' f'ollll'lisilllll'ntg fir Jri,ill'l'ialist philosophy. ::-\1 ill, Oftf'll 11")(1'1 illtl'l']Jl'l'I.l'il JIlilll'l'j;lli~l riodrinl's as l~ssl.'lJtiillly id('<llisl. For ('\Hlllph" Iii' 'Jail! Ilwt Thull'S "dpHrrihcd watl~r as an inhnih' COIH'I'pt, a~ a siHlJlIf' pssl'nr-(! of thought", (64; 1.1, 20!J) In II('gf'I's VH'W, tile School of _\filetus representf'lI till' transition from ('veryday ~flf)ntanpous materialism to idf'alism.

Hegl'l's idealist theory of development postulates tlw di<l lectical identity of the result of development with il~ ini tial stage, The identity of being and thought- ·the basis of absolute ideali~m seen as thl' summit of all philosophy -must he revealed at the initial stage of that proc(>~s, al Leit in an undcvcloped form. Referring to the con­cept of lhe substancl' emerging from thr naive views of the early Greek philosopher:--, lIegel a~serl~ that tlH'y proceeded "from the unconscious precept that thought is also being". (64; 13, 126) That speculative assllmption underlies the pre:"entation of ancient Gref'k rna· terialism as unconsciously idealist philosophy. Yiewed from this angle, the transition to the doctrines of Socrate~ and Plato-the emergence of a truly idealist system of views-is merely the realization of what earlier philosophy could not express conceptually. But this pattern of den·l­opment excludes Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus. He­gel attacks the great ancient materialists, claiming that their doctrines do not rise above sense perception.

Idealism ·e\·en dialectical idealism-is incapable of grasp­ing the significance of materialist philosophY. Nevcrthe· less, Hegel 's Lectllres on the Tfistory of Phi.losophy afC the most remarkable work in this field, and hiS theofY: of philosophical development immediate~y l)recedes its SCien­tific dialectical-matcrialist interpretatIOn.

H'egel's idealism is passion~tely s.cie~tifr.c,. bu~ ~ truly scientiftc approach is incompatible With Id~ahsm: flllS con­tradiction entails the opposition of idealist plulo,sophy to actual scientific knowledgc, interpreted. a~ an Imperfect form of science, while idealism is descnbed as an authen­tic manifestation of the> scie>ntific appl'o~c.h: That .ref~rs aboH all to th E.' natural sciences. Hegel cflhclzes thmr h~~. todcal limitations: their empirical methodology, ntechanl~·

, " n,\ 111"'n\ll<j'siCIlI rt'tl!'onillj,! Hill I matL>l'iaiiSI IIC no Ion!' a ~-. . world outlook i.'" what Ji('gl'l <'IIIIS1111'I's I ht' most nnaCCt'pt able thing abou t lIallll'<11 sl'il'llfl'. _'. '. '

H{>gel's cult of ::;('.il~ IH't' abo 1,,1011;-; .1dt'i~ l l:;t phliu:-onphll. ing. lie bclit'H'::' that tlH' prillliley. 0\ sl"nt onr 1I,lath:,' makes science ,11l-poWPrflil. Ontolllglcally, ~hat. asscrlIon l~ based on the principle of th(' id£1ntity of bClng and though,l, maintaining that philosophy as tiH' thought of thou~ht IS not only a science of the absolute but ~h ? absolute Itself, that is, the cxtl'atempol'ai realm or til{' (Ii\'lne. llegel wrote. "But it [the absoiut(' spirit] knows it se lf as the absolute spirit only in science, and only this knowledge, tho spirit, is its t.rue existence." (64; 15, 690)

Thus the deification of thought (as the thought o[ thought in which form coincides with content and the subject with the object) means the deiflcation o[ philosophy. Plato described God as a geometrician, a cosmic designer, bu t Hegel's God is a philosopher whose speculative activity creates and maintains the world; everything is born of thought, of philosophical thought. One mus t admit, how­enr, that Hegel usually avoids extreme conclusions: " Phi ­losophy deals only with the brilliance of idea reflected in world history." (63; 4, 938) But in that case philosophy is a human and not divine occupation. Still, even as such­as historically limited spiritual activity-it is radically con­trasted to scientific knowledge per se. Hegel is often a priest (even a high priest), and as such he is not unlike a theologian extolling his "science" as the supreme knowl ­cdge, with God as its subject and source.

Thus, ~ccordiDg to Hegel, philosophy, or the thought of thought, 15, on the one hand, the infinite realm of pure rea­son that forms the substance of the worl d and on the other hand, a speCifically huma n, flDal his to'rical spiritual ~phere .. The diff~rentiation between ontologica l and h istor­lcal belD? of p lll l oso~hy permeales Hegel's enti re doctri ne of. th.e hl~tory of phIlosophy which cannot be grasped if tillS Ide~hst assumption. is not taken into account. Viewed from thiS ~ngle,. the IHs~ory of philosophy has two fun­da';llcnlal dimenSions. Philosophy is develo Jed direct! b p!lJ!osophcrs-indi\'idllnl~ acting in the hist~ricall d K ./ Circumstances of a ginn era Countr rye Illl e gel dcscribes this aspect of t1~e histo;' na I O~, etc. IIe­follows: "The history of philosol>hy ,.sy11of IP.lll lOSOPhy as

Ie llstory of the

• •

1

lii~(,oVl'ry nf f}/(Hll!hts .. hont thr ah~oll1tf'. which i~ II" !;lIb· jl'rL" (li/l: (i, XX) It i~ tht· cnrthly, "lIlpirically fPcortil·1i Iii:-;Iory, allil IIplo(t'1 nt11~ it" ,1I:tl'llt!' ht'roes I)f ri'a"onill~ ill 11'111,(,(. '1'110 pililu'iophil'al Io(t'lIills i~ thl' hilSlt.rically limit.·d ]H'rs.olliliriltioll of tlw <lhsoIUlt· spirit. Bllt, IInlikl' tlw "l'1Il

pil'iclll" history of I'hjlo~(J"hy, the ah~olult· ~pirit is a 101{ ieal slI('('t'ssion 1101 of historically limitNI syslt'll1s of "hi losophy hilt of till'il' priuciplrs and fundamt'ntal rah'l{oril':-; w hmw hit'ran'by f()rIll~ illl extri.lkmporal ]rlgical prOrl'''ii, t he suhject of The SCience oj LogiC.

The notion of the ~ecolld, substantial dinH'n~ion of Ihl' history of philosophy is direclly lillhd to Hegel':-; pun lo­gism w hich hold ~ that the logical (reason) iii. not only a means or fo rm of perceiving the es:"encc of tlllngs but al so that essence itself. This means that the consciouiiness of its conlent (philosophical content) is innatl', cxtra tl'm pOl'a l and extraspalial to the absolute (~alll'd absolutp knowledge, subject substance, God, etc.), Slnce spact' ~nd time are, according to Hegel, forms of alienatl'd belllg. Mankind apprehends that absolute identity. in the c,unrsl' of its development o\'(>r the ages. And that IS what IS calle.d the history of philosophy, since historical devrlopment lS foreig n to t he absolute. ,

According to H egel , the history of philo:<ophy examtn(:s the hi storica l forms of philosophical knowledge for the~r absolute prototypcs; that is, it sees each hj,:.torica~ly d(>h· nite and limited system of philosophy as a renee lIon_ of a certain logical definiti"eness of the ab~olute sp,irit. ··l·.sse~' tially, the history of philosophy deals not. \nth tIlt' paiit but with the e ternal and fully present, and lt mu~t ,be co~­p~\I'ed in its result not to a gallery .of. hUI~lan spl,~11U?I. c~-1'01"5 but rather to a pantheon of dlnne Imagcs .. (64,. '

167.68) That gallery of divine images is the pnmor(~tal br I d d CXl.!:i ls ideal, an imperative that has becn est~ IS Ie an.,. '.

rorc"el' and that opposes the temporal lusto['y of pllllo!:joph~ with all its inhel'cnt human errors which IIcg~ 1 fr~l'ly ad­mits Beca \lse of that contrast between the hlstoncal find the 'Ruprahistorical, lI egcl facl:'.s i 5su~5 that woul~ hav{' been pointlcss in a different pilliosopillcal content. FO.r ex. ample, he asks. "what is the ca~lsl:' o~, the f~ct ,tha t,. p11l10so· phy exists in lime and has a Illstory ? (G~, 13, 4;)) I

1 )ropose to show that to ignore I.-i egel s concept of t. \(> dual I dilllension of tht' history of philosophy means to Ig-

'19

non' il~ major contradictioJls and oH'f8implify IIl~g(Jl's UD­dcr::;tanding of the rca I dt'H' iop lllt'n l or phi losophy, Thi~ point i~ espl'cially important hN'i\IISl' IIq~t'l 1I0t only divide, allll, cuntra:;l!:; , two aSlIl'('ts o~ tlll~ hif'tory or philosophy; he 15 cqU<llly 1I1tcnl on rcdu(,ll1g lho:->l' opposi tes to dialec· tical identity. For, according to Hegel, the task of philoso­phy is to ro\'eal the unity of tho Irans('.C'ndcnta l and the immanent., th~ divine and the human, thc cvcrla::)ting and the transIent ; to sec the ro;\1 as the ideal and vice \"('1'5;\.

Although it proceeds £l'om essontially theological pre~ ccp~s .thoro afC profound dia lectical insights in the difIer­cn~latLOil between the two major aspects of the history of pl111~sophy. There .are two methods in the scientiftc study o[ history: the. log~cal-theoretical and the specific-historical, the lauer takmg mto account the distinctive individual feat\l~es of a given process in a gi\'en country, in particu­lar clrc.umstances, . and so on .. Hegel regards hi s logic as the logiC of the Illstory of philosophy in its ideal, extra­~emporal. form . As to .the actual history of philosophy, it IS a~ ~henated and distorted reproduclion of philosophy's ~ YrIOrI ~elf-~e\'elop~ent. "The success ion of philosophical s~~tems lD h~s~ory IS the same as that in the logical ar­~J\ ~l ,~f defillitlOns ?f the idea," Hegel writes, and ampli­hes. .1 assert that If we free major concepts erner in ·n the IllstO~y o[ ~hilosophical systems from everythi;g ~o~­necte~[ With theIr out\~ard form, their speciflc applications ~t,c., I we take them m their pure [arm, we will have dj{ ~ ~le~l s~ages ~[ the definition of tho idea ilself in its 10 i­

ea dloterpr.etatl?n. On the contl'ary if we take log· I fg

, "ar motIOn 10 itself we w·U £ .. Ica 01-motion o[ historical '0' I. md. In It the forward hut of course, one must \~~t~ Ifi theH'. major moments; cepts in the content or the I}:!~o;i~a~oilce t,',lCse pU~'e con-

. Applied rationally, the 10 ical-th orm. (64; 13, 43) clbc-historical methods o[ st~d ,eoretlCai and the spe­must go hand in hand B t y ate. equal ly. necessary and lion of these methods ·in ~t ~ ~enulOely ~clentific applica­phy is impossible within the

U f~lOg th\llistory of philoso­ophy. Hegel subordinates the l~~:~j?r I .o[ l~egel's philos­the history of philosophy to th~ CI IC- ~Ist.ol'lcal study of ,:roach .of. substantiated IlhilosophiC!1 ~~I?l'~. schematic ap­contradictIOn between his theory of tl lhl~ mg. lIence the Ie IS lory of phi loso-

pity UIl'\ til!' fipf'cifH :it Illy of Clf> development of philc 0 ph,v, \\ hic·1I of ton tlOI 101 I'll illto I If' theor)

III (:I)ltl ,I. I til till' actllal dl'velOjlIDf'il 01 philogopliY, thl'P' I~ !II) fitI'III(K'" willI! I he I 111111 WI k d the theory r the history IJf I'ltilo~.Jphy that op(~r(ites w I I a hicrDrchy of logi(· .. 1 prineiplp~ and Co.Iteg:Qries. In impersollal uh~olHte rpi\~OJl, <III philosophicul IJrinciplcs underlying difi(!rt'ut flY!! t('ilb ('xi:4. Ollly as a (It{wition of the "allsoilltc idea". Ilert~ tlH'l'l' i~ HO iti!-tol"Y, nothing icppears or disappears. TIll Tllan hi~tory, ,lllel consequently the history of philosophy, is diffcrent. lIf're "extrateffiporal" philosophical prinCiple!! are histo ri cally tlefillite systems of philosophy. Each be longs to, and shares tilfJ limitations of its own limp, and cannot therefore rise ahove it.

Dut if, as lIegel maintains, philrJsoph)· deals with somE' thing everlasting, hO"t can oue r('concilc that to the thc:;ig that philosophy is "totally identical with its time"? (Li"~ 13, (9) lIegel "reconciles" these mutually exclll:,iH th(,~l':' as referring to different a:;pects of the hi::tory of philo:,o phY. Yet, precisely this extreme contra position made to tit lIe gel's IDl'taphysical system exposes both lh{'ses as fal­lacious. A hbtorically defmite philosophy i:i not merely identical with ib time, and the principles of philo::.ophical systems are not at all cxtratemporal truths. Systems are indeed t ransient, but it does not follow that their princi­ples arc forner true. The fallacy of the subjective idealist system is tho fallacy of its principle, even though a c~r recti)' understood subjectivity is the real and ~ubstantwl definitiveness of thl' process of cognition. But Hegel opposes hi s toricall y limitC'd ~ystClllS of philosophy to their 'prin­ciples, alleged ly free from empirical limitat ions an.d Inter· preted as logical definitions of the absolutC'. BCSldcs, he obviously Ill\{ll'rp~li matC's the fact that a system i:; the l'cal ~ izalion of i t ~ principlc, and not merely its one-sided, ab -solute de\' elopnlOnt and exposition. . .

Ph ilosophies diff!'\' substantially, and so do thell' Justo· l'ie5. The doctrines of Dcmocritns, Epicurus, Pl~ to an~ Al'islotle grC'ally affected the de\'elopment. of p.hlloso~h). The same cannol be ~fl itl of all outstan(hng plHlo.soplllc~1 lh{'oril's. It follows lhat the o\"erall relation of. plulosoplll­('ill dllctrilH's to lln'i r til1l{'s <lntl to future socl:11 de.velop menls is liiften'nl 100. Some philosophies are rO\"1\'cd .10 lat­er pCI'iods, dl'\'clopcd and transformed under the Impact

51

,.

of new doctrine~; otiH'l"s frnH\in hilt i'lHt!llli\rks or IIlUIl­

kind's intellectual hi~to['y, 'I'll{' thesis nilout thl' 1"tralt'lHpo [';\1 essence of philosophy, leading to till' {,Olldusion thai all systems of philo~ophy, \-it'Wl'd ill :"illilst.\tH't', forlll a chain of images of the absoilltl', i:-; .\I so wrong hl'{',HiSl' it is incompatible wilh the ~l'lf"l'\'idl'llt fact. LhM philoso­phrrs of dillerrnt eras are not contt'n1pol'l\ril's, This ::-implt' statement leads to a conclusion that is fm' from Il'itl': phi. losophers of each successive era pol'~(,!'s a iH'l'ilngc theil' Ill'edccessors could not have had,

While correctly sh'essing the histo l' ical limitations placed on each philosophy by its time, Jl egel l'efers to the de­\'elopment of ph ilosophy which, according to hi s doctrine, is absent h'om the realm of the impersonal phi losophical (absolute) idea, But preCisely because he refers to au ac­tual, empirically vel'ifltl.ble 1)l'OCeSs, that tr uth is exagger­ated; it is finally asserted that any philm;ophy "can there­fore satisfy only those intercsts which are in keeping w ith its time", (64; 13, 60) But great phi losophies retain their Significance, influence and, to a certain degree, their topi ­ca l yalue for se\'eral considerably different eras, Of course, Hegel is well aware of it hut, in h is view, it is true ex­clusively of tbe ideal aspect of the his tory of philosophy and can refer to its empirical aspect only insofar as it as­cends toward tbe ideal level. The latter is thus the stand­ard, the norm, the impcrative, but since it is primordia l it i~, certainly ~ot the imperative as understood by Kant or hC,hte, In tillS strictly speaking IJUrely logical and not hi s­torIcal, aspect of self~development "each philosophy existed and stIll necessar,ily eX,ists: t~lerefol'e, none has d isappeared but all arc retalOed III philosophy as momen ts of one ~hole", (64; ,13, .sa) Hegel is right in streSSing the eternal 1Il the historical development of ph ilosophical knowledge, But he cxaggera~es, and even makes an absolute of tha t ~ome~t, though It IS no doubt impor ta nt in the his torical dialectics of truth and errol', BeSides, Hegel strives to avoid absolutely, opposing the logical and the histor ical be­cause he IS ~ware of the fact that, contrary to t he funda ­ment~ls of, hiS system, that contraposition is relative This cxplal,ns hIS, attempts, at interpreting the historical ~s )ect 0,£ philosophies not slmpl,y as ,something historica ll t!'an­Sl('nt b~lt al so as somethlOg historically eternal { th' connectIOn Hegel oUers a specific interpretation ~[ 310 r~~

52

i;ltiOIl flf iI philO~f)phy te, ils lilllf'_ "While a philo~oJlh~'. in ib ('Olltl'llt, dol''' llot rJ~e allow illi timf', it is still aho\'!) it in il~ fOl'lII 1)I'1::\lIsl'. ,1~ thrlllght and knr)\yll,dgl' of the sllh:-olillltial 61'iril of it~ l'l'il, this philosophy makes it it suhject", (Wi; J:J, tjH) But this diffN'cntiatirm of form anel contcnt in philr)sol'hy is a fif~viiltioll from thc fundamental thesis of ahsolutE' it!l'illisJll whith holel!! that form and ceHl­lent arc idpiltical in philosophy as the thought of thougl,lt.

Thus II ('g(,I's di:4inction I)l'tw(,f~n the logical und the ~w .. torical nspccts of th(! history of philosophy is cle~rly ~us' tirled and epistemologically necessary, But he Idrnllrll's epistemology with ontology; h(m~e lhe c~nnicting assc: s mcnts of his philosophy often ,gl\'cn by ItS ,students, l'~r example, s tudents of Hegel's \"le~\'s on the, history o[ ~lll~ losophy usually quote ~he Iollowlllg very Impor~ant p~ln~, HThe latest philosop,hy I!; the result of all precedmg p~llo~· ophies; it must th,en con~ain the principles o~ all; It I!' therefore, when it IS a philosophy, the most de\~loped, ~he richest, and the most concrete," (64; 6, ~1) \VhIle quotl,n~ that precept, s tudents of Hegel seldom ,lhmk about ,lh~ \\ a~ it describes his dew of the actual llistory, of pllllo~,oph), Since the quotation refers to the late~t p~llosophy, It, a~­pea rs seH-evident that it applil'5 to the ~I.::itory, of plll~O~~ ophy, But the assertion that each followm,g phIlosoph) 1.

higher than its predece~::;or fIt.::;, only the lO~lca~ order,o; ~~? d efmition s of the absolu,t~ wl11,ch, ,as the a~~:.olu,te ::,plrlh: deploys its log ical deflllltlOlls III time, that 1::<, hlsft0[lca i'.

Jean Hyppolite a well-known French student 0 ege::>

philosophy, rC£er; to t1~a,t and other h~imilah,ten~t~ ~~~ttnC~ cuses lIegel of d iscl'ed lllDg great p I osop les, ), t f them as [ ull y surpassed: "The fault 0(. Hegel,S ~IS or~oo_ ph ilosophy w h ich claims to present ph~losopilies 11\ a g ica l a nd ~llI'on ol ogical order, is, that It turns ~a~ I s~lh~ sequent ph iloso phy into a s upe['lor one comp~ls~~~ (Gq, princ iple of, and surpassing t h~ one tba\recfde'te~ 'abov~' 82) 1n the light of the quotatlOll fl'O~'_t ege tlphiIOSopll\: thi s eYaluatio,n ~f hi s con~ept ~~'ltheund~r~7te~ the contra· appears convlnc\Ogb' Bu~, \t cl~, tl;e historical (the logical position of the su, stan la an, . to Jean Hyppolite ) as­and the chronological, ac~ordlJlf, which lIegel insist~ peets of tlil' hi~tol'Y of pllllosroP l~ IIO'S~l Lectures 011 the /lis'

I I , ' ' I is dc,\!' rom ' so nwe It W wlcas I . I' I" ot follow his own prtn, tory of Philosophy tlt<lt Il' (ou; n

53

ciplo in Sp('CiriC studit'!'i of till' history of philosophy For ~x.am~l~, he docs not rc~"rd Stoic.'ism, Fpinli'('nni~1Il or Skepticism as the sunllllll of allripnt philosophy II· .. 't the fact t.hat they were its lalr"t st"IY"S II" """1\' r r' SPI C E . " . ,nt'..... ~~.. t' PI'S to

plcurus as a t.hlllkC'r who did not rist' ahon tht' len'l of sensory C?IlCepts. He !s, cqUillly disdainful of Skl'ptifism and des.crlb~s.e\'en StoIcism as a dccalil'llt l'l'flC'ction of I',' iosophy 5 CfIStS. p 11

. Hegel does not consider medicval philosophy as Sur)3

~1Ug. the pl~ilosophie.s th~t yreceded it. Later Sch~lastic:sn~­tnl hIlS opll1l0n, Jost lt~ distinctly philosophical content witI' tieD ogy replaclDg philosophy. • I

In analyzing the philosophy of the New Age Heg I . even f~rther from presenting the latest philos~ h ~s I: synthesIs of all those that preceded it \-VI'l p. Y I metaphysical s stems f I ... . 1I C pnnsmg tIe 180 y. 0 t Ie 11th century he cI'iticizes e l-cen~~rt philosophers, especially boul'ge~is Enlighten­/s, as t lin ers '~'ho had even fallen short of their redc­I:s:~:s, a\~east III the specific content of their docfrines Ie ~ ~l out saying that Hegel does not regard Berke~ th~na~he d~~t~i:!Sr~r~entingt a ILli~he~ stage o! philosophy

If we' escar es, elbDlz or Splnoza. oph tha~O\\ turn fron~ Lec.tures on the History of Philos­call(mowle~~~c~o t~~e hS~~~r1cal 1L'eI~pnHmt of philosophi­categories leads from th 're

0 ogle, whose hierarchy of obvious which aspect ot thow~r. to the higl~er, it becomes means when sayin that. e Illstory of pllllos~phy Hegel morc developed ri;her ~ac 1 subsequent philosophy is of course, does' not refe:nt more co~crete (Hegel's logic, to its fundamental precept 0 t~e patlcular philosophy bllt

One must also remembe; r~I~Cip e and categories). of the development of h'l a g?nerally Hegel's concept oversimplified version Sla~ O~~~l;l~ ~s milch richer than the nomenoo represents a st < rams that each new phe­lhr previous one. \Ve kno~!eth~t 1~:vClopme~t higher than a necessary component of dev I gel co~sl dered nogation t ..... ('en abstract and concrete ee arment, dlff(lrentialing bo­opmrnt, hut only concrete n~ gt Ion. Both OCCur in devel­a lowrr to a higher stage cgoatl~n mean~ transition from (h'r<;ja l' r· ..... n lury to tI . . . n( mg 0 direct transition fl' I IC ~Implistic Ull-

lI~p~rrrc~ .to perfcct, lIegel desCl'il~~~ d~\:et to higher, fl'om ra In \, IIch past ~tages arl' re\"iv(>(i (\l' opm('nt as a spi

on (\ new basis.

51

Thus till' diiTl'l'I'1l11alioll iJl'twel'n the Ingieal 'lnd t1w hi torital il~ J1!'gf·j"~ inh'l'pr('IHtioll of th!' df'wlopmf'nt of ph losophy l:i (,lJlInlly nel'l~ssilry hoth for criticizing Hegr'\'s idralist rITOI'~ ami ror f'inglillil out his hrilliant diaif'ctical Insighl~, T1wt i~ thl' !\Ialllipoint hom which WI! shrml!i view lh'grl'!,) rom~l'i't of tho lIIoti\"(! forces of the develop· mcnt of philosophy and till' SOllrl'f'!'I of the historical d(·ft· nitivellcss of its ('lintI'll!. If the logical is accepted not only as a speCific Cjualil.y of the cognizing subject but abo a~ the substantiol, it is thns acccptcd as callsa sui, as self-de­termining. That is lIegel's principal conviction directly reo ferring to philosophy, anf! lhe de\'clopmenl of thc latter is interpreted as a substantial process; "the entire history of philosophy is essentially an inherently necessary for­ward-moving succession, which is reasonable in itself and is determined ... by its a priori idea. The history of philos­ophy nl1Ist prove it by its example." (64; 13, 50) The goal of this logical proc('ss, contained in it from the start. is its internal motive force; this means that its result is preordained from the start. The contradiction between the historically limited form of philosophy and its infinite con­tent is the direct moti,·c cause of the de\'elopment of phil­osophical knowledge. According to Hegel, the finite is not yet true, and thereforc "the inner idea destroys these finite forms" (64; 13, 50) -in other words, it makes the tran­sition from one system of philosophy to another a neces­sity. Therefore, since the history of philosophy is regardcd as a logical-ontological succc!'sion of the definitions of the "absolute idea", it is also determined by the latter and .is thus immanent-teleological. Everything that happrns In the world is in the final analysis, a manifestation of rea­son. In Heg~l's view, "this great precept: .. _which i;S the only thing that. makes the history of philosophy so IDter· esting-is nothing other than the belief in Pro\'idence, only in a diffcrent guise". (64; 13,49)

All those derlDition~ refer directly to the aspect of the history of philOSophy Hegel describes as substance. But the latter does not exist outside the "empirical" develop­ment of philosophy because it .f~rms it: essence. Acco~d­ing to II('gel's wellknown delllllll?ll, pllllosophy as a hIS­torically deveiolling phenomenon IS an epoc~ apprehend~d by thought; it is ,·thought and the apprehenslO,~ o.f ~he spir­it of the time". (61t; 13, 66) Of course, the spmt of the

tlmo" doC's not (':'I:i:;t indl'pl'lllit'nliy of thl' "llh:-;ollllt' spir. Ir' ~() Ow.l thl' sPl'cu\atiH' ilnd till' hi:-;tnril'al dt'liuitiolls of ;lhilosophy arC' not HllltlH\lIy l'Xl:lll~i\'t'. ~1'\·t:l"lht'I"~S, thai which specifLcally dr::;cribC's a pnrtH.'u\.U· hlslorH';l1 Nil (and consrqllcntiy a particular slagt' in thl' dl'H'loplllllnl of phi losophy) is not. contained in thl' j.!l'lwral t'OIH'I'JlI of tlu' absolute, in the speculativC' \'iC'\\' of ~hy thought of thought, the seU-aiienation of the absolute spm!, Ph'.

Thus, on the one hand, Hegel I'('dun's the mali\"{' forct's of the' history of philosophy to lllLI'C' thought, whill', on thl' other, he tries to connect the emergenco find suhsC'quC'nt dC'velopment of philosophy to cer tain history-making social lIphcayals, Discussing the historical (ll'cmises til at led to the emcrgcnce of philosophy, lIegel says they included tho diyision of labor, the rise of "estates", that is, tho disin­tegration of the patriarchal clan, tho ('mergence o[ the human personality independent of the patriarchal way of life. the crisis of spontaneous religious consciousness (see 64: 13, 66-67), But Hegel giyes no speCific descl'iption of historical epochs whose contC'nt is expressed by this or that philosophy, Usually, he merely gives a general outline of the "spirit of the time", the intellectual climate, the con­.-iction!:i that dominated this or that historical epoch; and therefore philosophy itself, as a rule, appears as the most important manifestation of the spirit of the time, Hegel's view of the relation of philosophy to social relations as a whole does nol provide any defillite answer to the question but is rather the question itself.

lIegel is well aware of the fact that since Lhe question is the existence of philosophy in histol'y, philosophy is not the cause of social transformations; the idea of phi losophy d£'l~cnde,nt ?n tl,1Ose ~Lrans[orma~ions, is incompatible with rallOnal~s~ Ide~llsm, The relat lOnslllp be tween philosophy ~nd political history, forms of govemment, art and rel igion IS not such that they are the roots of philosophy or vice H'I'Sa; rather they are all rooted in the sp irit of the t ime," (64; 13, oD)

Apparently, Hegel proceeds fl'Olll the concept of the sin-gle, uni\'('r!'.al absolute spirit a c{'rtain stage or I - 1

I "f I " W llC 1 ap-p£'ar~ as t ,Ie. splI'll 0 t 10 time, and its divNsity is expres-sed In religIOn, art, government and most ad t I ' philosophy, The relationship betwec;l Ilh'iloso "I<i

ua 0 dY' 11"1

II r r - 1 l-r - I ' ply an a o u'r orms 0 socia I e IS t 1at of corre lation 11 I_ , pal'a e Ism,

('"nl'!'>I'''lId''II(~/, in tlllli' and, ilJlpan.'ntiy, also of intt~I';H' ­lion IIl1d inh'I'III'IH'tr,lIil)n, Till' ha5ie postulatt' of IIl'gt,l'~ illt'ali,..;1 flY5tt'1Il n'jl'tt~ tlw t'.o.s('utial difft'l'I'ntiatillll IwLwt'l'n sunlll eOlJgC'iflllsnl's~ a!H1 fional lH'illg, hecilUse hoth an' rl~­dured, ill Iho lill.d 'I/Jalysi~, to till' thought of thllllght, tl)l' subslil!lc(' ~uhj('('l, IiiI' idt'ntily of Iwing and thought.

'1'1'11<', 1I1'j.{(·l's philosopby of law draws a firm di\'illin~ IiII(' h{'Lw('pn till: statp anll civil f;ocictythe sphere of pri nlte inll'r('sts, aho\'(' all ecollomic Olles, But this division has no ('.(Juntt'rl)ilrt in his analysis of the d(!\'clopmf'nt of philosophy_ The actual :;tl'UctuJ'{' of u c1a~s society eva po rates in the speculative annihilation of the empirical. All Lhat leads the Htlldy of the sjJecilk historical content and social role of philosophy away from the already P£'l'c{'pli­ble correct (but, of COUI'''£', not idealist) way. The fmal conclusion- absolute id{'ulism does not dare go [urth('1" than that in its analysis of philosopb:r"s place in the social life of each gi\-en historical cra-merely recognizes that philosophy and all other forms of the social comprise a sin gle whole, and that the intrinsic composites of that whole form a relalionship of necessary correspondence, ".\ defi­nite kind of philosophy correlates therefore with a definite kind of people among which it exists, with their stale sy:;­tem, government, '" their social life,"' (~: ~3, 68) But what determines this correspondence, whIch IS no merc temporal coincidence? Hegel's philosophy answers this ques­tion in the most general way: the uniqueness of the abo solute spirit. This means that the substantial difference b~­tween two historical epochs is predetermined by the logi­cal structure of the absolute spirit, in which each epoch IS a necessary step on the way to its self-cons~iousne~s,

AccOl'ding to 'Marx, Hegel turns world Ills!Ory I,nlo ,the history of philosophy, Jl e idenLifies the speCific histOrical (economic, political, ideological, technological, etc,) devcl­opment of society with the development of k,nowledge and scH-consciousness; and philosophy is proclamlC,d the ~u­the nLic form of the latter, This fully ac~ords With t,~e In­ter )J'etation of wodd history as progress Ill, the u~dE'l::;tand - I r r' dom The div('rsity of human history I~ reduced lllg 0 ICC ' I- 1 ' eo;s Tn lie I Ie 'clopment of philosop Ilea conSClOusn -, " ' to ~ Ie ,( ,~ "world hislO['Y is Ih£' expression of ~he dl~'1I1~': gel s "OI<S, f the Sl)irit in its supreme malllrestatlOn~, absolute pl'oce~s ,0 f that succession of steJls through it is an expr('ssion 0 '

57

-, ..,. , • , •

I ,- , 'J

,

" • • ,

\. '~ ' j ," - - - I> -' .... -""""

- , , " \ " ,

" -"1 , - ~ ,

, , " ~

" " ~ , ,

which it realizes its truth and fl'nrh('!i <{'H('nll~n()w ... ness, .. 'Vorld history only show::; how ~('H ('onSriou"Ilt'SS and the striving for truth gradually l\Wakl'll in tlH' ~(lirit there afC glimmers of conscious1H'~~, it. appTl'iu.'llds till! main point.s, and finally it beconll's fully l'(lIlSrious." un; 1, 75)

That one-sided interpretation impoH'rishl'R and di~t.ol'ts the diversity of the ('ontent of world hblol'Y·

Idealism has always presented hUllllln hi~lory alloH' all as t.he history of intellectnal development, as the s truggle of reason against error, of good against ('yil. Although He­gel's doctrine of the objective logic of the history of soci­ety to some degree overcomes certain naws in the idealist interpretation of history, he is obviously a captive of that philosophical-historical precept. But in his analysis of cer­tain systems of philosophy Hegel often convincingly shows their relation to specifIc features of the given historical epoch. For example, he re\"eals the historical necessity of, and justification for, bourgeois French Enlightenment. Ac­cording to Hegel, its anticlericalism and even athei sm are an expression of tbe struggle against the obsolete feudal ways and their mainstay, the Catholic Church. The Revo­lution of 1789 is seen by him as directly linked to that in­tellectual mo\-ement to which he refers with obvious en­thusiasm, despite his well-known hostility to naturalism and especially materialism.

Hege~'s The Science of Logic admits only of logical connectIOns between philosophies, but not of the historical rcl~tionship. :ecorded by him between ph ilosophy and the SOCial condlt.lOns. that are independent of it. Still, Hegel needs .a soclOl~glcal assessment of philosophies because, accordmg to. hiS runda~ental concept, he recognizes not on~~ the logical self-moLlOn of the philosophizing absolute Spll'lt but a.lso the development of philosophy in history. 1 he latter 19, of course, necessary because the absolute cannot be co~t?nt with mere self-contemplation. And "the deeper the SPll'lt plunges into itself, the more intensive be-comes the contraposition, and the broader' ,'s II ' I d' I d 'd . le riC mess Irec e Out!';1 e; we mu~t fathom the deptl bId of th~ need, the yearning of the spirit Wi~h ;\.r1e .egrei~ !"c.cts Its ~?arch outward to find itself". (64' 15 dSj,I)l }~l d WIthout nolating the principles of his a' I '. 1 1 HIS, lIegel combines the logical and the histoP .. n logical Sy.stCOl,

Ilca as the IUtel'

58

{ ,

,

"" "\ , -, '. , ,

\ I I , ,

~ - , ,J \ , ,

I , - , , , 7--' ' --. ...- .. •

Iwl ,llld lht' I·xlf'tllal. Thl'sc cfmtn. lositiflfl'3 arG dia!f'clIcal, lilld Ih/' ('1:&-"111111 hC' 0111/' Hltcrn&I, 'it' Illl! th ... ir union r{Jrlll~ \\ fI.-Id III ·",fi n HI, I~ ib nu 11 f'IW" lip ,1nv/·lllpiog phil o:,ol'lIi.·,,1 Iliril. JI milly. ima( J i aelorlll'·j to tllf' In~­ifni: Ih.' "lIIpirl(·,1 i rcd,wPll II) /Ilpans hv which tho

,

~pirit hl·I'OJl\/'i 1:/)ll",Cir)IJ'J of il!\ ('IJDlfonl. .

III his allllly~is or varillllQ i!!\!wct'3 of social life, olll·n qllitp nlif'1I II. I'hill)~()phy, 111'it!'l, of course, cannot ignorn ll\(' 1"1111(1""11'111 .. 1 link of philosophy with nCJnphilos0l'hical }itlldif'~ nnd othpl" f(IWI!! of FI)tiul c:on~ci/jlJsnpss: religion, ad, morality. In f'xllmining tho philosophy of the :'\rw Age, h(' ('xplieilly ~tillt's: '·Will!lJllt the indeptnrlrnt devrl­opnH'nt or IIII' p\:]H'rirIH'nllJl 'wj('IlC('~, philosophy woulrl nev· ('r haw l'iS('1l aboVl' thr Ipnl f)f thp ancients." (WI; 1.5, :28:3) BuL this admission do<'s not fit the ~trllctllrp of the systclll <llul thcrefor/, doC's not learl to appropriate theor(!t iral cOllclusions about the motiH' forces of philosophical devclopment: the historical succc~sion connecting systrms of philosophy has no place for the natural or ~ocial scienccs.

The mcchanistic world outlook, directly related to the natural sciencc of the :\'ew Age, was of great importance for the de\'elopmrnt of philosophY. But Hegel pays little attention to that fact, apparently because he is a critic of the mechanistic approach. His Philosophy of Salare con· tains many dialectical conclusions drawn from the natural sciences. But since they proceed from materialist precepts, lIegel fails to correctly evaluate their relations to ph.ilo:-1o phy. TIc expands the concept of philos?phy t? the maxlffil~m and rcgards it as an all-encoffipasslDg sC.iCoce, compris­ing the sp('culatively a~simil~ted natural SClcnces. Thus he admits, albeit indirectly, the Importance of the. natura! (and SOCial) sc,ience!'; rOl· the de\'elopmen~ of ~htlosoph). But that admission is worded so tlHlt speCific sCI.ences appear to owe thcir outstanding aciti('vements to philosophy. Heg~l puIs an cxtreHlC' con~truction on the tradit.io.nal contrapOsl­tion of philosophy to nonphiloso]?hic~1 aclinty (~otl~. prac: Lical and tlH'oretical), and that InC'\ Il;lbly affects IllS doc Irine on thc hi.:;tory of philosophy. . '

I [C'gt'l both ulld(,lTat('~ lll(' il~porta~ce of ~pec.lfIc sClenc('~ for Ihl' dl'\"i'lopnH'nt or pllllosopillcal kno".Ie.dgC' _.~ml: lIot ~urpl'i:-1ingly, nn'l"e:-otil11ate:o; th~ rolC'. of r.ehgl~n. ~IDC{.

I 'I I ' ,.. in his ,"it'\\" (':''ienttaliv Idl'<liIst, It dlff('r~ p 11 O~O]lI) ~, ...

, ,

from frligion not :--;0 mllch in ('onh'llt I\S in fOI'III. Whill' ill his [,ectures OIl the f/istory 0/ Philo .... ophy IIt'gl'l as!I{'!'\:' that philosophy exists only inaSIlllld\ as it di~:-;()riaII'S it ",('If from fC'ligioU5 consrio\lsn('~"" in his Philosophy 0/ 1ft> liKioll h(' \"('ry often ~IUl's OHI' that fundament'l) dirtt'rtllll't'.

~o important for idealism too, and l'n'1l $la tl's Ih:\t'philos ophy and friigion arc idC'nlicRl". lIis 1'1'Sl'rYil tions ahnllt t.he dialectical nature of that identity r,\il to 1l1i\1,1' it Jllau .... ihlC'.

A point to l'elllcmbC'1' is thatlrl'gt'l'~ arguHlents to pl'OH' the identity of the subjects of philosophy and t1lC'ology arc mostly exotC'l'ic. And essentially, they ('\'('11 pro\'e the op­posite; that philosophy is indcpC'udcnL of religion. In ]lC'­gel's opinion, religion cannot claim that its subjC'ct stands higher than that of philosophy. Philosophy is on the top rung of the hierarchy of knowledge bC'calise its supreme subject i~ the divine. Philosophy is higher than religion be~ cause what is the subject o[ the imagination and emotion (and IIegel thinks little of their cognitive yalue) in reli~ gion is the subject of conceptual knowledge in philosophy. T!lis explains why, in Hegel's lifetime, theologians viewed 111~ contention as an act of arrogance on the part of philos~ orhy, an attempt at usurping the prerogatives of the~ ology.

I,n crea~ing his theory of the histol·y of philosophy, lle ~ gel s studies [orm the basis of that subject as a science. That essentially dialectical theory is the theory of the de~ velopment or philosophical knowledge which in turn serves as a. hasis,. for .Hegel's spe~iflc and systcn;atic st~ldy of the worldw Ide history o[ philosophy. He interprets the do ~ vel?pment of philosophy as a distinct form of development, radically different from other forms of development in na ~ lure .and ~ociety .. The existence and struggle of opposing doctrmes IS a salient feature of the development of phi~ losophy; . accordin~ to. Hegel, their connict does not rule out t~l~ InterrelatIOnship of their content or the inevitablr tranri">.lt:?n fro~ one doctrine to another. The concept of the con IC mg unity of the history of philoso h did. I(·clieal understanding of historical contin I! y ~n tie 18 '

(·st aecomplishm('nts of Hegel's history of ul:}~1 ale }he great -His !dcali~m ~i!<torts all the a~hiewment~ ~~op .IY. . .

oJlhy. fhe IdealJst interpretation of dcwlo ,IllS 1~llIlos ~ that concept and subordinates it to tl Plm~nt distorts

a leo oglcal system 60

\\ hidl larM!"!.\' diSlll ifl: 1' 8 the !rtll' mol v~ f'Jrr.."s of till' tip · nlo]lllwTlI or philo. npby .1Iul III U)(' n01l1 an:oI)'sis, n·"ol1 ("ill'S dialpl·lil" with thp nJl"lapliy I("al illtl'rpn·'c"11111 flf till' hi~lory of philo~ophy. Ill'gl'J 'f' IIICIIlJhy~it·al ~y tem Orrl'I"S a olll'-~idl"d illh'r]ln~t:llioll of the IllslOlY flf I'hi1o~ol'hy which igllort's t.hp ~tuely fir t1w dl~n:I(J')f1l(,1I1 fir thl' mah' riali:4 outlook; r(Hls('qlll'lIl1y. it igIlOI"l'" tlH' struggle of JlliI

tel'ialiSIl\ (11)(\ id!'alislIJ, iI 1Il(j~1 importal1t aspect in tliI' ell' n\oJlJllcnt or philosophy. Tho "anlfJgicai conc(:pl of till' Iwo major rlillll"llsiolis of till' hi~tol"Y of l'hiiosfJphy, t1w ()n­tologization of its iogi(·al·thl'o["ulical interpretation, the re· duction of philosophy to the thought of thought elevated to the status of tbe subject-:.;uhstancc-all that, toguther with the theological precepts and conclusion~ of Hegel's philosophy, puts a mystical construction on his history or philosophy and gives risc to contradictions t~lat cannot b(' solved by absolute ideali!'m, and to consen·alin (and part iy reactionary) ideological c(jnclusion~.

Marxist philosophy removed the ~ystical s~roud rro~ Hegel's concept of the history of philosoph.Y: It not o~l) exposed its major flaws but also r.ev~aled Its outsta~d.lng discoveries, accomplishments and Iflslghts, whose ~nli~al assimilation and development helped create a SCientific theory of the history of philosophy.

\ CO~TR\uUTIOI\ TO THE Clll'l'IQtlE OF THE UTES'!' l'Lt'l\.\L1S'I'lC co:o;cm"I'

OF TilE 1115'1'01\) OF PHILOSOPHY

Diversity o[ doctrines has always bocll and still is typ ical of philosophy, Its signirlcance can be underslood COI'­rectly and explained scientifically only by studying the dis­tinctive aspects of philosophy, the evolution of its subject and ideological [unction, the epistemological and class roots of philosophical errors, the place of philosophy in the sys,te,m of fundamental sciences, and its relationship to art, religIOn and other forms of the social consciousness, That is, the, only app~oach that explaios the wide variety of phil­osopll1c,al ~octflne~ not, as a merely empirically obvious and sCle~t~fically lDexphcable fact, but as a phenomenon of the splfltual life of society that is both historically nec­essary and historically trausient.

Today's bourgeois philosophers and historians of philos­?phy OrlC~ present the incrcasing diycrgence of philosoph­~cal, doctrmcs as a unique process rooted in the sub­Jecllve creativity of out:stan~ing individual philosophers, But the fact that the dlVerslty o[ philosophical doctrines does not rule out their contradictory unity and that in the f-ra1 ana,ly~is it is reduced t.o the funda~ental antithesis o ma~er,ailsm and idealism refutes this subjectivist inter­pretat.lOn of the hist.orical process in philosophy, , ire rdcvelopmcnt. of philosophical knowledge difrers rad­Ica y rom the ,do\"elop~nent of phYSiCS, chemistry, biolo­~IY and ,other sCiences, Just as philosophy differs from all

lOse sCiences bot.h in subject. and in me'l\ods [ 1 no h d ~ 0 rosoarc 1.

diff::;::~ o:se t~d~ul,s ~ot rua~e an, absolute o[ that radical of phjlos~phy usu:n J~r\e~ls ph~losophel's and histol'ian~ lo~ophy hec~mes reafi y effecti~'est~~J~ ~~h~~e t~~~St.Ol{ t?[ P~li­~\\eelJ the iustory of philosophy and the h' t re ~ IO~ e" I~ under:-:.tood not merely as a differenc> J I~ o~y 0 sCle~ce Icctical unity, That is the only meth~d;l~g,acaSlo as a dla1-, approac 1

6,

thai truly rlll,'s Ilut lht· "ppo.tin!! /J! JhilosojJhy to the) n'lil',LI .1. ""I-lL 11K prflrlL('ul lIoIJphilo:;ojJhl1al ,H:livitv ThaI (I!,IUl~ili()1I i:; typicr,i IIf 1\11) ('lIlin~ 1m) ~1al·xian. ;Iud I'ln'

I'lally, 111,·"h, I pIIlIrJ~rJphy. I'.~(~II Jlhill)~IJIJ1I1'rs of IliaiE'cl eill idt'uliSHI did litll "'''''qJlJ it. Thill "PI)I)siliIJII is HIll a slIb· jeclive opinion acivancl!d hy philosophers but. an Qhjl)cti\'u fralllrp of tlw i'flWI)SS (Jf di[[erenliatiQu hetween philosophy and specilk "dnnc(~s. Till' fad that this o(Jj)Qsition, long since drvoi(\ of (.Iny hisloric:ai justification, hag not only f;ul'yiH'd hul is cVlm morp intensively emphasiseci in lo­day's idealist philosophy, is a graphic illustration of the crisi:; gripping the laller at present.

To substantiale thc Hced for a scientific philosophy, classical pre-Marxian philosophers tried to prove that the increasing divergence of philosophies was a transient phe nomenon, For example, Fichte was convinced that "thrr<' is only one single philosophy, just as there j" unly fJne mathematics, and as soon as that only possible philo~OIJhy is found and recognized, Jlew ones can no longer emerge; and all the previous so-called philosophies would tliNear ter be regarded only as attempts and preliminary works' (52; 3, 3) Therefore, he regarded his doctrine as "elevat ing philosophy to the le\'el of a science", Of course, Fich­te was wrong in asserting that the creation of a scientific philosophy would end the de\'elopment of philosophy and, consequently, the debate in philosophy, But his ~hought that the situation later described as "anarchy of pililosoP~l ical system" was historically transient came as, a ~ml­hant prediction of the scientific solution of the iustorlcal­

philosophical problem, , ', Unlike classical philosophical authors, today s bourgeOIs

theoreticians of the history of philosophy try to pro\'c ti~at P

hilosophy like art (and of course, like religion), by ,ts , ' 'd that very nature cannot and mlls,t n?t be ,a sClenc~, an, c any attempt at creating a, sCientific plllloso~I,lY I~nores ,th _ unique meaning and siglllficancc of that bat:i1call), l~nsclc~ tiu.c "spiritual mode" of humau existe~lCe, The SWISS pili: Josophel' Audre Mercier sai~ at the 1'),th World ... ~ougrc~~ [ PI

'I I "Pl,;losoph" IS not a SCience", ~clCnce ' o 11 osop lY, 'I" (8~' ,)~) neither a philosophy nor philosophy I~ ,g,enel'a, ,,','-:~ '1'1

'ts I'k 'lel'ciel' reJ'ect the posslbd,ty of a t;cwntlilc . leol'lS l'e 11 "f h'I' I' as an

philosophv, rcgard the wide {11\'el'slt~ 0 P l o~op lies, , authentic· cxprc:-:.sion of the sovcrOlgn freedom of pllllo'

.3

~OJlhical thought, and crilirizC' Ibt' d:l!'!'i('~ of lit'!' 'Ianian philosophy, charging Ihut th r ir atll'mpls at Crt,.,ling a !'('i·

t'nCl' of philosophy were quixotiC t'ITOI'S of oplimistie think ers who lacked bitter hi~torical l"I)(·'I'it'IH"l'. Such i" til(' "proof" of a viewpoint that ac tu all y nega te's lilt, history of philosophy as a science about the pl'ogn'ss of philol\oph . ieal know ledge, find it negntC's th e' V('I'Y po!'sibility of a lIcienlific philosophical vicw of the world.

That negati vist trend found its cQncC'lllun l consumma­lion in the studies in th e history of philosophy by a num· bel' of French, Jtulian and West German philosophers who call their trend the "philosophy of the hi s tory of philos­ophy". MaI'tiaI Cueroui! is recognizcd as th e leado!' of that trcnd. He is the authoL' of numerous s tudi es of Des­ca rtes, Leibniz, Fichte, l\lalebranche, MaimOD and of thc methodology of th e hi~tory of philosophy. Gucl'oult's sup­porte!s and followers IOclude Henri Gouhicl', Paul fii coe­ur, I,. Brunner, franco Lombardi a nd V. Goldschmidt

There .is nothing surprising about the name "phil os~phY of the Illstory of philosophy" . Both th e nallle and mOl'e­o\'~r, the ~I,rst a,nd tI.le only " philosophy of the hi;tory of philosophy of Its killd were created by nOlle other than lIegel, the. first to eYoh'e a phi losophi ca l theory of the his­tory of philosophy. The theoreticians li sted above however never me t' thO f b ' ' ' n Ion IS act ecause their doctrine is directly ?pposed to Hegel's theory of the development of philosoph­Ic~1 ~nlowledgc. The point is that Hegel subs tantiated the prlllc.l!) e of t1~e unity- the contradictory unity of ~;ll{rse--o: tre Ill~to.ry of philosophy by demonstrating the

tl acy 0 tIe oplDlOn dominant dUl'ing his Ii(etim e that Ie many mutually negating syst f' "

substantial conne t' . I ems 0 p II osophy had nO ferent aspects of ct~on ~lt lone another and wel'e not dif­of philosophy In G~e~~nu~i~' th~u~h manifold, development very possibility of the histS oplOlon .that would negate the Hegel's history of philos ~y lor pllliosophy as a science. fact it c1~ims to substanti~~e.r (60; c59)t~nds, "abolishes the

AccordlOg to Brunncr Hegel' I' a "despotic solution of tile 'ss s r llSll?ry of philosophy is (40; 1!J3) because Hegel 1 .... UCtO P 1I10sophicai dive l'sity"

"

'd r"'JCC s the auton f' " sop IIca octrines and descr'be tI I ' omy 0 p 11 o· a~ a progressing dialectical l~e s ,I~ IlStOl'Y of philosophy of philosophies. Goldschmidt ~I~~a of the actual diversity

rges !legel with an im-

•

•

,

p<' l"i a1ist mlNprl'talioll of thl' history of philosophy FJ7 a; 'to) Iwea11:-I' Ilpg,,1 iJll]lingp~ Oil the IInqm'slionllbll' sovcr· eignty of phil.n~op.hieal "y~tI'IW a 1111 Illitkl'S them depen· dellt fill Iht' III~tol"L('al cll'wlol'lllPllt of philo~ophical knowl edge, dl',;crihing: pach systPlll of philosophy as the seH· consciousncs~ of a historicully delinitr era. For the spok('s­men of today's "philosophy of IIH' history of philosophy", a!'l we sec, til(' historical apprO<tch to philosop hical doctrin es is absolutely unacccptabil'.

According to Lombardi, lI egel tries to read meaning not only into Plato's truth but also into AI'istotie's truth; con­sequently, he presents all thi nkers as contributors to the gallery of errors in the temple of human knowledge. But in that case it is perfectly obvious that those thinkers lose their autonomy in order to represent mere special "mo· ments" of the concept forming Hegel's doctrine of the idea. Lombardi obviously oversimplifies Hegel's history of philosophy: the latter considered his philosophy the result of the previous history of philosophy, thus maintaining that he continued and completed that history. Hegel wrlS wrong to believe that his system was the end of the de­velopment of phi losophy; but Lombardi rejects the develop­ment of philosophical knowledge altogether, regarding the pluralism of philosophical systems as the only possib le form of existence of philosophy. The German historian of philosophy Gottfried Martin a lso lapses into this error, ex­cept that he ascribes the pluralistic interpretation of the hi story of philosophy to Done other than Hegel. Accord­ing to Martin , "Dialectics recogni zes diam etricrllly opposite judgments as equally meaningful, and in this sense it recognizes the diversity of mutually contradictory jIH~g­ments. From here it is not far to recognizing the diverSIty of mutually contradictory philosophies. That was what Plato and Hegel did. It is a fa ct that there arc numCfOUS mlltually opposite philo~ophies and that .appa~entl~y they will always be in confltct. Rut from a dl81eclica.l stand.­point, thi s fact is not a flaw but rathN a n{'cesslty. It I.S important for philosophy that there should. be .many ph ~­losophies; philosophy can cxist only as a (liVer:;l !.Y of. p~l­losophies." (8fi; 283) Martin i:; ob\'i~usly wrong l.n IllS In ­terpI'etati on of Hegel 's his~ory .of pllllo~ophy. !t IS a long way from admitting the diverSity of p~llosophles to plura­li stically interprotiog the history of philosophy. And Hegel

65 :;_01 :1 62

:-;har('d th(' monistic (dinl('cticnl moni~lil') approach t) til!' hi~t()ry of philosophy. _.

Thl' idl.'ologicul ohjl'ctiH's of tht' "pllllo:-;\)Jlhy 01 thl' his­tory of philo:-;ophy" an:- oll\"il1U:-; .. 'I'u~l'thl'l" wil~1 ~hp prin­ciple of hi~toricisU1, it I"l'jects I\I:-;Io\"l("al mahl ~· I;'h :-;m,. Pl"t'­~t'ntl'd a~ a crude sociological cOlleept rcliuclIlg OI'lglllal \\Ol"k~ of philo~ophy to thc imnll'dinl.e histori ca l CHIISt':; or lht'ir l'lllC'fgencc. Thl' "philosophy of IIH' hi~tory of philos_ ophy"' oppose~ thb "iew (\Hongly ascribod and totally aiicu to ~[af:\ism) of philosophy (and of ally form of so· cial conscion::;nes~ in general) as a :--:illlpll' ('ousCqUOllCC of material conditions independcnt of consciousness by the idealistic principle of philosophy's indcpendence from ever­ything non philosophical. Thai principle rejects the mate­rialist interpretation of history. Brunncr arrh'('s at thcse conclu~ion~ when he writes: "vVhilc Hegel abolishes th e autonomy o[ philosophies by rechristening them as mo­ment::. of his own system, Marx goes evcn further: he de­~troys philo~oJlhy itscl[ b}T dcpri"ing it of its inherent au­tonomy a~ philosophy. From tht' ::.uprt'IlH' disc ipline il.. used to be, philosophy turns into an epiphenomenon of man's life in society'-' (40; 194) Like other followers of the "phi ­losophy of the history of philosophy", Brunner still thinks in terms of the past. lie regards philo.sophy as a 5upt'r ~cience which has evcry right to ignore "lower" scientific knowledge. l\"aturally, r..larxism resolutely reject s that in­terprctation of philosophy, which has become an obstacle to tllf' effective development of philosophical knowledge.

Olle must note that the principle of the sovereignty of \lhilo~ophy i~ rejected even by idealism if it recognizes phi­losophy's connection to other forms of spi!'itual life (sci­t'nce, art) and its own dependence on religion. Not sur­prisingly, the Belgian idealistic phi losopher Alphonse De Wa('lhells defines philosophy as "reflection on a nonphilo­!'lophical experience" in his article "Philosophy and Non­philosophy" and stres~es the "indt'lible hond between phi ­losophy and non philosophy". (!16; G, 12) But Do Wad­hens advances a neo-ThomiRt concept of philosophy that li{·::. it directly to religion.

Till' th('oretical precepts of tilt' "philosophy of the hi~to­ry (j~ Jlhilo~op~y~'. rejcct till'. uni.tr of the histOl'y of philos­f)pil:-" tllp J10~~I)lI~IIY of a s('lt'nllhc philosophy, and th(' dc ­w-'Iopmrnt of pllliosophy. According to one of its adepts,

Itti

thl' "J1hi.!()~tO.J1hy or 111' Iw'tCIY or nhilosophy" s 'r fiil at ill. "dl.'"illl _ I hat, III 'flU!" l' ,mt II al(;(': c:ll id, .tlisn: th t IHPlaphy~i(";I.lly llI!E'rpr,'! I g"lIf, lily lcceplf'1I fa, t II dilll'n' lu'p 0\ t.ho hi,;lol"Y of pnlir)l>uphy rrf)m the history 01

malhemlll Ie!'!, physics itllli 01 hel" !-dpnccs. In Cl ch ()f th" lattl'1" till' eOIllIJlJIII!llts fl,nll 11 1"/,lati\""ly orderly systpm. T u difft'n'lI(:Ps l.wt'VI'I'1\ nHJdf'rn phy~ics aud da'<sical JII(>('han' it"~ I'xi~t within tlwil' unily whi"h "I'prl'!!ents a prote ,nl1 jed to a I;I\\- .'\jl,l:- I\uill" c\""nilll'!\ as lh,' principiI! of .p­propriatL' IlL';.ls. T\aturally, the principle docs not apply tn the rclationship bctwc('1\ philos()phie~.

The devclopmvnt of each sc ience iller/'ases and aecunIu lates truths eventuall y accepted by all its scientists. A new stage in sc ientifi c dcveioplHl'ut is a step forward that ov('l"­comes the limitations of the preceding stage. It is true that in natural science !:iupporters o[ the old often fight against the ncw, cven though its COl"l"ectll(,ss has already been borne out by the facts. But. the ~ilnation in philosophy is in· comparably more compI!;!x: a new sy~tem does not alway:» Rlll"paSS it!'. pl"edcc('ssor .

Martial Gucroult offers a !;ubjectivist interpretation of all these facts, that c;lll for special epistemological study. Ill' simply declares that the pa!'.l of !';cience (unlike thl' past of philosophy) is constantly de\'alucd by its present. There· forc philo:-;oph r ;Hlt! seil'nec are diametrically oppo::::ed, de­::pite the fact that each system of philosopby, like any sys· tem of scientifi c knowledge, searches for the truth. How­eyeI', the point is that each system of philoso~hy . regar(~~ all other systems of philosophy as wrong, while m G\~t.>· roult's view, they arc all equally legitimate in their c.lalO1 to the tl'uth.ln tho history of H'iencc, each new aclllt'\"~· ment is based on, and SU1'paSSes, its predecessors. The "phl losophy of the history of philOSOphy" sees. Ihis fact a~ 1)I'o~f of constanl.. dcvaluation of SCil'ntirlC acillevement.. FOI' t'X·

ample, J lenri Gouhier stall'S t.hal.. ."t.he .only indl~putabl(' fact is that th e science of today discredits thc s(,l~nce ~r yesterday, while the philoso~hy ,?f today does nO.t dlscredl~ the philosophy of yesterday'. (09; 111) Accordmg to tIll. Bel"gsonian Gilbr!"t 1\\lIire, philosophy 11t'\"CI' grows ob:<oll'te. "The physics of ,\l"ist?tic and J)~~c~~'les .arc dead., ~I~t their philosophil's ('ollllnIH.' to noul"Il'h. (81,. 19) ~Ialrc I I

.S

not a SUPI10l'tel' of tho "philosophy ?f .the hl~tory of PHi losophy". But his views largely comClde With those 0

.7

'*

that schoo1. The "philosophy of t.ht' 11l~to1'Y ''If ph O'lloolly' ('xpr('s~t'~ t.he cOIwidiollS of Uli.l1Iy h(lllrgf'oi~ phi1o~WIllIC:, .llt1HlUj,rh Ihl'Y may nut. bl'illIIg III thl' I'PJll vdy sllIal! It) of ib adlH'l'l'nb.

or course, those assertions run ctluntvl' to tht' tnll' hiL tory of science. Newton's mechnnirs i~ not discl"l'ditnd, and neither are other real accomplishuH'nt s or thu natural SCI ('uces. It is a different matter that thf' sd (' ntili c arcomplish ments of the past have been surpassed by newer arhieve­ments. By misrepresenting the above and laying binsed stress on the fact that many philosophical issues posed in the past arc still topical, supporters or the "philosophy of the history of philosophy" build an impenC'trable wall be­tween philosophy and the scicnres. For example, Heinrich Bombach of "Vest Germany who bl'longs to that school even asserts that "philosophy is not a 11henomenon in time .. . It does not develop in a temporal framework, but it itself creates the external framework for all spiritual events ... " (93; 13). The "philosophy of the history of philosophy" thus becomes the theology of philosophy.

By making an absolute of the radical distinction between the hi~tory of philosophy and tht' development of science, Gucroult attempts (of course, by purely speculative reasoning) to answer why the legitimacy of the hi story of philosophy as a science has always been and still is being

# questioned. He wants us to believe that this is because cri­teria and yardsticks borrowed from science and foreign to philosophy have always been applied to it. Philosophy has been likened to science whose greatest values arc its latest accomplishments because they surpass preceding achievements. That point of view obviously oversimplifies the development of scientific knowledge, reducing it to a mere accumulation of new results that arc higher than past ones. But the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics :cmain the greatest accomplishments of 20th-century phys~ ICS, I'ven though they were followed by many other out­Rtanding di.scoveries .. Having oversimplified the develop­ment of sCl~nce, Gu~roult contra~ts it to philosophy and 8!'1Serts that Its past IS equally. if not mol'(' valuable than i~<; ,present.: "Science and its history ha\'e' two radically distinct objects: the first, scientifIC truth which is nontem­f'?ral; the seco.nd, the a~uisilion of t.hat truth in time. I here fore the history of sCience can in no way be part or sci-

68

Pile£, Tll.'lr rcspcctiv~ ntere1ts :' quit£> dinerent' (!j();j~l, 1'\'011 helavll n cho! who i I'IO!! to

I ••

"phi n~ophy ,f tt' II t. y f 1 t-al/ Jots I CV'. mor olll.-.;pok.'n The ellt·· do 1,,; ne t. I lOW tbr h istOl") of hI.' SClen.,' to move ~tlf' d he tudif> the statt- it S 11, lfl 1I :'le ~ lI from ,. and he not intel'pstl'li 1[1 thn past' (4", 2!iJ A cllli 19 to (,up )­ult, the picture i:;: totally dirferent in philosophy W Hch nl ways facml its past SW(:c both ancient Ilnd subsequenl phI­losophies rvlain thclr-igniflcaw'(' today, their authc: are actuall y our contempOI"arips. Hw opposition of tlw present and tl lf' past, so obviolls ill thp histnry of science, is (it' scribed as having litt1!' ~igllih("llnct' in philosophy. "'Thtl ill divisibility or philo~ophy <'nf! its history," Gueroillt em· phasizes, "is an essential characteristic of the fact of that hi story. " (60; 47) But. if philosophy and its history al re ally indivisible and the millennium separating l do~trine from another i~ of no cunsequencC'. how then is the hi~ tory of philosophy at all pos~ible as an actual proc~"s n time, in (·adirally diITrrent social conditions? lIow dot's the " philosophy o[ the history of philosophy" see thC' transi tion from one historical era to another? It answers th('~~ questions by ref(>rring to the numerical in~rea_se -:,f philo· sophical masterpiec{'s. There was no Hegel III Kant s world, but there was Kant in the world of Hegel, and that ine\-j· tably affected Oil' lattN's philo:-;ophy. ,-\11 thi:; mean~ si~­ply that all oublamling philosophers aft~ not on han~ In any era, a fact or paramount importance for the ·'pllllo,,­ophy of the history of philo~ophy". But if interpr:ted fu11y that fact completely rt'ful(>.-:; tlu' gronn(lle~s ass(>thon abo\~t the ('xtratrmporal esspncl' of Neh philosophy. In their attempts at salvag ing that id(>alist principle t.he adherent:­of the trend in quest ion claim that for readers (or st u­dents) of philosophirfll works, their au~hors arc contem­poraries no ffiflUer Whl'll they actually Im.'d. But that ,\~­se rtion is also grouml1l'ss.

0} Regreltably. thig ob"iou~ denigration of t1~e hi~lory of !Orience is shared by !'oml' hi!'torian" of the n~tural ~clCnCeg .. For example:

d" (" '10 "Ondrc Ko"rc "Copcrfllcan or Newtoman a~tronom~ accor inA' o!\ , x.. ~, , . I· t d 's

j " no !Oll"<'r of inh'rpsl 10 anyo)Jlc. It 'pM~£,!'~~~ no ,·n tiC In ~ ay . ,~.orld. tll ; t i~ whl'l't' Ill\' hi~lorr nr.~rH'nr(' .chrkr~ fro.m th,£' ~llstoo r 1 '·1 . I ' \nll \'(' hl'lit,VI" (Without dl"rus!'mg III (h 1:\11 ho\\

jus:~ti~(r~/:a? ·oilinion i~) thllt till' doctrines of .\ri~totle :'In(1 Plato relain lhl'ir validity today. (Sll; til) ,

Clearly, to negate the hi!'ltorical ra('t~ lln(\f'rlying rliffpf ('Ill philosophies, their conh'nt ami form, nlt'an~ to qUl'stion Ih(' legitimacy of the hi:.:tory of philosophy as il sriPIH"P.

~t\ldy of a history of philosophy offNing no historical ('valuation of different philosophies 1'l1llS ('o\lllll'r to its Iwill, cipal purpose. Still. according to Gucrollit, Ihl' historicity of a philosophy rules out its elernal value, wilhont which it cea~es to be a true philosophy. But a study of the actual history of philosophy shows that philosophies relain t.heir outstanding value after their own era precisely because they afC the product of a speCific time which helped shape subsequent social development.

In Gucroult's opinion, the proof of the history of philoso­phy as a science is the same as Kant's famous formula : how is pure mat.hematics possible? How is pur(', i.e., theo­retical, natural science possible? Kant began by register­ing that "pure" mathemat.ics and "pure" nallual science did exist, and then went on to examining their ep istemo­logical premises. Following his example, GueroulL main­tains: "Consequently, to say thaI, the history of philosophy exists means, striclly speaking, only that then' have long exi~ted studies of past philosophies, aimed at reproducing the philosophical consciousnes!i of that moment in its orig­inal i;cn::;e and assuming that thc students understand thcir authors." (60; 47) Kant proved the existence of pure mathematics and pure natural science by ass\lming the ex­istence o[ a priori forms of sense perception and thought. The subsequent history of mathematics and natural sci­ence fully refuted that. assumplion. f\e\'erlheless, in defend­ing the idealist principle regarding philosophy's indepcn­d~nce of history, Gueroult actually l'epC'ats the errors o[ I,ant's a priori approach.

Gu~r~~ll.~ describes his history of philosophy as "diano­t'llIatlcs , _c defined a~ a science "dealing with the condi­tions in which philosophical wOl·k:-; are posl:iible inasmuch as Lhey pos.sess in~estructible. philosophical value". (GO; (8) Thus pJlIlos~phy s alleg~d mdepenJence of histOL·Y is what. lIlahs the Ilislory of philosophy at all possible as a sciencc. But how dops onf' explain the V4'1·Y possibility of a phe-

'-. In an~j('~t Gr('C'k phi)o~o~hy, dianoia m('lml mrditation, con-(',('phon. thmkmg. In Plato!' Tlmarlll dianormn slan-' f \',

",on 8"hol" I " D' 'I" h ,us or mC'( I a-__ ." kn lau r.. l(!nOIO og r III t e IIcif'nce lltudyi tI bTf

of reason. Gueroult's "dianoematics" has a !li~ilar ::'~anli~;. Illes

70

1l01l}I'IIOII ~hHt "UIIS ,. ,"nlf" to I Ie IllIVe :llil~· of ch.,nge­Gue .. oult l~ awan' thal Ihl' I'xplanation rwnnt bf' rl.',I!lc~d to tlu' a:il-H'I:lioll: "I~ lin Olll' filiI philflsophf.;1 can fll'finiliv(' ly prove hlnl~pIr rJl(hl, IIPill]l'f i;<lti hi' ,il'flni!i'w'i y (efute others." (GO; .-10) That arglllllf'lit. CIII~rOlllt hollis, will h, accpptahll' [0 i\fly ~kl·pli(' who mainLtins that all philoso­phiC'~ an' \\ortldl'~~. tllLl 1114' til<;k i~ II) proH, contrHry to thl) skeptics, that. all phiiosophirs -- -of course, inaSffillch a~ tl]('y nrC' original ~y~tPIlI~ an' H'mporally impregnable spir­itual valu{'s. "Thl' prohlt'rn of tilC' possibility of the history of philosophy as a scirnce translates itself (se transpose) into the problem of the possibility of this science's ohject~, that is, into Ih(' lransCf'ndental problem of the possibility of philosophies as permanent objects of a po::;sible history. in short, into the problem of the possibility of philosophy as a plurality of philosophies that cannot be reduced to onc another or dl'~lroved ht'cause they remain eternally \·al-

• •

uable for philo~/)]lhical rcn('ction." (00: 51) Thus, to prove the thesi~ about the eternal value of each

philosophy Gucroult rcjcct~ not only the progre:;;;. of phil· osophical knowledge but also the fact that one philosophy can solve (or at least pose) the problems another system has f<liled to soln or pose. ~omt.' of Glleroulfs rollower~ go even further. According to Brunner, philosophies can coexist without coming into connict with one another b('­cause they are not true or false copies of the real. (40; 198) The wOl·d "copy" is clearly. ~u.t of place. here ~e: cause Brunner rejects even the pOSSibilIty of philos~pll1e~ being true or false. But if philosophies are not. stud,ll.'s 0', objective reality, then whaL arc they? Brunner slmp~~. cal~:5 them objects of art. (40; 198) Philosophical cog~ltlon I.S thus likened t.o artistic vision of the world, and p}lIlos?plll­cal systems, to Lhe works of .PI~e,i,dias, Raphael, r~halkov: sky, etc. O[ course, this "al'll:;tlC ~pproa~h to pllllos~ph.~, is not supposed to dccide which phllosopl,lIcal. prC'cept,; _ al~ true and which arC' fabe. Bul the solutiOn IS too co:.tly. it refuses to l'l'cogniz1' the fundalllNllai. differe~ce betwel'll aesthetic perception of l'r,llity ,Ind i.lllIlosoph). the lat:~r 1 L aL all thC' cl'Ntion of artisl~. Unlike thC' port, thc l~ li­

; 0 '\ : . ..;tri\'l'~ ttl ;lchil'\l' cognition in co.ncl'l~t~,. no~ 1m . aO~~J) l~':)l'ts ol't~n ,I~el'nd to gn'llt philosopilicallllslgh~~, HII ;)~ii~sopIH'rs do not pfodllCl' gn"lt porlry .. \pp~~C'_n~I), lha~ i!' the rcason why GlH~rolllt, although he gC'ne;a ~ O('S no

j\

oppose likening philosoph;£'=, ttl works flf art, I\{'V(·rtIH·less deems it n{'crs~ary In inlt'o(\ul"t' nHTPdinTl~ iulo that O\'l'r

Iy straighlfor",;\nl ,"il'Wpoint. ,\('cording 10 Gllrroult , philosophy I' ,lllnni hI' vil'wpd in

isolation il'om Ihl' )'l'Mning for tlw ![,lIth which iuspil'l's p\".

{'ry true philo!':Ollil{' l'. Thnl YI'lll'lling is n(lt ~i llllll y a suh· jcctin state of mind that slm's On'1' the llt'.tllal hu t not at all Irlll' contt'nl of philosophil's. 'I'll(' pl'oblrJll i~ prc­cisely to grasp each philosophy llS a di :-; Iinct I'raiizalion of thaL organic yearning for the truth. Bllt if that is so, th en clearly phiiosophil's ought to he' compared to one anoth er, to the information supplied by the' nallll'lll and soc ia l sci­ences, and Lo historical C'xperience or practice, because that is the only way to ascertain how cOI'l'cctly t.his or that phi­losophy understands reality, But thnt is what. Gllerolllt re­ject.s, and he asserts that there exist philosophical truths totally different from, and independent of, f'.cientiflc truths , and that the former are based on a special kind of reali­ty foreign to science, The subject of philosophy is totall y opposed to the subject of all the natural and social sci­ences taken together, The conclus ion i!'i that th e philoso­pher has no need of '<:cientific knowl edge and that scienti sts are incapable of philosophical di scoveries, Guerou lt needs this contra position to justify the> right he alleges philoso­gl~el's .!l~ye to ignore scien tific di!\coveries, Obviously, this

!'I,ght, IS deduced from a false 11l'emise, that of philosophy being IDdependenl of history. including the history of sci­ence" According to Gucroult, there exists a basis of philo­~op~llcal truth and of the yearning for it, and that basis IS lIl~ependent of the philosopher's will (but not of hi s consciousness), To justify that thesis, he im'onls the con­cC'pt of, philosoph,ical realiL~' opP05('(1 to everyday reality, the ~mbJect of SClcnce, He mterprets the facL that science hns long transcended the boundaries of everyday expel'i . ('l,lce to mran tha.t tho!';e honndariC's [H'e gradually expan , dmg, But that does not bring everyday ex)' '\ to th(' II II "r. < - ,I onence c oser

a, ege( Y supl'aSClCnllJlC philosophical I'ean 1'1 whol(> thing r('s('mbl('s the claim or Ih(>olog' til y. tl · 1,e subject of "stlldy" is not of this world, lans lat lelr

TllllS G\lf!roult claims th"l philosophy f(' 't If ff fron;t e\'('J'yrlay reality IIml lurns 10 quit; an ncl's I,se 0 r('allt~·, :\forrow'r, only that is philosoph v wh~~'rr, 1I1,

de l?lh tlwl l'pality, Thp ]l(.rcl'Jllihh', IHngiblt, ~'\'(' .",1 deals, Wlt,l!

r~( "y I'l'alitv l~ ,

Uhjl'4',pd to I ... • It 101 d.~rogatc.v philo${Jl'hi~1l1 rritil'Slll CIlI',rolllt 1ll8i,ntaill lal lhe tl {ferenl e1 among JhilosfJ

pilIP l~r'I'.I. 110 JU I rlf:~t on n thp ye; of fl>verydav I ,~l!IY ~d'.J(·h l~ I .1( IU~ Ilonl,rI bv philosophical thought. -I hug II I~ I'vf!l'yda v liltv IIld "]01 phiioSOPI1:W nJ rnu! t dl 'enll iI:O:l'lf l)l'rlln~ rel'OIi. 'lllll)~opuy dislo-; .5 IR cn~.ydl y real ity (or I'1l1hl'l', on tbe other side of it; its cogDlldbh~ l' .

seuee phil~Js(JphitlJl reality, Th/.: lattcr, uulike o\wyllay rl·l1l1t,.-. IS .11l'i('piu·,thly Jjnkl!d to (ree but not random phil­o'iojlillral J1HI~ml'nt, hC'c IISH al",i;lYs and en~rywhf'l'e (l~\'l'n tlmong irrtltion<llists) it is hasf'd on the ration<ll, ,11111 lr)~ic is it s intrllrdmd tonI.

