Schwartzman - Althusser, Dialectical Materialism and the Philosophy of Science

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Althusser, Dialectical Materialism and the Philosophy of ScienceAuthor(s): David W. SchwartzmanReviewed work(s):Source: Science & Society, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Fall, 1975), pp. 318-330Published by: Guilford PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40401861 .

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ALTHUSSER, DIALECTICAL MATERIALISMAND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

DAVID W. SCHWARTZMAN

PHILOSOPHY HAS LONG BEEN a field fsurprisinglyittleoriginal esearch,n contrasto otherareasofMarxisthought. ortunately,he astfewyears

havewitnessed thoroughgoingeexaminationf itsfoundations.A large art f thiswork- hat one n theSovietUnion-hasbeenunavailable oEnglish-speakingeaders,1hohave ufferedotori-ously rominguisticfnotpoliticalhauvinism.he author astoconfess oan ignorancefmanymportantaperswrittenn Rus-sian and other anguages.romFrance, owever,avecome omeremarkablend often xasperatinglyonvoluted orksby LouisAlthusser,figure hohas ttackedhe trongurrentf humanist"MarxismrevailingntheWest rom n "orthodox"erspective.2

In particular,lthusserasdefendedheprofoundheoreticalbreakthroughhat ialectical aterialismepresents.n this uthor'sopinion,Althusser'soncept fscience s "theoreticalractice"sofgreatmportancen carryingn fromhe"dialecticsf nature"ofEngels ndLenin.

In ForMarx3Althusserroposedodefine hilosophydialecti-calmaterialism)s the heoryftheoreticalractice,.e.,thetheoryof cience.ubsequently,nLeninandPhilosophy*erejectshis s"a unilateralnd nconsequencealse onception."e instead ro-poses newdefinitionfdialecticalmaterialisms a practice f"political-theoreticalntervention."he journalTheoreticalrac-

1 See Loren Graham's Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union (New York,1972)for very aluabletreatment.

2 N. Gerashas usefullyummarized lthusser'shinkingn New LeftReview,No.71, pp. 57-86.

3 L. Althusser,or Marx (NewYork,1970).4 L. Althusser, enin and Philosophy New York,1971).

318



ALTHUSSER AND SCIENCE 319

tice5has repudiatedAlthusser's ew definitionn favorof his oldone. In thispaper I will explorethiscontroversynd its relevancefortheso-calledphilosophy f science, nd forthepracticeof thenatural sciences.The first ectionprovidesthe background, om-mencingfromAlthusser's ld definition; he second considers heimplications orthe relationof dialecticalmaterialism o the sci-ences. n thefinal ection cyberneticormulationfAlthusseriandialectics s sketched,n thehope of betterdefining he potential

contributionsf philosophyo the new "metatheories" f science

and clarifyinghenatureofphilosophical ractice.

1. Materialism- aithorKnowledge?

For Althusser,materialismtartswithan acknowledgementfthe real object existing"outside the head," which is knowablethrough cience.6Unfortunatelyhe central dea of materialism-knowable bjectiveworld-has usuallybeen treated s a usefulbut

unprovablepostulate,convenient

ssumption, faith, yphiloso-phers ympathetico dialecticalmaterialisme.g.,Freistadt7). et itsomehow urvivesn itscuriousrole as the implicit ssumption fmost practicing cientists,hurchgoers r agnostics, nd of non-scientistss well,being ncorporatednto the deology freligion r'Village atheism."All would kick Dr. Johnson's tonebut forthe"irresistiblend gargantuan utburst f laughter," o use Gramsci's

phrase.Yetmaterialismersus dealismwith tsnumerouspermuta-tionsremains hefundamentaluestionofphilosophy, articularly

because ofargument ver tsrelationto scientificractice.The essential ore of materialist hilosophywas of coursede-fendedvigorously y Lenin in his polemicwithMach, Avenariusand theirfollowers.8his defensewas strongly eiterated y Buk-

5 Cutler and Gane in Theoretical Practice, 7/8 (January1973). Theoretical Practiceceasedpublicationwiththis ssue.

6 Most materialists r "realists" incorporatesome concept of dialectics including therelative nature of the classical subject/object relation {i.e., the phenomenon of"mind" as partof a multi-leveledbjective eality).

7 H. Freistadt,DialecticalMaterialism: Friendlynterpretation,"hilosophy fScience,XXII, pp. 97-110.Even Graham uccumbs o thisview;see Chapter I,op. cit.

