DHS Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment and Desktop Tool · 2014-02-08 · 1! DHS Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment and Desktop Tool February 5, 2014 George R. Famini Jessica A. Cox

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DHS Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment and Desktop Tool

February 5, 2014

George R. Famini Jessica A. Cox Rachel E. Gooding

U.S.A Department of Homeland Security Chemical Security Analysis Center Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 2

Chemical Security Analysis Center

•  Integration and Analysis of Chemical Threat Information and Data

!  Reachback Capability to Provide Expert Analysis Support

!  Fusion of Information from Different Communities

!  Chemical Hazard Awareness, Assessment and Analysis

!  Science-Based Risk Assessment

Basic Science

Chemical Industry

Intelligence Community

Operational Requirements

CSAC

Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003

DHS Risk Assessments

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•  Are end-to-end assessments focused on a broad range of risks incorporating hazards, emerging technologies, available countermeasures and IC/LE input to evaluate the acute risk to human health due to a chemical biological, radiological or nuclear attack on the U.S. Homeland.

•  Mandated by HSPD-18, Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destructions, and HSPD-22, Domestic Chemical Defense.

•  Provides 3 primary outputs needed to examine risk mitigation strategies

•  Critical Vulnerabilities •  Critical Data/Knowledge Gaps •  Relative Risk Ranking of compounds, targets,

classes of compounds, scenario, etc.

•  Targeted studies put useable information inot the hands of the end users

•  Scenario driven strategies •  Local/Regional Risk •  Many Others

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Critical Components of the CTRA

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Each section represents a significant data collection/generation effort. Input data obtained through interagency coordination.


2012 CTRA Compound List

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2012 CTRA Toxidromes

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A particular toxidrome can be identified with clinical observations including vital signs, mental status, mucous membrane irritation, lung exam for wheezing or rales, skin for burns, moisture, and color. For CSAC purposes, the toxidromes include:

Toxidrome Chemical Examples Upper Pulmonary Allyl alcohol, Hydrogen fluoride, Nitric oxide Lower Pulmonary Benzene thiol, Chlorine, Phosgene Vesicant Lewisite, Nitrogen mustard, Sulfur Mustard Blood Acrylonitrile, Methanethiol, Cyanides Hemolytic/Metabolic Arsine, Carbon disulfide Anticoagulant Brodificoum, Bromodialone, Diphacinone Convulsants Picrotoxin, Strychnine, TETS Cholinergic CWA Cyclosarin, Soman, VX Cholinergic Other Aldicarb, Disulfoton, Parathion, Phorate Opioid Carfentanil, Diacetylmorphine

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2012 CTRA Target Classes & Targets

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CTRA Event Tree

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Event 3

Event N

Event 1

Event 2

Scen

ario

1

Scen

ario

2

Scen

ario

N

•  CTRA scenarios are defined by an event tree •  Provides a framework for generating a more

than a billion representative attack scenarios from a distribution of relative frequencies for each branch, and it considers interdependencies among events

•  Each branch encounters the next decision point (event level), and one of several subsequent courses of action (branches)

•  The complete event tree contains multiple events, each having branches that represent different choices or outcomes

•  A path through the event tree is a CTRA scenario. The likelihood of the various branches at each level are sampled from distributions.

•  The probabilities of each branch along a path through the tree are multiplied to get the scenario probability


2012 CTRA Modeling Overview

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Dermal Medical Mitigation

Food Indoor

Water

Outdoor

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Inhalation Modeling- Outdoor

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HPAC dispersion, overlaid on a GIS-based population model at GIS land tag informed locations


Synthesis of Multiple Data Sets

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Time resolved contour overlays

Provides a comprehensive synthesis and application of location, meteorology and population density for use in risk analysis.

HSIP Gold ISHD from NCDC

•  HSIP Gold – Homeland Security Information Program

•  CHIRP – Chemical Hazard information retrieval portal

•  ISHD – Integrated Surface Hourly Data •  NCDC – National Climatic Data Center


Indoor Inhalation Modeling

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o  Well-mixed zonal model (CONTAM equivalent) integrated with moving population

o  Models a release zone, near zone, and far zone; and either recirculated air between the zones or within a single zone. There is a separate model developed for subways.

o  Each building type has area and population boundaries. For example, The Pentagon, Sears Tower, Empire State Building, Chrysler Building, and Transamerica Building

o  Awareness in the Inhalation Models begins after a weighted number of symptomatic victims is generated by the model.