POI' G1l(~roult, e"cryday reality does not stand (or thf' extl'rnal worlll that ran be perceived through til(' spnSI'S,

He expands t he concept to cover everything studied and undel''itood by non philosophy, The knowledge <lLoot that tllJegl'clly c"(try,lay 1'('ality thus coinciriE''i with the knowledgl' Iwscd on (>xlwrience or practicf', And 1hl'i ae tual knowledge, to which mankind owes '-0 much. without which modl'l'D civilization is impos::'ible. is contrastell to th ... great philosophies, prc!;ented as a :,eit-sufficient whole in dependent of e\'eryday reality. as a clo,;...,.d world of thought detc l'mining it self through a priori precepts, Brunner call~ that concept monadological realbm, Each philo~ophy is PI'l'sl'ntt'd as something similar to Leibniz'" monad, at h',)!'>l in t il{' 'ienSl' that it form~ it clo,:ed realm of the idt'al. The philosopher hoth creates and percein"s being. tho sub jecL of hi s reflection, According to Brunner, the rcalitil':­examined by philosophy are similar to the world of Plato's tl'an scendental ideas which opposes the exoteric world of things perceivable by the sense::;, Thu!', for all th~ir c1ai,m~ about t.he fundamental equality of all gl'l'at plulosophll's, th(' l>l'opOII('nls of the "philosophy of the hi:.-tory of pl~i1o~­ophy" reject mat('riaJbt doctr~nes and defend "Plato's lIne, i,l'" id('"li~Il\, or cours('. thl" dor5 not mean that they adhere 10 Phlto'::; philosophy, The idealism of today cannot accept PIMo's doctrine as created 2,000 year" ago, ,\nd Iht' "philo,<:ophy of th(' history of yhilosophy" pre:'lenl,!\ th,~1 mllch.\'aunt('d philosophical real,lty as a .'world of ,Inlell~­!,!ihle [dNI :'l no lllattl'r W~lat their o~tolog~c;,~ :"ta.tl~~, Tn~,I' liC'nlall\', tll<)t intl'rpn'latlon of Plato f'. pllllo:-nph:'o I:'> a ~,l-lit'll! h~a llln' of 1I(1~:O:Nl's phC'llumcIlology, ,

Plalo Ilsed myt.hs to explain the fundamC'ntals of 111~ sy:o:

• • f·,

tern, Some adherents of the "philn~ophy or 11If' hi~lllry nf , philo~ophy" Iry 10 do Ill(' ~;lm~', For nampit" in his ,u'lid .. "Myth, "islory aud \ly:->tl'TY", .\lht'rt ,,'agnt'l' i1t' Hpyna, one of the more con:->i~t('nt follow('r5 of that :->chool, maiH­tains, fully in the spirit of (;hri:-;tian t.h('oIogy, that. "myth is a word of truth, becans(' it is a word of trust", (n7; 2ft) Myth, h(' asserts, "is tru(' inaslIluch as it disc()yc'r5 H'Cllitv , from its point of \·iew". (97; 24) This paean to myth has a definite theological connotat.ion, According to this con· c('pt, a myth is not ('ven a symbol but a sign of cosmic mystery coming to man as a re\'clation, The cntire mean­ing coded into a myth is incalculably greater than the on(' 1IlldC'rstood or expressed v(,rbally. Therefore, myth " r e· v('als the b('ing, thc essence of th e transcendental, of 'cos­mos' ", (97: 23-24) Myth is unavoidable because "it is impossible for man to express his vision in the Jangtlage of logic or science, io which self-con templation from the outside is an impossible and absurd \'enture", (97: 25) Myth can be expressed only in metaphors or symbols. It cannot be grasped by reason, its mission is to shift the in­tellect that trusts it inlo the transcendental reality which it denotes. -

:\'aturally, not all proponents of the "philosophy of the history of philosophy" proceed as resolutely from abstract ~udgments to "specific" theological statements. Therefore, In order to fully decode the "philosophy of the history of philosophy" we would do well to return to its alIegedlv scholarly arguments and to the facts (or at least what ap­pear to be facts) that it cites,

According to Gueroult and his supporters the histor" of philosophy must employ a strictly scientific' method, Bu't ~,his much publicized demand for a scientific approach is l,n actual fact made for th(' sake of appearances, beca use It ahsolul~ly rules out ~he evaluation of the method applied ~ )y ho~ I.t reflects obJcctive reality and the C01Tcspond­I~g. ohJectlve truth, In t.his conncction, Paul Ricoeul"s defi ­nllion of scien~ific, o.bje~tivity is significant: "Here we must l1ndcrsla~d obJechnty 10 its strictiy epistemological sense: !hal whIch i!as 1)('('n dvclopC'ci by methodical think­mg, arranged 1D an ordrr~y way, is l1ndrrsLood and can be ~lIl1ll'rqan(lnhlt, to olll('rs IS ohjt·cU\,(', That is lru(> fl. I('nl and hinln~ical ilis('ipliIlPs' that is also tr 0 t?S tory." (fl2: 2(1) This r('dllction' 'of the objectivity I~cr ; st~~~

,

10 It,('lInin!! rl"lllin'lIlI'llts, ,.lthl)\lgh lhf'y afe no flouhl IIPt'('·""lV, h'lIl~ lIil:OE'UI' to th .. c '.'Iclu'~on that the histor if·ill (and all 1\' 11, Ili~tul'icll nil lo~ophi('al) study IS sulf­j('{'ti\'l' d.'spilr' ilS, ~~l'i,~tt!II1()\fJJicnl ohjet~ivilY,. Bl~!, thai ,IS "~l'i(>nldil' !luilj,'dl\'lly , 1101 If) he ('onfn~cd With .111 ,!lt~ 11

tiollcd ~tJhj~'rtidtvn oilier word~, with had fallh 1)[ In-

('0111 pc tr IICI' , , Thl' sl1hjl'cti\'l~ ",;pert of rp!'I'arrh cannot Iw H~llor!'l1. Bllt

recognizing 01' denying thE! suhjective appro?ch hy tlw scholal' is not the point; the important, th'n~ I~ to ~('P thf! way l(,~lflillg til thl' oiljl'ctiY(, Iruth, to Its cr,lterJOIl- III nth PI' 'words, 10 haw a IIHltcri.lIist 1l11<il'fstand.Jllg. f~f t1!f' suiJ­jt'cliv(' asper\ of cognition and human subJ~ctlVJty III "gc~: "I That is pr('cis{'ly what the adherenls or the phi ~~~~;)hY ~r thc history or philosophy" ~ack, and tl~at .lcart: them to a subjectiv!' approach to the hlst~ry of pllllf~?[lI~), despite lhri(' strict ob~erYance of the ,reqUJrement~ () ... ep,ls­temological nbjrctivity", The pri~c~ple of .. subJec.tl~lt! n that is the pl'inciple of personal ~r'lhance-I: t~e k~,~ co • cept in till' "philosophy of the IHS:~OQ: of I~hllo~~~ph~ 'f ~~{. true con lent of each phi1o"ophy .I~ ItS. ('~~!e~"lOn 0 I~ uniqu(' crrativity of the philo"ophlZl~g l~dIGdll~~~ra ~r:i~·_ of self-a"f:.('rtiol~, For ,(>xam'p.le~ ._ e~~l ano~l~e: ism. lIad

. "I 0 II' new no Ism gn e" rl~e . . W~:~~~h {~irdl a~ a c'hild, there would haYe been no ~PLDOZ-

isn~~~u~i~,2?I~l' "prlil~~opllrt 0i~I:!~~ ~~st~~~ ~~2b~il~~~N!~\;~~ merely rehashes 0 ( I ('a s d. d genllrDlen ha\'c n

I , d tl 'I "yon la le~ an ' James c alme I" , ' , " -1.3) He reduced the philosophy, each and al~ r,f ~olla~d(l id'ealism rationali:-m struggl e ~):t~~ecn matrl'H'I (~ll~~r 'differencrs al~lOng phil~so and t'mpJ1'ICI~I~I, anel aV'I?t' of tcmperam('nts. Thb new pliers 10 111(' 1l1comp.al,1)( I). ~chop('nhauer's doctrinr, which obviously o.nglllt~t~~l, t I~OI~CC'Pt of philo-"ophy as a later led to thr l'\(~tC'n (a I~ , I· \'. vi,doll or Ihl' I'l'al.

tHlrdy Sil )Jl'C 1\ r ' , 'I . Illl\'lo$Ollh\' doc~ not IIlNtll ., ' contllHlI v In . B G N('('dl('f:.s to !',l), . 'I' ,tl to n ""CCC'~SO!'. ut ,Oll-t ·1 ' lilY g(\·l'~ HI I - AI ,.

that onc h JlH MOl, It.,· ('I Il'a"t fol' a II ;\I:\:-[ tl·" (' l'lIH-'1l aJ " .

hie!' Jlroc('l'tl~ Will 11. . -ll o:call\' thai thl' COIlIl'lIt i"l) f·wl In cnndut\t·, tputP II (l"'(r~r\'O' ;lncl''' tht' CI'(',lli\l' " 1·1 . hi!''' ll11'rt' \' ~- .

of diffl'l'l'nl JIll o.:->op t ' It 'fol'g('t~ thai Jll'rs()I\,\1 crt'a-, [ tht'l\' <1UII Ill ", (' b 1 31"'0 lll'l'~(lll<lhly II .. f' tlll'r of philosophy or art u .

ti,.it.y is not onl~ .1 N

of sclCDce and other SphC'fC'5 of hllman lH'tiyily. That Ein. stein. Cf7atC'd tI,w thcor~' of t'l'I,\th'ily W;l~ no nC{'jill'ut lIut that In ,~self did not, a[fl~ct ,till' cOl/tCllI of his II1('ory 10 any sub,;;tantJal dcgrN" lor It l~ a systrm of ohjer! in' t I'llths,

NatUl'aily, Gouhief and othcr t'xpolll'nb of tilt' wbjecti1Jc interpretation of philosophy cannot 1H'('C'pt this hl'(',Hh(1 thl'v oppose ~hilosoph}r I? science al~d t.hl" history of philosoph)' t~ t.he Jllstory of sClcnce. GOUhH'f flatly refuses to differen­tiate bclw('cn the suhjC'ctive and thl' objectiY(', the p('1'S011-

al and, !lil' social, in different eh!losOl:hil's. That is why he ~eOlcs the ob,:lOus facL, t.hat ~pJnozn s materialistic pan­theism develops Ideas which took an entire historical era to. shape. A~cording to Gouhier, "Carlesianisll1, l\Ialebran ~ cillsm, ,Comtlsm and .. Bergsonism re[N' us to the thought.s of fir-nl? D~scarle~, ;';:.I,col~s de 11alchl'anchc, Auguste Comlc and. Hl'nl'l. I3cI'gson. (;:,9; 20) lic lhink:o; hC' is merely ~lat.l~g obnous facts that pro\'c philosophy is a completelv md.mdual way of conceptual thinking. But SHch statcmentS deliberately proceed from the groundless assumption thaI.. De~ci.lrtcs. -'laIebl·anche. Comtc and Bergson worked in a soc~aI ~'acuym, that their philosophies expressed no real S~ClO-~llstOl'lcal nceds, and that they did not assimilat.e the Ilistorlcal experience or scientific achievement.s of their time: B~t Ber~son's doctrinc of "creativc evolution" was an Irrational mterpretation of Darwin's cvolution theory and an alta.ck ?~ Einstein's theory of rrlativity. •

The. sllbJectln~t intC'rprt'lation of tho history of philos­~!ph~' IS r?Olt'd In t1~; slIbjeeti\"ist interpretation of thc p~llosophlcal reality discussed above. Philosophies arc

s~ld to .b~ ~s~entially not compar~ble, since each allegect ­I) studies It!< own world. Accordmg to Go"I,' e "D'ff', enc' f" I Jr,IC'1 , rs 0 OpJOlOn l('lw('en philosophel'f'. are not accidental: th('~ arc ~t the SOUl'ce of all philosophy. Oifferent )hilos­o"hJCS e:nst because' the philosOI)her'" I',eld of "I I nol

" VIS ion (DeS cover one and the same world, tb d'ff

philos~plwrs. precede their philosopilies~ lhICl:rei~ces am~ng ment III their thoughts beca\lse the d . no aglC'c­the same data" (59' 42) A I Y 0 .not proceed fl'OI11

. , c oser exammatio '11 I that ;l('c(lrdill~ to til(' "phil()~f)lIh\" of tI ' I . n \VI S.lOW ()pby" phih'~(llJhl'l"s IlwIllSI,lw, . r,',' I " IllIstory . of plllios

I. . fl I' U' 1,1 I I' I rl'a Ity Ilspd to slIhshntiatl' II" I I'" II osoJlllCa I . .'" , 10..' II 1Ira [St.IC conc' t f I IIstO? of phdo~()p!.y: in otlit'r word!';, that 1"1" . ~ ~. 0 t.1(' n~oJl!II(".tl C(JII~trll('tion. IIltw call /Jilt' tJ .Ii[\.) IS a plltl

, lell I.lXplalll lhe eh~l"-

76

Ilal aTlfI ther' 101 IIltcr ubjl'rti1'c gmflc,nce .,scrihl·rt to IIIJilosflpiLip'l.l Le qnl lioll I.lm~ 1\ In I~ ,vere,1.

.\IIIII"L·I·lIl ')1 thl' lilL!) Ilph;. II Ihl' II lory 'JI phdo-IIplty" ILlalw 110 )'lllil"lc :IlIai), I III 'Ie cun"cpt c·1 !'Jh·

jectivity. NeiUwr do UUJY Wft'renti.J.tc betw,·('O 8u\Jjecll'lI' ty and subjeclivism. They completely igoorn the fact that subjectivity, as Lh.~ iu:tua! dirfercnce of one human !gubjcct from anothl'r, ha~ lin ()bj!'/~livt contcnt. According to Lenin, "Th(H'c is a riiff(!rl'lH:o hetwcen the .~lILjer.tive and the ob· jective, 13 UT IT, TOO, liAS ITS LI M ITS." (10; .18. U8) As to Gouhicl', he bestows a :iort of ontological status on the subjpctivily of til!! philosopher: suiJjectivity is the SOIll"Cl' of t.he philosoplwr's personal universe.

According to Hicoeul', true suhjectivity in an Oulsli.lOding philosopher mukes his cloclrine a free \vork of his genius, a work complC'tply inrif'peodl'nt of other. abo brilliant, phil· osophical works. The study of the history of philosophy is therefore called upon to pro,·ide a maximum "singulariza· tion" of each philosophy--that is, to establish its unique­ness. That would prevent it from being included in some speCific trend of philosophical thought. According to that theory, the concepts of materialism, idealism, rationalism, irrationalism, etc. are merely artificial categories obscur­ing the uniqueness of each philosophy, and that uniqueness makes it impossible to classify them. Thb approach makes an absolute of the moments of interruption, relative inde­pendence and uniqueness in the history ?f philosophy. But each o[ these moments i.s organically hnked to l!S oppo­site: discrC'teucss ncc{'ssarily implies continuity, Indel~l'n .. dence presIL PPOSi'S dependence. <l nt! un.iq uen:ss -. sUCC:S~IOIl. By making an absolute of the essentIally lrratlO.nahst ~o­tion about the total incompatibility of great pllllosophl~S, Ricoetll' even denies that. many of them haY(' to do With the same pl'oblems. As he sees it, recognition of evcn a relative unity of philosophical problems throughou~. the long history o[ philosophy is. hound .to l~a~ to S~~Jlhc.lsm: a docll'inc h(' ['('jt'cb. "Th(' llL~lory 01 ph~lo~ophy IS, [r,\I~k I k' g a lcs~on of skcpticism if it IS seen as a scncs Yf

s~(',~ I~ ~o"\ltions to immutable problems called elNoal o "allous. 1 G d t)" (9')· ;)"") But (freedom, rt'ason, reality, sou, .0, e c. '. .,"", I

I' lH' do(':o; not unde!""tand that rejectIOn of co~­a'pp~rent.) I hi<;tol'Y of jlhilosophy also leads to skepll­~li~~~Y t1:~ ~;~Icr -l1lafntains thai Ilhilo~opher:l can neither

11

..,. \ {

/ , •

"

- ,J ...... ' .-~ ~ '-. ( , , '-- , (.. .... "' ....... ~ -, - • ,. 'f

, ~- ... - •

:f .- l~" , ,,~. - <: • :-.J....' , - ...""""'"' , , /~ , .. ,- • • - ,

It'arn froOl thrir pr('d('r('~sor.'\ nor t('.neh t lI,rir Sll(,T('~:;or~. Hirol'ur hims(,1f j:-; !,;lthC'1' do:,!' 10 pllllosol'llIcal Skl'ptH' ISIH

(idtholl!!h hl' frjecis it) pn'cis{"Y hl'ri\~lSI' hi', ilkI' the ~hll-I'e l,,_""'ulially d(,llil'~ thai phdosupillral pl'ohll'lH:i rail be 1:-, .. ,~ •

inlu'riled. In the past, hi:4orians of philosilphy usually said that

all philQ.';ophcrs had always posl'd i\lId trit'd tn soln: the same "dernal" issues. The history of philosophy was Ilken­I'd to a closed cycle of ideas Ilnd unsolvable probl('m~. I nlik(' that traditional concept already ('xposC'd a:s falla­ciotls by lIegel, the ·'philosophy of t.he hi:--tol'Y of philoso­phy" dt'ni('~ that the philosophical problcJll~ t["('<,led by dif­ferent philosophies havc anything in commOLl. !low to ex­plain this leap from onc metaphY1)icaJ cxLr('ITIC to the other, from the typology of philosophical prohlC'TIls to their "sin­gularization", or, as Halian existentialil'3t Nicola Abbagna­no puts it, their "individualization"? The answer may be gil'aneci from what. we have just discus~ed. The "philoso­phy of thl' hif'tol'Y of philosophy" altacks the' iciC'a of a sci ­('ntific philo!'iophy, while its dcfC'nse was a progressive fea­tUfl' of pre·Marxian philosophy. For the school in question (and for most of today's bourgcois philosophies) philosophy anrl ~dl'ntilic approach arc incolllpatible. Jiellce the st.rug­gle against "5ci('ntism" in which tl1('1'(' surfaces a most con­tnHlictory combination of critici!'illl of some ncgat.i\"e coo­scquel1ct's of one-sided scientific specialization and rejec­tinn of til(' siglliiicanct' of science as a world ouliook in gen­('ra\. TllI'ri'forl', the opposition or today':; bOllrgeois -philos­ophy to \1arxi~m is exprcs~cd in a r{'jecUon or the con­C(~pt of ~('i('ntiflc philosophy, scientific wodd olltlook-just a~ ~ht, I~o\lrguois refusal Lo accept the inevitability of 50-(·Iall~rn IS. cxpl'es~ed in a nt'gali\'ist rejC'ction of historical ucc(,~!-\Ity In gcnt'ral. . Hi,coe~ll' gop;s h('yo~d the 11l('I'C rcje'clion or historical con­

tlnll1t.y In JlIHlo~()plllcal prohlcms. Ill' attacks any solution flf .tiJ('!-\p prohll'~s, claiming that thi!-\ is nol t.he function or phd()~o"hy: Jlh~l,osophy only poses qu{'stions, it should not HfI~wpr thrm. 111t'l"pforp, till' uniqul'nc!'i!'!, the g('nius o[ a phdfl~o~~I~'r ~aHTJ()t 1)(' in. ('!-\~l'l1('·C t'xpn's!-\C'll in an~wcring thr. qUI ~t.iOIlS pf)~NI by ill>.; Ilr(>(\('C(,>';:<'01"" II'," . . . II r I I

- .. .'. ., gC11lUf' IS In II' a('t t .at It' po~('~ prohll'm" ill a IH'W " .. \ I I . r. I"· ,. . "< y, ant tie ao-

~\\er~ {OIHI' ,,"n l'~~ ~lgnlhl'i\llt (\lId ('SSt'ot" II - 1·1 80phirlll indi\'iduals. la ~ nonp 11 0-

78

, •

.:.-'\ , . " -. , - \ , , -~ - .

" / h , , .

~ .' I 1 , • rtl~ - - ~ I • , .... ; . ~, , • , - • ... ' • . -. .

\I J- InlC IlLat ('orrc·':t ]lo:~inlo!: of a pJ'nhlf'm is \'c'ry impor tall\. III 1111110;-<op1l,)' L"-f't·yhody klll)WS 1111' impnrlaJII'p t)1

1'0:-.111~ .)]clL I'l'tIhlt·tm iI~ Ihl' uuil.v of til!' world, -':IlIh-.latlc·l', ,,(·\1 ~llOIJOl1 (.f JIIallpr (·rill'ria I)f tlw Irlllh, <IlIcl :;0 011. To H

{:ulI:;lCll'rablc' degl'l~I', philosophy\ (listincli\"l~ nature ~tem~ !1'OCli Ill\' f"c·t thal it illl\,<HIC{'~ lH'W i",su('s Ipfl IInnotiCl~(1

in til(' pa ~ t nnd fOl' who~1' ~ollltion the reflnisil!' <;('il'utirlc infol'JI\,llioo is oftf'n lacking. It is therefore clear that the Wily pl.dlosophicai prohlpms (Iff' po~ed ch.'\"plops cognilion. 1 f lhe lIuport.tlnt thing herp is not the ilnswer, then at any rate' it i:-; lh(' :-;lIgg<'stic)ll o[ po~sihlp ways of arriving <It it. Hut philo:-;ophy noL only poses questions. it answer", thf'Ol too. It is a diffe'l"cnl maUrr that, as seen from the hi~tor\" • of philo!-\ophy, those anSW('l'S WNO vcry oftrn IInscipntirtc. Still, thaI dops not !lll'un they ~hollld he un{\prrateci. If there is a grain of Il'1Lth in an answcr, that, too, is progress. Philosophical problems diffcr n\dically from t.he ~pccirlc is· s\le~ of any special science because their solution calls for (lir£t~'l'ent types of infol'mation supplied by science, practico and historical experience, and therefore cannot he the re snit of a :-;p('cifie (':qH'rin1l'ot or dcmon!'!tration hil!>.pd on lim ilNI data and equ<llly limited theor('ticai prembcf'.

The "philosophy of the history of philosophy" does not mel'ely deny the possibility and necessity of a scientifiC philosophy. 1t extoIls the unscientific approach (that of idealism, of comse) as the highest form of theor('tica~ in· ~ighl into the natul'£' of things. This cult of the tichber­alply \ll\sci('ntiiic, pre!>.euted a!'! illl authC'ntic £'xpr('~sion of I hC'~l"clical l'ea~Oll, is an id(>ali~t atl('mpt. to {\i.,bast' ~cirnc(', the highcst forill of theoretical cognition.

Gueroult charges Kant with having tried to assr:;s the value o[ metaphYSiCS (philosophy) by its capacity. for h~'. coming a science. GuerouIt is convinced tl1<\\ t\C'f'plte th('lr unscient ific nnt.UI"C', all metaphysical sy!'!tems JlOSS('~~ ('\:Cl"· lasting val ue, lIe preaches the following: th~t winch 1m: parts everlasting inlollocLu~1 value to a JllllloSOI~~lY dt:t~;, not dcpend on its correct Judgn~en.ts hut on th(' f\l\lIH~,; of being" individually expl'cssC'd III It.

According to \Vilhelm Dil.th~'y' one .of th£' f()\lI~tI(·~·s o~ the German "philosophy of !Jfe '. thc. hlst?ry of pllll()!,OI~h~ ("\pl"t'~st'S till' ~ltbstl\l~ti.lllilY and IrratIOnality Of. h\l~I:a~l, lI.fl': lt~ impu\!-\i\"c', srnsltlH' <I lid sp~)~lalH'OIl!'> .11.1tllll. I.~ I,".

compaliblt' with till' ol'dl'l'ly sUCCC~:<'lon anti I£'glll.\flt~ l~ (I 79

\ , - , , , , ., -

irl"li of iifrless cntit.irs. TiH'rrfort" lliltllPY hold,. tIll' Ill. tory !If philosophy ca.ll (l1l1~' h.l' IInclt'l'fln!ld l~ 'llIarch~1 of philo!<ophiei;: cach pllllo~ophy lI,IIt'II!'rI.uallr n·prodllt,.,. Ih., ~Jlirit of life illl'vitabir III ally ~I\'t'n IlIsloru'al I'l'iI alld ran­not be described as true or fnbl': likt' Iif(" it simpl\' is Although the adherents of thC' "philosophy of tllP hi~lor\: of philosophy" dispute Dilthey'::; "hist.ori('ism" and IY1II;. log~' ?f worId outlooks,. they too tl'.Y to suhst.antial!' a pll\. rallstlc concept of the history of pilliosophy, I'l'j('cting Ihun­ner's "fiction of progress" and maintaining that LhC' notion of dCH'ioplllcnt cannot be ilpplirci to tli(' history or philos­ophy at all.

Professing to support more profound analysis of the his­tory. of philo~ophy and thel:eby single out tho distinctive (Itwlity of plnlosophy as a lorlll of cogni ti on and of man­k.ind.'~ spiritual life, Gueroult and his followers question the sJg.nthcan~e of philosophy and reject the ideal of scientific­phllos?plllcal knowledge, an ideal it took the entire history o[ philosophy to ,~h.ape. But the " philosophy of tho his­tory o! philosophy IS seen as a perfect science r iSing above the ~lased approach. of. t.he authors of philosophies who ar~ mcapabl~ of obJectwely evaluating all other philoso­pllles. Acco,:,dmg to Brunner, " the object of a h istor ica l study mllst r~maln .a~ object, and that quality is guaranteed by the Impartiality of the historian, The strictness of the ~etho~ dema~ds th~t philosophies be examined as exter­T~u!h;~gs"qU!etly vlewed by the historian." (40; 184-85)

. el

phIlosophy of the history of philosophy" has a ~~lqUetP ace di~ ,the history of philosophy, It is allegedly a

npar Isan, Ismterested j' dAd' historian of philoso b u ge. . ccor mg to Brunner, a the system of view: ~ mus~ nelthe~ ,support nor oppose philosophy makes a hie st~dles, A ~Iklng for a particular difficulties that Philoso~~n~n of fhllosophy disregard the prives him of the crit' f IS una lIe to overcome and de ­portant in a scholar ~~.~ a~p~oach to the subject, so im­('nee to a particular 'do;t ,;"e rom that standpOint, adher~ to that doctrine and ;lD~i~~e~ns a? uncritical approach In this connection Brunner C( attitude to all others, 19th century historian of Ph<I.fote\Edmond Scherer, a mid­stand a philosophy we must

l hSoPl'Y who .said: "To undel'­

wer~, to regard it from the outs~d: ,~en(4~o, It and able, as it J\obody questions the fact th t' ,185)

a a scholar who is guided

80

by hi!.! pefPon u \ like, tas; q mtJ Interest:; in-stead of ~cicn tilie ohJecliv ty 18 very r III being a true resr' hrr Unt the point IIt~rc 1 lci4 DUrlC gool faith which doc!'" lot It till ruIn nu' J, 'li~:.I 1.111) ID pbil0'501)hY, A philosopher (01' historian of pluit,eophy) C'lonot Le n, 'tl aD Ol • 10n

partisan" hy choice. l'artl"anstlip in scientf'· and ID pili losophy. i~ not a pcr801l~j.l but 8 locial position and musl naturally be freo from a.ny subJE'clive preferences.

Partisanship in philosophy meaD!, above all, a deflUile aud consistcnt philosophical position of principle. A con sistent differentiation and contrasting of major philosoph· ies is thus a necessary expression of partisanship in phi. losophy. Lenin describes it as a position of principle in­compatible with ('clp-cticism and stresses that "this refus­al to recognize the hybrid projects for reconciling mate­rialism and idealism constitutes the great merit of Marx, who moved forward along a sharply-defined philosophical road." (10; 14, 337-38) Obviously, such partisaoship con­forms to, and (!ven cssentially coincides with, the reqUlre· ments of scientific objectivity.

Exponents of the "philosophy of the history of philos­ophy" rightly stress that a historian of philosophy must be a historian in the strictly scientific sense of the term. Bu1 a historian of philosophy is inevitably a philosopher. Then how is one to interpret the fundamental precept ~f th,e "philosophy of the history of philosophy" that t~e hlSt?rl; an of philosophy is outside past and present phlloso~hles. The historian of philosophy is supposed to pl.ace hImself above all philosophies no matter h~w meanlllgf,ul they may be. But he is a historian of phllos~p~y pre.clsel

y, be~

cause he is not outside philosophy. AdmlttI~g thIS obv~ou.­truth adherents of the "philosophy ?f the hIstory o~ phllo~­o b :, talk about tbe inevitable antmomy of .the blstor)' of phil~sopbYl and in the final analysis plunge IDtO total COll-

[USiOD'm tin to iron matters out, the "philosopby of the I ,Atte P

f p:ilOSOphy" says that rejection of any adherence

llstor~ 0 , I t arc being 5tudied does not rule out a to yllllos~ph;es t ~~'on for the historian of philosophy. He ~hlllosophl~~1 P~ps~l~r than a metaphilosopber. His pbilos~ph­~s css a, ~ I o~ " hilosophy of the hi~tory of, phUos· Ical position IS t~le Ph f philosopll\' or the phllosoph-

1 " or the phllosoP yo·' ?P llY I' o[ the history of philosophy. lea tleory

81

6_0Hl62

Thus a critical analysis of tho "philosophy of tI ~ory .of philosophy'.' points to th.ll l'lllldIlSi{11l that. it

lC his.

Hil'all ... t mterpretatlOLl ?f thl~ Ilistol'), of philoso lil IS, ,1111 much-vaunted JlOnparlls3nshll) is nol ""r)··1 I

Y' Ihe . I d . ' '" I I'ISlIlg Y

\I'a C {\::i pscudo-nODpartIsnllship, ·in othl'r word' .. ',fe-bourge~is par~isans~ip .. And thaL partisanship iSS'j (~~~llI~CU compatIble "nth sCIentific objectivity We 1,-, n( (til tn·

Ih "h·1 h f . mo SCl'n tI

.e .p 10S0,P Y 0 the history of philosophy" I. HIt mte Ideological function. The pluralistic into las ~ deft­th~ history .of ~hilosophy is also an atlClll)t ~prC.latlOn ~f <lh~g pluralJs~ lD social deyclopmcnt in gOI!cral t '1~h.bst~ntl­~oglcal concluslOn, contrasted to tho doclduc abo' <\t ~deo. Itable transition from capitalism to 0' 1" ,ut the mev­jU~,t impliCitly present in the "philo:o;;~/t)~, 115 m?re than pllliosopby", Martial Gueroult 5 oke of 0, t 10 history of World Congress of Philosophy in 1~68 " It at Ihe 14th

l'~or ,~11 ,its suprahistorical claims t1~e c ' gC~ls philosophy of the history;f h,tnte~lp,~I~ry bour-"rJflC~p~ de~nite subjectivist e.xpressio~ ~~~~~ y IS a his­() auall's lD idealist hi! 1 "current state a,lism. I ustification of t~e osop ~ gra\'ll~tlUg ~o irration­lIent feature of contem ~narc y of p~ilosop'llles is a sa­~lIrprisingly. exponents of ~~y bourge,ols phIl,osophy. Not hoth the pluralism of h'l 1 scbool In questIOn consider numher of "pbilosophi~s 1 rS~6 lYh.and the existencc of any ly justified. 0 e lstory of philosophy" ful-

'I:he crisis of bourgeoi h' , fUSIOn, the absence of t s p llo~ophy, the Ideological con-imbued, the great Philos~e hfeasslOn for the truth that had 1H()('~atlC protest against P" t s ~f t~e past, the pseudode­aSCribed to dialectical ruat s ,an, ardlzatLOn" of philosophy losoph;r to scientific knowlee:lahsm, ~ho opposition of phi­a (hstlllct everlasting \'al ge, the, Irrationalist concept of lH'ndent of their correctn ue of ph,llosophies that is inde­Illustrates the degeneratiCSs or sClCntiftc worth-all that ,though the "philosophy oro~1 o~ ,bourgeois philosophy, AI-11~po~tant and topical issues 1\ llstory of philosophy" raises {l."g'mse the crisis of hour' 1 ~ app:oach and answers only normal state of affairs fungeolS ~hllosophy, extolled as a ture of philosophical knowl~g~~nslstent with the very na-

lIis, report is critical! tlu' IrratIOnalist History f YphD.,fli'lIYZPd in the

o dosophy". (3t) articlo "Postulates of

82

TilE 11IAI.Ef.TIf.AI.·MATERL\UST VIEW In TilL I'll I LOSOI'IIIC.\L SYS'fDI

Mur.lism is the systeTll or Marx's vif'WS and tcaching~

V, I, Dentn

I havo ah'ead~ note~ that the scientific"philosophical worl,d, outlook o[ MarXism negates philosophy in the old, tradItional sonse of the Lerm; that is, it negates any at. tempt at creating a complete system of philosophical knowl edge, exhaustively co\'ering its subject and independent of all the subsequent development of cognition and social life, It is a specifiC, dialectical· materialist negation typical of the revolution in philosophy Marx and Engels brought about by creating dialectical and historical materialism, a system of philosophy fundamentally different from all phi­losophies of the past.

In his critique of bourgeois and revisionist attempts at playing oft one precept or component part of Marxism against another, Lenin always stressed that Marxism was a single, integral scientific system, This very important point is also truc of Marxist philosophY, but neither its bour­geois critics nor even some (although admittedly inconsis­tent) Marxists understand it. Suffice it to recall that in the early 20th century the Marxist attitude to philosopby was still interpreted as clearly negative, For example, Karl Ka­I1tsky said: "By that [Marxism] I understand not a philos­ophy but an empirical science, a distinct view of socie­ty," (74; 2, 452)* That peculiar "understanding" of the philosophical fundamentals of Marxism is important to re­member because today it has been revived by the theorists

.. Kaut!1ky's rejection of tho fact that Marxist pbilo~opby cX,ists i~ an empirical "statement", ,Ther~foro ~e has n~tJllng a~alDst "linking" Marxism to bourgcols philosophies, He hunself tncs to interpret tho materialist view of history in, the spirit of ,p~siliv!~m, Asked by a Social Democrat whother MarXism could be 'hnked to Machism, Kautsky replied: "This do~lriDe is"o{ course, incorn~a~ibJ~ wilh idealist. philo~OI)hy, but no~ With Mach s theory of CO,gDltlOD, (74; 2, 452), rhis prov('S that Kautsky overlooked tho obVIOUS fact

that Mach was an idealist. 83

••

of the Frankfurt School of Sodal S~lIrlit's. who rla III to of f'r an authentic interpretation (01', III tht'lI' own \\'orli, -I'l'

c~nstruction") of Marx's doell'illl'. For. (':\,11111)11', I h'rill'rl Marcuse, a man of considerahlc ~tat\ll'(, 111 t}H' l'Yl'S of to­day's petty-bourgeois intellectuals, ('.CIHWS hallbky in as· serting that Marxism "is an economiC, not. it philosophical system". (82; 103) And here is what Marcuso thinks of the works Marx wrote while only beginning to elaborate his doctrine-a time when the philosophical aspects of Marxism were of paramount importance; "Even Marx's early writings arc not philosophical. They express t.he ne­gation of philosophy, though they still ~o so in philosophi cal language." (83; 258)

Some critics of Marxism (for example, Jean Hyppolite and Jean-Yves Calvez) interpret it as only philosophical, ignoring Marxist political economy and scientific socialism as doctrines essentially different (rom philosophy. Others refuse to accept that Marxist philosophy exists, citing the fact that Marxism rejects traditional philosophies and phi­losophy in general in the old sense o( the term. But the opponents of Marxism ignore the dialectics of that negation. A critique of that antiscientifJc interpretation of Marx­ism and the need to grasp the Marxist approach to past philosophy raise the following questions: what is the Marx­Ist negation of traditional philosophies? What is the Marx­ist view of philosophy as a system?

The Marxist negation of traditional philosophies rejects the (act that they all oppose philosophy to nonphilosophi­<al (and especially practical) activity and nonphilosophi­cal ~tudy. To avOl~ the er~or of oversimplification, we must rermc~ber ~hat ~hlS opposltion, typical, first and foremost, o rationalist, phllosoph~es. and to a certain degree criticized hy 'pre-M~rxJan materialIsts and by empiricists, records Ob~lOUS d~ffcrences between the philosophical and the non­phl1osop}llca~, Ad~ittedly, those are substantial, but au­th~r~ of philosophical systems made an absolute or them a~ ruled out the moment of identity inherent in s· ecific d,r~erence, But distinction and identity form a dial~ctical U~lt~. an; they are both important as aspects of that cor­r~ atlOn. _, 0 c.lte the example quoted in En els' letter to Conrad ~chmldt, the suh!>.tantiality or th ~·ff b tween man and woman im Jr h' e I cronce e­But the difference between ~nlC~<lpp\eeltrr" seubstdanttl in1 identifty.

v an 1e moon, or

84

,Ill ils flVI()U~ and 1ll;IOY ~iclNl nntnre, is a meaningless state· 01£'1\1 If I. 110"" nol lif'mi I\"tr~. ~ any slIbstantial identity. This doC'!s not mnan hat he t~lm 'opposition" is alien to fliilll'ctkni miltcrinli sm. On the (:ontrary. thl') point. lS to nn· derstand it llialectic'llly tnt! ejf>ct its antillialectical inter­pretat.ion which is usuallv totally negative. Essentially, thAt is a specific expression of the more general fll~d(\men \.al dist.inclion belwrcn specifi,f' and abstract neg,allon, .

Opposition of the philosophical to thp, nonphllo~op~lcal in pre-Marxian philosophy was to a cer~aJn degree ]ustlfled by historical cooRiclerations, although It was cxagger~t.ed out of all proportion. But it was already an anachron,lsm in the 19th century, On thc one hand, philosophy r?ahzNI that it could no longer be a passive observer of ~oClal up­hraval:-. On the other, the great scientific. discoverIes pro\'cr~ ad OCUlllS that non philosophical studies are of grea im ortance for philosophy. Philosophical reasoo began. t,o re~ize that it did not rise above the unreason.able t~mpl~~ cal reality as pure, sovereign and self-as~rSSrlng ~;'ng The illusion of philosophy's in~ep~ndeDce "0,, ~(::~ wr10le lIonphilosophical was shatterrd: Phll~~~P~~~'hr~om~ ont of in his early works, "do not spnng uP. I ,e f their nation the ground' they are products of ~he~r. tlm~,? n : th~

, I hI d 10\'ISlblo jUices ow 10 whosr most subtle, va lIa c an . 't that constructs railways ideas of philosophy, The same SPtiri cts philoMphical systems with the hands or workers. cons TU 1 1.9-) . in the brains of phil,osoph~~'S.'~ ~\~d;in Oaf non philosophical

Opposing the philosoP uca. '1 os eets of philos-reality, Marxism rcveals the IllS.~~:I~a it~r u~ion~ with non ophy's cr.eati\'e dr\'elopmdl'n;h!hIpra~ticai political stru~gle philosoplncal U:eory .ao h condemned only sprcnlatlyc­against. everyl-hIDg ph~l.o::;o~ IY "Hitherto philosopliC'rs have ly, if at all., As ra{t ~idi~s lying in their writing-drsks, had the Solll~lon ~ a. TI, lel had only t.o open its mO~lt~~ and the stupid,. exoterIc \\ oroillte knowledge t.o [I~' into It, for the roast Tngeoosdof abs the speculative attitude to man· (1· 3 142) Marx con emns

l t of a seif-eufficient and

" I ble015 on tIC par < 'fl· on kind's rea pro. . r T. fc'ects utopian re e{'tiO~s " self-satisfied phlloso'pll~. flC ,1 11's critirism of c~qllt"h~t.

f nklnd 'nH \I"rs I. I 1 W" the rntnrr 0 ma '. to t.he fll(.lIrf' ha~l·t on a .. rC'ality to Sf'al'eh [or II \\a( gard his critic.ism of rf'ailly nnel his\.ory. Marx Idoes ~°l'l'~·~l~. On the cont.rary, he con as a force intll'PCII{ ent 0 •

nC'cts that crit,icisD1 witl.' th.r already .f'm rrg!ng Iil ll'ration struggle of thC' proletariat. III houl"~{,{) ~ S 8-f)nl'l~· .. Ili'fmi ng the scientific significanc(' of tha t. I'arium" pO~)Jll(lIl, Marx ~ays: "In that case we do ~ot .con fl'{wt t l ~ t' wMld in a dor -Irinairr way with a nl'\\" IH'llll"pll' : Il t'H' I ~ thl' Il'lIth, kIH'(" down 1dor"(, ill 'Yr d ('yciop nrw prin l'i ph'~ 1'01' thl:' world out of the world's own princi pIes. " ( I ; .1, 1·)1 )

Those theses of Marx make it eas iC'r to fl1lly grasp hi!-1 last thesis on Feuerbach: philosophers only II'iNt to rxpla in tho world in various ways whereas tli r task is to ch ange it. To counter the many non-Marxist in tC' l'ln'C'lat ions of t.h al thesis onc should stress the following: l\larx do(' ~ not at all rl'jC'cl the need for <\ philosophic"l ('xpianation o[ th e worlel. He is against reducing the miss ion of philosophy to the in ­terpretation of that which exists because such self-r estric. tion opposes philosophy to the s truggle fol' a r a di cal tra ns­formation of reality. Thus the true meaning o f t.his th e­sis is a categorical imperatiye: to make philosophy a theo­retical substantiation of the need for the r eyolutionary lranf'formation of the world.

Once again, the second major aspect of the Marx is t ne­gation of traditional philosophies is rejection of the oppo­sition of philosophy to nonphilosophical study of reali ty . It is clear from the history of science that such s tudy is nen'r completed, its results reflect reality only approximate­ly. Still, pre-Marxian philosophy hclie\:ed its miss ion was to create a system of final knowledge independent of the subsequent ?evelopment of cognition. It is perfectly obvi ­ous that philosophy borrowed that ideal of absolute knowl ­edge, m~ually opposed to natural science and history, from, parad~xlcall~ enough, science itself- - rneaning, of course, not sCience 10 general hut its historically dermite form. 1"01'

~v~r ~,500 years both .p!lilosophers and nonph il osopll ical . c,lcntlsts rcga.rded Euclid s geometry as a totally complete f'~~tem o~ .axlOms ab~oll1t()ly independent of experience illldd reqlll.rlllg no further development. Nobody c·ver stop-pe to thlOk that geomet· 1 . r h· . 1 l'Ica aXIOms renected actual rela -

t',onts lPd~rt on y approximatel y, Nobody dared cven assume

HI. a IlJerent geometry might exist 0 I ' rf'nwmh('r lha' tl l. 1 -.. ~e s lOuld , of COlli se,

I, 1(' £,\e of cngnlto I' 1 malic ao ah!'lolutc also in f . I 11. n(' II('YC( was t J " • • oflnal logiC wilich wns believed o la\£' ( f'~entlal1y exhn1Jsled it~ ~llhJ·ect P , f· 1 1 '

was a part of philosophy -U : ,UI, 01 ma oglC 10 part which, unlike others ,

86

waR IIs1Ially nc"m que llmp(\. This explaills why philoso IIIPn rc,I,liIy likpnul It'ilc unhical knowledge ifl 11:£'I1f'TlI :0 tha t purl. of it whir.1i )pf''lIClI alrca<l)" ,omple~.

Th liS ph il()~o ph ;cal I y.de m s llircetly e1:pr('sscd the OUIlO·

f'itinn of philosopllY to non philosophical ~tlHly_ n, <trtes t ried to dc(lurp Ihe rotire p.yftll'TIl ?f p~lSjble philollonhf al kllOll'ledge from cogito. l-Jpinola h.UJlt hl3 8ys~m more g"'O" meiricO. Kant was right in shOWing th?t .cogt~o. was not, fundam ental wilhout prrmises becausc It Impllclt1~ prcsu}l

osed "an awarcnf'S5 or the existence or Olh:f. tllln,gs 01.11 P'd If" (7'1· 1 20 1) Kant contraslNl :->PIOOza ~ aXIO­S l e ro yse . .,' , If I' , nd matic m eth od to t.he thesis he himsc provp.(: aXioms '~ defin iti ons in the matlirmat ical sense or the t:rm are 1m

ossibl c in philosophy. nut he still tried to bUild a !i.YStC ~ ll p[ S a "'-·!ltpm of complete and absolute knov;\ o pure r rason a. . oJ· . dIe wrote edge. Sh aring thr illllf'ionf' of hi)' p~e CCl'<:lsor~'bl1 rl 1

I . I ·1 hy' "This S)""tcm 15 una trr,l C, an about li S P H osop . r ' " ., (""3. 3 ?9) He expe-ctNl to hope it .will rernam f'0 toorpe~_~~ritvl ,,~s 'C;pi~'ll not to he' in hand hi S system o\'er ~ oJ

I f tl "(70- 3 00) creasc{ UI' . \Cr , :' ,t '-d r and retur ned to rogito. Fichte r ejected hant s ,~a ISr:n a" an axiom hnt a:' nclil"

But. he saw the l atter not ~.;Jmpl~ d d 't-elf and the non­ity through . wh ich . t he ~~.~ ,rei~;r:for~ ~Ficht(' viE-wed tilt' E go, the ob ject of Its aCh~..,1 ~a·or categoriC'" 81:'0 as rrea deduct ions of the system. .J 0 fl" it.; <:elf_developmen t. tiyc acl iyity by .th(' a~f'~~u~(, dE~i~ <s~'5t~m~ to exhaust t he'

Like Kant •. F ICht: E- le\ e '-i~ ot.her words. he t hought s ullject of philosopillcal stud) of all possible' Ilhilosophi: al hi s system was the f'ys tem

d r the "a rn e illu:,ion - but. Wi th

truths. Schelling laborf.'d un f.'r s"e .\ccord ing to SrlH'1 d I · own systf.' m 0 cour . " . t' of regal' to liS . ' ttrihu tive characlerls IC

ling, absolute aut?oomy IS an .r 1 "answers for itself and the true philo~oP~lIcal , ~ystel~,\ ')~ IIC 1 , conforms withlD Jt self . (95 , - ) t t building a syf' tcm of

Regel made a brilliant a~te~lp ot a dialectical cO ll cept of dialectical ideali f' 1l1 on .ti1et . aSI ~r<-, <; "in g t.hat it was precisl~­developmell t. lIo was rlg'\ I tn s ". ~ ~t elemen t.:; in past phI -

1 I I ad proyen ran, k k ' '" ly sys tems t, l a I I I been built by rn a -I ng , . b Uf'{' Sys tems Jat . - h Ie: Ollt

losoplllrs, (' c ~ ,. I '. t Ie only within cer t.no . ounl ., d absolute of pnoclJ' f.' ~ . ~j('c t. lo· lli alec liral negation . . \rc(l~ f' idc which Ihf.')' ?re Sl; , is thl:' Sf.'lf .ronf' riollsn <'.s':; o[ a '~l~ ­ing to Hegc! , pl\llOS~~.lh\~h is a nect's~ary step In til£' 5 1

rillite hi stoncal era \ "7

development of the "absolute sririt~·. Viowed from this an­gle, the transition to a DCW 111storlcal era .also means the emergence of a new philosophy, But the ph,losoph:.: of past {'ras is not simply forgoUrn. Frrcd fr?Il1 t.hc~r hlStOI'~C81 lim. Itations, the principles of past philosophieS rctam their significance for the entire sU.bscqucnt dc\'clopl~lcnt of phi. losophy, Therefore the negatIOn of the precedmg s tage in philosophical development (we should remember, natural, Iy that Hegel refers mostly 10 the development of ideal, is~) is also the assimilation of what has been accom· plished and moyemcnt toward a new and higher stage of philosophical cognition. Truth is a process; it is knowledge in development, progressing from ODe definition to another, more specific definition, thus forming the developing sys­tem of categorial definitions, According to Hegel, "the true form in which truth exists can only be its scientific sys~ tern", (64; 2, 6) Hegel thus arrives at a new concept of philosophical system; he rejects characteristics which his predecessors accepted as constituents.

Hegel also tries to overcome the conviction that a philo­sophical system is deduced from an initial postulate, The system of categories in Hegel's The Science of Logic is not simply a result o[ deduction; rather, deduction is regarded as a means of reproducing the objective process of devel~ opment, interpreted as the sell-development of the substan­tial spirit which becomes the subject~substance. Therefore, according to Hegel, the fmal result of a philosophical sys­tem is its beginning which, however, bas completed its development, deployment and realization, It follows that ail the previous philosophies must be regarded as moments of ~}1? ~yste~ of tr~~ philosophy taking shape in history. 11~lIs phll~sophy, lIegel asserts, "is in development, anrl

so '" the hIStory of philosophy," (64; 13, 42) This under­stanrtlng of ph)losophy (and the history of philosophy) as it dweloptng system is IIegel'R olltstanding contribution to the .development of philosophical knowledge.

r\f'V(>rthele~~1 .Hegel docs not break with tho tradition he tiD rl~htly cnliclzes, :c[using to apply the concept of a de~ Vf!lo~lOg ~,yste~ to IllS o~n 'philosophy. Hegel justified this ~()nn,H',l ~ltI.1 IllS .own Jlrlnc,pl~R. by a~~{'rling t.hat hiR his. orie.11 (ra I~ IlH final slagf' In ti,!, 1)1,',10" I' I I I

r .. .. . ,..,op lira (rv(' op-1n('lt r 1Oilnbnd. IIrf1rl s. 1I1p·,\,'"n1 II)e I' II d 1

• • . b (., O['£' I(',a y pre (' ('T'

milled the conlradlcl.loll b(~twecn his dialectical method and

88

metaphysical system; this contradiction entails a restrictN\ I'ptro."pcct.ivo Interpretation of thr deYClopment of philos­ophy. For. ;ll'f',orfiillg 1.0 Hegel. philosop~IY is tho soH-con SciOUSIlf'SS of t.hr divine absolulr, and Its temporal devel opment merely reflect.s that w~ich is always with~n it. The "absolute idea" comprehends Itself through the .lDteliectll al activity of mankind in the course of wo~ld history, .anr! tl{'vrlopmcnl {'('asps as a reslllt. T~us the .lllstory of phllo~­ophy, just as tll£' philosophy of history, IS a game t~le ~l. vine being plays with humans, the game Hegel mlschIC-vously calls the guile of world reason. _ .

\Vorking 011 his system as an encyclopedia oj plalosoph· ical sciences, 1I1'grl inevitably com~s to oppose. na~ural philosophy to natural science. the philosophy of history to the science of history, the philosophy of la~v to law a~ a

, etc llegel's speculative SystE'm is realized by maklOg SCIence, . '.' . ··fi k 1 an ahsolut(' of the achieved lenl of. sCient; I~ r now

