Defra Waste & Resources R&D Programme Lifestyle Scenarios ...randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=WR0104_7293_FRP.pdf · Programme Lifestyle Scenarios & Waste Composition The

Defra Waste & Resources R&D Programme

Lifestyle Scenarios

& Waste Composition

The Core Report

Final Report

March 2007

CONTENTS

FOREWORD ...............................................................................I

1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 1 1.1 Presentation of the Results .......................................................... 1 1.2 Structure of this Report............................................................... 2

2 THE RESEARCH................................................................. 3 2.1 Overall Approach – a Lifestyles Framework .................................... 3 2.2 Research Process ....................................................................... 6

3 THE INPUTS ..................................................................... 7 3.1 Waste Drivers and Composition .................................................... 7 3.2 The Character of Households ....................................................... 9 3.3 Life of the Home and Consumption ..............................................11 3.4 Wider Forces ............................................................................17 3.5 Lessons from Other Scenario Studies ...........................................18 3.6 The AEAT/Future Foundation Model & Waste Composition ...............20

4 THE SCENARIOS............................................................. 21 4.1 Development & Structure of the Scenarios ....................................21 4.2 The Scenario Narratives .............................................................24 4.3 Lifestyles .................................................................................35 4.4 Key Linkages ............................................................................45

5 WASTE & LIFESTYLES .................................................... 47 5.1 Introduction .............................................................................47 5.2 Waste by Source .......................................................................48 5.3 Waste by Stream ......................................................................81 5.4 Summary of the Waste Composition Scenarios ..............................86

6 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................... 89 6.1 Key Points................................................................................89 6.2 Policy Implications.....................................................................90 6.3 Final Remarks...........................................................................92

APPENDIX A: THE CHARACTER OF HOUSEHOLDSERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFIA1. Population Trends and Structure ........... Error! Bookmark not defined. A2. The Character of Households................ Error! Bookmark not defined. A3. Affluence, income and inequalities ........ Error! Bookmark not defined.

APPENDIX B: LIFE OF THE HOME AND CONSUMPTIONERROR! BOOKMARK NOTB1. Consumption trends – overview............ Error! Bookmark not defined. B2. Modern lifestyles and consumer cultures Error! Bookmark not defined. B3. Shopping habits ................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. B4. Food, cooking & eating ........................ Error! Bookmark not defined. B5. Home-making .................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. B6. Play – leisure time and activities ........... Error! Bookmark not defined. B7. Gadgets & Equipment.......................... Error! Bookmark not defined. B8. Health and Personal Care..................... Error! Bookmark not defined. B9. Non-consumption activities with product implicationsError! Bookmark not defined. B10. Product use in the home .................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

APPENDIX C: POLICY BACKGROUNDERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

APPENDIX D: SCENARIO NARRATIVESERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. D1. Preliminary Scenario - “2005 – As if it was Now”Error! Bookmark not defined. D2. Primary Scenario A – “2030 – Blinkered Evolution”Error! Bookmark not defined. D3. Primary Scenario B – “2030 – Civic Renewal”Error! Bookmark not defined. D4. Primary Scenario C – “2030 – Strong Government”Error! Bookmark not defined.

APPENDIX E: QUANTIFYING THE BROOK LYNDHURST SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF WASTE BY AEA TECHNOLOGIES/FUTURE FOUNDATIONERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

APPENDIX F: THE IMPORTANCE OF PACKAGINGERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFI

APPENDIX G: THE IMPORTANCE OF CARBONERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED

APPENDIX H: BIBLIOGRAPHY....ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

APPENDIX I: GLOSSARY ............ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. © Brook Lyndhurst 2007 This report has been produced by Brook Lyndhurst Ltd under/as part of a contract placed by Defra. Any views expressed in it are not necessarily those of Defra. Brook Lyndhurst warrants that all reasonable skill and care has been used in preparing this report. Notwithstanding this warranty, Brook Lyndhurst shall not be under any liability for loss of profit, business, revenues or any special indirect or consequential damage of any nature whatsoever or loss of anticipated saving or for any increased costs sustained by the client or his or her servants or agents arising in any way whether directly or indirectly as a result of reliance on this report or of any error or defect in this report.

Lifestyle Scenarios & Waste Composition – The Core Report

Foreword The authors would like to thank all those that contributed to the conduct of this research study, notably: • Our research partners Kit Strange of the Resource Recovery Forum, and Zoe Kimber

and Adrian Lee of Hampshire County Council. • Defra colleagues who contributed who participated in a series of developmental

workshops near the beginning of the research, in particular Nadine Smith and Adam Bell, as well as others who contributed towards the end, notably Anton van Santen, Fiona Lickorish and Sam Thomas.

• Our project manager Professor David Wilson, for his support, guidance, advice and

understanding; and others at Defra – Simon la Roche, Catriona Cardiff and Vanessa Fandrich - whose administrative support was invaluable.

• Ian Dent of the Packaging Federation and Helen Loose of Ashursts for providing

facilities for the conduct of three workshops in summer 2006; and to all those that attended those workshops.

• Colleagues working on the two closely related studies referenced throughout this

report, notably Alison Richards from the Environment Agency and Lloyd Burdett from Henley Centre Headlight Vision; and Andy Maunder (AEAT), Chris Farmelo (Future Foundation) and Tim Yates (Future Foundation).

• The Brook Lyndhurst research team, including Sandy Patel, Jayne Cox, Eve

Chabord, Oci Stott, Jon Fletcher and David Fell. We note also that: “The best decisions will still be based on the judgements of mature non-electronic brains possessed by men who have looked steadily and calmly at the situation and seen it whole.”

E F Schumacher “It is in the spirit of the age to believe that any fact, no matter how suspect, is superior to any imaginative exercise, no matter how true.”

Saul Bellow Finally, a note of caution on the use of this report. As well as the ‘normal’ remarks associated with the use of scenario-planning (which are set out in the main body of the report) particular caution is needed with respect to the figures given for future waste tonnages. These were produced during the autumn of 2006, using a novel method for forecasting waste (developed by AEA Technology and the Future Foundation) and using the then most up-to-date data on waste arisings. Since that time, both new data on waste have become available, and further refinements to the model have been made. In due course, should the qualitative scenarios presented in this report be re-calculated, there would inevitably be different quantitative results. Users should therefore bear this in mind when interpreting the results; the overall pattern of the scenarios, and the detailed qualitative arguments for that pattern, will remain intact; the detailed figures will, in due course, evolve.

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1 INTRODUCTION This report, and its accompaniments, comprise the final outputs from the research programme “Lifestyle Scenarios: The Futures for Waste Composition”, commissioned as Project WRT202 by Defra’s Waste R&D team. The research was conducted between autumn 2005 and winter 2006/7. The purpose of this predominantly qualitative research programme was: • To highlight and explore the relationship between lifestyles, households and

household waste • To explore possible future development paths for lifestyles and the possible

consequences for household waste composition • To identify possible longer term priorities and risks for waste policy The intended uses of the results, among both Defra and other interested parties, are: • To provide a contribution to the evidence base on household waste at a general

level • To provide strategic input in both the short and medium term • To provide a resource-base for future discussion, debate and research In terms of its spatial coverage, the research has in general adopted a loose definition of “national”, in part because many sources drawn upon refer to different spatial areas – the UK, Great Britain, England & Wales, and just England. In the case of the specific quantitative expression of the qualitative scenarios, figures are based on use of the model developed under WRT218 by AEAT Technology and the Future Foundation, which refers to England only. The research programme has been broad-ranging and multi-disciplinary. In pulling together the final outputs from the work, it became clear to the research team that the various elements of research do not fit neatly together in a linear fashion. Furthermore, the degree of cross-referencing and inter-linkage between elements means that full explanation of the origin of any given analytical remark would render a linear narrative excessively unwieldy1. Rather, different elements input in different ways (and at different times) to the overall “story”; and a full appreciation of the relationship between inputs and outputs requires an holistic use of the material.