8 Materialismnd Empirio-Criticism.ee especially he section ntitled Did na-tureexistpriorto man?"



320 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

harin,9who came under attackbyGranisci.10n a passageclose toidealismGranisci efusesoaccept n extra-historicalrextra-humanexternal bjectivity. n thispoint pivotsGramsci's ejection f theautonomy f dialecticalmaterialism r Marxistphilosophy,whichhe mergesntoan historicistnterpretationfMarxism.11

Timpanaro12 ecently olemicized new againstthoseMarxistswho have essentially akenGramsci'sposition.He emphasizes heprofoundmaterialistmplications f the "historical ciencesof na-ture"

(geologynd

biology).He definesmaterialisms "above all

acknowledgementf thepriority f nature over 'mind/or if youlike,of thephysical evel over thebiological evel,and of the bio-logical evel overthesocioeconomic nd cultural evel; bothin thesenseof chronological riority . . and in the senseof the condi-tioningwhichnaturestill exercises n man and will continuetoexercise t leastforthe foreseeable uture."Much ofhis essay s ajustifiedmphasis f the mportancef the"biologicalbase" under-lyinghistoricalmaterialism. n doing so, however,Timpanaro's

polemic s weakenedbyhis implication hat "nature"is somehowmorereal thansocial structures. materialist istorian s no lessmaterialist han physicalcientist.

In anycase,can Marxists ffordimply o accepta materialismbased on "assumptionshat re moreconsonantwith he naturalismimplicit n mostscience,"13o present hesympathizers'ase in itsstrongestight? s the materialist aithcompatiblewith Marxistphilosophy? thinknot, because it fails to recognizematerialismwith tsdialectics s a knowledge,,productoftheoretical ractice.

The theory fdialecticalmaterialisms anchored o the sciencesbyitsknowledges,most trikingly,erhaps,by thesciencesofgeologyand astronomytheEarth nd solarsystemre-existentoman) andbiophysics nd chemistryconsciousness, hought nd emotions sobjectsof science).This relation can only be a starting oint inexamining hephilosophy fdialecticalmaterialism.

Engelsdefined ialectics s the mostgeneral aws ofnature nd

9 See his "Theory nd Practice rom heStandpointf DialecticalMaterialism"nH.

Dingle, d.,Science t theCrossroads

London,1971).10 See Selectionsfromthe Prison Writings New York, 1971), especially pp. 444-447.11 See Althusser'siscussionn Reading Capital,pp. 130-137.12"Marxismnd Idealism,"NewLeft Review,No. 85,pp. $-22.13Graham, p. cit.,p. 440.




humansociety s well as ofthoughttself.14n itsinclusivenesshisdefinitions close to Althusser'stheory f theory," ut Engelsdidnotdevelop tmuch further han isting nd illustratinghe famouslaws of dialectics. f dialecticalmaterialisms a theory,t requiresdevelopmentn a logicaland internallyonsistent ay,ustas muchas the ciencest reflectsn. It requires ts own theoretical ractice.15

How might hispractice e specifiednd developed?Theoreticalpracticeof the sciences tartswiththe raw materialof ideology,16

"facts" nd/orpre-existingcientificoncepts Althusser's enerali-ties ). It transformshesewiththetheory fscienceexisting t thatmoment generalitiesI, whichincludes, n experimentalcience,the various pparatuses ftheory-tsconcepts,mathematicalxpres-sion and physicalnstrumentationhich perateon GI) intoknowl-edge,"the appropriation f the externalworld" (generalitiesII).GUI includes the experimental r observational onfirmationftheorynd thenon-revolutionaryxpansions hereof.

Althusser'sepistemologicalbreak,"

aconcept

derived fromBachelard, s defined as the transformationf relativelyunder-developed deology ntoGII, i.e.,a transformationf an ideologicalproblematicnto a scientificne. Thomas Kuhn'sconceptof "para-digm"and "revolution" s paralleledbyAlthusser's problematic"and "epistemological reak,"respectively.17o sketch he transfor-mations n a scientific evolutionwe note that "knowledges" rebeing processed:

14 FriedrichEngels, Dialectics of Nature (New York, 1940).15 This concept of philosophyis quite similar to M. Bunges "metascience"; see his

MetascientificQueries (Illinois, 1959) and especially Method, Model and Matter(Dordrecht, Holland, 1973), henceforth referred to as MM&M. In this volume,Bunge is strongly ritical of dialectics in the usual classical (metaphorical)formu-lation though he supports a so-called "logical materialism,'- fusion of dynamicmaterialism and critical realism.