t-

edge with ib inevitahle gaps. But phil.osOph)'tl~li~"~~le~ 't blank spaces on the map of the um\'ers~, I : .

~~~eby natural-philosophical or philosophical-historIcal spec-

ulation. I' d 1 One proves the Contrary to Ill'gel's expectations, 11.~_. oc rl . of anY

fallacy of any motaphyrsical s)s:em~~~\~~~~~;c~atk~~wledgC' ~:i~~g~~s asais~t~~!I~te~~~!s. ei~possible af~:r ~e~~~~e;:~~ world clearly con~titutes a ~lllg~. sysst::.:n l'p;esupposcs a whole, but the knowledge of. i IS ~hich man will never knowledge of all nature r d h~:t ory~ must flll in the count attain. Hener h(' who ma es ~!~ ~~~ imagination ... " (8; less gaps with figments of hIS. . a metaphysical philo· 400·01) In this ca.se . syste~:~~~~v~s knowlrclg-c of the world sophical syst(,nl ~Ia,~~ng- .ex these systems as lltopi~n, En­as a whole. Wllll~ I eJc('\m~tl world clearly constItutes a gels also rmphas l 7.es that r J(' tl ral ontological content single system", thus revea ~~g )hil~S~~hY. View cd rrom tllis or the concept of a syste~ 1 \'educcd to rationally group angle the concept cann~.)e system of knowledge. Th(' ing ~lassifying and roa I~g asin Ie intC'g-ral whole. a ~ys­proposition that th(' world IS a, 't gi" rathC'r a phil(\~opillcal tem is not Jl1C'l'ely ;l stall'lJl1 C'o 'crln"ll'~O' of qualitaliyply di~

, I I on ltC' e.o", ' I' I' IS g 'nn,'al',z"'tion lasC'{ .. 'rl,'" g<'n('ra l1.a Ion .

l ~- < ." r tI 11D1\·(·rse. ' fC'rent rragn1C~ts. 0 d .1(' ot contradict new knowledge'. justiflCd only It It oes n

Till' concc]11 of the worM as a ~y:o;tC'm dl'y('lops eha alld 'H'Cl'pt.-; COl'rrction.::; that is wh~' it contains n~ (Io~ ngcs ic prt'Cppt:-;, In other word~, to rC'('ogniz(' 'Iu' wodd ·· mat " It" I r as a ~lIlg (' f'.ystem mC'ans 0 fecogn17:e tiC' act th .. t cognitio

of t.hl' world system will n('YPI' hr ('ompictNl. This inc n p1ett'1ll'~S is both quantitative and qualitatiY(' b~'('.,,<> on~, ] ]

" r T < ",C ,t a sO app les to separate ragmrnts. hat is ('xactly wh\, olliy in mctaphysies and nat.ural philosophy Ill'll als' n?t II I I d

"I" """ "0 In H' na ura an socia sCiences It IS lmpossihlc to p thr (historically limited) knowledge achieved a'" • resent

I <" < com

Jl "It' :-;ystC'Dl of final truths. One must not.e that aln'ady in the 18th, c('ntnr~ the more advanced sciC'ntisls cont l'a'sled s.ll,~lemallc experimental study to the absolute cl'.,'act II

" t h"" < or of lelr con emporary p llo~oplllcal systems, For e" 1 J('an J~e Rond D'AJembcrl, a prominent ally of I&~~lp c, lury I'rench materialif;ts, belie\'cc! that a ph ysic"sf 1 cen-

Po"scss tl " " r h ' J - must. .. , ,Ie spmt 0 t. e sYf;tem" (l'esprit de systeme

~)ll! Ih~l ',I£, n~l1st nol f'ollccllmh t.o lill' temptation of buil~~ Ing plillosopillcal f;ystems that Ignol'(I facts which do not ~It tlll'm and that lead to conclllf;ions which do not foll /'~)~n:\, ~heoretic~l analysis of th(l facls. Lavoisier was r~;~ I~ ,<~\\<II,\ of the Imporlance of thc systematic mC'lhod in nat­

(I.;~~~~t n~" ,an~ 'Il(' hims£'lf was woddng on a system of

I,n " ~'I' (1\ er e (>!'s he held thai the "spirit of the sys-

1 I~ (ang:£'roll~ for th I 'I . ~ ()h!,(,lIfr~ '4udy in~te d ~ til) lYSI~<l s~H:,nccs" because it (:''')'1: imp .. ' . a 0 1r(l\nng light on its objects,

:\rgation of any dogm r I I tprrc\atpil philosophical a IC a )SO ult' of some systC'1ll of in-the pI,)~!'ihility OJ' nt'C~'!'i~S[~C~rt~ do~s. not p~aco ~n «(lH'~ti~n fI~oplll(','1 knowh.clge PI:\ ' t 1,1' sYi:'lI.'matlc Uility of phll-1.lr thp rlaims of o\lt~t~ndi\~ OS:;:~hl~al Syst~~lS arc not horn Itahlp 1'1',,"11 of tl," g 1 do!'ophC'l's. I hey arc the ine\,-

I ,~ , PI'OC(,!'S of (' 't' [ " "

1'4 gl' In gl'lH'l'al l)hilo~ }', 1 ognl lOn, "lkC' any knowl-Irfl~1. Ihr 1('\'('1 ~f its ~,~I) l1?n tnowlcdge is limit~d by at i~ !'I'moH'11 11Y sllh~eq\le:l( ~l~~,~tment. Bllt ,this limitation ~ IllIt rn'p flf limil',I",o,," "II opmcnt whICh of course

I, < SC1H'rA I' ",' ' o~np lira! !')'~h'Tll "sllr"" "f ' C('OI'( mg to '<, ngt'ls a ])hil -II I ,lgs rom a' , . , <

1(' 111IlIan mind tl,(, I' n Impcl'Ishahlc (in!·;il'c o[ , '. IpSlr£' to .... . til ncr (:~; Ill, :'Vt2) Hilt ~rsol" OYl'rcome all contradic-mpfl!'.'!~hlf' .... <; f'Xlll'('~!'ing inr;nit'lIl.g all contradictions is as

~1(1f'rnl1f1n 110ps not impose nn~ 111~ r~gures, ~till, this con~ til \'riopmclIl of phil(Jf;.0 I,hical I.' mils on the .svstC'matic

< hnow\t·figl' A " < , S Soon as thi s

•

law is recognizeli, philosophy m the old, lradit.ional sense or ,the wO,rll comrs to an end, I1C'gd's system complptes tlw ph,llosoplu('al, development that preceded it, pointing al­helt lInconsclfHl~I~' -the W(lY "out of the lahyrinth of ~ys, te~~s to l'l:al POSlltve knowi('dge of the wol'1d", (:1; Ill, 312)

, I hilS hng-I·ls r.nlltr~l~lS tho concppt of systematic cogni" 1l~1I I? tlw nwtaphY,s.u'al roncepl of the philosophical (ami SCl~ntlflc) system" I he former docs not merC'ly group ratlOn~lly, methodlcall~ (or e\"Cn methodologically, episte­mologlcally)· -th.c aval\a~le knowledge, but cognizes the systC'llls nat\ll'r Inhrrent III all objects of both natural sci e~t.ifIC and ph!lo~ophical cognition, Naturally, syst('ms cog­IlltJon nnd bnl1dmg a system (not only in philosophy hut also in any specific science) arc entirely different things, But if the object of cognition is a C[ualitati\'ely deftnite sys· tern, t.he study is aimed at grasping that system. In that case the deyelopment of the system of knowledge is thr progressive cogn ition of a certain system of phenomena. This system of knowledge is synonymous with scicnce in t.hC' Illodel'll srTlSC of the word.

IlegC'l contrasts sc ience to the gat.hering of information, ITe Sel'S the scientific quality, truth and the systems nl) proach as concepts of one catC'gory, "Th('re can be noth­ing scientifiC about philosophizing withou.t a system," he says, (64; 6, 22) Therefore, here his under~tanding of phi~ losophy as a science opposed to the traditional "passion for the truth" coincides with the concept of a dialectically un­dOl's tood philotiophical system. The latter, once again, is a developing system of philosophical knowledge,

According to Hegel, the next major characteristic of a true philosophical system is the llnity of its component principles. This unily is only possible inasmuch (lS it rules ouL lil(' making or an absolute out of spec ial. particu­lar principles and consequently opposing them to one ?n­other, AIJparently, that is what he means by t.he follO\\:lng thesis: "A philosophy based on a limited principl~ dbtlnct from othel's is fabely understood as a system: III act:llill fact, the principle of true philosophy is that it COIllPl'I~,l'~ all particular principles,. (64; 6, 22-~3) ~ontl'a,ry to \~·hat Its Cl'ili('s h('li('\'(', this theSIS doC's not JHst.lfy p~lIloso]llllcal {'c lecticism, It l'C'fcrs to the diairrtirai nN!atlon . of all ]l~l'­ticular principii'S froill lhl' !'tandpoint of t,hr \I~lIY('l'~al pml, ciple-in lIegl'i ':j \,jeW, the fundamental ui('lllist pn'c{'pt 01

91

his monistic system. Working on an idealist system, Ho­gel proves that the incompatibilit.y of yarious idealist doc­trines stems from treating special, particular idealist pre­cepts as absolutes. He tries to synthesize idealist doctrines in the helier that t.he dialectical negation of their special principles turns t.hem into rompatihle clements of the true philosophical system.

Hegel has summed up Ihe history of idealist philosophy, But because of its idcaHst content, his system contradicts the dialectical concept of dcyolopmcnt. The "absolute spir­it" demands that philosophical development be totally c?mplcte~. D~spite all dialectical reservations, the prin­ciple of Identity of being and thought reduces being to the ontologically interpreted thought and thus rules out the epi~temo,logica~ principle of reflection, Knowledge appears as Identical \\'1th being; the system of knowledge is inter­preted as ,a syste~, of being that deploys itself and com­~re~ends Its defiOltlons, Hegel essentially ignores the sub­]ectwe human character of cognition and consequently the con~radictions between each system of knowledge and its sublect, the. latter as a system independent of cognition, The resolutIOn of these contradictions and the emergence of new ones are a very important aspect in the develop­ment of c~gnition, ~nd that fact also escapes Hegel. But the rene~tlOn o~ reality, the distortion of its image and the ~vercomIng <,wlth,in limits, of course) of that distortion arc ,m! portant POlDtS lD the dialectics of cognition the dialectics o truth and error. ' Le~in s~res~es that the image of reality which is being

cogmze~ IS distorted not only in judgments speculative ~:~~u~~o~~o:e~d ,th~~rie~. !he distortion of the object of ability to cogn'z~n h? h B:SIC acts of cognition, in the very there ,'s 01 I W IC IS also the ability to err-because

, course, no special abTt 260) Overcoming that d'st t d n 1,1 y to err. {10j 38, ing at an adequate' orne I' re ecllon of reality and arriv-

, re ec Ion of the b' t . I ' dialectical process Heg I' a lec IS a comp ex . e s system has I 1 ' b cause cognizing reason is 'd r' no p ace or It, C­substance tbat has become 1 ea Istl~ally interpreted as a pos~e!i'!i'es all possible knowledthe sublect, the absolute that

S· H I' ge. IDee ege 8 philosopby re' eels h '

ciple of reOection. it lacks aJ el t d epl,s~mological prio· relating to the attitude of th ear e6mtmn of the Issue

e systema of knowledge to ac-

t;

tua1 objects of sLlHly, which are also cept of a ::iyslcm as an integral complex component!; <Iud itself determined by their first formulated by Marx in his study of the tern of production relations. The signilica_ of the Marxian concepts of the system was quite limited ad ristic because they proceeded from the there existed immllJable elements (similar 10 atoms), The sludy of a system was understood II lUI ysis or all possihle combinations of immutable nC'nLs. Tht' whole was reduced to its component pariI' determined it. Changes in the position of that is, structural changes-did not impart any D8W'

ty to them, The number of elements comprising each given Qat­

(or, more precisely, whole) was also regarc!ed u tmmma· bIc, established once and (or all. The system deelf was \h8l8 fore considered balanced; the notion of a.",,,, iD .. velopment appeared incompatible with th. COJIG8lI& system. The question of a system's origina wu occasionally-for example, by Kant (with solar system), .

Marx studies the laws of the developm8llt 01 the ist system in a tota.lly different way. Be uuma­structural elements of bourgeois society as different from the economic elements of the of production, despite the fact that the muket monetary commercial capital, profi.~1 and the like existed under feudalIsm ~ Marx descrihes commodity as an econO

m! ..

ilalist sytscm and not otherwise, Marx specially studi .. th. exp~Dded

capitalist system, the traDSforiliatiOD of resultant new qualitative system, new trends and and cenlralization or esses which as evolution of the systeJll of tr<18 the system of monopoly monopoly capitali:-;m. A studies, Lenin's theory of the substantiation of the 01 transition from the syateD'

sociali~l ~ocial sy:;lcm. ,\ccol'lling to Lrnin, "~o(',iali!'m i!:! merely lhl' u(':d :;It'p [ol'\\';\l'd frolll ~1;\ll' capili\li~t mOllop­oly. Or, in other wonls, ::;()di\li~1Il is 11H'I'Piy ~Iall'-capilal ist monoJloly which is made tu SI..'rllt! tile il/len'::ds uJ 1!lc u,hole people and has to t.hat ex.lent ceased to be cUJlltaltst monopol~'." (to; 25, 362) The history o[ the cl1lCl'gcncl' and dcYC'lopmenl of the socialist sySl~m. has fully. bor~ll' out that brilliant conclusion. Its pred ictive yalue IS dlr ficult to overestimate.

The Marxist-Lenin ist economic analysis o[ capilalisID is an l'xapmle of the systems approach which specifics, deep­ells and substantiates the dia lectical-materialist theory 0/ del;eiopmellt. That is precisely what distinguishes it from the systems concepts which dominatc today's bourgeois sociology and usually negate the principle of dcvclopment.

The concept of system has now acquired universal sig­nificance. The systems approach is effectively applied to linguistics, biology, mathematics, mineralogy, logic, et~ . The multitude of substantially di£lerent systems makes It increasingly difficult to offer a single comprehensive defi­nition of the concept of system. Apparently, here we must also follow Marx's instructions and regard a specific defi­nition (in this case, of a system) as a unity of different, morc or less abstract definitions. Thus the very definition of the system becomes a system too. \Ve must proceed [rom this methodological position in discussing the issue of philosophical systems as well.

H the concept of system has universal s ignificance, it. mllst be applicable to all philosophies. They are a ll sys­tems, irrespective of the intentions of their au thol's or the ways ,the~. are set forth. Viewed from this angle, I<icrkc­ga,\I'~!'o, ~Ictzsche's or Gabriel Marcel's rejection o[ philo­~ophlcal ~ystems appears only as a subjcct ive aspect of the Issue :w}lIch must not. be confused with the objective, sys­tematIc COil tent of ~heJr doctrines, no matter how they were ~C't rOl"t~ (as ~phoflsms, diary entries, etc.).

MarXist ph~losophy was ~o~ded in the struggle against ~hc metaphYSical system-bUIlding which is inspired by the Hleal, of ~,hsolu~e kn~wl~dg~, alien to the theory of devel~ ()pnH~It. Lngels J1ntt.-Duhnng is a graphic example of the MarXist struggle agamst that metaphys"c I t dOt" I" I I

" d _. I a ra I Ion w lIC I ! OffilIlate prevIous philosophy. But later M"" I -

d tl t"d" I . arxlsm a so op

pose Ie an I Ia ectlcul wholesaln n"gat" [ I t , ., '" Ion 0 tie sys e-

94

n1'I~ie I~,dlln.' of philo.supllY '1"11<.11 Ilcgatinn i!'! typical hUll! of In·aIIlJlJ .. t. ... ul dud flf IIlf1t.1t W'oIJOsitl\:i:-t~ who l"l!g:ard "Ill losopliy 1I0t ;l~ a tI/(~{J"!I !Jilt flilly as ;1 IIJ1'lhud fflr 'Hlillyz lng stal~'IlII'~It!t In LI'''i/l'8. wOfd~. ··,llllr.r;ljf1L i!3 Uw sy~t;·1JI of .\\farx s ~·wws and tcadllug::l." (10; 21, ;-)0) r fCjJC,lt tllilt ~)()th l\f<H\lsn~ .'13 iI whol.· ;llId c!lch of ts compolH'nt flil .. '"

lS a syslrm. I liP uc\"plopllwnt of Marxi"fII is a gr,lphil: il­Ilistration of a developing sYfitf·m.

Thus the Marxist negation of traditional pl'ilosopliiral systems and philosophy in general in the old S('/lse of tin: wOl'd substantiates a philosophical system of a new type. ~1al'x and Eng('h; created a dialectical-materialist philosoph­Ical system. As the Soviet Jlhilo~ojJher F. V. J\.ollstanti­nov rightly obsefV(,s, their doctrine is '·infinitely far from those philosophical and sociological systems which wen.' huilt as systems of fmal and ultimate trutLs that is wideh claimed to have definitively solved all issues: wheth~r tilerf' were enough facts for that or not". (26; 45) The under­standing of a philosophical system as a system of both qualitatively and quantitatively immutable eategoric:-; found its consummation in h.ant':-; table of categories. lie in­terpreted the latter as eternal and immutable ~tructurai forms of thinking. That divorced them from the dcv('}op­ment of knowledge and thus turned them into purely sub­jective forms of knowledge with no objective content. Kant's a priori approach was an inevitable logical conclu­s ion from that antidialictical, formalistic understanding of categories. Bllt the categories of logic to which he refer­red-just as philosophical and general scientific eate>go­rics-are meaningful forms of knowledge: they comprise certain knowledge about reality which historically dl'\"C'!­ops, becomes more comprehensiyc and reflects ObjN'ti\"C rea l i~y more ad('quately. Suffice it to point to the den'jop' mcn t of the category of causnlity which has c1('ariy shown its meaningful charactcr. ;'\aturally, Jl1('aningful philosoph­ical catcgori(>~ Me conccpb that arc neither artifIcial nor academic distinctions.

Hegel's The Science 0/ Logic justly raises the que:-;tion ahollt a system of developing categories. But his panlog-­ism o\'('rsimpliflCs and distorts the de\'elopment of cat ego" ri('s, divorcing thi~ Jlro('('~~ from the' entire nonphilo<:°llhi ca l d('\'clopnwnl. Ohj(,(·tiH' tl'uths r('('ord('d in philosophicnl ca tegor ies arc obtainNI by tho study of the entire diver~ity

95

r r rl Ot bv the immanent self ,(h~Y('loproent of un t) arts all n . . J . 1 - I -llIl'C'3 J 1

·1·" Jlhilo"'Ollhical rai('gorlcs ar~ liS ,orten ::; < ':> t l'r~ i,lJIl Ill",. • -. . II' -In till' oPYeiopmcnt of cognitlOH, .they sum lip l~ ,lelr o~\n way the history of cognition. Like ,thl' catcg.orJ.C!:> of {l<lr

I - I c-enel" ([or example the notIOn of ma~s III meehan-U'U af S I· • • . J - I -

ic." OJ oj clement in che~istry),. pllllosop lIea categorlcs a prox.mately reDect obje.c~l~·e. reality. PHrgel was right in cntlclzlDg .the .authors, ?i 17th-c?o­

Lury metaphysical systems for arb~t~arJly ascnblng to belDg its fundamental, ontological definitIOns. Hegel argued. ~ha~ those ueflDitillDS lllust be logically de.due,cd a.s de~DltlOn:-; of immanently developing being. Despite Its dlalect.leal ,ap­proach, that position failed to lead Hegcl to tbe ~Iston~al understanding of the ontological. But epistemo~oglcal hls~ toricism is necessary for a correct underolandlllg o[ ~n) knuwirtige (including lh(> knowledge of th~ ontological definitions of heing) as comprising a dual attitude: t? .the object of cognition and to the IJreced~ng level of COgmtlOD . 1'1 other words, cognition of an object both expresses a dr-finIte level in the devclopment of cognition and is, to a ('crtain degree, determined by the latter. That which c~nnot he ('ogni1.cd at one level of cognition becomes cogntz~ble at a different historical stage. That is why all ontological definitions oj objective rrality should also be seen as lim 'ted by the ipnl of knuwledge attained, and therefore subject to change, correction, etc. Thus Marxist philosophy epistemologically interprets ontology .and any knowle~ge at .. II, hus preventing it from brconllng dogma and slim" Ilating i1~ furthf>r dn\'e1opmcnt.

Marx st philosophy rejects both epistemological skepl1· (! sm and the illusion that, unlike particular sciences, phi­ln~ophy often, more authenlic knowledge of reality. Since scient.iflr: philosophy proc(>cds from scientific data, it ob­'lIou~ly ("an not claim to jJo::isess some special knowledge that difif>TS radically from scientific knowledge. It, follows tht cif'nl ifH': philosophy like scil'ncp in gem'ral, is a study. and III ~e~lli' rrnl'ct reality only apPI'oximately, or coutse, OM IDL'''' r-'IlH'mher that a philosophical study 1eals \IIr th : If'S(~ {orm3 )f unin-rsnlity, integrity and unity which particular science'S divide into parts into limited fields 1"J{ study. Thus those forms become ~ore accessible to eogoition. But the universalities, integrities and unities stndied hy ph'losonhy arl3 not abstract hilt concrete divided , - ,

i

I

Iy particlllar s ·if>nc. and 111iwd by philosophy, This lIleans that pllliosophy "t I\,e, to grasp the unity of quali­tatively c1elillitc Il'ugmenls of those system rcalities (nature, sucil'Ly, Illi1l1, cog litiolJ, ell:) wlllcil, divided, urc 'iLudied by indinullul scieJll:es.

All those reflections aLout the dialectical-materialist un­derstanding of philosophy as a system can be illustrated by an example borrowed from Engels. In his Dialectics 0/ Nature he summed up the discussion of the infinite and its cognition and wrotr: "The infinite is just as much know­able as unknowablc." (U; ~3;j) Does that mean that phi­losophy is fated to remain halfway on the road to the truth? Exponents of i\'icolai Hartmann's "ne,';' ontology" and many other bourgeois philosophers say yes. But the meaning of that quotation from Engels is totally difIerent. First, it refers to the inexhaustibility of the infinite: ever­ything that remains unknown in it is also infinite. Sec­ond, Engds sees the cognition of both the finite and the infinite as an essentially single process. According to him, "All real, exhausti,·c knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought frOID individuality into pal' ticularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the li-ansilory_" (9; 234)

The unity between the cognition of the particular, tran­sitory, and rlllite and that of the universal, eternal, and infmite can he found both in each particular science and in philosophy, since the latter is the most com~on form of the theoretical integration of knowledge, a speCific sum ming-up of the history of cognition. That det~rmines the historical boundaries of the scienlific-philosoplucal system of knowledge. t:)inco thoi:le boundaries are cognized a~d overcome by general izing new scientific data. and new 1115-

torical experience, philosophy develops and flSCS. to ~ new, higher level of knowledge. ?IDUg co~placency IS ahen to that forward movement; philosophy IS forever on the go.

Thus ~I3I'xist philosophy rejects any claim of absolutl' knowledge, but it diHerenliates hetw~en the latter and ab~ suI ute truths·-~specilic knowledge which c~n deal U?t onl.1 wilh the uniquo and IJUI'Licular. but also "\-,It~l. the unn .l'rsal: The specific is the unit.y of .ulfferent d:fimtJon:-;., .\h~I,llllh truth is specific tl'uth, or ulllly of relallve tl'uthi:i. A('~oru jng to LCllin, "Each step in the development of :-;('LCOCl'

97 7-0 t !l62

adds Dew grains In till' ~lJm of ~1J.<;oluto '.rulh, bnt. the limil~ of till' trllth of l';\~h ~l'i('ntillc IH'~)po:-;lll()n ure 1'I'la t.iw. now {·\.palldiug", now shrinl,ing: with thl' growth of knowledge." (10; 14. 135) .

Relative truth is objective; therrfon', to n certam dcg~cc (to be determined) it is abo ah~olulc t.r.uth. That oxpl.a~ns why, for all its jueyitable efrors, the history of, coglllt~on is also the cognition of the absolute, But, accordlug to En gels, "The infinity of th? th~ught which know~ the 3b50 lute is composed of an lllfillitc number. of fiDlt~ .hum~n minds, working side by sido and successively at thiS mfiDltc knowledge, committing practical and theoretical hlun~ers, setting out from erroneous, one-sided, and false premIses, pursuing false, tortuous, and uncertain paths, and often not even finding what is right when they run their nOses against it." (\); 234) Still, despite tho relative, contradic­tory and incomplete nature of any knowledge, cognition of the absolute is an actual process. To quote Engels again,

/ "AU true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eter­nal, the infinite, and hence essentially absolute." (9; 234)

In developing philosophy as a scientific-philosophical system of seeing the world, Marxism admits the qual ita­live change in the place that philosophy occupies in the sys­tem of philosophical knowledge. In this connection bour­geois philosophers bemoan philosophy's fate, claiming that its role is constantly declining. But it is only the role of idealist philosophy that is being eroded. The 'part Marx­ist-Leninist philosophy plays in the system of developing scientific knowledge is growing, and it increaSingly relies on jOint research by philosophers who share the same views. The forms of SCientific cooperation in philosophy are essentially similar to those of research in modern science. Such a philosophy is an open system-open, naturally, to real and not alleged philosophical accomplishments.

Philosophical generalizations of the world outlook and ~ethodol,ogy stimul~te integration or scientific knowledge tn today s democratIc commonwealth of the sciences. Phi­los~phy ~ssimilates the achievements of the natural and SOCial. sClen~es. Particular sciences assimilate the rcsults ?f philosophical development. Philosophical problems arise l~ al~ost every field of fundamental scientific rcsearch. Essentially new problems concerning both . I . t·fie . d h' specJa SCIOn I I Issues an t ose of philosophy and th . [h Id , e view 0 t e wor 98

t"1I1f'rJ'I' ill ,flc bunlt·dine nreas ~ep:,r.1tiDg philo~(Jphy Irom It;lltil:ular !oil 11'114' ,"wwIlLHC' 1,IJlII"ol'hy Iwconll ~ rlH.:wl l'OII~I'iOllSIlI' Hut only ill cuu,· nt but a1 0 III Iht, w.w il rUlldiulIS. (,01 1111 If Iw tlJat t1J1-' fULllrc hold.'J au ,,"'ell grpaLl'r I"('cognition of philosophy as a science, as a ciovf'loplrIg sy~ tum of knll\vll'rlgl! u!JoUl 5cil'J)ce ;HIII the \'lew of Oil! world?

,.

l'IIILOSOPJlY .\ 'ill EYEHYIl.\ Y CO:\SCJOl:S;\ ESS

The traditional, age-old concl'pL of philosophy is directly associated with the opposit.ion of philosophical I't'rtl'clion to "unthinking", c,"eryday consciousness. Thl' laLle!' is de­:,cribeu as something possessed by all, including ignorant people. T\o doubt, a critical attit.ude to everyday conscious­ness and its basis, everyday experience, is both necessary and justified. But the history of philosophy shows that tra­ditional philo:,ophical criticism or everyday consciousness (and everyday experience), .usuallY fails to understand the nc~_~ssary organic connection of philosophy (and science) to tI.le.se phenomena of everyday social developments. The l'orrelation "philrisopby-e,'eryday experience" can only be correctly unde~s,tood as a unity of opposites comprising not only oPPositIOn )JUt also the moment of identity.

~'he sentence repeatedly passed by speculative idealist philosophy on the materialist understanding of the world was usually the following: materialism is not philosophy hut every~~y consciousness which, lacking intellectual cul­lure, uncritically approaches its own premises and does not even ,suspect the need for a critical analysis of sense im· ~~esslons and of its own confidence in their correctness, SIDC(~ ever~day consciousness is not a speculative myth but so~elhlDg actually existing, we should examine the true a~tltude of materialism and idealism to that form of reRectlOn of the objective world Everyda . b d' . . y conSCIOusness can e stu led by soclOlo~y, history, social sh cholo ethnography and other sCiences B t h P Y gy.

'th th' . . u ere we shall deal WI e epistemological and historical-philos h· I pects of the issue. op lca as-

. ~i~torical materialism dHlerentiates betw . IDdlvldual consciousness Ind··d I een SOCial and

• IV! ua consc' . r course, also social. But unlike rt llOusness, IS, 0 other rorms of social conscious a , ~or~ 8, religion and

neas, It 18 the immediate

100

,

t'I",sl'inll~II.':I of ,ndlvld'Ja!' Areorf\il1g to Engel:, tilollght I'xi!t-.; "only l' till' IIltllVldudl thouglJt or many millittrd~ of pa!'t., I'rp-~';!~nt ,tTul ful urlJ men", JX~, 10:"',) The sam*" ,IS trill' of ()vprvday l:fJll,1:IIIU rlf'-"I. 1')0: f~lat form 01 socwl ('()I\:-;ciollsnp~~ dol'S 1101. (lire-ctly depend Oil the purl"':;I'lul and piunlJl'd cognilivo atlilflty of men. The ·h:,~ing of ever vday eonsciollsn(,gs (nnd of everyday cxperirnc p

• its lm­~is) is mo:-:lly a b(Jontanl'ous rrocess. and its. uecc"~ary ell" ments include involuntary m(,IDory. A largo part or every day c'l:prricnce is {lequirf'd unnoticed, simply h('callse a man }ins, comcs in ('ontact with other indi\'iduai!!. re;l~t'3 to his environment, to developments in his per~onal iI{{~ and society, without realizing what has left an imlJrint 0!l his consciouSness and become part of his personal experi-

ence. Everyday consciousne~s is a multi-layered. complex and

contradictory entity compo~ed of a multitude of perc~p, tions, emotions and concepts that arc generatl,d Ind co~t~n­uou:-ly reproduccd by the relativel)' con~ta.nt a!,d fa~llia,r eonditions surrounding indi"..it!ual~. The dl\'er~tty, 111~tof1-cal transformation and development of those conditions arp echoed in the historically den-loping divt'rsity of t'veryday cxperience and everyday con~cioum('ss. it~ cuncomitant. through which this (lXperience is percei\'ed, interpreted antI applied in knowledge and practical activity. \Ve ('ncollnter concepts or everyuay consciousness everywhc:(>. They arc, first and foremost, empirical notions consi:-.tlDg partly or relative truths and partly of illusions and errors: water boih; at 100° C; gold doc::> not rust; the. sun ri~~~:-. in th~ morning and sets in the e\'ening; money l~ a ~a\'lng:-. hank pays interest. Pro\'orhs are dassic. expreSSIOns of c\'cryuay consciousness, polishrd to prrf(>ction by the ages; they arC' the Cluint.cssencC' of popular wisdom ("lif(> is not a bel~ of roses"T, the class instinrt of thl' oppress(>d and explOited ("satiety can't ft~rl for"),. pOI~ular fea:s and .1~oJl:~. ,

Tn his eronOIlliC and hlstnnral studies M'II x h.l~ shu\\ ~l that IIllscicntifu.' pnlitil";ll ('('nnomy record::- and theo:e.h. r,lll\' suhstantiatl'~ l'n-ryday concepts of the hourgeolsle: lan;1 pl'odurrs I'l'n\; l"lIlitill. profl~; il~l.t1 labor. llH'rt'ly wagl:~ . Marx Ilns t'xpfl:'t'tl till' nJl:'(,IPntllic l':,~('nrl~ of tho, ~ conct'pt~, l'll'\'at('ti hy rnull' political ernnOl~lY, ~(: t,he st<\tt~~ of thcoretir"l dogma. "nd prowd. that oll.l~ h~ t ~'lbor pr • duces value, surplus ,,<\Iue and Its modlhcatlon~. At the

101

S<l~(,. ,tin.l~, he I.l~~ also {'\pll~ill('d t.hat lin' fills!' formula of url.~cttntlhc politH.'al ('COIlOllllSI!'l n'fl('('ls '('",'1'" I r . ." . "ill YPt' of n'3 Ity. gmc!' the ownl'r of ctlpitnl dOl'S 111111\(' prolit tI. landowner docs receive rent, lind the working mall ,.,,' . ~el W'Ij.!I'S fo I" I b I I . ' ., l!tll( .', " r liS II o~. II t liS ('1\.';C t'\'C'ryday hour ('ois C

s~IO~lsnt'ss ,"upl'rficUllly r{'fleeb capitalist JlroduC~ion rc~~­lIolI,s. h reneelf; tht' appearances generated b 1 . a: fH1IJt;l!JSL ways of l'edistriilllting the surplus \'nlt~ p~g~callt IYAtlH.'lITl'olt'llll'!at among- Y<ll'ious groups of ca;)itali~ts lIce

nlllyS SU~;5x ulp'OO,nltcd, ~ut'd]lctty-J).ourgCOis ideology th~orcti­. Ie ('\ cry ay notIons of th tt b .

SIC. III other word" for nil 't tl . C pc y ourgcol­nnt rise above class")I'(~'ud'i IS lcorctJ('al guisc, it dONi personal status of ds fdeof~s: Although th~ edt.wation and than tho~l' of the pelly I gists .Jl~ay be mfinltely beUN

h JOurgeolslc they 5"11

t at class because "in their mind' I represcnt tile limits which the latter d s they do not get beyond arc consequently dri\'~n thcO n~L g'ct beyond in life, they aUfI ~()Iutions to which' m' t o~e~lc~lly, to the same problems

li',",' dhriYC th~ latter in pr:c~;~=." tn(~~r7; ~n3dO_3'lo)ciaIU PI~k!'.i­pc y_ ourgeols ideolo .. ,-,' n I 'e comc!'. the ~pontant'ou~Y' l ~c~cntJf~c ~ocialisl ideology over-1l<'!'.S of the workers b~in rjl< c·~nton.lst eycryday conscious­IIced lor rc\'olutio~a gt ng Tto It the rcalization of the and the destruction ~r tI~/~gg,~ I~gainst the bourgcoi!Sic This is how Engels 0 U' apl a 1St mode of production. between everyday noti~nmrs til(! .fulH.lamental difference f'verydav purposes . k sand sClCntlflc concepts: "Fol' " I' "e now and can sa I <ulima i~ alive or not B t ,< y, .c.g., w lethcl' nn that this is in rna . II, lIpon clfJ!'.er IOquiry we find '12) '1' ' ny cases a vcry c I " , he contradiction I t't '. ~)mp ('X questIOn." (8' ol ~eality and its rene('I;~n\\~I~ntha SC1~nti[jc unde/'standing perlcnc(! is inevitably e I~Ollons of cveryday ex­standpoint of ('very(lay", pa~atl()x If pcrc{>ived from 11,(' "S' .~ 0IlSC10llSllf'~~' A • CH'ntlllC truth is alw. ' .. ~, ('cortling to Mal'\" day' ys paradox ·f . d d ' ,

CxpCrlCnCf>, which catc! (> i' I JU go by cvery-Ance .of things." (1; 2, ~4)'~' Oil Y the delusivc appeal"­{:~m~nent French philo~opher ~~af' GAston Radu'lard a

rlstlCS of 20th-century' natur~l 5 a, yzes the major cll(t]:a(' "a.~e ronclusion Marx lnmle in I ~Ience, and arrin's at tiL(' ~;J:~o 100 years ago; "Any IWW :~~lt~I°(,.IO-elconomic stlldi('~

us, any lIew t.xp(>·, . IS lOrn dI'SI"t· II ' rience" (3(j. _) fit nrt· urlSt'.'! d('S't " I ( It

, , I PI f' (im'et ('X pc-

102

I\sirit! frow ih l'lIlplrLeul anll illl'ologkal content, anoth-1'1' prOlllilH'ul r!'fllurt' or ()\"eryd"y t;OW"IO!l!'ne-j is 11, re­ligious asped, I'specially illl]lC,!tanl III antagolli~tj(" sO"~Cly_ Unlike theologknl p~\!,lIdf)scil'ncc. rclig:owc cOD5f'iou-ncs'J is olso ('v()rYllay, althou~h hoth l\ll,oIO'll<.lns lind ideald philosophel's refns(' 10 Ilccepi it as '<uch. ,-",(,If '(llienalioll, tho division of the world into the imnginarv anti the ]'I!ai havo been noted by Marx as fcature~ of th"e religions re flection of reality, and they arl"! nxpre:o:sed in the conlnulic tory naturo of everYflay con!:'cioll:'!nf'ss which combines 1'111-

pirical experience wilh rantll~tic religions notions. III their practical everyday activity. believerc-: almost always act tilC way unbelie"el's do: they disregard the r('ligiou~ interpr('­tation of the transcendental origin of any e',(i~ti!lg' thing, they are guided by empirically eslablished causes, effects. etc. Rut that spontaneous irreligious trend {borne Ollt hy ('.onscious activity and knowkdge) constantly runs into the traditional religious notions which are introduced into men's minds not only through antagonistic socbl relation .. hut also through upbringing alltl educntion. Ths dichotomy forces the believer to judge things and his OW11 life from two diametrically opposed and even mutually exclu!'oive standpoints. Naturally, he can neither reconcile hi!l r£'li· gions feeling to his own irreligiou!' approach, nor o\'('r­come tho doubts whose deep 50cial roots he does not un

derstand. It folloW5 that cycryday consciomme:,s cannot be reduced

only to evel'yday experif'nce, its [actual basis. It faces both tho real, "this" world and the nonexi~t('nt "otlwr" world. Thcrcfol'o it is wrong to identiry everyd<,y COil'

sciousnoss with common SCD!SC, although the latt('r is \ln~ dOlllltedly a vilal component of th(' former.

Since ovoryday consciollsness rrmains itseU---that i~, docs not rise to a scientific interpretation of th(l world -it is incapable of critically analyzing its own cont('ut in which realistic and il'ratioDfl.1 notions collide, ovcrlap and hlend tOg'cthcr. Irrational notions can be not only religions uut simply ull~cienlifJc or antisci('ntiflc, That jg why SOli 011 ('ommon 5t'nSo is oUen far from H',)lly sound.

In his !.ectures (111 the l/i.~tory oj Philosophy. lif'g('l ~1H'nks ironically ahollt Dielrich Tif'd('mnnn's claim (mfldl~ in his Spirit oj Specui(l/iPt' PhilMOphy) Ihat Gorgins goes farther than n man of common sensc. Hegel remarks that

103

every philosopber "goes farther than commo~ scn,Sc beel.lIlse what is usually called commo" sense I~ 110t plillos­opby. and is often much less sound l.hn~ thl' lat.lf'f. Common sense comprises the way of tlllnklllg, lllaXlln~ )oDd ptejudices of its ti~~ ... an~ it ~s nbso~u~l'ly .H1~:lware of the intellectual definitions of Its time glllulIlg It. (01: 14, 36) Lenin quotes this remark in his noll'S on ~lcg~l's Lectures on the History of Philosophy and follows It 'nth "common sense=the prejudices of it.s time", (10; 38, 273) This formula should be interpreted rather as a summary of Hegel's thesis and recognition of its relative correctnrss than as Lenin's own evaluation of common sense. It is clear from numerous remarks made by Lenin that he res­olutely rejected one-sided evaluations of everyday con­sciousness. For example, while noting that "common sense" regards the latest discoveries in physics as outland­ish (to; 14, 261), Lenin condemns Hegel's attempts at remOving the rational content from notions based on everyday experience which not only gh'es rise to but also daily checks, corrects and confirms those notions. When Hegel declares that Epicurus' recognition of the correct­ness of "perceived being" "does not at all rise above the viewpoint of everyday common sense", Lenin says that critical remark distorts the essence of mat('rialism: "Dis­agreement with 'common sense' is the foul quirk of an idealist." (to; 38, 29t)

The need. to distinguish between scientific, philosophical and everyday concepts was already recognized in ancient Greece: Democritus demanded that a distinction be made X between that which is true and that which exists only in opinion. Francis Bacon's doctrine of idols also contains criticism of everyday consciousness and, which is equaIly important, everyday language. However, his criticism does not negate the cognitive value of everyday consciousness but triea to purify it, correct its concepts take account of tb~ truth it COD~8.i~s, and. ~o fu~ber. ,In' creatively devel­opJDg the materialist tradition, dialectical materialism has 'I proved that. the contradiction between theoretical knowl- / edge and dlr~t sensory data does not in the least under-miDe the significance of tbe latter. ConsequenUy it does not fefute the 8e!,'1tionalist thesis about the se~ory ori-gina of abetract ld"~. Usually, this dialectical contradie-tlOD hetween the rational and the sensuous is inCOmpre-

101

hcnsiblc to uV('ryflay cOII~cioll~n(,!lS because it rt~cognizing only IIiClt which call he vcrirwd by Thill i.'l wilY tiJP. con('ppts Hod norms of COIDDIlll& which reOcrt I:l'rtain ilSp"e!S of reality more 01' ...

(1'IRt('ly, cannot guide a scil'ntific study: the l"tll" i~ immeasllrahly g'rt'utl'( ami moro significant "'ea wilh which "vf>tyday {:()lI.~I:iul]sn{'ss deals and whleb tably limits its I:fJllIJll'tc'llef'. :\ (~(JIlnjct between concept~ and common SeIlSj' (Ioes not (efute the only science and practice call refute or con6rm Hence this quotation from Engels: "Sound MDUDQD s('nsC', resJlectable fellow tlwt he is in the homell ~ of his own four walls, has very wonderful adveutwel til-­recUy he ventures out into the wide world of neeueII.I (8; 31)

We all rem('mber how common sense argued again'" the heliocentric system, non-Euclidian geometry aad &be theory of relativity. But it was not only everydaJ 022' sciousness hilt also the conservative contemporaries of C. pernicus Lobachevsky and Einstein in the academIe world WllO persisted in their refusal to recogniw ~. revolutions around the Sun or the seemingly paradoiFcd theories of Lobachevsky and Einstein. Conservative ecin.­tists did not risc above everyday common sense, m.hrt,in ing that "it is impossible because it ca~not. be". .

But in contrasting enryday and sClCntlfic CODSCIOUlD811

we should not ignore the diversity of ~~'eryd~ ness which accumulates not only familiar notioDs the environment immediately hut their versatile experience, especially that tion activities_ That experience sen-es as tific conclusions too. For example, Kolmogorov, a noted Soviet scientist, axioms reDect facts deduced from everyday

\- "In the final analYSiS, confidence in the "'\ ,aXioms .fs'AIw~y~ of ex~rimrental origin.

underlying tillS conodence I~ a case of perience shared by aU manklDd. and neous conviction that does not cite any as proof, then we are dealing with an axioms of eicmentary geometry are a case (25; 394) Euclid himself described axioms notions.

Man had Icarned to raise crops, huHd hU\l!'i{'s anll sn~clt metals long before science began to stl~dy tI.wse Ilfodncllon proc('sses. Agronomy, constrnction l'llgIIlN'flOg l.\I~d IlIctai lurgy all 11aid due account to (,H'~yday p~oduct~on l'XPt'­r"cner that is to the cycryday notions wl\lch gmdcti man i:l thl'\r work.' As to prejudice, it is not confllll'd exclusive­ly to C'H'ryrlay consciommC'!'it': t~he history of .sci~ncc shows that it is common in scienllfic (or pseudOSCientifIC) thcories. .

Hegel, who thoroughly examined the. Opposition Of. the dialectical and metaphysical modes of thmkmg, fully Iden­tified everyday (io his own words, reasoning) consc.io~s­ness with tile' metaphysical view of the world. Describing

- t.lur objections of eycryday consciousness to the doctrines of ancient Greek Sophists as "the cry of common sense which knows no other way to help itself" (64; 14. 7), IIe­gel maintained that everyday reason would inevitably lapse into sophistry because it treated the truths and max­ims it was guided by as absolutes.

Hegel correctly identified the typical features of a definite historical form of e\'cryday consciousness, but he made the same mistake (which he himself exposed) be­licving that the metaphysical limitations of everyday COD­

lidousness were something cxtrahistorical and insurmoun­table. That negative assessment of cveryday consciousness stemmed from the rationalist-idealist nature of Hegel's philosophy-,\"llich claimed tllat the outside world perceived through till' senses is only an appearance (alboit objec­tive), and that it is the only realm of everyday conscious­ness. Philosophy, Hegel claimed, differs from everyday \ consciousness in that it regards only as a phenomenon that ) which everyday consciousness presents as existing.

A specific historical analysis of everyday consciousness leads to a conclusion that was totally alien to Hegel's phiJosophy despite its historicism: the metaphysical featu­res of everyday consciousness were products of the same age that ga\'e rise to metaphysical thinking in science,:;-

• Engels bourgeOis bourgeois

106

the metaphysical limitations of overyday "Tho ja~ed of tho commonplace course in front of the ditch

from eRect; but go coursing over

223)

Tltf'r" i~ 110 ubl'ululn 0ppo ilion I)(·t\\-I'(·II f'vl'ryday ilnd not 1'\'C'ryduy . (scirNtirH~, philosophicnl) cODsciousnC'ss. EV('ry. day con~('.If)USIH',~S IIoes not exi!'l ill isolation anll tOibv it is not so commonplac(~ as it was 100 years a~o. II e"QI~'es, hut it dot's nol disappcnr. To a r{'rlain degree, it becool1'S morc intellectual becAn~e it is arrected hy culture and edu­cation, and scientific ('oncepts fmd their way into it; (lnd still it remains cvcryd(lY and commonplace, The ~ame al' plies to commonplace, cveryday experience which is limit­ed compared to the Rpecial experience of science. Every­day consciousness assimilates experience, knowledge, ideas and certain scientific concepts; but it is not indepelldcnt in assessing their cognitive value. People use them as stereotypes or sorts for picking their way in the spiJC'r(' of their everyday, nonprofeSSional occupations and int('r­ests.

Today, men have the telephone, the radio, the television set, the automobile, the cinema and other achievements of science and technology at their disposal, but they usually have a rather \'ague notion of the scientific laws underly­ing the operation of those devices. The individual is con· tent to know their purpose, to be able to use and enjoy them, and to know where to apply should they malfunction. And it is impossihle and even IIseless for him to under­stand everything that is clear to physicists. mechanics. electrical and radio engineers and other speCialists. But because of specialilation, scientists themselves arl' quitl' vague about those accomplishmC'nts of science and technol· ogy which they use hut which are not connected more ~r less directly with their own fields. So here, too, t~erc. 1S

no absolute opposition bl't.ween everyday and SCientific consciousness. Nowadays, th(,l'e ar(' no people whose con· sciousness is either purely ~cientific or purely e\'eryday. Both those forms of human consciollsnl'ss are insl'parabll'.

Thus the Marxist umlerstanding of everyday conscious· "ess is based on the admission or diversity in man'~ rela­tionship with objectiH' re~liIy,. hoth natural. and .o;ocla1. .A'f'. an agent discov('ring thl' lIlfiOity of the nmvcrse~ learDln~ and mastering its la\\":-;, cl'pating ,·tll(' ~erond en\"lronm{'n~, and thlls ~hnping hims('ir, mall ~hapes nnil denlops .Ill~ RrienlirJ(' C(m~ri(lll:-;IH'.":-;' nut n:-; :-;onl('on(' Illl'l'l'ly. nndlll~ his way in hi:-; illlllll'diak {'1l\'lrOnllll'nt all~ adaphng to It by \Ising triet\ HIHI tested method~, man IS a creature of

\07

,

t'H'ryday consciollsnl':<~ which ClllUhilll'S I't'a~tlll lind (lrt'ju­dice, real knowledge <lod illusion in t.ht' most IItH'XPI'riP!\

and contradictory way!'. Since everyday consciousnt'~S 1'l'fl\l\ill~ ha~l't1 nn llvery.

day experience, it i~ rnlpirical anti thu:-; undoubtedly hO:-4. tile to idealism~ a "fact l'l,nl'ctcd in {hI' spct'ulnt iH'-idl'cliist criticism of it. Still, once again, it is not, always based t'xclusivcly on en:'l'yday cxpl'ricncl' and practice. As w{'

see from ancient philosophy (which emerged berore science and interpreted everyday experience), everyday consciousness comprises prototypcs of both materialist and idealist views. In that sense, idealism, as well as maLerial· ism, relies on concepts of cYC'l'yday consriousness. And materialists, as well as idealists, argue with it.

Materialism relies on "naive realism" of everyday con· sciousness; idealism, on its subjectivist notions. Material­ism criticizes everyday consciousness from the left; ideal­i~m, from the right. Materialism argues against the preju­dice of everyday consciousness; idealism (usually but not always), against common sense. A classic example of tbe I latter is Tertullian·s claim that religious faith must not fear the absurd which common sense rejects. But the history of Christianity and related philosophies proves that Christian theology and the idealist philosophies which sup' port it try to reach their goal both by criticizing common scn~e (Protestantism, Protestant neo-orthodoxy) and by appealing to everyday reason (Catholicism, neo-Thomism),

. Thomas Aquinas, who proclaimed the harmony of reli­giOn and reason, tried to prove that the latter, proceeding from facts of everyday experience, logically and inevitably concludes th.at God exists: For example, an object moves hecR.,IIf'c motiOn .has heen Imparted to it, [lcnce, according ) to .' h0'!la~ AqUI~as, tl~e logical conclusion that a moving obJect IS I~p~sslhle, Without something moving it. Dut if the ~ov?r IS It~elf lD motion, it is also a moving object, that IS, It ha~ Its Own monr, This chain cannot be cnd I~ss h.ecau.se In that case no motion could have a bcgin- ' ~mg Ifl tlm~. Thc~efore, th('~e must exist :-;omething that Imparl~ motIOn while bf'lng II~elf lllotionlf'ss, i.e" th·c first caliSf'.

~hom<ls Aquinas and his medicval followers 511PPol'lt'd t~lelr appeal. Lo I'r1:lson a~ somethillg illfiis]H1lahle by pllt­tlDg a mystical COlll:,tructlOn on Lhat human ability which

106

they prnclniflle~ t('l h /ll'n l cl"Il or II mf'!n -respectlv of Itt' c 1111 1(IUIl Ilu'v Ii\.· I ill ul till) k W\\'I dgf' thl'V )0,:\ ;1.':>sl'd Iwt 1:1. rJlJll,llllllg' 11111<111.', hI' owet) flU lilt, hum! L

_0111 from al)(ne FfJr exalllpil Ll Jf;tll·cl'ntury Thomijl /JidllJlIlIJ"fJ uj Ijltilu.~tlll!tirfll Sllelln' a r II tlliIl cotnmoll

scnsc "is OXattly lhe ,:amo in all Jll( I aud ill all ages it nl'it/H'" advances JHII' i"I'treab, , as it were, re'lson ill it:-; prirnonij,al bLalt, (i'ctal brut), r asoll without reneclion and without science." (7:); 971) ObViously, snch raison II l'etat lmlt, "untainted" by reOection or education, readily admits that the pxistencp of Goel is logically demonstrahle This explailLs why JtIUUt'i'n ThlJfIlists fully share the vil'ws of theil' IIlpdif'yui fOI'l'l'1lllllt'l".:;J aiJOlit immutahility of every· duy ('xperiencl' (alh'gt'rlly slclllmilig from immutauility of hUlllan nature), Viewed from that angle, phil()sophy cor responds to its concent-that is, operates as auli.Jentic phil osophical knowledge· ·only when it is conneded solely to everyday eXjlerience, interpreting its content. I n that casp philosophy is independent of science, which can neitiLf'r refute nor confirm fundamentals of philosophy because science deals with spccial·-that is, scientific- l'xpcriencp.

In till' neo-Thomist \·iew, all philosophers are contempo­raries llf'causc they all illterpret everyday experience which is unchanging and common to eH~ryone, That ex­perience contains neither affirmation nor negation, is nei­ther true nor false, but a totality of immediate experiences of reality and one's own life. The neo-Thomist apologia of ovcryday consciousllC'::\s and experience-just as the at· tempt to proyc Lhe inuependence of their basic content (~f time and spacl', of sciencC' and ~pecial scientific expen­cnce·is aimed at acquitting the theological philosophy of Thomas Aquinas: he i::; trealed as our contemporary on the grounds thaL c\'{'l'yday ('xperil'llcc cannot bel'OI:nc obso~etc, According to nco-Thomist~, Thomism O~W5 directly from the pure SOUl'ce of common sense, .untamte? by specula tion' and bC'cause of its l's,:clltial ImmutabilIty, common scns'c must be understood as the extrahistoricul spiritual human faculty be~towed on liS frOID aboye. Rejecting thl' Thomist yiew of ~()llJe neutral and mute enryday e:qw· riencc which i~ the only thing philosophy is SliPPosl'd til sLudy, Ga:>ton llachelard aptly r('murk~:. "After the age·old dialogue hetween the wo~'ld al~? th: SPlflt, one can no long~ ('I' talk niwot mute expenence, (3li: 8)

109

/

Tn t.he 1St-h cent.ury. Frt'nrh .nl~krial,i!"11IC flp"r('~1 no pr­forL in exposing the aUt'lIl!,l:; 01 ,( ,alllot.c Iht.ologl~llL:-I !llltl phihl~OplH'r:; at usin.g !.Ill', ~Ulthurlly (If rOIlIlIl,o~1 :;\·~I~'~~. t,!) jll~til"y tlll'ir fautilshc l't'lIgwu:-; 1I111101I~. 110111.11:,11 ,1 ,,_,\ lit Ii that man can 1'('u:-;oo soundly only "hell he 13 Iwalthy, "when his soul is JlcitiH'f troubled by [('nl' 1101' rhfkl1ged hy illnc!3s nor disturbed by Jlnssion~". (77; US) Sound fl'a·

son he maintained cannot l'cconriiC' ilsrlf to religion whi~h "demands that Wi' firmly hr\iev(' in things that are not ('yident and in propositions that are either barely prob· able or greatly contrary to rc~son". (76; 142) ..

\Vhcreas French matcrinltsts proyed that rehglon was incompat.ible with reason, t.he Scot.tish "philosophy of common sense" saw its principal mission in proving t.he opposite. Thomas Reid, the foremost proponent of that school, maintained in his Enquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764) that the ad­mission of the existence of the outside world cannot be based on the evidence supplied by sensory organs because that e\'idence is only valuable inasmuch as it commands credence. Common sen~e is the original ability to behen which precedes sense perception and reflection and leads 10 the admission of both the external world and God. Thus a lack of faith in God is as contrary to reason as the re­fllsal to believe that the objects reported by the senses are real. Therefore, according to Heid, rejecting religious faith is tantamount to refUSing to h('lieve that the outs ide world is real.

Thus, historically, both materialism and idealism have claimed to represent common sense. And although because of its organic contradictions everyday consciousness oh­Y.iollsly. sustains opposite philosophies, the everyday expe­fll'nce It reflects-.the experience shared by all mankind, and co~stant~y eD.flched and confirmed by social practice­co~tradlcts Ideahsm .an~ sen'es as one of the starting POlDtS of the materialist. world view. Lenin repeatedly stres:ed ~hat very important aspect of the issue of the relatIOnship .~e~ween everyday consciousness and philoso­r.1IY: . He C~ltI~~zed those idealists who tried to use the

nal\ c realism of evcryday consciousnes I bit' I II' . . I' s 0 su s an la (' llelr antJmaterl~ IS~ co~ceJlts. Onr of those was Geor c

l,crkeley, a subjective Idealist who said " I "n I . gl .' d' I ' ,,(c~\\our 0 \ Ifl Ica c common sense" (37 ' 102) T I ' . " li S asse rtIOn , at

110

JirH glanr'p .1:QmplPte pan.rJOX lOCO :t is madl' ",thill Ihl) 11"'IIIH'WIJl'~ III I' RLlbJPtlll'~';IIei.lli t sytcm, he':OlHC'S dl'ar if Wll II'j:!1I til..,.' Uerkcley Idl.li I CJl1y inteqJr.'tl'd elllpiriclsUI h;l~iI~d 011 c\'er,yJay ex peril Df',t.. lo(]"y, idl'.,list empiricislIl of tell proclaim! Its ledicaLon 1:.0 or'Hnary COUl·

lIlon scnsc. For example, ::l .!!llbstantiating hiS &'lbjf'tlivi.!' l agnostic epistt'nlology, Karl Popper proclaims: "I was al­ways a comrnon5en~c philosopher, t'ld l: ·;ommonsense real· ist .. ' I \VUS thoroughly opposed t ",,'cry deaiislIl, ",)si· tivism, or even neutralism in philosopby. (90; 322-23) Typically, the pseudoncgation of idealism by t..oday'e bour­geoiS idealist philosophers is prpsellted as agreement with everyday experience. This is indrpct PIOot or the fact that lhe main content of everyday exper.ence lS largo· ly in favor o[ materialism. In his monograph ,)0 Charle~ Peirce, the Soviet philosopher Yu. K. Mel ... 1 'l4Lp~ that this founder of American pragmatism dc:-cribcd his doc Lrine as a philosophy of "critical common 5'e·l~e". Common sense is pres('nted as comprising ideas and beliefs that are "the result of human experience nandrd ·Jown from generation to generation". (:29; 382}

Lenin criticized the Marhbt attempts to portrJ)" sub­jectivist-idealist empiriCism as the .... iewpoint of unbiased everyday consciousness which allegedly knows only seD!'a­lions and their complexes and refuses to recognize anything difierent, that which cannot be sensed. "The refer­ence to 'naive realism', supposedly defended by this phi· losophy, is sophistry of the cheapest kind," Lenin wrole. "The 'naive realism' of any healthy persoD who has not I

"Deen an inmate of a luna'tic" asy1um or' a pupil o[ tlle idealist philosophers consists in t.he vicw that things, thl' envir onment, the world, exist independently of our senSi\­Li on of our consciou~ncss, of our self and of man in gener-al. . '. Materialism df'liberotely mak('s the 'naive' belief ,~! mank ind the fount!a.tion of it.."i theory of knowledge.

(10; 14, 69·70)

• In his Philosophical Notebooks Lenin str.ess('~. tba~ forDl9. of logic are organically lioKed t<? ~\"ery_day practice: Man s . practic.e, ropenling itself l\ thou~and mllhoo ti.1I!('s, bec~mes consohdated in man's cOllsciou~oess by figures of logiC. I?r.ccisely (aod only) on account or this thou!'!anrJ.-million-f~ld repetition, thc~e fIg.ures ha~ve the sta bility of a prejudice, an aXIOmatic character. (to, 38, 211).

Itt

Ewo in its undcnlopl'd f()fm, malrrinlism gors milch (urther thJIl Iwin' 1'l';\li'-;lll ilUd rritic;lUy IlllidYZI''l. both the jl"l'jtulicl';j aUtI the l'Jlljliricai tonlt'lI! or. l'\ "'ryday COil· :-;ciuu:mess. In its more iHh'aIlCt't! IlWt!l'fll 10rUl, lIIatprial i~lll :slmlil':-; the dialectic::; of till' adiVl' rcflection-knowl_ (.dgc. fl'Orclioll-sluuy of object in' reality, corl'c~tillg the nnin' idea about the dirrrt "('flection of the {Iulsltit· world by sense perception, about the ident.ity of t.he image with the object reflect.ed in it. This \"iC'wpoint. dialrrtically ut',

gates nahe realism but rctains and develops the truth it contains. It follows that the precepts of maLPrialist, and \ especially di[dcclic<li·malcl'iniist phi lo.!:iophy do not morely I il"lIl.scclHi the hounds of t'\,cry(Jay consciousness and it!; \ emplfIcai notions, but abo contradict the laUer, Everyday consciousness, inasmuch as it is not permoated with the relevant sceotific concepts, is incapable of grasping the :<clf.propulsion of matter, the unity of mutually determin· iog and lllutually exclusive opposit.es, otc, That is not e~> plained by the metaphysical (as asserted by Hegel ) nature of cveryday consciousness but simply by the fact that the content of dialectical t.hinking is too versatile to fit into the framework of the limited everyday experience of iudi· viduals,

Usually, today's positivism, which differs from Machism in its rejection of the empirical origin of mathematical ~nd}ogical. precepts: d~es no~ ally itself with "naive real· Ism but Instead dismisses It as an unscientific view of the. world. Trying to overcome the spontaneous materialist llotlOns. of common sense, neopositivisls almost invariably a~c~se l~ of a theological bias, They refuse in principle to llisttng~lsl.l between reason and prejudice or to ana lyze the c?~t~adlct!OnS of everyday consciousness. For example, lluil pp .ha~k waots the ph ilosophical terms that mark the. dlstmctlOn between ma terialism and idealism to be haUl shed from the philosophical vocabulary because t he c?ncepts those terms denote are historically rooted in no· ~o~s of e\'er~day, cOI~~ciousness , In his Philosophy 0/

Clellce he mamtams: Expressions like 'matter' 'm'nd ' 'cause and effecL', and similar ones are today mer~ly ~OD1~ monseose terms, and have no pia . l· I . . discourse" (U, !.~ 6) TI ce 10 s nct y sC lenllflc cl:ntral probJ~~ ~~. th 1a~,tamehhook als,o holds that "the

t r e fJ 1 osop Y of sCienCe is how we gc rom commonsense statements to general sc ient ifi c

112

•

I

I,rim'llll!' I "'~ 'J.) Thj~ Ibl' _ /·oITec·ly jf\l'nlin,~s all lUI I,orlanl .1'IIISt.,.tlIfJI"J.{II·,1 pl"llbll'lIl. v. 1]("11. 1I0\\;1'\'('r, IlPI'l'llsi 11\1~11l 1.'1 111,,,1.11' II) ~111\·t· hpl<tIl'uo l tol.III.\' ql'po~ls ·.·i'·I11"· III p\"I'ryd"y "X.III'l"i"III·I" ,\n'onlillg III IJI'I)IJI)~itl\"i"IIl, :-;iun' St'll'JI(',' n'("o~1I1ZI'~ till' I'XI~II'11I"1' of Hwlll'l". elJII"willuSut'SS

ami dl'!l'I'lI\illi!:-llI, il 1"t'lllilillS 1/11 IIII' 11,\,,.1 1)1 1'\"I'rpla .... ("011 :-;riouSIII':-OS ,tlld il~ I ,UlI-{Uilj.J:l'. That el;,im S lbjt'ctiwly dis· loris t.h{, anolllpllShlllPllls fir sl'il'II/"1' "I,]("h ha:-; (lj"co\"I'I"I·1I lIollsul):!!ialllial I"OI"lIl:"i or lllattl'l", 1"I'\/'(lI,'d the cOlflplex Jlby

siologi<'ai IlIt'l"li;llli:-;rn "r pSyclllllr'j.J:iC:'11 (lClir,ns, ,Ifill ahiln dOJll'd till' 1II{'ehalli:;lic I"r)IJCI'Jll~ of dch'l"milli~m. Tho~'H' di" con'ri('S ali(I I"{,lateo thl'()J'I'tic(l1 c(Jllclllsions 00 [lot (It all imply thaL a scientist ojl(']"(!ting with thl' cOIlcept of'mat­tel''' is at the :0-;,1111(' ]l!\"('\ ,IS a hOllsewifl'.

Proclaiming his oppo:o-;ition to lhc identity of scipntiflC nnd everyday I(lngll(lgl', Fnlllk is e%l'nlially trying to gl'l I'i(\ of matll'l", a task long laid down by Georg{' Bl'I"kl'It,y, According to thl' lalter, "The only thing \\"ho~(' ('Xi:<tI'IICl'

\\"e de ny, i~ that which piti\o:-.ophl'l"s call m(lUer 01' corpo· real substance." (:37; 2, ... ),")) But apparently Frank is more consistent than BC1'hicy bCC(lU:-;l' he denies the exi~h'nce o[ both con:-ociOllsness (he contrast:; it to mattN) and cau­sality, the cal('gol'ies dil'cctly related lo the key philo­!;ophical is:-;lIe: about tht' cau:<a\ I'l'lation~hip of mattt'r and consciousness ,

I n the fln .. l analy:-ois, the Ill'opo:<ili\"ist "rC'\"ollltioll in philosophy" rejects all past philosophy with it~ agt·-old issues. TIll' latter at'e ])l'l'sentC'd as a disorderly multitude of unver ifiable and umh.'lllon:-;lrable \'iews, unable to riSt' a bove everyday consciollslll'SS and naively prohing qu(>s­t ions thaL ca nnot be answercd bec31l:<e they are phantom~ devoid 01" rea l con lent. That is pl"t'('isely tllC' meaning of \VitLgens tein's pronOllUCl'Jlll'nt asserting thilt what cannol he d iscussed should not be spoken about. ::. This means tha t people without a propel' (in the "modern", Ill'oposili\"' is t sense of the word) phi losophicnl ('ducat ion i.Hglll' nbollt whether I Ill' worl d is tinite 01' inlinill', knowable or unkno\\"· ab le, etc. J\ ll'llnwhi ll" thl' philosophl'l' (neopositi\"ist) is si ll' nt: those i:-;slIL's cannot Iw ans\\"{'l'ed bl'CUIlSl' tlH')" al'e

In this Witl gcn:<tt'in oh\"iou:<ly t..'cho{'s .\ietz5chc',.: "Sometimes, .b the ~;\ying hints, Ollt' can only slay a philosoplll'~ ~f one kc.cps sih'n l." (89;:1, 11). Thai is not. thc only C.bc of po,.:it\n,.:l :<nl'ntL,.:m l)U lli ng its own Clln~\rl1t'tiotl on irr,ltionalb\ lh{',.:l'~,

113 I:I_O I 5()2

Rllt, prc:'l'nling tll£'. ~R'p-f)l(1 .philo~ophi(':tl p!,(,\ld.oissu('~. "j" {'Yl'rnhy 1H'llpn~d 1\ Ist~ llld to IHlliel' {'OnSCIOIISIH'!'S ,:< .' <.' ." II _ I -" I " .. I 'I

' ",_,j",H'iatloll of till' :0;(\1,1 II 1111 ,IP \~.IC t wi IClr ' ' . I 'I ' I·' ' , II ,robleJII:; hl'IOII~Jng 10 JIll 0:<011 I) JlIOJlel I. 'llt'alllllg ,It' I . ' -I' ,I I" '.

I . ," "I'" onlinar)- nllllilion ~(·ll~t· \, III I t 1~IIIIS:<I'S NII.ltr !-'l1l1l ill 0 . I' ' I 'I I' I ""U"5 and Tl'gards lh~Il' t ISCIISSIUII as 1'lIlply pit nsop Ilea ~ ~- . _ ,

~,llk unworthy of SCflOllS jl<'oph. , . E\,(>ryday consciollsne~s apprars 1(1~:JlI(" sl'r{'~H' and PI'I'·

ha s even carefree if viewed in the C'])lstemolog1cal aSpl'ct tI:rt is, as empirical self-com,ciollsllCSS, the COI~lJlr(>llPn. sion of the out.er C'llYironmC'lIl, l'('asOlHl.h.ly arg111ng that the self is the self and therefore the self IS not a cloud, a I'Ock, a donkey, etc. But ~'iewed from ~noth('r fln~le, <15 a totality of cycryday expen?Jlces-t.hat IS, all t,be JOys and sorrows, hopes and disappolJltmenls that conllll'lse ~\'eryday life-that eyeryday consciousness appears continuously turbulent. Scientific. and philosophical conRciousuess np­pf.'ar as something similar to the ancient Greek ataraxia in comparis.on. This aspect of everyday consciousnc~:-;, 111'e­\ iously .studied by the philosophical doctrines 01 affects (both by materialis.ts and idealists), has now been almost lotalh" annexed bv existentiali~m. The latter re"ives in its own 'way the op'position of philosophY to the so-called positi\"(~ sciences and regards them as practical, utilitarian, pragmatic and therefore unable to probe the being of that which exists, that is, not rising above everyday conscious­ness.

Existentialism opposes the natural scientific descriptions of objective reality with a hermeneutic description of man's being, defined as worry, fear, being-in-t1lC-world, freedom, etc. Essentially, it is the emotion that fiUs t.he ('veryday existence of individuals. Existentialism interprets those emations in the spirit of Husserl's phenomenology, divorces them from the empirical source and declares to be (>xistentia~t tha~ is, a priori inherent to man's selfness. In tTi8.t connection, Heidegger and Sal·tre, following Kierke­gaard, draw an essential dividing lint? between fear (Furcht, La peur), generated by external empirical causes and allegedly insignificant as far as "existence" is con­~er~l('d, a.~,d. anguish (Angst, l'a.llgoisse) , caused by the eXI~t~nce Itself and therefore Insurmountable. An exis-

~entlahst regards existential consciousness as cleansed of Its everyday aspect, of philistine conformism, because it

1'\IH'I1('III't'~ fl"'::I1 not 'll .1 l\pfiIl1f', "lh'LIlILtial (langer, hut III' till' \'l'I')I I x, ·I('nr,. prl·- '·' .... l·,l U~ tJ,'llg'r,)1I~, lragilc, 1111 st,thlt· ill OIILI'I w(!l'd~, Ill .. ' ."LI! llll: I!lI.r~lA!ILC'· I~ "fraill (If il!'t·H

Exi~lt'l1tiilllsl~ r:l~tiJ.{ul(~ lilt' vul~ •• r lHcryday) (e.li" 01' dl'ath, il f£';l1' bast'd on perfl'f:Uy real .~mplric.ll (',au e5. and (,lIntl'(.15t it ll) the f-'xislfllLtial it'ar of the ultimate 1'05 :;ibiliLy, till' possihility lint In \)(', which, in their view. hilS no COlllICCtiOIl with 1111' I'vI'ryday I'xigtence of indivill+lal.i among otlwr inilividu,d3 who livl~ alLt! die. TIJ{,':I.l :-V!!I) 1+'111 p()rariiy stay ali\"(' thll:' acquirf! n perfectly empll'Icai 'If)­

Uon flrst of oth('l's' morlality nwl then of their own, All existentialism argiles furiollsly again:;t c\"f'rylluy

existence, presented as faceless, illusory and. ~eaning­less, against everyday, spontaneously matenalist con· sciousnc:-;s, ullegptlly reflecting not reality but p;;eudo­real ordinariness. An existentialist describes e\'eryday COil sciousncss as alienated (although that can only be trill' of some of its aspccts), claiming that only the existentia~is\ self-consciousness of existence, renouncing e .... erythmg iHundane, 0\'(>I'COn1('5 alienation. But the "ontological SQli tude" of thp C'Xistcntial ~('lf·consciollsness mystically re­flects the actual alienation of the personality in bourgeol~ society; essentially, existential consciousne,:s is refmed everyday consciousness. .

Existentialism criticizes everyday conSCiOusness as aile: gedly incompatible with t.he graspi~g of the :ub,:tan~e_ 01 being. According to Hcidegger, phllosophy \'Iolah's lbclf when it reckons with object.ions ,·oiced by common sen:<~, because the I attN' cannot see that to which it O?jcct~. Phi­losophy, Heidegger writcs, "canoot. refute .ordm~ry, COIll­mon sense because it is deaf to its language '. (6;); b) Rllt cxistentialism itseH, whilt' fighting the mundane. ~and . to a certain degl'eo really exposing the del!('rsona~lzlflg lfl­fluence of bourgeois relations), limits pllllosopJllc.al prob­lems to a detailed dc~cription of everyday COnSCI?US~~SS, emotions and concepts . .:\!though Hussed's sublCC\!\"l~t- ~ idealist phenomenology does distil them, y~t {or all I~S criticism, existentialism is not much ~nterested III all that lies beyond the c\"cryday consclOusne~s an.d the ordinary (and lll'gatiHly inlerpret('d) emotJ~ns It criticizes so harshly. It ~ees nothmg wort.h notmg Ifl

I ' b· ... its l'\"eryday lif(', especially in socia lflt.erconrse ccans,

1I;j ,.

Illj~8nlhroJlic inlcrprdfllion of !"i:-;tl'/H'I' O~I'~'1'1 no pial'!' f{n thing':' likl' work, Jon' ,or kllow!t.dg~." 1'\I~tl'l.l.lialj."t phi. IO.~(lllh.r Iwrr{m.:; l'n-II II .. tllt'pry 01 t·\.I~·('Tll(' (criti!'al) ,..itltatinn:<. which \,I('Yilll' mall .,bo\'l' 1"'0;<<111' ",pryday lift· frllw neryday Ilv!iOIt;< of impl'llIling clt'nlh, il"J't'dl·t'IlI;,bl(: .~in. I'll.'. ParaJoxi.:ally. a Jlhilo~oJlhy t~l;limin!-:, tn "I'P!):;I' qnit£' tlncomJlromisil~gl~: .C'H'rythlll.R .()I'd,lllal'Y i.-: inrapahl!', litl(' to its {'x!reme lIHI~\'](luallsl 111I1I1;\IIOns, or ",(rkaling" I ilst'lf frolll the q Utlglll If(' of ('\'(,I'yd,l\ hOlll'gt'ois ,'ou l ine

l'1l1ik(' {'xistentiEllism, Manis! J1hilos()ph~r {'I'ilira ll y nlla~ J~'z{';; ('\"cryday existCllce [tnd nil' 1'(' I('Yanl (,yt'l'yday eon­c('pls and emotions as hislo!'ically definite' :-;ol'iul phenome­na which do not I'e'mazn lI11cJlangt'd tlll'olighont llist.ory but

. ai~c1lillfgliaiir rhc ·co ui':.; e of tTl(' commlJni~L tl'ansformation of ~o('i('lr. Medieval ~chola,!;lici,!;m maintained that cOlllmon ~(,II~e is th(' awar('m~~s of certain fUlH/al?,entaL pl'i nciples, rndependent of the trme and place and ul('ntical with all p('op/e; but today there is no longer any Il('('d to pron~ that common :ense a~d ('veryday con,;cioll!'Ill'!'S as a whole, r{'fiect the SOCial ennronment and change together with it.

Indeed, from the point of "iew of both mundane COOl­

ilion ~en:o:{' and science and philo:-;ophy (materialist philos­ophy,. too) in, say,. the 181h 01' early 19th ce nturies the \"Cry rdea of a cubiC c(>ntimeter of substance containi'og a huge amount. of energy was not only absurd but also ex­tremely mystIcal, and making no distinction between th e supe~natural (unreal) and the natural ( L'cally existing or po~slble). -

~od.ay, both s~ience and philosophy arc very cautious III ) therr IIlterpreta~lOn of t.he notion ;' impossible", Meanwhile, everyday conSClOllsness has grown used to • he miracles workcd b ,. II ' . . y man s mtc ect and ca n hardly be shaken by ;cl~n,t~lc and technological breakthroughs. 1 t has not yet a~s I se.nselof wonder, but it firmly believes that there te:h:Zlo~~ac es-at least not. in the lield of science and

» Here I do not refer to the" "'" . (A bbagnano, Bolnow and other )Ptl~~S~C ~crslon of existentialism o .... e~rome the peSSimistic inter s ta ~\ IC tne.s. (albeit in vain) to f~IlI:lly life, holidays customspre tct)on Of. poslhve emotions (joys of tlalism, becau~e the 'truly po!/ . . typical of "classical" existen­of life is basically incompaubi lYe,. blgniflcant and genuine content the wo~Id .. The Soviet Philosoph~ w~t S the existentialist apIJroach to and SCientifically analyzed that f te't ' Bogomoloy has substantially

a s type of eXistentialism, H6

h\"I"\,lay rt'lig:il)lI' l'IUI'<("ioll. 1lI'~3 has .)l~() eirangl'lI (wllt,I'I' it !L"" at ;111 sur ... ·,·.·,j.' In • .11 proh~brjit:v, no OUl! Ill'litwe" ilny rutH'" lllat {.ol C"l1,!,l\(·d the world ,n -iX' days, if only i)t'('all~e it L' ,'0111111'111 knnwi,~dgp. tlwt ,lays (awl nights) ('irlll,' inlo 1"!lIIg aft,·!, Larlh IHHI tak'~n Fiwl'C awl 111'1-('1111 '0 1'01at,· 011 il'\ .Ixi " . Till . ,;;~)liliIJS the genllinl'! ,II' spair or UP!'!);lY'!\" wli" I';lie! tl.;l! HlfJsl people, including Chr istians, had IUrtH'c! nral,·rialisl III~CallSe thcy hr·licwt! only ill tIl(> mat!!l'i,d pow!'r mililary or cCfJllfJwic- -aud no\. in thl' pO\H'r of the :o:pirit. The \'rotf!stant Chardl has l'f:'conci]Ptl itsclf to \.his ~itll;ltjon alld no longr·r requil'e3 its adhl'J'cnts to accept all t1Hl t!oglllala: it is enough to brJieve that God and Jesus Christ II is ~on exist.

Tn his The Conditio/! oj the Working-Class in England Engels oHered t\I(' following description of the life and spir· itual dcn'lopnwnt of British worhr~ on the eve of the indlls tl'i al re\'olution: "They could rarely read and far more rarely wr it(-'; went rt'lotrriarly to church, newt' talked pol· iti cs, n~\'(>r cOllspin'd, n{'\'Pr thought. delighted in physi· cal cXt'rcisl's, Jisl(>lll'ri with inherited T('nrenee when the Bible was read, and were, in their unquestioning humility. exceedingly well-disposed toward" the 'superior cla:::~(',;',.­They WCI'e comfortable in their silent vegetation, and bul for thc industrial re\'olution they would never ha\'e emerged from thi ~ ('Xi:-;t(,IICl', which cosily romantic a,:;. it wa:o:, was ne\'erthekss Ilot worlhy of human beings." (I; 4, 309) Thel'c is no need to de~cribe here the tremendoll,; changes in the con:-;ciouslll'% of all the working pcople brought abouL by !:lubs<'qucnt dc\"£'lopment~ which led to thl' establishment of the new, socialist :::ystem first in the CS~R and then in mally other cOllntr ie~, The victory of social­ism rad ically changed eY('ryday consciousness. In capilalist countri es, too, mass consciousness has changed greatly. ;\ s Jacque Maritain, a pl'ominent Catholic philosopher, r('­marked , "Nobody want:-; to die for capit"lism any more--ll('i· ther in Asia, no!' in Africa nor in Europe," (84; 124) This admission by an opponent of ).[arxism is cvidence that th('J'e j~ .increasing rNlIi7.ation among the e:xploited mass('s that -only d('strllction of capitalbm can bring about their fwci.IJ ·C' mall('illati on.

f do no-t~l]'op~ hel'l' to <lll<lly7.1' the impact of socin econoll1il', scit'n tifIc ill)!1 tl'chnologicaJ progress on en'ryd<lY consciou.slll'ss, I would only note the major asp('cts (If that

Hi

hi~tOfiC81 pfOel'!'!': it !'upplanls IfrnliOl.lal notion: ,lIld otlu r grouDdles~ belie!5 i.n 1'\"l'rpl~IY I·OIlSI·wn~ UP J nn.:! hi I g. f'veryday and 5cleuldk ccm!'cIlHI~IH'.S9 dllsl't to.gctller Willdl, howev('r, does nol CililCd oul tt~I'lr ~l1~IStlllltUti clifiercTl("l' F vcrytl ay consci ou:" Ill':':' i.)l'{·\ 'II\('8 lilt· fl'~ S 11l!-r~ Y I' a I I, J lIul, mOt

, ill. Ili:,criminating, l'~lhl'lIrall\ tlc'lIlalllllll~, I1l1lt'PPIHIt'UI /lnd critical. It no longer Ilwrciy ,Uiilpb tn Iht, \·,jslin~ l'0n tlilions bul piuys an ('WI' IlWfl' actiw pllrt in lllan·s {T('a liYf' activity .• \11 that jZl"l'ntly chnngl'5 Ill!' l"C'latiClII.<:hips lw· twecll philosophy and overyday ('onscillu~ru'ss and rXIll'n encc. The latter is an intcgrni part of socinl practice, which \lnd('rlit'.~ all forms of kllowiedge.

2

DIALECTICAL :\1 \'fERI \LlS'1

AND DIALECTICAL IDEALIS:\I

nDI.Y\ r EL 1';,\ \'1' Y'W 17t1d:E\TliHY p IIII.OS(WIII C,\ L 1\.\ T I {)\.\ LlS~1

lnllHunuel Kilnl, the fnther of da~sical German JlhilQ~o­phy, hoth followed and criticized 17th-century rationalism. Like phiiosOI)hical ellll)jl'iciSIn, philosophical rationalism is thc bOll rgeois ~elf ·(' onseiol1slIcsS of tho Na of cmergent cal)­ilalisl mod(' of ]H'Oduclion. Its dbtinclly antifeudal char­actcr is (',·id('nl in th£' l'atif)ll(llisl conviction that the "nal­ural light of reason" (IHInt'n naturale) is innate to every human being irrespccth-e of hb intellectual ahilitie~ OJ'

educatioTl, ,\ccOI'ding to Descarles, "the ability 10 rea~on and to distinguish truth r.'om errol'--which i" u~ualJy cal­led common sen~e or reason--j" naturally equal in all men"_ (4:'i; 27) The thesis is 1I0t merely a theoretical con· viction but an ideological declUl'ation of the anlifeudaL bourgeois r(',-olutionary movcment.

Rationalists wer(" intransigent in their oppo~ition to scho­lasticism, although the lntler, \lolike medieval mysticism, also appealed to reason and logic. They exposed the fallacy of scholastic dogma which maintained that theology was on top of the hicl'nrchical ladder of knowledge, science wa~ at the bottom, and philosophy in between. Rationali;;lll proclaimed science to be th e highest form of theoretical knowledge, and reason, tl1(> highe5t scientific authority. TUl'ning to the "great book or the world"-that is, to lli.\­

tllre-Dcsc<\rtC's considered it a maHer of paramount im­portance to create a philosophy that would help in har­nessing the el("menlal rorc('s of natUl'e,

The rAtionalist stl'uggle against ~('holaslic philosophizing spread far beyond tIll' hounds of Iht' specific hi"toricfli sit­uation whicb g('IlNated, shaped and inspifl'd it. 1t was i\

strllgglp against all that wa!' 1l1ll'l'itLcillly taken rO!' gl'ant('(\ -that is, against dogmatic thinking which ignored thc

121

u:t eubslantiating its aaaer.

the critiq~e of da,mat.­In his words, "Our

to everything must and law, because of

realm of that critique ca!8 they rouse suspicion and

count on genuine respect with which re ~ ~omethiDg that can 'Yithstand its free aD~ . FB, 8, 7). In demandmg a consistent and

cntical analysis. Kant went much further th rat.ioa'uets because be stressed the need fo an

of reeson itself too. r a m1int'ined. &hat bourgeois transformations fA=-' hB~U88 social institutions were to be changed

. to ration,) human nature, to the ra ui til ·nasal rneon. This idenli& .. 1i f b q ~.

Ibe .. on 0 DurgeOl8

realization of the ideals of reason WU 'Qaell of the ration8U't concept of rea·

pietured U all absolute and autonomous to ,,!;;;;~, eo/voJbo\huate, jadge aad establish norms

I apeuvent le"'e p-6ftt.io d . I' the ntjon.Jj.... --I'- n an sOCIa .... V18W, rBRSOn never errs At·

...... rooted in the will whi~b is and LelbDiz thought it

was allegedly vague to wrong conclusions if treated

was

amODl mao', gre_telt theonUcal 811011. It· .. rationaliat doctrine of tbe canna of enGl, p:rGYiIII perceptiOD, afleet, could not deceive UI b.ta.... .. not a judgment.. It ia the mind and "liOn that are r'Mr of error- and not beeeUie they proceed from upmellee but because they try to draw cooclusioDi indepeDdentb' or experience, thus depriving themselves of their onlJ M.­sis.

The rationalist cult of realon (and the concept of pure thought as its concomitant) was a one-sided (and often leading to idealistic eonclUlions) interpretation of \he ma\h­ematieal form of knowledge, which rationaliats cqnajdetJd 8 priori, based on the purely logical deduc\ioa of .... tain theses from axioms. Rationali" were convinced. that philosophy could be constructed ll8 a mathematiC'M tem of conclusions and that this would end. argument and make it possible to in all nelds of o&udl', 1\ oDly to damenlal phil .. opblaal ui_" and apprOjlliaie SpinOla auemptad Ibe' in hill -.

Unlike rUkmaJist.B, Kant dud.

neither mathematical axioma DOl' In hill view, philooophJ aoillprillil ."'" • tal that deserves to be called. aD u:ica". In contrast to mathematics. pbU080phieal not apodictically authentic. rather. they are of available concepts. On the other hanA. definitions are shaped by the modeUng of fore, "in philosophy, the detiDiUoa u 811. • definitiveness must rather tile II

it. On the contrary, before the concepti gin w\\b

Trealine eluded that data) \lie enlire

nil' ralioullli .. 1 conviction thai Ih," h{)~IIHI;Il .. it,S of t'\pt'I"lt'IICl'

can ht' tl'<l[):-;ceuded. III till' ratlOn.III .. ! nt'w, matlll'malirs 11:\d <lln'ad.\" soln'd that problelll. HOW it was philO;.iophy'" IUl'n.

I\RIlI rejected (.h(' rationnlist doctrin(' (If intellectu;ll in ClIllinll and countered it with i\ Ill'\\" intel'p!'!'(,,'ioll of "spll'. evidellt." mathcmilfical thl'~('~ which he d('fiurd <1. __ speria[ sensory (but [llso J priori) acts of ('.(lllll'mp/nlion. As to thr mind and rca'-;Oll, they W('n' una hie to Jll'l'cei\'c and conLt'mpiate directly and t.hus ftI'l'in'd nt li1ril' concllll'ions by spC'cuiatioll, t.hrough disconr5r.h:nnl, [he1'efo1'(" Saw thC' fallacy of the doctrine' of intcllrctual intnition in tho alien­ation of thought from empirical <lnla, in the attempts to tran .. c('nd the bounds of any p05~ibl(' cxp(,l'icncc by pure thought. Such attempts often led to theological conclusions who.~e theoret.ical fallacy Kant specially exposed.

~1ath(>D1atics and mechanics werr the mosL ad\'anced sci-1.'11«'.': in the 17th century. Mrchanics examined the moye­ment of objects and related processes, and it proceeded mostlr from mathematics. Chemistry, biology and other nat­ural ~cience." were actually only taking shape and we!'r mostly ('rupirical-that is, they usually described the phe !lODlena obseJ'\"ed, Rationali~ts proc('eded from malhrmat. ic.':. while philosophical empiricists from natural science. The antithc~is of rationalism and empiricism thus reflected the actual opposilion between the theoreliral knowledge of that age and empirical natut'al science.

Kant's I~istoric contribution was that Ill' cl'iticized (and to ,a ce~talll degree o\'Crcame) the limitations of both the 1·~tJOn~Jllsm anll empiricism or his time, 110 coun tered ra­tlOna~lsts by shOWing that any knowledge proceeded fl'om certal~ sens?ry obsen·ations. And he saw the main fau lt 7f , pl\JlosopllJca~ empiricism in its rejection of the possibil­"t~. (Jf. the,o.retlcally substantiated judgnl('nts lhaL wel'c . trlcti:,: unl\e~~al and necessary. For example, according t,o"Locke, the ¥eneral and universal brlollg noL to the I'ea! {j's~('nce of thlllgS, but are the illvention.<; and creatllres ~~n t lB llnd~rsfandi~g, made by it for its own lise", (78; -) lit, ant pomtC'd out, <lpodiclic judgmf'nls formed

Of'etr!1 thp concept of intellectu I· ,. thcor:r of knowledge maintainin II intUItIOn to the !'lpnsllliollalist the more abstract (including n gttth3~ ;,dl

1hum311 knowledge, ('ycn

st·nsory origin, 13 If'mdhc3). had an experiment"l.

124

Ihl' Jlln,,1 imporl"nt ('''nll'lIl fir nw!ilf'm"lin ,11\11 Inf'dUllli('s,

Th"l'l'fol'l', Ih,' i 5 ~11f' W,' S III ~I'.~ P thnt fart (withllllt which. Kanl ]I1<1ininilH'd, Iltl 'Cil'lIf'l~ \,,, ... pf!~<;iblt') illld explain till' po~sihilily or inflnilt'I.\" IIllin'\':<ill illlli nl'n'~s,\\'y Ir1ltbs. Ilow('vCl', lH'it.hl'l' K;lllt 1101" 1..01'1,1' placl'u the IIlIin'l'sal ,\OIl th(' n('('rss{lry in t.1I1' n'ahn of rt'i!lity Ihat Wil~ illlli!ppn(\rnt or knowlpdgl',

Thp rationalist vi('w~ or IIH' 171h ('Pllt\lry w('rf> til!' phil­osophi('al I'xl)l'('s~ion of n Il'illlsiticlIwl historical lll'rini\ awl w(']'(' thus {lmhiguo\ls and inriinf'{1 to compromise, The hOl1l'g('oisi(' \ls('d compromise to hl'('ome the economically dominant. class of fCtHlnl society, And while the bourgeois philosophy of that period l'('soll1lely opposed schola~ticism and, to a certain degrrc, also theology. it preferred a com· promise with Trligion, til<' dominant ideology of feudalism. Such was the ideoiogic<li mi~sion of the metaphYSical sy:-;-. !('ms crNtteci by 17th-cl'ntllfY ralion<llists, In De~carll:s philosophy, that. compl'omis(' was l'vident in the duali~~ic OJlllOsition of physics and metaphysics, Cartesian phy:-;~cs (the philosophy of nature) studied the existing real~IY that could be perceiYC'd by the sen~es, while metaphys\c~ claimed to comprelH'THI the extrasensory, But since expe· rience pl'o\'ided no basis for recognizing such supr~reahty, Descartes granted t.he possihility or the human l~tellect possessing innate ideas and innate knowledge WhiCh, In his view, could be used to logically dedu::e all the charac­teristics or metaphysical reality,

To reduce all metaphysics to the rationalist interpreta· tion of theological (or theology-related) questions wouill, be to oversimplify thC' iSSlll', The metap,hysical ~y5t('ms. o[ Descal't('s and LC'ibniz did milch to pronde a ph,los.ophu·al inlel'prrta l ion of mathematical and natur~l .sciC'ncc prob­lems. Spinoza'll ll1('ta]lhysic~ was a ~llaten,allst. sy.stem, ~f views a lbeit prcsentC'd in the panthelst W'Ill and Idcntlf~­ing God with nahm', lIrllc(' Man's and ... Engeb;' a5sess­menL of thC' POSitil'f. earthly content of 11th-century met­aphysic~, TIl{' situation changed ,only in the ~8th cenh~ry: ··The wholr w(,fllth of metaphYSICS now conSisted onl). of hrings of t.hought and h('t\\'C'nly things, at the yery hme wht'll real bC'ing~ and l'.ulhly things began to b(' the c('ntE'!' of all intere~t." (I; J, I~G) .'. .

Thi~ m(>'Hl~ that 1\..1111 t1l'ii\'('red ht~ cl'llique ,of rahon~l­isl IlwlilJlilysil':-; at a tinll' o[ ib d('cline, Pnhke SkeptiCS

1:!5

10 I ". FrC'IlCh mnicrifdisL"- who fl'jC'clPd UIr.t.1 or 011-(,('11 Uf, . I II , ' I I

I ' I ""DI' ,"~It of h'UHI hant ,11m l';) nC'! (l tnlrl' II ly"lca :-;\~ ~- . " I I ' , I ·: . -,"",olog", ... , IIIl'Ol'l'Iieal, pInT w tJ.LncHI 1'0010;; IIJill

llC'lr l'JlI!' ~ " , '" I ..... ", j .. whr Ill' :;Iudicli not :;;0 much IIh 1,11 1,1) :'Il ,d 8?t~'t Ill~l~ 1/1(' PI:OC{,~!' (If cognitioll a~J(1 i,h COII!l·i\(~Il't.l()ll:;; WhH~h lilt'\'

itably found their c_'\pr('~:;ron III thl' hlllldlllg of 1ll('laphys_ iell] 8),."1{,1118. ..

1\3111 never doubts that Jllclaphy."tc.d sYi'IC'llls I'<ll:~('d proh. 1{'llls of imlllCIlS(, phiJo.c:ophicnJ, grl1C'I'al sri{'lltilic and mOr_ al importancC'. If scicnt.ific (,xl~(>rj('nc(> nhra~'s l'cn~ains in­complete, if ioductive speculation ba.s('(~ 011 (,XP(,rlCl~C(' al ways 1'rmains incomplete, t.hen how IS It at all possible to arri\'(' :It a scicntiflc theory that formulates pl'C'cepts unlim_ Bcd in their unh'ersality (and necessity)? If all theoret­ical knowledge stems from sensory daln, how can one ex­plain the fact that there are scientific tl'Uths which can­not be reduced to the content of sense pel'ception? Kant agrees with those critics of theology who maintain that the concepts of God, tbe immortal sou l or life after death arc theoretically and empirically groundless and are only based on the belief in the supernatural. l\'evcrthelcss, Kant rc. jects atheist conclusions. He holds that the scientilic falla­cy of theism is not enough to pro\'c the scientific validity of atheism. If religion cannot rely Oll theoretical reason (science) could it be based on practical reason, on moral consciousness?

.4..s Kant firmly belie\'cs, religious faith is such a substan­tial and permanent feature of human existence that philos­ophy must study that form of spiritual and intellectual life as som{'thing inevitable and not accidental. The same is true-and apparently to an eYen great-el' degl'ee-of the pr~blem of free will, for centuries the stumbling block of philosophy. If man has no free will, does he possess will a~ all? If he cannot control his own actions, how does he differ from an animal? If he has no freedom of choice and cannot cont!ol his actions, then he is not responsible for them. But III that case there is neither sanity nOL' moral ~tan~ards. nor .~oral actions because man's conscious life :~phes. hIS ablhty to exercise at least limited control over i~s :ctIOOS. But the existence of morals, and human life

tica~"n(~:~~t~~~o~:!~~te th~hma~ possesses at least "prac­and on what cond',t· o~'. at!s the natur€' of this fact

, IOns IS It pos~Hble?

IZtl

Till' pl"ohh'rn "f iwillg' tI.l' ("1>1111,)1 rrohlpm of <\11 m!'t "l'hy"i(';,1 ~y"II'III!I i. .11:,,, I h,.. prohlf-m of tlw h'S{,IlCC of all Ih,lI l'xis\", ;ll1d till!. IIf' or 1111' unity of lit!' world as a \\holl'_ Plriln:-:oplr y (',111110\ JlIl't'(·ly f't;ltc til!' t·)..j"lcl\("'· of minI' raJ .... , Hldal.s, rivI'n, IIwulllaill~, plants, <\nilllal~, dc. It is SlIpposl'd to 1"I'\"l',d Ih" hasiJ:J of all that diH'rsity of phe­nOlllena, some conlf'nt I hat tlH!y all share, their intern'la' lionship and illt('l"dcpend('ncC'. Ar(~ there any primal (,if)·

ment." of till lhat ('xistg, is there substance, docs the wori(1 ('xi:::.t as one wholc or is it only a contemplated cntity, an ab:::.tl'actioo with 0() factual basis? Does the world havc a beginning in time and space or is it infmite in both thcs~~ dimensions? Does it consist o[ simple or complex elements! Is the caw;(' and df{'cL l'e1alionship of things absolute or arc there things free of determinism? These and other s~lch questions are the key content not only of m<:taphyslcal systems but also of philosophy in genera1. The h('n~h ~la­terialists of the 18th century believed that by rCJccltng the systems o[ Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz they were putting an end to all metaphysical problems. But wa:o> Hoi· bach's System of Nature not all attempt at a ma~('rialist solution of those same problems? And wa:; lleh'etlUs not partly right when he said, "1 comp~re these two t~pes of metaphysics [materialism an~ idealism} to tW? dlfierent philosophies, those of Democrttus and Plato. 1t IS from. t~e earth tbat the first gradually rises to the sky, and It IS from the sky that the second gradually descends to the ,arth," (66; 1, 396),

Thus, 17th-century m('ti'Phy~ical systems we:e not mere­ly speculative constl'tlc!S deali~g with none~lstent meta~ physical reality, Accordmg to h.ant, metaphYSIcal probl~m. (i. e., problems posed by Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spmo­za and others) form the most important part o[ the con­lent o[ philosophy, the laUrr comprising only the met.aph~s­ica l trend and Sh}1ticism, it~ age-old enemy, wInch IS, howe\'er devoid of posith'e philosophical content. There­fore on~ of the key quC'stions the Critique of Pur~ Reason pos~s is this: how is metaphysics possible as a ~clenc~? Ia~ other words, how is ,~rielltiJic philosoph.y posslhh> (If • all)? That question was rll":o>t raised preCisely by 17th-cen­tury rationl.llisls. 1

In Kant's virw, mctaphY:o'ics as " system of philosophic~ know ledge is the meaning of philosophy and the summit

t 17

of (1)(' cultllr£' of thl' human iuh'lIpl'! III gf'llf'f,d .• ";ril'llc'f' i~ a .... pilC'l'l' of :-;oulHl H'Il:<I" l'iliI(I:«lphy i:-; fhl' l'C'idm of 1"I',r _~(m. lIuman n'a ... on is hy 11.11111'1' 1lII'l,lp'.lysir,t1: tlulikl' ;Ollllt!

."l'Il."l', it .-;ll'in· ... 10 Iroltl . ..;Ct'ud 1"llI'l"It'II\'(', .\1111 Illan _

. "l'nliC'llt bring, is il IIll'Ii.1Ph)·~il'ill lwing, diffl'l'ill~ from 'III:: animal jl~ his ilbility .not Jlll'I'{'I.r 10 1'1'IlS(~1l ,inri Slll'ellllllt'

!JUt to IhJ~lk IllctaphysICC11I):. lIo,,"{'n'I', so Inr ~1~1 llIL'tiljJhys lcal doctrlnl's lH1H' 1c(,11 hl!!'l' and Ittl:-il'h'lllil[('. That of coursC', has not bcrll accidt'll(nl, nnd it points to the fallacy of .tlie fu~~am('n,lals and 1I_1l' n'I'Y nH'~hod .or .mctuphY~ic<\1 phllo.s~jlhlZlng. 1he~efol'e hanL ::;~('S Ius pl'Illclpal objective :Il radlC<l!ly reforming m,etajlhyslCS nnt! tl'l.\llsforll1ing iL IIIto a SClellce, But he ~-IC!\\'s the task of ('{'cating new trall~c(!lldentaJ, ~1etaphyslcS a~ a total l'C'jection of aU th~ preYlOusly eXlstlUg metaphysical systems, This explains among ot.her things, his words to the effect that "it is not metaphysIcs that I am \\'orking on in the Critique [of Pure Reason] but a completely new and heretofore untried '_ (!~ce, namely, a critique of reaSOn thaL speculates a prio~~'~ ((2; 2~~) But it should also be uoted that Kant consider~d the Cntlque oj Pure Reason a substantiation of and . t oct I' , < an In-r S ~clOn to, transcendental metaphysics, I' ,-cience for Kant is the model of true knowledge lIence liS ormul~lion of the dilemma: either metaphys'ics be-

comes a sCience (naturall)' . . , h' ' a SClCnce Slll generis) 01' it has ~~, rig ,t to eXist ~t all. Kant's philosophy shows that tr~-

Ilona metaphysIcs cannot become . 1, . precepts are th r II a sCience uecause ItS Iy IInv~rifiable eo~e t~~a y /lI,l~emonstrable and expcl'imental­icaily new meta't I.ng Olt l the .task of creating a rad­a scientific philts~~~ca'r~,):stem, h.ant p~'o\'es the need for fl'rs substantially froY' 1I 1is methodological approach di(­understanding of the ~'ffile r~tionalist ~ne in its profound a !'cientific philosophic II l.~uIL1eSf of tUl'llmg philosophy into

The t'" a \ICW 0 til(' world . ra lona IStS of the 17th " tem~ of absolute knowlcd. cent~ry ,(fwd to build sys-parlier attempts by I' gc and explaIned the railme of , . IC enol'S of . ,. 'd \ant does not share thos' , 11l( 1\'1 ual philosophers.

llip conflict belwe(>11 m ~ 1~lu~~oI1S, he is fully awaro of S('iJl'ciJp!' for w')'O 10 e ap lY:SICS and scil'ncc alld 'Ie

,~ ovel'coJnP't II ' ~ metaphysical ideas should not '1: .c' cOl1cludcs thaL major of actually existing tra' d ue Interpreted as concepts lacls I ' nscen ental enl't' o consciOusness as ide I lOS, but only as

I~ , as of pure roason. But this

.. •

]

mf';lI~~ thai IllI! nln"l'l't~ of Cod, I'l'r£;on.lI 11IIllIo!'tality ;11111 thl' Ilkl' 1l111~1 IH I ">'I'J1HIt'11 1'('111 1111' I'lI'hl Itf "','JI'nline knuwl t,!lgt', _ ,nlll all t.hat 1'I'Iliains to 1111-'01 l~ Iii£! rlPlti of faith . In Ihl ~ I'III.lIWI'IIIIII 1\i1111 ,'olllf'fIlpiatl'S tlu' IIpe.l 10 limit r.';, 8011 tlial ~s, .pltre l"t'aSfJll with it'il priori ('l<Iim5: "\Vp have Iflll/osed 11fI1I1~ 011 n',,~ol1 so til at it wonld lIot lose til(' IIirl'ad of ('lIll'il'if,tl t:oudililJfl:-; "lid Ilol nlsh ort inlo tllp l'1':dm flf tJ.·illlgt,t',lJdl'~Jt;Ji snbstal1tii1tjlJlI~'" (i:~: :1, :m:!) In thIS ,quotallOll, I\ants agnostici!'Ol is aimed against lIlt'la. p,hySiCS. But th ... point j" that, according to Kant, tht' en lire outp)' w(!l'ld whiclt i~ independent or consciousness thc world or "lI~illgs in llH'lIlst'ins" which i~ • .lSf) jlro('i,.im('fi to he ess(>ntl<dly unkuowablp, is transcen<il'ntai too. II t, 11('1' the fideislic leanings in Kant's agnosticism: "I harl to n' strict (aufhebell) knowledge to make l'oom for hilh" (7'~ 3,25) <, "

And, so hant's reform of metaphy .... ic~ ('~'ienliitlly inter pr~ts Its k~y precep~s as devoid of objective content that eXists outside con!'CIOlisness, Rationalist philo:-;opl\(>r .... l'{'­

garded the supra natural (metaphysical) as a distinct, high­est and often diyine realm of being, Kant declares it to be merely an aggregate of ideas of pure reJ .... on. Tho .... e ideas do possc~s Yitally important, especially moral, signili­cance, but the latter bears no relationship to objectiYC reality which precedes and is independent of knowledge. Metaphysics is supposed to study the origin and signifi­cance of those ideas, but not to prove the existence or re· specti\'(! otherworldly entities. Proc(>eding from tht':'c pre­cepts, Kaot provides a thorough critical an~lysis of the ra­tionalist doctrine concerning the identity of physical (1'('<11) and logical substantiations, and or the theory of a priori Imowledgc, created by Vl'ominent 17th-centnry rationali~t~.

Even before he wrote his Critiqlle, l\:ant attacked the cornerstone of rationalist philosophy: the conyiclion that what is logically necessary is by the same token physi­cally necessary 100. Hationali~ts reasoned approximi.\tcly as follows: if a l'Pl'lain logical concln~ion has bC'l'11 deduced in accol'danc(' wilh logic:!.l rules (that is, if no logical er 1'01' has been committed), the contl'nt of thal conclu~ion should be regarded HS objectiYC' reality, evon if experiencp docs not COnfll'l11 it. The mcaning of that thesis becomes clear if wo recall t hat often logical deduction does lead to a disco\,(>ry- that is, it does establish prcYiollsly unknown

fI-OU62 t~9

. f t -ho::;(' l':xi:4l'n('t' was Iwl ('oHlinll!'tI lly ob. phy,sl('.ai aC·5 '\"fillH'llt i'lu' il hi~llIl'icall: .. /(1I1J.{ Ppl'io(1 uf -l'n-aIIOIl Of ex}" I" ~, " But the Joint i.s th.11 j(lgil';\ r(,l\~tllllug Cilillmt f{'\t'ill ~UJlt .. /. t e IDot inlpJicitly pn·."il'lll III Jll't'n'pt::; until'rly !act~l t ~al "df duction J'lit'anwililt" lith-l'l'lltIIl'Y I'l.ltitllWli.s(s Illg oglca C . [ d tit"" " tried 10 deduce the exi.-;lcIlC(' 0 tmnscl:n ('II a ell ItH'S Iront

I t·, Ilfcmi..;(>::; thai naturally, dill not go beyond the "pee II a I\C . , 11· t· tl' b 1 . . I Iltall)' COlllllfehem;iblc. ell'C lUg ,lI.h .. a so ute in t':'I:jll'l'Il1t' < l' . 1 t~r Jrctalion of the potential of d~'dndlOll, \.ant. QI:gues that I I .. I 'ub.talltiation relates to lIs l'on::;Cllucnco III such <I oglca .. '" I· . I . II \va)' that the latter can be graSpl'l 1]\ it. oglea y, uutie!' the law of identity. In oLher words., a lo.glcal. consequence is only valid bcc .. mse it is esst.:'~ttaIJy l(lentlc~l with its prcmise; Ihal is rcycaled by a loglc;)1 ~rl'akup of ,010 prom isc; the conclll~ion is re\'ea lcd to be lis part. 1'01' oxam pie, "complexity" is the prcmise of ';divisibility"; that b~­comes obvious when 'YC break up the concept of complexI­ty. An actual premise is a different matter: .her~ the con­sequence is not a part or feature of the premise. Therefore, an analysis of an actual premise uoes not reveal its IJOS­sible consequence, it does not point to the inevitability of precisely thb, and none other, consequence. For example, what causes rain is an actual but not logical premise, be­cause there is no logical reason for rain.

According to Kant, an actual premise makes it possible to reveal the relationships among empirically established facts, but it caDnot go beyond experience. Meanwhile ra­tionalists, haying identified the actual premise with the log­ical one instead of differentiating between them, concluded that they had broken through into the realm of the su­praex.perimental and supranalul'al. Kant brilliantly expo­sed those illusions, which led to the major errors of ration­alist metaphysics.

The concept of a priori or supl'aexperimcntal knowledge was central to 17t h-century metaphysical sys tems. For ex­a~ple, Leibniz asserted that apart from truths of fact thOl'O eX lste? truths of reason which the latter arrived at w ithout reS?rtlllg to .experience, to sensory data. The pr inciples of logiC, the a.xlO~s and demonstrations of geometry were re­garrle~ as mdlsputaLle a priori trut.hs with obvious uni­\"~'r.~allty and necessity as their salient fealmes. The dofi n]~lOn of the a priori as universal and necessary Dloans that the problem of the a priori is profoundly meaningfu l:

f ;;:0

II IT·'·OI·lls ,'{'!"tain .I('.tllol rblll'llI·t('li~,til·3 or throrelical sci· Pillilil' kI1O\\II·dgo P jwnally of matlu·/lialil·s, whnse I'fcCellb. an' 1"I'lali\d.v I III]..!" nill'lIt of f'.\tlt'l"iJIIl'lilal d;ila. At 1],1' 11.:'0 1,1 lIIalliPflliitic vilil I<'I-:"il: ]"I·,il·hed ill the 1ilh I;cn!lIry, thl' path leailillg fr/Jm l"JllJljt"i(~:d data to logical and also math clllatieal prt'tt~llts Was still CI)llljlld(lly uncharted. And r,\ tiollali."'its ju,liB\"f'(1 Ihill IfJgjl~"l alld maUll·lIliltie,ll prN~PJlt:l \'.-"I're lot-ally illflt~PE'IHlpllt r)r experif'llf:e. They regartled t1i(~ latt!'1" II1I'fl'ly as (In i\J.{J.{l"cgate of individual sense Pf'rccl'­lions. J\lltlJl"Hlly, tlli~ limitt·d lInderstanding of experieuI'e failed to I'xplain the ulli\"(~rgidity ,HId necf'ssity of logical and mathematical precepts. And rationalists always an swcred this question in lhf! same way: logical and mathemati­cal propositions al"C~ lluiVPI"!:'tll and necessary preCisely br~· cause they arc completely indepcndent of experience, because they al'e a priori. .

At that lime, the concepts of uni .. ·er:-;ality and necessity as specifiC features of theoretical propOSitions c?uld not y~t be subjected to a sjJccial scientific analysis. );eithcr logIC nor mathematics possessed any data confirming the .. fact that the univCJ'~ality and nece~sity of their prOpOSitIOns were not at all absolute, that they were limited, first, by the le\"el of knowledge achievcd and, second, by their the­oretical premise. All that became ob\"ious only aftrr non· Euclidian geometry, the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics had been created.

This explains why Kant did not reject but ,merely. revi~ed the rationalist concept of the a priori. Like ratlOn~hsts (and all philosophers and natural ~cientiHs of the t.lme~, he could not explain the objectiye emergence and. histori­cal development of universal and necessary theoretIcal pre­cepts . At Lhe level then reached by science a~d phi~osophy it was even more difficult to explain the ulll\"ersahty and necessity of tho categories of theol'elieal thinking: for ('x­ample, space, time, causality, 1\0 one-at least 8m?lIg tl.ll' scientisls- ·doubled that all natural phenomena eXI::;teti In space and time, that they all had ,definite causes, et~~ ~\.\t could one prove that thos(, catego~'les were really u.nl\t'~.H! and nec('f:;sary? That was why hant followed ral!on~l!~l. in diITel'entiating betwCl'11 pme (a I~riori) and emplfl(:i.\~ knowlcdgC' and mainlailwd that IOgl.C and ~athema~lc~ were a priori diSCiplines, while mechallics comblDe~ a pnon fundamenta ls with knowleuge deduced from expeflence.

9' 131

tlow £10('1' f\illlt.'1' ('(1I11'l'l't (If IIH' ;1 prion Iliffl'r rl'flIli til(> J";1litmalist mit'? ,\1 lirsl glann' it might ~t'I'1l1 Ihill Ihi:-; is l\hl'l'(' "illlr,~ p(lh'lllirs with lith ('('njury IIl1'taphy"jl'ialls is least ('({('din' hl'cnIlSt' Ill' hilllsl,]f slIpporh'd tilt' a Pl'iori approach. But in ariun\ fart I\.<lllt's ulld~'\"~I;\llding of th(· a priori differs radically from thill of I'al\onalls\s. The lat­IN fC'cognizcd a pl'iori kllowledge of the wol'ld. It follows that they assllI1lCd the ('xi5\('I1(,(' o,r sOIllC' way or knowledge other than that hased on oXjlCl'ICIIC<.', aod they accorded priority to that differcnt. wny. That I:; \\ hCl'e Kant brcaks away from rationalism. lie is ('ol1\'ll1('('d thut iciC'as and concepts not taken fl'om ('x]ll't'loner po;o;st'ss no rca I conlent at all; they Ollly perform an illstrumental function --that is, they arc necessary formal llleans or cognition, The con­tent of knowledge stems only from :-;ellsory data, but the a priori is undoubtedly necessary as a form 0/ know/edge that unites sensory data int.o definite images, Such a prio­ri forms of knowledge include th<' categorics of unity di­versity, r.eality, causality, interaction, possibility. ncces~ity etc, 1\Totillng contemplated a priori is independent of knowl~ edge, According to this doctrine, a priori forms are not :<upra~ but pre-experimental. In otber words, they precede exp.enence as its premises and conditions that enablc ex­pe.rleo.ce. and knowledge to become reality. It is only in tillS bU1l1ed sensc that oue can and must view the part played by the a priori in klowledgc and a priori knowledge IQ general.. Kant stresses that "for us, the only a priori ~no,\!edge IS that of objects of po~~ihle CX!lerience". (73; 8, 130) He explains.th.is point further: "The only thing that reaso~ can ~o a priori is anticipating the form of possible e~perlence 10 general, and, because that which is not a p enomenon cannot be an object o[ experience sound sense ~an never leave the confi.nes of sensc perdeption which IS the only realm where tillngs can exist." (73" 3 21-/)

Thus .. f ' , .. a pnorl orms of knowledge at·c necessary for or-gadnlZlng random sensory data inlo a :-system of knowledge an not for soari b" '

[.. ng a ove expel"lI'Jlcc and into the world

o Imagmary entities I I" . "" II . n con rast to IllS IH·cdecessot's hant IS we aware of the fa L tl· ' <

[ I" II [ ~ lat cxperlmental knowledge illl-

lies lC use 0 categorle~ F· . ment ll,at lh .. or ('xample, th(> ~Imple statt'-e sun warms a 1'0 k \. k

the categoriai relation or caus~J"t "\.~ scns.e perc~plion to tween the judgments of . I y. "\,lIlt differentiates be-

experwncc and those of direct per-

132

rpplion; "tril'lly s\waking, thp lalll'r arf> nol Imoll~h til !lrO\·iflp gI'IlUill~' kllnwl~!\g-c. al \E'a:<t the 'l,no\\IPljgc "I r~' IlItioll!J ;1I111)Og ptH'1I01lIl'na. II hlllf)wS th:lt f"ntq.J:"ri~'", _Irt' lWrf'5:;ary pn'I"I'!J1Ii.-;ilt·s of ~'lIlpirieal kill/wll'flg!! whif"h, lik. theol"t'lic·al kllf)wl~·~lgc, I!' ratinflill. \lenn' \,;ont's illn!!i"n: categoriC's ]lrpl"I'fIt' ('xpt'riPIH'e. TI\I' point is that han! (and aU thillkf'r.~ and !l.t"i~'llli!lt" of his lime) dOI's not yet rI'alil.!"

the hbtoriral df>wlopnlf'ul of I'xpprir'IJ{·p in whirh cat"1.(1l ries em('fgl' anel df>\·j'!Op. Thi~ ('rror, inevitable for its timc, must not ohscure Kant\ historic contribution to tlw understanding of this prohh'lll: he has fi'\·l'all!d till' unity o[ the categol'ieal apparatus of thinking with the content of experimental knowll'dge. That is why hant does not {"Ol\

Hne himscH to opposing ··pure'· (a priori) knowledge til empirical knowledge. thE' way his prcdecessors ~lid. lIt' proves that since the prccellts of theoretical natural science art' universal and necef'sary, they are not)Ureiy a priori hut both a priori and empirical- ·a priori ill form and em pirical i 11 conlent.

Thr rationalist negHtion of the unity o[ a priori (that b, properly theOfeticill) and empirical knowledg(, led to the inevitable conclusion t1Hlt a priori prl'cepts (judgmenb. conC\u~ions) were purely analytical~-that is, that they ditl not producc new knowledge but ml'l"t'ly re\'calt'd thal which was alrcady implicit in the subject of the proposition. The entire w('allh of mntlH'llli\tical knowledge wos tlllls reducl'd to something JlI·Nll'Icrmincd and preformed in tIll' logical pl"('mises of mathematics. That inevitably came into con· niet with the de\"{'\opnlt'nl of mathematics, mcchanics aud theoretical niltural :'orience in gl'neral.

The principle or the unity of the a priori and the empir· ical ennblesKnnt to refute thnt rationalist dogma too. Withont dC'nying- thaL analytical judgments cxi:'ot, Kant ["{.'­gal'ds the discovcry of a priori synthetic judgmcnts as I~I~ greatest nccolllillishlll(>nl. In hi:'o view, such judgments t'XI::<t in Illathemalic~ and mechanics becall::<l' they procced from a special typ<, of sl'n:<.Ol"Y Ohsl'r\·ations thilt he lil'fllwd as a priOl'i oh~ervati()ns. They art' po:<~iblc in other "cit'ncl':<, too, bl'ca\l~(' the lalll'r ad,lpt the a pri()ri to ::<CllSOry dula. Th(' l'ignilit"IIH'l' ()f a priori :<.ynlhetic j\ldgml'nl; i~ thai tlll'Y provide all al'lll,l! ilH.'n'a~{' of knO\dt,tI~l'. h,lnl:'o \In' dl't't':'osor:'< hl'!it'Yt'd th,lt only l'lllpirical jlldgllwnts \\t'fl' 'iyll tlll'tiC ht't'llll'it' tlwy l"l'conlt'd Ill'wiy obSocrwd dOl!;.\. Thilt

llpproach se\,<'fel)' limitrd Iht'. ptl."~ihiliti(,:-l ~llnd Jlr~lsp(>cls) in Ill(' ueH'lopment of Iht'ort'll(,<ll nalural 51CH'nt'f'. h,anl pul an end to thaI anlilliah'flit'al oPJlosilioli llf llnalytkal alHI 51ynthetic judgments, <llld his Ill'\\" ilpproach \\<l~ ripurly of outstanding import.ance for tho drwlopnwnt of throrl'lical natural science.

It is easy to sec that h<lnL's doctrine of a priori synthrt. ie judgments was an attempt at philosophically substan. tiating the possibility and l1N'(,!'lsity of theOI'Nical natural science which was as yet practkally llonexisit'nt in Kant's time. But mathematical physics already existeel, and it prompted Kant to raise the morc genC'ral question about the epistemological premises of titeClrf'lical knowledge. The Iatter, by its wry nature, transcends the confmes of ayail· nble experience. That is precisely why it is theoretical and not empirical knowledge. In Kant's system, however, the theoretical, which he considers a priori, is independent of any possible experience because it is based on a priori-sen­~ory obsen·ation. The assumption of that distinct type of obs€'r\'ation-that is, the concept of th e a priori nature of space and time-distinguishes Kant from the rationalists. This distinction reveals the contradictions of Kant's a pri. ori approach. On the one hand, he asserts that the a priori is merely a form of knowledge. On the other hand, by as­suming the existence of a priori synthelic judgments, he admits, to a certain degree, the existence of a priori con· tent too. The contradiction between the form and content of theoretical knowledge thus remains umesolved. Still, the problem is posed in a comprehensive way (inasmuch as it was possible in that historical period).

Summing up, we can say that Kant was the first to sub­ject 17th·century rationalist metaphYSics to such meaning­ful and profound criticism. lIe was the only 18th-century thinker to have singled out and developed further the more valuable ideas of philosophical rationalism, True, he failed to oyercome rationalist metaphysics because he criticized it from idealist and agnostic positions. nut to believe that ffi:taphysics could. be positively overcome (with every­~llJng .of value retaIned and latC'r aSSimilated) at that time IS to Ignore the lleC'd for a hi storic,aI approach to the d('­\'.('lopmellt of phi~osoJlhy. As Mnt'x and Engels tloted, clas­Sica l Ger~an pllllo.sopity revived I7th ,century rationalist metaphYSICS. (1; 4, 125) And that revival of metaphysical

134

, ... , • \. • - . , -• , ,

• • , , " I t • , - J (. ", , • '~-.J .!.t ..,

• - ..

I, I'\'I"S I)()CTHI\E OF "TIII\(;S·I\ ·TllnISELI i:S"

1\1l \OlI"E\1

/ ,

The COllCl'pt of thc ;'thing-in ilsrl!'" b c{'nll'al to Kant ."i philosophY. 1'hc recognition of tl1(' objl'cliH' c'\isl(,llcc, in­dependent of knowledge, of " things-in-thC'OlselYes" is insep~ arable from IJhilosophical matcrial ism, But in contrast to I\.antian philosophy, lllatcl'iaiism demonstrates that "things-in-tllemsel\'es" can, in principle, be comprehended and ineYitably turn into "things-I'ol'-us", Lenin criticized ceTLain pseudo-i\lal'.\i~ls who tried to pro\'e " that the ma­terialists Marx and Engels denied the existcnce of things­i~-thernselns (i.e. things outside OUf sensations, percep­hons. and so forth) and the possibility of their cognition. and that they admitted the existence of a fundamental boundary between thl' appearance and the thing-in-itself." (10: 14, 117·18)

Kant's concept of the "thing-in-itseH" is profoundly con­tradictory. " 'hi le recognizing lhe "lhing~ in -ilself " as the source of sensory experience and eyen admitting that it n~ay be a phenomenon-and phenomena arc knowable­~:a~t ne:'crthelc!'s in~!sts on the absolute unknowability of tillngs-ID-themse!\,es and e"en considers them transcen­

dental. Hence the inevitahle question: pel'haps Kant rc-gards "things-in-lhe~n~elve~" as noumena, i.e., supranatu­I'al, ,oll~el'worldly ent itles? 1 he arfirmative answer which ap­pealS lOescapable would rule out the materialist trend bound I?y the assump.tion of "thingS-in-themselves" as g'enerat­I.ng, ~.~I,r l~ercept\Ons, But then how do "things-in-them !je h(.~ differ from nOttl1lena? Regrettably, 1\ larxist philos­ophy has not ~'et produced a special study of that ques­tIOn, although It would he extremely imporlant fol' a COI'-I'('c~ .und~l'standing of Kant's philosophy, <

I' f1edflch Jacohi, OIlP of lit(, r,,'sl cl'ilics of r l d !lH' foil' I 'I ,an, ma e

" ,OWI~g. 0 )~~~'\'?tlon \\' lid later became proverbial: the thlOg-m-ltself IS a concept without which one can-

136

'~

1 ,.

. \ ,

• , ,

JlIlI I'r,I/'1 I\nnl S !I}"l:lf'nl, hllt wIll "'lieh OIl(> (',)nnot 'e·113in thr'I'I' l'l)inl ng to Lhp lntillomy of Knnts uldl'l'ilnml nR of '11Ijlllo( ill 1111'111 pl\'cs '. Jacobi sa" ";lolhingl It xccpl ,or loJ,!ic:dl y 1I111.':Qurdinntc I assertions. III' OppOSCtl hotlnti I

philo~ophy \\ illl the intuiti"i"t d()drill(, Jf faith 1. I Ie nly dplllflllolltnillip ('omprt·III'nsion of mrta ,lIy nl eally in otlll'r word!'. Itt' \'iwlicatf·,1 C\'cr\o'thng han! (ritif}ue 0

1)lIre /If'rI.';fI1I rl'i"nlrd. '1'111' (·orll!'.ulidory Ilature flC Kan"s doclri'1o fir "Ihillb"

in tlH'ITl~f'I\,(, 5" i:: mote,! in the att~mJlt to rC'l'oncile In .. t!' riali~JH wilh ifl/',di~ru. Jacohi's mi~tnkP was that hI' "e~a fire/!! il!'!'I':--Sf,d till' ('ontrurlictions Iii' 5J1oltPII. Bul Ihose ('OIL

lradidiolls arE' vpry mpaningful, anrl onl' can ('\'1'11 ='iI)' thal they inriiI'1'cUy point to the profound approach to tho proh l('J1l, Dial('clical TlHl.lf'!'ialism :;lIhstanliates Ih!' nN'ri for a positin' ('vaillation of contradictions inliNl'ut in ()ul.,tall(1 jog philosophical doctrinps, :'Ieaningful conlnlllictilms Ihitl I'IUrmpt to OY('rcome the limited and one·si(h'd approach 10 problC'ms are not merely flaw.-- but to a certain fil'grt'l' vir lues of tho~e doctrines. Lpt u:; recall that \Iau; regMliP(1 th(' contradictions of David Ricardo',.: thf'ory of ,'aille as prerequisit('s for a correct approach to an extr('mely CClIO

plex ('conomic problem, I would think that an analog.y (nat uraily, only in the epi~temological and m(lthodolo~lcal a\, peets) between Kant's doctrine of ·'things-in-thc!flsl'l,vj,s and Ricardo's th(lorY of value i,.: both ju~tifll'(1 and frllltful, because w(' are dea'ling not only with till' {'rror~ -brilliant el'rors---of the German philosopher but also with objec· ti\'ely exi~ting contradictions. .

It' would bc wrong to blame Kant for his incon~lstent ,ilil proach, for haying I1li~tillder5tood or Oyc.r1ook(ld s~m('lhlllg', fOl' t.hc contl'adiction~ that were so ohno\l."i to IllS follo\\. el's. Thill would bc an anti philosophical analysi."i of ,? 1~1\l' losophy. Had Kant inlerpreled ;<things-in-11H'I1l~C'hC'~. :-;1111-

ply af; absolutC'ly tl'ansc('lHiC'ntal or merely a~. an C'lll.~t.l'I~Hl' logical phenOIll('1l0n, that would han ~e~n.<tultC' ('on:-'I:-.tlnt, but ht' would not h.w(' bcen a grC'at thwkC'1.

Ll'nill dClllonslt'atcd a profound approach to tl~t' ,P1'?blC'm of the 1lC'("(i to owrcome the primili\'C'ly mat(,I:lalt~t1(' ('~ 1'0l'S in Ih(' Cl'itiquC' of Kant's philosop.hy. A s(,l('ntlftc. cr.t~ liqlH' of Ihl' lall!'!' dol'~ not. simply, reJt'c.t hut r01:.r('d~ .,~1~ pO~llllatl'~, In this COlllwCtlOll LC'llln ... at.lI tll<lt )~'~IX].t .• niticiz('d (at titc lH'ginning of th(' tw('ntu'th c{'nhu~) lIH

1:)7

Kantians and Humists morc in the Olanm'r of Ft'UrrOM,h (and Buchner) than of Hege1." (10; 3~o 17U). or gn 1t methodological importance, that ob~rr\·M,lon p~Hnt~ to t h nc('d for studying the divrrse real content of hantH1.n (',C d l ­

tradictions so that they cou ld be rcsoh·ed in a truly scieD

lific way. We know that before he wrote his Crilique, Kant had

created a basically materialist cosmogony which, in full accordance with the laws of classical mechanics, adequate­ly explained the facts cstablished by astronomy and pro· "idce! a scientific (for its ti me) interpretation o[ the "sys­tematic structure", origin and development o[ the solal' sys ­tCOl. Explaining the principles of his study, he said: "Here one could say in a certai n sense and without arrogance: Give me matter, 1 will build a world out of it! that is, give me matter, 1 will show you how a world must emerge from it." But then, how can one "boast about this success when we deal with the most insignificant plants or insects? Can one reall y say: Gi ve me matter, f will show you how one can create a caterpillas? 0 •• So do not be surprised if T dare say that it is easier to grasp the constitution of all celestial bodies and the cause of their movements-in short, the origin of the world as it exists today-than to under­stand, on the basis of mechanics, the or igin of one single blade of grass or caterpillar." (73; 1, 231-32)

The evolution of Kant's views before the Critique led him to conclude that the origin of life, let atone of con­sciousness, thought, could not be explained by the motion, development of matter. or course, this refers only to me­chanical motion and a mecha nistic interpretat ion of devel­opment. But neither Kant nor all bis contemporaries had any idea of other natural processes, those subject to nol1. ­mechan ical laws , Mechanistic materialism is incapable of tracing t.he or igin o[ l ife, and Kant proceeds from Lh is fact in his rejection of aU ma terialism: in his view the me­c~lallist.ic .for?1 of that philosophy is not a hi stori~ally tran­sIent ilmltatJOn but the very esse nce of the m atel'ialist (and natural scientific) explanation of the world

\VJ~i1e he does not reject but instead justifies· and sub­stantiates the mrchanislic mrthod Ka nt never theless stres­ses its limitations. Hence his cOI;clu!'ion about th(' ~sscn­t.ial.impossibility of phi.\osophica l monism: the diversity of reality cannot be explained by assuming one fundamental

131<

postlllatf'. And Kant rollow~ his th('_~l about tlll' nsufrl ci~nry of the mat~riali"t (actually. m 'chani:;lic) Im'mi~e WIth a (\f'monsll"<ltlOn of tin' rallac)' of idealist monism (that is; of deducing the external world from consciousness). ~Iert., I'~~,t .re[pt:s not only to Berkeley's "rlreamy" and dogmalic IriNll!SIll hilt also 10 1I1f~ "problf'matic" ich'albm

of Descartes which (\('(Iu(f':; knowledge of thfl ('xi~tence of the ollleI' world from. cogito, ~elf-consciousne~s, regardf'd a~ a funclamentnl l?remlSe that makes all other premisf's re­dundant. AccordlDg to I(ant, the existence of self-conscious­ness proveR the cxistrnce of the outer world percpived th~OUg~1 th(' lien!,;QS,. because "the consciousness of my own bC'.lng IS al~o the dlrr~,t consciousness of the h('ing of other thlllgS outsIde mysel[ . (73; 3, 201) This postulnte rccog­nizes the dependence of consciousness on the external world, b~t K~nt's concep~, of the outer world is ambiguous because It POlDts hoth to things-in-themselves" and to phe­nomena. ,~

This quotation is from the section Refutation of Ideal­ism written for the second edition of the Critique of Pure Hea sol1. It is directed against those reyiewers who belien'd, not without justification, that the book leaned toward subjective idealism. By stressing the points where he dif­fers from B(,(okel('y, Kant insists that an aggregate of con­cepts organized in a defmite way and understood as nature perceiyed through the senses or as the world of phenom­ena inevitably implies the recognition of a world totally independent of knowlNige, the world of "things-in-them­selves" which underlie the world of phenomena. The sub­jective nature of that which is perceived through the senses is rooted in the distinctive mechanism of human knowl­edgr, but thr sensory images which form the content of external world, and sense perceptions point directly to the "things-in-themselves" affecting our sense perception. Thus the ex istence of consciousness pro\·es the existence of the thinking fH'C involuntary becallse they arc caused by the existence of " things-in-themselves" which should be regarded as the causes of th e formrr and which to a certain de-

* In :mothcr pltlcc in .the Crili~f/c 0/ Pure Reason, Kan~ is ev(>n lllorc C'xl'lirit in connectlug consc\O\lsne~s (and selr-con~clollslH'Ss) to objective rcalitr, to "things-in-themselves": hr ,1m [1'1 sure of the cxblcnc(' of things out!<ide myself thtlt ar(' related to my sells(' [IS or my OWII oxistence ill time." (73; 3, 31).

130

gree determined not only tilt' din~r~ity (If ~l'I\!<ory dalil hilt al~o the distinctiY(' featun'~ of then· rllutt'n!.

According 10 Ka nt, tlH' fad iheIr that .tIl\' world .. of yll( nomena undonbtedly exisb prOH's tht, l'Xt~h'lH'l' or tl.I,IIl.R"~ in-themseh·es" bera\IH' the , ·('I'Y W01'I1 '·plH'nol1lt'llon Im­plies the I'x istem'e of SOIlH'thing diffl'n'n l" of .the nOll·l~h(', nomenon , concl' i\'ablc only i\S the I'cn~orlal Imperceptlhh! basis of things or phClltHlll'na pl'I'cci\"cd through. till'. ~l'.n~t·~. To other words, ·'phenomena always iml)ly a. thmg-m-lts('H and, consequently, poi nt aL it" ... (73; .J, 109) ..

Thus E anl rejects hoth Ihl' materialist and til(' Ideailst o;olution of the key question of philosophy, and he slr·(':-\ ­scs the need for a duali::;tic s tartin g pOint: on the one hand, consciousne~s, thl' subject of knowledge; on lhe oth er han(\' the world of " things-in-t hem::;ehes", independent of and totally opposed to both consciousness and its object, ~IH' world of phenomena. That latter wodd is in correin tlOn with the activity of knowledge, It is the dualisLic opposi­lion between the subjecti ve and the ohjective, the spi ritual and the "material", th e phenomenon aod the "thing-in-it­self" that is the centl'a l premise of Kant's agno~ticism,

In contrast to materialism, which confJl\c~ th e absolu te opposition of the spiritua l and the material to the key prob­lem of philosophy (that of the relationship between th e spiritual and the material), dualism rejects th is limitation, interpreting the ot>position as absolute in all aSt>ects. But Kant's doctrine of the essen tial unknowabiliLy of "things­in~themsel\"es" is not only based on the duali s tic opposition of the spil"i lual and the matel'ial: it also reflects and offers a subjectivi st interpretation of the historically deflllite sit­ualion in natural science and certain general features of the cognitive process. As Engels said, in Kant's time "our knowl edge of natUl'al objects was indeed so fragmentary that he might well suspect, behind the IiLtio we know abou t each of them, a mysterious 'thing ·in-i tself' " . (3; 3, 102) Even in the IJrs t half of the 19th ceotll!'y, Engel s pointed out, chemistry treated organic elements as mysterious " things,i n-themseh·es". It follows tha t Kant offered a philo­sophical interpretation of views held by many naturali sts of his tinH'.

Since that time, outstandillg sCi('ntifrc discoveries and theil' practical application Il3ve convincingly refllted the hasic postulates of Kant's and a \J other types of agnosti-

!'i()

,'i~m. Hut [Jutu]".dly tilt! (;(JlIlr.ldir·Ii(Hl~ or knowleelgl', (Ir tht, [!\ullltioll of ullkllU\\abl" "IIUg In- hlJllb('IH'"'' illto '·thingo; [or U:-I' ha'"t' uot eli"'lpp ar 1\ These er'lItradiriioll~ ,U·l' H'pl"uduccli (usually, in ,I qualitatl\ely hew form) ,It ('ach histmil'ai ,.\.dge in liw de\'du(JlUent ui ku()wiedJ,tc, Till' difference Iwtwct!il tho '·thing-fur-us" and the '·thi ng-iu ibclf" is nol nnly tlw I!pisl!,lnoiogical difference h(·l""!'1'1i liw known an(\ the unknown, As Leuin emphasized, ·'the thing · in itself is distiucL from the thing-for,"s, for the lat· tel' is only a part, or only one aspect, uf the formlJr". (10; 14, 11 9) Therefore, Ihe known is part of, and to a Cl'r Laiu extent depends on, a broader, still unknown whole.

Each new stage of cognition also reveals that which .... n!-l unknown before---new unknown phenomena. That, too, is an expression of the progress of knowledge: the notion of the di minishing unknown ill true only within a certain frame­work of knowledge; it must not be applied to knowledge as a whole to all available and possible (but not yet ob­vious) obje~ts. For in the final analysis, the s~bject o~ the entire process of cognition taken in its histoflcal e?l!reLy is infinite. True, by cognizing the finite we also cogOlze the infinite, buL the fundamental difference between the two remains.

Marxist philosophy is equally incomp~tible wi,~h ~be_ ~g­nostic refusal to believe the k~owablhty of, tbl~g~-l~­themselves" and with the opposite metaphYSical faltb. In the attainability of absolute knowledge. The latl~r \·leW, laid down by the authors of 17lh-century metaphYSical sys­tems was l'e\'ived by Hegt.'1. Theologians have always been a ttra'cLed to that "iew too, because they hold that the Gos­pel contains all truth, and ahsolute truth at that.

Prominent skepti cist philosophers-i>uch as Bayle ?nd Montaigne-conLribuled signillcantly to th~ s.tl'uggl; agalll:t theology and melaphysical system-bu IldlI~g. TlH~S ~t would be unhistorical to ignore the .connectlOn of h.an~ s agnosticism (particularly, of the theSIS about .~he cs~~nt!U1 scientilJc fa llacy of all available and P?Ssible ''p~·oofs th~t God exists) to un obvious anli theologlcal posltl,on, alb~lt , . " and mitigated by nume rous reservutIons .. It I~, InconSls~elh 1 \T. 1 I l ant "" f 'se no accidenl that t Ie atlcal\ en erN \., . ~ol~slllon' the list of proscl"ibeJ ~ooks: the dog~~ of the

1 ',I demonstrabi lity of the eXlstt.'IlCe of God I~ among oglcn , 1 I" I ' t ' o'e' to impose.' the fundament.lis of Cat 10 tCISlll. \.an piOp S S

14t

I

limitations on th e metaphysical and theoln,g:il'al dtlilll ~ )r retl~on, His doctri ne i:s thus Ilimed directly <l!{ainst Spl'C

lalive metaphysics of th e 17th century, ilnd especially against its later followers who interpreted tho rationalist at­tem pts at creating a theoretical method <il'signed to OVl'I"

come th e limitations of the anlilahle t.'XIH' I'ience as sub­stantiating the possibility of :s upraSCll$UOUS, supraexperi mental knowledge pro\·iding theology with a rati onalist methodology.

Kant rejects the rationalist dogma abou t the identity o[ real and logical postulates, used by speculative metaphys­ics to "prove" the existence o[ transcendental entities and God, the immortality o[ the sou l, absolute free will and the like. He also rejects the rationalist premise about the su­praexperimental nature of a priori precepts, a nd contrasts it with a new interpretation of the a priori as a form of knowledge which is essentially inapplicable outside expe­rience and possesses only empirical content. Despite Kant's subjectivi st interpretation of the forms of knowledge, this concept of the a priori approaches the rational understand­ing of the nature of theoretical knowledge. Thi s explains why Kant's famous question formulated in the field of transcendental analysis-how is pure natural science pos­sible?-is essentially a question about the possibility of theoretical natural science. We know that Kant answers it expressly in the affirmative. ~ It should be emphasized that for all his polemics with

11th-century metaphYSical philosol)hers Kant is to a cer­t~in extent, their successor too. The t.heologic~l implica­tIOns of speculative metaphysics are not in the least its ~najor content, The rationalist theory about a priori think ­mg and knowledge is rooted in the accomplishments of 17th-century mathematics and mechanics, in the distinctive aspects of the development of these deductive sciences whose postulates are apodicticaUy universal. What is the source of th!t indisputable (it se~med at the time) universali­ty? The 1/th-centy"Y ratIOnalI sts examined the logical form of ~athematlcal constructions and arl'i\-ed at what they consldered. to be the only poss ible conclusion: that those construct.lO~s. were independent of experience, that they were a. prIOri JO character. Hence, too, the more en­eral .concluslOn abo~t the possibility of supraex erime~tal knowledge. Kant rejects the latter conclUSion, igterpreting

'.2

till' <I I'rif'rI a~ 1'C1millg belflrf' ex)c cm nd pp'icahle unlv 10 !!Xpl'rll'IH'I' 11wr('lJn' In.pplIabh· !l\Jpr8I'xp>r

IIH';.I;\lly-I\;lut H!llnn!s lile IIwtapbys "iii hc)ry 0 heing (ont,,\o­

gy) to H doctl'illf' nblJ~lt the eatf'J,(oli(:s }f CfI"llIzing ~hllIK ing', Hhollt tlu· ral('gorwl syntllf' sol cnsr)ry data. I'or all it:-; suhjecti\'(' cilaractpr, tlw l~pi:;lem()logical intf!rpre1aliOTi of catrgories posPri U J'j!Hl Ilj,dl'ctical problem, It is nl, ;H

cident lhat Kant uses the transcendental analytical approach to demonstrate the need foJ' ,I new, non formal logic he cali:s Il'[lllseendentai.

Ttunscendental dialectics· ·one of the key sections of the Critique of Pure Heasoll-- is dc\·oted directly to demonstra­ting the fallacy of metaphysical claims to supraexperimen, tul knowledge, The major ideas of metaphysics-the p~y chologicai, the cosmological and the theological ones---arl' devoid of objective content and cannot even indirectly prove the existence of transcendental entities. ~eason deab only with intellectual concepts whose content IS taken ex elusively from experience, By synthesizing intellectual co~· cepts, reason docs not enrich them with ~ew, .',upraeXpl'r1-mental contcnl. That is why the metaphYSical I~eas of re~· son are nothing more than mere ideas expressmg r~ason." stri ving to " make the categorically perceived synthetic unt' ty totally absolute". (73; 3, 164) Thus the idea of th~ s~b­stantial soul contains the absolute unity of the tlllnklD~ subject; the idea of God, the abs.olu~e u:oity of the condi­tions concerning all objects of tinnklOg In general. etc, _

The 17th-century metaphYSicians regarded lIOIH~ena as transcendental and essentially divine entities, perce.l\'ed by the SU]JI'usensuolls cognitive ability of reaSOD. But hant de· Hnes them as a priori ideas of pure reason (not based on experience), li e says: "But in the end, onc cannot s~e the possibili ty of such lloumena, and outside the realm 0.1 phe­nomena everyth ing remains empty ,(for us); that l~, we have reason problematically ('xt('mitng beyond. the INlim of phenomena, but we have no such cOl1te~pl atl~n" 11.0r C;ll~ we even form a notion of such cont£:'mplatlOn, b~ \\ hlch (lil jecls could be given to us outside the realm of the senses . , . Consequently, the concept of. t~e nOllm,en~n, is ~~IY a demarcatioll notion, Ilsed to hnlll the c1al.Dl:> o!, th;, . l I~ SUOl\!, and tlwre[ore applicab l£:' only negatlycly. (d.: .. ,1, 22 1) But if the concept of the noumenon has no POSlll\e

H3

contcnt this also calls into qucstion thc assuDlption t' ~t mctaph)'sical rcality exi:;ls: "The dh"i~ion o~ objccb I lo phcnomena and noumcna, and of the world 1l.1to that I' . cei\.cd through the senses and thnt grasped Intellectually is inadmissible in a positive sense." (73; 3, 22l)

Kant's theory of the problematic. nature o[ .the tra.nsce n~ dental as the subject o[ metaphYSICS makes It pOSSible to better understand his agnosticism. l(ant holds ~hat the co~­niUon of the world or phenomena, of nature (I.e., tile suo­jeeL of the scier.ccs) is innnite, Only the tra,nsceuden~a~ is unknowable. Viewed from thnt angle, Kant s agnostIci sm can be described as anti metaphysical (of course, if we re­fet" to the theory of meta -physical reality and not to dia­lectics). Still, oue must stress that Kant's agnosticism is organically linked to the ambivalent interpretation o[ ob jecth'e reamy and the subjective-idealisL conclusions it en­tails. KanL's concept of the transcendental, of the meta ­physical encompasses everything objective, everything that is outside and independent o[ consciousness and that pre­cedes knowledge. Thus be docs not stop at an antimetaphys­ical assertion that the existence of metaphysical entities. the noumena, is undemonstrable : he turns the pllysical­whaL is outside and independent. of knowledge-into meta­physical, transcendental. Thereforc, the things wbich affect our senses, generate sensations and therefore exist before and independently of knowledge arc described as supra­sensuous "Lhings~in-themselves". But in that case, what is accessible lo knowledge? 1[ sensations caused by " thi ngs ­in-themselves" provide Deithel' knowledge about thero nor ('ven any basis for such knowledge, then where does Kant's ngnosticislll end?

Kant trics to solve the problem he poses by subjectiyely interpreting the known reality as existing within and througb experience, He maintains that "objecLs of experience arc never given in themselves: they are given only in ex­perience and do not exist ouLsido it". (73; 3, 350) The world percei\'ed through the senses thus appears as a phe­nomcnon of knowledge, taking sllape only in the course of cognition. J\llowledgo abouL an object and the object itself arc treated as essentially identical, because "things- in­,t!lelllselves" arc excluded from the ~phere of knowledge, true, the content of our scnsations is independent or con­sciousness, but things perceived through the senses as phe-

noownH are th(' product of synLh!' . , L )ug:ht ahfJllt by rf'a­,;oo's unconscious productive force 01 lmagination through the lise of transcemlcnlal schemaliJ and categorie~. Acrord ing to Kant, '-phenomena are 1Iot things in - t1H'm~l'l\"e~ but only a play of our concepts which are, in the flllal analy sis, reduced to deflOitions of the inner sense". (i3; :1, f:it:1).

Thus the alllbiguiLy of Ka.nL's concept of the "thing-in­itself" leads to a s,lbjectivist distortion of the concepl of nature and the cognitive lll·ocess. But that, naLllra!!y, Ctlll not justify th o nco~J\antian rejection of "things-in-them· sclycs". "The world in itself," Lenin writes, "is a world that exists wilhollt us." (to; 14, 118) He points out that Kant's mistake was not recognizing the existence o[ "things­in_themselvcs" but insisting 011 their transcendental, un­knowable nature. Everyday experience itself, Lenin cmpha­sizes, proves that '"\hings-in-themselves" are knowable, [or "each one of us has observed times without number the simple and obviolls tl'ltDs[ol'mation of the ·thing~in-itself' into phenomenon, into the 'thing~ror-us'. It is precisely this tranSfOl"OlaLion that is cognition." (10; 14, 120).

Those \\ ho interpret EanL's philosophy idealistically usu ally equaLe "thill.,s-in-themselves" and noumenu. For ex­ample, Paul Foulquii>'s DicliOTlllaire de fa langlte philoso-phiqlle proceeding from the dichotomy '·phenoDlena~n~u­mena" claims that the "thing-in-itself" is synonymous With " noumenon". (;)3; /1~3). This view is shared by Dagobl'ft Hunes (!)4 ; 215), :'~uller (57; 2, 231) and HudoH Eisler. (47; 887) But all those scholars coniine themsel~·es to an anal ysis of hant's terminology and do not deal With the cs­sence o[ hi s theory of "things-i n-themseh'es" an? n?ume~ !la. Besides, Lhey fall back on the vagueness or 1,ant s ter­minology: he often unites those two concepts in the gellel:~ at notion of the intelligible, "understandable substance (Verst.andcswesen). (73; 3, ~~9) .' . ..

The fact that hant sometimes classes t1l1ng!; -l~ -them­selves" togethcr with 1I0UUlcna is well known, bUt .. lt ,call,S for elucida Lion. Kant nevcr regards noumena a~ thlllgs­in-themselves". In his theory! a "thing-in-iLs~H" is not an idcJ or pure reason; that (S th e key premise of tr.an­scendental aesthetics, lhat i!l, the theory of sensation. "Th ings.in tIIl'1l1 5civcs'" aBect Ollr sens:s. A!> for the I~OU, mena, they have nothing in c?lIlmon With ~CII:<l' p('rcl'pllolb or wilh the cogniti\"C- procl'ss III genl'ral.

t-i5 IO-OI ~62

T have already quoted h.nnt.'f; phrase that the existence of noumena is l)l'oblematic nnd undemon:strahlc. "TLiugs_ ilHhemselves" are a different matter. Kant repeatedly stres_ ses tha t their existence is obv ious from t.he existcllce of t.he world of phenomena. lIe dismisses as absurd the asser­tion th at "the phenomenon ex ists without. that which ap­pears". (73; 3, 23) That which appears is the "thing-in_ itself". In Kant's view, that conclusion inevitably follows from the distinction between "things as objects of experi­ence and as things in themselves" (73; 3, 23), although one still cannoL understand why " Lhings-in-themseln:!s" can be absolutely unknowable if they really appear. But that does not in the least affect the distinction between '·things-in-themselves" and noumena. God, absolute free will, the immortal sou l are all noumena which Kant calls ideas of pure reason; " th ings-in-themse lves" t hat cause sensations are a different thi ng. True, in his foreword to the second edi lion of the Critique 0/ Pure Reason Ka nt says that regrettably, the existence of "things-in-them­seh'es·' is theoretically undemonstrable, but in the same brea th he stresses that they "provide us with all the material of knowledge even for our inner sense". (73; 3, 30) He describes the impossibility to theoreti cally refute the skep­tie ist questioning of the objective nature of "things-in­themselves" as a scandal of philosophy. But he disproves the metaph ysicians' attempts at demonstrating the objective reali ty of noumena. He is especially explici t in his Pro­legomena, an attempt at a popular version of the Critique 0/ Pure Reason: "The esse nce of idealism is the assertion tha t only thi nking beings exist, and that th e other th ings which we think we perceive in contempla tion are mer ely concepts within thinking beings, concepts to which no ob­ject outside them corresponds. On the conti'ary, I say: thin~s are given to us as objects of OUt' senses existing ou tSide us, but we know nothing about what they really are, we o.nly know thei.r appearances, Le., the images they generate I.n I1S by affectin g our senses. Therefore I natural­ly recogDlze that th<'1'e exist objects outside us, 'Le., things lI.bout whose essence we know absolutely nothing but which \\e. k~ow through the concepts we receive as resulls of their .Impact on our senses and call bodies, II name thus denotmg only the appearance of the object which is Ull­

known to us but neverthel ess real. 1I0w can one call this

H6

idealism? It is a rompletF antltiu'!'is of the latter' ('i:J; 1. :~S-:~~l)

Thi s quotation c1t'iJrly bears Ollt Kanr~ (iesir{) to dis­(.ingui ~h between "things-in-themselves" all!1 llfmmenu as a priori ideas of pure reason. He describe!) "things-in-them­selves" literally as things, objects "corresponding" to sense pel'ceptions despite their essential unknowability, Appar­ently, this means that different "objects of our senses" "cor· respond" to the distinction among sense perceptions, Re­ferring to those "objects"-that is, "things-in-themselves"

·Kant also says that they appear, manifest themselves in sense perceptions: "we know only t.heir appearances". That is, Kant regards the existence of "things-in-themselves" as an obvious fact: we know about these things "through the concepts we receh'c as results of their impact on our

" ~en ~es . II would he wrong to consider this emphasis on material­

ist trends a pllrcly polemic exaggeration which docs not reflect Kant's profound convictions: the dualistic nature of his th eory caused inevitable fluctuations now to the left, now to the right. Kant uses the concept of the "thing-in· itself" to try and limit the subjectivist leanings in his sy:;­tern. On the other hand, by resorting to subjectivist episte­mology he trie~ to overcome the alleged dogmatism of the materialist recognition of objecth'e reality and its infinite knowabilil y, All that is clear from the contradiction~ of Kant's interpretation of "thing~-in-thE'mselves".

Neo-KanLians have excluded "things-in-themselves" from Kant's philosophy but t.hey have r~ta~ne~ the wor!d o~ no,u­mena, having thlls accepted (albeIt lDdl~ectly) hant s d~s­tinction between those two concepts. Still, they paBs OHr in silence the materialist implications of that distinctioo.

0} Sometim('s K':llll interprets the term "thing-in-itself" di££e.renlly. applying it, nmong other things, to. h~man r~ason (th,e subJe~t. of know ledge in genernl) inasmuch as It I~ examlD.ed out.slde empmcal application. Vicwed from t1.\at angle, reaso.n. Itself IS not a pht:, nomenon and it is nOl subject to a~y conditions ~f sensuousness (73; 3, 386), it "is present an~ !emams t~le .same ~n a.1l human ac­t ion~ and in all tl'mpornl conditIOns. but .It IS ~ot l~ hl~lC and do.es not acquire, [or (''(ampll', a new state In which, It dl~ !lot ~,(Ist earlier". (73; 3, 388). O?vio~~ly, in this casc too, Kant d~stmgUl,she!l llel\\c(,1l the '·thillg-in.ltse~f and t.h~ noumen~lll that IS. oul~ an idea of I'l'a!<on which is uellh('r empmcally apphcabic nor connected in any way to th e world or phrllomcna.

10'

. 'I ' (' ,01,"( 1 fly ""H'~I (l \" Illt' llti ons i t \\llh indig 1 li nll I II' Irra IOJ" ~ ~ , ' " I '. ' bJ to accept the> fart th ai l\tUl t In'als 'lm~s 1II t h('1n

una c. I I' ( ' ,I , ,,,,,I ,' " ' 1'1 ' (' I _ " . ""doubledy O)J ('('l' l) t ., (Ollla!l. Jtlc.

"(' H'S a!i ' . .• r ' , tion to nOUllH'IHl. ,rri te . ..; .~hl~s t O\·: I l' r(' IS an ama.zlB ~ fact which none of Uti has gm~n enough lhoug,h t t~. Complete_ ly dispassionalely - I "",ould ('W' 11 sa~'1 wI t h JOY and re_ lief-Knnt. arrin'd by h,s own rC[, son lll~ at the ,lIndl'tnon_ sir-ability' of the existence of God , th£' lm mOl'lnll ty of the soul and frce will (which he' I'cga l'cls liS th e con tent of met­aphysics), belic\'ing that faith basra on lllo1'aii ty wo~lld be quite enough for them and th ey would weI! se1'\'O ,theIr pur­pose of being modest pos tulat~s . but he was .genulnely hor­rified at the idea that. the realit y of ou tC'r th lllgs could rely on faith ... Why should God. the immor tali ty of the sou l and freedom make do with faith a nd postula tes , while sci­entific proof is lavished on the D ing an sick?" (31; 221-22) This rhetorical question clearly shows wha t cons is tent ideal­ists totally reject in Kant's philosophy.

The thesis about essential inapplicabil ity of categories (and of all a priori forms in general ) to the suprasensuous is among the f ll nda Dlental~ of Kant's theory. But he ap­plies Dot only the categorie~ of ('xis tC'nce and causalit.y but also others, whose Significance, according to him, is con­fined to the realm of phenomena , to " th ings-in-themseh·cs". Gottfried :Martin, a prominent West Germa n expert on Kant's philosophy, remarks in this regard : "One can weJl say that. Kant appJ1es almost all categories to the th ing-in­itself, espeCially the categories of unity, quanti ty, causali­ty, community, possibility, reality a nd necess ity." (86; 227) But all that is not true of noumena: Kant applies no categories to them, thus denying tbeir connection to sen­sory data.

It may seem that the oppos ition of " things- in-themselves" to Iloumena refers mostl y to th e Crili qll e 0/ Pure Rea­son and not to Kant's theory of ethics, advanced in t.he Cri­tiqu~ of Practical Reason which, to a certain extent, con­t~adlcts the first. Critique. But an analysis of Kant's ethics disproves that view (as will he shown momentaril y) and ~onfJ rms the c?nclusions drawn from his theory of theoret­Ica l rea:,on. h.ant'~ ethics dt' fi nc'" noumena as postulates of pra~tJcal reason. This means that t.he assertion about the eXistence of absolutely free will, personal immortality and God are factually and theoretically groundless. Tt pays

148

1o !; ll"l 'O':'S thai h lit !ll)es IllIt ~fJn.sIUf r tlnngs in themsche " postul flh'S of pr'H"tU"llI re "::m, MOl .... ; SOIl ha. loth ing to do with tilC'm at nIl. "'.ant aintalls ~ at o~c:ous­nesS is only worDl Ina".much a It Qot nc e1 b" thlDg¥ iD _Lhcm~elves", i.e., i<; not delelfni Id. ~ fernaiIy. hu the distinction betweon "thing~ in·thems lv>s' and noumena, t.entatively advance.! in the doctrine of thf oretical rr'ason, becomes a radical opposition in Kant's ethics. Dracticfll rea· son is noL engaged in cognition at alL Its ideas express only moral self-consciousness. Therefore, Kant holds, 'W_f'

cannot even assert that we cotfllize and discern the pOSSI­bility of these ideas, let alone their reality". (73; .j, 1)

Kant counters theology by proving that morahty l~ the source of religion and not vice versa. Of course: that IS an idealist viewpoint, but it is clearly aimed ~galDst theolo­gy That also means that postulates of practlcal reason arp not preconditions of moral consciousness ~ut. its necessary convictions which coincide with the con'\"lctlOn abo~~ ~he categorical imperative of recompense .. Bu~ that coml~tlOn is incompatible with the facts of real hf~ In the r:al.~' orld; Nevertheless, moral ('on~ciousne~s ~em~lDs wbat It I::. .o~: inasmuch as it is com'i~ced th~t lUs.t,lce kno.'ws .no .~Iml~' in space or time. AccordlDg to h .. ant, the bel~ef ID h ca. ter death is not a prerequisite of demonstratlng .th~ ret~~ bution just ice imposes on DIan; on the contr~ry, It IS ~at -er that the conclusion about life after death IS drawn rom the necess ity of punishment". (73; 7, 306) .

Kant actually maintains that the ine\'ita~le failure to rid the world of injustice forces moral ~on~clOusnes~ ti~ ac­cept divine judgment. And, sinfcehmo~athtY .'1' le.s~en~;:eolog a:~

. . g acceptance 0 t e lD ern , ~~t~~~)Ll~~~tl:~ n express t.he insoluble contra?icti~~S b~wdeei~ what must be done and wha~ is. In Kant s r:~til~:i re~son. inflDite duty i~e\'i.tably. conce.lyc\lb~~ ~'~~:nr completely re­V F Asmus IS nght In saymg I . . ' l'Oat -j~cts ' the real ollt?logiCflI :;~gl~i~~aGc:d o~s r~.~;:~: ~~~~: the ural con tent... fhe cone 1 . f s tmes but in the dept h relations of co.ncepts ,a~d tl~f·~ t~ reconcile himself to the of conscience,. In malll s lila \1 Xi<:cord that exists in the reality of eVil, to t Ie mora . world, to social evi1." ( t4; 4/1.3) .

Among postu lates of pure pract.le.at out free wi ll as an absolute (and m

reason Kant singles that sense prelimin

aryl condilioll of morality, \\hO~t\ \l' ry \'x ish' uCl' pron' th. lt there is this free wilL But this do('s not I'l' h'r to 11 nOUlnl

non or Ill(' so-callNt ontological , Jl l' imal fn' l'dolll concf' i ... u bl(' only as an a priori id(,ll, but to rt' lati vl' frN~d om, qu ite sufficient 10 explain the possibility of mora lity, "Freedom, in the practical sense is will's (WilIkiir) independence of compulsion by the impulses of the senses," (73; 3, ~ 7 S ) This definition of freedom by Kant is cssenlia lly s imilar to those proyidNI by Spinoza and 01 her pre-Marxian matcri al­isIs who understood froedom as reason 's domination over alTects. And although Kant holds that practical freedom stems from the idea of tran scendental freedom, he inter­prets will's relative independence of sensory impulses as an empirically established fact which fot'Ills a sufficient basis for actions dependent on the subject and determini ng its responsibility for the consequences.

What then is the position of the idea of transcendental freedom among other noumena (postulates of practical rea ­son)? Theology claims that absolute free will is incompat­ible with the natural order of things, that it is a case of direct dh'ine predeterminat ion. In this problem, too, Ka nt actually opposes theology: in his view, the concepts of God and personal immortality proceed from the concept of free. ~om, Here Kant is more categorical than anywhere else, "Since its reality is demonstrated by a certain apodi ctic law of practical reason, the concept of freedom is the cor­nerstone (Schlusstein) of the entire edifice of the system of pure, even speculative reason, and all other concepts (those of God and immortality) which, being mere ideas, ~re not based on that system, arc added to it, and wit h It a~d b.ecause of it they acquire firmness and objective reaitty, I.e., t~eir possibility is demonstrated by the fact that freedom IS real, because lhis idea manifests itseH in ~oral. law. But. f~e,edom is the on ly idea of speculative rea­son \\hose p~sslbliity we know a priori although we cannol comprehend It, because it is a condition of the mOt'al law we k.n~w. But the concepts of God and Immortality are not cond~tlOns of. the moral law but merely conditions of t he ~~~~4stry object of the will, d('lermined by that law," (73;

~ne c~~ h.ardly find anothcr quotation where Kant for. ~1u ates , It lDterpretation ~f .tlte intNrelations hip of id('as

practlca reason as explICitly and even frankly, Und er

150

KRllt ' ~y" l pm , 11 1(' IIInr, I ItI\\' forhlfl II' but JI r nil , whl'rr ILI'(' I '~sa ry, fII.(IU'I'!i fIr ilom' and hant ortf'n 'sor ed tv lhr m liP('a ll !!(' hi, 'rt~ljgjoTl w lh n pure .l!!on" w of Hciall y concl,·mnf'fJ. Thus hant a!'1pr 1 thaI thp. idea of fre -dom (act1la ll y, simply fr · edom) S10111d h ~ C)nc~lyed as precpdi ng {Illd gl'J1('wling lIu' itie'IS or Gol ,nil immOJ talily,

Therefore, on the' one hand, there is the fact of frcNtom, obviously hor Of' out by the exislimce of morality, and on the other hand, thf'rc arc theological i(leas which can only be interpre ted as convic ti ons held by moral and pssentia lly frec consciOllsnrss. It is only practica l reason. Kant main· tains, th a t, "through lhe concept of freedom, provides the concepts of God and im mortality with objecli\'e reality. with the r igh t and, morf'over, the subjecti\'e need (the ne' d of pure reason) to bc assumed" . (n; .5, Vi)

To avoid mislllldC'rslamling, it should he noted immedi, atel y Ihat Kant \lSP:, Ihe It'rm "objective reality" to express the necessary un inr:-al significance of ideas of reason (and form s o f knowledge in generall, and not to denote reality independen t of knowledge. The concepts of God and im­mortality which, according 10 Kant. are nol deduced frOIn the mate ri al o f knowleuge and which form what mi~ht h(' called secondary postulates of practical reason can only he explained proceed ing from ils :,ubject~ve , need as th e re­sult of its freedom, a imed at the realizatIOn of th e moral law, Therefore, these ideas arc not arbitrary : man creal I'", the concepts of God and im mort ali ty n~t in any way h,c likes but accord ing to hi s far from arblt.rary ne('ds, TillS idea was latcr to be expressly sl at (>d by Feu E"rbach: aware of hi s hel pless nes!) before the ext ernal world and ,search ing for at least ill\l ~ory SIlPPOrt in hi s slru ~gl(' aga l.nsL th e clements, man crC'at('s th e idea of ~omethmg. ommp.ot,ent. But Feuerbach is a n athC' isl, whil e h.ant remams relLglOus "wilhin purl' ['('ason", .\c(,Ol'din j.:t: to Ka nt's philosophy of religi on, " the doc triill' of th(' ('xis l ~n('e. of, Go~ is bu~ (~o(' . trinai faith ", (73; 3, 5;:'3). Such fa ith IS m entably hnlltcd beca\l~c it nlilS cO ll nlpr 10 the critiqu.e of pure reason, that is, t.h(' self-critici sm of reason, which hol~s that one cannot " positi \'(' ly ex pand. ~h(' realm of the objects of oll.r thinking h{'yond Ih(' condItions of our sensuousness or as · sume lh (' ('xisl l'IH'e of not only phenomena bu~ also ,of oh­jects of pur(' thinking", (73; .1, ~!jO) By applymg thIS pre·

15 1

cC'pl to religion, Kant ::;ny::;; "I mu::;t not e\"Co say: it is InOi_

ally certain that God cxis1:;, etc., but: I iUll morally ~l!i­tain, etc." (73: 3, 5.')5) 1\ant's philosophy of rel igion i:s, of course, not atheism, but it has played an im portant rnle in the history of atheism in the New Agc.

Thus Kant's concept. of the "thing-in-itselflt is contrasted to the concept of the noumenon, although tho " th ing-in­itself" is interpreted as existing outside space and time and is 11Ot, strictly speaking, a thing in the lIsual sense of the word because the latter, being spatially dcHnite and sensu­ollsly perceived, is a phenomenon. ThC' relationship between these mutually exclusive concepts, th e " thing-in-itself" and the noumcnon, pOints to the contradiction between materialism and idea lis m Kant triC's to o,"e rcome, Hence also a certain, mostly terminologi cal, vagueness of d is­tinction which enables many students of Kant to turn "things-in-themselves" into noumena. This confusion o[ concepts and slurring oyer the distinc tion fundamental to Kant's philosophy rejects the latter'g materialist aspect. ~he materialist. interpl'eta ti on of the " lhing-in -itself"­

whIch, as we ha"e sho''''-Il, is not alien to Kant.-encompas­S?S all reality because it exis ts il' l'es pecli " e of the cogn i ([,·e process. The concept refers to a n infi ni te multitude of objects no~ necessarily related to th e cog n izing s ubj ect, a.nd not .slInply to indh·idual thing!:! that ge nerate sensa­tIOns. It IS a problem, and, of course, not only for Kant. li e h?s. record~d the fact that objects independent of the cog­ntz.mg sub~ect do not detNmine, nt least directly, its th eo­I'elicnl notIOns. The e'"olution of the latter is affected not mel'e ly by the object of knowledge but also by the incom­parably more complex interrelationships of phenome na­naLlml1 a~d social, objective and subjective, physicnl a nd psychological. As the Soviet philosophpl" V. J. Shinkaruk ohserve~, "t1~e duplication of the objects of knowledge as Loth ~hlDgs-lD-~hemsel\"Cs and phenomena was not simply nn. epl.sLemologlcal error on the pnrt of l\ant. This ambi­g\l.I~y IS present. in knowledge itself. The thing as it is per­cel~ed ~nd ~e~erally known by the cognizing subject. and as _I~ ;~lsts In Itself i~ hoth the same and totally diffe rent. " (3,), fJ) Therefore, Kant wa~ mi~t 'k"n not' d' t' ' I , b ' - ........ In ISlllgUiS l -Ing' ~tw('cn phenomena and "thing!"i-in-thC'lll~el\'es " but io opposmg one to the other.

One rannot blame Kant for having failed to provide a

I 52

logicilll y consistent deftnition of the "thing-in-itself" In his case, such a tlcflll ition would have been an act or es· cape from the problem Kant wanted to pose and deal with compreh ens ively. Any attempt at formally denning the "thi ng-in.i t~('l£" i:o; lwprlE'ss. A defillition o[ the real, unlim­ited d iversity of thiug:o; is only meaningful inasmuch as it unit es its IHlml'rO\l:-; abstract that is, inevitably ooe­sided defini t ion:o;. Bllt how does one define this diwrsity or the objectively exisLing which, to a signifIcant (and, per· haps , eve n overwhelming) degree, is not yet the object of knowledge?

Thus the antinomy of Kant 's concept of the "thing-in-i t­self" r eflects the heterogeneous content of the problem he poses . Therofore, we should refer not only to the antinomy of the " thi ng- in-itself" as a concept but also to the contra­dictions of the cognit h·e proc('ss itself, the contradictions whi ch , to a c('rta in ('x lent, J\ant exposes. ~foreover. we should in all probability 1'('ff'1' to the contradictions of objec­tive reality its('lf. For example, the opposition of the appear­ance a nd th e ('l'se nct', the eSl'eoce a nd phenomena does not de pe nd on kn owledge at all. And, if Kant does not digtin ­gu ish clearly e nough between th e diiJerent meanings of the " thing-i n-i tself" it is l ikely becaus(' he is th e fi rst to gras p the need {or this disti nction, The complexi ty of the problem inevi tably points to the conclusion that the incon s istency usually stressed in an alyzing Ka nt\:: ~oc tr i ne of " th ings-in.themsel\,('s" is largel y the reverse SIde of tl~e purposc[u l seal'ch fo r a rea l solution of th e ~roblem . ThiS search is inco mpa tibl e wit.h s implifying the Iss ue [or .tlll' sake o[ a rr iv ing at a n illusory solut ion that wo.uld :,a tJ~ fY a s uperficial int~J[ec~, And~ in contra:, t. to. th e Idcall~t .In­terpreta tion of hanLmll philosophy, dialectIcal l~latenall~11l interprets nnd solves Kant's problem in the ent.Jrety of It s

hi s torical developme nt.

TilE IJJ.\LECTIC.\L iDE.\ LISM OF JOIIANN GOTTLIEB FI CIITE

Dialectics had exis ted long before the theory of dialec­tics and dialectical logic apileared. BuL, as a system of theoretically substantiated pos tulates, the theory of devel­op~ent, which is also a theory of knowledge and a meth od deliberately contrasted to the metaphysical mode of th ink­ing, dial ectics emerges only in classical German philosophy. Eyen Descartes, Spinoza, Le ibniz, Diderot. and Rous­seau did not lay down a theory of dial ectics although tbey did have brilli~nt dialectical insigh ts. ' . Immanuel hant drew up a docll·ine abou t th e inevitabil­Ity of contrad ictions at the highest level of theoretical knowledge. Kant's tra nscendental dial ectics deals wi th un­~ \"oidable errors, of pure reason which strives, accordi ng to Its nature, to rise above the inevi tab le limitations of ex-perience and the mind. .

The ~ppositi~n of Kant's " transcendental logic" to for­ma~ logiC d_efiDlteJy poses the issue of creating dial ectical logiC. As Kant pointed out, formal logi c abstracts itself from any co ntent and exam ines only pure fOI'lTIS of thinking. Co~sequ~ntly, ,those forms of thi nking which, for all their u?l\·ersah~y, possess definite content (specifi cally, all catego~les. are like that) , remain outside formal log ic. T he latter IS lllt~rested nei~h er in the necessary and the acci. den.tal, nor l~ the possible and th e r eal, nor in oth er ca te­~ol"les- that IS, forms of thinking which I'eflect the exis t­mg forms Of. u~iversality irres pective of thought. Accordi ng tf Kant, logiC IS to deal not only with s \lbjecti ve fo rms of ~ lOu~ht but also wilh the forms of uni versality inherent ;0 .P eno~llena themseh·cs. "Tn thi s case th cre musL be a

k~glC lWdhIC~, d~es not ab!:ilract it self from aoy conten t of nowe ge (/3· 3 83) D ., .

tati OIl or·u .' 'd f es plte tie s ubJeclivis t interpre-fllzes tI Ie I ,~or 0 phenonwDa, thi f'. obviously recog­trace t~ e n('~(. 0 1' t new, dia ll'cti cal logic. Th is logic is to

e OfiglD 0 our knowl edge about objects because t54

tid;! knowJ~',lg(J II1nvl~r8al awl nOlc ary. or (which ill !\HIlt'S vjl!W j" tho 881110) ohjc til ...

Trilll~I'l'lIlh'lllallogic is 1 doctr e 1Illmt 100ms of Llllnking <11111 Ih,·i .. application II, 'cn~ I: data. hc~e a priOri form!'; are tho idealistically ,JOI) agnostically interpreted llllin'I".~,dily ,11111 Ill'c{',,~jty of eal"g,)rical form!> of cogni· lioll. Tllu<1_ Iranscpnd('1ltai logic anlicipalc!.', to a cerlain de g['{'<', IIIP pl"(Jhlf'Ill:!l of lliilipctie"llogic. "'1'0 a certain degr('c" llt'ca1J~p Kant J'ult's (/ut the examination or Uw devel­upmellt of c{/legorie.~, regarding them as immutable struc· tural rorms of thinking and experience in general. But dialectical logic (ami dialectics in general) examines the dCH:>lopnU'lll or lIl{' forlllS or universalit.y inherent. in thinking. Thrrefore, 3!though 1\.311t played a prominent. part in the history of dialectics and founded dialectical idealism, he was not, strictly speaking, a dialectical idealist.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a direct follower of Kant, wa~ t.h e first representative or dialectical idealism. ~[arx said that. Fichle's concept. of the absolute subject, together with Spinoza's substance, idealistically interpreted, became part of Hegel's philosophy. Hegel'~ postulate that ~ubstance should abo be understood as subject (that it becomes sub­ject as a developing sllbstance) is already implicit in Fich· te's philosophy. .

Fichte the dialectical idealist differs substanllally from his dialectical predecessors. He was the first philosopher to deliberately deyelop dialectics as a method of research. the theory of development, the sy:::tem of the categories of scientific knowledge, and philosophy as a science.

l\I arx called Kant's phi losophy the German theory of t.he French Revolution (1; 1, ~06), Thi:-:- definition also applws to Fiehte's Ihcor~': his dialectics CRn be properly \Inders~ootl pI'eciscly as a philosophicRI intcrpretat ion and c?nscI.ous exprcssion of that r('vo\ution. Ma nfred Buhr IS rIght when he says that Fichte's "first works are .. . an. ope~, courageous and cmotional acceptance of the re\'olu liOn 111

France and recognitio n of th£' right to overthrow gov.ern ­m('n t~ in genrral." (-'II: 13) His \atN works on the ph llo~­oph\' 01" law and elhies an' largely dcvoted ~o t!le anal ~­sis of goycrnment and law p '·?h l('m~ .and soc ' ~ l .Issues ad·

I I tl\" l;"rcl1eh Re\·olut lon dUring the Na ti onal Con vanc('( ly " . r F I I \"C'ntion. Fiehh' eon~il.il'l:ed 1 1In~s.clf an all~' 0 : re ne I )~\Ir.

. . I,t,·o,,·"-'·"" \\ hen ll11 ilt ant reactlOnanes succeul£'t\ gl'OI:-< 1'l'\O \ < ... ~.

in removi~g ~i~! from the f"c~llty ,of ,lho Univcf.::liLy of J?oa, he \Hote. The l'C,aSOD be-lund It IS clear; it is oh· ViOUS although no onc wll! call it ,by its name ... To them I am a democrat, a IacoblO; that IS th£' whole point" (1. 0

•

5,286) . ". Fichte wa~ an open and dedicated opponent of the feudal

~ystem and ldcolo~~ that reigned in German states. That ~deology, both ~ehglOus and secular, sanctified the exist­IDg order. of tluogs .a~ inviolable, natural, justifled by its age-old history, traditions and customs. The divi sion iot estat~s, tho privileges of feudal lords, the oppression an~ l,lOvel ly of the mass of people, the tyranny of the aristoc­\acy l;d by the, royal family and wallowing in luxmy-aU ~~at \\as proc,lal,med ordained by human nature and divine

as?n, Submlssl~n and humility were regarded as the high­~st ,ttues. Any Idea that the existing order could or should RC / la~ged was treated as sacrilege. But the French 't e .~Iuvon de~troyed the feudal system and discredited " s I, co ~gy. FlChte welcomed this revolution not only as a ,~IH mar' "Ill ~rench history and an example to be emu­a' tt:~~ Heh-.a~v It as t n expression of a law of world history

which t~e:;for~e~~de f~~~d PreviOusly failed to grasp and conscious activity But 't . 0 bt.e~ome an ~ssence of their or th . I IS ac IVlty that hes at the heart

('Xi~t: :~~~~:~ o{o ~::n,~n? r°rl~ histfry. And if something that man docs not ;~ ~res an{ well-being, it means role of his own activit;~ Sl;~~n~r h;'~~?I'stand the decisive tory we shall never fmd an tl' c e.. n all of world hi s ­not introduced into it befor~.'~I(~9~vl:r~9we ourselves have people are authors of their historic~l' ) I n ,other words, at that conclusion in h's ,. 1 ~rama. Flchte arrived

C I ar~IC e entitled "A C .

to orrect the Public View or tl F I ontrlbution that article Fichte expla',ncd I,' 1e r1encI Revolution", In t . IS conc usio . "N em IS safe from change, it is in theil' n. 0 state sys-

('hange. A bad syc::tem wh'cl ' nature that they all It' ... I I luns counter t tI

U I,male goal or any state unit must I I 0 1e necessary ~\lllCh" contributes to the attainmen~eo~ laID.ged; a good one ItS('~r. (49; 6, lOB) This quotation f/ liS g,oal changes p('clally valuable in its admi~sion of tl om. Flchte is es­f's.<;ary character of change ['I d 1e Ilnwersal and nec­o~IY w~en ma,n is dissatisfi~d, c:laC;ge

al:% b:on~tions, )Iot c ange IS a uDlvcrsallaw. lin to occur ;

Thl' idea or peopln shaping their own history was horn of the bonrgeois Rrzlightenment as a theoretical generaliza­tion of the antifeudn' popular movement. But this convic· tion, regarded as self-ovident by all opponents of clerical­ism, failed to fit in with other, equally significant com'ic­tions of the Enlighlcners. They put a naturalist construe· tion on society, arguing that people's Jj,'es werC' shaped, on t.he one hand, by their external natural environment and, on the other hand, by their inner nature. But neither the external natural environment nor human nature depend on people. In that case, whence the conviction that people shape their own history?

The bourgeois Enlightenment never formulated this an­tinomy. True, sometimes, while discussing free '\\"ill and necessity, the Enlighteners did note that contradiction. Sig­nificantly, while 18th-c('ntnry French materialists offered a fatalistic interpretat.ion of necessity, they neycrtheless in­sisted that people shaped their history themselves. This conclusion stemmed directly from their atheist world ,'iew,

Fichte is proroundly aware of the contradictions in the naturalist interpretation of human history. Before him, Kant already 110inted to them, but he regarded t.hem as es­sentially insurmountable because freedom was inherent in the world of things-in-thcmsclYes, while necessity belonged to the world of phenome na. Fichte rejects this dualistic precept and proves that the contradiction between freedom and necessity can be resolved,

As an empirical agent, man is totally dependent on nat­ural laws. "i mYf'elf with all that T call mine am a link in thi s chain of inviolable natural necessity." (52; 3, 15) Both man's psychological activity and his bodily being are necessarily shaped by forces over which he has no control. "What exists in nature is necessarily such as it is, and it is absolutely impossible that it be otherwise." (52; 3, 10) According to Fichte, the endless causality which predeter­mines each moment of man's life, the universal connection of cwrything to all, m('anf' that the existence of an empir­ical subject i~ det('rmin('d by any accidental factor, by the position of a grain of sand on a seashore, for example, Hence my Ego is not my own creation. "It is impossible fol' another to t:'lk<' my plac(': it is impossible for llIe, having emerged, to he, at ~onl(' momcnt of my existC'llC(" dif­ferent from what T 3m in reality." (52; /1, 15) But. if that

t :i7

IS tJ.l~ case, no Ego, no pcr!:ional iLy ('xist!'. )[ow('\'(' 1' thl' cmpmctll Ego, the hun~an i?d iviciual, do('~ not want ,uul lherefor~, ~an~oL reconcile h,lI1lSCif to tht' olllnipotl'IlC(, ()!' nature. IllIs Ego l'C'voits agmllst the slaH'I'Y impost'd on and ~hc strength of this revolt helps it comprehend ib roo! relatIOn to the external world. "There is in me" l'I'cl t

't " ' 1(, WI'I cs,: a ycal~nillg for an absolute, independent self -activity. There. IS nothmg less acceptable for me than existence' only In ,lnother, for another and through another. I wan L Lo be and bec,orne s0D:wthing for myself and through my­~el~. r feel tillS yearmng as soon as 1 perceive myself' i t IS IDseparable ~rom. my self-consciollsness," (52; 3, 85)

Thanks to h.lstoncal developmen t whose most essential clonlent, ~ccordtng to Fi~hte, is self-knowledge, man r ealizes ll~\ he IS a sl.a\"~ ~r IllS own extel'nal and intcl'nal naturc on) as an mdtVldual as an el1'p,'r,'cal Eg f.l .. ' ~ .. 0 unaware o I s Ulllty With the universal Ego of humanity with the ~~~:~~Ite subje~t, lhe infini te actiYity which is th~ absol ute J Self or ne~atlOn and t.he absolute power or crcatiYity. 1<; -conscl~u~ness, Flchte. maintains, forces man to face

, . ('udtlleccsslt). And then It tmns out that he is a prod-