1.1

Presentation of the Results The final results from our work are therefore presented in a “core report”, supplemented by a range of appendices. These take in most of the outputs from the primary phases of research, but are not necessary in and of themselves to convey the key findings from the project as a whole. We have included them to allow readers to

1 See Ivan Illich’s “Gender”, 1982, for an example in which footnotes outweigh the main body of the text.

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pick from them as required, without muddying the waters of the main report with unnecessary detail. For example, fully developed narratives of the three scenarios developed for this study have critically informed the waste-level analysis presented in the Core Report; but it is not essential for each and every reader to have read the entire scenario narratives in order to access the waste-level findings. On the other hand, some readers of the waste-level analysis may find they have questions about some of the underpinning argument, and will wish to refer back to the full scenario narratives. The appendices are as follows: Appendix A: The character of households (Phase I research) Appendix B: Lifestyles and consumption (Phase I research) Appendix C: Waste and lifestyles: the policy background Appendix D: Full scenario narratives (Phase III research) Appendix E: AEAT / Future Foundation model specification Appendix F: Briefing paper on packaging Appendix G: A note on carbon Appendix H: Selected bibliography Appendix I: Glossary For ease of use, the waste-level analyses do not endlessly cross-reference those parts of the scenario analyses that have particularly been drawn upon in formulating an argument; and, in turn, those parts of the scenarios that are most relevant to waste-level outcomes are not “forward-linked”, either. This approach applies to all the various appendices. This method of presentation, we believe, strikes a balance between robustness and accessibility.

1.2 Structure of this Report This Core Report nevertheless has to follow a linear structure, and does so as follows: • In Section 2, we set out the details of the research process – the underlying

rationale, the approach adopted and the sequence of stages undertaken. • In Section 3 we present summaries of the main research inputs – drawn from the

various appendices – covering issues such as the character of households, the composition of waste, lessons from other scenario work, and so forth.

• In Section 4 we discuss and explain the lifestyle scenario results that lie at the

core of the work. • Section 5 presents the results of the detailed waste analysis emerging from the

scenarios, and compares the results from the three scenarios. • Finally, in Section 6, we draw out our conclusions from the analysis, make some

broad policy recommendations and identify a range of questions for further discussion, debate and – potentially - research.

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2 THE RESEARCH

2.1 Overall Approach – a Lifestyles Framework Our overall approach hinges on a tripartite notion: • that the household is the appropriate analytical unit of household waste production • that the lifestyles of households shape waste and waste composition • that the determinants of future lifestyles are in many ways indeterminate, and that

scenario-planning offers a valuable route to explore the range of possibilities This in turn led us to specify SIX inputs needed to develop scenarios for future waste composition: • Information on waste drivers and waste composition • Information on the character of households • Information on the life of the home • Information on the wider forces at play (the economy, legislation, the packaging

industry etc) • Lessons from other scenario planning exercises • The quantitative model developed in parallel to the Brook Lyndhurst study by

AEATT/Future Foundation Inputs from each of these six are summarised in Section 3. However, it is worth before then appreciating how lifestyles drive waste volumes and composition as an input-output model. In this model, materials flow into households, are used in particular ways in the household, then flow out as waste. This can be represented simply in the following diagram. Figure 2.1: Household material flows

Household consumption

Non- consumption inputs (e.g. gifts)

Household behaviour

Waste Volume

Non-household waste outputs (eg cans @work)

Waste composition

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Central to this project are considerations of unpacking the “household behaviour” element (i.e. the central box in the diagram), identifying how this influences: • flows of materials/products into the household • use of materials/products within the household • disposal of materials from the household To unpack the “household behaviour” element – and to explore how this might change in future – we argue that we need to create a ‘story’ about “the life of the home”, since this drives both what materials come into the home, and what goes out of it as (solid) wastes. By the “life of the home” we mean: what households are like; how they work, play and consume; and their use of, and attitudes to, products. We are then concerned with those elements of ‘lifestyles’ that most directly impinge on the life of the home, and the life of materials/products within the home. Figure 2.2 overleaf shows how the “life of the home” was conceptualised and defined in the research (left-hand box), with links to household material flows (middle box), and then the impact on waste (right hand box).

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Figure 2.2 – Lifestyles Research Framework

Ma Ho • •

•

•

Noinp •

• •

•

•

An • • • •

terial in-flows

usehold consumption

Product mix De-materialised economy Packaging trends & composition Disposal legislation & impact on product choice e.g. WEEE

n- consumption related uts

Community v household locus (e.g. composting; shared consumption)

Gifting & social capital

Gardening behaviour (including paving & planting)

Commercial waste via home working

Solicited and non-solicited mail

T Ch •••• … ••• … ••

• … ••• … •

••

… ••••

d external factors

Legislation Climate Change Packaging Trends Product Design

he life of the home

onsumers living in these ouseholds…

Family structure Age Income Housing type

live like this

Shopping Cooking & food Home making

work like this

Working patterns Female participation &

working hours Home working

play like this

Leisure time In v out of home Home entertainment

think like this…

Cultures of consumption

Wastefulness Environmental

engagement

treat products like this…

Wastefulness Repair & maintenance Fashion & lifespan Re-use

Mi Ta Cw No •

•

•

•

aterial outflows - mpact on waste:

otal household waste risings

omposition of household aste – key drivers

on-household waste utputs – trends in…

Commercial reuse – eBay, charity shops

Personal reuse – hand-me-downs, plastic bags

Transfer to workplace or other disposal routes – packed lunch

Storage of unwanted obsolete goods within the home

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2.2 Research Process The research proceeded in four phases. Phase 1 – a review of lifestyle trends and drivers The first phase comprised a detailed and extensive literature and data review, drawing on a wide range of sources, culminating in the production and circulation of a large reference document. The principal elements of that document have been re-cast for the purposes of this final report, as Appendices 1 and 2 (see Section 1.1) Phase 2 – preparation of initial lifestyle scenarios Drawing upon the research from Phase 1, and using a range of scenario development techniques including brainstorming, facilitated working sessions with Defra and liaison with other scenario development projects (see Section 3), the project team developed the basic parameters of the scenario planning element of the research. Phase 3 – full development of lifestyle scenarios During the third phase, the initial scenarios were refined, finalised and fully written up. A programme of seminars was conducted with experts from the “lifestyles”, “waste” and “packaging” sectors, to test and explore the scenarios. A major interim report was circulated, and, as before, its principal elements are included among the appendices to this Core Report (Appendix 4). Phase 4 – assessment of waste implications, quantification and conclusions In the final phase, the waste-specific implications arising from the lifestyle scenarios were developed, and quantified. Conclusions and broad policy implications were also developed, and this report prepared. Throughout the research programme, there was close liaison between ourselves and Defra; and, particularly during Phase 4 work, between ourselves and the AEATT/Future Foundation team.

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3 THE INPUTS As explained in Section 2, there were six main inputs to the research process: • Information on waste drivers and waste composition • Information on the character of households • Information on the life of the home • Information on the wider forces at play (the economy, legislation, the packaging

industry etc) • Lessons from other scenario studies • The quantitative model developed in parallel to the Brook Lyndhurst study by

AEATT/Future Foundation Findings from these six are summarised, in turn, in this Section. It is worth noting that these are merely overviews of the material gathered; and, perhaps more importantly, not all facts and figures have necessarily been deployed in each scenario (in Section 4), nor for each and every waste stream (in Section 5). Rather, between them these inputs comprise the gestalt from which emerged the scenarios and waste detail.