16 Ideology is distinguishedfromscience by Althusserin that the "practico-social"predominatesover the theoretical. The late Sidney Finkelstein likewise empha-sized this distinctionbetweendialectical materialism and ideology in Political Af-fairs,July,1959,p. 43. :

17 See Kuhn's The Structureof ScientificRevolutions (Chicago, 1962). This parallel-ism was noted by J. Oakley,Marxism Today, September1972,p. 269 and AndrewLevine, Radical America,August 1970, p. 165. On the question of the objectivityof scientific nowledgeKuhn tends to an agnosticposition.This has recentlybeen

pointed out by Pappademos and Lumpkin,Political Affairs,November 1974.




GIIPre-revolution Gì -» GUIRevolution GII -» GIF

GIFPost-revolutionGF - GUI -> GUI'

If scientific evelopment s characterized y such ruptures ntheorys Kuhndescribede.g.,Newtonian o Einsteinian hysics18),thenthere s stillanother ourceof ideologicaldeformationf sci-

ence apart fromdirect political or other extra-scientificffects,namely, henatureof theoretical ractice tself.The finite nd in-complete characterof each GII insures that GUI, the startingmaterialfora new knowledge roduction GI;), is alwayscontami-natedwith deology n the sense of being ultimatelyncapableofproviding meansofknowing eality.An impasse s reached n theself-reflectionfeachtheory, hichthenbecomes faith ideology)ifit survives asttherupture.Althusseruggestshis n thefollow-ing passage:Herewe cansee mmediatelyprecisexample fthe deologicalhreatthathangsover all scientificabor: ideology otonly ies in waitforscience t eachpointwhere tsrigor lackens,ut also at thefurthestpointwhere n investigationurrentlyeachests limits.™

The process f production f knowledge,n Althusser'swords,"necessarilyroceedsbytheconstant ransformationf its (concep-tual) object,producing new knowledge . . whichstill concernsthereal object,knowledge f which is deepened precisely y this

reorganizationf theobjectofknowledge."20his reorganizationsinevitable n thehistory fscience, nd particularlyhoroughgoingin theexplosiveperiodsof scientificevolution. he latter s illus-tratedby Kuhn in his discussion f the Einsteinianrevolution nphysics e.g.,the transmutationf theconceptofmassfromNew-tonianphysics).21

What then s the rawmaterial fdialecticalmaterialismf it is

18 The recent development of plate tectonicsin geology has strikingly llustrated

the Kuhnian concept of scientific evolution; see B. Jones,New Scientist,August29, 1974,pp. 53&-538.19. L. Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading: Capital (New York, 1970Ì, p. 90.20 Reading Capital, p. 156.21 Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 92-110.




itself theoretical ractice? t cannotgeneratethe same kind ofknowledge s the sciences (e.g., "prove" the infinityf the uni-verse22).he rawmaterial f dialecticalmaterialisms GII and thehistorynd mode of its transformationnto new theory. his in-cludestherefore he mostgeneralcharacteristics, ethodologyndlogicalfoundations f the ciences.One might xpect t to be vitallyinvolved n the transformationf GII, since this involvesthe re-definition f scientificoncepts nd their heoreticaloncept (their

problematic).uhn

acknowledgesheroleof

philosophys follows:

It is ... particularlyn periods f acknowledgedrises hat scientistshave turned o philosophicalnalysiss a device orunlockingherid-dles of their ields.23

While in thehistoryf sciencethishas involved urning oall varie-tiesof idealistand mechanicalmaterialist hilosophies,we shouldexpectthata developingdialecticalmaterialismwould fulfill hisrole nowand in thefuture. et usthow shoulddialecticalmaterial-ism ntervenen these crises/1et alone in "normal"science tself?Althusser mphasizes he clear distinction etweenempiricist hi-losophiesand dialecticalmaterialism,n that the former eek to"guarantee" heknowledges f thesciences,while the lattermain-tainsthepositionof theself-sufficiencyf each science'sknowledgeproduction.24notherwayofputting his s to saythatthescienceshave a "strong" (determinant) elationto dialecticalmaterialism(e.g., the philosophical ategory f matter s enrichedby the sci-ences),while dialecticalmaterialism's elationto the sciences is

"weak" in the sense that t clarifies,uggests, elps thesciencesbyproducing general heory f them.25 usthowdialecticalmaterial-ismmay"help"willbe discussed ater.