~~~~C~ledJa~~r~1 only basI an emp~rical Ego, but as a pure Ego Ie a so ute subject man creates t d

;1~~of~~essitY. inherent i.n it. Freedom is the ('ss:~c~lr~f ~~c link in e t~:b~~c~. Its WIll, the absolute wiII, is " the first

:~~a~,~~':~s i~1~~~cg~{.~:~~;e~!~~:1~,s~~,~~l~i:;~~~~~d~f t~l~c c~;:,~ ment of matter is the first)" k' < I n, 10 nown mo\"('­embraces the e'ntire syste Ill

f- In the material chain which

'fl . m 0 maller" (52' 3 118) . lat IS how Fichte res I I . "

in the naturalist interpret~t~:~ trtlco~~,radictions in herent lation. He rejects the fnndam 0 10 ma~-naLure" con'C­holds that the external nat lcntal. naturalist thesis which ture itself shapd the life ot

ra en;;ronmen t and human na­

cl1lsion follows from erroneOma?d' I~wever, this correct con-I,. I ' us I ea 1st I)rem'

I,e lte.s philosophy fa il s to sec the' Ises. I~an s , 11ft': social production ~lll C force that shapes lIOns. I'his, no doubt cxprc<;s(': I~OCltl prodUction reIa­Ho.wev~r, the i mporLa~t poi~t i: t~::t )~~rgCOis limitations. re\OlutlOnary advances (albeit· I l lchle the bourgeois form) a brilliant insight which ~n rt ~e erroneous ideal ist damcntals of the scientific approna~ftlP~t('~ .one of the fun -

o llStory: mankind 158

it~r'1f ("n'ides ('Oi1f1ilinl1~ thai i11'lf'rmine its history. Of {"flU)":'t', Ihis ;lpproileh In lIiI' Jll"f)bl"1II is slill quite abstract, ;lIul it does not rllh~ Ollt an erroneOllS-- and theological in tl'l"pl"l'talion of worl,1 history. Bnt in the actnal conl('xt of the development of classical German philosophy it led to the materialist interpretation of history which offered a sci­entifiC explanation of how and why mankind was really the author of its historical drama.

We shall later return to the concept of the absolute suh­ject . But before we turn to the analysiS of the dialectics of the Ego and the non-Ego, we should yet again stop to con­s ider those hourgeo is-revolutionary views of Fichte's which arc directly Hnked to h is dialectical understanding of the world. Feudal ideology trNl.led social contrasts as primal and absolute. Bourgeois ideology rejected this metaphysical op­position of man to man as contrary to human nature. In this bourgeois ideologists proceeded from the concept of immutable human nature. Rousseau is the only one to ap­proach the issue of the history of society affecting human nature. Fichte repeatedly quotes and supports Rousseau, but he goes further in understanding human nature. He re­duces the latter to activity and regards all the qualitative characteristics of man as objective expressions of that ac­tivity.

Fichte rejects as unworthy of man the traditional feudal "iew that masters remain masters and serfs remain serfs. Developing the ideas of Rousseau and anticipating Hegel's famous postulate about the relative character of t.he con· trast hetween master and slave, Fichte questions the ap· parently self -eviden t truth: are masters really masters? And do slaves remain slaves? He exclaims with indigna tion: "Anyone cons idering himself master of others is himself a sl ave. If ho is not always really a slave, then he has the soul of a sl ave, and he will cringe disgustingly before the first one w ho is stronger and who enslaves him. Only he is free w ho wants to make free everyth ing around him." (52,

1, 237) Thus the opposition between masters .and slaves t urns

out to he dialectical. The French RevolutIOn brough t down feudal lords. Fichte idealizes t.he bourgeois revolut ion, he sees it as abol ishing all relations of dominatio~ and sl~b­mission. This great objccli,·c justifies revolutiOnary \'10-

lence. 150

Thu<;, Ficht~\ passion for dialectics I::; rooted in the LOllI' J.:1'()i~ rl'\"olution. In his view, the I'evolutionary rest fUl.; turing of society, the conscious traosformalion of state ... nd legal rclatillDs, the abolition of the feudal yoke, idcntiti( rl

wilh the abolition oC any oppression, reveal the univers II essence of man and human history.

The ideologues of the French Revolution, the French E n· lighteners, were mostly metaphysicians and not. dialecti­eiaus. They absolutely opposed the new to the old, and that undoubtedly played a revolutionary ideological role. Unli ke those p.{'oplc, Fichtc was a contcmpol'ury of the French l~cvolutiOn, he interpreted it drawing on the ideas of h is I'fcnch forerunners. On the other hand, Fichte was a fol ­lower of Kant and of the German dialectical tradition in genCl'a~. Tl~is e.xplains why in new historical conditions dlalectL~al .Lde~IH;m became the ideology of the bOllrgeois revolutIOn III Germany.

TI~e mission .of philosophy, according to Fichte, "is to ~urDlsh man w~th stren~th, courage and confidence, show­m.g ~ha~, al~~hls_ a,n~_III~. destiny as a whole hinge upon hLl,HseH . (a_.: ;;, .3.],) I hat j~ what Fichte :->('('5 as th e lilt amug of Ill !) pilllo!)ophy which lu' tll'scribe!) as 'l cons'st­r~t de\'elopn~ent of the concept of freedom, In o~e of IhiS etters to Hcmhold he remarks: "The SOli I of my system is ~h;~ s~~ltemen~: the Ego is unquestionably con:-.cious of it' .. e. lcse v.ords have no meaning nOI' "alue without the mner se~f-contcmplation of the Ego," (48' 1 477-78) If !'ouhstanliales this postulate banal zin I' , e uh~?luh' subject, the absollLl/E~o. y g t.1e concept of th e

lilt' concept of the absolute Ie: . I . tilt. least clear concept in F'cI t ~o IS t 10 most chfflcult and tt' proceeds directly from til. 110 s syst~m. Naturally, Fich " " I' 1 l\lman I'.go who'. ." t HI, In liS ('yes, incomparably mol' b' ::; eXlS ence Lernal objects that is e c tl. e 0 VIOUS than that of ex · HS t1~e non-Ego. In hi~ a~af:""i~I~~ h~r ncgati.vcly describes te, Iiko Kant, arrives at Lhe c so -COnSCI?USneSs, rich ­only possiblo inasmuch as thc~~r~ct ~onclusIOD. that it is ('Hernal world. But in an id r t~ t Ie perceptIOn of the rrcoj:l'nition of the external wo~~dlsi~c, system ~r views the ,nteliertual intuition and 0 I tl d' a COrlclrlSw'l based on

. I IC Irect aw .Jnqllf'stwnable existenc£' of til I nroness of the ,..' It. C luman Ego PI"

II; I {' emphaSizes, must proceed nni' f . lIlosophy, lIhsoiutrly authentic: its £'ntir(> co t} t

rom that which is

n en DlURt be deduced

.00

, • •

I

from a fundamental precept, so that "if and inasmuch as this first is authentic, the second must also be authentic; and if the second is anthentic, by the same token th e third must be authentic, etc," (51; 7).

However, Fichte is far from regarding the consciousness of an individual, the individual consciousness he describes as the empirical Eg.o, as the cornerstone of his system. That cornerstone, he maintains, is the absolute Ego whose exist­ence cannot be questioned either. This he refers to "quite a different Ego, concealed from ordinary eyes, not re­vealing itself in the realm of (acts, but knowable ooly by rising to the basis". (50; 35) Fichte both opposes the abso­lute subject to the eD~pirical Ego and insists that they form an integral whole. This is a the.is of tremendous theoret­ical and ideological signincance. Each human individual comprises something absolute. True, the empirical subject comprises the absolute Ego only in a limited, undeveloped and transient form. But the absolute Ego realizes itself in the activity of finite empirical subjects.

While Berkeley is content to examine the individual hu­man subject who perceives his sense impressions with com­binations of lhe latter allegedly forming the objects of the sensuously perceived world, Fichle deems it necessary to risc from the individual Ego to the universal Ego, the ab­solute s ubject. Only that absolute subject is the source of everything existing, it is the activity which creates and determincs everything.

The empirical s ubject is potentially absolute only in it­self, The oppositioD between the absolute subject and the cmpirical Ego is relative although it is the relation of the universal to the individual, of the everlasting to the tran­sient, the suprnsensuous to the sensUOUS, the infinite to the finite. According to Fichte, the limitation of this opposition (which, naturally, is impossible to overcome), the risc of the individual to the level of the universal is the most profound essence of aU that takes place in the world. This is likely to lead to the conclusion that for all its specula­tive abstract nature, the absolute Ego is actually mankind in the course of its past, present and future development­that is mankind unlimited by any historical bounds which could J;ave restricted the development of its knowledge, its power over nature and the perfection of its social .organi­zatioD. But this idealist abstract concept of manklDd, all

161 U-01662

abstraction that to a certain extent ('rodes the distmctivc nature of social development, does not at nll exhaust the concept of the absolute subject. In the flflnl analysis the absolute Ego is substantialized activity transformed into the absolute subject. That is "something totally un­conditional and undeterminable by anything higher". (52; 1, 314)

Fichte refuses to proceed from the categories of being and substance. He maintains t.hat they should be viewed as forms through which activity realizes itself. He is not satisfied with the formula that activity is inherent in being. In that case activity is regarded as a quality, an ability of being which, apparently, possesses other abilities too. nut activity is that which makes being being. "That whose being (essence) is solely that it pOf\its itself as existing, is the Ego as the absolute subject." (52; 1, 291) This ex­plains why Fichte rejects the traditional philosophical coo­cept of substance, usually understood as the absolute basis of the diversity of being which is devoid of self-activity and independence. 1t is true that Leibniz revised the con­cept of substance and interpreted it as the force making the material alive. But Fichte believes even that concept to be insufficient because in Leibniz's view monads and not activity are substances. Fichte maintains that if the coo­cept of substance is to be used at ali, it should be reduced lo the absolute subject. "Insofar 85 the Ego is viewed as comprising the entire and fully determined circle of all realities, it is substance." (52; 1, 337) V. F. Asmus is right to point out that Fichte's philosophy combines subjective and objective idealism. (13; 81) Since the absolute Ego is treated as something di fferant from mankind, it admits the existence of a supranatural and suprahuman first cause­lhat is, it recognizes the starting point of objective ideal ­ism. "My absolute Ego," Fichtc writes to Jacobi " is of course, not the individual ... But the individual 'must he deduced from the absolute Ego," (48; 1 501) Fichte's dis­tincti~n between the concepts of the absolute subject and mank~nd t~ a c~rtai~ degree anticipates Hegel's concept of th? dlaleclical Idenllty of being and thought. "The only tiling that undoubtedly exis.ts," he writes in his System 0/ ~he Mo~al Theory (1812), IS the concept, the purely spir­Itual being. The majority cano?t rise to such being as the concept. To them, the concept IS only an expression of ob-

1(;2

jectivr knowledge, a reflection, a replica of things The idea, or pure seeing (blo::;ses Gesicht) is the real and only true being which reveals itself to pure thought." (52; 6, 31) Further, l;ichte emphasizes: "The real Ego must ap­pear only as the life of the concept. The Ego whose self­consciousness would include some other principle besides the absolute concept would not be the true Ego but mere­ly an appearance of Lhe Ego." (52, 6, 37) That is precisely why Fichte's absolute subject is, as Marx and Engels point­ed out, none other than "metaphYSically disguised spirit separated from nature". (1; 4, 139) That concept of the first cause eventually leads to the recognition of the divine first cause of the existing. While in his earlier works Fichte docs not formulate this conclusion, later he is quite explicit about it. ... .

Thus, Fichte strives to prove that smce activity .IS recog­nized as absolute, it is not an object but a subject, and only in this sense the absolute Ego, This identification. of activity with substance, with the subject and, finally, ~:lth selfness (Ichheit) as the idealist solution of the key philo­sophical problem implies the absolute opposition of thr suh­ject to the object as the point of departure. "Either of the two must be removed: spirit or nature; the two ca~not be united at all. Their imaginary unity is partly hypocrisy. an~ lies, and partly the inconsistency impo.sed by the feehng. (52; 6, 32) He does not reject the eXistence of n~tur~, or the world or things perceived through the senses,. Its mde­pendence of the individual human Ego. He rejects the primacy of the natural, material. .

Furthermore, treating activity as an absolute mea~s Ide­alistically interpreting motion and change inherent m sen­suously perceived things covered by the ge:,-eral conc~pt, o[ the non-Ego. The motion and change of thmgs are vie" ed as alienated forms of activity; they are therefore reduced to activity which Fichte both distinguis~es from an~ op;. poses to the motion and change inherent m natural tlungs.

,. The Soviet philosopher V. V. Lazarev sa.ys: "Fi,cht.e i~~isted that development was actually contained not l!l the o~Ject Itself but only in the method of theoretical construction a;ad lD tbr \~ay it was set forth. He believed thal the conc?pt of th~ self:dcv: °iJfl~ object' was seU-contradict?ry nnd d~structlve fr ~~ie:ant~r~h~Y!:~~ His dialectics of self-con!"clOusnc!"s d.ld 0, ot ~eb~ Y

t' 't 'wplied thi~

I)hv!"ical view of nature a~ a mollOn ess 0 )ec , I I

vicw and was based on it." (27; 33)

,OJ 110

Fichtc's philosophy prodded a comprehensi\'e, albeit sub· jectivisl-'voluntarisL development of t.he principle of :til IC·

tive role of the subject, already of paramount imporL lCO

in Kant's system. Denying the existence of "things -in ·tIlf~m. selves", Fichte rejects not only Kant's agnosticism, the ob· ject's independence of the subject, that is, the non-Ego's independence of the absolute Ego. Since the absolute Ego is continuous activity and constant emergence, it is not something that is ready in advance, something immutable. Its relation to the non-Ego should be viewed as a process of change, of development. Therefore, the negation of t he reality independent of the Ego (in other words, the OOD­

Ego) must fully take into account the interaction and uni­ty of those opposites which are both mutually exclusive and mutually implying.

The relation between the Ego and the non-Ego is t he subject of Fichte's supreme principles. According to the first supreme principle, the absolute Ego originally undo· doubtedly posits its own being. This means that the entire content of consciousness is rooted in the activity (Tat-han­dlung), the self-positing of the Ego. "The Ego is the source o~ . all reahty, because it is posited directly and uncon­dItIOnally. :rhe concept of reality is given only through and ~ogeth~r With the Ego. But the Ego exists because it posits lts .e~lstence, a~d that because it exists. Therefore, self­posltIng and belDg are one and the same thing. But the concepts of self-positing and activity in general are also one an~ the same, It follows that any reality is active and everytlung active is reality." (52; 1, 329)

The first supreme principle does not yet comprise the conce~t of the world of objects, of the non-Ego. Here Fich· te dehberately excludes everything which is not the Ego ~hus postulating the absolute freedom of the absolute sub~ Je~t,. absolute activity's independence of conditions, and the ablhty of the human! empirical Ego to shape, create it· seU-of .course, only masmuch as it approaches the abso. I ute subject. ~heref.ore the meaning of man's life is "that each ~evote hIS entrre personal life, all of its strength and all of Its pleasures, to ideas". (52,4,460-61)

Further, th~ first supreme principle formulates the pri­~a.cy of practical (of course, idealistically interpreted) ac­tIVIty over t?~ore~ical activity and knowledge in general. Absolute actIvity IS, above all, practical activity: all other

164

forms of activity are derivatives. "This world is undoubted ly only the spbere of our activity and definitely nothing greater. CODsciousnes!; of t.he real world stems from the ncpd to act, and not vice versa ' - the need to act from con sciousness of the world; this need is primary, consciousness of the world is a derivative. We do not act because we learn, we learn because onf mission is to act; practical rea­son is the root of all reason." (52; 3, 99)

Fichte thus offers an idealist interpretation of the sub­stantially new epistemological understanding of practice as the basis of knowledge. He even goes further, describ­ing practice as universal activity and therefore as the es­sence of the absolute snbject. However, both consciousness and practice imply something that is different from them. Activ ity is impossible without an object. Therefore the Ego asserts itself only inasmuch as the non-Ego exists. Self-ac­tivity of the absolute subject and the existence of its op­posite, the objective, determine each other. Fichte formu­lates this dialectical truth as a subjectiye idealist , assert­ing that the Ego posits t.he non-Ego. That is the second su­preme principle, according to which the opposition between the Ego and the non-Ego exists only within the abso­lute Ego because nothing at all exists outside the latter.