3.1 Waste Drivers and Composition Headline findings from recent studies of waste composition and drivers (including the EA studies from the late 1990s, the Strategy Unit review in 2002, and the Wales composition study in 2003) have been the primary basis for our thinking. Other studies – including an Open University study of student waste and the Statewide Waste Characterization Study (December 2004) from the California Integrated Waste Management Board (CIWMB) – were also drawn upon. While the evidence remains inconsistent because of methodological differences across studies, and some of the issues remain contested (e.g. on socio-economic drivers), enough is known about broad parameters to provide a steer on which “life of home” aspects need to be considered. The most widely cited figures come from Julian Parfitt’s 2002 review for the Strategy Unit. These figures include collected and HWRC waste. It is important to note that the AEATT/FF model used to provide quantitative expression of the Brook Lyndhurst scenarios estimates a compositional structure that whilst broadly in line with the Parfitt results, nevertheless differs in some respects. Issues arising from these differences are discussed below.

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Figure 3.1 Household Waste Composition

Household Waste Compositionsource: J Parfitt for the Strategy Unit 2002

Paper & card18%

Plastic7%

Glass7%

Cans3%

Kitchen17%

Garden24%

Furniture & appliances6%

Textiles3%

Nappies2%

Wood4%

Other9%

The results of the AEAT Technology/MELWales study broadly concurred with this composition profile, though with a lower bio-degradable element more similar to that in Waste Strategy 2000. Importantly, the Wales study notes that while the amount of dry recyclables remained stable in the 1990s the organics fraction increased substantially, and overall household arisings have grown as a result. For the purposes of this scenarios work, it is clear that the important “life of home” aspects are: • Food & cooking (including packaging and food wastage) • Other paper & packaging usage • Gardening • Home making – including furniture, appliances & DIY (wood) • and, to a lesser extent, clothing and personal care It is worth noting that 35 years ago, dust and cinders accounted for over one-fifth of domestic waste but this has almost completely disappeared as a result of near-universal central heating.2 While paper was then the largest and fastest growing fraction, plastics were negligible and organics were less than 20% of the total. In terms of drivers of waste arisings, the existing evidence remains inconclusive. The following is a generic list of drivers that have been identified in various studies as being relevant to total arisings, growth and/or composition:

2 Waste Age Man, J Holliman, Wayland, 1974.

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• Population growth – in relation to the total amount of waste produced

• Age or lifestage of household – with older households tending to produce less waste. The following is taken from the AEAT Technology report of the Wales composition study in which age was one of the clearest differentiators of arisings.

• Affluence – as households get richer they tend to produce more waste. Several studies (including Brook Lyndhurst’s work for Project Integra in Hampshire) demonstrate a strong link with economic growth, though this link is beginning to be contested.

• Social class – early studies showed that wealthier households produce more waste, and especially more paper waste, though this was not confirmed in the Wales study (using ACORN groups).

• Supermarket usage.

• Behavioural traits, such as frequency of eating pre-packaged meals or newspaper buying.

• Pet ownership - pet owners tend to produce more waste overall and of particular types (e.g. organics and card).

• Presence of children (especially under 5s and for nappy waste)

• Household size – the Wales study suggests that larger households tend to produce more waste per capita; in this study, paper/card, organics and fines are notably increased.

• Service characteristics – though the picture here is clouded by variations in how bin, HWRC and recyclables collections are treated in different studies. The Wales study disagrees with earlier research on this aspect, showing no link. The Wales study similarly showed no variation in kitchen or garden waste between home composting and non-composting households.

• Seasonal variations – noted in several studies, affecting in particular garden waste, but also organics and paper in some studies.

3.2 The Character of Households Recent population trends and future projections • The UK population has been growing at accelerating rates in recent years. Continued

growth is predicted for the future, though the rate is set to stabilise towards the 2050s.

• There will be 7.2 million more people in the UK in 2031 than in 2004, an increase of 12%.

• The size of the population matters in waste futures because total waste arisings will grow even if the amount per head stays the same.

• The UK population is becoming increasingly ethnically diverse and this trend will most likely continue over the next few decades.

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• Although much of the emphasis in the literature is on older age cohorts, it is interesting to note that the number of children aged 0-4 is set to be some 1.5m higher than today by 2030. Coupled with new products which encourage longer nappy use we can expect nappy consumption and resultant waste to continue to rise.

• Increased longevity facilitated by medical advances, ageing baby-boomer cohorts and a decrease in fertility have all contributed to the ageing of the UK population profile to the extent that, for the first time, the old will outnumber the young within the next 5 years.3

• By 2030, the median (average) age of the population will have increased by 4 years from the present day, to 42.9 years; most men can expect to live into their early 80s and women their mid 80s.

• A changing age profile will have profound implications for incomes and patterns of consumer spending and, ultimately waste generation and waste behaviours.

Household trends and projections • The number of households in England is set to rise from 20.8 million in 2001 to 24

million in 2021. Growth is projected to be slightly lower than in the last 20 years.

• Ever more people are living alone, to the point that by 2020 one in three households will be single person households.

• As a result, average household size will continue to fall, with one less person per household in 2021 than there was in 1961.

• People are most likely to live alone when they are older, especially over pension age.

• A key driver of the recent growth in single person households has been the numbers of young men living alone. However, older households are likely to make a significant contribution to future growth, given the changing population profile coupled with bereavement, rising divorce rates and improving health meaning that older people are more likely to be single and capable of living alone.

• The prevalence of single person households is important to waste generation since these households tend to consume more intensively, and generate more waste per capita, than multi-person households.

• As is well documented, the pattern of partnership formation has transformed in the UK in the last thirty years. While marriage remains popular (though delayed to later in life) it is in decline, being largely replaced by cohabitation. Divorce continues to rise and women are having fewer children and later in life.

• There are alternative stories for the implications of these trends on family structure. Where parents stay together ‘beanpole families’ (small multi-generational families) emerge. Where marriages break down and parents remarry, large modern families with multiple step-relatives are formed.

• The nature of the dwelling stock is capable of affecting the amount of waste produced in a number of ways: by the size of dwelling (and therefore space to accommodate belongings); by the presence and type of garden and therefore organic waste; and through rates of residential mobility (which is one of the drivers of household durables sales and replacement).

• Homeowners are more likely than tenants to reside in their homes for longer. Current initiatives to increase homeownership within the UK may increase residential stability and reduce the turnover rate of the housing stock.

3 Old = over 65s; young = under 16s, both by 2011

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Incomes & Work • Rising real incomes across the board mean that people have higher purchasing

power than ever before. If present rates continue, household incomes could double by the 2030s (as they did over the last 30 years).

• Income inequalities are being exacerbated over time. Whilst all income groups are becoming richer in real terms over time, the richest people are doing so at a faster rate than the poorest, causing the UK to become ever more socially polarised.

• The scenarios considered questions about future income trajectories in an ageing society, both in aggregate and for different groups within the population.

• Apart from its obvious income generating role, the working pattern of households is also of interest in so far as it influences how households organise the life of the home. Aspects that may be particularly relevant are: working hours and the creation of a ‘time-short’ culture; female participation (as a driver of convenience lifestyles) and the extent of home working (which has the potential to bring new sources of waste into the home).

• Weekly working hours are rising (though lifetime hours are falling); 70% of women

work, including the majority of mothers of pre-school children; a quarter of UK workers work from home at least occasionally, but only 2.5% work mostly from home.

3.3 Life of the Home and Consumption 3.3.1 Issues Consumer Spending • Consumers’ expenditure more than doubled in the last 20 years and household

spending is growing at 2.5% in real terms (after inflation). • Increased spending on services – especially leisure services – was a key

consumption driver over the last two decades, though spending on goods has also grown.

• There are significant differences in the amount and profile of spending across

household types – including by age and income. Generally, the oldest and poorest spend least and display a more ‘traditional’ pattern of spend than those who have adopted an ‘experience economy’ lifestyle. The leisure/service transformation has been led by younger and wealthier households, but these groups spend relatively more on goods too.

• An issue for the future is the possibility of a consumer ‘catch-up’ in which growing

incomes allow even the poor to take on the consumption habits of today’s wealthy. Similarly, consideration needs to be given to the extent to which older households will take forward more youthful patterns of consumption into old age, as the size of the older population grows.