The knowledges f dialectical materialismre its concepts, tscategories nd their theoretical ontext.The classical categoriesinclude matter, ime,space, contradiction,uantity, uality,etc.Someproposednewcategoriesncludeoverdetermination,nforma-tion, structure,ymmetry,ystems. he fact that the latterhavefor themostpartbeen "borrowed"from ther cientificnvestiga-

22 See the discussionyG. I. Naan,Science& Society, pring 963,pp. 176-202.23 Op. cit.,p. 88.24 ReadingCapital, specially p. 15-69.25 As Bungeputs t, "The testof scientific etaphysicss science."MM&M,p. 158.




tions (includingmathematics)nd are as yetin rather ll-definedrelation o theclassical ategoriesndicatesboththeimmense aborawaitingdialecticalmaterialistsnd the richness f the "space" ofthephilosophy. he urgencyfsuch aborhasrecently eenempha-sizedbyA. Ursul26nd P. Fedoseyev.27edoseyev osestheproblemas follows:Old philosophicalategoriesaveto be concretizednd newonesfor-mulated. ut the nterconnectionfcategories ustnot be understood

as a closed ystemf dialectical ategories,s was thecasewith

Hegel.To follow hispathwouldmeanto stopthedevelopmentfdialectics,whereas ialecticss a science nd it cannot emainmmutable.

2, How Does DialecticalMaterialism elp theSciences?

It is clear thatdialecticalmaterialismannotdictateto scienceitsGUI. It can intervenet theinterface etweenthesciences ndideologyby defending hevarioustheoretical ractices gainsttheideologieswhich pontaneouslyttach hemselveso thesciences nd

impedetheirprogress. his formulations close to Althusser's e-viseddefinitionfthepractice fphilosophy.28For example,note the essentially ialecticalmaterialist efense

of quantummechanics gainstthe intrusion f positivistic otionsof causality n thewritings f Bunge,29 öhm,30 vechnikov31ndothers.32he defense s also positive n the sense of stressingheincompletenessf our currentknowledgeof the micro-worldndstimulatingewresearch.

While Cutlerand Gane defendAlthusser'sriginalformulation

oí philosophy,hey eem toreject hepossibilityf deologyweaken-ingthepractice fscience, ince cienceprovides tsowndefense yitsresults; husLenin's polemic-defensef the materialist onceptofmattern Materialism nd Empirio-criticisms found to be re-dundant ince t presupposed hat the"transformationfthescien-

26 Social Sciences,4(6), 1971 (Report of the 2d Ail-Union Conference on Philosophyand Modern Natural Science, Moscow, Dec. 1-4, 1970), p. 112.

27 Ibid., pp. 124-5.28 See his Lenin and Philosophy.

29 See his MetascientificQueries, pp. 173-209.30 Causalityand Chance in Modern Physics (New York, 1957).31 Causalityand the Relation of States in Physics (Moscow, 1971).32 See articles in Philosophical Problems of Elementary-ParticlePhysics (Moscow,

1968).




tifie onceptof matter s takingplace." Lenin's defensewas in re-sponseto the dealistmisuseofthe results f natural ciences t theend of the 19thcentury e.g.,so-called dematerialization"f mat-ter).Cutlerand Gane argueas follows:

The questionwhichthe [political-theoretical]ntervention ustposeiswhetherhe dealist eprise asan effectn thepracticefthe cienceor not.Furthermore,t is clearthatthequestion evolves n theques-tion as to whetherhepractice f thesciencehas previouslyeenat-

tenuatedrnot.To think therwises to think hatphilosophyeallycan attenuate thepracticeof science itself.However,the possessionofa materialisthilosophical osition nd a concept f the practice fidealist hilosophy. . willobviously otallowsucha judgmentobemade forthispresupposes pre-existingffectiveracticeofscience. . .The representationfpoliticsn therealmof theoryan be no morethantheexpressionf a predeterminedpolitical"position s a mate-rialist ositionn theoryut this nterventionan n nowaydefendhescience or t presupposests effectiveunctioning.33