Fichte is well aware of all the difficulties inherent in the subjectivist-idealist solution of the problem of subject and object. The existence of the non-Ego is a necessary p:econ­dition for the Ego positing its own being. If that IS the case, the Ego does not pmiit lhe existence of the n?n-Ego but finds it as a condition of its activity; that questIOns or at least limits the self-positing of the Ego. The b.are Car· tesian cogito ergo snm (I think, therefore. I a~) IS essen­tially impossible: thinking implies an object Illdependcnt of the thinking subject. Ficht(1 writes: "The E~o ~ever p~r­ceives itself and cannot perceive itself except lD Its em~lr­ical definitions ... These empirical definitions alw~ys lID: ply something that is outside th(' Ego. Even a man. s bod~ which he calls his own body. is something outside ~hc Ego" (52; 1, 223) Typically, Ficht. excludes cverjrthlng bodily from the concept of the Ego (in this cas~llt 1~ tl~~ empirical subject). But he ngrcf'S that the hodl~'. a cC· t'

I I · '(ent (,\·en drtcrmln('s I • consciousnc~s am to " err:"ltll {,,\: ,' .' i hnt t.his detrrminat.inn of th(' s~lhj('('t h~l th~e&~:~~:'ri~~io~­fcrpl'ctC'd as posited by th(' subJcct, as Ie . ,

Ill;}

splitting into two, self·alienation of the subject. Thefl,r)re according to Fichte's theory, the admission that there ex' ists "something outside the Ego" remains within confines of subjective idealism, because tbe external is interpreted as the seU·restriction of the subject (that is nlready pre. sent in Kant's system),

As it was to be expected, Fichte uses idealist dialectics to substantiate subjective idealism, The opposition between the subject and the object is interpreted as a result of the subject's activity, although this activity is impossible with out the existence of the object independent of it. "Any op ­position as such exists only inasmuch as the Ego acts, and not for any other reason, Opposition is generally posited only through the Ego." (52; 1, 297)

N,e\'e~'th~less" for all. his attempts at substantiating the sublectl\·e~ldeahst solutlOo of the problem of subject and object, even despite his conviction that their unity cannot be substantiated otherwise (of course if one rejects the de~ pendence of the subject on the object), Fichte is forced to admit that his substantiation lacks a clearly npcessary ele~ ment which, however, is ruled out by the entire content of the theory. In his letter to Reinhold quoted earlier Fichte offers the follOWing description of the difficulties in the s,\Ibsta~ti~tion of l.he concept of the absolute Ego: "If the Ego orlgmally pOSits only its own existence, then how is it pos~ible for something different to be posited too, that which opposes the Ego?" (48, 1, 478) This means that the non-Ego cannot be something that has appeared after the E~o: But then the origin,al act of self-positing is not really or/glDal becallSe the actIOn of positing (and consequently thl:' very existe.nce of the subject) already implies the exist: rnc(' of the object., of objective reality.

Theref.ore the ~on-Ego cannot be reduced to the Ego be~ cau~e tillS ,reu~ctlOn would have destroyed the unity of op­pO~lte~ which .IS the bas!s and the content of sel£~conscious~ ne. s, And Flch~ admits that the Ego needs a funda~ [Jlc?~.al external ~~pulse, a primal impetus without which ,Ietl\ ~,ty, self~posltlDg. a~d self-consciousness are impossi­ble. Alt~ough ~h~ yrJOCiple of life and consciousness, the pr~or of Its POSSillllJty, are, of course, contrlin('d in the Ego ~L IS. not Yl:'1 the ~ollrce of, any real life, any empirical lif~ In. Ilmr ... If thiS real life must he possihle, this needs still ,mother special impetus on lhe part of tho non-Ego

!OO

to affect the Ego." (52; 1, 471) Na~u~3ny. l'ichte's SySl ~m floes not develop these and other simllar statements. They are incompatible with its subjective· rlealist basis. Trac· ing them to their logical conclusion means abandoning subjective idealism in favor of a materialist reroognition o[ "things~in.themseJy~s" or in favor of ob~ectiv~ ide,aiis~. The objective-idealist trend keeps sllrf.acmg .ID. ~Ichte s theory but it is suppressed by voluntarist subJectiVism, Thu~, the analysis of the first and the second supreme

principles of Fichte's theory shows that he cannot fully overcome Kant's "thing-in-itself", th<lt his own philosophi­cal consistency forces him to admit the exist~nc~ of, SOlI!6-thing which transcends the bounds of the s\lbJectJve~ldeahst solution of the central problem of philosophy. Fichte's con­clusion is a continuation of Kant's approach to the rela­tion between theoretical and practical reaSOD. The probl~m of the original impulse-or, more preci,sely, of t~e realIty independent of the subject- is r~cogDIzed as msol~'able within the connnes of the theoretLcal approach to philoso­phy; it is solved by the practical approach, One should.note, however, that this formulation of the .problem .co~tams a rational element: the existence of reahty that I~ mdepen­dent of consciousness is proved above all pracllcally.

The dialectical opposition of the Ego and ,the non-E~o. of thesis and antithesis, of reality and nega~\oDI of actlOn and submission necessarily raise the quesllon about the outcome of this struggle of OPPOSites. Why does one oppo­site not destroy the other? Why do they .no~ ~ancel .each other out? Is their synthesis possible and If it IS, ho" . can it be achieved? Fichte tries to answer all thos? questIOns, thereby proving not only the necessity of the th~:d suP[e:e principle hut also the. the.oretical underst<ln 109 0 e interrelationship oi OppOSites !D, genetal. 't denotes the

In Fichte's opinion, the UOlty 0 OppO~1 es I f tI transition of the qualities of one .a~pect mto t lose 0 \C

other If the Ego is defined as actlnty and ,the ,non-Ego a: .',·t the dialectics of these opposites mcvltably lei a(~~

passl\ I y, . t nd the non-Ego t lO::;C to the Ego acquiring passl\'e aSl~e~ s, a h 'posed'

.' "P ivity and activity as suc are op , ~~v:~~:;:l~~S, a:t~~'itY must necessarily imply passivity and

vice versa," (52; 1~ 347~ 't, of differcnce and identity.

Th~~:Oi~t:On i1~:~;~: \~i~h~~ntl ~ifference; there is no difIer-

161

ence without identity. It follows from lhe. second s~proD1e principle according to which the Ego POSits the eXistence of the n~n.Ego, that "the Ego posits negatio,n in i~e1f 8i~cc it posits reality in th~ non-E~o, ,and It pOSits reallt.y within itself since it POSIts negatIOn In the Don-Ego. Thus it posits itself to be self-determining since it, ~eceives the determination, and it posits itself to be reCelvlDg_ the de:­termination since it determines itself." (52; 1, 32;:,) * This means that the Ego is both active and passive at the same time. But the same applies to the non-Ego. The uDity of opposites appears as mutual transition up to the identity of opposites. The Ego not only opposes the non-Ego, il "opposes itself". In this connection Fichte says: "The Ego cannot posit any passive state within itself without positing activity within the non-Ego; but it cannot posit any activity in the non-Ego without positing some passivity in itself." (52; 1, 343) Does this dialectics of opposites not cancel out their differences? If that which distinguishes the Ego from the non-Ego is inherent in the latter and that which is distinctive of the non-Ego is present in the Ego too, if there is nothing in the subject which is not pre­sent in the object and vice versa "how then can one dis­tinguish also between the Ego and the non-Ego under these conditions at all? For the basis of distinction between them which should have made the former active and the latter passive is no more." (52; 1, 354)

Answering this question-which is essentially insolvable for a subjective idealist because he views the outside world as derived from the subject-Fichte maintains that the problem can only be solved if the absolute Ego posses­ses a quality that cannot become a quality of the non-Ego. Therefore, to solve this problem one must go back to the original definition of the absolute subject, a definition which

.. Whilo stre!'~iog tho great imporLance of Fichte's approach to the problem of the mutual transformation of opposites ono 'should not forgot lhat i~s ~ormulalion is subjective-idealist, 'treating tho ~roblem as .tho pnn~aple of t1~e mu~ual detormination of the subject an~ thl' OblfJct: actIVIty and Its object aro de5cribed as an identity whlcl,: on t Ie 5tr~nglh of t.be acti,~ity that shapes it., splits into two OPPO~ltRS. AccordlDg to Flchte, Do not strive to spring out of your~~1f to f>mhr~co more th~n you can embrace, such as conscious­Of'S5 and thn tiling, the l1l1ng and con~dOIl~neS5 0. '0 b

" ",' " ." e morc IJrCCI~C. 1'1 IN 0 tlO two gcparatoly, hut that whith only' , ," into 1w t1 , '"'" "" . . a f'r sp IL~ 0, 18 W JlC I IS OOCf'5!'an y 5U IjCCllVC-objcctiw :md b" '" lIubjective:' (52; 3, SO). ' 0 Jee IV("

.6R

does not have to he demonstrated bcc:ause it is intui tively obvious. 'Writes Fichte: "This characteristic o[ the F~o which cannot at ,,11 be ascribed to the non-E[:o jg the un conditional positing and the unconditional hcing p)<lited, without any ground." (52~ 1, 354-55) tn other. orl.. • III Ego differs from the non-Ego in that it needs no original substantiation. Naturally, this fundamental postulate of subjective ideaHsm does not help in solving the problem of the unity of opposites but confuses the issue still fur· ther. This key flaw of Fichte's supreme prinCiple is aptly noted in the letter from his outstanding contemporary Frie· drich Holderlin to Hegel of January 26, 1795: "But his absolute Ego (= Spinoza's substance) conmprises all reality; it is all and there is nothing outside it: so there is no ob­ject for this absolute Ego, otherwise it would not have com­prised all reality; but consciousness without an object is unthinkable, and even if I myself am this object I am nec­essarily restricted as such, at least in time, and there· fore I am not absolute; thus, consciousness is unthinkable in the absolute Ego; as the absolute Ego I possess no con­sciousness, and insofar as I possess no consciousness, the Ego (for me) is nothing, therefore the absolute Ego (for me) is also nothing"" (67,6, 169) "

Self~consciousness is not the starting point of human hfe. If consciousness is recognized being, self_consciousness is the recognition of this relation of the world of man to the outside world and, above all, naturally, to other meo. Since man in Marx's words "comes into the world neither with a lo~kin~ glass in hi; hand, nor as a Fichtean phi­losopher, to whom 'I am l' is sufficient, man first .sees an.

d

recognizes himself in other men. ~eter .only est~bllshes IllS

own identity as a man by comparIng himself With Paul as being of like kind." (5; 1, ;;9)

Fichte understands perfectly that the problem of the s~n­thesis of thesis and antithesis cannot be solved by lookmg for intermediate links combining features of bot~ ~spects. He holds that. this does not resolve the contra~lctJon b'~t merely moves it onto a different plane. Even. If t.here I.S

something int.ermediate between the ~wo OP~oslte~, as. tv.'!­light is halfway b!"twe!"n day and Di.ght, e\en t1.l<l.t mter­med ia te link do!"s not nnit!' t.lie opposites .. The unl~y of op posites is possil)lro brcanse they are r~lat'YC ~~d Ill.a ('~r­lain sense id(lDtical. The pOint, nccordlDg to hchte, IS t at

160

I "light and darkness are not opposites in general but Ili ff" r only in degree ... The same is true of the relationshi p he tween lhe Ego and the non-Ego". (52; 1, 340)

.,",till, why do the opposites the Ego and the non-Ego nol cancel themselves out but remain? Fichte stresses that th is que:-;tion cannot be resolved by any means of logic: the point is oot to unite these opposites in some way but to find in them that which really unites them. Therefore the task is not reduced to "huving immersed ourselves in re ­nection, invent for them [the opposites] a certain juncture by some trickery; it means that since the unity of con­sciousness is posited simultaneously with the positing that threatens to dostroy it, such a juncture must be alread y available in our consciousness, and that our mission is merely to flDd it through reflection." (52; 1, 323)

According to Fichte's theory, t.he unity of the Ego (the absolute fullness of reality) and the non-Ego (the absolute fullness of negation) is formed through mutual restric­tion, on the !'trcngth of which the Ego partly det('rmioes it ­srH and is partly determined by the non-Ego. But thi s me~~s that the non-Ego, too, is only partly determined by the aC~l\'I.LY of the Ego. Fichte formulates the third supreme P~'I~lcr"lr of his theory as follows: the Ego opposes the di­vlslb~e Ego to the di\'isible non-Ego, that is, both opposites re~t.rlct each other quantitatively, in part.

I !l1IS thr third !'!upreme principle, a synthesis of the two carhrr ones, cancels their one-sidedness and substantiates ~Ilf" .1Illconrlilional reality or both the suhjective and the oh­~r("t.I\,I" Thei: .relations. arc, intel'preted as a correlation, that IS, l.n t~)(' i'pmt of subJeclive idralism which recognizes til(' slll.IJrct.s clep('ndcncc 00 thG object only inasmuch as th e ohJf'f:t 1.'1 rcc.ognizcd as dependent on the subject "Neither sholl1rl. Ih~ s\lbjective be destroyed by the ohje'ctive, nor ~h~ ohJ~clive by. th(' subjective .. , Both must continue ex­Islr.ng !,!J(lc by SIdf'. Therefore they must be synthetically llnJl-NI, anrl that through something third in which they ~rI' ('(pwl, through determinability. Both arc not the sl1b­~I'et.. ~nli tlu: niJjf'ct as ~lIch, but the subjective and the ob­JN~tJ\C, pr~SILNI through thesis and antithesis and mutual Iy rlrlr>rmIJ1;Jhlf'. amI only brcnus(' thev 're I II I 'I . ," !jUC \ l ev can In IlmLf'f <lnll frxf'd hy the <lbilily 01 Ille" I' 1 . 'I') k' . "go (oree 0

una!{ln;J IOn. w?r Ing In the synthpsis." (52, 1, 400 .\n '·Xallllll.ltlon "r 11If' ~UI,rf'm(' principlcs of Ifichte's

theory reveals the key features of his dialectics. According to Fichte, opposition, the struggle of opposites and their mutual restriction imply the activity of the Ego as their primary condition. Therefore, Fichte never mentions the iDunanent dialectics of the object, although he does dcmanrl that the basis of the unity of opposites should be sought in themselvcs. Interpreting any reality as subject-object, that is, as mutual dependence, in which primacy belongs to the subject, Fichte is far from seeing contradictions in objects themselves, irrespective of the existence of the sub· ject. Besides, objects arc described negatively, as the non­Ego which is, moreover, posited by the activity of t.he Ego. Thus, substantiating the concept of the moral subject, Fich­te considers it a condition of the recognition of the external world's dependence on the suhject: "Our world is tbe ma­terial for discharging our duty; this is the t.rue essence of things, the substance of all that is seen." (ltn, .5, 185) Sub· jective idealism inevitably distorts a profound approach to the problem of the unity and struggle of opposites. Never­theless, Fichte's concept of subject-object dialectics provides a mystical renection of the dialectical character of hu­man activity.

The unity of the subjectiye and the objective rc\'eals the distinctive objectivity of social relations that are both ~r~d­ucts of the joint, historically developing human actIvity and independent of human consciousness and w~. Hist~r­ical necessity differs radically from natural necessity whICh is indcpGndent of human acth'ity. TI,te laws. of human ,ac­tivity arc its inner content --tho uOity of 1.lve and ~~Jec­tivized (substantiated in the form of histoflcal condlt\O~s, causes, institutes) human activity. Fichte treats the diS­tinction between the Rocial nnd the natural as an absolute, he turns th e social, tho human into the substantial which determines and gives rise to nature.

Fichte's subjective-idealist dialectics rev:als the real pr.oc­ess and at the same time, puts a mystICal construc~lOn on it. H~ sees its infmity as a justification, of the subJec­tivi st, voluntarist view of the world: mank.\lld ~asters the elemental forc.es of nature and turns them mto Its own hu­man forces. T 11 richle'g word!'!, "T wanl. to b(' ma~l('r of na­ture, and it m\l ~t be my ser\"a."t; T want to han po\\:('r 0\':1"

it which is commensurat(' wllh my strengt.h, hut It m\!. t have no power over Ole." (52; 3, 28-29)

171

Fich~e d?es not describe. his meth~d ,as dialectical Dil L

as an~lthetlcal, thus, stress~ng ~he trIadiC relationship he has discovered: thesis-anti thesis-synthesis. Accord ing t Fiche, however, the antithesis is not a result of the dev(!l~ op,men,t of the t,hesis. The existence of tho antithesis is im­plted m. the ,existence ?f the thesis, just as one pole of fI

magnet .lmph~s the cXlst~nce. of the other. Of course, the co~reJati\'e l1~lty of Opposltes IS a substantial dialectical reo latlOn, but FlChte sees it as the only possible ODC. There­fore he ~oes. not interpret the relation of opposites (thesis and antJthes,.s) genetically, in development. He dcscribe~ cY~n synthesIs ,not as a ~ew stage in development but as a JtlD~ture ~f given Opposites, as something akin to a form o,f un~versa!tty that unites them, In describing Fichte's an­tlthettcal method as a specific form of dialectics, V. F, As­mus aptly remarks that "Fichte's dialectical method alter­nat~s b~tween two mutually determined approaches: the antithetical and ~he .synthetic, The antithetical approach looks for the quahty In which the things under comparison oppo,se e,ach other. The synthetic approach searches for the q~ahty In whic~ they are equal. Antithesis is impossible ~6thout sY,nthesls, and ~y~thesis. without antithesis," (13;

,> Ho":,,e\~r, ~vbd~ pOlDtmg to the inevitable flaws in Fich­tie, s subJ~ctl\'~-ldeahst dialectics, one must not underrate liS g-cntllne dIalectical insigbts.

I mn,st add that the third supreme principle a ears to contradict the original subjective-idealist premis/~nd on t~~ strergth or, the mutual determination it establishes' im­t les o~ y parttal determination of the non-Ego by the 'Ego

rue, tn, the language of subjective idealism this merel;

ili~~~~ht ~~~ ~~~_~gg~ ~~~\tstlitself as partially determined h .' , I, Ie crux of the matter remaing

~~;e:(~::t\~bt~lou~IY, ac~ivity, process, being which is ib~ in thl' Ego itsel~ t~gO ~xlrts not only ,in the non-Ego but the entire reality or then(noalt~oug~ Flchte maintains that ported from the Ego the" ~~ g~, IS ~erelY reality trans , of the Ego, he is fo;ced to

a ::~: ~~n 0 s~rts" JEntaussern) independent of, although ori in g, ze thiS bemg which i~ ~lJbjrrt~ "Thl'rf! mll~t he ~om ~h,atlD~ fr?m, the absolute tlI8t i! inrl('rrDflrnt of ' e Ing-,m thulgs·by-thl'mRelves

hi ,our perception sornetl' h

a ('~ thr-m to penetrate onr anoth :th Hng t at r-n, (e2. 1 '70) ~ er WI out our 't .J, ,., However to avoid th' ,fl~SIR anee.

I e ImpreSSIOn that thi~

!itaLCment recognizes the "thing·in·il'~c1f" Fichte adds: :'But the reason underlying till' fad. t.hal we conned them [things) together mU6t lie in Ol1l'Sl'iv(,5, [or eX:lmple, in our perceptio~." (52; 1',370) :-jtill, aside from Fiche'~ subjec­tive-ideahst concluslOns, one must stress the ratIonal as­pect of his reasoning-the r:cog?-ition of th~ ~ialectical transformation of the subjecllvc mto the obJecllve, Con­sequences of subjective human activity become, an objec­live process which is independent o[ men an(i which shapcs the conditions of their subsequent activity and partly even the basis that determines it.

Naturally, Fichte offers a subjectivist interpretation of the transformation of the subjective into the objective, i,e., the objectivization or human activity. But i~ is also c1e~r that this dialectical process discovered by Flchte leads dI­rectly to the understanding of social development in whi~h material production, an objectivized result of human activ­ity is on the one hand, live human activity and, on the other hand, an activity indepcndent of men and determin­ing all their social relations as a basis,

Already in his Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel, pro­ceeding from Fichte, was on the verge of und~rst~ndi,ng the real content of the transformation of the sublecllve In­to the objective, That was evident in his brilliant d~fini­tion of the essence of labor, a definition that Marx highly appraised, According to Marx, Hegel "grasps labor as the essence of man-as man's cssence which stands the test"

(1; 3, 333). .. . . Hence, people themselves do create obJect~ve cond~t~ons

independent of their consciousness and w,lil-condllIon.s that unlike the natural environment, determIne human ex­iste~ce, Of course, Fichte does not even mention any nature independent of the subject, but he c?nst,antl~ refers ~o the idea of transforming nature and ~ubJectlfig It to man s will. That is how he resolves the oPPosit,i,on between s~ch seemingly mutually exclusive theses as m~n are mab~ers of their own history" and "history is determined ~y"o Jec­tive laws independent of mCll'5 consciOllsnes.s .or Wtll ' ~ro­ductive forces develop through human a~t1Vlty, but SI~C~ each new generation inherits the produc~lve forces frea ~ by the preceding generations, it is obViously nO,t r;e In its choice of productive forces, that is, of the mobve orces

of socio-historical development, 173

Because of its inherently contemplnliYc nntlll'C', pre-Marx_ ian materialism ignored the tran~rormation of tho ~t1bj~:._ tin' into Ihf' objrctin" thu~ \wah:enillL:' (h (' rotH'ppl nf t)~I' ~\lhj('cl which wn~ described OIH'-,;jdC'llly, lHo~tl y ,IS iln oh. ject affected by things of the external world. Th(' rC'fli bn"j'l of human history is not nature ns slIch hut the "secolI;1 nature" created by mankind throughout ib histot,y by lila terial production. Incidentally, this concept should bC' ap­plied not only to til(' natural cDvironmC'nt transformed hy man but also to his own nature. .

Marx and Engels criticized F'euerbach for his lack of und~rstanding. of that fundamental fact and connected it to Ius. naturalist and, in lhe final analysis, idealistic views of social r~la~ions, Fichte's dialectics enabled him to set forth-albeit In a speculative, idealistically absolute form -that which Feuerbach failed to see because of his met, arh~sical limitations, This reveals not only the historical slg~lficance of ~ichte's philosophy but also the epistemo­logical roots of 11I~ subjective idealism,

~r~le real dialectics of subject and object implies, as its orlgm~I, natural premise, the existence of the objective ns a real~ty pre~edi~g (and independent of) human activity, a reality which IS transformed by men, As a result not only the sU,bje~tive ,is ,a consequence of the objective: but al~o the objectIve (m Its definite form) is created and re­]lroduc~d ~y ,the, subject. To a certain degree, Fichte gues­sed thiS dlstlDctlve characteristic of the social as distinct from thc natural process-and distorted it too because he treatcd the "subject-object" relation as a pri~ciple of on­tology,

~ic~te's theory of supreme principles is the starting pomt In the, dedu~tion of the laws of formal logic and sys­~ems of maJor ph~losophic~l categories, Kant accepts th ese a,ws a~d categories as sImply existing in thinking but ~J('htf' J,nte~prets them as determined by the dialecti~s of t)C sul~~eClI\'e and the objective, Kant confines his mission ~o draWing up a table of categories, grouping them by ma­Jr types ~r lu.dgments and revealing the inner connections o categories III each of these groups (here Ka t f ' ]aU's the dialectical triad and thus appro.ell tnJ ordffiu­~t r r II' es Ie un er-

ani JOg () Ie negatIOn of negation), Fichtc t k th next step forward, He views categories as fo ,a es , e archy comprising both coordination and subord~mgl' a Iller r lOa lon,

In subslantulting ho lil'l UIJI'('1II1 J'!Rciplr of (,Iuil) 0 phy Fichtc cOlllpares it to tllII rurmal loglc,,- law of idl­tily , ".\ i~ ,\" (or "1\ \") i.", o\Jviolll<ly 11 lugil' I~ clJr d propositioll, but it lIue 1I0t follow that A n.:ally ~XISts, \Vhat is the condition of A'~ {'xist(~lIcr,' Ac';onling.o '1, jccti\'c illealisnI, til(' rl'ality of A i~ plI:-lilcd in till! Ego

Ficllte says that. "lIlp propnsilil/ll A· - A i" origin?l!ly meaningful only for the Ego; it is deduced from the phil­osophical proposition the Ego is the E~o; therefore any content to which it is applicable must lie in the Ego", Thus no A can be anything other than posited in lhe Ego, therefore our proposition will read as follows: what is po, sited in the Ego is pOSited; if A is posited in the Ego, then it is posited (because it is preciflely what is posiWI as pos­sible, real or necessary), and thus it is undoubtedly true, j[ the Ego should be the Ego", (51; 49) No doubt, any law implies objects and conditions which are subject to it. In lhis case Fichte opposes the metapbysical absolute con­struction put on the formal logical principle of ident~lY, proving its conditionality, Fo~ all tbe fallacy o~ the ,subJec­tive-idealist view of the baSIS of the law of Idenhty, tbe raising of the issue about the need for a critical interpret~­tion (and substantiation) of formal logical laws and theLI' real significance (and limitations) is a philosophical accom­

plishment, " ' ~ Substantiating the second and thLI'd supreme pnnclple:;,

richte examines the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded third, Formal logic treated these laws as se~f­evident axioms, Fichte questions that vicw as dogmatic, According to him, intellectual intuition does not pro\'e t~at those laws are undoubtedly true, Only the second and tlurd supreme principles of philosophy make the,m ,true, an,d e~'en that-and this is especially important-wltlun certam hm-

itsA further analysis of th e supreme princiyles singles out major categories of theoroti cal thinking wIncl\ afe thus not merely detected, enumerated and classified but deduced, by a logical development of tho conc{'pt of tho, ab!:'olll~e sdbl 'ect, For example, lhe concept of substance I,S an exten e,f ~efinition of the concept of the absolute subJC'ct becallse It

osits itself, But the subjcc!i\'e-idenlist con,cept o~ sub~ta,nCl' ~ivorces it from nature and thus robs It of Its dlstmc-

tive content. !75

An analysis of the dialectical relalion between the L:'O

and the uon-Ego makes it possible to deduce the conc""~ of the boundary, divisibility and quantitative dcfiDiti "'n~ ness. Any res triction is a definition and negatioo of a dif. ferent definitiveness. Therefore, the concept of the bound. ary comprises the concepts of reality and negation. T:\C Ego aod the non-Ego mutually resLric t each other and tIll"

rest,riClion is restriction on action. This provides' a l ogi~.a'i ~asls , ~or dcduci~g the categories of interaction and causa.­IIty. J he deductIOn of the latter category is substantiated by ,the di~Li.ncti.on bet,weeo activity and passivity: "That to wl,lIeh ~CtJ\,lty IS ascnbed and therefore passivity is nol as­'crJb~d IS called cause .... w~ile. that to wh ich passivity is .aSCrIbed and therefore achvlty IS not ascribed is called ef lect." (52,1,331)

U~like Kant, Fichte did not believe that cause must nec­e.ssaril?, precede effect; he deduced the concept of causa­lity prwr ~o the deduction of time. This concept- like oth­er categories, to be exact- was devoid of the versa til e con­lent the nat~al sCi.ence of the late 18th century was aJ r£lady bestowmg on I t. But Fichte treated the EJZo as an ab­solute and thus divorced it from nature and he could not use na~ural science data properly, altho~gh he did aim at p~oducmg not only general but also specific supreme prin ­elpl~s needed by all sciences, including natural science.

Flchte does not stop at deducing the categories l isted a?ov~ a,?d. the. l~ws ~! formal logic. Since, together with Kant 5 thmg-lD-ltself, Fichte is forced to rej ect the the­(lry of sen~e perception being the starting point of knowl­e~ge (havmg replaced it with the itellectual intuition of t ~ transcendental unity of apperception) , he faces the Ull­

t~lmkabJ e ~ask .of deducing the existence of sense percep­lIOns: .But l.ll t.hls case sense perceptions inevitably lose their ~,ogDltlve slgOl.ficance .. This explains Fichte's assertion that com~ et~ly dlsregardmg perception [italics mine) the the~

:YstO t Skclencle deduce: a priori that which, according to it u. a e p ace precisely in perc f h ' '

riori" (52' 3 34) H F' h ep lon, t at IS, a poste-d'to!( ' ere IC te takes a step backward com-

pare ant, and that is an inevitable result fT ' IDg Kant from the right K t' . 0 crl ICIZ­essentially thal which c~nno~n belDSI~~. tha~ ' :perception is .(73; 3, 161 ) Ficbte rejects this se~~a~~~~at~ III any wa y". lDterprets sens uousness as passivitY_Whi~lSf~S~s;~~~~. ~~ 17t1

t •

p

theory of atIects· ·and consequently the practice he refers to is opposed to .,ensory activity i.e. that whicn it really is.

Contemporary critics o[ <.Iialel;tit:lI matcnali::;m, repeat­ing their predecessors' arguments, maintain that dialectics is essentially incompatible with materialism. And while ancient mater~a~ists. alre.ady he~an to develop di~ectical ideas, t bese cnllcs, 19normg or distorting the history of ma­terialism, fall back on such idealists as Fichte and Hegel. But it is Fichte's dialectical idealism (and tbe same is true of Hegel's idealism) which shows, in spite of all its accomplishments, that idealistic speculation distorts and cancels out t he major dialectical ideas it is connected with because of cer tain historical conditions. The intellectual in­tuition of the pure Ego, the cornerstone of Fichte's philos­ophy, rules out a SCientific-philosophical analysis of the emergence, consolidation and development of conscious­ness. Inevitably, this distorts the essence of dialectics. Lenin wrote, "One cannot begin philosophy with the 'Ego' . There is no 'objective movement'." (10; 38, 104)

Space and time are forms of the existence of matter, they are the conditions of movement, change and develop­ment in nature and society. But Fichte's absolute subject which being absolute, is conceived outside space and time, cannot of course be the point of departure in studying the dialectics of nature and objective social relations. Ficht.e has completely foregone natural philosophy; as to the phi­losophy of h istory, that is where he strays farthest from dialectical principles. ..'

Since the absolute sllbject is the startlDg pomt, the ph~l­osophica l system must end w~lCre it.. began ; there.fore'"hls­tory is a closed circuit , it a ttains absolu.te completwn. The basic premise from which we proceed l S also the final r~­suit." (51 ; 36) This ap~roa ch. by Fi~hte to the. problem l~ inevitable in a rationalist philosoplllcal system , Hegel re peated it after Fichtc. Obviously, the result .that rcproduc~s the initial idealist.. thesis affects the £lntlr~ understan -in of knowledge and the entire theory of sClen~e. And al­thg gb unlike Kant Fichte understood the UOlty of self­co~~cio'usness as a process going. th rou~h cert..ain progres­sive stages (and t hat, of course, IS an lmportant r eP. for­ward ), nevertheless he mai ntain.s: :'The ~beory 0 sClen~~ exhausts all humaD koowledge In Its major aspects ...

12-0U62

therefore compris(>s the object of aDy possible science Each study that is undNtaken sol\"('s the ]ll'ohl('IU Olll',!.! .lud

for all." (5~; 3, 87) Fichte's works C'\I'ry a nUl~lb{'I' ,01 ~ll('h metaphysical btatcments: they btcm frail! ~h L' Idealist COil,

cept of the extrahistorical, supranatUl'lll subject. It is equally obvious that Fichte's concept of absoluLr

knowlC'dge (and of absolute paWN and absolute good) ine\'. itably lC'ads to a metaphysical opposition of duLy anti being, infinite and finite. As Lenin remarks in Lhis connec­tion, "The standpoint of Kalil and Fichle (especially in mor­ul philosophy) is lhe standpoint of purpose, o[ subjective ought." (10; 38, 236) The root of this metaphysical opposi­tion of being and duty, at first glance incompatible with Ficllte's voluntarism, is revealed ill tho basic premise of the theory of science.

lIegel says in this connection: "I find myself defined , and still the Ego equals itself, it is infinite, i,e, identical with itself. This is a contradiction that FichLe, it is true, tTies to settle, but despite this attempt he leaves in existence the basic flaw, dualism. The last point Fichte touches on is only somc kind of must, and this does not rcsolve the con­tradiction, since while the Ego should obViously be with itself, that is, be free, it is at the sa me time, according to Fichte, found with someone else," (64, 15, 629)

Therefore, Fichte's understanding of the absolute also makes an absolute of duty, interpreted as basically unat­tainable for the historically limited mankind. Fichte writes: "fdeals arc unrealizable in the real world; we merely assert that based on these ideals, reality must be asses­~ed and .modified by those who feel capable of it" (52; 1, 220) ThiS quotation reflects tbe impotence of the German bourgeoisie wbich only dreamed about what other Europe­an nations were dOing.

Fichte's deduction Of. categories is dialectical only as an approach to the questIOn of the need to examine these forr.ns of 1I1?ught i,n ~onnecLio~ with their content, to study their genesIs, t,helr lntel'l'elatlOuship within the system. But lh7 categorl('s themselves are examined outside motion, fl,nd 1".lcht~ loses sight of their intel·changes. lIe con ~ SHiel'S It Ius paramount task to deduce all categories from the concept of the absolute subject, thereby proving that H('c(>ptance of that concept is absolutely necessary for build­Ing fl sysj('m of knowledge.

178

Thi~ idf'fllist pf)~tlllalr> I'IILdl'J al'li/i('I.! l()~'c d Ci'lO~trnd .llId h'ads away fl'olil Ihl' Qlldy of Ihe dllal slIiJodilJal on of eatl'M'oril's, II~I' IOl{ir'.-1 n·nl·!·li'JlI f,f tllt~ histfJl'ic;J1 prOt: t·ss allll Ihl' I'IS!' fl'fllil Ihl' a!J,~ll'ild 1(, the spe ilie 1I('gPi is right ill dl·"'· ... ihing FiC'hlp's li£'riuttion (If cat ('gOril'~ and pIH'nOlIl!'1Ia of t!if' ('xtf'rnal worlrl in W'TIf'ral: "It i!'! a plII'ely olltwa rd t"ansition from on., 1(, an(,llil'r hv lll('allS of ordinary 1('I('ological l'Xilwinalion, Th£' tecllniqu~ lIsed is th e following: man 1011;.;1 f'flt---thprC'ff}l'(" somf.thing edible must exisL-·-that is the way plants and animals arlO deduced ; plants m us t g.,ow fr'om something . therefore, tllI~ earth is dcdllc(>d, ,"Vhat is completely lacking here is the examination of the object it!'!elf, an examination of what it is in itscH," (G4; JS, 038)

Fichte's subjective idealism has also affected his dialec. lieal und("'s talldin ~ of the opposition, unity and interchHngl' of opposites. He insi~t~ that conrtadictions are inherent­ly necessary, that they ~ llOUld not be confused with the erroneous contradictions described by formal logic. Dialec­tical contradictions are th e moti\'e forces of progress, But in FichLe's sys tem, contradictions only exist in thought, consciollsness. Even lhe subject-object contradiction is jll'e­sented as a contradiction within self-consciousness, as its spliUing into two. Viewed from that angle, contradictions proceed from the Ego, thererore they essentially cannot be regarded as existing outs ide and independently of human consciousness. Resolution of contradictions thus appNlrs merely as a logical process of the mutual restriction of con-cepts, as a transition f.'om one deflDition to, anothe~. .

Natlll'ally, this does not obscure Fichte s occaSiOnal dlH­loct.ical insights into the objective dialectics of nature, For example: "But naLIII'e hurri es onward in its constant change: and while I am s till talking abouL the chosen moment, it is already gone and everything has changed: and eq\lal,~ Iy, everything was different. be[ol'C' I chose thiS moment. (02; 3, 9)

In his " philosophy of identity", Schelling tried to OYcf·

come the subjectivism of Fichte's interpretation of contJ:a­dictions and their source. AccOJ'ding to Schelling, contradic ­tions exist in nature itseH, but the latter is only the un­conscious staLe of th e absolute subject, evolYing through contradictions to the seH-conscious Ego, the intellect. Schelling goes fUl,ther than F'ichte ill his understanding of

12' 179

dialectics as an objective process, ~)llt li b Ih('ory lbo! t. the ahsolute identity of subject and object, all{'gcdly lilt' pl lmal source of development, shows that tlw ol'igi.nal 1"'clll i C of ~chl'lIillg'~ objl'cliYC id('illisDl. is ~Jt l' l~lJ.dIY :·H(,i\l 'lll~. obVi­ously not free of elements of llTl:\tJOnali sm lhat. dam '~ les his later works.

Hegel profoundly criticized both Fichle's subject ivism and Schelling's absolute indifference. Hegel's concept of the identity of being and thought, substantiated in his Phenomenology oj the Spirit and serving as the basic pre· mise in The Science of LogiC, is a concept of specific iden­litv from the yc'ry start comprising a differcnce which c\'olves into an opposition, a contradiction. Hegel develops Fichte's ideas about the necessary relationship of t hesis, antithesis and synthesis into a theory about the law of the negation of negation. Fichte saw his deduction of catego­ries as a development of Kant's transcendental logic. IIe­gel provided a fundamentally new development of Fichte's deduction, which led to the creation-albeit on an errone­ous, idealist basis-of dialectical logic. Hegel used the lat­ter not merely to deduce categories but also to show their development and intertransilion, the movement of know­ledge from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher. But the best Hegel 's dialectics could do was hut to pose the problems it proclaimed solved.

The theory of dialectics, the dialectical method, dialec­tical logic were originally worked Ollt on the basis of idea­list philosophy. Dialectics, the most comprehenSive and un­hiased theory of deYelopment, could not emerge all at once in its rational scientific form. The road to scientific, mate­rialist dialectics created by the founders of Marxism pas­ses through all the ~tages in t.he progressive developm ent of pl'e ·Marxian philosophy.

IlE(;E1;S PIIILOSOPIlY OF 'I'm POWEll 01' HEASO'l

The Manis doctrine!~ omni polent Jf!l;au5p. it is LlD

V I. Lenin

Today's idealist philosophy, often professing to do away with idealism, actually merely negates its historically pro­gressive forms. The irrationalist 'p~lilosopher ?f today .re­gards rationalist idealism as permciOUS, te:.:uptlDg mankmd with an illusory reign of reason lU our obvi01Isly unreason­ab1e world *.

According to Martin Heidegger, a leading existentialist, reason is the most stubborn enemy of thought. 1£ we follow the logic of irrationalist idealisI?'. reason ':'ould appear as something divorced from the orlgmal, pr~-lTItro. spective and allegedly authentic thinkin~, as .ahen~tpd th inking. An analysis of contemporary phllosophl~al Irra­tionalism shows thnt its polemic with rationalist phlOlsophY which bas become historically oh5-olete is aimed agaInst the dialecti(',al-materia1i~t world view. That is why the quc~­t.ion abollt thc Marxist approach to the rationali~t trad. tion and its greatest representative, Hegel,. is of both SCI­

entific and topical ideological interest. It l~ all t.h~ more obvious because today's seemingly specu~ahve crlh~ue of reason has acquired an empiri?al~y ;,anglble form In the ideology of "technological pesslml~m that condemns the scientific and t echnological revolutIon as an al!egedly ~r­rogant and suicidal intrusion of human reason lDtO the Ir­rational world of the natural, hut is actu ally subtle apolo· gia of the capitalist system. .,

The concept of reason is one of r!ulosophy ~ .funda~cn­tals. Al ready in the ancient world philosophy \\ ~~ dC's.cnhcil as an cxamination of \h(' world from the UlelfJpomt of

II- In his critique of Gabriel Marcel'5 philosophy. B.. E. BYkhO\'~~Y show~ thfll ('xis tcnli[lIi~Jll is "not :l re jection of idcnhsm hut n Iy~' tincli'\,1' I:ndica] fot'1ll of the !allt·: \~'!li~,htl:l~ Il.o ~d~~!~d,d t~\'~I~l' ~~~~~~ as an object of knowll'dge h('c[lu"ic l\. IS \u. r of the rntionnllr knowable". (17; 558).

181

renSOll, [It' H rllli(lIlal inlt'rpn'laliotl of I'l'Hli1r \\ hi ch, dirT"r in!!, from hnth lllylllOlo,.:y <lud t'\'t'ryday (," ()n~rinIl Stlt'.-:!;, \\ilS

Ih(' mlioJl<l1 human Iwing's Hllilud,,, fn'I ' frolll irTatiolial af. fl'cts. to the o\l(:.;idp world ilnd its 0\\ II lift' .

Th{' ~Iiddlf' .\ges slIhonlinnll'l[ rt'l\sOIl 10 faith , <lud phi losophy to r('iigion. But it was Tholll[ls Aquinas w ho pro claimed faith \0 be rool(.'d in rf'aSOJl, allhough th e l'caSOI] he mcnn\ was divine', not hUlllan.

The philosophy of the Ncw Age, shapl'd in the CJ'<l of bourgeois rc\'Oluliolls, rejected the views generated by the stagnant felldal social production. The foundel's of the /lew philosophy advanced n new concept of reason, independent of faith. As a rational agent, mall was to become master of nature, rebui ld society along rational lines, and learn to n~aster himself.'~ All those aspects of the new, progressive View ?f man's mission were summed up in the concept o~ social progl'ess. Bourgeois Enlightenment proclaimed so­Cial progress to be based on the perfection of reason, in­crease of knowledge, and eradication of error and super­stition.

Hegel's ~hilos~phy, the. summit of this upward evolution o~ bourgeOIs social conscIOus ness, imparts a universal s ig­~Ificance to the concept of reason. Reason is " substa nce I.e:, that throu~h. whi~h and in which all reality find s i t~ bemgj reason IS mfinlte power, because it is not so help­less as to. confine itself to an ideal, a duty, and to ex ist as somethmg special only outside reality nobody kn ow,') ~\'h?re, .somewhere in the heads of certai,; people. Reaso n IS .1~fiDlte contc.nl, the cl.ltire essence and truth, and it is fOI .. tself l~l(' object at which its activity is directed because ;~nllk~ ft.'lIte activi.Ly, it docs .not need the conditions or

e extClnal matlmal of the given means to fi nd in them the conl?nt and objects of its activity." (63; 7 28-29) It 1hl~t ~s ~he b~sic fOl'JllU ia of H egcl's absoh;te idealis m.

. 0 O\\~ r?m It that nature and ,111 that is not thinking all? mere y ItS cxtcl'Oal, alienated eXIH'ession All " ., ~ lings lIegel s "1 . JlO! e their ~xistencc ,~~~ I~\,C an untruth in thcm" because ___ .__ s no cOI'l"espond to thcir conccpt". (64;

* :\Ianfred Buhr prov('~ it u"'in F.· , ('xamp]!' .. \loH np!'rt!'l o·n nll~()n g '" llln~ls Bacon s ~octriDe as an former of logic. hul th(' mo~t jlll)() l ('r 111":1 llIi 11 shlpwrccked r('­differcnt. Buhr. howcvcr. a~~l'rts.r .. rn~~t POlOt about his theory \\" 11 '" o/ human lor:ie lll , not a rl'formc~·or I ?n" wllnted to be a reformer

OgIC. (42; 30)

l82

Ii, .... :!) Llu'h finil/' Ihing (Jr plu'llnnH'lIon I. h <:'I'd )11 8om{­Ihill ).: d ifff'n·llt: I,ll r a~fJn, IIR thought lIeh s 'r of he Ijlllilati/) J1~ rypitClll (If fJhj(~d!!. I) II"j.u,l prfJ .... laJnls lbfll "rHI'

Iv til o ll g' h t IS till' I enO nj II illg. (j/. fi, 77) III' riP­;·rI"ihl'~ I·('[I~IHI <I~ thnllgh1. hilI he 31 /J ~1!tjnguishN it fronl thp IllllN (11\ authentic think ng direr:fed at itstlr Dnll not. at th r ('.'\ lPrnal, ~cw;ufJusly p(~rl:ei\'ed C/lnt(Jnl. Iii '"'I!"f'l'l'I word s, reason is "though t which dl'lPrllliliCS its\,H fre/'I)·" ((i3; 1, 30) Thus H egel's philw.;opllY puts MI ?hs(jl~ltl" IInL vC'rsal CO II~trlLction on rca son, thought, and It rCJect~ lhe fact- alread y known in Hegel's time-that thinki ng is a functi on of th c hrain.

Thi s docs not mean that lIegel ascrihes the ahility to think to evc l'ything existing, that hc treats things a~ ani· mate , th e way the hylozoists did. On the contrary, He~('1 bclicvcs that m an is the only living being endowed With sentiencc reason thought. But. he maintains, rC8!\On e[ln not be u~derstood as a quality, as something inherent in this or that b06 y, as something conditional, sec?mlsry. ~or is rcason, in Hegel's vi ew, a property of spcclally (Jrga~­ized , li v ing mattcr. All Hy ing i!' fi n ite, it is horn ~nd It dies. But reason is not som eth ing that is born a ?o dlCs If) gether with indi,' idual human exis tence. Acc ordlD~ to Hc­gcl, to unders tand reason correctly m ea ns to ~rasp It as .the sllprahuman, supra natu ral , infinite and un1\"crsal Wlll~h , however, does not exist outside the natural , hu m a n, finzle. individual but forms thei r substance. Hegel s tre~ses that this is aIr·cad y expressed in religion, albeit inadequately; bilL philosophy gras ps the truth in the form of a concept, i.c., in a way which i~ adequ at e to the natme of thought and consequently, to the nature of being.

In Hcgel's opinion, the recognition of reason, t1.lOught as the absolute essence of things docs not menn. that It .negat.es the material naturc of things, that thc?, (h~sol\'c III ~plrd it, reason, consc iousness. Alth ough things. are. ~escrlbe as creations of s pirit, they themseh'cs remalll .spliltlcss ob­jects; such is their being for they arc not a dl~ect l)tlt sec­ondarv co xpre~:;i on of s pirit, it s transformed, ailenatcod f~r~n of being. Hegel distinguishes between rea~?~ and 1~Pl~lt, rC'gar<iing reason a~ the highest form of the spmlual. \ 11.',~ed frolll thi~ angle, material things app('ar ?s the 1,0\\('r, alienated forill s of the spiritual. its other-bel?~. Thu.:;, the opposition between the material and the spliltual IS Dot

l83

I

removed but preserved and emphasized, sometimes CV(' n

overmuch. But this opposition is interpreted as an external rolation brought about by the splitting of the spiritual in to two m~tually exclusive forms of being ,vhich determine each other and form the contradictory substantial identity of thought and being.

Hence, Hegel's definitions of reason quoted abo~e do not deal with merely human reason, because Hegel IS an ob· jective idealist. However, according to Hegel, human rea· son is directly related to the absolute: it is the highest form of the latter's self-realization. And if absolute reason is Goel, it is a God that overcomes his imperfection. Moreover, this God finds Himself in man, and Jesus Christ is His symbolic image.

Hegel describes reason as infinite activity, infinite con­tent, infinite power, the absolute All. It does noL exist sim­ply "somewht'ft, in the heads of certain people", nor is it­and that is eyen more important-"outside reality, nobody knows where". The latter remark is directed against orLho­dox theism which insists that the divine is not of this world, that this world's existence is allegedly contingent. Hegel argues that infinite reason and reality are, in the final analysis, identical. Accordingly, he holds that "all philosophy is pantheistic: it proves that reason is inside the world". * (64; 14, 437)

Thus Hegel offers an idealist interpretation of Spinoza's pantheistic materialism. Spinoza's concept of substance, mterpreted in the spirit of objective idealism, is, as Marx notes, one of the basic elements of Hegel's system.

Hegel uses all those definitions of reason and philosophy to conclude that, strictly speaking, materialism as a philoso-

: I would like to stress that pantheiJolm, especially in its Spi­nl~l~t for~ wllich s~riously influenced Hegel, is essentially an anti­ge J~JOUS ~nterpretahon of ~h.e world 8S 8 whole. For example the

OVlct . philosophers I. Vasihev and L. Naumenko stress in 'their dna.lys!! of Spinoza's materialism: ''This is a truly dialectical break-dO"" n 0 the fundamental co~cept of theology Rnd religion, n break­et~~s t~:~ C~~£I:I~IY. P~veerbzcs the cornerstone of religious-idealist attribute~ ascribed gyto Him Y b~ne~e~o1105~ all the ~spect~ and restored to their rightful owner man g ~n, esc are Imm~dlatcly lo~('~ any definitiveness at all' and . nth" final analysl~ , God infinite tot.1lity of all m~tual1y nega;i~ml'!;telr mC'rgcs .\\:ith thf [n other words, the name is tbe ODlygth.YPC~1 or f deftDlhvcncss. 61-65) 109 c t of God." (18;

184

"hy is impossibI(' N('\'erthf'lcsR. Hegel's idf:'alism. a<; Engel!:; repeatedly point~ ('lit, is materialism turned upRidf' (lown. (£i1: ,1. 3-1.8) On(> mllst Ilf'nr in mind that panulO"< to ~rasr thl' fl'al content of Hcgel'ii philoRophy. his dialecW:al hiral ism, which in some OSPf'C".ts i~ dos('r to the rlialf'ctic<ll-ma terialist world concept than metaphysical rnaterialh~rn. For Hegel maintains that t.he universe is causa sui, that it pro· pels itself, although he holds that this uni~ers(ll dialecti cal process is rooted in reason; and reason IS. "the soul of the world, it lh'cs in it, i.e; its immanentncss, Its most gen­lline inner nature, it~ universality." * (64; 6, 46)

Hegel's absolute treatment of reason is based on the princ.iplf' of thr diale('tical identity of being and thought. Hegel tran!'lforms the traditional idealist formula-thought is primary and being is secondary-into a .new po~tu18~e: thought is being and being is thought. ThiS new Idl'{lh!'lt solution of the fundamental problem of philosophy is madf' meaningful l)y an important. as!'lumption: being and thought arc not immediately identical. .

Thus, Hegel to a certain degree recogmzes the fallacy of the traditional idealist approach to the fundamen~nl problem of philo!'lophy which holds that thought (and spIr­it in general) i.e; prior to being. Bnt he cannot accept the materialist Rolntion. A position halfway between the two is incompatible \vith absolute ideali.e;m. cith.l'r .. Thus H?­gel suggests the following solution: bcmg l~ lDher~nt ~n thought, thought cannot he excluded from hemg, bcmg IS,

in the final analysiS, t.hought.

t85

lIegel reduces being to thought. :lI1 d d ('~cl"ih('s it flS an objecli\'c unive rsal process of forwal'd motIon, change and dcn'!opment. This spiriLualizalion of being is the princi. pal direction of un~ve.rsal . pC,ogress: Dc\'(' l oll~C~t i~ the tra ns ition of that eXlstlDg In Itself Into tha t CXlstmg for it. self. Therefore, according to He~cl , the identit~ of being and thougllt is a concealed premIse and a n obvIOus reSult of dc\'eloprnent. In otJwr words. lIegel 's pri nciple of the idenULy of being and thought di scovers the substantial nature of development and puts an idealist mystical con­struction on it.

The identity of being and thought docs not mean that the two arc indistingui.:; habl c, the way Schelling believes. It is rather an identity of oppos ites wh ich therefore presupposes that an opposition of the latter ex ists-the op­position of thought and being. S uch an identi ty comp"ises its own negation; it is thus a unity of ide nti ty and non­id('ntity. Howevcr, the laller exis ts only in t he former as its dial ectical determination . This d ialect ical relation of opposites i s a continuous process of emerge nce, of self-de­termination. Contrasting his interpl'etation o f t he fllnda­m('ntal identity to Schelling 's philosophy of identity, He­gel stresses that " philosophy is noL a system of identity; t1wt is unphilosoph ical . .. 1L is acti\'iLy, m otion, repul­~ ion . and so not an immutabl e idc nl ity; at th e same time It . is. id~nti ca l w~t11 itselL" (64; 14, :3:12) Thus, d istinction wl~hln Identity IS as signillcant as identity itself. And if IWlOg an.d tholl.gh.t are sllbstantiall~r ident ical, they are also sllb!<. tanlmily dl stmct.. S ubsta nce itse lf must be understood as the unily of identitY,and di stinction.

Hc~cl 's concept of the primordial dial ec ti cal id en tity is not Rlmply a speculative-ideali s t constr uct. It compriscs ( ~lId ,~atll1'ally , mystifies) a profound unders ta nding of t he dlll~ ecli cal form s of universality which Hegel red uces to 10j:pcal forn~s of knowledge. But we must al so re member that, accol'dlllg to Hegel, knowledge cog "t " " t I hU1ll '1Il t"·t b I , nl lon, IS no on y ., '. ac l\' l.Y . lit a so, and above all , the Ullivcl'sal , sub­~t . \ nt~nl . functIOning of the "absol ute idea"-that is of the ,d f'<l ll ~ t lca l} y inte'·,)J·C'lNI unh'('rse. '

Whd e' h.nnt J"('ganls categoriC's onl" . ~ ( ' l l~() l ·\' ('on t('mplation c: H(lgpl . as \\ays to conncct tlit, m~j() r d (' I ('rm i tlati;J ~ ~ of hPi~;g:;:: Irlh~t Icatrgories l~rc fI (·cf'!<.~i ty etc ar (l not I r . . Il( cO(, causa 1 y,

, • < on Y ol'm ~ of thinking: they are

18(;

s uch only ina~mnch as they conceptually express the ob· ject.i\'('ly existing forms of \Iniver~a1ity. It is true that logi­cal categoriC's re-Opct ohjectinly existing forms of uni\"f~r salily only approximately. Bllt ae: knowledge dl'velops, th{'y develop too and pro\·ide increasingly precise r(lnections of interrelationship:; among phenomena.

The epistemological principle of reflection inseparable from Lhe materialist world concept is, of course, alien to lIegel. But his concept of the identity (and distinction) o[ being and thought off(,l'cd an idealist interpretation of the di alectical relation between categories (thinking) and tho forms of un ivC'l'sality existing independently of conscious­ness a nd organically inherent in being itself.

MetaphYSical materialists both pointed to the objecliYe conten t of logical forms and stressed their distinctly hu m an, subjectin' character. They nevcl" considercd how the fo rllls and content of thinking came to correspond to each other despite their obvious diITeJ'encc. lIegel addresses him self to an analysis of this contradictory relationship. In hi s examination of thl' structure of judgments and SpCCII

la ti ons he substantiates the following thesis: logical forme: are as objective as the ir con tent. The importance of this d iscovery, nOLed by Lenin in his Philosophical Notebooks, never theless should not obscure the fact that Hegel onto­logizes t he ep istemological objec~,ivity of. lo~ical forms, t hu s pull ing an ideal ist constructIOn on his. dlsc~very ..

T he self-acU\'ity of reason within the dialectical Iden­tit y of being and thought is exprcssed abo,:e all as .nega­t ion. The dialecti c of negation in Hegel's philosophy IS, ac­cOl'ding to Marx, t he moving a nd genera ti~g p~inc iple. (1 : 3, ::332) Bll t ncgatio n proceeds fl'om sometill ng gl\'en , stated. ThC'rcfo l"P Lh c first act of reason is alwa ys t? .l'ec?rd t ha t which is avai lable , to 1'e\'eal relati ons of clJ s tlncl10 n and si m ilarity. Tn Lhi s quality , reason is m.e1'cly ~o~m~~l sense, which is " a necessal'y momen t of se.n s~bl e Yl1 ll l{J ll.g . (()Ii ; 7, ~;,fi) Nl'vl' r lhel ess, comm on se ~lse IS I n ~' \'l l abl y ~ I.n: , il ed by it:; 1"('al m or objec ls a nd by It~ one-slderl PO:l t l\ ( a pproach to that which ex is ts. It remaills on the l e\ e~ of phenomena, their inter relations and the laws d et ernHn e(~ by the la tle r. Common sense cannot tl ndcl'sla o.d th rl t th.{ ba fl is of fl ni le th ings "is not in t\w lll scl\'es but.. In th e. \ 1111

H rfltd divine i<i{',\". (H'!: 6, 07) lI owe'·c!'. hC'!" llieS .~h ~ ~ :~ .. ference to t hc divine, lIegel also offers a full y rcali :-t lc ...

187

planation of tile limitations of common senRe: til(' I:ltte' i reason fixed in its subjectivity and ind ividuali ty. In )the 8

words, common sense is simply the reasoning huma n ; n~ dividuaI, it is "understanding reason or reasoning under. standing" which is ine\·jtably limited. (64; 3, 7) In Hegel's language this means that common sense is in contradiction with its essence-sovereign reason. . The pri~cipJe of com~on ~ense. is t?e principle of iden_

tIty. But It is not a dIalectIcal IdentIty wh ich forms the cs.<;rDc,<' o,r reason and being hut a formal identity. the h igh. (',5t p~lOcrpJe of element.ary logic. Observance of this prin­ciple ,IS doubtl~ss. neces~ary but absolutely insufficient for meamngful t!ll~kmg. Smce commonsense th inking elimi. .nates contradlctlOn as allegedly incompatible with iclenn , It un~erstands definitions of a concept only in their ~~~ stractLOn-and consequently, in their one·sided and fin ite nature. Therefore, while stressing the reasoning charact of comn:oDsense thinking (and, by the same tok en, of fo~~ ~lallo~pc), ~egel constantly criticizes t.he la tter, contrasting It, to dlalect.ICS as a logic of a higher order. Some authors, e\~n MarXIsts, are often mistaken in t he ir inter re. ta~l?n of Hegel's cri!ique ~f formal logic. Some see ihis ~~~Ique .as a concesslO.n to Irrationalism, they accuse it of the r:~:!lDg ~o~~~l J~gl~' o~ a~ unjustifi ed contras t between clem t r an. I~ echca tJunkmg which al so h as to observe

ers t~~ ~r: sll~;"~\~~C~~g:ts ror,~:~l 10gir f Conversel~, olh lieving that essentiall clI.lque 0 ormal l ogIC, be. tions it ,'s a cr't' y, alnd despIte Hegel's express indica-

I 1 Ique 0 the m t h . I .. . mode of thinking. But th . \ap y~lca, antldlalechcal Hegel, reason com rises : POlD~ .ere IS that accord ing to ticizes itself, subjtctin i he prmclple .o~ negatio~ : it cri . ~('gation (Aufhebung) g I_Its fwn definitIOns to dIalectical 109 formal logic but in' int:

ge ;~as whrong not in criticiz· Son as an a pr,'or' , rpre 109 t e selj·critique oj rea-

I Immanent proc r ment of the concept. ess 0 the self.develop. , According to Hege] the . . In the very nature or' reaso~rJJbclple of negation is implicit of common ~en~(' tJlat ,'s I', ecause rea ~on is a negation J ..' ,0 ItS own I' 't t· r, ne.Q'ation IS positive and ro Iml a ,Ions. Eventua l tl~nal nr·.g~tion .a~ a real mom~~tt(' .. hecall ~(, abstrac t, ra b) skrJltu' l ~m, lS itsrif ~II' , h eated a ~ an absol lllt' of negation is the third' ~~~et~ t~O negation. The nega t ion

, e IC, speculative moment of 18B

reason which, in negel's view, 'cancels" the "negatiye-rHo tional", LIt\l~ a:sscrtillg the " positive- ''ltional'' Th i ~ rcasoning-al Jir:sl glance, completely spcculal l\:o­

sums lip perfectly real, divers!! contents whil'h, however, are not of equal value (as rar as their rational element is concerocll). 1 havo already noted that above all Hegel tries to grasp the "dialectic:; -- formal logic" relation as a dia­lectically contradictory unity, the unity of identity and dif. ference, which in certain conditions is transformed into a relation of mutually exclusive and mutually determining oppu!Silcs. The ract that formal log ic is linked t{J the authro· pological "finitude" of t.he human inuividual cannoL ob. scure the rational meaning of Hegel's approach to lhe prob· lew of dialectical logic as the authentic logic of reason­all the more so because, according to Hegel, in the course of his emergence as a member of society and due to his fur ther personal development, the human individual is an increasingly meaningful and substantial expression of the social whole.

The negative nature of reason, formally expressed in He· gel's famous triad, is not confined to its relation to com· mon sense. All forms of the existing~consequently, above all na ture-are finite de termi nations of reason. The spirit which i:; the ('s:;('lIce of nature is not yet reason. l\everthe· less, the :;yst.em of natural phenomena and its laws are described as rational. For example, referring to the laws o[ tho solar system, Hegel !Says that t.hey are ··its r eason, But neither the Sun nor the planets that revolve around it following those laws are conscious of them." (63; 1, 37) Thus the concept of rational nature is merely an idealist interpretation of the universal character of its laws. '.' And at the sarno time it is, of course, a subtle teleological in· terpretation of the world, contrasted to ordinary, crude te· leology which maintains that "sheep are covered with wool only so that I could be clothed". (64; 7, 10) Hegel define, the teleological rela tion as the unity of the mechanical and chemical processes. However, this brilliant insight into the

.. Such views aru oHen held by natural scientists who are not at all ideaHsts. For example, Louis do Brogli~ believ~s Ulat the ·'concept of the rationality of the Universe ... IS a baSIC po~tulate of science", (39 ; 353) This t~cs is is ~n i.nadequ.ate express~on of th o scienti lic postulate rl'ga rdlDg the 1D0vltabie 1Dtcrc~nnectiOn of phenomena, th eir "ordcrl iness"-that is, their conformity to laws,

189

material structure of the expedient in Ih' ing nMllI'(' is only a moment of th e idealist in ll'l' pl'ctatiol1 of natul'l': 'H.'COI'lt

iug 10 Jlegel, sp irit is the goa l of naturc and that is "11\ it both crowns th e hiera rchy of natural substances an;{ forms their fUJldamC' niai basis. T I'IIC, Rpiri l 1)I'cccdes natur'(' not ill timC', "not empi rically, but in a way thaI, spirit, which posits nature ahead of itself, is a lways already J}l't'.

srilt in natur("', (04; i, G95) J'\a llll'C is dcfinC'ci as tile ai iC'lI­aLl'd being of the "nbsolute idca"; and th e mOJlo!ineall y interpreted hierarchy of nature's s tages from the mechani­cal motion of maLter to life is described as th e COmlJl'chcn sion of its olhcl'-ileing-or, as Jlegel puts i t, of its oLh cl' ­by the "absolute idea", Knowledge, cognition of nature is thus the realization of the di alecti cal iden ti ty of being fi nd thought, the identity that is the active basis of natUl'e, And lil t, phil050phy of natUl'e (Hege l's ideali s t natural philos­ophy) reproduces th is road the "absolute idea", universa l reason has taken from its alienation, 1\'lor'eover, "natural philosophy is itself part of this road back; because it is what ca ncels the separation (die Trennuog) of nature and ~pi l'it and ('nables spirit to es tablish its essence in nature", (1i4; 7, 23), Saturally, we must ne\'er lose sight of th e fact that philosophy, according to Hegel, is not simply a distinctiv~ form of human knowledge; above all , it is the ~(' lf-consclOlIsness of the "absolute idea",

Thus, accOl'di ng to the logic of absolute idealism the na t­~Jral is rational, but it is not yet conscious of its' rational­Ity: and there~ore it direclly appears as its negation, Mean­whde, acc?rdmg to the defmition, reason knows itself as,!'eason, r:h,crcfol'e, it is spiri t comprehending ilself.

r h(' tl'ansl tlOo to self-comprehending spirit 0 1' reason is th(: ('lrv,alion, of Ll,lC "absolute idea" that has t~iumphed o'ver ~,h( entIre d~v:~~'ty of the natural, materia l and r each ed ,abso lute Splrlt , that is, mankind, This ideali st concepL IS. ,'elated to mytholo~y, but it still contains profou nd and ('xtremely va~uabl e dialectical insights, The most impor­tant of these, IS the . idea of developing substance,

1'1'1'-!frg('hun plillosophy f;aw sub5la nce as the fJ' t 111/' pl'llflal ~Olll'C(, of ('\,er\,lhing exis tilw Id " 1~ ls! I~aukscd' Ihis ' It" ' I">, .... a IS III C

, sprell <I J\'{' conccp t wilh the notion of 1I d" , first ellWir. Converse ly matC'rialists rr 1 10 IVlne tprflr(~btio/l of the· co~ce <t r ' I ' 0 erce a naturalist in -

~ p 0 su )stancc bu t they £I 'd t rC'('{JglJlze tilt, substan tial nature of d : 1 .. I no

e\c opment. 1'01' ex·

ample, that was tlIP viC'w IlI'hl hy SF 1Ol.;I, th!; hrilliahl ('n' alor o f lhe ill t'a 01' tlw s u b:"' l illI1.i.d 1, '<I~IICC I., nalilre. ::\1';,­l'rtlL('l c!<~ , ht, !!'('atr- II su\)",ta uce (LLatUl'a natur,IIL"!) arlll thn worlo or modes (natura lIaturata)t1I"t is, th,~ wf)rld of real things subject to mot ion and change 'U!5 absolut" op­posites, The 18th -centu ry l,'reneh matNialisl!' overcame the inconsistent a pproach o[ their hrilliant preder,(>ssor and sub­stantiated the principle of the self-p l'opulsion of mattn, But they d id not connect the seH-propulsion of matter with development, which they did not view a5 a universal form of the ex istence of the ma terial.

Already in hi s Phenomenology 0/ Spirit , Hegel rormulates the following principle: the beginn ing must also he un­derstood as a resuit ---specincally, as a result o[ de\'elop, ment. This mean5 that the sp iri tua l, at any rate in its high­est rorm is not the starting poi nt but the summit of the devel opl~ent o[ the universal whole. Contrary to the Chris­tian mythology which Hegel fo rmall y constantly, upholds (this often deceives scholars who u~derra te ~he dl~erence, even opposition, between the exot~nc form , m wilich lIe­gel sets forth his philosophy and Its esoten c cO,nten9, h.e maintains that the highest is a result of the entire histori­cal development. The highest is the ~o\'e l~e ign creative hu­ma n reason tlH'oughout its global Ilistoncai devciopment. Viewed from this aogle, the "absolute idea" is an a,bsolul(' but unconscious source of nature which does not eXist out-side nature because the latter is its being, ,

In h is Conspectus 0/ lfegel's Book ,"The SCIence o~ ~~g-, ic" Lenin cites the following quotatIOn from Hegel. l"01 the'Idea posits itself as the absolute u?ity o! the pll~e No­tion and its Real ity, and thus gathers Itsel,[ In~o th~ tln~~~­diacy of Being; and in do!ng so" as tOlality III t,i!IS, fo .' ~ it is NatlLre," Lenin describes t illS postula~e as, archblll liant" and says: "The trans ition of the logical Idea ,to, na­ture, It brings one wilhin a hand 's grasp o,f m~terlahs:l, Engels was right when he said that lIegel s s)~tem ,,~rs materialism turned upside down," Then he, ad ~:, l~ sum total t he l ast word and essence of lIegel 5 logiC IS the dial~ctical method- this is extrelllely notewo~th~, J-~nd I on~ thin more: in this most idealistic of lI~ge,l,s " ,orks ~ l~r~ , ,g last ideali!'1ll and the m Oil" n13tcnal~sm, Contra~hc, IS t ,IC e [tl" (10' 38 234) And, despite these powt::; ~f.?t \e~dt ~~ ~c matcri~lis ~, Ilegcl keeps repeating that tlH'

191

"absolute idea" is supranalural, divine. These statcill4'nts express his subjective com'jetion but they contract Ius d! a. lectical approach to the problem of subst~nce. Here, He. gel's position is similar La Spinoza's who. tltd not doubt the existence of God because he was cODvlDced that God is nature. . fi .

lIegel\i undersLanding of developm~nt as an III .olte proc_ ess negates all attempts at interpretlDg any of Its res ults as the final completion of development. And, although He­gel constantly violates this categol'i~?1 imperati~e ,of dia­lectics he himself has formulated, the true slgmficance anu the revolutionary character of tho Hegolian philoilO­phy", according to Engels, is that "it once for all dealt the death blow to the finality of all products of human thought and action". (3; 3,339)

Thus, reason in the entirety of its historical develop. ment is substance which has become subject, self·conscious­ness. Aside from nature, the finite, alienated spheres of the existence of "absolute reason" are "subjective spirit" on the one hand, and "objecti .... e spirit" on the other. These opposites-the human indi .... idual and society-form a unity described as "absolute spirit". The development of subjective spirit is dealt with by anthropology, phenome­nology and psychology which comprise the first part of Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit. Here, man is examined as a bodily, sensuous natural being, as the individual with all the qualities inherent in the latter; he is born, tums from a man in himself into a man for himself and, as an adult human being, strives t.o reach his private goals generated by, the conditions of his existence. This being suffers and eDJoys life, loves and hates, succumbs to disease and final­ly d!es. '~'he d~velo~ment of the individual aspect is in over­c,ornlOg Its ahenatiOll irom the universal in its eleva­tiOn to t~le social. This concept reflects bodl a profound un­der~tand1Dg ?f th~ s?cial essence of the individual and the tYPlc~y ra~lOn~hst'ldealist underrating of man's sensuous life, hiS s.ubJectIveness, uniqueness, "finitude". , A.ccordl?~ to Hegel, objective spirit is the truth of sub. Jechve Sptrlt not only b~ca~se man is a social creature hut aLo.ve. all. because, With its negation of the anthropol­oglca~ limitatIOns of man's iudividual being, reason begins ~ne~Joy, frct! de~elop~.e~L unlimited in time or space, Rea-

ilh obJective spmt the ~oclO·historical process of

192

t "

o

gl·ll~ping ib ('!'i_"l'nCt' (fl'E'l,dnm, ,;lIh~tafltlfllity), 01" attuillifl[! ~tat(' ll'!{ill rOl'llJ~ alld l't;fIrlOIlItC on It· I·;,; ("civil !'ocif'ly") that are ill(';l'eahiugiy adequate to mall\ ratiomli natUl"l'.

Iiegel d('sCI'ibl's till' !'Iatl' as a rational-moral organi!:illl and law, as the rl'aiiz<llion of rreedom hased, 31lwng other things, 011 private oWlIl·rship. Till' elimilJation of slaw!')' and scr£dum, the l'!':>tabl ishmcllt of the " inViolability'· of priYale prop{'lty, I"n·{'(IOIll of ('on~cif'nce, an end to feuoal priyileges, tltl' t'sltlblisiJnH'nt and It'gal fOJ"maliwtion of iimitr t\ eiy)l fr('eOOlllS --Hf'gl'l yit'ws all that as t.he finAl completion of t.hl' cause 01" "objective spirit.", despite tht' fact tha t according to I1C'grl's system, as EngC'b points out, "just as knowledge is unahle to reach a complelt­conclusion in a perfect, ideal condit.ion of humanity, ~o is history unable to do so; a perfect society, a perfect "state", arc things which Call only exist in imagina­tion". (3; 3, 339)

'Ve know that Hegel described the state a~ an l'<lrthly­divine being and world history, as God's progress 011

Earth. These g randiloquent phrases were, of COIll'Sf', not accidental; ('\'en theil' bombast expressed the social posi­tion of the German bourgeOisie, pinning its hopes on the flpontaneous dl'H'lopnwnL of lh~ capitalist systC'm alul s triving to e nsure an l'\'olut ionary li'ansition from feudal to bourgeois mona rchy. While s tressing these socio-pol it~ . cal aspects of lIegel 's system, one must remember th~t It tl'eats "objecti ve spirit" as a rlldte, limited and ('ssentlally sU lI alienated form of Illliw l'sal, infinite reason.

Infinite rl'a ~H)II, 0 1' "ahsolulc spil'i t", absolute knowledge, which is to be I'cgal'd t'd as the grasping of the absolut~, n nel s it s authentic C'xpn's!'ion only in art, religion and pill· losophy. Only in the cl"l'aLi\'e spiritual sphere which lIegC'1 l'le\'a tes above all forms of conscious and purposeful l)rac­lical activity, "thinking is J)y itself, relates to itseH, nnd lias itself as its su bject". (64; 6, 63)

Spiritual cL'cn~ive nclivily is cont.l'asted to othel' [orm:-; of human activity dealing with material objects, Althollgh tllis opposition i ~ noL absolute because, acco,rding to. ',1 ('gC',t, the essence of the material is spiritual, thiS Oppo!':>ltlon 1:-;

of importance for his entire system of vjews. Specirlct\Il~" iL shows that Hegel is noL quite free from the romantll' censure of soc ial I'eali ty he himself criticizes as a pO,\\",el" less and affected posit ion. But, appnl'cnUy this opposition

13-0156';> IP3

· . ", ',I, ,'" '\ !"\':item IH'(\r1niming' I~ 1/1('\. [11) ~ " . th e thought ot

thoughl 35 the ooject of plnlm:.ophy. It is equally obvious that tI~(' COllct'jl L of. pur,l' thought

immersed in itself is only applicable, to ~n .ldcah~t system of views, and own that only to th (' .J(~C'ah~l.lca1i y IIlh:I'Jlret_ ed logic but not at all to ~rt or n'llgl ol~. l oa c('rl,lIll de­gree, Hegel is aware of tlll~1 and th at IS Oll~ of the ~ca­sons for his treatment of plulosophy as the. h,Jghest realiza_ tion of "absolute spirit". But art and reltglOn al so deal directly with the spiritual, ralional . which .. as al'tistie and religious consciousness develops, Increasmgly overcomes the inertia of sensory guises to eventually become COD­scious of itself as pure spirit or pure reason.

On the one hand, the concept of pure reason is a specu­lative-idealist abstraction opposed to empirical study and reality perceived through the senses , Tn thi s aspect, pure reason is inevitably associated with the teleolog ical no­tion that God, who created the world out of noth ing (the mythological prototype of pure thought), is, in the lan­guage of scholasticism, actus PUntS, 'Ve know that Hegel refers to and upholds this definition of the di vine.

It should, however, be noted that the reduction of " pure reason"- that is, the central concept of the entire ration­alist philosophy-to a meaningless teleological premise ex­tremel¥ oversimplif~es the task of historical-philosophical analYSIS. The, task IS to reveal the rea l and not imaginary ~onte,nt of thiS concept, that is, to critically interpret the l~eaIJst error about the fact which \\-as di scovered and also distorted by idealist philosophy.

The ratio,nalism of the 17th century pl'oc1aims that rea­son (meamng real human reason) is strictly speaking never mistak l II 'r" , en-na ura y, I It observes its own rules,

... 'r "d ' of hil~s [tV,l error III understanding Hegel's concept of the object opl~y jq ~~tl~b~~~hl~h\!t~~sf~J't1datb th1ught as the object of philos­with forms of thinkin ifr U Ie, y orm~ 1 logic, The latler deals contrary is interested gin t~!pectlve, of theu content, lIegel, on the as reflected in thought, and t~eanmgful form~ of t1~inking, reality herent in knowledge and in b? ft~rms of, universality equally iD­critique ot, .'lay, the logical d~c{~? Ive reah,t~, That is why Hegel's regard forms of thinking only a n~,tof stol,c,sm, stresses that they no content as sllch" (61' 14 1.51)s II orma forms which determino lids understanding ~f th~ughtJ as t1 ego!.,di!';llssocilltcs himself from

Ie oUJect of philosophy,

194

Ihilt i~, ir it I"I'{'ognii'!'l' tlU' oh\"ioll' ,If'' ohviom; and m('C'ts the l"l'qllirellH'IlLs 01" logIC \"il'\\ ,·d ",m this angle el or is rooted in :,PII~{' ]1('I'I'ppliIHI' whidl ill' hy 1alnrp vagll{', in Jlit~sioll~ which carn nottJing >Jout th' trll h, lTIrl n the "ill which pl'l'fPrs UH' Ill,-;jred to the 8('tllaL

'['he ratiollalist (,OI1("('pt of pure r(>ason (collI II it pprhaps be ('OnljHU't<r! to <'t'rlain ('onLI'mp0l'ary not.ion3 of tlw rlec· ironic. "int,rll(>{'I" <IS incitpahle of ('ITOI' if it pMOO:C!'-Sl'S all the information ll('cpssary for solving the que:o:.tions posed before iL?) was formed on the basis of outstanding acc?m­piishments of " pure" mathematics (and of mat.llematlcal physics), 1L was a philosol1hical interpretation" or t,he es­sence of mathematical thinl.:ing, treated by ratlOnalis FFl as uni\'ersal and paradi gmatic, No doubt this c?ncept co~­tained a ra ti onal element because it substanliated, albeit paradoxicall y, reason's independence of faith and of asser­tions based on authority, Descartes' cogito, which pro­claims the seH"consiollsness of the thinking individual to be th e highest authority in the argument of truth and error and the rat.ionalist cult of infallible reason are phe­nom~na of the same order, Their revolutionary scientifiC and ideolog ical signi[jcance is obvious.

I n the late 18th century, a new period which completed the era of early bourgeois revolutions, :Kant ?pposed the rati onal ist cull of pure reason, Above all he tried to prove that pure mathemalics was based on sensory (~lthough a priori sensory) observations, Kant did not questiOn the ex­is tence of pure reason not based on sensory data, bu~ he argued that it inev itably lapsed into error (paraloglsm l

ant inomy) precisely because it was pure reason, Neve,rthe­less Kant cons idered the concept of pure reason illghly s ignirlcant as the source of the more gC'neral , regulatory ideas of knowledge and morality, '.

An analys is of the concept of pure (especia ll y ,!HI! e practical) reason as independent o~ indiyidual, CO~~~lOlIS­ness hut ex is ting only in the conscIOusness of Indl\ Iduals s h o\\'~ that th e point here (if we abstract olll'::,elv~s from the idealist mode of expression) is social COl1SCLOilsness and the totality of all theoretical knowledge possessed by humanity, This real mean ing of the concept of pll:rc reason, already evident in Kant's concept. of, ~ategorlal transcendental consciuusness preceding any llldn'uhlftl ('X.­

perience, was fully revealed and systematically dC'\'l'iopcd

13'

I)" HC[1{'1 in hi" dor ll"lll C' of Iht' rnrlll~ ot' ilh~·nll1l .. ." ' . PII'II'

MI, rdigiull <HId phd ll ~(lphy . ' :-;0, <I:' 11 con.si~l ~' nl id Pilli ~ t ,. lIl'gl' l IH~I,'; all dh:"ulut{.

COD.:; tr uclwlI on .splrl f-ual Pf Otl lll'l lOll. t h,\1 ]:0;, Ih,· I'rnl I .. I I I I ' II, . tion of kllo,,- cdgt', <1I'! I:5 t1C nl 1I l'~. I ll' (t'n' opmt'll! \' \' , . I I t ,I,

.:ion il:;clf. f'(.r, ~ i nCl' rL'ason I II ll ~ a 1-"11 lilt' on loln).! i \ I (orm i:s treated as the pl'imord il11, th £' substantIal, 1It';~i for nil h!s jll$ight~ into the rol e or ~ [\hol' in t he (,JlIl\l'gCnc~ ?f ~l,l.an~ IS. totally JIlcupablC' of gTilSplIlg th a t, n:-; EIlg'l'l s put It, It l,s ill the nlC'a s UI'C t.hat Illil ll h ilS h 'i.U'!H'd 10 chang naturo that his intelligence has Increased". (9; 231) M: terlal p~oductlOn IS reduced to ~p~rrtual production, and the latter IS regarded as the actl n ty of pure reason. Th· st.resses-of course, idealistically- the social character ~~ production.