Shopping habits • Nearly 90% of all groceries are now bought in supermarkets, compared to only 20%

in 1960. Intense competition (and the internet) in recent years has encouraged

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supermarkets to diversify across a much wider range of goods from clothes, to decorative household goods, to electricals.

•

•

For Christmas 2006 IMRG estimated that 25 million British shoppers spent £7.66 billion online, while British shoppers spent £13.5 billion online during the first half of 2006, 40 per cent more than they did in the same period in 2005.

At present, alternative outlets, such as direct sales from farmers and producers, remain a minority market, but growing interest in health, food provenance and authenticity may drive an expansion of this niche in future.

Food, cooking & eating • Three important future drivers of food habits are: the continuing importance of

convenience to consumers; growing health concerns and pressures; and interest in ethical and environmental issues relating to food.

• The average person in the UK spends just under an hour a day in total preparing food, including dishwashing after the meal. The average time taken to prepare the main evening meal fell from 90 minutes in the 1980s to just 20 minutes today.

• Brook Lyndhurst/MORI research for the Countryside Agency in Yorkshire & the Humber found that only around 5% of consumers actively buy ethical/environmental products, compared to 45% who are interested but passive, and around half who are not engaged at all.

• The trend towards healthy eating is reflected in consumption of fruit, vegetable and bottled water all displaying substantial increases in recent years; however, obesity remains a major public health concern, and alcohol consumption at home has increased heavily over the years.

• Traditional cooking from scratch is progressively being replaced by reliance on ready meals, snacking and eating out; although growth in the ready-meal market appears to have slowed recently.

• Total inflation-adjusted expenditure on eating out increased by a factor of 2.2 over the forty years since 1964, reaching £60.3 billion in 2004.

Home-making • The impact of home-making on household waste arises through consumption of

homewares (e.g. crockery, lighting etc), home furnishings and carpets, appliances and DIY/home improvement.

• The fastest growing segments of home demand recently have been gardening and DIY.

• Key drivers of growth in “home” demand have been identified as: growth in household numbers, the rise in smaller households, an ageing population (older people are more skilled and more interested), high levels of housing transactions with house price buoyancy, mortgage equity withdrawal, strong media interest and an “improve not move” mentality.

Play – leisure time and activities • The average adult in the UK spends approximately a fifth of their day engaging in

leisure (mass media, hobbies and games, sports, and social life and entertainment) as their main activity.

• As income increases the amount of time spent on leisure decreases, from an average of 387 min among low income groups to 262 min in high income groups.

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• Given rising incomes and increasing pressures on leisure time, there is growing demand for leisure goods and services offering greatest intensity of experience.

• The proportion of consumer spending spent on recreation and culture has risen from 4.3% in 1964 to 13.7% in 2004.

• The area of most sustained growth in leisure spending has been Recreational and Cultural Services (including membership of gyms and other sports facilities and expenditure on cinemas, theatre, concerts, film hire etc). More dramatic recent growth has been seen in expenditure on games (including, most notably, computer games) and audio-visual and electronic equipment (TVs, videos, PCs etc).

Gadgets & Equipment • Consumer spending on gadgets has seen exponential growth over the past two

decades. Since 2000 alone real expenditure has increased by over 30%. • Ownership of mobile phones more than quadrupled over the period to 1996/7 to

2002/3. • In 2002/3 45% of households had access to the internet from home, just 10

percentage points less than the 55% of households that owned a home computer • The speed at which these markets have taken off illustrates how important

‘unknowns’ can be both in terms of consumer spending and waste generation in the future – the first mobile phone call was made in the UK in 1984; today 15 million mobile phones are thrown away each year in this country, with a replacement cycle of only 12-18 months

Health and Personal Care • Consumer spending on some elements of health, and across the board in the area of

personal care, has been rising sharply in recent years. Although this makes a relatively small contribution to household waste at present, sustained growth of this kind over the period to 2030 could herald significant implications for waste composition.

Non-consumption activities with product implications • There are a number of ‘life of the home’ activities with product/waste implications

that are not concerned with consumption per se, but which nevertheless warrant consideration: gardening, gifting, home-working, and unsolicited mail.

• Gardening is important in terms of household material flows both due to the green

waste which it creates and the potential for home-composting.

• Continued growth in garden product sales suggest increased gardening activity. Particularly high growth in sales has occurred in products which enhance the leisure use of the garden.

• Composting seems to be a relatively stable behaviour, with households who owner-occupy detached houses being most likely to engage in composting.

• Rising incomes, better job prospects and social aspirations have contributed positively to the ‘gifting’ market.

• A study by Mintel finds that a significant proportion of gifts are unwanted by their recipients. The majority of respondents claimed to loyally keep these gifts, recycle them by giving them to someone else or to charity or exchange them.

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• Gifting options in the form of services, both ‘experiences’ and charitable donations, are increasingly available but remain niche.

• The rise in homeworking is expected to increase office waste (paper, printer cartridges etc) in the home, increase waste from daytime snacking and lunchtime eating, and reduce the use of the commercial waste stream as an outlet for household waste (e.g. packed lunches and newspapers).

• In addition homeworking has been found to affect wider household routines with homeworkers being more likely to prepare an evening meal from scratch and shop more often.

• Solicited mail experienced an initial steep decline as a result of the internet, however expenditure on postal services has remained fairly stable since. The increased use of direct marketing to target consumers is likely to increase waste associated with this form of advertising. Services provided by the Mail Preference Service can eliminate most of this form of waste but only by the request of the household.

Product use in the home • There is a number of over-arching features of product use in the home, that affect

many of the ‘life of the home’ behaviours covered earlier, and which are treated separately in this final section:

Throwaway culture and wastefulness

Fashion and product lifespan

Product design

Repair and maintenance trends

Re-use

• On the demand side, rising incomes and the prevalence of “conspicuous consumption” are driving the development of a throwaway culture and increased wastefulness.

• Wasteful consumption is particularly prevalent in food. More perishable products are wasted more frequently, demonstrating the links between poor household management, more spontaneous lifestyles and waste.

• Large amounts are spent on gadgets which are never used. This is particularly the case where purchase fails to instigate intended lifestyle changes (e.g. buying a bread-maker but failing to find the time/remember to use it) and where gadgets are bought primarily to signal belonging to a certain social group.

• Attitudes to wasteful consumption are embedded in issues of guilt, stress and social ambitions. However not all wasteful consumption is regretted – a substantial proportion admit to getting pleasure from wasting money.

• On the supply side, product lifespan is determined by technological factors, competitive pressures (referred to as ‘built in obsolescence’) and household behaviours relating to the use and disposal of the product.

• A ‘throwaway society’, rising incomes, increased pride in the presentation of the home and incessant advertising contribute to ‘planned obsolescence’ – the premature disposal of products by consumers who wish to satisfy their consumption aspirations.

• Perpetual product innovation coupled with advertising campaigns drive demands for the latest products. This deters purchase of longer lasting products and contributes to planned obsolescence.

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• Over a third of household appliances are fully functional when they leave the home. This suggests that product lifespan is more socially than technologically constrained. However rather paradoxically close to 45% of households reported that household appliances do not last long enough. It appears that households want longer lasting products which they can choose to throw-away prematurely if they are so inclined.

• The use of repair and maintenance services has all but evaporated over the past 40 years, although some companies do offer maintenance services in order to increase product durability.

• Like repair and maintenance, reuse activity faces increased pressures from competitive replacement costs and fashion driven consumer aspirations placing greater importance on ‘virginity value’.

• There are social stigmas associated with reuse but very interesting variations in the level of reuse that is deemed socially acceptable. Men are more likely to accept products with new parts and a reconditioned exterior, women are more likely to prefer reconditioned parts with a new casing.

3.3.2 Threads Drawing some of these threads together, and summarising some of the “softer” issues raised, highlights the following features as relevant to the consideration of future lifestyles: Social trends • New life-courses – individuals now spending more time ‘post-family’ than in family

period. • More ‘life-changes’ than previous generations; an increasing need to be flexible and

less certainty about your ‘place’ in society. • New families – ‘beanpole’ (i.e. long, thin, multigenerational) families and, at the

same time, broad multi-relational families as a result of patterns of divorce & remarriage.