However,thisargument gnoresthe factthattheoretical rac-tice,theproduction f knowledge, resupposes,s a necessary utnotsufficientondition, heparticipationfpeoplein socialactivity,livingpeople in "lived"relationwiththeworld (Althusser's efini-tionof ideology).This is notreturningo thehumanist onceptofthe ActiveSubject,but a recognition hat deologyhas had a pro-foundeffectn thetempoofscientificevelopment.t can be per-suasivelyrgued, or xample, hatneo-positivismashad a negativeinfluenceon the developmentof physicsbeyond quantum me-

chanics,34s has vitalism n biology.Of courseLenin was not pri-marily oncernedwiththeharmful ffectfpositivismn thephysi-cal sciences (thoughhis polemichas provided nspiration o manyscientists)utrather tseffectsn revolutionaryoliticalpractice.

Thus Althusser as proposedtwodefinitionsf philosophyndits practice, ontradictorynot dialectically!)fromboth his andCutler nd Gane'spointofview,butpartly ecauseboth havemain-tainedunilateralpositions.CuriouslyAlthusserhimself,n Leninand Philosophy, sesmultipledefinitionsf philosophy,ometimes

implicitlytheory," ometimes olitical-theoreticalntervention,s

33 Cutler and Gane, op. cit., pp. 47-48.34 See Bunge, MetascientipcQueries.




Cutler and Gane pointout. The resolution f thisparadox seemsto be as follows:political-theoreticalnterventionresupposes nddraws on theorywhile theory ssifieswithoutthe stimulusof en-gaging deology n combatvia political-theoreticalntervention.

Dialectical materialism ntervenesn the sciencesin another

way- positively"- y suggesting ormalstructures nd modes of

development nd perhapseven on the sensuous evel of scientificintuition.35 his heuristic ntervention as been commentedon

manytimes36 ut has barelyfulfilled ts potentialbecause of theunderdevelopedtateofdialecticalmaterialismo date.We should

expectthattheorems f dialecticsdevelopedformallywithall therigorof logicand mathematicshould anticipate hestructurend

catalyze he development f the sciences ust as mathematics as.Thus, we mightdistinguish etween he "real" and thestillformal

concepts fa systematicialectics.37unge has indicatedthe "landofopportunity"n thefollowingassage:

Whethert might e possible o builda metatheoryor wholeclassof physical heoriess anothermatter-ne, incidentally,hathas notbeenexplored... It is onlywith eferenceological ndmathematicaltheorieshatwe find ully evelopedmetatheories.38

In a laterwork,Bunge advocates the development f "scientific

metaphysics"whichwould include mereology, he theory f thepart- hole relation.This metaphysicss "useful to the extenttowhich tclarifiesnd systematizesasicconcepts," ut is empirically

untestable. ncluded in the class of presently ormulated heoriesthatare conceptually ut not empirically estable re thoseof in-formation,ystemsnd generalfield.39 . Cornforth oldsa similarposition,viewingdialecticalmaterialism s "empirically nfalsifi-

35 See Karmins remarksn SocialSciences, p. cit., p. 114.36 See Graham's xamples, p. cit.37 See Bunge,Myth fSimplicityNewJersey,963), . 46,andA. Blumberg,cience

è-Society,all, 1958.38 M. Bunge, Metatheory"n Scientifichought, omeUnderlyingoncepts,Meth-

odsand ProceduresMou on Unesco, 972), . 231.39 See MM&M,pp. 38-41.Metatheory,orenarrowlyefined,fcourse, lready lays

an important euristic ole in science.An interestingxample s the theory ígravitationalheories; ee the discussion y C. M. Will in Scientificmerican,November 974.




able." He also urgesthedevelopment f materialist ialectics s ascience.40

The new sciences f cyberneticsnd systemheory,nformationtheorynd theory fmodels nd levelsthus ppeartoconstituteherawmaterial or scienceofdialectics f hierarchical elations,ys-tem nteractionnd structural elations.41. Novik has stressednparticularheneedto elaborate he"micro-structures"fdialectics;42thesepresumablywill have to be producedfrom the above-men-tionedborderlineciences.