Marx says that Hegel understands labor as the emer­gence of ~he human personality in society. But "the only labor whIch" Hegel knows and recognized is abstractly mental labor. (I; 3, 333) And the point is not only that Hegel pU!-S an absolute construction on the intellectual moments mherent in any labor 01' presents the highest in­t~lltc~ual . forms of man's productive acth·ity as t.he essencc ° rof~ or .lD ~cner~l.. The c.r~x of the matter is much more p d un~. b, ele\ atmg spITI tual production above material pro uChon lIegel h'· - t fi d

'. .! . . le:-:; 0 n a way towa rd overcoming ma~ s ahenahon ill bourgeois society.

t. Smcel Heg~l fails to see the tr ue cause of man's aliena-wn- t Ie cXIstence of 1" d I jng the 1 .. f·d a Jenate abor - therefore, follow-

ing in g~~I:r~) 1 lealism (and the logic of bourgeois think­world of objects ' l~ sees ~h e s.ource of al ienation in the of human acti\:i~n tlesyeclally III the objecLivized products According to 1.1a/ "~J oppose man 's self -con!;ciou!">nC'5s. the object 0 / COI2 S~~USIl;~S IS~~~ ! t~ e.refore , i s to surmount as an estranged h I· }ectWlty as such is regarded

uman 1"e at" h· spond to the essen IOns Ip which does not corre-reappropr iation of t~e o~.ma~l~ to self-consciousness. The within the orbit of es~ 0 Jectl\e essence of man, produced fore d~notcs not only rt~~gement as something alien, there­of objectivity as well M::nulmen~ of estrangement, but ed as a non-objective· . ? that IS to say, is regard­In his exposition and ss~ntuaz. being," (1; 3, 333-34) of alienation Hegel ,·s . scnptlOn of the phenomenon

, IOcapable r .. o POllltmg to any t UG

t'Hediv\' "ai IIf ovpnOIllIIlJ{ I II" (j[jJy reff'r to t II' sur mounting of I1Iif'nntioll in r:f)JI!"ir,iou~.1ess, and that im plies UH~ rt"lpntioll of nilPllation In ac:tu<11 life. Con ~CiOIlSIlf'~.1 \\ hil·11 allf'g'f'dly fI\!'J"{'OIil"S liif'Tlat (JII, a 'peur (silw(' thl' r;l~t' III jlllilil I~ nllgi'!11 " r iril'<t t phdos() phy) 1.\:-> {llit'lIntl'd rOI1~('i/)ll:'HW·~, altll« UI!, ccording Lo 1\1ar;.;, "t.hc' f:llperscliillg' ill tllIJHglit , whil II 1t-c1\"!..' It~ oiljl."C"l jn existellce in thl' "PHI world, 1J,,]il'n· tll<tt It Ja~ rrnlly oyercomc it". (I; .1, :H 1)

Bu t then what is ,'atiorla\ ahout IJpg{'I's doctr Ine of a I·

thentic 1'raSOI1, 01" '·Hbsollll(~ spirit"'! This essay is to dpal rather with what, in Ilrgt'l's view, defines social ton· SCiOllSIlC'SS and human knowledge in general, than \\Ith what is of value in his understanding of art, religion, phi· losophy and its history. This df'flnition of thes(' hight'l" forms of the spiritual lies in Ihe dialectic of negation, in historical nature and dl'V('lopml"nt. In other WOI"lh, tIl .... h igher forms of t.he :;ubstantial imply not a cessation 01 de\·elopment but, on the contrary, de\"(~lopment in it!"> ful­lest form, fn">C' f["Om onr-sidednes:->. :\[orpo\·er, Hegel a:'Sf'rt-. that genuine de\"Clopment takes place only at the stage of "absolute spirit"'. That is why the clltC'gory of devC'iopment appears only in the third part of The Science oj Logic, in the doctrinc of thc concept which, according to Hegel, is d irect basis of lirl:'.

Although Kant <lss('I'ted that pure reason is fatf'd to f'IT

by its very nalun', he \\"(1:-; naturally unable to explain why it comprisC's thc highest forms of knowledgC' and morality. Kant was not fully aware of this contradiction and hc ncver posed it as a problem to be soh-cd. But Hegel not only intcl'pl'etC'd it but also offered a solut.ion of sorts in his doctrine of "absol ute spirif'.

Hegel regards the rationalist dogma about the infalli­bil ity of put'e n'a~on a~ a th('~is; Kallt\; po-.tulatl' that it is precisely pure reason wh ich errs appears as antithes is. As to his doctri ne about t he dp\"l'lopmcnt of pure re(\~UJl inh erent in mank ind, 1ft'god tk:->("I"ibC's it as a synthC'sis, (\~ a negat ion of negation. 1Io\\"('\"c1', thc question is not ex· hausted by thr spccull.lliyc form of the triad. HejJel finds even a specific form of the under~tanding (and expression) of the di alect ic of negation inhere nt i n pure rNl~nw thr pl'inripk of thr historical chrrrarler 01

reason.

I

I

Ri.'a~on is limited at least by t.he 10\el of it s dl'wl /TIeDt. The historical character of feason, an ollt~tan l~)Jl' discovery of Hegel's method obviously contradict~ { ~ng unconditional universality and inflllity of reason lwhe tulales .. But it i:; an actual and not sceming cOl1tradic{~~g­the moll\'c force of the deyelopment of knowledge Tf n, discard ~hc idealist assumption of the sUjJranatur~1 (;l~ th?ugh JOseparable from nature) divine fil':;t cause tl pomt, it tur~15 ouL, is that "human thought is ju~t ,Ie

much SOye~clgn as not sovereign, and its capacit t s

knowledge Just as much unlimited as limited It . Y or .rc,Og I a d nl° °t d ° ° d . IS so\'-, I n u Iml e III Its iSIJOsition its vocaLo ° P

°bolo,o dO]' . ' 1011 lIs OS~I I hiCs an Its llstorlcal ultimate goal' it is t' en'l d °t ° ]0 ° d ,no so\'­~n an I IS tmlte in its individual realization and i reality at any particular moment," (Engels) (8' J n Thus Hegel treats the essence of human thought a~ b0

6)

ute ,and dlnn~, and its historical character as the a s~­st,a~tlal expressIOn of its human existence, But both ~u.-l"jltHHlS of thought (knowledge) arc equally substantial A

efi-,

egel actually pro - -t < • fl( "Ahsolu t ~. '1" \C~ Ib ctntl'al'Y to his, own pos tulates.

as true b~t ·tJlII"el ' jOIda l so ,ute I reason pOSits its dcfinition ~ .' n h Ia ectlca ly negates tl .

tlu'sls to antithesis and unitin tI l e~, C?Dtrastmg thl'sis which constitutes a n .g I .lete , OPPOSlt?s III a syn­opment of reason II 1 de", lIg leI stage 111 tI \{' den'l alld o,~ercoll1es it s' l'l'I~!~: lI~f:5S not say t1~ at I'~a so n, e~'1's compalihIe with the d' 't mode of expresS ion IS 111-fact, II/m over I1cgcl lglll ,Y lor absolute reason, In actual

, re'ca s the d ial t' r ('ITOI' and pro"es til' j II ec Ie 0 tl'uth a nd 01 1° J. a~ . le power of I'e' s ° ° J. (In rct l('a ll y negates 't 1 ~ ,,<l on cons ls t.s In thal g~asp~ the tl'lItiJ, the l altt~/ ~\:llJtl,ons as untru e a nd thll~ dwl(>(.tieal negat.ion, olvlllg fUJ'ther also through

TII1I~! on the one hand He 1 cOlltnlriH':t0l'V It:1.tlll'C of II' . ge grasps the nece~sa l' ily f ° I ' H? IJIll\'crsal . ' ,

o Its f p\'I'lojlJJlf'lIt throug-I tl '- < . plOcess of cognItIon, (HI tllf' otiH'r 1t.1I1,1 'I II 1(> nrgatlOl1 of I1I'gation nut I " " f'g:(' lOyst· II . " II slorl CU / !II'W'P". ,°'1°1 I ICll. Y I nll'r !)f(~ l s tilio o ,ocal I J . ~ H'("IIIS ·1'· ~ " • (('H fJpmrnl of Ba lm'c "' lid c, ',r I IS l(!t'nlificd wilh thc 0f . < ~ocldy I rnllr~l'j j!", iI 1'f""IlJI ,,[ tl I' all( second nnd tbn1 Il I ]rs\l)~lal'l" < <,

egl ' pre!'l'nts Ow nla tc'I'jalJ " . n 1:1. ~zatlOn of J'('a son :f'IOPIlII'llt I!£ k llOW/I.rigc (I~ III: ,~:ft('rmlne~1 his torical de­~(~'J.. 1 .{f'f j· ITln~ If) Ihi" fundHmr~~[lpr~p~II~lOn of pure rea­pl/'I.JtlOIJ or 111/ ' ill~\"('lo!)m('11 r"k n.l\\ In Hegel 's intel'-

I {) llOW I! • t·( gt', "ran says:

"\VhPrE'ln dm's thl~ 1lI0H'Jl\Pllt or I,ur reason consi:-l? Tn posing ilseH, opposing itscH, composing LtseH' in formulat­ing it~eH ~s thesis, a~lith.esis, synthesiS, or, 'yet again, in afftmlIng Itself, negating ItS(>l[ and negating its negation." (1< 6, 164), Mal'x exposcs the fallacy of H(>gel's attempt at lIlterprC'\.Ing the Inllnan as the ~Jlprahuman, the histor­ical as the suprahistorical; hut he also stl'e~~t'::; the ont­s tanding impOJ'lancc of t.h(' diall'ctic of negation and of[C'l":; a classic formula of this law gOH'I'ning the knowledgt, <lnd development of objeclivc "('<llily, the Ia' .... lIegel discov(>]'(>{l. Accord ing to Marx, dial ectics "includes in its COUl­prehcnsion and ufftl'matin' recogni tion of the (>xisting stiltl' o[ t.h ings, at the same time aiso, the recognition o[ t.he negation of that s tate, of its inevitable breaking up; be­cause it regards every historically denloped social form as in nuicl monment, and th(>l'e[ore takes into ac­connt its transil'nt natlJl'(' not less than its momenlar\' ('x· •

is l ence, .. " (5, J, 2G) Lenin describes positiw dialectical negation- a moment of connl.'ction, a moment of develop­ment -- - as a highly import.\nt el(>IlH'nl of diah'clic:"' (10;

38, 225-26) °

Natura ll y, heCi.llIt'l' of the idealist premises or his sys-tem , Hegel is unable to reveal the real motive rOl'ccs be· hind the historical dcwloplllellt of knowledge, forces deter­mined by till.' soc io-('conomic process, The deifu.'ulion of knowledge actHally rules ou t a sociological intl'rpretation of the history o[ knowledgc, And th(' asscrtion that. then' is no de\'clopm(>nt wit.hin di vi ne reason because the lalll'l' is outside spac(' and time' I.'xtremely con[uses th (> idl'alist concept 01' the hi s t.ori cal Ch fll'a cLp l' o[ reason,

H('gri is right Lo stl'e~s the historical Cha l'flcl(>I' 01' ('"cll philosophic .. ,1 system: he sees tltis ch Ul'flc lC'r as both its limitati on and its l'ca l historic<.ll significance. But h(' docs not apply tho principle to his own t.heory. Hegel i~ con " inced tha t hi s sys lC'm crow ns the sclf-comllrC'ilf'll!'ion of pure reaso n, Th is means that he is gu ilt y of thr snllH' il ­lus ion for which he justly CJ'iliciz('d hi s pred('('cssol'S, TlwlI how do we explain hi~ at.1(>mpt at a 1h('0l'c1ica1 sllh~lan1i<l­lion of the need for a finfll !'yst(,ll1 of philo.:-;.ophY that would end philosophical devclo pJllent? The point hl' l'C' is not vanity or concei t hut lhe very principil- of ahsolul

l'

idealis m maintaining that. absolul(> l'ea:;on full~' COIIlPI'l'­hemlf; itself in (,\'t' l' ylhing hOl'n of il~ infinitC' pnWl'l'. Thi~

llH'ilrlS that. for all tile;!' panthci::;tic interpretatioll, tel"f)_ logical prcllli.:<es make a consistent dialectical ('xamindtion of til{' hi!'ilory of philosophy impossible, Hegel's philf)."'oplw of thc hi."tory of philosophy admits only the past and l'~_ fll~es to recognize philosophy's future,

How(>\'er, one must noL oversimplify Hcgel's postulate <lilo!!t thr nh.".olute completion of the hi stol'Y of philosophy Ihe wny Ih(' French personalist p, Ricoeur does, He hold~ 11t,lt accol'ding to Hegel, tho entire pl'eceding development of philosophy providentially leads to Hegel's sys tem (WI'S

moi) nnd is n monolinear process whC'I'e each sys tem has heen merely a failed attempt of anticipating Hegelian philosophy, (92; 55-56) Tn actual fact , ITegC'1 saw his phi­losophy as the summit of the 1)I'oce~s which had progl'('~­sed over millennia, lIe Cl'cdited hirnsC'lf not witli solving the pJ'oblrms over which his pl'ecl('c('ssors bad 1:1 gon i7.ed, hut wilh compkting thl'il' accomplishments, It is trll e that "t'gel's ('nlire philoliophy is, in a ('rrlain !oi(,Il~e , thr res ull of pn ... I-frg{'lian philosophy: Ill' organized it into a sys tem. Hrgl'l'::; emphasb on the dialectical interprrtation of s uc ('r."'."'ion is the salient feature of his concept of the hi ."' tory of philosophy.

Of coul'~l', absolutl' knO\dedge in Hegel's vicw the completion of the histol'y of philosoph y must not be in-1('I"I)I'eled to mean that, from the standpoint of the philos­opher, a stage has been reached where everything is known and Ihere is actually nothing left to do fol' mathe. maliciaJ\~, phy:o;icists, chemi~ts and other scientists, Ac. c~lI'Iling 10 liegel, absolute knowledge is the ('ompreh en­."'1011 of Ih(' nbsolute and only the absolute thaL is the comprehension by rcason of its Own essence, and th;t as ~h(" ,e.o::"rnc(" of, eye:Ylhin~ ('xisting, The fallacy of thi s Hl{'ah~t c~nclllston .IS obvtous, b,ut it is equally ob,"io\1s ~hat kno\\ lrdge, logically surpasslllg its OWII achi(',"elll('nt~ III thr ~ol1r."'e of its dcnlol1menl, also produces res ults of ~'\'rrlastmg yalile (of cOl1rse, within the dialectical l'elalh"­Ity of tlu' hounds of,any knowledge), ,\nd the concept of ~h<:.ol ,llir ~no\\:ledge III Heg.el's ,system rrfers not to the . rorr or kno\\ledge hut to II.'" distinctive qual it TI " r (" 0111''';1', "ot'~ not nlCilIl that IIr,£trl's (,OII('('pl oj' llh1,l:-ii ~ knl",·ll ,dgf' i:-i acceptablr to dialectical mater. I" ."'0 1I e fallacy of that ('oncC'pt i." al!":o in the h('t tll~ I~m, The lllO"'U)· tn philo_"'ophy. that i~, to the sph'cl't! otkd~wl~~r;; ~~I

\ \ h(' I'{, it i,.; h'~"" appli('ahl{' than in ,.;ollle particular di ";(' i, plinc rC'."'lr ictrd to thr conflDl's of its ."ubject. Howeycr, onc must abo rememlwl' that phi losophy does deal with the ab:;oI ute, if on ly in till' ."'!'n~(' that the motion, rhanJZ:e and dC' \"{'Iopment. of matt!'r is ahso illte',

The prohl(,1ll o[ til{' l'y('rlasling yalue inherent in certain result s procillc('ti hy th£' clr\'riopmcnt of knowlcdgc and the pri nci pl e of t il e di,tlrct iral nf'gation of knowledge ra n not 1)(' (lpp()~ed 10 radl nthrl'. ThC' dialectical undrfSLaTHI ing of nega t. ion mrall~ Illlth'l', .... t.amling its rrlatiyily, II Ihel'cfo)'e im plies npga t.i on or nrgat.ion itseH which t.akrs pJacC' in the cours(' of "liYing, fertile, genuine, powcrfl1l, omnipot.en t, ohject.i\"(', a h~oI \lI (' Illlman knowlrdgr", (10; 38, :{63) This st<l.trillen t. fOI'I11I11<\If'(] h~r Lr nin ill his ('rit ieal analysis of Hegel's philosophy is a ditlle('tical-Illatr rinli sL defin ition of the ('\'ed asting Yerity of til{'! major re­s1IILs ach i{'wd h" ."'ri (' nl ifie kn()wledgC'. Thcn·fore, the ell'­lllent of t ru th con tained ill n egrI's concept of ahsohlte kno\\J rdge should hl' ('ontra~ l rd to th(" <l.bsolule fe ialh·ism which is widf'spl'rad in ('ontrmpol'nl'Y hou l' g('()i~ philo."ophy and wh ich mainta ins, the way Karl Popper docs, that "in science , we new'l' ha\'e sufli cient. reason for the belief that we have atlai ned the tfuth", Il is, using the language or Plato and Aristotl e, information concerni ng the lates t scientific 'opinion ', This yi('w mC'a ns, furt. hC'l'more, thtlt wc have no proofs in sci (' ncc (excepting, of course, pure math-ematics and logic), " (91; 2, 13) ,

Th(' II'u(' lllC'aning of Hegel's philosophy as the pl1l1oso­phy of Lhe efa of bourgeois revolutions in which e.". tahli s,h ­monL of the nrw and rrj ec tion of the old w('re organIc, mutually complementary aspects of a single hi storical proc­ess, lies in its postulate about th e infinite p?,~er of rea ­son, The opposition brtwe('n humtln and ~lI\,lIle reason of te ll discu s:-;(' d hy Hegel, in th(' final anal YSIS appr a. r;o:, ~)y the logic or dialectical deH·lopmenl , to, he lll~r('ly .a di S­tinct ion within identity, The <l.bsolllte IS realized In ~he human because al)solute reason is none other than the lin personal, aggregate reason of humanity, its inflll,itel~ de­\'elop ing <l.cti"e knowledge which transforms the Il'rattOnal into rat ional: th r laller is in turn to he !' Ilrpasscd hy th(' more rat iona l. Hegel's seemingl y accidental phra~e to th~ effpct th at "God and man nrf' gC'nrrally not . ."0 0 , far aparl (64 ; N , 305) in <tc t llal fac t expresses the pl'lllcipal content

~\)\

of his world view. 11(' adnlllces this point in ill lOl l ' I "0' , 'd'ff lei look too: lVID~ nature IS not I erent from h Ulll nn." .

2,66) Ac~ordlll~ to Hegel, tI~ e divi,ne, ,the i~lC\' i tabl (', the(~.I: tlOnal, mcludIDg the rational In Its di st inctive 11 a f "t II "d ~I' .. . ulllan orm, ,,-ven lIa y COlllel r. I liS cOIncidence lI nd"l' '(ood 'I' ' ~-~ as a process, IS t 10 most llnpOl'tanL content of h uman hi'"

II I, 't' 1 " .-,ory ~ cge 5 convlClon t lal, roason dominntcs the wo 'ld' and therefore world history is ratiollal" (63' I 28) 01 l id' ., d d' " " IOU ~e Ull e1'5too With due l'egal.'d to the dialecti cal nature or lea,son whose, power, accordmg to the ohjecLi ve logic of d.C'\clopment, IS equally.cxprc,sscd in afftrmation <l nd nega­tlOll. lL pays to recall III thIS connection Engels' opiniOl ~I~out the grea~est accomplishment of Hegel's philos<;lph;: For the fI~st time the whole world, natuml, hi s torical, in­

tell~ctllal, IS represented as a process, i.e., as in constant illatIOn,. change, transfoL'wation, development; and the at­tempt IS made to trace out the internal connection thal makes a continuous whole of all this movement and de· velopment. From this point of \' iew the history of mankind n? longer appeared as a wild whirl of senseless deeds of Violence, all. equally condemnable at the judgment-scat of ma~ure piulosopl.Hc reason and which al'e best forgolt en as qlll~kly as pOSSible, but as th e process of e\·olution of man Illmself. It was now th e task of th e intell ect to follo\\ the gradual march of t.his pl'ocess through a ll its dev ious ~vays, and to trace out tho inner law running through all ~ts appar~nt.ly ~ccidental .phenomena." (8; 34) This Marx­ISt ,matenalist interpretatIOn of the rational content of lJ e­gel s theory <:lbout the pOwer of reason makes it poss ible to. more profoundly grasp the anti t lieo logical as pec ts of tillS theory .

. 'Ve all. know about the IlUIll(>I"OUS misconce ptions and slmpl~ misunderstanding (let alolle its groundless intcr·­pretatl~ns) ~I'ought about by Hegel's famous th es is about UH' 1·.allOnaltty of the rcal and the renlity of th e .. ·lli on ill but , If we recali the fundamental disLinciion Il ege l' dr·a~\'~ <: eh'een .th~ real and the. simply e~is ling, we can easilY . ee ,that It refers t,o lhe hJstoric<lliy necessary and that the po" er of reason IS eq uall . d ' negalion Th I· y expresse 10 affirmation and

. us, accor( mg to Engel II· h dcwlopment all that . s, In t e course of loses its ne~essity ·t wa.s IPI'evlo\1s~y real hecomes lIllI'eal. Thf'rf'forr, th(. rati~nl<l~ i:lg;t or. eXJ~lence, its rationality".

a SQ lIstol'lcal, <InrI Iha! 110t onl \' ,

iu the s (lhere of knowlCflge but also in socio-CCOOOlll ic dev(')opmcnL This IIlt'ans, Engl+: continues, that "cwry thing which j" rational in th" mino. of mf'n is d('~lin('d to become rcal, how('yPi" mllch il may contradict ('xi!'lillg apparent reality". F>; 3, ~38)

T odny's hOllrg('ois ir)po)ogists oppose social progrf'!'!' and di f; llli ss Hegel';.; [flith in \"('ason as naiye, uncritical anrl uto pinn. iIC'gcl, lhC'y assert, \wli('\"f'{1 in the rationality of the r eal, but th e raLion<l1 has turned out to he unreal and the real, irrational.

According to Hegel's irl'ationalisl critics, a rational re­structur ing of social l'cl<ltions means the transformation of society and the hum <ln per~on<llity into objects of bureau­crati c manipulation. Yiewed from this angle, a utopia that has become reali ty is the worst of cyils. TIl\l~. today'~ bou rgeois cr iticism of lIf'gcl's philosophy i~ e~~entia.Uy th(' bo urgeoisie'~ l'rnunciation of th(' progres5iYC philot'ophical tradit ions of its past. The reactionary nature of this cri· tique is evident in that it actually defends not ewn the status quo but the ante stat ns quo of contemporary capi­talism. The ~ov iet ph ilosophe l' M. B. )Ohtin sa~'s in. this con nection: " lI egel's historical optimism, his dlalecliCally so nnd cone-cpt of social pl'ogress, his condction that till' rati onal is feasi ble are l'ej(>ct('d a~ naive I'at ionali"t illu· s ions . T hey are con trasted to the concept of unhappy con­sciousness wh ich is grncrall y acc('llted as secondary in Hegel's doctrine, ovcn in his PhellomellOlogy of Sf/i.rit, le,~ alone The Scie nce oj r.ogic or the P1Iilosophy oj History. (30, 140-150)

Unlike t.h (' l7th "cenlm y rntionalists and the 18th -centu ­ry bOllrgeois philoso Jlh e r~ of the Englight enm cnl. lI egt' l'" fa ith in rca son was not uncriti cal. The moM imporlt\nt point in h i" di alectical understanding of reason: th(' yri.n ciple of de\'(' lopm (> nt , contradi cti on and neg<l.ll ? n, IS It.~ pos iti\.c critiqu(' of reaso n which differs . fr?1lI \,?nt '" Cfl · tiq ue in th a t it s ubstantiates (of course, 1.1l It~ ratIOnal cle ment) th e ine vit ability of knowledge which IS. not conlln · cd to the world of phenomena, and of the rational trans­formation of the world. That i~ why Hcgel's t heory of th e )wwcr of re<lso n found its scientific -philosophical develop­

mcnt in th(' Mnr xisl ~y~ll'Ill .

THE SOCI\I- ~IK\'iI '''~ OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

Like hi s brilli a nt pn:-decl':;sOJ' ll l' racl i ~u s, Il egel i;;; orLell cnllcd an "obscure" philosopher. That is undcrstandable. Bu t in thi s case we havo to examine wil y he is called that: l'lPlltll'cntiy, hi s "obscurity" s hould not be reduced to liI (' compll'xity or flaws in t.h e expos ition of h is t heory. Trill', j !egel's language is diffI cult, it. hfls to be studied , and it takes getting used to, ~tjl1 , thi s di sti nc ti ve lan­gutlge b ycry expressive and vcr y good for convey ing all th(' nuances of hi s thinking.

1Iegel once wrole to van Chert of Holla nd t hat t he di f­fi culty of hi s languag e was expl ained by the complexiLy, the abstract and specul a tive nature of t he philosoph ical content which appears s imply incomprchensi bl e to tho~{' not. well wrsed in philoso ph y, B il l I1 rgel i~ obscul'c not only for beginner studc nts of philosoph y, T h cl'eforc t.hi~ " ohsc lII' ity " i ~ not 5upCl'ficiai but !'>u bs La ntia l, llleani:lgfui. Some experts explain this s hortcoming in Hegcl ian p hil os­ophy by the complexi ty of its dialcct.i cs whi ch oftcn runs counlrr \0 ordinary common ~c n se , That e xpla nalion is bot.h apt. ::Illd ins u fftcient, because th osc who havc g raspcd Ihr, lru(' contcnt of Jlcgel, 's dialcctics scc it as h ighly logrca l ~nd I,hereforc access rbl e to a cognizing mi nd,

Hpg'rl s phrlosophy i\ "ohsclIl'c" not only fol' l ay me n b ut also fot' expel'Ls ~n phrlosophy, Another important po int is that !loth ,the supersubtle" spccll ]ali\'c di s tinct.ion s in ,lI egrl, s Jl~rlosophy and hi s socio-politi cal and philoso ph­Icallllsloflcal post.uiatrs appCar IIncical', <lltholl g h th e lat­\.('r: <lr(' se,t. for~h in, a more or less pOIHllar \Va a nd a r'e fll (' of dra i('ctrC<l1 ' Ilaradoxps" '1'1" ~

I - . , rf' .1Igum(' nt IS not so

11111(, I 0\,('1' the meaning of tir(' catrftol'Y of " I ' " -:1 s('1 r" " Ih . I ' '" )('rng I n I "over e ~ocra meaning of I ' I "' . prrlgr('~s i\'(' 01' rf'artionnr\' ',l Tir' I I '" I" 1I osophy, Is !t I I

" . . ' r ~ (r )(\If' If'gan rn Ir<>grl < I elmw l;I lId continues tu thi s day" ' ""

~'"

:--IOIlI!' ('\.1wl'l!! hf'li,'\'(' Ihal IIl'gl'r~ I'lri lo:,ophy i" it {t' 1l dal l'l!lll'llliri,,' ["I',lI"till!! II) 1111' rr'I'l11'h H('\'oll(tiorr. (JIl thl' con trary, others lil'e il a~ the idl!ulug:y of the bourgeoiS rev ul utio n" 1I,lirwa\' LlI,t\\"'('n tll4':"l' I'xl["E-TlWS thN!' ;\J'e those IlIHinl:lillillg Ibilt 114'101:1'1':, ,l"rh"iw' is 0\ t.iIPf)("Y "f til(' "'l)rll~" siHn"" .. mul or capitalist dt·\'(,loPIllPlit or, COIlYPl'sely, of the pe r iod or tll(, Hl'sluraUou whirh W<lS fl)l'ced tl) ("I'corrcill' it se lf to the gains or til(' bOllrgeoi!;il' h il t did <Ill it could to I,(':;tl'irt 11H'Ill, or (,oUI":'(', thl's!' ('onOirling asse:,stnt'ub or Ihe i(\('lIlogicill C'llntl'll\ of Ilt'gl'l ian philo:<ophy ('cHilli Ill' expla ined hy thl' confl icting itil'ological pos itiou!' of their au thors, But fill('\l mutunlly exclus ive po ints o[ \"iew ha\'c a lso been advanced by MarxbLs, T his brings us back to the "obscurit.y" of Ilegel's philosophy which thw; acqui res a certain meaning and possibly even some concealed pur­po~e, And so the quC'sUon arises: could it be to a certain ext.(' nt at'liflCial , deliberate, at. least where Hegel sets for th his socio-political beliefs? After ali, in feudal Germany (su ffl ce it to recall 'Marx's critique of the Pruss ian cen~or­ship regulat.ions) one could only expr ess, argue and pub. Ii cize a n tifeud al views in an "obscured" form, On the other hand, th is "obscUl'e" approach perfectly fils into the t radi l ional d istinc t ion between exoteric and esoteric philos­

ophies, Hegel spoh diffpl'en tly about quile important socio-pol-

itical issues in his worl\~, This is particularly ol)\'iou~ when hi s let.ters to friends (which were often delivered by fricnds too, and not. hy po!'lal services) arc couwarcd

w ith hi s published works, As fa r as the latter are con­cerned , we shou ld d is t in g u ish (of COUl'SC, it. is not. a fu nda­m r ntal d i ~ tinction ) h('lwee n th o works Jlu bli sh ed hy H egel hi m.<:;elf a nd hi s lec t ul'e cO \ll 'se.<:; pu bl:-hcd b y his ~ t lldent :' nftel' his death a n(\ basC'd on hi s own nott~S an d t he :; um ­ma l' ies Wl'i LLC'1l by s tud e nts. It. is equally int (' l'e5ling' to comp a re H eg'C'l's socio"political Yiews s(' t fO l'th in hi s Phi­losophy of r~(IW a nd Ih 05£' ad va n ced in hi s aeslhC'\i cs f\1~d history of ph i] OfiOph y wher e he expressed th ese \ ' (' \\"5 In passi ng and no d oubt mu ch m ore freely , T he F renc h cx­prrt on H egel's phi losoph y Ja cq ues D 'Hondt has l'?(,l'n ll y mad e a compamt ivc s t. lld y of Hegel's works that drffC'1' in

t heir ol'i gi n . (68) Th r F1'(,11ch Marxis t. h as cJ Nl.l'l y OC'11lOns tra led th(' Il'1Ith

o f a ion g- ati va ncNi ass umptio n: that H('gel wa~ IUllch mor<.'

('xplicH 'lhollt topical SOCiO~Jlol~!ica! prohl~ lll s in ilL"! If' "tu l'e.s and leUer.s to friend::; lhan HI hl ~ IHlhl l~ h l'd WOl'ks. Illil does not moan Ulat Hegel advanced roact ionary ideas in llis books and revolutionary ODOS in his lec tures and, £'S~ pocial1y, letters. An examination of Hegel 's leU('rs and oth~ er documents makes it possible to elucidate a nd amplify the postulates Ile laid down in the books he edited for I'nb~ !ication himself. This cancels the cerli.'dn \'agll (' n ('~s which often obscures lhe true meaning of some of the pr incipal postulates of Hegel's social philosophy.

We might also refer to the four large volumes of Lec­tures on the Philosophy of Law recorded by Hegel's stu­dents in 1818-1831 and published by Karl-Heinz llting and to excerpts from some of his manuscripts, specifiCally thoso he used for his lectures. (70) In the introduction to the first volume, Hting shows that Hegel, adapting to th (' changing political conditions (specifically, to the rise of feu~ dal reaction), often altered some of his especially provocative statements concerning the monarchy and other topical po­litical issues. However, the principal content of his theory of the state and law remained essentially unchanged.

\Vith regard to esoteric and exoteric philosophies , one should stress that antiquity and the Middl e Ages generated many esoteric doctrines intended exclusively for members of a particular religious sect or a closed (som etimes cven secret) philosophical society. The ideologis ts of th e bour. geois revolution usually rejected such doctrines because they ran counter to the overall spirit of the bourgeois En­lightenment. But in their struggle against the dominant feudal relations and their religious sanctification, these ideologists resorted, when necessary, to esoterically cipher~ ing their true views and to exoteric language which should not be taken at face value. Justifying this ideological technique, the British 18th-century materialist Anthony Collins said that although the philosophical mind was a good judge of the truth, it yielded to the need for don­ni n,g. a m~sk. Therefore, Hegel is no exception. His socio­pol~tJcal Views often appear unclear precisely because h e deliberately obscures them by all kinds of reservations and vague definitions and sometimes by such statements- us u. ally, affected-which contradict his basic, systemati cally presented postulates.

So, Hegel was not at all always frank in those of his

\\' o rk~ wilu'li WI'I'I" Hlh/I'('I III 1·f'II!Wr,/tlll, slJrnl"linll's hp for Illulated hi s pustulates with de:liLel'<ite ambiguity (m lhi~ conncr tlon, Engels pOinted to the thesis about the Tation­ality of the real and the reality of the rational), of len he did not )l IlfSUO this or that f(ormula to the fmd and con· cealed something. In Lll(~ perilHi of the Frcnr::h Hevollltion J legel thought that the time had already com£' when peo~ pIc could express th.emsclvcs more freely. But tli(;se !~opes turned out to be vam, and Hegel, who reg<irded the cun­ning of universal reason" ~s the fundamen~al ol~jective law of world h is tory, acted III accordance WIth IllS own maxim: reason i ~ as powerful as it is cunning. Truth must not be bare: it is too blinding.

Therefore, the distinctive features of Hegel's thoroughly organized manner of exposition are rooted not so .much in the uniqueness of h is personality (althougb that IS o~~ viously important too Y,.) as in the fact that a. bOu.r~e?lS ideologist, who relies for his livelihood only on hIS posItion in a feuda l hierarchy, is forced t? :partly conceal and partly disguise his rea l v iews .. And It ~<s. not on.ly ,~ case of inSincerity, secretive beha\'lOr or tImes.en'.lDg. The point is also that clear class consciousness ~s 1ll gen~ral not t ypical of the ideologist of the bourgeOIS ~evoluho~. Holbach was per fecUy sincere when he dedIcated .1115

L'Ethocratie t o Louis XVI. An ideologist of the rev?luhOn­ary bourgeoisie, he entertained illusions. concernll~g en­lightened absolutism. The petty~bourgeOl~ revolutionary and republican Jean-Jacques Rousseau beh eved that mon~ archy was the best state system for a large country and dreamed about a philosopher on the throne. ..

The foremost illusion of revolutionary bourgeOl~ Ideolo­g ·s the belief that bourgeois social transfOl'matlOfls are n~t~ral rational and, in addition, financially sound. The bourge~is thinkers of the 17th, 18th and early 19th ~en­turies believed that those o~posing .such tr~nsformahon~ were either ignorant or maliclol~S .. PhIlosophe:.s of th; re;e olutionary bourgeoisie were striVing to com mce, e uca

B r Un·versity Hegel wroto to >} Already a professor at er m \·roid ~an· on tho other

Niethamn~er: "O.n the one hand, I :~lla e~·oy watching the storm hand, I like qUlet, nnd ~ , do ~o~7i) But hls friend HOldorlin con~ approach all these years. (38, 11 l' "You like it when it. is noisy tl'adicted that when he wrote to egc . but I need quiet.." (67; 6, 138-39).

207

and ('onn'''! thrir cla~~ en(,llli('~. rhi~ "hap('d what mt~hl be called tlll'ir educational ideology which guiul'tl bour_ geois ideas to adapt to the feudal world cOltcept. If we re­call that, under th e impact of !he spon lan('ou:=; dt,\,C'1 opUlPllt of capitali.sm, feudal lords griHlllully switch('{1 o\'er 10 a bourgeois economy, we see lhat the educuLional ideol ogy was based uot only on illusion hut also on fact.. :-\1I('h , ap, parently, arc s.ome of the key t'easons behitld botli th e ex­plicit and implicit meaning of Hegel's work!-l, l)('hinci h«Jth /I'/wt be sa id and !tow he said it and, nn,llly, what Ill' til'. libcrutely suppressed: leL us recall that cven J(unt, who preached rigorously ethical behavior, argued that in cct'­tain cases omission did not contradict m ora lity,

Let us turn to Hegel's Philosophy of Law, lite work usu­ally cited to pro\'e his reactionary socio-political v iews. Here Hegel refers to the traditional classiBcation of stale forms adopted since antiquity and says that monarch y, aristocracy and democracy in the shape they took in the past arc one-sided forms of state organization which "can­not tolerate the principle of free subjectivity within them­~elves and are unable to correspond to a developed reason". (64; 8, 360) The principle of free objectivity is none oth f'r than a speculative (and esoteric) definition of th e boUl'­gcois·democl'atic concept of civil rights of the ind ivid­ual.

With regard to "feudal monarchy" (his own term) He· gel declares that "under this politi cal system, the life of Lh f' state rests on privileged persons whose whims determine much of what is to be done to lH'es(']'ve the s tal e's ex ist­('flCe," (64; 8, 359)

lIegel contrasts feudal m onarchy-i.e" uu locl'acy us a system of arbitrary political rule-to constitutional monat'­chy which he considers the highest, flllal and essentiall y absolute forlll of state organization: "The evolution of the state into a constitutional monarchy is tho task oC the new w.orId in ~~hich the substantial idea has acquired an infi ­mte form. (64; 8, 355) Thus Hegel extols the immediate objecti\'e of the bourgeoisie. This obviously contradicts !re~ gel's dialectics. But does it contradict the interests of the bourgeoisie?

Tn connection with the defillition of constitutional mon­archy, Hegel holds. forth in detail ahout tho greatness of the monarch (who IS allegedly abovo responsibility £01' th e

21)8

go\'('rnm('nt '~ fl("lions), ahmtl hl~ dl\'inp aulhoritv ahout stale so\~'n'i~nty jll'J'slJuili!'«1 ill tll!' 1I10n'lJ'{:h. I"C '1-:'"1"11 III

J.lcgel s hfl'llllll', all tlWl t'o uld not fail to a['(JII~e inlli~n .... lIon ilJlHl,ng iulvo('alt's of tlt( ' rq)Ubli(". This ~l'rvilc a~p{'rt of Ilegel ~ plllll)~ophy of Iilw \\lIS thl' sllbjl'ct 01 d(-\'a"lat ing c]'itici~m by youllg \I,II'X in his tnHnll~c['il't t'''''av .1 qOllf,:ibutiOIl fo the Crill/illc u/ lfeKeL'.~ Philo.wphy 0/ i'(lIl'. Specifically. r.. lan s h{)w ~ that tht' Nliius(Jphy 0/ Law off«.r" a mY~lical inLeJ'jlt'ptalion of consti!utiotl;ll monarchy to prp" sent It as th e ilbsolttlp socia l i(I(>;)1 which l'ealizes itself: ·'lie. gel converts all th e aUt'ibutes or the constitutional monarch in the Europe of today into the absolute !wif·dl,terminations of the lcill. 11e docs not say 'th(, monarch's will i~ the rltwl decision ', but 'lhe will"s linal decision is th e monarch'. The first pL'Oposition is empiri cal. The second per\'Crt~ the empir­ical fact into a metaphys ical axiom." (1; 3, 2,)) ,\t the same lime Marx notes that in fact H egel place:,; the strict­est possible limitations on the monarch's fUllction" and re­duces them to acts that ha\·e nothing in common with lllt' functions of th e head of state. :\lan: interprets lIegel'~ viewpoint as foliows; " The h{'t'editilry Chal'flCler of the m()n­arch follows from his concepl. He i1'i to be th e pel':,on speciii­cally distinguis.hed from the whole' species, from all othel' perso ns. What is it, theil, tlti.ll ultimately and firmly dis­tingui s hes one person from ,,11 olh('['s? The body. The high­est funct ion of th{' hodv is sexual activity. The highe:'t cons titu tional act of the ·king is thNf'fore his :-exual act h'­iLy, for throug h this me makes a king," (1; 3, -'10) '\Ian ironically comtl1l'nts on that ~t<ll{'men t of Il egel':,; which describes the killg'S highest mi ssion ill dead eamest, al­though this royal prerogative' is r('-iated neithet' to legisla­tive nOt' to ex('cutive pOWl'I', ')

>} We should here fccnll the OI'NIl]] a:-scs:;nlt'nt of lIC'grr~ Philos­ophy oj Law which ,\Ian offers in th e De!llsch-Frall;osiscll e Jahr­bUcher: 'The critici~m of th{' GrrmOI! p/!i!osopby 0/ sial,' and 1~lc which attained its mosl con"i~trnl, riche,~l and hU:li forlllulatlon lhrough liege!, i~ both II crilic"l nnnlpi~ of thr modern, ~tatl' and of the reality conn{'ctl,t1 \Iith it, anti the n'solute lIl'w, hon .of the whole Germo'll poli/iC(l1 1l/ICllq!t!i,cOIISdo!lsnrss ~~ pract(s('~ hlth~~to. the most. distinguished, llIost UluH'rsal, e~IJr('~"ton of II IlId~. ,ral:;e~! to the levcl or a ,'Ci<'IICC, i~ tIn· '~flrclll"I(I·,',pllllosQP"Y ol {au, It~ C'I~. (I; 3,181). tnfortunatl,ty, lhi" Illt,"'i" \IIIICh r~n?I" HC~,l:I"_"'oC,I?: political view" 1H1 ~ not ht,t'll t'\;H1I1I1l,,1 III dl'l<H1 III \1:lr~l,..t ,..tudl~" of thl' hi~l ory of philf)"ophy.

1~- O I:'G2

\\ c ha\-c s('cn (liat indeed th pl'l' is lIluch th'lt i:s "ob­scure" in Hegel 's socio-politica l \'i ('ws. That is why WI' Bl\lst separate the r~a l content of hi~ ~ocial philo:-ioJlhy fI"ll II '1 11

sorts of exotel'lC phl'aseology, bow~ nlld s('mpcs IJt'ff) n~ lhe Prl1ssian state and gOYC'rllJllt'nt, etc .• \11 thill lIlu:-;{ ,-\1:-;0 h(' takcn into account, but only jna~lI1uch HS it t'XPI'C'ssPs lie. gel's gCIluine cOIlYictions. And it is this fact that caOs for i IlYCSliga ti 011.

Let us bcgin the examination of this '-obscurc" 11I'ohll'Ill with the fact that Hegel proclaims Lhe establishmen t of constitutional monarchy to be th c supreme pol itica l goal of his timo. Some scholars belie,·c tha t lhiR f.\ct alone pro\'ps the conservative character of his politics. I belie\·c that this view is clearly unhistorical and abs tl'act.

In a revolutionary Situation, when absolutism is ready to "bostow" some scanty constitution on the people in or­der to s trengthen it.s own social baSis, the demand for a constitutional monarchy is usually counterrevolutionary. \Vhen feudal absolutism is on the verge of collapse, the propaga nda of constitutional monarchy is taken up by po­litical reactionaries. But Hegel advanced and substantiated the slogan of a constitutional monarchy at a tim o when there was yet no revolutionary situation in GCl'Inany, when all attempts at imposing legislative restrictions on absolut­ism failed a nd the very idea of a constitutional monarchy was offiCially dismissed as "dp-magoguery" . Could it be that this forced Hegel to accompany his demons tl'ation of the need for a constitutional monarchy with all sorts of res­ervations about the greatness and inviolability of tho mon­archist principle? And perhaps the objective logic of ideo­logical s truggle demanded such maneuvering also because monarchist illusions still ruled the bourgeoisie?

Engels probed the true meaning of lIegel's concept of constitutional monarchy; "Hegel pronounced, in his Phi­losophy oj Law, Constitutional Monarchy to be the fIDal and ~os t perfect form o~ Government. In other words, he proclaIm ed the approachmg advent of the middle classes of til(' cou ntry to political pOWN." (1; 11, 14) Throe dec­a.dps bcr(lI'c the ~ 848 Revolution the s logan of cons titu­tIOnal mo~archy In Germany was a bourgeOis-revolutionary slogan w!lJch ~ndoubtedly helped the anlifeudal oppositioll to consolidate Ils forces.

Truf>, advocates of constitutional monarchy can interpret

210

II dillt'!"!'lllly \\'11t'1l ,\ )'f'af'iioll<t )0 0[" U cOII:scnallve "fill"!"!'.! 10 admit tlwl wltliollt it conRtilulion onp. can flO longer presf'l"\·c JlIOHalTlty, Ito !5C(' tb. on ,I: uti(Jn mer(~ly as a new monarchist guiSf! wltli delllocratic -immlors. A super· flcial examinatiun of Hegol's Philosophy of {Jaw can lead to til(' condnsion that lIegel advocates precisdy buch new democrati c guitic for absolutisOJ. In ar:tlJal fact, however, he argues against thj~ approach, althougb he does slur it oue,.. Lot us recall that in his Philosophy 0/ Law he speaks about the development of tho subjectivity, initiative of 804

ciety's members, about tho development of civil rights and representative institutions as a highly esscntial content of the constitution. The citizens' private aims are legitimate aims and even arbitrary action by an individual (of course, within legal bounds) is to be regarded as necessity. Such is the "iew of Hegel, who stresses the first element in the expression "constitutional monarchy", while the con­servatives naturally underscore the second.

But the real meaning of Hegel's understanding of con­stitutional monarchy is expressed explicitly and unequivo­cally in those of his works which do not deal. directly with law. For example, in the third chapter of hIS lectur.es on aesthetics (Beauty in Art, or the Ideal) he says that lD the past, works of art usually portrayed k~ngs and queens, and adds: "The monarchs of our time, unhke the heroes of the mythical times, are no longer some summit of the whole which is concrete in itself; they are rather the more or less abstract center within institutions that have already been independently developed and established by law and the constitution. The monarchs of our time no longer have the most important fUllct ions of the ruler in thei: .hands; they no longer exercise legal judgment; filla~ces, clnl o~der and security a1'O no longer their own speclal occ~wallOn; wa.r and peace are determined by the overall .con~lhons of fOl­eign policy which is not subject to theI.r dll'cct l~e~tion~l guidance or power; and when the. final, hIghest declslOil In

all these matters of state rests WIth them, neverthel.l'ss the specific overall content of these decisions depen.ds htUe on their individual will; it., too, has been detCl"IDllled b:fore it js presented t.o them for decision. Thus t.he sumnllt of lhe statc, the mOllilrch's own .:subjective will is pu.rl'~?' fo~'~ mal in its rclation lo the uJll\·crsal and the pubhc. ((i.~, 10, 248-49) Of course, those firmly subsribing to the preJ-

". 211

uclicc that J-Iegrr" :-iocio-political yirw!" \\'('1'1' ['('arl[I>II. ,'\' can interpret 11ll'~e ~llfli('iL'ntly clt'a!" thl'~l'S as a l"OIl1phn{l of sarI:; ,\bout lhl' decliue' of royal <\ulhol'ily, Ill'calls(' lie. g!.'i is qUill' t'autiolls hl'l'C' 100: he dl.':-it'l'illl's a PI'O{'c.ss ,(\t lakl.'::; place in history and doC's not C',\\Wl':-iS- -at it'asl di­n'etl..,- hi~ attillule to it. :\t'n'l'lheiC'ss, this "Uillld" is ob· \'iOlls to those who howe gl'asped the (,5s('n('(' of hiR philos­ophy: the history of mankind is its ronrtl1'd molion , and that IS tiH' I"l'H!'iOn wh .... the dl'sil'l' \0 fn'('iy hllild Olll" S life sllb.s.t"nti<~lly in,herenL in lhe> IHI1~lil.n P(,l'f>ollHlity, bcco lll(l~ pOSS lbl('. fha! J:; why the quotatIOn cltC'd abovC' describes Hegel's convictions sufficirnlly clearly, Thcy can har'ell" be called simply monarchist: undel' the conslillltiona l mo~­archy which he sees as the summit of soc ial de\'clopment the monarch is a flgUl'e-head because all malter's of stat~ are, decided, by appropriate s tate bodiC's, This explains Ife­gel s unequr\,ocal ~tatem ellt: "\Vlwn laws ar'(' unshakable and, the ~tate is ol'ganizC'd in a certain way, that which is subject to the monarch's exclusivc decision appears incl­e\-ant compared Lo the substantial." (63: 4, H37)

rn his Philosophy of Late Hegel goes into great detail to pro\'e the advantages of herectitar'y 0\'('1' elected monar­chy, This_ has nothing to do with extolling hel'edilarr mo n­archy, Wben Hegel asserts that only the Iatler corre­sponds to its concept, he simply stresses thal the question o[ ~orm.al, aCLual~y fictitious supreme royal authority must deCide Itself, as It were, on the strenglll of birthright and not as a result of polilical st l'uggle. Viewed fr'om this all­g,le, Hegel's ,negation of elected monarchy is perfectly jus­llfled, Hegel s C?IlCept of constitutional monal'Chy cC'nters not, on "the ~octn~e of royal authol'iLy hut on thaL of "civil sO~lCty (b~rgerhche Gesellscllaft), J n his Lectures on the [[lslory oj I hilosophy he analyzes Plato's UICOI'Y of tile ide­al st~te, and formula tes his view of tho rights o( citizens, Pla~o s , I~eal, he sa~s, faces the past, when there was no suhJ,ec tJ.YlLy ,?f the I~divjdual as an element of socia l 01'­g~llIzatlon. . ~lato did not recognize the knowledge the \~'11I, tllp clt'ClslOn ()~ an individual, he did not l'C'cogn iz'c hi s right to stand on IllS own two fec'l al],1 (1,',1 L k I I

' < no "IlOW lOW W ('(mid reconcile this right to hi:s id"a fl'll ' 'I' I I d I I

" '-" JUS IC<' ('qua -y rm(!IH s t lat thiS prlDciplc too be accol'll d 'I I ,I I' I . , .. " C' J S proper

pace, . drl{ tlal tllS pnnclple ill' :-:.upremeiy di"isoh'C'Ci that It hf' Ifl hal'lllony with the IInin'I'sal '[I .. . ")'

,<. Ie OJlPOSltl' of I la -

:!J2

IO'~ priru',pI4' ;: titP prillrlpip of 111(' con'3ciuLl~ fr"e will of Ilw inili\'ilillal whil'h ill l'l'I'pn\ tlllll'S ha' ht'f'1I p\l~hed to the l'ot'l'fl'llllt. ""pI'cially hy Holl.'s 'uu: tim' 1 'eedom of tlw indi\'idllai is 11l'CI'«S;ll'Y prcl'isl'iy ,1:-; that of till iurlh'idn­ai, that l'lll'h individllal nlll~t hp (tbif' to ClP c~s himf-ielf f II " " (I'" II ')11-) U J , )J,-,_,.I

lIegel contrasts Plato to HOIlsseall thr! bourgeois reyolu­tionary, who!'lc vi('wpoint hp. l'(~gard:-; a~ an (>xpression of the neces:-:al'y dcvplopment of lho i(lea of statehood, the de­yeIopment free frOlH the arhill'ary approach of philoso­phers. True, Hegel dON, make a reservation: in Rousseau'~ doctrine, "lhis Ol)posite prinCiple is in tlH' extrcm(' and ap, pears in its lotal on('-sidednes~", (61; 74, 205) This reser' \'ation should not be PI'('sl'ntNI as an allC'mpl at disguising reYolutionary views. Urg{'l really disagrc('s with Rousseau on many points,

In his Philosophy oj ffislory, Hegel de\-(']ops his concept of the constitutional monarchy and puts the demands for the freedom of ownel'ship and individual to the forefront, seeing lhem as the centl'nl moments of objectiw (real) freedom. As a result of the establishmcnt of this "objec­live freedom" that is, capitalist social I'elalions-"all un­freedom stemming from feudal relations ceases, as do all determinations Sll'JlHning fl'om feudal la\\', tithe and quit­renL, FUl'th(,l'lllol'C', I'eal fl'c('dom dC'mands the freedom to choose an O(,(,II\Hl.tion, meaning thai man must be allowed lo use his abilitit's till' wa~· he dlOO!'lCS and that all gO\'l'rn­ment positions Ill' accessible to him. ~uch are the moments of real freedom which '-'I'C hased not. on sense because sense admits the existence of both seddolll and slavery, but on man's tho ught and self-consciousness \\hich belong to his spil'i lunl cssence." And furthel' Hegel stresses: "A cit­izen must not onl\, he able to do hi~ job but also to profit fl'om it' it is not ('rHHlg:h ror him 10 be in command or hi" abilitie;, he must. (II so be able to apply them," (63;

4, 927) " Hegel cOlltl'a~ts feuclal law \0 boul'geoL:; law whLch h{'

idealizes: PL'j"H tC' ownership i~ dl'rLIled as "freedom of OWIl­

ership", and the elimination 0[" serfdom ,(fo~'mal, fl'c?dom) as "freedom of thC' indiyidu.-l.\ . But tlll~ Ldealizatlon of bOlll'gC'ois Iran:-;forllllllion:-; (which, in lTegl'l's.liIllP w(lre rath­el' tempting pl'ospect~ than fact) was. tYPLca.l of, reyolu­tional'Y boul'geois idC'ology. Those who did not Idealtze such

213

transformations in the ('Ira of hOl1l'g('(li~ I'PYOllltioTl. "('I'e moMh- its feudal opponents.

F'inaJly, to conclude our (''\alllinution of tlH' f]lIl'Stifl ll of constitutional monarchy, we can refer to some of Ih(' ul~as Hegel expressed in his letters to friend s. Tn DOC' of his let­ters to Niethammer (Hegel always remained loyal to the convictions he expressed in this letter) he st r('~ses that the problem of the constitution is not reduced to the restric­tion of royal authority, that thC' most important point here is the freedom of t.he people and th eil' participati on in elec­tions and decision-making. vVithout it, any constitu tion turns into arbitrary rule, grossness and cruelty, which in turn leads to stupidity, dissatisfaction witl1 everything so­cial, servility and meanness. Hegel knew full well that the "constitutions" graciously granted to the people by the monarchs of some small German states simply disguised royal despotism. Hegel connected the introduction of the constitution to profound cbanges in the very way of life of the people: "There is a great and profound meaning to creating a constitution; it is all the more great and pro­found the more freely-in Germany-the country is ruled and tbings a re done without any constitution, and this is considered not only possible but preferable!" (38; I, 197-98)

It is obvious that Hegel idealizes the social consequences of introducing the constitution and the constitution it­self; he sees it as something similar to til(' suhstantial ba­sis of social life which has achieved genuine self-collscious­ne~s and freedom in its development. Meanwhile, no con­stitution prevents the exploiter classes from gOing their OW11. way. The idealist understanding of history inevitably entad,s a reappr~i!)al of the ~('gal SUpol'structure and legal conSCIOusness. Neyertheless, 1t should be noted that sllch idealization of the constitulion idealizes hourgeois de moc­rnc¥ and not bourgeois monarchy,

1 0 , sh~w the degree to which Hegel's understanding of constitutIOnal monarchy and the monarch's role contradict­ed the f('udal ideology th(,1l d~mi~atinf{ GCl'many, I might fJ~lOte the speech made by Fl'lcdnch Wilhelm IV of Prl1s­.<'Ia l,n .ypar'.<' aft('r lIe'g'p} died. D(,nl(lnding 11('W crrdits from the JOInt landta~. ~he klllg a~serted that no constitution CQ1Ild equal a king s fatherly conC(lJ'n for hi!) suhjects: "T and my h01lse, we want to se1"\'(' the Lord!" (;;0' !oj") \ j

, " i n{, cen'

211

l'uring tht' Iwliollwirh, d('marHh for a constitution, thl' kin~ df'dal'f'd Ihpl'l' wa~ Ill) {"re(' fill E,rrth that could makr him l'l'plac{' 111(· "11111111'<11" n,latiolls l)('tw('l'n the king and the ppoph' J'('iatioll:-: liaSI'd 011 SOUl{' illnf'l' truth- with (' n'.·('D·

tionell (,OIl~titlllil)llal I'platiolls. Ideologists or the {('udal-romanticist rraction saw Hf'gd's

concept of constitutional monarchy as an attempt <l.t ap­plying t.he British paUf'I'J1 to the conditions of Gt·rmany. In Britain, the presPI'vntion or the monarchy upheld con­servative tl'aditions, but it. was naturally not the king---a king who reigned 1)11t not ruled -that stood in the way of completing hourgeois-democratic transformat.ions, But in Germany, a hackward country, the issue was not comple­tion but commencement of bourgeois-democratic transforma­tions, As it specifIcally appears in his articles, Hegel's po­litical program is modest enough, In my opinion, this also ~xplains his negati\T(' attitude to the British Reform Act~ (1831) which envisaged a substantial dem?cratization of the electoral system, Hegel was firmly com' meed that the "absolute spirit" was progressing slowly a~d ?a~ely perceptibly and that this was where Its IrreSistible

power lay. . ". , While seeing the "obscure pomb m Hegel 5 philosophy

as a deliberate stC'p t.o disguise the political program of the bourgeois revolution (of course, this refers to the German theOl'v of the bourgeois ro\,olution), we must also remem­ber that thero is a contradiction between the self -c~n­sciousness of a bourgeois philosopher all(~ the a.ctu~~ soc~al meaning of his doctrine, that is, between Its subJectne fOll:n and objective con tent. The author of thi~ or t,hat, ~heory ~~ often noL awarc, or not fully aware. of It~ obJecli~o mea ing; on tho other hand, his own e\'al~latlOn. of, hiS theory is not compl'C'hensivr with re~ard ~o Its (lh.leClIY~ c?~tel~~ and sometimes ('yell distorts It. ThiS ge,ne~al met 10( 0 o~, cal consideration which is ,among the p~'lIlrlplcs °l\th('llb~~ tory of philosophy is partICularly apphcahle to ege Caus(' thc conlra(iiction het\\'('(,11 llle~,hod and ,system I~:'l~~ m('ntes his ('ntire philo:-;ophy, !n th,hlS c.o:m~~~~~tef;.emor(' say that tile conlcnt of Hegel s t eory 15 ,,' d

• j I aware of and I'XIHef=Se ' Significant than t Ie one Ie w~s < < _ f h. b~ur cois rc\' -

Hegel's ph.ilos,ophy was. :.U~ ~deolog) °o;ted not ~he re\'o­olution, SuhJectlYely, hO\\dl>\el

j, bhe s~~fs transformation of

lution hut reform- a gra un. ourg ~

215

feudal ;-;ocia l r('lations, One mll~t then,ron' di;-;tillg'l1 lflh h(' rw (>e n J[egeliaJl dial('ctic~ a thl'ol'Y of I'('\'olutioll, .\llel lit, gel':", int('rprl'tiltion of it. Th at i;-; a l'atltl'l' difftl'ult til ~h. hf'­Ci.HI~C IIl'gel simullalleollsly cl'l'atl'd tht' I'l'YO llltionill'Y thl,o_ ry of dl'\'l'Iollment and ib reformi:-;t inll'rprl'tiltion.

Heg('l's dialectic~ is il theory or im mancn t, ah~olllh' ilnd il"l'esistiLle development. Bill he interprcled it to mean that social progl'css \\'as spontanco ll s and that it was lIO lise ":::llbjeclin-"Iy" intcl'fel'ing in that process which , hc a11e­g('cl, was inherl'lltly rational. J [ence the idea of recollcilia~ lion to socia l l'ealit~" which is inte rprc ted si ml}l y as what exis!.s, ;'Comprehending what is is th o ta sk of philosoph y, for what is i;-; 1'C'ason." Then he adds: "This l'ational viewpoint is rcconciliation with reali ty," (64; 8, 10) This inteqH'ota­li on of dial ecti cs completely cancels its cootl'al (in Len in 's \'iew) idea, that of pos itive negation, and replaces dial ec­tics with a reformist approach to [eudal ins titutions which ~s justirlt'd by the s imple s tatement that they change and Impl'ove.

Thb "uncri t ica l positi,·ism" (Marx's term) of lI egel's philosophy direcll y affects his altitude to the Prussian s tate. The latter is s('cn as the most adequate embodiment of thC' Pl'ot(,.'tanl Reformation which Hegel contrasted, to a certain exten t, to the French Revolution, li ege) writes: " Tn thi~ light, Friedl'ich I I is a figure of world history. H o ma y IH' called the ruler, with whom the ne w el'a became reality in which the true interest of the s late I'ealized its 1IIli\"{'I'MIHy and its supreme justification... Ire was the \)C'I'O of Pl'ote~tantism, hut not on ly personally, like Gus­ta\' Adolf, but as the king of a grea t powel'." Fl'edel'ick the Great not only turned Prussia as a Protes tant power into OIl(' of the g)'eat powers o[ ElII'ope, but he was also a philosophf'l' king." (63; 4, 919)

We III liSt, of course, l'emember that 1I0gel saw the P I'ot­C:"t~tll nef.ol'ma t}on n.oL, only as the s truggle of a new 1'0-Ilglon ag!unst Cathoilclslll but also as the s trllgg le of the C'llwrg{'nt bourgeois soc inl I'e lalions against thl' dominant ~(, II,da ) sy~l('m. Appal'f'lltly, hi~ 1l!'~l'~~IlH'nt of I)rll ssia took It Iflto account that already in the second decade of the I!lth crnLury .1~I·lIs~ia had become the stronge~ t German ~tale (both 111liltal'lly and economically) and that thi s had largely predetermined its role in the unification of Ger­many. He it as it Hegel indulgently tolN'a ted lhe re~

2H'

aC'l;nnary fl',lIurp;-; IIf tlIP PrllSS;,.n ",I "ll' and oh\';oll"I~' idl'alil.l'ti ib ["flit' ill (;1'1""<111 lli:'tol'~'

Elt'vation of Illl' slat" to II", abso\IIII'. 1'\'Pt! ib (il'ifi('ation is onC' of Ihl' cl'lllral alHl :'01\;1'111 f",llnn' of lft'l«:l'l'!" socio, political vil'\\":-;. 1Ii;-; ;-;yslf'1Il (Ip:'trilu's the state a~ "u?jeclive spirit", and its finilC', limited form" arr the lamily a~d "cl\'il socit'ly" that i:" thp sphl'rt' of prlvilh' ;ntrI'Pst<;. In

eluding economic onC's, By recording tile l'l-iation "the st.ate ·civil !'ociC'ty", TiegC'1 posrc\ a qllP!'lion wh(}~e mat.mal~

ist soll1tion is 01H' of the fl1l1(lamrntals of the scientific· philosophical I1nilC'I'standing of history.

NaluraIiy, iT qn'l soln>s tid.." qllP..,,(irm idralistically: hr sees the slaLc as a moral and I('g<ll organism \\ hich deter­mines the basis of ciYil society. Thus h(' IIses his a\)'<:'olutc apPI'oach to th e !'laLe as a J)['inciplr sul)strmtiatrd by the entire content and struclul'c of his system. But the cf'nl.rai question of <lny ['('yollllion is that of p~we~.; the rc\,oIUII?; destroys one type of slate and replacC's I,t \\ Ith another. hI, toricallv more pl'OgreRsi\'e type. Hegel s system do~s not philosoi)hically 5\l 1)~tantiate the need for the re\'olutl~nary transformation of the state, On the contrary. that s)sLem implies an immanent, spon~aneous de\"elopm,ent of the state~ But in contradiction to IllS sYi'tem (and III full accord anc~ with his method), Hegel ~el)al'ates the. ~ta,te conf?I'Ill' ing to its concept from th(' pselldostate whIch IS ter,IDlnrt ed by a I'evolution, " In 11 statC' which is truly ratlOna ~ compal'tmentalized all laws and institutions are none other than the l'ealization of freedom according to its subs~an­hal determinations." (64; 10, 128) But. no~ ~vel'Y sta~e. IS a realization of fl'ee ci olll. Fol' example, d('scnblllg the ,Flen.cll state'on the ev(' of the 178fl 11e,'o\lI lion, He~el exclaims ~l­dig na ntlv: " \Vhal a state! T he tol(lll y arbItrary rille ~ mini sters and th e il' whOl'es, wives, lackeys; s? that t1le.~n~~ mous host of pelLy tyra nts and idlers saw It as t le~WN\t vine rig ht to plllnd f.' 1' th e wealth o[ the sta t(' and thC' t of the people. Sha mf.' lessn(,Rs and inj\lstice Wf.'l'e ;-a,mpt~l , morais could only be compared to th,e 1)(l5~neSR 0 ,I,'~r ' tlrI (. s W(' sce a lack of indi\'id llal nghts III thc CI\I. an IOn., .• 11 ' \1 sphere of con"clence.

political "a~pec,t~, as ~~~ T~~iSI~'lllal~~ on the Frenc"h (and thought. ((Vi. 7.''), I!) .) tl t ITegrl did noL put an ah~olut{' any fetld~l) sLatr s IO\\S ~\~hCn he was to e"plain the need const ructIOn on ~he stallO (' th(lt had airead\- happened. for the homgeOl~ r('\'O II ,on <' ,

21 j

Condemning the abstract oppos iti o ll of rH't'('ssil, I I . he often made this oPPosition s pccirt c (lnd hi:"t;Jri;"IJ I It'lng,

Thus, the contradiction between th(' ObJ'C'Cll"YI' ~ .... I t I r II I, . . ... (1, ".1 ('0 en 0 - ego 5 philosophy and his subjC'c l i\"(' vir'\\, n·

rooted i.n the in~onsistent and halrh('artC'd nature ~f '~·ts bourgeOIs revolutiOnary spirit Lenin point ~ to til" Ie th " . .." ernx of

e matter: Although Hegel himself wa' "0 "d"," I · . " <I )rer of

t 1e autocrat.lc Prussian state, in whose service he w a professor at Berlin University Hegel's teachings a~. as

It" "(10 ," "ere revo U lOuary. ; 2, 21) Lenm draws a firm line bet"" tl b" t" " f ... een Ie 5tl Jee lye views 0 the thinker and the actual so . I direction of his philosophy, and even opposes one to ~h other. The role of t.he I~Lter in ideological s truggle is in~ dependent of the thl~lke[" s consciousness , H ege l 's le ft-wing £ollow.ers gras~)ed thiS real conten t of his philosophy and used It to arnye at revolutionary and atheist conclusions. Of course, such conclusions were alien to fIegel, a nd he would have opposed the Young Hegelians had he li ved long ~nollgh to. witness their emergence. Nevertheless, t.he Hegelian left dal not simply impoge these conclusions on and ~ scribe them to, Hegel 's philosophy to use th e prestig~ o~ hIs. name : they a~tually foll owed from hi s theory - his dialectics,. to be ~recl se . Paradox icall y enoug h, t he cen­tral meaDing of 11I.s own ~octrin e was in m any respects u n­clear to Hegel; tillS meanIng s urfaced in th e course of hi s­tory.

~Vhat then is. the revolutionary significance of Hegel's phIlosophy? Lemn answers thi s ques tion as follows: " He­gel's faith in human renson and its rights, nnd the f unda­mental ~hesis of lIegelian philosophy that th e universe is lIndergolllg a cons~an.t process of change and developm ent. led some of the disciples of the Hrriin philosopher .those who re[\lsed to accept the existing situation to th e idea th.~t .the st]'uggl(' against thi s situatio n, the st.'uggle against eXisting w],ong and pr(,valent ('vii, is al so rooted in th e u ni­~el's.al l.aw of eternal. deve~opment. If a ll things develop , if InstltutlOns of one klDd gn'e place to others why should the alll?Cracy of the ~ru~sia.n king or of the R~lssian tsal', th e enflchm~nt. of an lOslgDlficanL minority at the expense of th e vast ma]onty, or the <lamination of the bOllr eoisi e over tl1(' 1)('01)1(', ('ontinll(' for('\"N? " (10' .J 1 1) g 01" I slI('h ,I' I I' , ... , oJ )\'10 115 y, , rM l('a ('on.c IlSlOns WNC' impOfl!'ihle f' 1T I hill U\('y ha\"e their Own OhJ'cClivc logl"c" tl 0.1 'teglcl'

. ICy Ille VJ (l )Y

~t(']\l from lilt' di.dl'dil'al ;lnaly~is of the sncio· h b lor icil l p rO(·!'."~.

Hegel often ,In'w on dialectic to produce conservative and ('\"en nt1('tionary conclusions. but in all snch cases Ill' actually violated dialectic". For example, he maintained that t.he de\'elopnwnt of HlP state. evcn when it leads to r adical ('hange, is "orderly and outwardly impercl"'ptihlc mo­t ion ". Marx cit.f'(\ this statement as ohvion"l~' conflicting w ith both dialcctics and the entire historical record of bOllrg('ois rt'yollllions, and sairl: "The category nf gradual transition is, in t.hl! first plac(', higtorically false: aOiI in the second place, it ('xplnins nothing." (l;.'3, 07)

The contrndiction between t.he philosopher's subjrctive vi ews and tile reRl social 'r('ncl of his theory should not he inter preted to mran that lIegel was a CQns('f\'ati\"C (or (,,'en retl cLionary) ('ven t.hough his doctrine was revolutionary. Any contradiction has its limits, it is r('slricted in real life: to ignore this truth means yielding to the irrationalist intNI1l'etat.ion of dialC'cti('s in the spirit of illogic.

Hegr}'s attitmjc to the Frt'llch Rrvolution exposes the fa ll acy of thc absolute, metaphysical opposition of th e thinhl"s subjective self·consciousness to the RctHal content of his philosophy. Hrgel described that rc'-olution a5 "worl d-historicRI for hecause of its ('ontent it is of global and histor ical imparlance". (63; 4, 931) After the Congress of Vie nna, when feudal reaction emerged triumphant and was dest]'oying bourgeois-democrat.ic gains, trying l~ ~tam p out memorirs of tht' rcvolutionary past, Hegel pa~5IOnat {' l y declarrd: "ft was a glorious sunrise. All thinking beings ceieb ratcd that er a . Exaltrd, moying fee li ngs reigned at that tim(> the enth usiasm of the sp iri t swept the world, as if it we]'e' on ly the n that the divine was really reconciled wi th th e wodd." (6:1; 4, \12fi) T hose enthusiast ic word s were fol · lowed by s('l'ious I'r.<:;£'I'\'at ions, bu t they were al rea dy u nabl £' to belilll£' thr a5SCSSOlf'nt.

T nl(', lIegel el id not b{'l ie\"e th(> r eyol uti onary road . of b011]'geois l]'an!".fol"lllalion to be ille\" i.ta bl~ for i, ll co unt ries. Bu l he ~ni{J it in ~o l\1any wOJ'ds (Ill IllS Lectltres on the lIistonj of Pflilo,<;ophy) that cprtai n condit ion-" make r~\'o lut ion' i n('vj t a hl('. WIH'n I he p0jlu l ar -" pi ri t. he sa id, r(' all z<,~ th at tIl(' {'"\ist.ing It'gil l ha~i s i~ no longt>l' m' ce'<:;S<l r y an d 11;\-.. lUl' ]) r li into sha('ldl'~, "an a1t(,I'na ti ye a rb:;e.<:;. ~ithN ~h e ~eo­pIe drs tl'oy, by tin intrrna l "iolent explOSIOn, th iS fight

219

which still demands recognition; 01' it quiC'tly and gl'<\du­ally changes the law which is still I'('ganll'd a~ ]~w hilt is no longer a genuine integral elelllent of morais, It is that

"" I I d " (0' 11 0-(" -- ) which the Spirit HIS a I'ea y OU'l'COIlU', "1: ' , .. j I- II Of course, Hegel supports a quiet and gradual transfor ma· tion of the feudal supers tructure into the bourgeois one. This ideological trend reflects the distinctive nature of the bourgeois l'cYolution which begins only when the capitalist s tructure takes shape within the feudal system. Still, He­gel is fully aware or Lhe fac t that such peaceful cyolution calls for the readiness of the ruli ng social forces to welcome the new. "The stale is transformed without violent rev­olutions when this L'eal izat ion is universal ; institutions fall like ripe fmit, they di sappear, no one knows how each bows before the inevitable fact that it must lose its right. But the government mu~t know that the lime for it has come. 1f the government, unaware of the truth, ties it­self to transient institutions, if it undertakes to defend th e insubstantial which is law against th(' substantial ... it is for that reason overthrown by the advanCing spirit." (64; 14, 277)

The ideology o[ the bourgeois revolution is logically in ­clined to compromise with the rulin g felldal forces; one of the r easons is that the houl'geoisi(' stands to gain the mosi.. from such compromise, The bourg('ois reyolulionary spirit is always limited, inconsi;;;tenl, halfhearted; but it is these features that win o\'er a certain part of the ruling feudal classes to the bourgeois side. And Hegelian philosophy authentically cx.pre:o:ses th e essenc(' of th e bOlll'geois revo­lutionary spirit du ri ng the I'ise of hourgeois rela tions in a backward, feudal count ry. That is what makes his philos­oph y the soc ial consciousness of an era.

Hegel's phiioSOI)hy los('s ib "obscllre" app('arancc under the spotlight or ?-. larxist-Leninist analysis. The social mean­ing of the Hcgelian doctrinc becom('s obvious. Why then do the bOllrgcois phiiosophC'rs or today prC'sen t him as a political l"eactional'Y, a:-;. a thl'OI'i:-;.t of tht, totali ta r ian state? Ironically, lil'gel the gl'l'ill bourgeois thinker is today an all~' of tilt' Jlrogl'l'~~i\(' :-;.otitll for('('s in their st ruggle <lgain~t rl'actiOlHlry idl'()I()~y.

)I.\LECTIC,\L ll\TERI.\L1Sll A:\]) TIlE HECELL\\ CO\CEPT

OF TilE U:\IYERS"\LITY OF PR.\CTICE

Remarkahh'. IIl'g,,1 ('Oilll'S to the "'idea"' as til{' coincidence of the notion iJn~1 tlH' obje(' t , as truth, iI/rough the 11I'actical, pur­posiYe acti\'ity of man. A very close approach to thl' \'il'w that man by his practice 1)I'oYes the objecth'c correctnc!'s of his ideas, concepts, knowl('dge, scicncC'.

V. I. Lenin

J\lar'..:ist philosophY has I'c\"C'aled t~H' dh:('r."'il~: .of pl"a~­lice, its ('piSll'moiogical, socio-economlc, soclo-polltlcal, r:\­oluliana!'\" r\1nclion~, its unh'ersal content ilnd m~anllHr

, " " I d , 11,· difl"l'l'l'nt ways III ma-which an' l'xpressC'd In un amen a " '.

" " " I '"" "r "",'",on" knowll'ciul' artls t01"1ell prodllctlOn, soCH\ [,\11'; 011, . ~ ' .,"'" .

lic actiyil\' and any human activity I.n ~l'neral., ~ ~l{' (~I~I~'c­" I "(; .. 1",;1 thl'on' of practice (''..:IS-tS Hnt! dnclop,; <l~ a

lI ca -Ill<lliia I. . . 1'1" r know\ecigl' 111 -crilical ,;llmming-up o[ the ('ntlL"l' liS- 01).0 , ' ,

cluding til{' history of philosophy as an Im!lol"tan~ ':\lm(I~.\ Signiflcantlv Ihe c1assi('s o[ )'Iarxis-m <ldvancl'd t t cen~~,\ , ,.",~ 11 ' 1hrxisl philosophical tl1('ol'Y 0 . PI'HC Ice post.lll<ll('~.O til' s'tu'dies of the history o[ philosophy; abov~ all In .. t l~. I flegel's Philosophy of 1,f1Il'. " :n~(' l~ Marx S COlltll II 1011 0 lEd of ClaSSical Germall Pill­

/,udwig Fe!le~ba~h. ~1~1a:e:~a/i;:11 (llId Empirio·CriliciRtn and {osophl/. and -,('Illn S k 1'1' naturally gives ri~(' to Ih (' Philosophical N.oleboo·\ r~ll:' did tl:e p;'oblC'1ll of pl"Uc t ice fo l lowing qllC'stIO~l: "\I~IOSOlh\'? ':"Ic\l"\ist philo,;ophy dirrel':;; play in pre-~I"I'\lan P 11 . II "I: 19 progre~:;i\"{' om's, in Ihat from <\1\ its JlI'{'dect>~so~~~ I~f l:~'i~~tiCl' the (,(, lIlral ph!losoph­it has mude the <\u('stl( I III oL IIndl'lTtlle Ihl' pllliosoph "I II ~ti1\ one S lOll ( n .' I , Ica pro) {'Ill., , I "I d·.lrclical and IIlSIOl'ICil Ill<\ c-" I I . without \\ \lC I 1<'1 Icn egac ) . r-'\, I to l'Il11'l"ge. . ' rifdi~1ll would lin\(' ,\I 4,'{ .' \0 (JI'ohlelll 01 I1I"<lctIC(' a"

k" g there \\ll~ I I 1"1 Strict ly spea'lI\ , . rirnl and 1l1(,tlil'\"il P II nS(l·

a philosophical pl"ohlC'1Il III an· .,., I --

I

phy l' Y('11 in those lhrol'i('~ whi(.'h po:-ipd "Pl"ilrli(',d' fIl lH II.

edu~aLiollal) problems Lefore yhilosop,hy .. Only III tlw )(' riod of early bourgeois rc\'OluL.IOIlS, ",llIdl l~ also tlIP! ad of revolutionary change in philosophical ~uhjl'('ls. lin(' <:. t Ie I

problt'D\ of practice become a. philosophical i~stll': Bacon j and UC:3ctlrtes Me t.he first pllliosophC'rs to pl'odaJJIl lUan llla~t('1' of nature. ~till, while l'ntl'u!"oling th e practical task or grasping natural laws La philosophy, thO~L'. thin kcl's, milke no distinction between philosophy and particular SC1('TlCI'S.

No)' do th!',)' study the specillc I'dation or philosophy to practice. The philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries sec practice mostly as the application of scientific kno\~­ledge or the activity of individuals who pJ'oceed from thou· everyday experience and pursue their priva te a ims . The contrasting of philosophizing to non-philosophical, and es­pecially practical, activity is retained, despite the attempts at a philosophical understanding of its accompl ishments and epistemological significance.

The new stage in the development of the ph ilosophical understanding of practice is connected with t he emergence of clas~ical German philosophy. Although the J\antian pos­tulate about the primacy of practica l reason over theoreti­cal reason reduces "pure" practical reason to moral con­sciousness, essentially, it already transcends the bounds of ethics . The point is that there are philosophical problems which can only be solved practically. The philosophy of Fichte, the direct successor of Kant, is not only a theory of science but also the philosophy of idea lis tically interpreted practice.