• Continuing changes in gender roles (but with a common proviso that household

gender roles have not changed as much as outside working roles). • Continuing change in parenting styles as society adapts to high rates of female

labour force participation. Lifestyle trends • Affluence – allowing individuals to look for meaning beyond meeting basic needs for

themselves and their families, but at the same “income-complexity” as the rich eschew the kind of conspicuous consumerism which is now available to all but the very poor.

• Individualisation – underpinning the explosion of choice and underpinning a search

for ‘authenticity’ that fits one’s own values and preferences. • Explosion of consumption choice – the role of brands in mediating and guiding

choice. • Proliferation of functional products – for example, a different bottle of shampoo for

each family member; a range of cleaning products for every conceivable domestic

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chore, where previously households would have used the same one or two for all purposes.

• Decline in deference – means fewer givens and less sense of belonging driving a

search for new ways of attaching meaning to life (especially via ‘tribal’ consumption). • Linked to the previous point, new ‘networks’ replacing traditional institutions as a

means of defining social order and belonging – owning products or being fluent in ‘cultural currency’ (e.g. TV programmes, games etc) act as guardians of access to these new networks.

• Connectivity – breakdown of traditional family/relationship structures being

replaced by stronger non-blood ties, underpinned by increasing ability to stay in touch through new technologies.

• Intensification of work - greater job insecurity and intensification of work to drive

up productivity have also helped fuel widespread feelings of helplessness and lack of belonging across the workforce. These feelings are often compensated for by indulgent purchases to reward us for the daily hassle of our working lives and help us feel we belong to society.

• Experience economy/24 hour entertainment – going beyond meeting basic

needs and searching for self-fulfilment drives a desire to try out a wide range of new experiences. The down-side effect fuels further feelings of time-compression as people feel they can’t miss out on all the options available.

• Homing/cocooning – at the same time, the home is treated as a safe refuge from

the complexity and pressure of modern life. This is said to fuel spending on home improvement and gardens.

• Technological change – increases the pace and complexity of life; high rates of

technological innovation encourage high rates of turnover as individuals struggle to maintain ‘access’ to mainstream culture.

• Multiple identities – affluence allows it; uncertainties about belongingness demand

it. People tend to have multiple identities (matched by consumption products) to fit in, or express belonging to, particular social networks.

• Feminisation of society – reflected, in for instance, currently rapid growth in male

grooming products. Changing mating and partnering patterns may be changing the terms of sexual competition and widening the range of people involved in display behaviour, with knock-on consequences for display-related consumption (clothes, make-up etc).

• Changing preferences of older people – typically, the over-70s have pre-war

attitudes to consumption and spending; younger older people are less distinctively different from other age groups.

• The ‘consumerisation’ of children - children having more say over family spending

(and the individualisation of spending to each household member) and defining their value and belongingness in consumer terms.

• Anxiety – as lives have become materially more secure, but also more complex,

people have begun to worry about a wide range of previously trivial issues. Areas where this makes a difference: parenting, health, hygiene, ageing. Many products now pander to ‘problems’ that previously did not exist. Likely to fuel growth in ‘preventative’ products and security monitoring.

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• Related to the last point, anticipated growth in ‘active’ products that claim health

benefits – e.g. nutraceuticals (e.g. bio-active yogurt drinks) and cosmeceuticals (e.g. cosmetics that cause chemical or physical changes in appearance). A recent marked trend on spending on self-medicating is expected to continue (e.g. vitamins, homeopathic remedies etc).

• Technological convergence – a term describing convergence between information,

biological and nano-technologies, including the possibility of genetic/robotic transformation of humans (e.g. in-head sat-nav).

3.4 Wider Forces A number of external factors were identified as having a key role to play in determining the shape of the scenarios: • State of the Economy – including the overall pattern and/or status of growth • Cost & Availability of Resources – noting in particular that the price mechanism

will act to limit demand and prompt alternative investment strategies • Climate Change – noting the different courses of impact – via government, via the

economy and through consumers/citizens • Technology – noting the distinction between evolutionary developments and step-

change developments • Corporate Priorities – drawing attention to the potential, pro-active role of Multi-

National Corporations in shaping the longer term future • Product Design & Packaging* – highlighting the importance of considering

possible future trends for waste and waste composition • Security – highlighting the ways in which concerns about security could impact on

lifestyles • Government – considering the spectrum of possibilities, from highly interventionist

governments through to laissez faire governments, and noting the way in which societies and their governments co-evolve over long periods of time

• Legislation* – summarising some of the major recent and pipeline legislation set

to affect the waste sector • Zeitgeist – drawing attention to the way in which a society’s ‘mood’ can influence

its behaviour, consumption and – as a result – its waste. The items marked with an asterisk (*) were the subject of specific, additional research and thinking, and brief papers are included in Appendix 3 (Policy/legislative background) and Appendix 6 (packaging).

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3.5 Lessons from Other Scenario Studies “[Strategic futures work] attempts to illuminate and understand the future and to use this insight to inform strategy and policy… Rather than predict the future per se, the objective of strategic futures work is to bring a new set of skills and perspectives into the organisation.”4 “Futures scenarios represent a heuristic tool for foresight, enabling a range of audiences…to envision possible futures in order to improve decision-making and strategy-setting”5 “Global Scenarios…cast light on the context in which [Shell] operates, to identify emerging challenges and to foster adaptability to change. These scenarios are used to help review and assess strategy”6 These quotations illustrate the importance of understanding rather than answers: scenarios are devices for enabling organisations and the individuals within them better to understand their operating environment, so as to make better decisions. From such a perspective, it matters rather more to read and take account of several scenarios and to treat them as contributions to one’s understanding, rather to attempt to meld a variety of scenarios [from different sources] into a single ‘right’ scenario. This is essentially the approach we have adopted in reviewing the scenario work of others. We have drawn on work from several sources, but have not attempted to integrate them into a single set of scenarios that will form the basis of our own. In turn, users of the scenarios developed in the present setting may find that our scenarios do not precisely ‘fit’ with – for example – the UK Foresight scenarios; rather, they will augment them as strategic decision making tools. The major sources reviewed during this phase of our work, together with brief remarks on their content and methodology, are as follows: • UKCIP/Foresight socio-economic scenarios are the most widely used scenarios

in UK policy-making, and are consistent with IPCC SRES [International Panel on Climate Change: Special Report on Emissions Scenarios] socio-economic scenarios and UKCIP02 climate scenarios. Based on a 2x2 grid (community v individualist; interdependence v autonomy) the four Foresight scenarios are: World Markets, Global Sustainability, National Enterprise and Local Stewardship. The Foresight scenarios are an example of an approach in which key drivers are identified, envisioned forward, with outcomes emerging from the forward visioning.

• “Decarbonising the UK” from the Tyndall Centre, by contrast, explores the RCEP [Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution] goal of a 60% reduction in CO2 by 2050. Scenarios are then developed that ‘backcast’ along development pathways, so as to explore the possible routes from ‘here’ to ‘there’. Five alternative scenarios plus a baseline are presented.

• UK Hydrogen Futures, also from the Tyndall Centre, adopts a hybrid approach,

working within the framework of the Foresight scenarios, and developing pathways within those scenarios for the development of hydrogen as an energy source.

4 Understanding Best Practice in Strategic Futures Work, PIU, 2001 5 Foresight Futures Scenarios, Berkhout and Hertin, University of Sussex, 2002 6 Global Scenarios to 2025, Shell, 2005

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• 40% House Project, from the Environmental Change Institute (ECI) at Oxford uses the Foresight scenarios to give energy policy and mix stories, plus UKCIP to give population & households, then calculates carbon emissions using their own UK Domestic Carbon Model to look at how a 60% reduction in domestic carbon emissions could be produced.