•  Based on chemical concentration, toxicity, and exposure duration •  Considers scenario timing, evacuation time is target dependent •  Model output is the number of injured victims and their exposure terms

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Three Zone Model

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•  Numerical solution •  Assumes building is not well-

mixed –  3 well-mixed zones:

•  Release zone •  Near zone •  Far zone

•  There are two versions of the three zone model –  Recirculated air between

zones –  Recirculated air within a

single zone •  Separate model developed for

subways •  Comparison for high fidelity 100 zone model was very favorable

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Ingestion Modeling- Food

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Stock-and-Flow model incorporating

• food processing and distribution • chemical stability; • recalls and timing

Expanded food clusters representing thousands of foods


Representative Food Clusters

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•  The National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) and the CSAC Decision Analysis Team (DAT) performed a cluster analysis using a binary scoring system of food and food process characteristics to identify a set of clusters representative of the food supply chain

•  An exemplar food and contamination point(s) from each cluster were then selected by SMEs from the food industry and academia as a representative scenario for that portion of the food industry

Multi-component assembled foods, thermally processed in the home

Multi-component assembled foods, not thermally processed in the home

Packaged, processed, cold chain RTE Ready-to-eat, primary component foods

Assembled companion dishes Main dishes, single component foods

Beverages Produce Home ingredients Industrial ingredients

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Food Recall Model Components

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Investigation Information Diffusion

Compliance

Investigation initiated due to a cluster of Illnesses

Recall issued for a specific product

Recall Timeline


Ingestion Modeling- Water

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• Notional Water distribution network model built based on characteristics from 3 city specific distribution networks • Compares favorably against EPAnet results from 2 different cities


Dermal Modeling

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Custom-built model, validated against PTA/MTA scenarios

Incorporates: Hand size Transfer efficiency Absorption

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Medical Mitigation Modeling

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Stock and Flow modeling simulates the progression and time sensitive nature of the response

•  Predicts number of mild to moderate, severe, and life threatening injuries. •  Victims can be exposed at different times •  Accounts for treatment rate limits and burden of worried well and minor injuries •  Different victims can progress at different rates •  First victims initiate response that may save later victims •  Tiered and alternative treatments •  Allows for situational awareness •  The size of the attack can trigger release of additional resources and victim prioritization •  Example model parameters include:

•  time to treatment identification •  efficacy of treatment •  countermeasure dosage •  countermeasure quantities •  time for countermeasures to arrive

•  time for symptom onset •  co-location time •  time to die •  time for symptom mitigation •  decontamination time


Medical Mitigation Modeling

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Fail

Exposed

Candidates for Treatment

Symptomatic

Expo

sure

Sym

ptom

Ons

et

Dead

Alive, Saved

Alive, Not Benefited

Alive, Benefited Worried

Well Multipliers

Succeed

Available Countermeasures

Primary Altern. #1

Altern. #2

Countermeasure Deployment

Gen

eral

Pop

ulat

ion

Col

loca

te w

/ Med

ical

Per

sonn

el

Access to Medical Care

Exam

or D

econ

tam

inat

ion

Next Tier

Adm

inis

ter T

reat

men

t

Worry Time

Severe

Worried Well

Life- threat.

Severe

Mild/ Moderate

Life- threat.

Severe

Mild/ Moderate

Life- threat.

Severe

Mild/ Moderate

Life- threat.

Worried Well

Mild/ Moderate

Worried Well

Local Regional National Countermeasure Stockpiles

Outcome Exposed Symptomatic Treatment Attack

End State


•  The medical response is parameterized •  The response is divided into a series of discrete events; each

discrete event corresponds to a quantifiable model parameter •  Medical toxicology and emergency medicine SME’s were enlisted

to quantify model parameters and inform model methodology •  The SME’s were tasked to review and improve data-based

values and estimate/extrapolate from literature as necessary •  Medical response is based on Toxidrome (10 toxidromes)

•  A single simulation of the response to a chemical attack can involve over 100 parameter values

•  Example model parameters:

Modeling Approach

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•  time to treatment identification •  efficacy of treatment •  countermeasure dosage •  countermeasure quantities •  time for countermeasures to arrive

•  time for symptom onset •  co-location time •  time to die •  time for symptom mitigation •  decontamination time

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!  A combination of models and data drive the CTRA !  The best data are mined from existing sources and through

extensive interaction with SME’s !  Models are continually reviewed and refined, if necessary, to

provide the best possible estimates within the constraints of the project !  Industry standard models are used to validate against !  Stakeholder input and feedback are valued and used as drivers

for improvement !  Comparison with existing assessments, such as PTA/MTA’s

are performed for benchmarking

CTRA Modeling Summary

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CTRA Desktop Tool

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-  Driven by Stakeholder needs CSAC has developed a desktop tool to produce quicker response time, create a parameter screening tool and allow focused follow-up risk studies

-  Existing consequence models and data from 2012 CTRA are incorporated into an easy to use platform

-  Real time calculations can be performed outside the parameter space considered in CTRA enhancing flexibility and allowing very specific questions to be answered.

-  Millisecond run time per simulation

Examples: •  What is the impact of

evacuation time in the DC subway during a CK release?

•  What is impact if a subset of navigable waterway routes are used for a particular chemical?