Hegel goes still further. He sees thought as an almighty and all-creative "absolute idea". In other words, he sees thinking as practical activity. Viewed from thi s angle, prac­tice is not merely human activity. True, man is the only iiYe, fHlite creature capable of purposeful practical activity which effectively transforms the world around him. But

jl Hegel' s practice. is above man: like __ thought and reason, it is -described as substantial acti\' ity which, by mediating the fundamental opposition of thought and being, bl'ings about t!.ci.. dialectical identity. These seemingly uninlellig ible idealistic theses actually lead Lo quito an important conclu­sion: the opposition between theoretical and practical activ­ity is rel~Li\·e. Pr~ctice is. th.e unity of the spiL'itual a nd til(' matt'flai; that IS why It IS universa l. And since prac-

•

lin' ~uhstaHIIHIt' iI~!'H h~ gi" IIg Imlh 10 'h~. w.orhl flf. Ihe ohjl'ct!') it rrt'alf':O;, it I~ rI',llly <lbove thl' ~llhJecll\'(~ ~ctlVlty fir indi\iduab as it I~ SCI'II, for {>xalTl(lh~. from !'fln<t l pro­

Ition till' determining blls' of soc.al IIff'. '\aturally, IIp­{\lr II(,\~I'I' makl's LItis coneiu"inn, hilt it ff)lIm\"" frum ~Iw ~~atl'rialisl inlprpn'tatioll or Ili:- 1~.()SI\.II<ltp~ .w~.i~,h df'~Crl~l~ u'H cticl' a~ tlit, sllh:-talH'1' of Ihe ah:ioh.lle ulea , the co , t l t of tli l' cosmic gt'nl'~is and tilC ~lItlrt· de\'!'i()pI~Il'nt 01 tfl~ \JJ\iYl'I'~1' till' diaipctirai itlt'utily of tllp mlltprwi tnd till' sJli rilu ~I.' Ill'gpj l'xprf'sst's it as (ol!ow:-;: ... j hi' ah:oo llt~ idea is above all the unity of the practlcal a~d th~ th?~rct ''',i ,'d"a 'I nri (',onscqllently, it i~ also the Ilillty 01 the HIN Ie, "" , i " ((iI.' 6 40H) ot' life and the idea 01 knowJutgc. 1,., . ""ll

Bill the opposition or thought .and bel.ng whkl.ch. dl'~tec t~ , n .. 0 ·lIU"101l It IS star Ica I y detcl'lnin e!') man S I e IS lld I I" 0 '. life constantly shows which we belong body an sou. Ul . . uile dif-us that the thin~,able a~ld lth~ rea.\~d::lst;I~!t.e~~~'e: is not ferent things. I.heor~t~ca t,O~o see' the world as it is, enough because It shi\es O? ~ -i t 't should be.

i 'I· to make It Into \\ la I while t Ie pOll~ ' IS, knowledge-interpreted by lle-

The theoretical ulea-or .vit but also as the sel£-propul­ge l not only as huma.1l a~~1 y s its content h'om its other sion of lhe "ahsolute !gea 1 ~lra\~ed world This reliance on being- rl'ODl lhe OutSI e .. \ I~~ans on th~ theoretical idea, the external imposes Ilml \10

ncompassing substance-sub­therefore it is not yet th,e tf. -c existi~g and contains it in ject which generate~ e\'c i y lIng

t "Tl cse limitations cannot

ilseH as its recog lllzed . coloten . s. \hcory must turn into be overcome by theor etl c1a. me3dO"t"lon that the concepL in

, lyon t li S COll ot practi ce. It IS on t [or itself-it now appears ? itse \[ becomes a concep activity changing the eXlst­oniy as knowledge but al so. as I 'd the coocep t introduces

l ' i s a llractlca 1 ea, . the ing heing. HIS, a < •• orId lhus overC0Il1111g its content into the obJec~~vef'7 i.:s alienation from the "external" bias of the 0 Je.~dl~e~ a rational basis. s piri t, and rebuil.diug. the ~:o~lso limited because it oppos~s

But the practical Ide~ ['on According to Liegel , It , i ' I as ItS nega I. ." (,:1.. 5 the theoretlca I( ea < f II e theorelieal Idc-a v· J , '

" ['ii lacks the 1ll0Jllt'nt 0 d' r tile obJ·cctiYc-s and lhe s " i dcrstan lIlg 0 r , r 32:3) - that is, t \e un d the cr ilical assessn~c-ut 0 rca {-

ways leading to them, D.UwttC"r what the lalter s naturt'. " t ty which i~ c1~angc~s, I:~ ~lCnt, lhe practical idea gl'asps ro­lhis slage III Its du\c P

<llih' ~lill inadcqllalC'ly, i\S sOJl1C'lhing \\ hich is "in:-.iglliflcl\1l1 by ll!-;cif and which must allain its true uctcl'ln inaliuu and only yalue solely throug,h good as, it::;, objccli~·e. ~li4; 3,324) lhr inadcqll<llc (,V<lluatlOll of obJl'clLH' reililty I:; OH'I'CUIll(' by the development of the practical idea, of practice because the hitler a~similat('.s IheOl'eticni knowledge and mastcl's it as the knowledge of rcality and of the law ::; go\ cmiug its chunge, thlls comprchending that its own opposition to the thcOI'eLicai idea is only relative. This produces and estab­lishes "nn objective world whose innC'l' basis and actual slability is lhe concept. This is the nbsoluLc idea. " ((H; 5, 327)

Despite its idea list character, tile dialectical concept of practice Jlegel de"elops prol'oundly anticipates tho true content and meaning of social practice, The practical change of the exis ting is the fundamental condition of its knowl­edge, Therefore, praclico is the basis of knowledge and the highest form of its I'calization. J\aturally, Hegel prc­~('nt~ these truths ill an i(IL'ali~t 111<\1111<.'1": the spi rit cognizes only that \\hich it creates it~l'If. But s ince Ihi s creative spirit has not yet achieH'u selfcol1",ciousness, it treats the reality it transfonn:-; a~ I1Il:;piritual and thet'dore insignif­icant. But reality is not at all ins ignincant because its {'",,,,('nce is spiritual. The praclicaL idea cancel s its ow n nt'­

gation or reality, compl'ehending it as its own CI'Cl:\ture. 'I'll(' practical idea in this aspect, as the " absolute idea", is above ~nowledge, because it. "has not only the dignity of the ,1l1l1\"l' I':-;al but abo of the :;impiy aclllltl", (lO; 38, 213) Ll'lllll sets milch stOl"O hy thi ::; postulalo of I ll'gd's,ln hi f'l notes on The Science of I.ogle Lenin analyzes Hegl'l 's pos­tlll;.~tl'S a~o\lt the lill'ol"etical and practical idea and revcal s then', rational e,lemy'~ts. Defining his subject- "l legel on pn.lctlCO and obJecll\' lty o[ cognition"· Lcnin shows how dose tho qCl"man idea list. is to th e conect epistemological \l1~d~I:~.ta.l~dl~lg of lhe role of p~·actice. Lenin sums up and l11'lIICI"lllsllc.a~ly cOl'recls lJ.egl'l s lheses as follows: .' 1'heo­~·t'tl,cal cog.lHtlOn ought to gin the object in its necessity In Its ull-, ... ded l""I"l"oo, "ll 'l' i I' ' . ", .. ' ... u , I :s con rae lCtOI'Y movement, an-\lll.(~ rll~:sl:I.1. L~lIt the hun~~n notion ·deflnitively" catches t1n:-; ObJl'Ctl\C .tluth o[ cogn itIOn, seizcs and masters it only "lwll thl' notIOn beconws 'hl'ing-for-i(""II" II .. ' r

.. c'i'" 'l'l l' I . .,... III Ie sense 0 Illd 1(. lil IS, llc IIl'i\CllCl' o[ nl"ln '\1 d [ k' d ,'s i l i i il 'l" < <10 man 'lll

Il' (,~, ll' <:1"1 el"lon ul the ohJ-l'cli\'ity r ' , ~ 0 cognitIOn. Is

""1. -- ,

I

that lJegel's iril'a? It IS net:(-~~;HY to '1}( Ir 1 to this." (to; "\' ')Il) '" , ..

JA'llin dOl'''' rt'lurn to 11J('~l' prollh,Ul:o- lillcr In hi:-; notl's ()Jl The Scicllre of [,ogic. 111 till' ~('rlion ueHling with [ll"i.lC

tice in t.he theory of knowlt'cige he critically analyses Jle­gel's und erstanding of the relation "theorY--l'racticl"', Lenin dismisses ideali::;m and shows that Hegel dialecti­cally und erstand!' both the relation of theory to practice and that or practice to theory, This leads lIegel to concluc!p that practice ('nrichcd by theory becomes the highe::;t fo rID of knowledge al each separate stage 01" its development. Referring to [leg<.>!'s tllC::;is quoted aboVl', Lenin sayo: "Practice is higher t/tall (theoretical) knowledge, fol' it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actualiiY," (La; .18, 21:1)

I must s lrcss t. hat Lenin docs not refer to any and all practice. Practice is examined in its .denlopment ... as 1.\

transition from one stage to the next, Illgher stage. Slfl1ll1-taneolls ly , the relation of lll'actice to knowledge changes too' the laller also de\Oelops and reaches the le\'cl of theo· redeal knowledge, Theory is transformed in.to practical ac' ti\Oity, rai sing it to a new, higher le\'e1. G~lded by the~~y, IH'actice cOlTecls, clll'ich('s it and makes It n~ore ::;~ecd.lc, It is the unity of immed iate actuality and Ulllyersah t.y In· herent in practice in its developed form and orga.nlcall y linked with lheoretica l knowledge that makes yractlc~ the criterion of the truth . And that is why thcorel1cal YC'l'lfL~a lion of the resulls of s tudy and their testing by pI'acllce complement and enrich each other, l'ul~ng ,out any a~solul.C approach Lo bo th the truth and its crltenon that IS, SCI-

ence and practice. . . 0· · Today 's idealist philosophers reject the Mal.xlsL VI("~

or )racLice as tbe criterion of t.h e tr uth and pOll1l Lo the 0) J1os ition between knowledge as a sp iritual phcn~l11enon III ' " cal activity direcUy connected to matenal ob ,

all( pl ac~l b . h·lo ·O I)hcr~ ·ects. Unlike these contemporary om',geOls Jl I ,':'. ~, he el totally rejected the. r:netaphYSlc~1 Oppo-:ltlon o,r tl g ht logic to practical actiVIty, Accord.ll~g to ~IlS theor), 10U~ " 'oce~s which turns the spn'ltnnl ][lto mate

:~r:t~~~ '~h: sl~:bjc~tive into objecti\'t:'. L~n~u points ~o lh~ , I lemcnt of thi s concept and iH'llhantiy declpher :-,

rTartlOnl~ ,ed I'sl poslulate' " For lIegel action, practice, i::; a ege s I ea I , . , I'" -;lor t

logical 'syllogism', a figure of logiC, And t lat IS tIue, ~,o,

15_015G 2

,

I of course, in the sense t.hat th(' lig-nrc of logic ha,~ S :lthel h('ing in the practice of man ('-..., ah:-:olu ll' ldpal ~ n, hut \'ice YCfsa: man's practice, repea ting ib t'H a thousa nd JL il­lion tilJl(,s, becomes consolidated ill mall 's cOlisciollSIlt' hy ligllres of logic." (10: 38. 217 )

Prr-?\-Iarxian matcriaJism countered idcali ::sm by suhstan­liilting the epistemological principle of r eflection, bil l it dirt not Jlose the problem of the r elation of the logical forms inhcrcnt in knowledge to objective r eality. Engels points out that metaphysical materialism "restricted itself to the proof that the content of all thought and knowledge must deri\'e from sensuous experience ... It was modern idealistic, but at the same time dialectical, philosophy, and especially lIegel, which for the first time investiga ted it also as regards jorm". (9, 266)

Because he opposes metaphysical materialism, on the one hand, and Kant's subjectivism, on the other, Hegel, despite his idealism, anticipates the correct understanding of the logical forms as forms reflecting objective reality, although his exposition is strictly id ealist. lIe holds that all things are judgments, speculative conclusions. Referring to these seemingly absurd statements, Lenin remarks: "Very good! The most common logical 'fi gures'- (all this in the Par. on the ·First Figure of the Syllogism') are lhe most common relations of things, set forth with the pe­dantic thoroughness of a school textbook, sit vcnia verbo." (10; 38. 177)

lIegel approaches the understanding of the fact that th e reproduction of the relations of objective reality in form s o( thinking is the result of the protracted, versatile, aggre­gate practical activity of men. Lenin notes this Iact and stresses that the seemingly absolute stability of the figures of, 10~lc IS determmed by their constant practical ap­pl,catl?n, Tl,lese fI~ures have the firmness of prejudice, they are aXlOmatlc precisely (and only) because they are l'ep eat~ ed a tho~sand million times (10; 38, 216.17). Summing np Hegel 5 understanding of the role of pract.ice in knowl­edge, !--cni~ says: "Undoubtedly, in lIegel practice serves as a link 10 the an~l.ysis of the lJl'oces~ of cognition, and Indeed as the tranSitIOn to objecti\'e (,absolute ' according to !reg.rl). truth. ~Iarx, consequently, clearly sides with Hegel III IlltrodUClDg the criterion of pl·tlctire int th . the-ory "f knowledge." (10; 38, 212) 0 e

226

Let us recall that Hegel describes the idea not as man IS

:onccpt of some thing but as something allegedly indepen­dent of nlan and mankind: the impersonal process of think­ing which takes place in everything natural and social and comprise~ their absolute essence, substance. The same aJ-l' plies to lhe concept which, in Hegel's view, is not only a form of human thought uut also an authentic form of the "absolute idea", that is, it is also absolute. According to Hegel, the idea "should not be understood as an idea about something/ just as the concept should not be under­stood only as a definite concept". (64; 6, 385)

Hegel uses tho word "idea" to denote substance, first, because of his idealist interpretation of the category of substance, and second, because in substantiating the dia­lectical concept of developing substance he argues that substance becomes subject, mankind, the theoretical idea, tIle practical idea, etc. That is why be describes the idea as the absolute, the single which combines itself to shape certain ideas. The latter, in their logical development, form the system of categories of dialectical logic, the system of universal determinations applicable to both knowledge and being. These postulates of Hegel's become clearer if we connect them to the philosophical tradition begun by Plato who main tains that the transcendental world of ideas is th e source of the world of things perceived by the senses. In Pla to's view there are as many ideas as there are in­dividual things 'and qualitative defin itive feature.s inherent ill them; all that C'x isls ill the sensuously perceived world has a counterpart in a certain idea of the other-world.

Hegel rejects th is infini te multitude of ideas whose quan­t ity and quality are actually determined by t~e sens uo~.sIY perceived things : it leads now'.lere. ~e ~ecogmz?s tl~e eXI ~t­ence of only one universal primordial Ide~ wblch ~s chfls­tened t.he "absolute idea" and is the UOlty of belDg and thought , is th ought-being, subject-obj~ct., Tln~s, reason. thought , knowledge, practice- th e prlDclpal I~te~lectual characteristics of man-acquire a suprahuman slgmficance and are regarded as attr.ibutiye de fi~itive fea tur,es of the universe its mode of eXistence, motIOn and de\ eJopment. Hegel 's ;)anlogical approach extrap~late~ ~an's features in:o reality which is iDdepen.dent of Illm ; It IS. a case of rno:;! s ophi~ticated i nl ellectuah ~ t anthropomorp~lIsm. . .

But the poinL is that , side by side WIth tlus tlllnkahle

". ')" 7 • •

world of thE' absolute, endowed with hypostatized i.UDlan qualities, th erc exist nature, society, the PlIIpi1'icall :· I)b­~(, I"n'd lif(' of men in which L'l'a ~o n , thought ilnd knowJI'dqe lire llt'illil'l' inHnitcly powC'rful 1101' alJ:-;olult, 1101' uIliv :::aL '\atul"alJ y, !legel cannot dony the oPPo:iition between t.he C'Xtratemporal world of the a bsolute where overy thing ha~ he en comprehended and reali zed, and the imperfect hnman l'l'ality which exists in space and time, in which knowl ('dgp IS fal' from complete, is not free from er1'or, and practical activity is directed at limited, rmite objectives. Aware of thi s contradiction, Hegel t ries to express it conceptually: the tmc essence o[ the world "is the conc('pt in and for itself, and so the world is itself the idea. The unfulfilled yearni ng disappears when we learn that thC' end goal of the world is as achieved as it is eternally being ach ieved ... But this correspondence of being and duty is not some. thing petrified and immobile, becauso good , the end goal o[ the world, exists only inasmuch as it constantly gener~ ales itself." (64; 6,407)

Thus lhe ab:::olule is realized ill its exll'utemporal being, but it i~ constantly realized in its other-being too, wh ich lIegel describes a:-i an a lienated form of the absolut('. Such arc real nature, man and society. 'vVhi lC' in the sphere o[ the ab:iolute practice is described as mediating motion which turns the opposites of being and thought into a dia ­leclica l identity, in real human life practicaL acti\'ity is :-;cnSIlOW:i and inseparable [rom natural Illotives, att.ractions, pa:::sions and interests. But the absolute docs not exiSL out­side nature, socicty, human activity. That is why the op­position between the "absolute idea" and human history i~ as relative as the antithesis of thought and being. There­fore, the point is to reveal aspects of the elernal in the hislorically transient social movement, 10 grasp the relative a~ the emergence o[ the absol ute, and the a bsolute as de­veloping.

Hegel ~~gins his analYSis of practice as human activity by df'SCrlblDg the human individual whOM consciousness appea~~ directly only ~s .sen~uousness. Although Hegel docs not ~lnglf' out the (lt~linctl\"(' nature of man's !-icnsations (in thf' ~.phf're or thp ~~nse:-;, hr !-iee:; man rather as object than :;oubject), he exam Illes till' forms of ~ellS U Ol1sness as forms of the em<'rgence of the human prl'sonaIiLv. The low. f'''''t ff)rm of :;ocnsuousne!'s b the natural motive '· the un. ,

fr('(', di!,('ctly determinrd, IOll'e~t ability to want, in follow ll~g Whl~h mall acts a:;o a natural being". (64: JR,4) Hegel cllffrrpntlal('s hetw(,Pll natural Ololins, also called desires, and thr yearnings of great content, purpose and meaning. Pa~siom: !-ilanu :-;till higher in tltf' hierarchy of man'::: inde pendl'nl sC'n~ll()lI~ activity. Tn Hegel's yi{'w, no great deed is possihh'. withollt ]la~:o;ion. Tnterl'st is the most devrJoped and meanmgfni form of ~('nS110U!' yC'arning. It must not b(' ('onfusrll with s<'ifinll'rt'st in which the human individ­ual is not eonsciotls of his sllbstanc,('. The yalne of inter. esls in human lif(' i~ hard to ovcl'estimate: nothing can take pIa('r withollt all int('l'f'~l. The existence of interests impli{'s th(' ('\i~t{'n('(' of illcJination~ -sub:-;tantial drtel·mi nations of man's ~('ns(':-; which distincti\"('iy de~c]'ihe man's indiYidllaiity. .

Thr will i~ th£' highrst. ahility of the sensl's and the mind. 1h{' will ass('~~('S s('nsIlO\l:-; Dloti\"f's; thr formC'l", as thC' high('~l ability to wanl, l'i~rs aho\·e tll(' latter although it i~ dr]1rndpnt Oil thrill. rllOire is the l"('suit of this a!-i~('s~­ment. Sincp choic(' is ddermined by t.he indi\,iduality of human e_\i~tl.'n('(', hy il."ielf it is still arbitrary, but, hrcallsl' the will, freeing ihi('lf from tilp rille of natural moti\·e:::, i~ 11 II NI wilh l'ationai, uniYl'r.<;ally significant content, choic(' o\'erconl('s arhitrllrinf'ss, eXjlresses the will's essenc(' in­cl'ea~ing l y adeqllal('iy, and titllS becomes fl'eNlom. In Jl l'­gC'l's word:;, "tlir subjectivc will is a purely formal deter­mination which say~ nothing about what it wants. Only Ihc rational will is this tlni\"Cr~al premise which is det('r­mined and de\,elops in itself and intrrpl'ets its moments as ol·ganic llleml)l'l's." (G4; /, 144) According to Hegel, the will is fr('c only inasmuch as it is rational, i.c. is dC'tr1' minrd hy rational Illotivcs whieh, I'is ing above human in di\"iduaiity, posS(':-;s lJniw'rsal Significance. Bllt man's ra­tional essencC' is not something direct.1y gi\'en: it is con­s tantly in the pl'ocess of emcl'genee. The human individllal hecomes :;oocial, or rational, through his own activity. Ill' makcs a man of himself.

Thus the will Hegrl i~ far fl'om rejecting its genetic link to SC'Il~\lOUsnr!'-s, he' ('yen triC'" to 8y~trmalically tracl' it- -is inilel'l'nt only in man and, like rr<lson, is " distinc­tiyC' det(,l"minnlion of hlllll'Hl nalUl'r. Thl' S<llll{' <1pplir:o; 10 pnssion:-;, inlr]'('sh, indinalion."i .. l !lei , 10 il cprl,lin .I'\tl'lll. CYeIl YC'arnings which differ I"ndlcally from the motlvrs of

•

. I Hegel himself stresses this fact, but his panlogi-aDlma s. . I . II cal premise maintaining that substantIa reason 15 Ie sou~ce of sensuousness prevents him from correctly understandmg sensuousness as a relatively i~dep?ndcnt sphere . of, hum~n life and activity. Hence th e Illevltable. contradICtIOns In

Hegel's theory about the relatIOn of WIll to. sensuousness, becanse in his examination of man as an, IndIVIdual lIe­gel, naturally, cannot fail to see th at man s sense percep­ti ons are the source of his thoughts, whIch are very often directed at sensuously perceived objects and therefore prove the dependence of abstract thinking on sensory experience. . '

J n describing the emergence of the \VII I. as an exclusl."ely human phenomenon, Hegel correctly Illdlcates the prIncI­pal direction of that process: the filllDg of the WIll WIth so­eial content, the determination of acts of will by SOCIally meaningful motives. Although, according to Hegel, the concept of morality is broader than that of ethics, reducing the objective content of the will and practical activity III

general to morality and law i ~ , Lenin stresses, a one-sided approach. (10; 38. 212). Of course, the point here is that law and morality arc the hasis of Hegel's "civil society". llis understanding of social life is substantially determined hy the legal world outlook the classical form of bourgeois ideology. As will be seen further on, lIegel has brilliant in,ights into the role of labor in the development of man. :":evcrthcless, he does not regard labor activity as determin­ing precisely tho human character of volition. This limi~ tation and the concomitant errors afO rooted in idealism which makes it impossible to understand material produc~ lion as the hasis of social Hfp.

Tnitially, llegC'l examineR the will in ils relation to sen~ ~1I011Sn('SS, but. lale>r, in c,onneclion wilh tho determination of Ihf' oll]rct.ive, universal ('ontent of volition he shifts his Annly~is to the relation of the will to snb;tantiated rea~ fon. '~hr rati{)na1i~t~ of the 17th century already defined Ih.r WIll a~ a speCIal form of rca~on. They contrasted the will In .affpft!o; .~o tiwy cou!d ~H1~~lantiale their concept of Ihe rnh?nal \\111. A~ a .dU\)cctJelan, Hegel restricts this (';ontm"I1nR', hoth ('onnpc.t.lOg thp will to aft t I d '!!er-.. I I . < ec ~ ant I ('ntwtlTlg IPtwppn t H'lll . .1\" 111 othpl' ('a~n <; 1'1 l'e< I • r· I· r I' . . <. , .. . 1£'Ip Ie app l .. 1 nTH(llI ~ nJ mil ,I n (Inl('('lJea\ HI('nt.it" '1'1' ach I 1 I I ." liS appro, IC ps ()"lji'ITOllll' Ill' il l~tra('t ri~ori~1 ('.ont'cpt of {.hp will

230

which is typical of rationalism and finds its cxtrcme ex­J"'('ssion in l\antian philosophy. The analysis of the vari­ous for ms of sen~l1ons activity enables Hegel to pose-al­beit within an idealist framework-the problem of the fun­dament[ll significance of practice.

Thus, according to Hegel's theory, spirit exists, on the one hand, as knowledge, and on the other, as the \\'ill, ac­t h· ity aimed outward. The will "stri\'es to objectivize its intemal content, still bearing the form of subjecti\·ity". (64; 7, 3;;9 60) Knowledge implies the existence of an ob­ject of cognition which is external to the subject. The op­position hetween cognizing activity and its object must he mediaten; olhcl'",jse the object cannot be an object of cognition. Thi~ mediation can only be practice as the unity o[ the spirit.ual and t.he material.

If knowledge is the interiorization of external reality, practice is. the cxtel'iorization of the internal contenL of COll5ciousnC5S acquired through previous cognition. Because of its dia\ccticai rclativity, this relation of the internal and l'xtcrnal is mutually t.ransitive: the external hecomes in t erna I a nel vicr yersa.

.\ccording to Hcgel, practice "essentially u~it€'s. the ~n~ tprnal with lho external. The internal determlllatlOn wlt.h which it brgins must be remo\'ed as far. as the form is conc('rncd, i.c., it must crase to be purely mte:oaI. and h~· come rxtcrnal; huL the content of that determlDatlon. mu~l hc preserved; for example, the intention to build 3

hOllse ... " (64; 18, 16) . . r Thus the transformation of the inteI'D3l detCL'mlliatlon 0

('onsciousness (and knowledge) into something externaI­lhaL is, Il racti cc-is, in Hegel's view, .the cOllstnnt. cootf'nt of human life, a conlrnt which l'ea!Jzr~ h~lmR.n ess?llcr, human spiriLllality and freedom. The det('l"mlnat~olls. 01 th~ human Ego "m ust. not remain only the det('rJl1l1l<lt'~I.l~ (: its concept and thought hut becolllr rxternnlly (,.\lsl~ngf Here I rietrrmine things, l am t.he ('a use ~f the ('h,lngl .0

lb' t " (131' /8 4) This drHnitlon of pl'<\dlc(,

I lrse 0 :Iec s. . ' . . I d d ·f \\"t' nhstract our· <.;trrs5pS Its UIlI\'C'rsal chal actrl'. n re , I . . ,.~ ~el\"£'~ from Ih£' distinct features of fllndnnH'ntil~l) cillllH n~ form~ of radice, what is gCI1Nal and tYPlc.al of nl:~.

. p.. 'o('r<.;~ (of ('ours(', n Illnlf'l'Ial procf'. ~ pracllcr 3PIlPars n.s a I~J f' :,. . ,) 'nitialrd and impk which J fegel til(' Hlpahst ,II s to sf'! .' I . t' Wolf ment£'d by human in<li\"iclllilb organlzrd 10 a err ntn

llegel"s undcL'standin~ of, Jll'a ~ tiCl' " tht' ~l'atl~roJ'mn li()1l of th e' internal detel' 1Il 1nal1(1Il JIlIn :-;ollll'l!IIug l'xlcrnal" (64: IS. 16) is inadequate' b('call ~l" um.ong olhl.'1' things, it inl(' I'IJl'el5 the fact of t il(' transfol'matlOn of til(' ('x l('rn(l l into the internal merely as the PI'OC(,SS of cognition. Bllt man. by changing ('xtC'l'nal nntul'C', changes his own, hu­Illan nalme too. Generally, the creation of the "second na­lurc" cannol be understood corrcc tly only as the transfor­mation of the internal into the ex ternal: naturally, man's mind does not possess an ideal image of everything he creates in pactice. Since the conditions of soci al life creat­ed by Illen arc the determining basis of Lheil' being, l)1'ac­lico comprises the transformation of Lhe external into the intemal t.oo. In this rega['d it is the exchange of s ubstances between nature and men organized by men , th e transfor­mation of the social into the natlH'al and vice versa. In­leriorization and exteriorization arc equally boLh acts of cognit ion and acts of practice.

Hegel's concept of the dialectics of the internal and the cxtemal tentatiYely pointed to the COlTect way toward un­derstanding th e unity of knowledge and practice. But a clear description of this way called for rejec ting the ideal­ist premises of Hegel's system and demystifying, material­istically assimilating and creatively developing Hegel's I~cthod. This task was brilliantly fulfill ed by Marx and ]'.ngt'ls and iater Lenin.

The high evalualion of labol" actiYiLy is typical of Jle­gl.'iian philosophy. lIe belieyes that labor is Lhe most im­pol'lant. form of practical activ ity: "Practical ctdture ac­quired through labor comprises th e need and habit to do something, further, restriction 0/ one's dOing, partly because or th e nature of. the material and partly- and mostly­b~causc of th.c ar~Ht.raly acts by others, and the habit, gen­e) ated by. ~llls dl~clpllfle, of perform ing objective activity and .. acqll)~·Jng un.lye~'sall y Signi fi cant sk ills." (64; 8, 261) Ma.1 ~ sees the s~gnJficance or Hegel's Phenomenology 0/ SPtrlt aboyc a ll In the fact that. in it, Hcgt' l " l'as s the l'~s('n('(' of labor and comprehe nd fi objective man~tn;c be­callS!' r('al man- as the outcome of man 's o,v lb'''' (l' S,:):)::}) . ( II a 0 1. ,

According to JTcgC' I, the (>Tl1cl'gc nce of man as a IllpmlH'1" of society concisciy ['epeats U~e hi~tol'Y of man­kind; til(' p('r~onality mast(' rs the eX W'I'It'nc{, of world his-

202

tOI"~' . This f'il'\'(lti(Jn or til(' pNsonal to the social is possihl{' (l il ly Ilil"Ough lailor,

In IllS ('\AlIlin<lli()rI of lI<,gf'I's analysis of 1ISI'£1I1 acti\'i ty Ll'nin :-; tl'l'sS('g thai th(' Gl'J"man philosopher pays special .. lIt('nliol1 to labor tooJ:.;. lIegel compar!'s th('m to the goab Ilwn jlU[,SlH' ill thc'il' labor actiYity. He belic\"es that eycry­day conSCiOIlSI1('S5 s('es labor merely as a means fo)' attain-

• • ing ('('['lain goa ls which are the sole reasons why labor IS implt'nH'lltNI. Yi(>wed from this anglc, labor tools al'e only tools, i.C'., C'xtNnai means used to attain that which is of grea test impor tance: the end. Hegel questions that C?nsu:o­er approach which, incidentally, is typical of the Idcahst "iew of history. H(' contrasts th is to the dialectical nnder­standi ng of the 1'('lalion "end-means". The ends whi~h ap­peal' as products of human subjediyity are ac tually dl~ta ted by the conditions of men's life and human nature .ltscH, while the tools (instruments) of labor embody the Imma­nent end of human ac tiYity-mastering the forces of na­ture. T hat which appears as the immediate end turns ou t to be essentially a means, while the means sel'\'ing a suh­jective end (of meeting men's immediate ~eeds) is an ex­pression of the principal end (and meanmg) of human l ife- the realization of its potential, the denlopment of the human personality. . .

In this connection Lenin quotes the folloW I?g pas::iage fro m Hegel: "The -r..Ieans is highe.r than the flfllt.e ~nds of exter nal lIserulness: the plough IS more honOlabl~ tha~ those immediate enjoyments which are procured. by It, ~ n scrve as Ends. The instrument is prcsefYed, wIllie the I1n-

mediatc enjoyments pass awayoa\VndERareO~~E~'~ot~~T~~J~i TOOLS MAN POSSESSES P' ~" , NATURE AI THOUGH AS REGARDS HIS ENDS, HE FHEQUENTL Y IS SUBJECTED TO IT.:' Lenin sees tlL,'; I · " the gel'lns of historical mat el'laiJsm [n Hegc " t 1t'SIS as . . . . . . (t f Ifegel s ( 10' 88 180) ExplallHng the poslt[\e con en ,0 "

I· 'of ,"cas'oning he says: " In actnal fact , l11en 5 (' nds aIC Inc < • • ld d' O'n ,·t - th('\'

d . I I the objC'clIYt' wor an IHCSUPp::.;... · . cngen C[ N)Y . . . resent But it seems to man find it as sO lll etlllng gl\en, P ts"de the world and are

. . 1 'C lakt'll from OU 1 · , as If hI S cnc s al , ld 'f. d n" ) " ( 10' .18. IBn) For-. 1 £ 11 e wor (Ice o. , . lIulC'pt'[l( C'nl 0 I. r stud '_" Hegel and hi ~t()I'lc .. \1 111;\

Illlliating lhl' s llbJC'CII 0 J ~ th e<:i<:. pOinting 10 thl' prill tC'r i;\lis lll " Ll'l1 ill a( \-;tncr a ~ ~.

cipaJ direc tion ~f s~lch study : " H is torical n~ at l' I'ii.\~i~1ll as On(' of thl:' a pphcatlODs and d C'Yl'lopmrnts oi the Idca~ o[ genius-- seeds existing in embl'Yo in lIegol. " (10 ; .18, l!JO)

J neyitably, the following question ar ises: how r an nne expla in the fact that, haYing profoundly undol's tood the role of labor activity, Hegel is so far from rC'cognizing pro­duction as the determining basis of social life? The answer lies in his idealist understanding of labor as exclusively spiritual, intellectual activity. This means that Hegel re­duces material production to spiritual production, dissolves the former in the latter. Hegel's vi ew of the world fails to sec the inner connection of the supreme spiritual mani­festations of human life with the diversity of the man­made "second nature". Idealism prevents Hegel from grasp­ing the fundamental phenomenon of physical labor and the facts describing the distinctive features of the ohjective ba­sis of social deyelopment.

The idealist distortion of the essense of labor is rooted in the fundamental precept of Hegel's panlogism which re­duces being, the material t.o thought, consciousness, self­consciousness. In Hegel's opinion, man is essentially se1£­consciousness. The bodily existence of man is described as the "other-being" of the human essence, as ali enation. or course, Hegel admits both the existence of mater ial prod­ucts of human activity and the fact that they are needed to satisfy men's needs. But he asserts that tho material is a product of the spiritual, its other-being, an alienated form or existence.

This concept finds its fullest expression in Hegel's Phe­nomenology of Spirit. Marx criticizes it in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts oj .1844: "ADd since it is not real man, nor therefore nature- man being human na­l~lre . ·who as such is made the subject, but only the abstrac­tion ~r man, s~lf-consciousness, so thinghood cannot be anythmg hut. ahenated sell-consciousness." (1; 3, 335) T~ (,Ol1TI~Cr thIS Ideahst mystIficatIOn of human consciousness 1:('Inllon to the world of objects, Marx. explains that the ob­Jf'c.ls of, man's needs and instincts "exist ouside him, as objects Independent o.f him; yet these objects are objects lhat }~f' n.eeds· ('~sent13l objects, indispensable to the mani­r('~t.atiOn and confirmation of his essent' I " (I; .1, 336) la powers.

So we see t.hat Marx does not confme himself to criti-

',"' -~,

cizing Hegel's understanding of activity's relation to the world of objects. He counters idealist dialectics with the dialec t.i cal ·matf'riali st IIndrrstanding or the organic con nec t ion hf't.ween needs, abilities, attractions and objects through which they are fulfilled. For example, the ability to sec implies the existence of the sun; the emergence and development of this ability is the result of the sun's impact on the development of organic life. Furthermore, the very ex is tence of life implies a certain diversity of conditions. T his means that there i ~ an internal and not external con~ nection between living things and their "life forces" on the one hand, and the diversity of things which constitute their living conditions on the other. But this does not mean, as Hegel believes, that objects are produced by the abilities inherent in living things, that they are the objec­tivization of the spiritual potential, etc, This inner connec­tion of the living, including human life, and its supreme, spiritual manifestations with the diversity of the world of objects and the man-made "second na~ure" is a, pr?duct of the development of nature, man, SOCIety. Hegel 5, Ide~l­ism prevents him from grasping this law because Ideahst dialectics distorts the actual process of development.

Marx notes that Hegel "sees only the posit,i~e, n~t t~e negative side of labor". ("I; 3, 333) The poslll"e SIde IS that labor creates not only the things man needs. but also man himself as an active agent, member of S?Cle~r.' etc. In Hegel's words, man in the sphere of productIon IS ~ho end for himself, and he relates to nature as to soo:ethl.ng which is subordinatecl to him and which bears the ,lmpnnt

f 1 . t'vI'ty" (63' 2 449) Despite the profound '"SIghts o 115 ac I . " . . d )'t IT s of this understanding of producti.on (m ~stry , I sti::

r_

from bourgeois one-s idedness, whiCh, Marx" s~resses'l ~t~ln .' 1 t . "the end for 111mself III pro( nC lon,

tammg t 1a man IS . d t' I Hegel obviouslY forgets that for millenllla, pro uc 10~1 11.~~ ex loiled man;' therefore the prodnce,r at, say, a capita IS· . P" . I ast of all an end for 111015('1£.

enb: prJse, ~s I~egel does not connect the ~xistence of sIav-cours , .. ca 1italist exploitatIOn of labor, to

ery an~ serfdo?J. ~r II } defmite levels of ils de\'eIopmcnt. prodHchon~ t? 11Is~or~ca ~ s(,ribed by Lenin ;1S the germs TTrgel'~ hl'llhant In~lgl.lt., d~, not in'c!udr OIH' nhoul till' of hi~lol"ical Jll~I(,"W~I~;~I. ~ ~/ production, lhr so('iid form exi~t.cn('c or SOt 'la/ ref a WIlt cti\"e forces. Marx ~tresses that or the dc\'elopmcnt 0 prot u

!legel shares the yiew ~f the. cl".s~ical j1oliti~al l'r(lnon~y of his time which, for all Its sCll'nllhr iH'compllshnwllts, 1(/1'11 tines capitnl wilh accuJ1lulalrd lahor, pl'odl1~'li(ln of gootl~ with production of things in general · that. IS, prl'Jll'tllates thr capitalist fOl'lll of social production, sl'<'ing it as the only rational fOI'111 consistent with human nat.ul'C'.

The category of relations of production is the ('(' nl ral cat· cgory of historical materialism. In descl'ihing capitalist production relations and examining the laws goyerning their operation, class ical bourgeois political economy did not single out that category becausC' it regarded slave-own­ing and feudal relations not as a histor ically doflllite so­cial form of deyelopment of producLiYo [orces but as un­j ust legal institutions, expla in ed by the employers' lack or humaneness and economic competence. Hegel genera lly ,]m'ed this \'ie\\', The only difference was that he regarded sla,"ery and serfdom as historically necessary, inevitable form s in the de\"elopment of the "objectiYc spirit" of na­tions, with the latter realizing only gradually that freedom is the substantial essence of man.

Marx counters Hegel's one-s ided unders tanding of labor, his disdain for the antagoni stic con trad icti ons inh erent in the development of production with the concept of alienat­ed labor, which makes it easier to understand the devel­opment o[ priYate ownership, class con tradictions and ex­ploitation. Referring to the anlagonisLic social rclations of production, Marx says: " Labor is man's coming-to-be jar him.self wiLh in alienation, or as aliena.ted man. " ('1; 3. 333) AlienaLed labor is the alienation o[ the produ ct of labor and of the very productive a ctivHy, the tL'ansformation of hoth into spontaneous social forces that rule m en. Alienat­ed labor is antagonistic relations o[ production under which man suhjugates and exploits man. The alienation of labor which Hegel (and all bourgeois thinkers) fai ls to notice i !S in the fact that " lahar is external to th e wodwr i.e. it cloe ~ not belong to his intrins ic nature; that in hi ~ wdrk, lhcrefol'c , he does not affirm himself but denies him seH, d~)es not. feel con tcnt hut unhappy , does not develop freely I\J~ ph~';lcal .and m,enlal encl'gy hut mortifies hi s hody and flllil S Ill ;';' mille!. 11w wOJ'kC'J' thf'T'l'fon' onlv fe('l ~ himself (jlltsirl(' "i ~ work, ancl in 1.li ~ work f('('I~ outside hill1 ~C' Ir. l1e r('('1!-i . at home when h(' I!S not working, and when he i~ working he docs not feel nt home ... It is thcrcfoJ'f' not

thl! satisfacLion of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy IIf'f·,b {'xtf'l"lI .. d 10 il.·· (1; .~. 2i4)

11egf'l's lac.k or Hlldf'r:--tall(iillg of the negatin' a~jJec l 01" lahor lH'oves thal not only ideali~lIl but a1::50 the l)f)lIrgeoi:-; world outlook in genera l makes both tho materialist ull ­oerstandillg of history and the scientific-philosophical un · derstanding of practice as universal human activity a~so­lutely impossible. Practice in its .funda?1ental fol'~-I.c., as material production--is the baSIS which detel'mlD~s a.ll social life. In the broadest sonse of the word, practice IS

the active basis of the active process of cognition, Distinct forms of practice are the criteria of the verity of knowl­edge, especially those of its form~ w~ich are conne)c~ed. to cognition, first and foremo~t to SCientific research. 1 IaClIC.C enriched by, and directly [mked to, the dO\'elopment of SCI­

entific knowledge is the summit of knowledge, . . . Any human actioD, whether individu~l or coll.ecll~Te, I:::;

directly or indirectly connected to practICe. Practice IS not only the changing of natw'e but of. social relations too. An,Y instrumental act even when the IDstruments are a man s hands and legs,' is practical. This understanding of. prac­tice , of its universal character, i~, of c?urse,. total.Iy I~CODl~ patible with idealist philosopby, mc1udmg .dlalecttc~l Id~a\ ism, despite the fact that it was the first I.U the Justory 0,

philosophy to pose the questioll of tbe ulll\'C'rsal character

of practice, ,. , 11 the Thc MarxisL concept of rcvolutlOnary practice IS a "

m ore incompatible with idealism because. of th? latter.s 1 l"mitations. In their understanding of pr~~tlCe, bo.UI ­

c as.s I., 11 roceed from the empu'Jcal noLlon geols thlDkClS usun Y P l"f tl e need to satisfy of the need Lo reproduce human I e, ~ 1"f H egel "external" requirements instrumental to .1U1llan ]1 e,], ,

- . t tI overCOJ11mg of t 10 a ICI1,\ -tri es to connect pr~ctlce r ~~ eory is jnhel'ent in Hcivil tion which, accol'ddmgl to ("]s t 'all'el1~tion which he t['cals

. " B t ho ec aros 1a c ·, . society. . u . . r s i1'iL to its other-bolng, can as the UlllVel'sal Iel~tJ~~o~' led~c in what lIege I describcs only be overcome b). .t relf ion and philosophy. It is at its absolute forms. al ~t )l'a~tice .which Hegel reduces, precisely knowledge .anci n k :owledge that absolute idcal­in the final analY~ls, 0) 't'\"'tl1 .:tnd thereIore ascribes to , 'ct Ulliversa ac I < Ism re~m s as ... it does not possess. . it functions and ablhtlc]S I revolutionary practice, which

Hegel accords the 11 ace 0

,)<) ~ _ ,J /

is aware of the need to apply materia l forc£' agains t mate­ri al social relat ions tha t enslave th e' worki ng man, to pure Iy spiritual ac[.i\"i ly which has COI1lJllotdy I'C' T1 oUJlcl'd din~ct connection to material obj ects. This lllca mi that Hegel's overcoming of alienation is not practical but theoretical and C\'en speculatiYe. This supersediug of alienation is, in Marx 's words, " superseding in thought, which leaves its object in existence in the real world" , (1 ; 3, 341) Marx counters this seeming negation of alienation with its revo­lutionary-practical negation which really attains its ob­jective. In his famous Thes es on Feuerbach he says : "The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of hu­man activity or self-change can be conceived and ration­ally understood only as revolutionary practice," (1; 5, 4)

As I pOinted out earlier, Hegel's doctrine transforms the theoretical idea into the practical idea. In the context of this process, which in its purely logical form is the se1£­motion of the "absolute idea" and in its specific historical, temporal other-being is the history of mankind, Hegel poses the question about combining philosophy with practice, This combination is interpreted as the realization of philos­ophy, 00. the one hand, philosophy is the extratemporal seU-consclOusness of the divine "absolute idea'" and on the o~her, it is the seH-conscious " absolute spirit' :-Le., man­kmd throughout its historical development, Philosopby can be reahz~d only III thiS latter aspect, and Hegel directly connect~ It to the French Revolution. It is precisely in this conuectlOu that Hegel maintains: "The consciousness of th~ spiritual is no\~ essentially the basis, and through t his phtiosoP.hy now rClgns. It has been said that the French l1e.volutwn sprang from philosophy, and not without reason philosophy ~las been called world wisdom because it is not o~lY lru~h III and f.or i tself as pure being but also truth because lt comes abve through worldliness," (63; 4/ 924)

IIowe\er, one should Slress that in Hegel's . the tL'ansforrnal~on of philosophy into practice_ theVl~~~'ional transformatIOn of the world - did not find 't d . , I F 1 S a equate ex-pressIOn III t le 'fencll Revolution. lIegel foll h b quolation with these WOl'ds: "Thus one sl °1'dvS l e ab?ve

t t tl J t II I I' · lOU not 0 Jec o Le .ac lat t 1e I'evo utlOn received its fi . I ffom philosophy. But this philosophy is onl b rtst lmp~ se . . y a s ract thlllk­~ng, non-concretC' comprehensIOn or ab501ut t· I d it IS here where the great distinction lies." (6:; ~,u~;4)an

2?~

,\c(':ording to Hegel's logic, the French Revolution could on ly haw' I'palizcd the philosophy of the Enlightenmcnt, till' i d{'a ~ IIf Voltaire, Rous~cau, Viderot, lIolbach, Hche­ti llS, ct al. All these thinkers differed substantially fl'om one a nother but were united in their struggle against feu­da lism. ,\lthough Hegel justifies this struggle, he criticizes l ht' FJ'en('h Enlightenment, describing it as a subjective unders tanding of the task of rationally transforming soci­ety. Hegel sees the French Re\'olution (and revolution in general) as a social restructuring based on subjective hu­man reasoJl, while the objective-rational, the "absolute idea" ··"absolute spirit" is the social form of its being-is the dctC'fmining contcnt of the world historical process. Ac­cording to Hegel, the highest forms of realization of "ab­solute spirit" are not revolutions but the state ("objective spirit") and forms of social consciousness-art, religion a nd philosophy- which he interprets as forms of compre­hending the absolute and therefore defines as "absohlte knowledge".

Any revolution fights against the existing state power. lIegel vindicates the French Reyolution and its ideologists, bUl he does not regard re\'olutions as a necessary, objec­tively inevitable form of the rational transformation of soci­ety because he fails to detect the antagonism of social re­lati ons and ignores the class nature of the state. He sees the Reformation as a form of the rational transformation of social rela tions. However, aware that the Reformation was also a revolution albeit in a religiOUS guise, Hegel concludes: "A principle is fa lse if it maint~ins that l'i¥ht and freedom can throw off their fetters WIthout free 109 conscience, that revolution is possible without reforma tion. " (63; 4, 931-32) , ..,

Thus accol'ding to Hegel, philosophy can find Lt~ obJcc­tive l'e~lization and truly combine itself w!th p l'~Cll~C' only through reforms carried out by the state Itself. fillS com­promise view expresses the class position of the Gel"l~1<ln bourgeoisie and its desire to peacefully tl'ansfOl:m. a 1('11-

dal monarchy into a bourgeois one. Hc~ce H.egel ~ HI('al ~)f the state: constitutional monarchy. Bu~ 10 thiS (a~l.d Olh~l) form of state organization, paramount Llllportan.cC' 1::-; ac.rOl~ C'd to religion and not to philosophy. lIeg.('1 IS C(~n~·LIICltl that "the Protestant Church. h.as r('conc,~ed rell,gL.on ~? law. There is no sacred religIOUS conSCience \\ Inch I:;

?'j') ."

isolated from, or even opposed to , secular law' (63;

4, .\~~:' J'd ing 10 li egcl , the ~ l a tl'.' and l,~ p.l'cially con~titn tiona I IllOllarcily, is thl' :s u!Js laulH\l l'mbudlllll'llt 01' H'M:'OU.

But what then is lhc rolc oC philosophy in social progress; Ilegel's approach. to thi ~ quc~tion i ~ contradictory. Hc ho.ld~ that philosophy IS realized J1\ society as a force cnsllrmg the ad\'l.\J1cemcnt of culture. But his conviction is even ~tl'ongcr that philosophy m~st never becol~le pra.ctical. Phi losophy deals above all wIlh contemplatIOn, wLth the ra­tional comprchension oC tho existing. Slimmi ng up his un­derstanding of philosophy's rela tion to practice, lIegel says: "Philosophy deats only with the brilliancc of the idea~ re­nected in world history. Aversion for the clash o[ dIrect passions in reality prompts one to undertake a philosophi­cal examination; its interest is to grasp the development of the seH-realizing idea, namely, the idea of freedom which exists only as the consciousness 01 Ireedom." (63; 4, 938)

111 t841 young Marx proceeded Crom H egel's theory abollt the relation oC the theoretical idea to the practical one and, in his doctorate thesis, concluded that by consist­ently developing its postulates, philosophy necessarily turned into revolutionary practice. True, at that time Marx generally shared Hegel's idealism, especially its Young IIe­gel ian interpretation and held that nnw practice of philoso­phy is itsell theoretical." (1; 1,85) But subsequently Marx crowned his philosophical development with the creat ion or dialectical materialism and scient ific communism. Marx concludes that since revolutionary theory seizes the masses it becomes a material Corce. lIe singles out tho work­ing class [rom among all those oppressed and exploited as the most revolutionary, capable, by its very position in capitali~t society, o[ destroying all political and economic o"pl·e~sLon.

Marx counters the Young Hegelian nphilosophy of self­consciousness" by proving that by itseH, philosophy can­not yet realize the humanitarian ideals it has worked out in till' course of its historical dcyelopment. "Phi losophy rann~)t be made a r7alily without the abolilion of the pro­If'tanat, the proletanat cannol he abolished without philos­op~y being mado a reality." (1; 3, 187) This means that phIlosophy nalul'al~y, the revolutionary philosophy which arriv{'~ at the negatIOn of capitalism and thereby at the nc-

240

g-at ·o.Jl of il~l rlJrl1l~ of domination (IWl' man- ·i~ to become the Hll'oJc!glcal hanll{'l" of the rmancipalion movement of till' worklllg c1a:-;:-;. Ih(· world outlook of thl! Communist Party. · ... \ s philosophy lind~ it~ material \\('apon~ in tilt' pr~leta l'L at, .~o the proletariat fmds its spiritual weapons in phl ~ osoph):- . ( 1; .J. 187) This radical change of philosophy's SOCial POSltlOJI al~o transforms its content and relation to ~oc i a l practice and 1'ocial reality in generaL

Thus, having posed the problem of the univC'rsalily of prac ti cr and adYanCl'd a number of fundamental poslulate~ about the epistemological role oC practice and the part it plays in the shaping of the human personality, Hegel is nevertheless unable to grasp socio-historical practice, rna terial production as the active, determining basis of social l ife, and the emancipation struggle of the working people as a trC'lHenciollsly important historical form of rc\'Olutioll­ary socio-political activity. Marxism-Leninism conn{'cts the solution of the prohlem of the uniycrsality of praclice lIe­gel posed to the I"l'Yolutionary transformation of philosophy and Jlractice by cl'ealiYCiy combining the two. This can be attained only through the communist transformation of so­ciety and the creation of a scirntific-philosophical, dialec­tical . materiali~t wodd outlook.

LEI'iII'i ON THE IIEGELUN CONCEPT OF TilE COlNClDEI'iCE OF DL\LECTlCS,

LOGIC AI'iD EPISTEMOLOGY

Lenin docs not believe that lIegel 's dialocUes has been fully reshaped in the materialist spirit and continues the work of Marx and Engels in this regard. The .soviet phi­losopher E. V. Ilyenkov is right to say that "in the [orIll of a critical analysis of Hegel's concept, LeDin examines the state of this philosophy of his time, compares and eval­uates the various approaches to its cardinal problems" (21; 213) . This is borne out not only by Lenin's notes on The Science of Logic and other works by Hegel but also by Lenin's own works. For example, Materialism and Em­pirio-Criticism, like Engels' Anli-Diihring, is a work on the history of philosophy. That is how we should interpret Lenin's words in the article "On the Significance of Mili­tant Materialism" about the need for a further s tudy and materialist interpretation of Hegel's dialectics.

Lenin's analysis of the Hegelian philosophy singles out those fundamental precepts of lIegel's dialectics which pre­"lously remained unnoticed. Above all this applies to the principle of the coincidence of dialectics, logic and the the­ory of knowledge. Materialistically interpreted, this prin­ciple has become part of Marxist philosophy. Therefore its {'xamination makes it poss ible to better understand the l'e­labon ot dialectical materialism to the Hegelian philosophy and tho classical philosophical heritage in general.

\legel's understanding of dialoctics as a theory of knowl­edge . and logic is rather abstract and idealistically distort­eli. Hegel sees it as directly following [roUl the fundamen­lal idealist postulate. The latter regards everything exist­Ing as born o[ thought which is interpreted not only and flot so )~uch as h~'ma.~ a~th'ity but as the seH-propulsion of the absolute Idea . ;:'\evertheless, Lenin s tresses that despite its idealist mystirlcation, Hegel 's approach to this problem is lhe theoretical start ing l)oint for its dialectical-

lIwtrnnll!'t ..;nlntion 11)0. For (~xample, refl'lTing to the ill Irlldllrtion III S('elioll III of TJI(~ Science rjf Logic and the apprupriate paragraphs of Encyclopedia Of the Philosopht. cal Sciences in Outline (paragraphs 213-215), Lenin says tha L th"y "AHI': I'LHIlAl'S TilE llEST EXl'OSrno:\ OF DIALECTICS. Jiere too, the COinCidence, so to speak, of logic and epistemology is shown in a remarkably brilliant way", (10; 38, 192)

Tho section and paragraphs in queslion deal with the "idea" which is defined as "the adequate concept, objec­Li vely true or true as such", (64; 5, 236) In Hegel's termi­nology, an adequate concept is one. whos~ conten~ IS thought itself and not external, matel'lal realtty per~el~ed through the sensos. Accordingly, he defines the obJectlve truth as the coincidence or the object o[ knowledge and Lbc concept described as the object's essence. graspe~ by thought There is definitely a rational element lD these Ideal­is t postulates because knowledge (and therefore truth) docs not merely record or reproduce phenomena but also reveals their essence and laws which are grasped and formed through concepts. Of course, we must .remember H~­gel's opinion that "something is true o~ly ~nasmuch a~ It is the idea" . (G4; 5, 236) lIegel explams It by stre::;!;lng that " the kind of reality which does not cor~'espond to the concept is merely a subjective, accidental, arbltrar~ phenom­enon which is not truth". (64; 5, 238) But slD~e ev.en this precept rejects the nominalist (and cOllcep~uah.st) 1Il­

terpretation of t.he concept and scienti fic abstractIOn lDdgen­eral it indireclly points to the need for a correspon ence

, ' d b' t I knowledge betweo~ concepts an 0 ,Jec.s a "The Idea'" in Hegel's The

In 1115 notes. on til,e !;ocllOo I He ers "idea" is a mys-Science of Loglc Leom S!lOWS t latma;kind which through tified portl'ayal ?f. lhe history \\?fed e increasingly grasps its practical aCl.l\'lty ~~d knOt I oJ being. Materialistically and transforms Its em !lonmon a L ' <.ys' "Tho Idea

, Ill's IJostulatcs entn ~ . interpretlllg ege I d ) , t1;c coincidence (conformity) (read:. man's kno.w e, ~e I~he 'universal') . This- fu's~ .. of noLton and obJ~dtl\ It?' ~I c relation of the subjoct lnly

"Secondl):, .lhe. fea. ~~sel; (= independent, as il WOI'O) (= mao) , \\}~Ic:h IS ?I is distillct (from this Idea) .... to the obJecllnty wluch. I to destroy this ::;cparat.101l

"Subject.idty is the l~npll se (of -the idea from the object).

243

".

"Cognition is till' process of tilt' !'illhm('l'~jon (of t1" mind) in an inorganic nat~lrc for tI~e sake of sllb~)J'(linating it to the power of tht' suhJect anel lor till' ~(lkl' ul gelll'rali. zaLion (cognition of the uninn-i<\! in its phenoIll£'na) ...

"The coincidence of thought with the object is a procesii : t.hought (= man) must not imagine t.ruth in the form or dead repose, in the form of a baro picture (image), pale (mall), without impulse, without mot ion, like a geni us, like a number, like abstract thought." (10; 38, 194-95)

Lenin's conclusions both explain how Hegel mystifies the history of knowledge and show the rational element of his ('oncept. Hegel has l'oyealcd the unity of ontology (the the­ory of beingL logic and epistemology ancl delivered a pro­found critique of their metaphysical opposition. Contrary to the opinion of metaphysicians, ontological definitions of reality-that. is, the categories describing t.he world as a whole, its motion, development, etc.-are not final truths hut the developing knowledge about the world.

The need for an epistemological extl.lllination of the cat­egorical definitions of objective reality is rooted in the \·ery nature of dialectical and historical materialism. The epistemological interpretation of ontological definitions makes our understanding of their objective content more pro­found and reveals its relation to the C'xisting level o[ the development of knowledge. Ontology thus becomes the epi­stemology of objective reality. The prominent Soviet phi­l~sopher B. M. KedI'o\' stresses qUite rightly that "to recog­nize the unity of dialectics, logic and the materialist the­ory of knowledge means to admit that a Marxist cannot even try t~ pose philosophical questions either as purely methodologlcal, completely isolated from the theory of knowledge (from materialism), or as purely epistemologi­c~l, cOJ?pletely isolated from .the method of cognition (from clialectlcs), or as purely logical, completely isolated from both the materialist theory o[ knowledge and the dialecti­cal method, the way it was possiblc in classical formal log-ic." (23; 6-7) <

Le~i.n·s phi~m,ophi~al definition of matter is a highly pffectl\c and lOstrnctlvc examille of the el»·stem I . I· t . f· 0 oglCa In~ erprelatlOn 0 an ontological category an ·nt t t·

J . d . . .' I erpre a Ion la.sc. on the ap~hcat.lOn of the MarXist princi )Ie of the

cOIncidence of dlaleclics, logic and the theory of LI d We know that Lenin's epistemological definitio~O\:: ~e~

cafl'gory of matter docs not include such obvious phy~ica l eiwrad('ristics as its existence in space and time, its mo­lion; naturally, these afC not excluded because LC'nin con ~idC'rs tiJem secondary or such that will possibly he reject· cd hy Ihp subsequent development of natural science. The episll'moiogical definition of matter records (naturally, in the most general form) its distinction from consciollsness· that is, it sera pates objectiY(' and subjective reality. It would he wrong to regard this philosophical concept of matter as negative, meaning that matter is not mass, some~ thing possessing a molecular and atomic structure , etc., but objective reality. Lenin's philosophical deftnition of Illtl.tter is not negati\"{> but positive. Besides, it points to I.he necessary epistemological condition of any possible sci­entific dcsription of material processes. This means that all characteristics of matter-both known to science and as ye t undiscovered-should be viewed as objectively real antl therefore existing independently of cognitive activity. .

Cognition is a historical process, and its. inte~pretatiOn and generalization is the central task of dJaleclical-mat~­rialist epistemology. Seen from this anglc, epistemology IS

also the theory of those phenomena and laws of the world which are revealed in the course of the historical de'·el opment of knowledge. Epistemological categories lar?e.ly f?­fer not only to cognitive activity (and human actiVity 111

general) but also to reality which is in~epcndcnt o~ mall. In other words, epistemology also comprises categol'les de~ scribing the object of knowledge.. .

Logic (dialectical logic) is not Simply a SCience about the subjective forms and rules of human thought. .Its O~l. jcct cannot he separated from that which is coglllz?d .In iogical forms, anel the latter cannot lw regard cd as JIldlf­fcrent to the content embodied in them.

Hegel rcsolutely criticizes tho.se .who sec logical form !' only as formal fu.nc!ions of thmkillg. and confine, tben~~ !-iC'lvcs to the descnplwn of these funcllODs. Of c.our.:;e, th. critique docs not apply only to Kant (~l.though It docs i.\~. ply above all to him) but to all, tradltlO~al, formal logiC which begins wilh Aristotle. 'Vhl~e stress~ng that t~e de-

. fon of the forms of thought lrre~pechve of thclr con· ~~~It \~'as a grrat accomplishment. of .\ristotlc's, IIcQe.t c;.lll~ for a further c...:amination of ,thc$(' forms aU.d of thclr log: ically gcneralized content.. 1he first task IS to see ho\\

the.5c IOl'Jn .. ll functions of thought "hy lhl'Jll~('lvl's Cone_ spand to truth". In this connection, Lenin points to the ide. alist vagueness, reticence and my:-;tiri~m in TIt'gal's ap­proach to the problem, but he also stresses that Hegel tries to understand logical forms as the quintessence, the Sum. ming-up of the history of thought.: HIn this conception, log_ ic coincides with the theory of knowledge. This is in geu­eral a yery important question." (10; 38, 175)

Genera1iy, Hegel examined the coincidence of dialectics, logic and epistemology mostly in connection with his ex­position of dialectical logic. Naturally, in creating a met­aphysically closed philosophical system supposed to have completely grasped the absolute, lIegel does not raise the point that the philosophical theory of the world and know­ledge which sums up the continning history of knowledge cannot be completed. He was equally uninterested in exam­ining the dialectics of the transition from sensuous ex­perience to abstract theoretical thinking. Lenin says that Hegel failed to understand this dialectical, leap-like tran­sition and that it was inevitable because thought, Wllich Hegel interpreted as the substance of things, was accord­ingly described as the source of notions, contemplation, senSe perceptions. According to Hegel, "In all forms of spir­it-in feeling, contemplation and notion thought remains as the basis." (64; 7, 111)

~aLurally, the problem of the coincidence of dialectics, logic and epistemology also comprises the C'xamination of the relation between the dialectical laws of objective real­ity itself and the Jaws of it s reflection in epistemology and logic. But Hegel only tentatively poses these questions which arise on the basis of the materialist interpretation of nature and the knowledge of it. Still, his approach to the coincidence of dialectics, logic and epistemology is among the greatest accomplishments of pro-Marxian philoso­phy.

. lIC'gel 'proceeds from the identity of being and thought, Il1t('t'prf'tln~ it in the spirit of objective idC'alism: he seeS tI~{)lIght (since it comprise~, the entire diversity of reali­t~) not so much as an ahlhty inherent in the individual !mt as l.Ile source, tht? original CSSCI1('(' of cvC'rything cxist-1,lle .", \~llIch ,n:a.:h(,g 1I11,' slIlll,mit of its dt'wlopnwnt and seH­(/)II~("101I.51H ss 10 m<.ln anel In Inunan I,,··t .. \,. d I·. 11 I· 1 . <!"i on..lCwe 101 t liS ang e, (>\,crytiling eXisting is a l11anif~station of tlli:,

246

,lmniprespnt, Suprahlllll<ln thought (the "absolute idea") which appears as hoth subject and ollject (in ITegcl\ trr­minology, sllbjC'ct·ohject), both knowledge (absolute know· Icdge) and tite' objC'ct of knOwledge, of philosophy., .

~aturalJy, no onC' denies the fact that the eXaD1111atlOn of the laws of knowledge, thought is among the central tasks of philosophy. ITowe\,er, Hegel's idealist understand ing of the objC'ct of philosoph,Y i,nevitably le~ds t? a my?· tical intC'rprt'taUon of the cOlllcHlence of dlalcclIcs, Jog~c and epistemology, a question he himself poses" .Thls IS graphically seen in his understanding of t~le transJtI~n from the abstract to the concrete. Hegel is right to pomt out that. the development of scientific knowledge pr~cecd.s fr~m abstract, one-sided, incomplete knowled~e (which Imphes the breaking-up of the object. of study mto separate parts and aspec l!'!, and the examination of each of these sepa· rately) to concrete knowledge which unites the already examined separate aspects OJ" pm;ts of the object?f study tl~a~ arc abstracted from the whole. ·The concret~ IS the. unlt\ of different determinations, principles; to achle,'e their. ful de\'elopment and appear fully determined before con~CiOUSj ness these must fir~t be establishcd and fully de\ elope

, t I " (6?· 18 182) However, Hegel puts a mystical sepam. e y. " ,., , . .. d presents construction on this actual cogllltJve proce~s an.: it as ontological ---in other words, he deSCrIbes the transl~ lion from the abstract to the concrete as tl~e ~Jllergence

and development of things themseh·es. ofdrea~ltYd'~~t~~~· l~~i . r to Marx Hegel was wrong to uo ers an .

COIC ,Ing . It < of' thought which synthesizes itself in Itse,lf, ?S t Ie. ~esu.t If 'n its01f and dcveloping from itself; wht~: IllllTIelStng I se I, tI b"'tract to the cOllcI'ete l~ lIn,elyn~ct~~~dy ~~lr'~~~~~ \~t;~i~h t~~'O~ght appropriatets tBhe

t ctol17s

o , tJ 'ritually concre e. u c('ete and repl·ocluces It as iBlsPI~. of the cOllet'etC' is by no means a process of tie emelgencc

itself:" (7; 1',22) f. 1 Marx graphically expl'es~es the Ol~ TillS quotatIOn lOll I r· I·olcctical matC'l'ialism and tit .. . the apI)1"oac I 0 (h, < 'I POSItIOn In· < • 'd ce of dialectics logiC anc . ·1 I· to the COlnCl en . '. I

alecltcai I( ea Ism . t Hegel the laws go"erOing t H'

epistemology. Acco~dl~~C' ~Ndity ~lo not exist outsidC' al~d dcniolJIllC'nt of obJec "I 1 I' ·'1 ...... " tll"t i .. thought 11\ , f tl itlf:.Ollt I ~U, ",' ,,', independentl,) (), . Ie tiOfl' (}bjecti,'c reality dissolws iD t lis it s abf:.olule IntC'IJl!~~a '\lId :-;inC(' IIl'gel pl"('~cnts knowled~(' slip rahuIllan thoug .

holh as a subjC'ctiYe human Jlrocl'~s a nd (IS the ontological (,~~l'nc{' of the objectiyc wurld, hi s ont.ology dil'eftly hlcnd~ wilh logic and epistemology. Tns tead of the l'oncrete unity of dialectics, logic and the theo)'y of knowledge, which does not rule out certain distinctions among them (Hegel stresses that dialect.ical identity comprises difference), there is the lotal identity which cancels out the distinction between subject and object, thought and being, reflection and ob­jcctive reality.

But the complexity of the coincidence of dialectics, logic and epistemology is rooted, alllong other things, in these distinctions, in the fact that laws of being cannot be de­duced from thought; they are merely rellected in thought, in logical forms, categories, elc. The fact lilat thought, sci­('ncc reflect, comprehend forms of matter's existence does not at all mean that these forms or matter's being ( [or ex­ample, molion, time, space) are generated by thought. A !'cientiflc solution of the problem concerning the coinci­dence of dialectics, logic and epistemology must fully take into account the distinc ti \'C aspect of cognition as a reflec­tion of the cxternal wod el in human consciollsness. The lat­ter, unlike the mythical "absolutc idea", is historically lim­ited, exists in time and space, and comprehends the sur­rounding reality above all because the la Uc]' affects man's ~('nso]'y organs.

\Vaming against a one-sided epistemological interpre ta­tion of the object of Marxist philosophy, the Soviet philos­opher L. F. Ilyichev aptly l'emarks: "A n effective exami­nation or logical-methodological, epistemological problems lal'g{'ly depends on progress in the theory 0/ objective dia­l~ctics" because subjectiye. dialectics I'enects the objective (halectlcal process. The pllliosopher pursuing his s tudy in another direction would risk a formalistic intcl'l'peLalion of methodology and epistemology, an isolation of the theory of knowledge from the fundamental dialectical -materialist ~h(,ol'~ of ob)ec~i\'e I'ea~ily," ,(22; 100) Hegel's panlogislll IIlrmtlftes ohJectlve l'eahty With its reflection in conscious­ness, knowl~dge, But Hegel no doubt understands that !<~nse p,erceptlO~s are man's direct link to t.he external mate­rial .()~)J,r('ts which :"urround him. I rC'n('e hi~ a~se:,,!;ment of {>mplrl(,.I~m as a n('ce~:-:.ary ('kment or cognition. IIowcvel' he idc~tifi(>s ernpirici!;~ and scns~t!onalism with the met~ tilphysH'a l Undf!rstandlOg of cognition and regards man's

"I", ~- I )

direct ~e llsOi'y I'elation to the external world as a disguise to ill' rC'mov('(1. For example, In the beginning of the Phe, nomenology 0/ Spirit he analyzes the ~ensory relation or suhject. to object and ~ays that the object, as seen by the subject, "i~ whether it is or is not, known: it remai?f:. even when it is not known; but there IS no knowledge If therC' i!' 110 object." (611; 2, 75) Howeyer, a further analysis oJ the so-ca lled sensory verity is completed by the con~lu­sion that the object of sense perception is not S?meth l~lg definite, but, on th(' contrary, that it is some lIldeft~lte "th iS", " here", "now" which can be applied to any obJcct and points, first and foremost, lo the exist.enc~ o~ the sub­ject. "lts truth [the truth of sensory v.enty] IS III the ob~ ject as an object in~lCrent,in me .(a~s memem Gegen~tan?e), or in the opinion (lin Memen); It IS because I kuo\\ of ~t. (64; 2, 77) Thus, irl'especti\'e of consciousness, the eXist­ence of the object is described as an appearance" and mate­rialist sensationalism, as the viewpoint of ordinary con­sciousness which is alien to philosophy. , ' t-

By rejecting materialist sensationahs~n, Hegel reJe.c oS

the theory or reflection. He uses the concl'pt of renectlOn mostly to descl'ihe the COI'reiation of di,fferenl, m~ltually de­termining moments of e~~cnct'., In thiS ('ono~ctlOn, lIege,l ~ay!; that in essence "all is pOSited as the be~ng ?/. re{lec

e lion, a being which shiues in the olher and III \\lllCh th othC'l' !:ihines". (64; 6, 229) , . "

TI' 'd('ali~t distortion of the concept of reflectIOn IS c~· , . ]]:0;,1, Y t'le ract that Hegel 's philosophy treats cognl -

p alJlN ),. . "1' tun' lion as a procC'ss inherent in things llel~l!'e Y('s'. III .na ~ '1'1 at too idealistically distorts the obVIOUS obJect,lve ~e

,l'si'i 0[' cognition as a process historic~lly determlll~? ).Y

I'~~i~~i;~:~;.;c~tc,~~ ~~~~~;is n~~~,~~:~n:oJ~c~~ L ?~~:e~~~,~I:;-~, . , he contl'RI'Y, mateflal objects arc 10 ('c· ,'~al ?,bjects, on t , t That is why he tries to "!'Ind only a tlOllS or tht' COI1Cl,tl '. "'·S external being "c(> till' fl'l'l' ' .. , r us ourse v(>s In I . ( , ,~ . , '" llllllOI 0 ", t ro" 'Ie sla tes eXI)hclt y: III . ISll1'ltlo nau . ( reflection 0 I I images of the concept, but in thc ages or nature arc, ~l'~g "(64' 7 696 6Hfl) elem('n t of ('xt~rna e,1 ,.".",.,)(,:\1' ;)lIt Lenin's. I'l'mark nholll

.,., II 'gel Jail pos II ". , I , , I(>.';e ~ < ffl 't between the ic!Nl.lislll of J ego ;I.IH

the idC'o,~glcal.a I:~~ Yarded matrl'ial things as pail" itUPN: lhal of Ilato \\,ho ,f!. of otherworldly idl'as ami COIll'l'pt:-, fect, di~lol'ted Ilnag l ~

While noting Hegel's ncgatin' altitllde to matcl'inli!'t ~l'n­sationalism, to the matcriali:-:t. throry of reflection -which clearly made it impossible to tackle scientifically the prob. lem of the coincidence of dialectics, logic and epistemo. logy-we must draw a firm di\'iding lin£' bctWCCIl the ab. jccti,'c content of IIegel 's philosophy and its suhject iYc ex­position. The point is that ITcgC'l's d ia lec tical intcfpfctalion of forms of thought brings him closer than his predeces. 501'5 to the understanding of their actual relation to objec­tiyc reality. Aboyc all, Hegel puts an end to the tradition­al belief that logic deals only with subjective forms of thought. OpPOSing the Kanlian interpretation of logical forms as a priori and consequen tly subjective, Hegel un­witt.ingly approaches the correct understanding of logical relations as form s of reOection of objective reality. His well-known postulate that aU things are speculative deduc­tions is a good example. Lenin refers to Hegel's transition from deduction by analogy to that of necessity and says: "Hegel actually proved that logica l forms and laws are not an empty shell, but the reflection of the objecti\-e world. More correctly, he did not prove, but made a brilliant guess." (10; 38, 180)

Thu.s, a~thou~h Hegel rejects the materialist principle of r~nechon III epIstemology, he inevitably a rrives at conclu­s~ons ~hat bear out and develop thi s principle in connec­tion \\"lt~1 the v.ery complex question about. forms of thought and their relatIOn to forms of being.

<?PPosing the subjectivist, fOI·malistic interpretation of logical forms espeCially d.istinct in Kantian philosophy, Heg:l does not confine LogIcal forms only to judgments, de­ductIOns, etc. We know that Hegel takes a broad view of forms of thought .as c0n:tprising all the mOrc general con­cepts a~d categol'les which renect general and substa ntial c?nneC~IO~S and relations among phenomena. That is why hl.5 logiC InchHles th? ~oncepts. of quantity, quality, meas­Ole, e~sence, ~ontt'adlctlOn, baSIS, phenomenon, a eara ee, causahty, reality, necessity fl'eedom ele But p]Pk l}l, t I " . un I C \.an, w lOse transcendental analysif; also (h~als with such con-cC'pts, Hcgel sees all tllPse categol"ies not as s b' tive forms of human thought hut as dcfinitions of ll' U Jelc . I " I' I . I I · . lings t H:om­se \es Wile 1 al'(' lIH ('pCtl( ('nt of man 's wi ll B'I I"

I · I . I ' . eSlf es liS oglc a so Inc tl(les the concepts of the meel . I' I I . I' lamca ane c ICmlca pl"ocesses , life and purposeful actiVity.

'r', -.~

(

1("J.WI f'I'P9 his miss ion in the analysis o[ the motion and 11I1f'rJ"elationships of all scienti fiC categories because logic Illtl~t 11£' the s(, jl'lIC'e of knowledge in the entirety of its d(,H'lufJlIlcnt. Lpnin ca ll s thi s defmition of logic brilliant. (10: :18/ 1O~) IIp va lues equally highly the inclusion of tllf' eategOi'y of life into logic and lIegel's approach to the place of practice in dialectical logic. 'Without these c~tc­gol"ies, dialectical logic cannot reflect the forward-monng development of knowledge and its objective content which d{'lerminC's appropriate logical forms.

\'aturally, one should remember that in his introduction of the so-called ontological categories into logic, Hegel does not conftne himsel[ to merely posing the problems o[ dia­lectical logic; he is substantiating the system or absolute idealism which transforms actual history into the history of sclf-knowledge, of the self-development of the concept whereby the much-vaunted "absolute idea" allegedly man­ifests ilself and comprehends itself. Exposing the Hege­lian mvstiflcation of objecti\'c reality and o[ it::; reflection in men\ consciousness in the course of the historical de­nlopment of knowledge, Marxist-Len.inist .philosopl~y pro­duces a matC'rialist solution of the dialectical r~l.atlO~ be­tween the objecli,'e historical process and cognlll,on. fhat is how dialectical materialism approaches Heg.el s pos~u­lates about the connection, mutual transformation, notion and deyclopment of concepts. . '

Lenin dC'sc(·ibes the key problems of. ~ialeclIc~1 logiC as follows: "Logic is the science ~f cogllltion. !t IS the th: ­ory of knowledge. I\nowledg~ IS the renec.tlOn o~ naLLue by mall. But thi s is not a Simple, not an I~lmedlate, .not a complete renection, but the process o[ a senes o[ a,bsltac­tions, the forma tion and development of co~ce}Jts~~\\ s, etc., and these cOnCelJts, laws, etc. (thought, s~lence - the lo~­'cal Idea') embrace conditionally, approxlmatel.y, the unl ­Ivcrsal law-governed c1uu'ac ter of eternally ~~\,In~ an~l .d~'I-

I · ,t II'e" (10' 38 182) Thus mediation IS I) pIC.\ v(, oping n" t. .: . of aIL stages of COg l1l tlO n. .

13ul if sciC'ntific knowledge of objecti,-e. reality. cann(~l I '1' (l'atC' reflection if it is necessarily mediated, It )e I 5 1111111(' .. 'I I cort'lin r II . II at ecien ti lic knowledge a ways repl"esell·~ ~ , o 0\\ S . I. ' I I II I 1siLi)fl 1'1'0111 '. ,,' tI It"'p lolllllent of know ('( ge, Il' ntl. { ~ t,\ g{~ Itl .1C' {t.; .jedgl' I"rolll one t,'!W of kn(lw)t'dgl' to :\~11~~)II;~:~,{'(;n~:~e pll~~;~und ~ne. It also m"eaDs that any knowJ-

., - I -,

edge must be examined in it~ fl'lalion. t,o a d.iffrl'cnt, pre. \"iou~ type of knowlcrlgr, for the cognitIOn 01 aDy object of ~ciCllCC i~ also the frsult of its uwn deH·topment. The same applies to the categories which are the logically gen. t'ralized content of knowledge developing in history. But the history of knowledge is infmite; therefore, categories as the logical forms of uni\"ersalitY--Dll1st also change and tieyclop. The principle of the uniYCfsality of development must be successively applied to all categories of philoso­phy and science without exception. As Lenin says, "if every­thing develops, does not that apply also to tho most gcn­(,l'al concepts and cotegories of thought? If not, it means that t.hinking is not connected with being. If it does, it means that there is a dialeetics of concepts and a dialec­Lics of cognition which has objective signiftcance." ( 10; "S, 256)

Thus, any absolute treatment o[ categories, including lliOsc of dialectical matcrialism- in olher words, disregard of the constant need for their fnrther development and gen­eralization-in the final analysis replaces dialectics with the metaphysical mode of thinking. EYen empirical discov­eries in geography, astronomy and othC'r sciences arc e~­s('ntially the results of til(> dp\"clopm('nt of those sciences. This is particularly true nr the basic concepts o[ this or that sciencf', especially philosophy.

\"at\lrally, the conccpt of the atom or the molecule ",bove all implies the objective existenc£' of these material parti­cles because this concept renects the objective fact that fllO~s and nl.oleeules ('xist. But equally ohviol1sly, t.he sci­('~\tlflc reflectlOn of lhe giycn objective [",ct has become pos· slhle .due to the developmeot of certain knowledge and ap­propnate methods and mC'ans o[ study, Viewed from this angle, the modern scientific concept of the atom or mole~ c\lle su~s uP. the history of knowledge.

Tn 1m; crlhcal interpretation or TlegC'I's dialectics Lenin c:()n~t.n.lltly ~tressC's that the scicntilic understanding' of oh­JPc'II\"{' fpahty at caeh given stage of devC'lopment also ~Ilms ,up the history of knowl(ldge about the fcal world, lhe Ills tory' ?f the sc.iC'nces and of the vcrsatile practical humnn flrllvlly. rt is pr<'ci<:.ply hy reason or II "l ' I , , . . . • • ' ·10 liS orlca

c en oplnI'nt of knnwlrdg(' (\dlllnllt whiell ·t I n .. \ cannot cor·

red y ro crt external rC'allty) thn.t the RcientifJe (I' I l' I I . I' 1 I l' r ' Ja ec lea· rna erla IS IlD( crstao( Ing 0 the world is .Is tl . o IC SCICO-

252

t fl llIcipr:--tanclillg of cognition as a process. For example, t Il history of physics historically rc\"{'als not only its ob· jl'ct <mel tilt' scil'ntiil(, und('r:-ilanding of the latter, but ulso thp proCl's:; of cognition of physical laws uncI the distinc· tive fe.ltures of this proce~:;, the emergence and devC!lop­ment of physical categories, the interrelationship of these categories, etc.