• Fistera, the European Information Society Technology Futures Forum have

done extensive work on technology futures, including building their own scenarios on the relationship between lifestyles and technological change. They have also prepared an overview of European scenario reports, mainly focused on technology and identified some interesting alternative scenario building approaches to the 2x2 grid approach.

• Scenarios Europe 2010, Five Possible Futures for Europe (1999) – mainly

concerned with the role of the EU, political futures & competitiveness. • Consumption in Europe, Trends & Futures, from Michaelis & Lorek for the Danish

Environmental Protection Agency, 2004, contains three explicitly consumer-focused, non-oppositional scenarios based on European 2001 VISIONS scenarios.

• SEEDA Future Scenarios for the SE Region – presents four main scenarios,

broadly equivalent to the Foresight scenarios, but (a) also presents a wider spread of scenario options on the basis of wider driver sets and (b) focuses on waste and waste-related issues.

• EU European Science and Technology Observatory (ESTO) & Institute for

Prospective Technological Studies “Scenarios of household waste generation” presents a baseline plus four scenarios to 2020 (from 1995). Adopts a ‘life of the home’ approach and creates stories for six dimensions before quantifying for different types of waste.

• Shell Global Scenarios to 2025 depart from the usual approach by having three

scenarios entitled “Low Trust Globalisation” (a legalistic, ‘prove it to me’ world), “Open Doors” (a pragmatic, ‘know me’ world) and “Flags” (a dogmatic, ‘follow me’ world). The scenarios are very strong on the global geo-political and social forces that might shape the world over the next two decades.

Our review of a range of these exercises highlighted the following lines of input to the development of our own scenarios: Common Methodology – virtually all the studies adopt the same broad methodology, in which a broad review of possible drivers is narrowed down through brainstorming and Delphic techniques to a ‘manageable’ number of ‘key’ drivers. Issues of scale, predictability/risk and relevance are typically factored in. In most cases, two binary axes are developed to frame a 2x2 grid, to give four scenarios; in all cases it is acknowledged that there is a balance to be struck between condensing drivers into two axes for the purposes of manageability, and over-simplifying the future and thereby risking ‘missing’ a possible future. Consumption and waste - Relatively few of the approaches explicitly address the volume and nature of consumption, which is of central importance in the current case, and fewer still consider waste per se. Zeitgeist – issues ‘come and go’ in the literature, depending on the prevailing concerns of those undertaking the work. Issues of ‘security’ feature markedly less in work conducted before 9/11, for example.

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Convergence – a common phenomenon in mainstream economic forecasting is that independent forecasts and projections tend to converge towards a common story (since no-one wants to be the one who most conspicuously ‘got it wrong’). There is some indication that something similar applies in the case of scenario-planning, with the same dominant issues recurring – though this may be, of course, because they are genuinely the dominant issues. Quantification – the amount of quantification is very variable and, inevitably, tends to focus on the specific purpose for which the scenarios have been prepared e.g. energy demand. Distribution – none of the scenarios we have investigated pay great attention to the issue of (social) distribution – i.e. how different groups within society either affect or are affected by the principal drivers that shape the scenarios.

3.6 The AEAT/Future Foundation Model & Waste Composition Developed under contract WRT218, the AEAT/Future Foundation model of household waste composition is the subject of its own suite of reports and deliverables to Defra. It was, however, used as the means of providing the quantitative expression of the Brook Lyndhurst qualitative scenarios, and warrants brief and specific mention in this Section of the Core Report. In broad terms, the AEAT/FF model links historic and projected future consumer spending to waste arisings, via estimates of the physical mass of materials purchased by consumers. Whilst producing an estimate of waste composition that differs from Parfitt, et al, it – crucially – provides an internally consistent means of projecting future waste arisings. During Phase 4 of this research, the Brook Lyndhurst team worked closely with the AEAT/FF team to “run” the Brook Lyndhurst scenarios through the model. This work involved a series of development meetings, which also benefited from input from Defra’s economic team and Julian Parfitt himself. The specification for running the model according to the Brook Lyndhurst scenarios is the subject of a separate paper (included among the Appendices). It is also important to acknowledge that a key requirement from Defra was that the Brook Lyndhurst research should take account of the scenario development work being undertaken by Henley Centre Headlight Vision (HCHV) on behalf of the Environment Agency and Defra. This study, concluded in mid-2006, explored broad “environmental futures” for the UK. The Brook Lyndhurst team did indeed take close account of this work, and in the next section of this report (4.4) the link between the HCHV work and our own is explained.

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4 THE SCENARIOS In this Section of the report, we: • Outline the structure of the scenarios, and the means by which they were developed • Present summary narratives for the scenarios • Summarise the “lifestyles” dimension of the scenarios • Highlight key linkages between these scenarios and other relevant work

4.1 Development & Structure of the Scenarios In broad terms, the research followed an established methodology for developing scenarios, in which successive waves of analysis, identifying and sifting key drivers and determinants of the future, iterated towards a proposition for a set of scenarios. Our time horizon was to look out to 2030. We concluded at a relatively early stage that to collapse the various drivers we considered important into a standard 2 by 2 matrix would run the risk of losing too much detail. We therefore developed an initial set of 24 scenarios, in which all influential factors were allowed to vary. Elementary cluster analysis revealed three main groupings among these initial scenarios, and these groupings formed the basis for the development of full scenarios. These three full scenarios were specified according to a range of key drivers, selected so as to capture the principal “character of households”, “life of the home” and “external factors” drivers that emerged from the earlier analysis. Each driver has, for each scenario, been represented by a “score” between 1 and 10. The score represents the state of affairs as at 2030; implicit, therefore, is a sense that this state of affairs has come about as a result of pressure in the direction implied by the score over the period to 2030. The precise meaning of higher or lower scores varies between the drivers. The drivers, and the meaning of the scores in each case, are given below: • Population – the mid-point population projection for 2030 is 67 million, but the

Government Actuary’s Department’s estimates vary between 62 and 71 million (with obvious implications for total waste, and concomitant implications for waste composition depending on the population structure). At an earlier stage of the scenario development, it was considered possible that the population might vary between scenarios, with a high value (i.e. above 5) for a population higher than the mid point, and vice versa. In fact, for ease of comparison, the population assumptions in all three primary scenarios are now the same, and have been scored 5. The fact that this key driver is invariant under the three scenarios does not negate its importance as a key driver, however; variations in population will impact on waste and waste composition, not least through their impact on household numbers.

• Housing patterns – this driver refers not simply to the number of households

(which vary between the scenarios) but to the types of housing and housing patterns. In particular, since there is evidence to suggest that there are linkages between housing/household types and waste per capita, this key driver refers

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specifically to the waste-generating potential of housing structures in each scenario. Thus, a scenario in which more households have high waste per head (e.g. because there are more gardens) has been given a higher score, and vice versa.

• Government – in this case, a high value indicates a strong government/regulatory

environment i.e. one in which there is a great deal of intervention [for whatever reason]. A low value indicates a laissez-faire and/or weak government.

• Climate change –a high value indicates that the impacts of climate change are

increasingly severe and apparent, a low value the opposite.

• Resources – this is essentially concerned with the price of (natural) resources – a high value indicates a world in which resource costs are high, a low score the opposite.

• Technology – this is concerned not with whether or not technological change is

underway (we assume that it will be) but the extent to which new technologies are having profound impacts – high impact technology (impact in terms, principally, of its effects on lifestyles) is ascribed a high value, low impact technology a low value7.

• Security threats – given the potential to impact inter alia on lifestyles, a future in

which security threats (both real and perceived) are severe is given a high value, while a less security conscious future is given a low score.

• (Employment and) Real incomes – high values for a scenario in which real

incomes have grown steadily and strongly throughout the period to 2030; low values for a scenario in which growth is either weak, peters out or even declines.