A new metatheorys generalsystems heory. ts researchpro-gram ncludesthefollowingmajorfunctions: 1) to investigateheisomorphy f concepts, aws and models in variousfields, nd tohelp in useful ransfersrom ne field o another; (2) to encouragethedevelopmentfadequate theoreticalmodels n the fieldswhichlack them; (3) to minimize heduplicationof theoretical ffortndifferentields; 4) topromote heunity f science hroughmprov-ingcommunicationmongspecialists.43 aterialist ialectics ould

do worse han tartwiththese asks.A more activerole of materialist ialecticswithinthe sciencesis dependenton its vigorousdevelopment s a scienceor "meta-theory"tself.But thecontinued ttachmento a metaphorical x-pression f dialectics an onlyserveto discourage his from ccur-ring. n this ight,Althusser'soncepts fcausality nd overdetermi-nation ppearto be an importantontributiono thereformulationand developmentfmaterialist ialectics.

3. Althusser's ialectics nd a CyberneticormulationIn thissection will sketchwhat appears to be a promising

convergenceetweenAlthusser'soncepts fstructuralausality ndsome ideas of systems heory.44his convergencemay be hardly

40 The OpenPhilosophynd theOpen SocietyNewYork, 968).41 See especially . Bertalanffy,eneralSystems heory NewYork,1968)and O.

Lange,Wholes nd Parts Warsaw, 965).42 SocialSciences,p. cit.,p. 112.43 GeorgeJ.Klir, ditor, rends n General ystemsheoryNewYork, 972), . 28.

44 SeealsoM.Godelier'structuralnterpretationfdialecticalontradictionn "Struc-ture ndContradictionn Capital," n Ideologyn Social ScienceNewYork, 973),pp. 334-368.The French heoreticalhysicist igierhas suggested similar n-terpretationn thefollowing assage:"The internal ntagonisms,hat is to say,the assemblage f forces hatnecessarilyvolvealong opposing ines, llustrate




morethana reacquaintance,n view of the structuralistnfluenceon Althusser, et believesomethings to be gained, n thiscase,by "retranslating"t intoa moresystematicramework.

Althusser's ialecticalconcepts re usefully ummarizedn theglossary o Reading Capital Structural ausality s defined s theeffectf thewhole on itsparts n a complextotality f a structurein dominance. or example, he economicbase "determines"whichelement s to be dominantn a socialformation.he overdetermina-

tion of a contradictions the reflectionn it of its conditionsof

existencewithin hecomplexwhole, .e.,oftheother ontradictionsin thecomplexwhole (itsunevendevelopment). or non-antagonis-tic contradictionhe overdeterminationakestheform f displace-ment,and forantagonistic ontradictiont assumesthe formofcondensationwiththepotentialof leadingto the restructuringfthewhole nexplosion (i.e.,socialist evolution).

In thesystemicpproach hewhole (system)onsists f relationsof things nd processes rogressingo a stateof equilibrium (for

deviation-counteractingeedbackrelations)or to a more or lessrapidlydivergingystemwitha potentialfordestructionnd emer-

genceof a newsystemfordeviation-amplifyingutualcausalproc-esses).45 hus theelements things, ualities,processes) f a systemare linkedbya set of definite elationswhichconstitute complextotalityrunity fcontradictions.n general complex ystemon-tainsbothdeviation-counteractingnd deviation-amplifyingausalprocesses.

A systemonsists f loops connecting lementswhich nfluenceeach otherby mutual causal relations, hus becomingan overde-termined ystem. ignificantly,in a loop, the influenceof an

the notion of contradiction.The unityof opposites is understood as the unity ofthe elementsof one level which engenderthe phenomena of the higherlevel. Thetransformation f quantity into quality is interpretedas the abrupt rupture ofequilibrium in the interiorof a system for example: the destruction of one ofthe antagonisticforces) that modifies the equilibrium and engenders a qualita-tivelynew phenomenonwithin which new contradictions ppear" ("Dialectics andNatural

Science,"in Existentialismversus

Marxism,edited

byG. Novack

[NewYork, 1966], pp. 248-249). Several Soviet philosophershave attempteda cyberneticformulationof the laws of dialectics: see p. 541, note 63 in Graham, op. cit.