Tn the dialectical-materialist view, the theory o[ know­ledge can only he the sum~ing-up of the ~istory of kno.'~,:­ledge, t.he history of the sCiences and practical human ach\­ity for only this summing-up of real history, of the real experience of knowledge can help soh'e key epistemologi­cal problems-let alooe those issues of the theory of koo\y~ ledge whose very formulation is. dir.ectly linked to certalD stages in the de\'elopment of SCientific know~~dge ~nd. so­rial practice. The Soviet philosopher M. A. hJss~1 IS fight 10 say that Marxist philosophy "is not ontolog~ 111 the old sense of the term, that is, it is not a speculatively devel­oped theory of being which shuos scientific knowledge about

tho world", (~4; 170) . , . ' d '0 Traditional philosophical empmclsDl. substantiate t I

principle of the sensory origin of theoretICal knowledge an~ arbitrarily reduced epistemology to the psychol~gy o[ kno~\ I lodge. Today, the psychology of k~ow.le~ge IS. a specla science mostly studying the huma~ mdlvldual who posses~ ses certain cogoitive abilities, The Importance of PSYC~O~~g­ical studies for the substantiation and de\'elopmen~ 0 t t&r lectical-materialist epistemology must oot be ~iU orra ~(. But tt is equally obvious that opis.temo.log~, '~hlch studl.e~ the development of knowledge (pflm~~11y lU It~ categofl~1 r. ) deals with the aggregate ~O.gDltl\'e ,exper.lenc~ 0.[ i ' OIm:. d not with the indlvldual. 'I.hat IS, pleCISe ). manklDd, an ,. f d· lectical-materialist eplstemolog3 why th~ eXposltltOe~ ~s a I~ecapitulation of the psychologi~ cannot e prosen s~lion perception and thinking. cal theory about S?; b t'the theory of knowledge also ap­

What I havc stU a. ou 'os. categories are the key junco I , t d'alecticalloglC WI ·l· pies 0 I. r the historical process of coglll lOn,

lures, the maJ~ Rtages 0 . this process froDl the \'il'Wpoiol D·' t· al logiC SUDlS up . d d lo I la ec IC , 1.1 ategorics emcrglDg an eve 1-01" the logical fOrID,S ~n ",Cation to one anollll'r, :\alur<llly, . . 't nd of t IClr 1l .. r' t) In~ In J a ,. that dialectical mall'rlalisID I:l' ~ISl'S . ( thiS docs not ~nc<\n'lilosophical probl(llll:" or matcnuilst lila deal with speCial P

~cct!cs-such as the' t.heory of .lhC' d.C've1opllH'nt. of the ob­JectIve worIlI, or pr~bl(>Jns of (halC'cll(',al logic and the the­ory of knowledge. 1 hcse probh.'Jlls do l':\isl, hul ollIY witl, !n t.he framework of unity, bl'Ci.HlS(, mal(,l'ii\li :-; 1 di~llt'cti~s IS the I,heory of. dc,"?lopmunl bolh of the malerial world and of Jts reflectIOll In l~llo~yJedgo and tho latter's logical forms. Therefore, the COlllcHicncc of materialist dialectics on the one hand, and dia lectical logic and epistemology 011

tilC'. o~hor, means only that, like epistemology, dia lectical logIC ,IS ,the. theory of development, a th eory de term ined bv ~he dlstmctlvc character of its object of study in each of Its thr~e aspects. !hus the coincidence of dialectics, logic and epIstemology IS not an abstract identity devoid of di f­ferences. As the general theory of development, as the the~ry o~ kn~wledge and its logical forms, materialist dia­Jectlcs ~ l alect.lcally studies the dialectical process. . In IllS PhLlosophical Notebooks, Lenin materialisticall y II1terprets Uegel's concept of law. On t.he one hand he stresse~ the objectivity of law as the relation of ess~nce a .relatlon which exists outside and independently of con: SClOusness. On the other hand, he underscores equal1y firm­~Y that the co~cept of law is a definite s tage of the histor­ICally de\'eloplllg knowledge which far from exhausts the knowled~e of phenomena and relations of essence in gen­eral. ThiS ~eans that any scientific law- for example, a law .of phys~cs or chemistry- expresses objective, real , es­~ent,al rel atlO.~s .. But i ~ e~presses them relatively, accord­mg to the eX.lst~ng obJe~tLv~ conditions of cognition, and consequ.ently It IS an object ive hut relative truth - tha t is a ~er ta lO slage ~vh ich knowledge reaches and wi ll Iatel: ~~Irount .. Rei rerrlll~ to Hegcl's asscr tion that "the rea lm

..Jaws IS l le qutescent rencct · f II pea ring world" L· . Ion 0 ·lC ex isting or ap-

k hI .' emn arrives at the following qu ite r e-mar a e, epIstemological conclusion· "Law t k 'I . cent-and therefore la I . a es tie qUles-

I W, every aw is n .

pete, approximate." (10· 38 151) Ob'. arrow, IDCOID­in the least diminish lh~ co' ·t' vlOusly, this does Dot

L . gm Ive val ue of sc· cnm warns agains t absolute tl'ea Icncc.

edge which is contained in ·1 [trnent of the knowl-B I I any aw ormulatcd b . ,Ill, a t lough phenomena arc richer than Ja\ y scwnc:.

tl,on of tile. laws governing phenomena is LI vs, the ~ognl­SlfJll of theil' essence. Ie com pi ehcn-

As he often does in his Philosophical No/ b I e 00 's, here

LI'IIIIl 1'ialJoratrs upon the pO!'luiat('s h(· advanced in cal' lie!' work~. For (':":<llI1pll', he stressed in his .ll(1terialism and Hmpiriu· Criticism that millions of individual producers in capitalist sodety inl('l'flct in somc way in the COUl'se of pro ducillg' ami exchanging goods, thu~ changing social being. ··The sl lIn ·total of these changes in all their ramifications in the capitalist world economy could not he grasped C\'cn by ;,cventy Marxes. The most important thing is that the laws of these changes have been discovered, that the ob-1ective logic of these changes and of their historical devel­opment has in its chief and basic features been dis­closed ... " (10; 14,325) Thus, using the operation of COID­

modity-capitalist economy as an example, Lenin formulates the epistemological understanding of the cate~ory. of la,w which he later develops and classically defines lD illS P}nl-osophicaZ Notebooks. , .

The description of each category from the pOint of V ICW

of its objective content and place in the dcvclopm~nt, of knowledge graphically shows how dialectic~l ma,tC'rHdl~~l a pplies the principle of the coi~.cidence of dla!ectlcs, logiC and the theory of knowledge. 'Iewed, frOID. thiS angle, the principle of coincidence is the truly dlale~hcal appr,oach to I he study of phenomena, an approach wh~c~ takes IlltO ~c­count the existence of the subject of cogDltlOn and .the lus­torica l level of knowledge, which rules out. dogmatism, th.e absolute interpretation of the results aclllcved br C.O~Dl­tion and concessions to absolute relativism, subJectlYISm , and agnosticism. ... ._

However that is not all there IS to applYing the prIDcl pic of coin'cidence, because the poin t is Dot only to, r eveal the objective conten t of a given category and strcs~ ItS rel­ativi ty as a stage of knowledg~, but a~so to define I t~ plac.~ am on other categories and It s rela tIOn to them. ~ or e.: am )1: when we deal wi lh lhe categor,y of necessity, \\ e mu~t ~I enne its relation to such categol'lcs as .law, e~~en?c, possib il ity, chanco, probability, basis, etc. It I~ equa y Ill: sufficient lo state that the cattegolr~ °a[lsoreaa ldt:rll~~~:s:~:ge~

I d I bjectiYc con ten ane IS < ~lIC I-a n. t~SUC 1\0 correct· ob jecl i ,'e dialect ica I, epistemological 111 COgfli lon, j I · Illation of the cat· I 1 . al definition must cxp aiD Ie r~ .. . am oglc . . nl to that of pOSSibility but also to egory of rea~l ty not .~st~lce essence phenomenon, appeal' -such categones as eXI , ' t ance, necessity, contradiction, development, e c.

:!55

In (lllalyzing Ih(' r('IHtiol1~ ;nUllng ('lItrgol'it,,, .\11(1 Ihll . ft' I II' " certain systrfll 0 ca egone:-;, OlH' ~ lOti t t~XaI1lIIlt' the mo'

mont of concepts and their intl'rtl'iln:-;ilion Ihut i!' det.'"

I. I . II . II ,In" concept:; (Ia celiea y, nut ,!:'i tllllHut;\) I' hut a:-; 1l10Yi] {l

flexible', capable of mutual trtln~itiun; 10 approach th >-r I

. . f t' I d lin rom tIe newpolDt 0 lilO lon, C lange, CyelOJllllcnt. There-fore, materialistically interpret ing JIegcl 's idealist theory aboll t the self-development of th o concept, Lenin says : "D"­a!ec.tics, in, genera~ is. 'th~ PUl'C mo\'cmcnt ot thought i:1 Not.lOns (I.e., puttlllg It WIthou t the mys ticism of idealism" human concepts. al'e not fixed but arc eLeI'ually in mo\'c~ ment, they,pass mto ono ano ther, they flaw into one anoth­er, otherWIse they do not reflect living life. The analysis of co.ncepts, the study of them, the 'art of operating ·with them (Engels) always demands study of the movement o~ ,concepts, of their in terconnection, of theil' mutual tran­SI[lons." (10; 38, 253)

Significant~y, Lenin sees tbe observance of the requil'e~ ment of motlOn, change-in short, of the dialectics of con­cepts-as the obseryance of materialist principles in epis­temology and logic, for we know tha t materia li sm demands c,orresp~nden~e of consciousness to being which is essen­tJaI:y dbalectIcal. Metaphysical materialism cannot consisl­\nt 1 0 serve that principle of reflection in epistemology. ~} I~r a[s Hegel is concerned, he reveals in a distorted luea 1st orm the .\ f .. ' .• . b.' um y 0 Dlotlon III thought ( in concepts) anu III elllg Engels ,[ . lh iloso h " "re ers to It by saying that Hegel's ~)hilOSO~)/~c~~ ~oat~e~~~~sm tm:ned uIl~ide down, And in his insiglLt of En els· d fiS'. ~e11ln s tr.csses the correctness and Ilegel's theorvgof th eDItIOn preclscly in con nection with

, . e concept. LelliD sees the meri t or Il l' '

has l)rOven the object' 't ege s VIC'W not only in that he tradictions, the univer~~t y ~nd ess~ntiality of inner con­change and development aa:~ trssentlal ~h~ractcl' o[ motion, the more general laws of d . 113.t he brilliantly guessed at is a ble to express this ob·~~~i~pm~nt, b,ut ,a lso in that he !'.onccpts-in other words ih t Ie dialectiC III the logic of logic, For, s tarting from' a. 1e has produced dialectical philosophers, while detcct~nngCi~~t Greek J?hilosophy, many or cogniiton arrived at a m l ,e

l c~ntra(hctions of motion

, e ap lys lcal . ment, at agnosticism and irrar l' negatIOn or move­Hegel's lI istory oj Philosophy ai~~a Ism. In hi s notes on

on the famous aporias

'J - " ... lU

or ZI'.1I0 ~r Elen, Lenin says, with good reason, that " the question IS not wlwt.her t.hf.:re is movement but how to ex press it i,n the l~gic or .concepts". (toi 38,'256) Hegel an­:-;wcJ'~ thl~ .q Ut'S~iOll '\-'III.ch was posed io ancieot times, by Cl'enlmg dialectical logi C, by substantiating the unity of dialectics, logiC and the theory o[ knowledge.

,Vo .know that unli~e Hegel'5 method, his system is con­servative and dogmatic, In his logiC, philosophy o[ nature and ph ilosophy of spirit Hegel claims to have exhausted a ll hU~~\ll knowledge- -at least as far as its principles and theoretical fundamentals are concerned. This is an inevi­table consequence of the premises of absolute idealism, be­cause the latter eventually reduces the history or knowl­edge (and history in general) to the gradual comprehension by the "absolute idea" of its own essence and of the entire wealth and diversity of development it comprises outside time and space.

The contradiction between method and system in Hege­lian philosophy clearly shows that Hegel is unable to con­sis tently fo llow, within his own philosophical theory, his own principle of the coincidence of dialectics, logic and the theory of k]]owledge. For, according to this princip le, any knowledge (even absolute truth) must he ,·iewed as a cer­tain stage in historical development, and the categories through which this or that content is cognized and formu­lated must be compared to other categories-that is, they must also be evaluated as certain stages in the development of knowledge. But Hegel's cognition and development are completed by absolute knowledge because the "absolute idea" comprehends itself, and by the same token it com­prehends its "alienation", "other -being", etc,

Another important point is that because of his idealist premise, and the long-established philosophical tradition, Hegel resolutely opposes philosophy to other sciences, main­taining that only philosophy deals with truth, that in other sc iences truth is not pure and is relegated to the background by other .idca.s, c!aims. and iotentions which have nothing to do With It. 1hat IS why IIegel contrasts the philosophy o[ nature to ~atural science, the philosophy of history to history, the pllliosophy of law to law, etc. In his opinion, cognition i~ dialectic~l ?nly. in p~lilosophy (more precisely, only In spe('l~latIYC-ldeal!st pllliosophy) because it comprises the analYSIS of concepts amI. thought

257 17_0t582

is the object of knowledge; oLher sciences,. especially th~se dealing with material objects, arc by tl,l(,lr ~aLure ~ndla­Jectieat. Consequently he belioycs that llialccllcS, lOgiC and epistemology coincide only in philosophy, and even that inasmuch as it deals with thought, knowledge. Naturally, this error is inevitable for speculative-idealist philosophy,

Unlike the Hegelian panlogisID, dialectical materialism consistently applies the principle of tho coincidence of dia­lectics, logic and epistemology. Observing this principle in philosophy means not only to reject dogmatism and dogmat­ic claims to absolute knowledge and absolute, final truth, but also to positively exam ine, develop, enrich, elaborate on and offer a concrete interpretation of, all the postulates, laws and categories of dialectical and historical mate­rialism wi thout exception, That is exactly why dialectical materialism is not a science of sciences in opposition to other, allegedly "nnite" and limited sciences. Like all sci­ences, dialectical materialism is developing, it finds new data, it deepens, elaborates on and offers a concrete inter­pretation of, its postulates and conclusions,

Another, equally important point is that Marxist-Leninist philosophy demands that the principle of the coincidence of dialectiCS, logic and the theory of knowledge be applied t? all ~ciences without exception. According to Lenin, "con­tmuatlon of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in th? dialectical elaboration of the history of human thought, sCience and technique," (10; 38, 146-47) This means that any postulate, concept or law in any science must be viewed, first" from th.e ~tandpoi~t of their objective content (re­flectIOn. of obJectlve reahty); second, epistemologically, as a. ~ertalD stage in the development of knowledge, as tran­SItIon from, one typ~ or knowledge to another, more pro fou?d type, and third, from the standpOint of dialectical logIC w~llcl: analyzes the interconnection and movement of c~tegones ~rrespe~tive of whether they are generally sig­~lficant philosophIcal categories or the fundamental nO-tions of some individual science (such as 'rt' veloc'ty a d 1 ' , 1 ' mass, Ine la, ... I n acce eratlon lD c asslcal mechanics)

!' or ?xample, Galileo's postulate that the veiocit of an ~)hJcct lD freo fall does not depend on its h Yd IS correct because it is abstracted from tSh ape a.n masst . 'h ' I thO I I 11 e enVlronmen J n W IC I IS, ree a takes place. Allhou h' _ menLal of claSSIcal mechanics refers to fre rg

11 ~ll1 s funda e a 10 vacuum,

258

it is an approximalely true reflection of the actual proc­esS of fall as it takes place in nature, However, today's aerodynamiCS regards Galileo's law as merely a certain stage in the cogll ition of the process in question: aerodynam­ics has to take iuto account the weight and shape of the raUing object, the environment, the atmospheric conditions -Le" all the factors which classical mechanics ignores, Such is the way the knowledge o[ a certain law devel­ops in history, generalizes and sums up the history ,of knowledge, examines the categories of classical mechaDlcs connected to this process and their relations of coordina­tion and subordination, and graphically shows the e,sse,nce of the dialectical-materialist application of the pnnclple proclaiming the unity of dialectics, l?gi~ ~nd epistemolo­gy in special spheres of knowledge, fhlS IS also the a~­proach to be used in examining relations betwee? Eucli­dean and non-Euclidean geometry; between claSSical a~d modern, quantum mechanics, While c~assical, mechaOl

CS

treats the categories of mass a~d velOCity as Ind~pendent of each other, quantum mechamcs sees them as lDsepara-

bly linked, , '1 I h ' ·d The question of applying the prlnclp eat e ~OlnCl ence

of dialectics, logiC and epistemology ,to ~pecl~ sph~rei or knowledge- a question Lenin poses 10 hiS p~tlosoph~c~ Notebooks-opens new vistas before know~edge ,lD any SCI­ence, Proceeding from that pre~e.pt, ~e,n~n POlDts out as

1 'Mater;alism and Emplrw-Cnt~ctsm that the elec-

car y as In' L " b 'II' t tron is as inexhaustible as the atom, emn s fl lan, con-ce t of matter is based on the .dial.ectical understandlOg ?f I P b' t' nature and the sClentlfic knowledge about It.

Lt 1e ,0 Jetc sses that any natural scientific theory of matter

eOln s res . ' 'd fi 't t 'n d t xhaust all its qualIties but IS a e Dl e s a~e I oes no e nt o[ kuowledge about matter, a stage mev­

~hcbldevclOP~ecd dialectically by the subsequent dev~lop­ita y nega 1 dge It follows-as I have noted earher­ment of knm~ ~f ~atter truly comprising all its states and that, a, con~e~ludin those not yet known to science, can quahtles, 10 'ter!ological concept, an epistemological ca.t­only be Nn ep\~ this does not rule out the need for the eg?ry. hatalurathYe~ry of matter to record all of its attrib-phllosop IC . d' d by natural SCIence, utes stu l,e 1 ing down the materialist prinCiple or t?e

!h~lS, In aly d.alectics logic and epistemology, LeDIn,

cOinCIde nco 0 I ' 259

,

unlike Hegel, demon st.ril t r~ Ih C' lIl' I'C':-;:-; il y of It s llpplication in auy ~p('cific sl'il'nl'<'. ~ t J't':-;~i ng that \l pg-d 's Th e , .... 'd f'llre oj Logic sums up the lii~ l (ll)' of tl lOu j.l'ht, Lenin says that till' laws .go\'cr~ i ng lil t' genera l 11'1'11\1 of human knowl('dge, of aU SCIence lU gencra l, al so opC' I'all' i n <'Mil indi\'idual scieuce, "To trace this morC' concrel C' ly and in gl'catrl' de­ta il in the history oj the separate sciences sC'cms an rxU'a­OI'dinarily rewarding task. " ( J; 38, il 18)

This is al so the way to unders tanding Lenin 's fa mons wo:ds to the effect th a t Marx's Capital applies dialectics, logIC and the theory of knowledge to one science- political ~co~omy .. He says that "Marx applied Hegel's dialectics I~n Its r~tlOnal form to political economy" , (1; 38, 178) Su~fice !t to comp~re the dialectical -materialist, strictly his­IOl'l~al mterpretatlOll ?f economic categories (labol', value, cal~ltal, money, etc) III Marx'~ Capital with their interpre­tatIOn by the .classlcs of English political economy to un­de:s~nd the Importance of applYIllg the principle of the ~olDcl~~nce of dialectics, logic and the theory of knowledge lD pohttcal economy. And since Marx's Capital is the fines t ~xample of such study, Marxist philosophers must exam­me the method of Capital and grasp its significance which goes far beyond the confines of economics.

IliA LECTICA L 'IATEHIALTSM, DI.\LECTIC.\L rDEALlSM

A'\1l COYm~IPORARY 1I0UnGEOIS CO\SCIOUSNESS (I'I LIEU OF A CO:\'CLUSIO:\')

W ha t T have understood from Heraclitus is wonderful, SOCl'ates u sed to say, but what I have failed to understand lllUSt he even better. Today's opponents of Marxist philos­oph y do Dot follow this wise example: they blame Marx­ism Jor their own lack of understanding or this doctrine. Hence the opinion t.hat Marx rejects philosophy as an ex­plan ation of the world and sees it only as a means for chang ing it. However, suffice it to recall certain statements in The German ldeology concerning this issue to see that Man:ism is against the apologia of social reality. Marxism counters it with a scientific explanation of social relations and theoretically substantiates the need for their transfor­mation. Marx's Capital is a great example of this revolu ­tionary-critical explanation of social reality.

The attempt at accusing Marx of the intention t~ do away with philosophy is equally fallacious. A one-sided interpretation of quotations fr~m Marx ~ends an. appear­ance of objecti\' ity to such cia lIDS. But I~ the 111s.t~ry of philosophy there is no single cut-and-dried defimtIon of concepts, including the concept of .philosophy. Feuerbach says that his philosophy is no ph~losophy, but no oue would think of calling him a non-phIlosopher. .

Marx and Engels consider it necessary to do a.way With philosophY in the old sense of the \yord, that I~,. sJ1ecl~ ~ lative philosophy opposed, on the one han?, Lo P?Sltlve S~I-

d on II\e other hand to the soclO-pohtlca l mo\e-ences, aD . ' , d'

t For Marx philosophy IS an Integral part an a S I~lr-meD " ' t' t '\' ell ' I 0 of the great emanclpa IOn movemen \\ I Itlla weap n· , b '1'\' r 1 , r nd o"I']OI'tatiOn of man y man . . lIS ac, IS to orever e ~., < " I

\' \ to , to Marx'" IJl'ofound understancling of llC w IIC I les Illes . L 1 ~ , 'I t 'I " r phiioSOl1hy (10( ay no on<, tlC'OIC'!' I. :t

s o (' /{/ mISSion o· . , f'f" I r II) sel'\'("'; I\~ a pretext 10 some CI'ltiCs 0 n niX ' Nlst ornlfl ):1' L it' [II'; "prcllrl'llnged thinking".

ism fOL'. c1C'SCI'I tiling s t\;(" scientifIC ways of studying thC' i\ lal':osm Oil InC'

tn'nds, contradictions and mntiv(' forces of our era, A cor­recL understanding and creative application of Marxism im­plies a rejection of a biased approach to it. But throughout the historv of social thought, no doctrine has suffered so much from distortion as Marxism. And today, when even its opponent.s have to reckon with Marxism and study it, it is being distorted more than ever before. Sometimes it seems that certain bourgeois scholars study Marxism not so much to understand it as to collect more "evidence" for re­futing it. This sheds light on the latest "discovery" by the bourgeois experts on Marx: that an immanent part of Marx­ist theory is, of all things, Hegelianism.

In his Essays on Marx and flegel, Jean Hyppolite, a French existentialist neo-Hegelian, draws a parallel be­tween Hegel's Phenomenology 0/ Spirit and Marx's Capital. I-Iyppolite sees both works as developing the same t.heme of alienation. "Just as in Hegel's Phenomenology," he says, "the producer, according to Marx, alienates himself in goods and money, and this monumental alienation consti­LuLl'S Capital; capital, the really leading protagonist or Marx's work, is produced by man and ends up as dominat­ing man in history and reducing him to a simple cogwheel in its mechanism." (69; 160)

Jean Hyppolite is a serious scholar and an expert on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Surely he knows that Marx's Capital-even viewed as an economic interpretation of Hegel's theory of alienation-differs substantially from the Phenomenology which deals wiLh the alienation of self­consciousness, with overcoming alienation by grasping the absolute. But Marx thoroughly criticizes the idealist con­cept of absolute knowledge, proving the fallacy of Hegel's nnderstanding of alienation as the alienation of conscious­ne~s ~nd self~consciousness, and countering it with the ma­te1'lahst postulat~ about Lhe alienation of the product of labor andlah?r ltself. True, Hyppolite does not deny that. He even admIts that, according to Marx, the proletariat's class .stru~gle, and not knowledge, leads to the overcoming of alienatIOn. But, although he points to that distinction h.€'tw('~n ~arxism and Hegelianism, Hyppolite does not con­SHIrr It. lmpo~tant. In hi~ vi.cw, much more important is tlHlt ~'llIch brIDgs the two thmkers closer together and not thr rlJrference between tIH.'m: Lhe conviction that alienation Call be overcome and that society can be restructured on

raLional principles. According to Hyppolite, this conviction is fallacious and it means that Marx is essentially as much or an idealist as Hegel is. Here, idealism is interpreted not as a certain ontological or epistemological theory but sim­ply as the belief in the power of human reason, the inevi­tability of progress and the feasibility of social.ideals ..

Since contemporary bourgeois ideology is. rrreverslbly llostile to socialism, it opposes not only Marxlsm but also the great rationalist traditions of its own past. Thus .t~e reduction of Marxism to Hegelianism bears out the SPI~lt­ual crisis or today's bourgeois society, its moral erosIOn and ideological impotence.. .' .

Lenin describes Hegel's faith In reason, hlS convlctJ~n that the struggle with the existing social evil is rooted In

the objective law of universal development, as the revolu­tionary aspect of Hegel's philosophy. (10; 2, 2I). In Hyp:

olite's opinion, this very Important aspect, crltl~ally ,ac ~ePted and materialistically, developed by Marx, IS nalve, obsolete and disproved by hIstOry. . . r v

Karl Lowith is close .to: existe~tlah~m, ~,nd he, be I~ e.s that Marx, like Hegel, was a ratIOnalIst: l!eg~l s pflnCI­pIe-the unity of reason and real!ty, and reah.~Y Its~1f ~s l~h,~

it of being and existence-Is also Marx s prmclp hi un y 10 'th is sure to know that Marx thoroug y (~Ot'; .

10d9

)Heg'e"J!s ontologization of reason, thought as edarlY cn IClze h t M 'faile to

1843-1844 Nevertheless he asserts t a arx , as . I" that he could not rernalD overcome Hegeys spe~~ ~\IO~~~i~'~iS of Hegel's philosophy. o~ the level. 0 a"~~~I~cessentiaIlY does not distinguish be­LIl{c IIyppolit~, L~ d the materialist interpretation of the Lween the r~tlona an ment of society: inexplicably, he forward -movlfl¥ devefloh

P . evitability of social progress as sees the very Idea 0 t e 10

idealist. gelieal critic of Marxism, is well Erwin Metzke, an evan < nnot ignore the opposition

aware of the .fact that ~:eelf:n absolute idealism, so. I~e between MarXism and g't as identical by a sophistic tries Lo treat thesed~wJo °tPPsos'Aecscording to Metzke, Marx's

. of la ac IC ' II h' a interpretatIon H l' 'dealism form, of a t mgs, materialism an~ . e~;'I~e I connection betwef'n ~~rx and unity of OppOSlt~S. . I It comprises Rn oPPo!'ltion. 1'~\(' Hegel is it~e1f d~alectlca . ds to the depth of contradlc­depth of connection correspon , . "(88' I5) Ion. !

This dismissal of the fnndamrntal opposition hetween Marx's materialism and Heg(']':-; iri('alisrn is an important ioeological indicator of loday's bourgeois ('ril iquc of Marx­ism. The latter 1S accused not so much of nrgativism (as was the case in the C'arly H100s) as of an insufficiently critical approach to the great rationalist traditions of the past. There is no need to recapi tulate here thC' fundamental opposition between materialist dialectics and Hegel's ideal­ist dialectics, between historical materialism and the ideal­isl. l)hilosophy of history, hetw('€'n scientific communism and Hegel's bOllrgeois views. To refute the legend about l\fal'xism's allegedly Hegelian view of the world, one has to analyze what is really common to Marx and lIegel and to spo t the fundamental opposition of dialectical materialism 10 dialectical idealism within what iR common to them.

Hege1's philosophy is the self-consciousness of the era whe'n bourgeois society established itself, it is actually the first 'hr illiant attempt at theoretically inter preting this so­ciety's past and future. l\larx's theory is the self-conscious­ness of the era of the emanCipation of the working class, it is a brilliant scientifiC understanding or the immanent development of bourgeOis society which, by its own prog­ress, creates material and spiritual prerequisites for a rev­olutionary transition into its opposite, the socialist social syslrm. This means that :Marx's dialectical materialism is a direct and immediat.e continuation of Hegel's dialectical idealism hoth theoretically and historically. , ,

"Hegelian philosophy," the Ru ssi an revoluti onary Ale­xander Herzen said, "is the algebra of revoluti on, it eman­cipate'S man, exceptionally and completely destroys the Ulristian world, . the world of mytllS that have ou tli ved I

IhrTllMlves." (19; 23) NatuNl.lIy, this does not mean that Heg'e'l has fully appreciated the impol'la nce of revolutions in human history. That nnderstand ing is precisely what he' lackf';. But the most powerful and, ono might cyen say, rpmarkable aspect of lIege)'R method and of himself as man "nil thinker is, as Jacques D'Hondt righ tly says, hi s tiL'e­l('~s and passionate intere!O.t in everything that changes, is in motion, alive and transient. Gocthe'!, mountain peaks, Ih(' ~ymhol of LlIC llllattainahl(' qtlirt for which man yearns, horf' TTrgcl. Above all he is inlerrsted in the' living, in

( what ha!' c.ome and will pass: it is eyer rmerging, and T-J e­~el clf'!'Icribes this state as unrest. (68; 14~ 18) Calmness

264

and the slowing down of motion are harbingers of death, aurl Rpeclllation about them bores him as it does Spinoza. Lrt. the drad bury their dead, E\'erything that exists in time, rspecially everything ali\'e, is transient, and its ener­gy is born of its limitatio.n. The power. of the li\'ing i~ in thr comhination of opposites. The habltual, the routme, t.he tradit.ional helong to the past which is of inter~st only inasmuch as it is the road to the present.. Hegel admires out­standing prrsonalilies above all because they oppose r~utin~.

Hegel opposes history to nature: natur,e lack~ passl.on, It always repeats itself. But no great deed IS pOSSible Without pass i'on: it is the realm of history, where eme~gence ,and destruction are inseparable. Here, de\'elopment IS contlDu­ous' there is constant ir reversible change, the e:nergen~e of the new Wllich is unl ike what ex isted before It or still survives. TT('('c the new battles the old. The struggle of op­posites is what gives birth to th~ ?ew. A~ Hegel sa~s, "Something is therefore vita l only If I~ co~talDs a contradiC­tion and it is precisely the power which IS ~ap~b~e or con­taining and withstanding it." (64; 4, .69) It IS ri~lc~d~~~etl~ say that one cannot think a contr~dl?t1on; to t lin opment means to grasp the contradIction. . world

Of course, these ideas and the perceptIOn of t,ho connected w ith thcm is only one aspect of TTe~el s thset~~' He is the croatol' of the las~ great metaphyslCa~ o::,s1r and And t.he sYstem, in turn, subjects the ~nethod .to ILe he

~~~t~:;d icittionA ~:~~~cnth~e:'~~; n~ i:'~~7~:~n~.i:~~te,~:, ~~~ ~~:

'ects completion of development and hiS sy~ em \\ HC r­

iablishcs, wilhin the f['amcwork of, bou~~~01~ ~~~ i~~~ll~C­del', absolute bonndarki,e's ] ofl'ltheySOO~~Og-PH;gIZI~ans looked fol' L I 'ogress of man In( . . 10 ua pI '. , d' f . the philosopher's person­

the roots of tillS ?OnlIa IC Ion In conformist prejudice. As

:~,L~ ~~ :~:; r.~,~~\~lhi~~~~~lliC~~dSLUdy- r~lu gl;u~;'I~!:.' ~V:: doctorate thesis-Marx Ig~es If~~~p~rea S;ys "to fall into quite thinkabl e fol' a Ptlt .oscOoPns

1 istency thro;,gh some sort

, lOt her "1'I)al'rl1 III . f 't B L one 01 al . < 'If y be conSClO\lS 0 I. U ~ of accommodatIOn: h~ Illmsfe iR ~I~ pos;;ibility that this ap­what he is not C?nRClolls'l~ d~('pe'st roots in an in[l(l:qllac~: parrnt commodatIOn has I . I t' of his Ilrinciplr It~('lf.

, \'n"I-qlUl le forlllll a Ion 01' In an ,,,, (1;1,84)

265

•

The inadequacy of Hegel's principle, i .e. , t.he idealist character of his dialectics, was exposed by Marx in his Contribl~tiOll ,to the Critique of Hegel's P~lilosophy of Law wntten In 1843. lIere Marx shows that Idealism dis­torts dialectics because i t sees the relation of opposites as existing only in thought which, although treated ontologi_ cally and as an absolute, nevertheless remains thought. There­fore, according to Hegel, contradictions are solved only in the realm of pure thought, i. e. , in the course of medita­tion. These contradictions are merely thought, they do not roally struggle against each other; each sees the other as its oth er-being.

In 1839-1841, when he worked on his doctorate thesis , Marx noted the two mutually exclusive aspects of Hegel's dialectics. Still paying homage to Hegel's idealism, Marx says that "dialectic is the inner, simple light, the piercing eye of love, the inner soul which is not crushed by the body of material division, the inner abode of the spirit". BuL already in the following phrase he stresses that "dia­lectic is also the torrent which smashes the many and their Eounds •. wh~ch tears down the independent forms, sinking .everytbmg 10 the one sea of eternity". (1; 1, 498) Marx c1 e\'e]ops precisely this second, revolutionary aspect of He­gel's dialectics. Having begun with atheism and a critique of speculativ~ p~ilosophizipg, he arrives at an integral dia­lecltcal-matenahst understanding of reality at scientific communism and the new economics. 1

Naturally, the transition from idealist to materialist dia­lectics cannot be understood without due regard to thc de­yclopment of Marx's socialist and economic views and his practical political activity, first, as a revolutionary derno­~rat, and then as a conscious exponent of the fundamental ~nterests of the working class, the creator of its scientific Ideo.logy. Mar~ himself. notes that, stressing, first, the 01'­

gam~ connectIOn of hiS theory to the experience of the worklDg-class movement, and second that dialectics in its I'~lional interpretation, is incompatibie with the bourgeois VIC,W of the world wh~ch makes an absolute of the capi­tali st mode of productIOn, But negation-dialectically con­~r(> l(> and not sen ~elcssly negati"i st negation - is a most Important elcment of dialectics. That is how Marx undel'-s~ands it, and that is why his analysis of dialec-tics comprises , as an important element, of the

speculat ive- idealist interpretation of negation. The latter pradically alway~ leads to .reconciling the new with the old J hecauRc speculattve negatIOn negates itself and also be­calise th e old, since it resists the new, is, according to He­gel, no longer old.

In stressing that Hegel's dialectics is limited, inadequate and inconsistent, one must not lose sight of the generally accepted , although disputed by the opponents of Marxism, truth that Marxist dialectics is as opposed to Hegel's dia­}rct ics as Marxism as a whole is opposed to Hegel's bour­geois theory. The revolutionary aspect of Hegel's dialec­t ics, the rational element, of his method, the passion for truth , historicism, the profound conviction in the possibili­ty and objective necessity of the rational transformation of human lire- that is what makes Hegel's philosophy rele­vant today.

Many scholars overlook the fact that Hegel not only profoundly criticized the views of the Enlightenment but also upheld its finest traditions: not the Enlightenment which is often pictured as something similar to the smug optimism of the philosopher Pangloss, hut the one that mercilessly ridiculed his pseudophilosophy, t~e one that anticipated, in the famous story of frankensteIn, the CO?­nicts of today stemming from the ~pontaneous ad,:ances ~n science and technology, the Enhghtenment w?lc.h h~il ­liantly exposed, in Rousseau's theory, the con~r~dlctlo.ns lO­

herent in progress and generated by antagoDlstlc SOCial re-

lations. . . I Hegel was far from the ovcrsimp!lfied notIOn that t 1e

light of truth is itself enough to dIspel the, da!kness of error, that good triumphs oyer evil thanks to Its,lm?Ianent significance, But he was even further f~om rejectIng }he 'd a of progress or seeing it as threatemng human eXlst­l ee merely because progress is not straightforward but ::a~izes itself through struggle and .su,ffering. F~ly con­scious of the difficulties and contradICtions of SOCIal prog-

He el was nevertheless absolutely free from the r~ss, I Igd by those of our contemporaries who believe thal views Ie bl f . the . I transformations are capa e 0 oyerCoDHDg no socia ' "L[ l' b 'I . 't ble disharmony o[ human eXistence. I ego ~ rt-l?eVI a, 1 from the way he connects the genesIs and hance IS C ~ar r the "unhappy cODsciollSDC'SS" category to dev(>}oplllC'1l r 0 enslaved man who is conscious of himself Ihc status 0 aD <

fl!'i n personality that i::; inherently fl'Pt' ,\1ul rapahlt· of crca. tive acth·it.y. Thi .... cnslan'll1Pllt. ~hould h(' intNpri'lC'd ~Hf (iciently broadly beca u::;e, lH'('ordinf,!" to l kgC' l, it i~ det<'r mine>d by the> ::;ituation in which Illan c hoo.'\C'::; bC'l\n'l'n life without freedom and de>ath; no olht' I' choicl' is possihlr.

Hegel destroyed Ill(' metaphy:,ical concC'pt. of immutable tl'llth, he was thC' first to PI'OVC' that truth i::; relative, that it is the dC\'clopment of knowledge. But naturally, he never e~'~n conceived of asserting- the way pragmatists, neoposi­tl\'l sls and oth er bourgC'ois philosophers assC'l't today- that trllth is reduced to useful ne::;s 0 1' that it is a convention agl'(~ed upon by scientists. ';Tr util ," says Hegel, " is a noble wOl'd and a s till nobler calise. If man's spi rit and soul arc s till sound, thi s word must make his breast heave higher." (64; 6. 20)

According ~o Engels, no other postulate of Hegel's gen­erated such diversity of interpretat.ion as his famous "ever­ything real is rational , everyth ing rational is real". Both myopic liberals and proponents of feudalism saw this phrase as a justification of the feud al ways. JIeilll'ich Heine \\~as the first to grasp the revolutionary mea ning of that (hctY?l' The most. important ideas of th e progl'essive bour­geOIsie of the 17th-19th cen turi<'s, procla imed almost si­multan.collsly by Bacon and Descartes, were those about mas,t~rll1g the elemental forces of nature and rationally or­gamzmg the life of society. Hogel's phrase is the quint­essence of these ideas .

Despite tl~e clearly idealis t cons tl'uct.ion put on it by H~gel, the Idea about the ra t.i onality of reality is filled wllh a profound a nd eyen materiali s t con tent. The science of the New Age discovered the diversity of natural laws an~ carne very close to th e unders tanding of soc ial laws. Na lvo teleological notions wero replaced w ith the theor y a~out ,the necessary connection 01" phenomena; i n Kant's View, It was so obvious as Lo be a priori. These scientific :?ncepts foun~ their p~lilosophic.a l , albeit idealis t. expres­sIOn In H~,gel.s pan~ogl.sn~; speclflca l.ly in the. postulate ab,out th~ .ratlOnal leailty . Hegel did not descrIbe every­tiling .exlstlllg as r eal. In its expanded fOl'm, the real is ~l<'C:::;SI~Y. T.he existing which has lost its necessity loses lI s JlI.stdicallon: it must yield its place to the new, the pro­gr(>ssl\·(>.

An equally profound malCl'iali s t conclusion can be de-

,

dlwl,d If w.e "IWf'.Ji ' tfir second part or Hegel 's dictum: ever­ytillllg ~'atlOn;~1 IS real. Of course, lIf'gl'l did noL d<'scriiJe l'\"I'l"yt.hlng tI~lnkahl(: alld ('~JlJ'l's:,1'(1 ill \\orlis ami phras!.':') liS ratllwn l. LOllc('rnlng lIlcdwvul ~c holasticism which .some bOLlrg(~oi." "hi 1050pll('1'5 arc ready to ~ee as a model of mIL thodica l scientifi c thinking even today, lIegl'l said that it was "(I barhari c philosophy of mind, dpvoid of any 1'£"[11

content". (G4; 15, 1H8) The rational must b(' sound, it au· thentically manifes ts itself as a dialectical concep t which I'ovea ls the unity of the uni\'ersal, the particular, the indio vid ual. The rational is real only inasmuch as its content is objective, necessary. This understanding of the rational differs radically from the subjectivist-abs tract necessity at which Kant and Fichte stopped. These predecessors of 11('­gel were brilliant thinkers, and they cannot be blamed for some of today's philosophers still maintaining that ideals cannot be realized in this world. They bold that such is the othcrwordly nature of ideals: all attempts at realizing them lead to catas trophic consequenr.es because the world essentially cannot be better but, regrettably, it can obvi­ously be worse. Hegel 's thinking was both much more so~er and much nobler: "Should an idea be too good to eXist, it is the fault of the ideal itself." (64; 1:1, 2i4)

Marx and Engels directly develop Hegel's idea by oppos­ing abstract necessity and the contrasting of the ideal to reality. This self-developing reality generates ide~ls and surpasses them in its subsequent development. Unlike lIe ­gel, the founders of Marxism are p~rfectly awar~ that uto­pias are not produced ~y :easo~ w~lch abstracts Itsel~ from reality and is engaged Jll tm?glDah?~, but are.a d~flnllc re­flection (from a definite SOCIal pOSitIOn) of Illstorlc~l rea l­ity. That is why they distinguish between progressl\:e a?d reactionary utopias, showing that the former unsclentl.fi ­cally reflect the actual trends of social deyelopment wh .. le the latLer idealize the past presenting it as a lost paradise to be regained, Thoroughly criticizing yariouS Jonll s, of utopianism, Marx, like .Heg~l, ar~ues that the ra~l?nal Id~­al stemming from rea.hty ~tself IS n~erely a spmtu.al ex-

'ession of the real llistol'lcruly defiOlle trend of SOCial de­J~.lirr6iJDlCnt. if it a~pears unattainable, it is only. heeans!.' ~l~e trends' it expresses are still embryol~ic: "Mankmd l~lll~ " ,-,'bll' sels itself only such tasks as It IS able to soh (', Ine't " . t" "II I 110'" '! " ys "s ince closer exanlina IOn WI a ways 5 II arx sa ,

269

that. the problem itself ar ises only when the material con. ditions for its solution aro already pl'l'sont ur at least in the course of formatioD ." (6; 21) Thlls lI eg'£' l's postulate that "everything real is rational, everything rational is real", at first glance a mystification of the socio-historical process, is actually a brilliant insight into its inevitable progress.

But today 's bourgeois ideologists sec the idea of prog­ress as an illusion of the Enlightenment gone bankrupt. If progress does exist, they maintain, it exists only in an oxtremely one-sided, limited and distorted form. As to the trend which dominates history, Lhey see it as mostly re­gressive. "The social pessimism of a large part of today's bourgeois philosophers," P. N. Fedoseyev observes, "indi­rectly censures any protest against the historically obso­lete capitalist production relations. It is apologia of conform­ism in a most subtle form, conformism which appears as nonconformism and widely uses pseudocriticism of capital­ism and anticapitalist phraseology, but which actually vin­dicates contemporary capitalism, allegedly radically trans­formed." (33; 11)

Everything real is rational, everyth ing rational is real. No, it is not a secular formula of Leihniz's theodicy, ridi­culed by Voltaire. It is a formula of historical optimism which is perfectly conscious of the fact that the tragic is not idola theatri but that it really exists not only in per­sonal but also in social life. But neither the tragic nor the comic nor their various combinations cancel either purpose­ful human activity or that dialectics of social develop­ment because of which struggle against the existing evil is rooted in the objective inevitability of change and devel­opment.

Ridiculing sober historical optimism has recently be­come fashionable with many bourgeois philosophers. Hegel used to say that it is childish to fight fashion, but he did not mean fashion in philosophy because philosophy is an intel1ectual occupation which is too serious and very im­portant for mankind. Still, some philosophers who follow philosophical fashion see the historical optimism of Hegel and Marx as an idealist dismissal o[ harsh reality, as fear of t.he lrue nature of life which offers no hope of salvation to anyone. But today's social pessimism is not simply escapism a la George Santayana, preaching placid contempla-

270

•

ti,oO ?f .the turbulent ~tream of life from a solitary clift. Nor 1.S It merely ,a philosophical fad successfully exploit­Ing Schopeohauer s legacy. This pessimism which iotel lect,ually ~xpresses the self-alienation of perSO~ality in hour­ge~ ls SOCl~ty, cenSUl'es t~e struggle against obsolete capi­talIst relatIOns of productlOn. In other words, it is the subtl­est apologia of conformism which appears as nonconform­ism since it creates the impression of intellectual independ­ence and opposes the saccharine meliorist sermons of a large part of bOUl'geois ideologists. But this misanthropic view of the world from above does not in the least justify social pessimism. Hegel was right when he said that it was vanity to contemplate everything as vanity of vani­ties: "Perhaps treating the conviction that everything is nothing as the ultimate wisdom is really some profound life, but it is the profundity of emptiness ... " (64; 14, 64) That was also Hegel's approach to the enthusiasm of the French Revolution. The most valuable aspect in his assess­ment of that revolution (which the ideologists of aristocrat­ic reaction saw as divine punishment for man's sins) is the understanding of its historical necessity, popular char­acter and great importance for socio-historical development in general. "I am convinced," Hegel wrote in 1816, "that the world spirit of OUf times uttered a command to ad­vance. Such a command encounters resistance; this being presses on like an armored and compact phalanx, inexor­ably and barely perceptibly, as the sun moves, forward through aU obstacles." (62;. 2, 85·86) These words rocog· nize the objective inevitabilIty of fund~mental soc~al ,:rans­formations and expose the faUacy of lts speculatIve-Ideal­ist interpretation. ~nyway howev~r, ~[egel's . approa~.tl to the greatest histoTlcal event. of. Ius. tllI~,e }?.8.ved the way toward understanding the obJectIve mevltabIhty of tho so­cio-historical process. That was wh~re his dia~ectics led, and it was capable of that because It was the Intellectual expression of this revolution's historical power. .

Dialectics demands that historical ev~nts be examined in their interrelation, in their immanent, contradictory move­ment;-- development. It is precisely the. id~a of the s~~n­taneity of the dialectic~l process, even III Its speculative idealist interpretation (l.e., as the process of thougl~L), ,tl~a( directly approached the understanding ,of til(' ob}ecllvLly of that process: the tbinker does not Simply transform a

271

('oncept into another concept, it becomes its opposite itself it. ~plii.5 and transforms itsclf into another. In thb connec-' lioll LeJlin referred to the gcrllls of historical mat.erialism in liegel's philosophy of history. I\atmally, thl'~c germs could not develop in a speculative-idealist system which saw the activity of individuals, socinl groups and classe~ as a means used by absolute spirit, world reason to realize its world historical goal. True, as \Vilhelm \Vindelband correctly observes, Hegel's absolute spirit is actually hu­man spirit. But the idealist mysti fication of mankind's hislor'ical act ivity inevitably turned world history into a predetermined teleological process, i.e., into the teleology or history.

The discovery of the materialist understanding of histo­r'y is a true revolution in the history of sociological thought. Marx and Engels have not merely proven that material production is an objective and necessary condition of so­cial life. That was nothing new. Even the demonstration that material production transforms not only external but also human nature is anticipated to a cel'Lain degree in Hegel's understanding of labor- Marx points to that in his "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844". Tlu' most .important thing Mal'x has demonstrated, the source of all hiS subsequent discoveries, is the fact that mankind itself creates objective conditions that. shape its develop­menl. Neither geographical conditions, nor the climate nor other natural factors can be the determining force of the socia-historical process. Tn the nnal ana lysis, productive forces are this force.

The development of productive forces is an objecth'c process of succession which differs fundamentally fl'OOl suc­cession in the history of ideas; there is no freedom of choice i? the former: people cannot freely choose their produc­tive forces. But it is the people and not "a bsolute spirit" who create and develop productive forces, and the histori ­cal necessity which emerges 00 this basis is the unity of live aod materialized human activity. The progress of pro­ductive forces and t.herefol'e aIM the development of man's substantial forces necessarily change the ratio of material­ized and live human labor in favor of the latter. And people determine the conditions of their life inasmuch as they create these conditions. Thus recognition of the de­cisive role of productive forces does not lead to the fatal-

212

t •

J

istic conclusion alleging that social development is prede­t('fmined. In the course of socio-economic progress the sig­nificance of the entire past of production for its current slate diminishes and not increases. By his theory about the role of material production in the development of soci­ety, about the working masses as the key productive force, l\larx has overcome the fatalistic concept of history Hegel did not break free from, and totally refuted the subjectiv­ist notion holding that history is the result of man's will. Historical materialism shows that the sway the elemental rorces o[ nature held over man for millennia (and still relt in some spheres of man's life today) is not rooted in natural but in human, social, historical causes. This means that it is historically transient.

Today's bOUl"geois philosophers and sociologists very. of­ten describe Marx's theory of society as a technologICal concept of history. This superficial view is usually b~sed on a biased interpretation of arbitrarily selected quotatlo.ns from l\Iarx. Besides, it ignores the fact that in the .Marxist view, productive forces and techno~ogy are ~wo differ~nt things. The most important product!,.'e. force. IS man Illm­self, with his historically shaped abilities which "ary from person to pOl'SOD. This obscures the fact that a~ a whole, they arc the product of social development, which makes them and tho extent to which they are develope~ as a whole independent of human consciousness and Will, a~­though each individual himse~f develops and perfects hiS nbiLities, i.c., cannot entL'lIst thiS task to others.

Marx sees technology as a most importa?t .element of the means o[ production and, of course, an md.tcator (and

l t all the only one) of the degL'ee to which prod~c­~li~te ~or~es have developed. Other indi~ator~ are the soc~al 0 1' anization of labor, the way productIOn IS. managed, t I.e de~J'ee to which scientific advances are applted ~echnologl-

lly etc. In the Marxist view, since techn~logy IS a mean~ ca, duction (and-another important pOint-a means 0

of p~~. a means of meeting cultural needs, il means ~[ cogn.] lon, , and re rettably, of destruction too) It. ~nedlcal ~~ea~Dle:t.certaiD dfalectical relation to tho objectives IS natura Y IJ?- ,. is seen not. only from tho fact that it helps. alL~ln. 'lllISmo feasible, attainable only through many objectives Ibe~o I meaos but also from the fact. that the given techno og.\ca.. mergence to the dcvclopmcnt of they actually owe wlO II C

'-3 -, 18-0U62

technology. Besides, while Marxism (lxplicitly stresses the imporlance of scientific and technological progress, it docs not lose sight o[ its possib le and ilrlual negative conse­quences. B?t ginet' hi::;lorica.l lllah·rialisTlI has nothing ill common with the technolog ical concept of his tory which maintains that the all-important 8IHi dceisive force is pre· cisely technology, it is equally free from the temptation to ascribe the negative consequences of technological devel­opment to technology. Marx holds that Lhese negative con­sequences are inevitably brought about by the fact that production and application oI tech nology arc determined by the law of value, i.e., by the minimum of man-hours ne­cessar~ "for t ile 'production and application of technology. In this connectIOn Marx spake about the terrible conse­quences of the. capitalist application of technology (and labor force) which opponents of Marxism only discovered in the past 25 years.

~arad?xically,. while today's bourgeois philosophers and SOCIOlogiSts aSCribe the technolog ical interpretation of his­tory to Marx and describe him as a "philosopher of tech­nology" who succumbed to the "eros of technology", they are. actua~y themselves under the influence of the techno­l?glCal. phIlosophy of history, although they have a nega­live VIew ~f it-in other words, they have succumbed to le~bn.ophobla. They talk about the "demon of technology" relgm~g ~ver. mankind, they say that mankind's only al­te:na~lVe ~s ~Ither to defeat the demon or be destroyed. All tillS Ideahst-trrationalist talk shows not only technophobia ~ut also consciousness, albeit mystified of the contradic­tIOns and dif~culties generated by the 'spontaneous devcl­opJ?ent of sCIence and technology, by alienated social re­latl?ns. and. by ~he self-alienation of the personality. "Bour­geOis trrabonalist philosophers," the Soviet philosopher A. c:; .. Yegorov remarks, "are not above presenting their peSSimism and mysticism as an adequate expression of hu­man nature. ~atu:ally,. this is not so. One should look for the roots. of lrra~lOnalLsm not in the human psyche and not ev~n ~n reactiOnary bourgeois ideology but, in the final analYSIS, m t~e general crisis of capitalism which is ex­pressed both lU bourgeois ideology and in bourgeo· uI ture." (20; 399) '5 c -

T?day's bourgeois. id~ologists orten accuse Marx of over-10okIOg the contradictions of scientific and technological

274

progress. Bnt it was precisely Marx who airrudv in thr mid Hltt. Cf!ntury hrilliuntly eXIJlJs<:d tho~r colllr'ililictilJns ill.ltI proved that. th<:y coUld <July b~ s(Jlv~lI l,y tIle commu III:-.t transfUrlUatloll or social relations. Marx on'reaCH: llot unly /«ialiMIt anu subjectivism but also the naturalist in ~erpretatio~ ~f history which even the greate-st or pre-Marx­Ian ma~eflalis~ had failed to surpass. In his "Economic anu Philosopillc l\lanuscripts of 1844", Marx described his understanding of history as "accomplished llaturalism", meaning that thc~~~v~ .forces of social dcvelopwenl are natural and not supernatural That \\'as also wby he sa id his accomplished naturalism was humanism: the forces that crea te hi s tory arc human, although they are obviously not the [orces of each given generation. Neither nature nOI" mankind arc all-powerful. Nothing is all-powerful....6.ll t there is the potentially all-powerful mankind, just as the aU­powerful nature, and these potential infinities can never be realized in [ull. The road to infinity remains infinite in each of itsseCtions, i.e., there are infinite opportunities for creative activity before us and our infinitely remo\"ed descendants.

The Marxist world outlook is full of vigor and optimism, it is based on a profound understanding of human history in all its complexity and contradictions. The Marxist view­point, Lenin remarked, "may be called h istorical optimism: the farther and the quicker things go as they are, the bet­ter it will be". (10; 2, 525) Defining the objective con­ditions of the communist movement, he said that a Marx­ist "believes in the present course of social development, because he sees the only earnest of a better future in the rull development of these contradictions". (10; 2, 525)

The llistorical optimism of Marxism is organically linked to the dialectical-materialist theory of development. Marxist philosophy sees objective reality as an infinite sphere for conscious and purposeful human action. There tire no unknowable "things-in-themselves"; the entiro reo cord of science and practice shows that "things-in-them- .) selves" turn into "things-for-us", just as necessity "in itself" lurns into necessity "for us", Le., into freedom. Naturally, the unknown, lhe undisco,'e red, the unaccomplished.' the future will always be greater than the known, the diSCOV­ered, the accomplished. That is what is mean.t br the .in­rillite prospects of social progr~ss, and t1~e sCle?L.llic-plulo­sophical MarxisL world outlook IS to help III realIZIng them.

275 os·

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deputs Descartes, Louvain, Paris, H166 59a Gouhi(>r II. , «Note sur Ie progres et la philosophic!) in: Etudes sur

l'histolre de la phllosophie 60. GueroullM.,«Le problemc deia iI~gi limite de I'histoiro de la philo­

sophic. in: La philosophie de l'1t/stolre de la philosophie, Istitu to di .studi filosoCici, Roma - Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, Pam. 1956

(If Hegel G.W.F., Jenaer Realphilosophte, Verlag von Fclix Meiner, Hamburg, 1969

62. lIegel G.W.F., Samtllche Werke, Frommann, Stuttgart, 1928 63. Beitel G.W.F., VorIesungen uber die Philosophie du Weltgeschichte

VerI(lg' von Felix Meiner, lJamburl{, 1970 ' 51. lTcl{Cl G.W.F., Werke, Verlag von Duneker lind I1umbolt Berlin

18'0 ' , 65. Heidegl{Cr M., Yom Wesen der Wahrheit, Vittorio Klostermann

Frankfurt am Main, 1961 ' 66. IIcl"ctius C.-A., De l'homme, de ses facuLUs in tellectuelles et de

wn education, t. 1. A Londrc!;, 1773 67. H~i1dcrlin. Samtliehe lVerke, Bd . 6, Ruten & Loening, Berlin , 1959 68. DHondt J .. Hegel. Phtlosophe de /'hlstoire l'fmnie, Presses uni­

v('rsit;l.ires de France, Paris, 1966 69. Hyppolite J .• etudes sur Marx et H egel , Librairie Marcel Rivicre et

Cie, Paris, Hl55 70. Ilting K.-II. , Hegel in Bertchlen seiner ZeLtgenossw Akademie.

V('rlag, Berlin, 1971 ' 71. James \V" Pragmatism. A New Name jor Some Old Ways 0/ Thin-

kinK, Longmans, Green and Co. , N.Y., 1928 72. Kant 1., Brit/weekstl , Verl~.c:' von Felix. Meiner, Hamburg, 1972 n. Kant I., Wtrke.' Ver}e~.~ bel Bruno Casslrer, Berlin, 1922 74. Kaut~ky K., 'Em Bnef ubC'r Marx und Mach. in: Der Komp/, Bd.l2,

Ifl'ft 10. Vcrla~ VOIl Georg Emmerling, \Vien 1909 • 75. Lalande '\' V~ca~ulairt t~chnlque et critique 'de la philosophie,

Pn'~~('o. l1111v('f":'ltaltcs dl' haneC'. Pnris, 1UGa ifi. 1./. hl)n-s~lu au idit:$ naturl'lll's. Ol'p".~el'$ nl/7 idies sllrnatllrelles

\ Lond rl's. 1782 ' i f.dtrt$ a. RUKfnle ou Pn8(''''(IIlJ ctlllire Its prijudes. Tome 'eeo ld

\ r.ondfl'~, 1768 S I,

27.

78. Locke 1., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Vol. 2, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London, 1974

79. Lomba rdi F., «Apres l'historicisme. in: La phllosophie de l'hlstoire de La phtlosophie ..

80. Lowith N., Von /Jegel::u Nietzsche, W. Kohlbammer Verlag, Stutt-gart, t964 . .

81. Maire G., Une rigression mentale, Bernard Grasset €dlteur, Pans, '959

82. Marcuse 11. , Kultur und Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1968

83. Morcuse n., Reason and R euolutlon. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, The Humanities P~ss, N. Y., 1,951. . ,

84. Maritnin J. , R iflexlons sur l Amerique, Llbrame Arthemo Fayard, Paris, 1958

85. Martin G., Allgemeine Metaphysik. Ihr9'SP5robLeme und O"e Metho-de, Wolter de Gruyter & Co, Berlin, 1 .

86. Mllrtin G., Immanuel Kant. OntoloKg'S'O und WlssenschaftstheoTle, Kainer UniverSitiitsverla~, Kaln, 1. .

87. Mercier A., «La philosop ie et la sCiOnce22

• 10: Abeles ld9u73X~~me Congr~s mondtai de philosophle du 17 au septem re ,ar-na (Bulgarl e), Sofie, 1973 .. . d

88. Motzko E., «Mensch und Geschichte im ud~sprungll?lh,nFOA)?!atz'95'7' Marxischen Denkons. in: Marxlsmusstu I~n, ZW~I e ' t>-,

89, Nietzsche F., «Menschliches, Allpu:nens,'Sh9)5Icbest 10: Werke, 1 Ab­tbeilung, Bd. 2, Naumann, LeipZIg,

90, Popper K. R., Objedl~ Knowled,9g'7"2An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford at the Clarendon Press,

9t, popper' K. R., The Open SOciedty and1915~ Enemies. Vol. 2, George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., Lon on, . '

92, Ricoucur P., /llstolrt. ,et "'lrl:Z, ~~won\tu ~~~1~'!; P~~~i' lr::r 93. Rombach II. , Die Gegenwart r osop t, '

Freiburg/Miinchen, 1964 d & Co 94. Hunes D. D., Dictionary oJ,~Phllosophy, Littlefield, A ams .,

Ames, 1955 l fd Ii . der 95 Rehelling F.W.l., System des) transscT~nbq.enta e~800a smus, In

. J G CoUa'schen Buchhand ung, U lOgon, . 96 Waelhens A. de. «Philosophic et non-phllosophlet in: Revue phl-

, losophlque de Louuain, t. 57, N 53, 1959 , . Laphlloso-97. Wagner de Royna A.

I, «MhY,'/hO, h~itoire ct mysterc. 10:

phie de l'lllstolre de a p osop e

NAME INDEX

A

Abbagnano, Nicola-7S, H6 Aristotie-iO-2i t 41, 51, 65, 67,

69, 127, 201, 245 Asmus, V. F.-149, 162, 172

B

Bachelard, Gaston-l02, 109 Bacon, Francis-1a, 104, 182,

222, 268 Bayle, Pierre-t4t Belaval, Yvon-69 Berdayev, N.-117 Bergson, Henri-l4, 76 Berkeley, George-t2, 37, 54,

110, 111, 113, 139, 161 Bogdanov, B. V.-27 Bogomolov, A. S.-116 Bohr, Niels-67 Bolnow, Otto-H6 Braun, L.-21 Brezhnev, Leonid-15 Broglie, Louis de-27, 189 Brunner, F.-64, 66 71 73 80 Buhr, Manfred-ISS: 18'2 ' Oykhovsky, B. E.-181 Byron, George Gordon-20

c Ca lvez, Jean~Yves-84 Collins, Anthony-206 Comte, Auguste-76 Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de-

24, 2.5 Copernicus, Nicolas-iOS

280

D

D'Alombcl't, Jean La Rond-90 Darwin, Charles-20, 76 DClllocritus-47, 51, 93, 104, 121 Descartes, Rcne- 12, 28, 37, 54,

610, 67, 76, 87, 121, 122, 125, 127, 135, 139, 154, 195, 222, 268

Diderot, Denis- 37, 154. 239 Dilthcy, Wilhelm- 79, 80 DiogeD('s Laertius-21, 22 Ducasse, C. 1.-25

E

Eim,loin, Albert-8, 76, 105 Ei~ler, Rudolf- :f45 Engel s, Frederick-5, 7-11, 15,

20, 23, 26, 32, 33, 38, 41, 45, 84, 89~91, 94, 95, 97, 98, 101, 102, 105, 106, 117, 125, 134, 136, 140, 163, 174, 185, 192, 193, 196, 198, 202, 203, 207, 210, 221, 232, 242, 256, 268, 269, 272

Epicmus-q7, 51, 54, 104 Euclid-86, 105

F

Fedoseycv, P. N.-34, 270 Feucrbach, Ludwig-20, 28, 37,

,44, 86, 138, 1St, 174, 221, 261 Flchte, Johann Gottlieb-41 46

52, 63, 6-1, 87, 154-80 222' 269 Foulqui6. Paul- 145' , F.-ank, Philipp-tl2 113 Frederick the Great- 216 Fuller-145

G

(;alilci, Galileo- ·2fJ8..r;o Goclllt', Johann Wolfgang von

·264 Gold~chmidt., V.-61 Gorgias- i03 Gouh ier Hcnri- &1, 67, 75-77 Gucroult, Martial-61t, 67-74,

79, 80, 82

n

lIartman D, Nicolai-97 lIegel, Geerg Wilhelm Fried­

rich-tO, 12, 13, 20, 25-29, 37, 41-61, 64, 65, 69, 78, 87-89, 0 I, 92, 95, 96, 103, 104, 106, 141, 155, 159, 169, 173, 177-258, 260, 262-72

Heideggor, Martin-114, 115, 181

Heino, IJeinrich-268 Ileisenberg, Werner-8 IIelvelius, Claude-Adrien-127,

239 Heraclitus-204, 261 Herzen, Alexander-264 Hobbes, Thomas-12, 28 IIolbach , Paul-Henri-33, 1 to,

127, 207, 239 l-i51dorlin, Friedrich-169, 207 Homer-19 D'Hondt, Jacques-205, 26/, Hume, David-12, 54 Hussed, Edmund-73, 114, 115 Il yppolito, Joan-53, 84, 262,

263

I

ilting, Karl~Heinz-206 I1yenkov, E. V.-242 llyichev, L. F.-248

1

Jacobi Friedrich lIeinrich-, 136, 137, 162

James, William-75

K

Kant, Immanuel-7, 14, 21, 41 46, 52, 69, 70, 70, 87, 93, 95: 121-55, 157, 1GO, 16/j, 166, 167, 174, 176-78, 180, 186, 195, 197, 203, 222, 226, 231, 215. 250, 269

Kautsky. Karl-S3, 84 Kedrov, B. M.-2It4 Kicrkegaard, Sorcn Aabye-91,

114 Kissel, M. A.-253 Kolrnogorov, A. N.-t05 KonstaDtinov, F. V.-95 Koyre, Alexandre-GO

L

Lavoisier, Antoine-90 Lazarev, V. V.-t63 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm-

12, 20, 37, 54, 61, 73, 122, 125, 127, 130, 135, 154, 162, 270

Lenin, V. 1.-8, 9. H, 13, 27, 77.81,83,92-95,97,104, 111 , 137, 141, 145, 177, 178, 181, 187. 191. 199, 201, 216, 218. 221, 224-26, 230, 232, 233, 235, 242-48, 250-52, 254-60, 262, "'2 2--_I , 10

Leucippus-47 Lobachevsky, N. 1.-105 Locke, John-12, 37, 122-25 Lombardi, Franco-54, 65 Lowith , Karl-263

Mach, Ernst-83 Maimon, Salomon-64 Maiebranche, Nicolas de-37,

64, 76 Marcel, Gabriel-Q4. 181 Marcusc, Herbert-81 Marie, Gilbert-6i ;\Iarit~'in, Jacque-IIi Martin, GoUfried-65, 118 Marx, I'::arl-9. I;), 25. 30, 3~,

33, 38, 39, 5i, 81, 84-86, 93-95, 101-03, 125, 134, 136, 137.

281

155, 16.1, 169. 173, 174, 184, 18.5, 187, 196, 197-99, 20.'), 209. 219, 221, 232., 234-36, 238, Via, 2'.2, 247, 258, 260-67, 269, 270, 2i2-i5

Melvil, Yu. K-ttl Mercier, Andrli-63 Mfltzke. Erwin-263 Mitia, M, B.-203 Montaigno, Michel-Hi

N

Naumooko, 1.-184 Nnwton, Isaac-GS Niothammcr, F. 1.- -207, 21t. Niet1.~che, Friodrich-Qt., 113

p

p,lrlOrnides-21 PllI'idins-71 Piom', CharJo~ SlInd!'r8- 111 I'lalo-19, 20, 21, 41, 47, 51,

G!i, 69, 70, 73, 127, 201, 212-13, 227, 2"0

Popper, Karl· 111,201 Proln gorllll- -21

R

Hnphael-71 Hcic!, TholDlIlI itO Hrinhold, I(nrl Leonnrd 100,

166 Ilicnrdo, David -137 Hicocnr, Pnul-6Io 7t. 75 77

7R,200 "" Bombnch, Hoinrich-68 nOU!\~rau, JOlln-Jacqu<,s- -1M,

159, 207, 213, 230, 267 ilunos, Oagohcrt-145

s !oi'11lll1yMlfl, Gt'1lrI{<'- -270 S:lrtro'. J\'an-Palll Iff, ~dl('llin~, Fril'drich Willll']1lI

JO~(lph vuu 1.1, 'G, 37 170 1RO, 1)1,(l "

Scherer, Edmond--80 Schmidt.. Conrad-84 Schopcnhauer, Arthur-70 75,

271 ' Shakespearo, William-t9 Shestov, Lflv-l/J8 Shinkarw<, V. l.-t52 Socrates-2i. 47 SpinoZQ, Benedict-H, 12 46

54, 76, 87, 122, 123, 125' 127' 135, 150, 154, 155, 169: 184' 11J!, 192, 265 '

T

Tchaikovsky, P. 1.-71 Tf'rtuJliaD-10B 1'hales-47 Thomas Aquinas-lOB, 182 Tledomann, Diotrich-l03 Timiryatev, K A.-8 Tol~toy, T ov-20

v

VAn C:hert204 Vn~ili('v, 1.-184 Vernfldl'ky, V. 1.-8 VollAirf', Frant:oi~ Marie Aroucl

239, 270

w

WaolhcDlI, Aljlhonso De-OO Woltner, Albort do Rcyna-7t. Windelband, Wilhl'lm- 212 Wi1tgonsl('in, Ludwig Josef Jo-

hann-113

y

Y('florov, A. G.-274

z Zeoo of E]ca-257

SUBJECT INDEX

A

Activlly.156, 159, 162-65, 1GB, m

-cognitive- 92-03, 223-24 -labor-229, 232-M -practical-t6, 63, 164, 165, 221-23, 225, 226, 231-32, 237

-theoretical-63, 164, 222, 223 A;no,l/cl,m-il, 14, 129, 140-41,

I" Alitnallon, lell-alfenation-l00, 1t5, 163, 16S, t72, 182, 183, 190, 196, 197, 234, 236-38, 262

Antfnomiu-IO, 81, 137, 153, IS7

rI prlopl approach-tt, 95, t14, 12.1, 128-35, 142 t.3

c Calegorlu (phllo,ophlcal)--46,

fA:. 252, 25f}-!i7 -defmition of -94-90, 241 Fichw'!\174, t78-80 Hogel'lI- ·95, 96, 180, 186-87, 2S0, 251 Knnt'II-05, 131·33, 151, 1M, ISS, 171i

-sepornlo .cn~ullljly-!l5, 171) content Dnd form-30, 1i8,

fh!, 131, 170, 187, 250 contrndiction!-t4I, 169,

171, 179, 180, 236, 265 .clevC!lopmont-7, 16, 19,

2n, 29-:l0, 3"-37, M, 65, S8-!l2, !H, 186. '91, 192, 197, I!lS. 202 :"'0:1, 2!i 1- ;I'~' 2~17, 265

-f'n'edom IIlId ntCCS.o:ity~ tS1, 1::.8. tOO, 171

- -identity lind dlslinction-25, 26, 84, 85, 167, 168, 170, 180, 185-87, 222, 223

- -mattC!r (umin's definition of) -244-45, 259-60

- -"one i!l not one but many"-38

- -oPlJOsites-31, 42, fl2, ISO, t61, 164-72, 170, 186, 198, 2115

- -space and time-l77 _ -~ub~lance (Hef::1l1's, Spino In'~)-162, 175,IM, 190·92,227

-substantiation and COD­

~equence-t30 _ -Iho absolute and lhe ro­

lative-228 -the finite and the infinite -97, HI

_ -tho historical and the log­ical-8, 9, 2:1 -the internal and tho 0%-

1ern81-23I, 232 _ . the means and end- .23.'-\ __ thesis and antilhc!lis, syn·

thesi~-tO, 169-72 _ -tho whole and a part-tO,

03 Clul/ '."'''' Cogn/llon

22, 27, 132, 1M, 200, 237, 257

_ - -p!lycholol!'y--253 Common ,tn't- I03-ll , 116 Conupl-6, 7, 27, 42, ,n, 132,

'0' 2"3 22' ""7 ""'1 .,~., ,_, ~, ,,._ , -"-' -"" 2S5-57

.aod nOUllll'non -136, H:J·4\1, 131, 152

283

Conscioasncss-2". 27, 138-40. 1"'1, HO, 169, 23.1

-moral-H.9. 150, 230 -overydny-23, 27, 28, 32. 1,7,

106, 108-10, H2-14, 117, 118, 233

-social-31-33, 57, 195, 239 -philosophical-27, 57, 107,

114 -religious-60, 103, 117 -and everyday expericnce-

103,107,109-12,208 (see also Spirit)

Continuity (historical, relati.on to the precedi.ng philosophy) -11-14, 27, 31, 42, 57, 58, 75-78, 200, 273

D

Dcduction-l29, 130 De/inition-[23, 153 Dialeclics-38, 39, 52, 61, 135,

154, 177. 179. 180, 188, 189, 196-99, 216-19, 242-43, 255, 256, 271-72

-idealist. (Fichte, Hegel) -166, 174, 204, 216, 235, 242, 263, 264, 266, 267

-mat.erialist.-255-56, 264, 266, 267

-transccndental-154, 155 -as logic and epistemology-

242-48, 250, 253-55, 257-60 -theory 0[-154, 155, 180-81 Dualislll-12, 140, 178

E

Empiricism-12 14 111 121-24 , " , 248, 253

Epistemology-9, 53, 244-46, 253, 254 (see also Cognition)

Error-11, 22, 122, 123, 137 (see also Truth)

Esoteric. the, and exoteric, the --60, 191, 205, 206, 208

Eucli.dean (Euclid's) geometry -86, 105

Experience -ovcryday-34, 72, 100, 101,

104, 105-07, 110-13

·hislorir;II- til --srit'nIUic to!l, 126

F

Freedom -213, 211, 217, 220 Fllndamental problrm of phil­

osophy-110, 167, 1&"i

n

H islorical-philosophical process -5, 9, 12, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 29, 33, 47, 57-61, 66, 67, 69, 79, 80, 81, 82

- Hcgel's-12-13, 25, 27-29, 37, 41, 52, 64, 65, 87-89, 91-93, 199-200

Historical-philosophtcal study -principles of-41, 42, 50, 51,

137, 138, 153, 194, 195, 215, 2[7

Historicism (Heifel's concept of world history)-39, 197, 202, 203, 210, 272, 273

-epistemologica l-96, 258 l!istory-20-21, 26, 156-59, 195,

212, 217, 232, 250, 251, 257, 265, 272, 273

-idealistic undcrstanding-2 14 -materialistic understanding-

10, 33, 158-59, 237, 271-72 lIistory of phiLosophy-7-10,

13-15, 19-23, 26, 30, 31, 34-37, 39-43, 4H6, /.8-51, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64, 68-71, 77, 221, 261

-subject of-19, 21, 24, 25, 34, 35, 41

I

Idealism (idealist philosophy) -10, fll, 15, 31, 36, 37, 38, 63, 66, 67, 73, 71i, 79, 88, 89, 91, 92, 98, 1().1, 108, 110-13, 139, 181, 230, 231 , 234, 237, 263, 264, 266

-ab~0Illte-12, 27-29, 44, 53, 57, 61, 182, 185, 100, 199, 251

-dialectica l (Gel' man classical)

,

;1, 1:1, :18, 1,6, 1\7, fi:I, 87-8~J, 154, t;,,"',, lliO, 177, 18:1, 237, ',," 2"1' "67 _ II, ", ~

objl'l·tive t80, 18", Vi6 suhjl'dive· -12, itO, 111, t61 , 16,"'1-71j, t7!!

ltlcologU--:{!, :i2, 1;;1, 66, 82, 102, t03, t:16, 15H, 160, 18t, 205, 213, 2W bourgeois (and peUy-bour· geois) -32, :33, 102, 207, 208, 2G3, 270 ·socialist.-31, 32, 102

lllteitect ual intuit ion-123-21I, 160-61,175, 177

Interest-229 Irrationalism-ill, 73, 76, 95,

H3, 118, Itj8, 181, 188, 262-63, 274, 275

K

Knowledge-57, 73, 89-92, 96, 97, 121" 132, 133, 139, 141, 11,2, 251, 252, 254, 257

-absolute (and specific)-28, 49, 86, 87, 94, 97, 98, 128, 178, 193, 200, 239, 257, 262

-3 priori (supra experimental) -130-33, 142

-empirical- 13l-33 - philosophical-27, 28, 36, 3i,

43, 54, 59, 62, 66, 71, 80, 87-92

-scicnt.ific t.hcoreticnl (scien­tific, lheorelical) - 14, 35, 4i-48 126, 130, 131, 133, 134, 195, 196, 223, 224, 251-54 (sec also Practice)

L

Labor-W6, 232-37 _ alienated-23G - lOols of-233 Law-i93, 213, 230, 257 _philosophy-56, 57, 209 Laws-35, 36, 174, 175, 190, 246,

247, 250, 2M, 255, 260

~if~lectical-I54 , 155, 179, t80, 188, 245, 250-54, 256, 257

formal· -86, 15/1, 175, t88, tSG, 2'- 2'6 I.), I

·lran;;cf'udental-143, 1M, 155, 1<tO

DOKical forml-187, ViS, 2tj6, 218, 2::'0, 2.'j1

Marxi!m (Marxist philo!ophy) -10, 13, 15, 16, 33-35, 38, 40, ni, 66, 83-86, 9/1-"98, 116, 137, 181 , 203, 221, 21,2, 2"8, 253, 261, 262, 264, 272, 273

Materialism (dialectical-mate­rialist philosophy)-8, 31, 38, 39, 4G, 47, 61, 100, 111, 112, 136, 256

-dialectical-5, 8, 9, 11 , 13, 14, 16, 34-36, 41, 112, 137, 153, 242, 24i, 258

-French, 18th--century-32, 33, 110,125-26,157,191

-mechanistic-l38 -metaphysical-i8S, 225, 226,

256 -pre-Marxian (old, metaphys­

ical)-174, 187, 190, 226 -and idealism-31, 36-38, 76,

100, 108, 112, 113, 137, 152, 225, 226

Material, the. and spiritual, the -140, 183-S4, 193, 196-97, 223, 231, 234

Method (methodology}- 13, 75, 94, 138, 139, 142, 155, 259, 260

-antithetical-l72 _dialectical-tO, 134, '135, 172,

180 - historical and logical-8, 9,

27, 50 _ metaphysical-94, 95, 106,

107, 128, 137, 178 - transition from tho abstract

10 the concretc-247 -aod Hegel's system-2 15, 232,

257, 265 Monarchy, Hegel's concept of -feudal and constitutional-

208, 209 _conslitutional-210-15, 239 Motion (and matter}-23, 30,

138, 163

N

Nalflral science-G-S, g...21, 23, 2.t 29, 47, 48, 59, 90, 176, 257, 259 -cmpirical-12

_theorelical-7, 8, 20, 133, 134, 1'L2

Negation (dialectical}-H, 42, 54, 84, 85, 87, 88, 9t, 92, 174, 180, 187, 188, 198, 199, 20t, 203, 266-67

o

ObjcctilJity (and subjectilJlty) -74-77

OnLology-44, 53, 1.43, 174, 24ti Optlmism -historical-2iO, 271, 275 Outlook-3t, 78, 172, 1St, 275 -bourgeois-28, 237 -scientific philosophical-15,

16, 32, 35-39, 61, 83, 181, 240, 241, 275 (seo also Philosophy)

p

Panlogism-227, 234, 248, 258, 268

Pantheism- I84, 185 Pcssimism -social-270 Philosophy -subject of-95, 97, 127, 128,

194, 240, 241, 248 -as a system of world outlook

-98 - and science-25, 32, 34, 35,

G2~64, 67~69, 72, 96, 97 -and religion-103, 110, 116,

126, 183, 239 - Hegel's-28, 29, 41-46, 48, SO,

57. 61, 87-91, 185, 190, 192 194, 199-201, 232, 240-42, 247: 256, 258, 283, 264

-of the New Age-1S, 15, ~ 182 ' '

-or tho bourgcoi!l Enligh tcn­mcnt-32, t57, IGO, 182, 203 2!i7, 270 ' loday's bourgcois-3'i, 63, 262, 274

soparate trends -iStcxistcntialism-75, 114-16,

_ -Frllokfurt School-84 __ ncopositivism-f.'t, 38, 95,

112-111 __ nco-Thomism-66, 108, 109 _ -"philosophy or the history

of philosophy"-63-68, 73-75, 78-82

__ "technological pessimism" -181, 274

-principle of partisanship in -240-41 (see also Marxism)

Practice-Ht, 117, 16t" 165, 176, 221-26, 228-33, 237, 251

_ rcvolutionary- 237-41 -socio-political-29, 241

-and thcory-224-26 (sea also Activity, Revolu­tion)

Progress-30, 42, 57, 182, 186, 203, 216, 263, 267, 268, 270, 272, 273

R

Rationalism of the 17th-c,-96, 121-25, 127-32, 134, 135, 143, 181, 194, 203, 230, 263

Reality-16G, 171, 243, 261 - cverydo.y-72, 73 - philosophical-72, 74, 76 Reason-42, 121-23, 128, 129,

143, 181-84, 187-90, 192, 194-98, 201, 207, 230

- practical-149-51, 167 - pure-122-23, 128-29, 146, 1St,

194-97 - theoretical-tliS, 167 - historical character of-197-99

(see also Spirit) RClJolutton - Fichte's altitude to-l55 156

159 ' , - lIegel's attitude lo-219 238

239, 271 ' ,

s SCience-32, 311-36, 47, 48, 63,

Gtl, 79, 92, tOO, 112, 113, i2ti, 125, 128

-history (development) of-8, 19, 20, 21, 27, 30, 31, 35, 36, 41, 42, 67-59, 86, 252, 253 (seo also Knowledge)

Self-conscioumess-f-7, 58, 138, 139, 158, 169, 177, 234

S e nsat lonalls m-248-50 Skepticlsm-12, 14, 22-2G, 41,

54, 71, 77, 78, 141 Spirit (and nature)-163, 189-91,

224, 225, 231 - absolute-28, 49, 53, 55-58,

87, 88, 92, 192, 193, 197, 198, 215, 239, 272

-objective and subjeclive-192, 193 (see also Subject-obJecL)

State-57, 192, 193, 216-19, 240

Subject -absolute (and empirical)-

160-66, 168-69, 172, 177-79 SubjectilJism-l1, 40, 75, 167 SubjectllJe, the -and the objcctivo-77, 144,

170-74 Subject-object-l63-68, 170, 171,

173, 174 (see also SpirIt)

Systems (phllo$ophtcaIJ-28, 42, 44, 46, 49, 51, 52, 58, SIi, 65, 67, 71·73, 80, 83-95, 177, 199, 246

- metaphysical-13, 54, 89, 90, 125-30, 134, 135, 141, 1.42

T

Technology-273, 274 Theism-l26, 184 Theory-20, 47, SO, 51, 60, 224,

225 -of reDection-lO, 32, 92, 96,

102, 112, 187, 249, 250 "Thing-in-itsel!" -136-37, 139-

141, 144-49, 1.52-53 Thinking-7, 29, 101, 112, 122,

123, 182, 183, 194, 222, 266 -theoretical-509, 175 - and being-96, 162, 222, 223,

227, 228, 234, 248 -identity of being and thought, Hegel's concept of-

47, 48, 57, 92, 162, 179, 180, 185-87, 246 (see also Spirit)

Truth-10, H, 22, 24, 26, 29, 41--43, 51, 52, 71, 72, 88, 102, 206, 207, 257, 268

-absolute-97, 98, 142 -relative-g7, 98, 268 -objective (Hegel's)-243 -and crror-23, 52, 92, 194-95,

198, 199, 267

w

Will-229-31 - frccdom-126, 150-51, 158 Working class-241, 266

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