• (Spending and) Consumption – low values for futures in which consumption is

predominantly dematerialised (i.e. there is a focus on the consumption of experiences, or of fewer things in general), high values for futures in which consumptions is material (i.e. there is a focus on the consumption of things).

• Values – high scores for a future in which social values/priorities/preferences have

become more concerned with personal well-being/development (potentially even spirituality and/or self-actualisation etc), low values for futures in which the culture of consumption/status/envy dominates.

• Family & social capital – high values for more collective/communitarian/socially

inclusive futures; low values for more individualistic/atomised futures. • Optimism – this is a composite indicator of the overall ‘state of society’, with a high

value indicating an optimistic/confident outlook, whereas a low value indicates timidity or fear or uncertainty.

As the above implies, the scores are relative to other scores within each driver, not between them. That is, a score of 8 for “Government” implies a situation in which government is more interventionist than a situation in which “Government” is scored 6; there is no relativity with a score of 8 for “Family and Social Capital”, and so forth. It is also important to remember: • The drivers are not configured along ‘good/bad’ lines. The main reason for this is

that the assessment of ‘good/bad’ is subjective and/or temporally specific – different individuals and different societies at different times have different interpretations of

7 Technology here is intended to capture product development, packaging technology, gadgets, bio-tech etc

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good and bad. As a result, the visual representation of a scenario (which represents the scores as axes) has no particular meaning.

• In particular, it is NOT the case that a ‘more sustainable’ future would have mainly

high values. • The axes/drivers are NOT independent variables, but are co-dependent and, in some

cases, overlap. • The scenarios do not describe futures that are ‘locked’ – rather, they are

representations of developmental pathways. Before turning to the full exposition of the scenarios themselves, three further points are warranted. The first concerns the visual representation of the scenarios. Earlier drafts of this work made use of a “spider diagram” approach, with each key driver represented as a spoke or axis on the diagram. Too often, we discovered, this led users to over-interpret the meaning of the image. In this final report, we are using a representation that is, we hope, both accessible and intelligible, but not overly symbolic. Secondly, we noted in our exploration of other scenario-planning material from around the UK and Europe, that scenarios are invariably presented solely in terms of the future. We found it helpful, in trying to imagine 2030, to think about the period in the past that is equidistant, i.e. 1980. We further found that, in trying to interpret a narrative describing some future point, a narrative presenting “now” in the same terms proved useful. Accordingly, in the full scenario narrative in Appendix 4, we present a representation of 2005 as if it was a scenario, and using the same headings as we have used for the scenarios themselves. We hope that this helps readers as much as it helped us. Thirdly, and finally, we were keen in developing these scenarios to capture the “distributional” element we had identified as absent from much other scenario planning work. Its (potential) significance lies not merely in the facts of political justice, but in the possibility that different distributions of behaviour, of lifestyles, within an overall average, may well have differential waste consequences. We initially conjectured that each of the three primary scenarios could be split into a pair of “sub scenarios”, with differential lifestyle mixes within them. However, this proposition tended to confuse potential users of the material with whom we consulted; and in any case proved, in the attempt, prohibitively complex to undertake. Instead – and, we suspect, this is both better and more straightforward – the detailed waste-level scenarios present the case in terms of lifestyle mixes, and in terms of upward and downward pressures. Thus, with explicit reference made to e.g. younger households, high income households etc, the distributional element underpinning the scenario is made transparent; and can, in due course and if necessary, be “re-thought” by prospective users of the results.

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4.2 The Scenario Narratives The three Scenarios are: • Scenario A – “Blinkered Evolution” • Scenario B – “Civic Renewal” • Scenario C – “Strong Government Each is summarised in turn, below. Detailed exposition, for each of the key drivers in each scenario, is presented in Appendix 4 (which also includes a “scenario” for 2005, to set the scene more fully).

4.2.1 Scenario A – Blinkered Evolution Drivers & Specification

Scenario A - Blinkered Evolution

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Overall optimism

Family and Social Capital

Values

Spending andConsumption

Employment & Incomes

Security Threats

Technology

Resources

Climate Change

Government

Housing

Population

The chart illustrates the quantified specification of the scenario, as per the explanation provided in Section 4.1. Each bar represents a score of between 1 and 10. With 5 as the mid-point, scores of 5 produce no bar. The colour variation has no significance; it is intended merely as a visual aid. Overview In this scenario, the 25 years to 2030 have been a period in which mainstream behaviour has remained committed to the individualised consumption paradigm that dominated the late twentieth and early 21st century. Mounting evidence of climate change impacts – most obviously in terms of climactic disasters affecting millions of

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people around the world, but also through its impacts upon the costs of basic commodities including oil – has not brought about significant changes in either behaviour or policy in Britain. Government is weak; civic life remains atomised; values remain predominantly economistic, prompting a continuance of materialised consumption – which in turn drives demand for ever scarcer resources. Consumption patterns and associated levels of economic activity continue to support reasonable growth in real incomes and thus spending; while technological innovation is focused on meeting the needs of consumption rather than transformation. To an extent, many trends that were apparent in the early part of the century have continued. However, given the way in which both citizens and governments have managed to avoid facing up to the consequences of British lifestyles, it is fair to say that - in short - British society has evolved in a blinkered fashion. Summary The Economy With some minor fluctuations, interest rates have been low and relatively stable since the late 1990s, with the Monetary Policy Committee relying on other factors such as rising resource prices to keep a check on the economy. This has helped to keep the housing market buoyant, though prices have rarely risen at the rate they did at the end of the twentieth century and there are marked geographical differences. Prices for some types of housing in the South East, for instance, have fallen, particularly when they are in areas prone to flooding. Mortgages continue to make up a large part of consumer borrowing, but the proportion relative to unsecured debts has fallen as low interest rates and economic growth have fed consumerism. Debt is now accepted by many as a fact of life; credit, as a right. British manufacturing industry continued the decline underway since the 1970s well into this century, but the recent turnaround in response to changed relative prices, increased recycling and the market proximity of the new nano and bio technologies, has brought the first increases in employment in the sector for more than half a century. British consumers’ thirst for new technologies and the country’s skilled workforce have lured many high-tech start-ups to the UK. Because of the small size and relatively light weight of most of these goods, many of these companies have found it cost effective to export from the UK to Europe and further afield. Britain’s deep water ports have also experienced resurgence as rising fuel costs have made shipping a more attractive prospect. Plans are underway for privately funded expansion of the high speed rail connection to mainland Europe to allow UK ports to act as freight ‘gateways’ to the rest of Europe. British agriculture has benefited from the higher costs of transporting goods but high labour costs continue to prevent significant growth in this area. Some farmers have moved to take advantage of changing climate patterns to grow produce previously unsuited to UK conditions, but overall, the long-term decline of British agriculture has left the sector ill equipped for such developments. The diversification into tourism and other experience-based businesses that occurred between 1990 and 2020 has had a long-term effect on UK farmers’ ability to increase production. Services continue to account for by far the largest proportion of GDP, but growth has primarily been driven by services supporting or providing new technology. Leisure services have continued to show strong growth since the beginning of the century.