45 See M. Maruyama,"The Second Cybernetics,"AmericanScientist,No. 6, 1963, pp.164-179.




element comes back to itselfthroughother elements/'46The systemis in a continuous state of flux.As Lange puts it:

The motionof the system,ts development,s ... a self-generatingia-lecticalprocess, .e., one in which contradictions ccurringwithin the

system roduce its continual motionand development.47

Bydefinition,systemlose oequilibriumsbasicallynvariantnrespecto itsdominant rimaryoops,therelationshat re thekey, ssentialinks.We may onsiderhis "complex otalityf a

structurendominance."For example, he classcontradictionetween apitalistsnd

workerss specifiedytherelation fexploitation,heproductionof urplus alue.Thismay eexpresseds the oopofreproductionofcapital.As ong s the apitalistystemxists,his oopcontinuesto be "in thefinalnstance" eterminant.oreprecisely,hebasiccontradictionor primaryoop) in a developedapitalistocietysbetween wo structures-he productive orces nd relations f

production.48ogetherhese onstitutehe

ontinuingeproductionofcapital. huscapital anbe viewedn contradictionoitself. fcourse,he omplexotalityf this ocialformationsnotreducibletothis ominantontradiction:he"superstructure"f deological,political nd other racticesre active lementsf the overdeter-mined omplexotalityfthe ocialformation.

In thecase ofnon-antagonisticontradictions,heelementsfloops, r "sub-routines"f theoverall ystemhange heir elativeimportance;ne maywitherwaywithout isruptingheoverall

stability.orantagonisticontradictionsheelementsrloops

om-prisinghe ystemondensewith hepotentialfwildly eviatingandexploding,estructuringhe omponentoopson a newbasis.

The relativeeactionrturnoverimesndstrengthfcompo-nentoopsdetermineshe tate fdominancetanymomentn thesystemf interlockedoops,but thisdominances determinedthrough dynamicquilibriumf he overallystem.

Anexample romhysicalciencemay e instructivenillustrat-ingthegeneralpplicabilityfthis ormulationf dialectics.arry

Commonerasvividly escribedhesystemsehavior f the eco-46 Maruyama,ibid., p. 176.47 Lange, op. cit., p. 73 (emphasis in original).48 Godelier, op. cit.




sphere.49n particular, e discusses hesoil ecosystem,onsistingfat least two criticalcycles: humus-plant-humusnd nitrogen.ToquoteCommoner:

The two yclesre notof thesame ort.One describeshe iteralmove-ment fa physicalntity,henitrogentom;theother . . involvfes]a set of dependenciesf one process n another.The tzvo ycles restronglyonnectedt a crucialpoint-humus. n one cycle, umus sthemajor tore f soilnitrogenorplantgrowth,n theother,t is re-

sponsibleor he

physicalonditionsfthe oil that nables he fficient

use ofnutrients,ncluding itrogeneleased rom hehumus.50

Thus thesoil ecosystemor rather heaspectconsidered) s a com-plex totality f a structuren dominance- he humus,as the con-necting ink between oops, is in the "last instance"determinant.To risk tretchinghepoint, hehumus s theearthlynalogof theeconomic ase,thekey inkbetween lements fthe ocialformation.

Hopefullythe gap betweenmaterialist ialectics nd the new"metatheories" f systems nd cyberneticswill be further losed

withbeneficial ffectsn all the sciences.The obviouslydialecticalcharacter f ecological theoryn particularhas pointedthewaytoa fruitfulevelopment long these ines.The possibilityf world-wide environmentalatastrophen thisera of transition f socialformationsas necessitatedherapiddevelopment f "no-ogenics,"thescienceofregulatingherelations etween ociety nd nature.51The successful pplicationof this science of course rests on theparallelsuccessofrevolutionaryoliticalpractice nd thedevelop-mentof itsscience,historicalmaterialism.

The conceptionof dialecticalmaterialism s theorywith itsownpeculiarmodeof nterventionn no waydenies the revolution-ary mpact fhistoricalmaterialismn theconduct fclassstruggle,but,on thecontrary,hould facilitatets development long withall theother ciences.52

Hoivard University,Washington, .C.

49 The Closing Circle (New York, 1971Ì, chapter 2.50 Ibid., p. 22 (emphasis minei.

51 See M. Kamshilov, "Scientific and Technological Progress and the Evolution ofthe Biosphere/'Social Sciences4 (14), 1973,pp. 53-62.52 Thus, I believe the fearsof the anti-Althusserian ritics who fall back on "Hegel-

ian Marxism" are unfounded; see, e.g., D. Tomlich in Radical America, August1970,pp. 69-72.

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Schwartzman - Althusser, Dialectical Materialism and the Philosophy of Science