CTRA Desktop Tool

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Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment

Transform into a flexible and fast consequence analysis tool Standard Laptop Enhanced Capability

• Intuitive • “Explore the Edges” • Beta version ready for transition to customers

Requested by CSAC’s customers and stakeholders

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Permits Detailed Analysis

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Different Locations •  Indoor •  Outdoor •  Food •  Dermal •  Water

Various Mitigation Strategies •  Detectors •  Enhanced Evacuation •  Shelter in Place •  Modifications to HVAC •  Medical CMs •  Collective Protection •  Individual Protection

And Explore the Effects of:

•  Explores the impact of various chemical, device, detection or response parameters

•  Tests the impact of various modeling assumptions and data estimates


Arena Example

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Attack Scenario Mass [kg]

Exposed Population (gray)

Life Threatening injuries (red) Severe Injuries (blue) Pe

ople

10,000 Simulations showing the range of life threatening injuries Mean life threatening injuries: 313±522


Arena Example- Countermeasures Consumed

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Num

ber o

f CM

Life Threatening Injuries

Atropine

Ventilators

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How Can the Results Be Used?

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•  Public health and fatality risk may be obtained by chemical, by target, by toxidrome, or any modeled result and depicted in a variety of ways (whisker plot, probability vs. consequence, scatter plot, pie, bar) to help aid policymakers and develop strategies.

•  Detailed analysis helps to understand the risk. •  Is it driven by consequences or frequency? Weighted Average Consequences per

Attack (WACPA) or Frequency of Successful Attack (FOSA) for table top exercises

•  CSC scenarios can be segregated by commodity, availability or chemical class to aid in planning and preparedness

•  Input parameters/assumptions can be tested. Observations of results can drive research, operations and planning

•  Sensitivity of risk can be analyzed and weighted: o  Detection o  Security or mitigation o  Medical response


CSC- Mean Risk by Target

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-  Identify key risk drivers by target/chemical combination to help refine strategies

Target 1

Target 2

Target 3

Target 4

Target 5

Target 6

Mean Public Health Risk by Target Mean Fatality Risk by Target


Notional Results

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• Understanding of risk drivers-consequence or frequency • Appreciation of uncertainty and expected range

Narrow uncertainty in consequences, significant uncertainty in frequency

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Notional Results

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Understanding of main contributors to overall risk will guide strategy in buying down risk Inventory control is very different than securing facility assets


Notional Results

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Chemical

Rel

ativ

e R

isk

Basic Security and Mitigation Advanced Security and Mitigation

Chemical

Rel

ativ

e R

isk

!  Sensitivity studies !  Impact of security and mitigation posture !  Estimate of the impact of CFATS–like regulation comparing the risk of

facilities from pre- and post-9/11 environments


!  It is the first end-to-end probabilistic risk assessment that is all inclusive and provides a detailed look at the entire chemical risk space including threat, vulnerability and consequences.

!  The risk assessment provides: !  Relative risk ranking of chemicals, targets, toxidromes, etc

!  Provides focus and allows resources to be prioritized based on quantitative risk

!  Parsing of the main contributor to risk by chemical, targets, toxidromes, etc. !  Provides the ability to determine data/knowledge gaps as well as

sensitivities in which risk may be able to be reduced !  Prediction of impact of a vast array of scenarios

!  Provides the ability to vary pre-event measures (e.g. security posture, forward placement and stockpiling of medical countermeasures) and post-event responses (mitigation, medical response) to determine impact

!  Allows pre-operational decisions to be made based on risk.

What is the Value of the CTRA?

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•  CTRA –  Three iterations completed; 2008, 2010 and 2012 –  2012 completed in February 2012 –  Assesses 125 representative chemicals, 37

representative targets –  Major upgrade to food, water & med mit methodologies

•  Desktop Calculator –  Specifically requested by stakeholders –  Currently focused on consequences, but incorporation

of risk is planned –  Has been used to address 35 specific questions

regarding chemical attacks

•  Tailored Assessments –  Detailed analysis of “what if” scenarios –  35 tailored assessments have been completed and 5

more are underway or are planned –  Meet stakeholder requests & assist them to fulfill their

mission requirements, provide operational guidance & make risk informed decisions.

CTRA Accomplishments

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!  Valuable tools for assessing Public Health risk from a terrorist attack

!  Three primary outputs 1.  Critical Vulnerabilities 2.  Critical Data Gaps 3.  Intelligence informed relative risk-based ranking and

consequences of compounds, targets and scenarios for a wide range of chemical threats

!  Numerous secondary outputs (Tailored Assessments/Sensitivity Studies)

Together these products allow decision makers and risk managers to inform policy and examine risk mitigation strategies from terrorism risk and impact

What the CTRA Provides

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Access to CSAC Information

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Jessica Cox [email protected]

202-658-8221

Rachel Gooding [email protected]

410-436-0018

Lars Skinner [email protected]

410-436-5969

Reachback (24/7/365) •  [email protected] •  410-417-0910

HSDN Website •  http://www.dhs.sgov.gov/csac • All published reports/presentations

for download

Unclassified Webpage under construction

HSIN & HSLIC Webpage •  FOUO documents only • Bulletins/reports shared with state

and local authorities

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Documents

DHS Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment and Desktop Tool · 2014-02-08 · 1! DHS Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment and Desktop Tool February 5, 2014 George R. Famini Jessica A. Cox