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In terms of transport, the growth in rail travel seen during the 20 years to 2010 has levelled off as the system has struggled to provide additional capacity without government intervention. Persistent terror attacks on the rail network have also had some impact on passenger numbers, with initial short-term losses becoming more enduring with each incident. Road use has risen, but at far slower rates than seen in the later half of the twentieth century. Congestion and fuel prices are beginning to show signs of changing behaviour, but rather than abandoning their cars, consumers are often adapting their lifestyles. For instance, people now live closer on average to their workplace than they did 25 years ago, and this trend is accelerating. Hybrid cars are also increasingly popular, particularly for those living in urban areas, and the technology has advanced to a point where their performance in terms of conventional road use is roughly comparable with petrol and diesel powered vehicles. Scooter and motorbike use has also grown, but very few people make use of lift sharing schemes, etc. All told, the UK economy has adapted well to the new environment of high resource costs, and has managed to continue to deliver a politically and socially acceptable level of employment. It continues, too, to contribute to climate change in a way that certainly belies the promise of “decoupling” pledged to the population in the first decade of the century. The Environment Some areas in the UK, particularly along the south and east coasts, are now experiencing winter rainfall as much as 20 per cent higher than they were at the end of the twentieth century8. In the south east, summer precipitation has fallen back by around 10 per cent. Summer temperatures in the South East now average around 1.5 degrees higher than they did in 1990. In terms of flood risk, the greatest impact of these changes are felt in the South West and North West of England and the West coast of Scotland, though tidal areas and river plains across the UK are also affected. Warmer summers are accentuating air pollution, which has traditionally fluctuated considerably depending on weather patterns. Little improvement has been seen in terms of particles released into the air. Recent growth in the use of hybrid vehicles and the slower growth in air travel have not yet made an impression on air quality, although the latest wave of nuclear power stations has had a small impact. Worsening congestion in built up areas, which has more than compensated for improvements in engine technology, has also had a negative impact. Climate changes have seen a number of new plant and animal types found in the UK, but many species have also disappeared or have become rare. New organisms have also bought with them new diseases, which have affected some indigenous species. Brand owners and retailers are now using less packaging and almost all FMCG waste is being recycled. Rising resource prices have incentivised businesses to cut down on waste and improve efficiency. Technology has allowed many electrical goods to be made far smaller than they were 25 years ago, but in some cases, such as TV screens, a consumer belief that bigger is better means this has not translated into actual reductions. Polluter pays schemes have been made gradually stricter over the years, though measures in the UK have not matched those in other European countries. Nonetheless, gains have been made – particularly in terms of electrical and electronic goods, many of which are now returned to manufacturers to allow components to be

8 This section is based on UKCIP02 projections for medium-high emissions, using an aggregate of the 2020s and 2050s scenarios.

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reclaimed. However, development of technology in this area lags behind the goods themselves and many materials are still discarded. Society Society is increasingly fragmented and disjointed. Where they exist in any meaningful way – in areas with significant numbers of ethnic minorities, for instance - communities are inward-looking and distrustful of non-members. Despite this, educational attainment has continued to improve and most young people see a university education as a right, albeit one that will leave them saddled with significant debts. There continues to be strong links between areas of deprivation and low grades, poor health and high levels of crime. Life expectancy at birth has continued to rise, with men now living well into their late 80s and women often making it into their 90s. Heart disease remains the main cause of death among both men and women and a focus on material consumption rather than personal well being has made problems like obesity difficult to tackle.

4.2.2 Scenario B – Civic Renewal Drivers & Specification

Scenario B - Civic Renewal

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Overall optimism


Values

Spending and Consumption


Security Threats

Technology

Resources

Climate Change

Government

Housing

Population

The chart illustrates the quantified specification of the scenario, as per the explanation provided in Section 4.1. Each bar represents a score of between 1 and 10. With 5 as the mid-point, scores of 5 produce no bar. The colour variation has no significance; it is intended merely as a visual aid.

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Overview Faced, in the early twenty first century, with the overwhelming evidence of climate change, it was British citizens and consumers rather than British politicians that began to change their behaviour. Facilitated by a willing and profit-oriented private sector, early coalitions of what used to be called “ethical consumers” brought about a tipping point in attitudes around 2015, and the period since has seen the emergence of a series of new lifestyle choices across British society. Economic growth, in the traditional sense, has been markedly slower over the past fifteen years than in the 1992 to 2012 period, and many economists remain worried that “competitiveness” is being lost, to the long run detriment of the country’s viability. Others argue that a process akin to the Japanese period of no growth in the 1990s is occurring, while still others argue that an entirely new form of economics has emerged. Whatever the analysis, the society of 2030 appears to be one in which psychological and physical well-being is both centre stage politically, and improving. And it is a society that is gradually reducing its negative environmental impacts, with only limited regulatory or fiscal intervention. In many ways, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”, grounded as it always was in civic society, has guided Britain into a period of unexpected renewal. Summary The Economy The UK economy of 2030 faces novel challenges, after more than a decade of low growth and significant changes in consumer behaviour. However, the basic bedrock of capitalism remains in place, and GDP remains the key economic marker. With some minor fluctuations, interest rates have been low and relatively stable since the late 1990s, despite pressures caused by rising resource costs. Underlying figures show that it is not public fear for their economic future that is controlling spending and that consumer confidence remains reasonably robust. For instance, spending on leisure services – generally thought of as a luxury and often a sector that has struggled in previous recessions – has remained strong. These underlying figures have been sufficient to ensure that investors have not jumped ship en masse, though there has been a redirection of investment away from more volatile sectors such as fashion and electrical goods. Alternative energy technologies have been a significant growth area and related services have also done well. Mortgages make up a larger part of consumer borrowing than they did in 2005 as low consumer spending has reined in unsecured debt. The decline of British manufacturing industry continued well into this century, but the recent turnaround in response to changed relative prices, increased recycling and the market proximity of the new nano and bio technologies, has brought the first increases in employment in the sector for more than half a century. British consumer’s thirst for new technologies and the country’s skilled workforce have lured many high-tech start-ups to the UK. Because of the small size and relatively light weight of most of these goods, many of these companies have begun to export from the UK to Europe and further afield.

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Britain’s deep water ports have also experienced resurgence as rising fuel costs have made shipping a more attractive prospect. Plans are underway for privately funded expansion of the high speed rail connection to mainland Europe to allow UK ports to act as freight ‘gateways’ to the rest of Europe. British agriculture has benefited from the higher costs of transporting goods but high labour costs continue to prevent significant growth in this area. Some farmers have moved to take advantage of changing climate patterns to grow produce previously unsuited to UK conditions and organic production has grown considerably. Overall, however, the long-term decline of British agriculture has left the sector ill equipped for such developments. The diversification into tourism and other experience-based businesses that occurred between 1990 and 2020 has had a long-term effect on UK farmers’ ability to increase production. Services continue to account for by far the largest proportion of GDP, with leisure services showing strong growth since the beginning of the century. In terms of transport, the growth in rail travel seen during the 20 years to 2010 has levelled off as the system has struggled to provide additional capacity without government intervention. Periodic terror attacks on the rail network have also had some impact on passenger numbers, with initial short-term losses becoming more enduring with each incident. The environment Some areas in the UK, particularly along the south and east coasts, are now experiencing winter rainfall as much as 20 per cent higher than they were at the end of the twentieth century9. In the south east, summer precipitation has fallen back by around 10 per cent. Summer temperatures in the region now average around 1.5 degrees higher than they did in 1990. In terms of flood risk, the greatest impacts of these changes are felt in the South West and North West of England and along the West coast of Scotland, though tidal areas and river plains across the UK are also affected. Warmer summers are accentuating air pollution, which has traditionally fluctuated considerably depending on weather patterns, although overall emissions have fallen as people have switched to cleaner technologies and cut back on air travel and consumption in general. Use of hybrid and fuel cell cars has helped to alleviate some of the problems caused by worsening congestion in built up areas. Climate changes have seen a number of new plant and animal types found in the UK, but many species have also disappeared or have become rare. New organisms have also bought with them new diseases, which have affected some indigenous species. Brand owners and retailers are now using less packaging and almost all FMCG waste is being recycled. Rising resource prices have incentivised businesses to cut down on waste and improve efficiency and falls in consumption in some areas have reduced the volume of material entering the waste stream. Technology has allowed many electrical goods to be made far smaller than they were 25 years ago. Polluter pays schemes have been gradually made stricter over the years, though measures in the UK have not matched those in other European countries. Nonetheless, gains have been made – particularly in terms of electrical and electronic goods, many of which are now returned to manufacturers to allow components to be reclaimed – a process that has been greatly assisted by manufacturer leasing programmes.


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Society Society is increasingly characterised by collaborative or communitarian action. Although many people still pursue individualised lifestyles, even in these cases the “tribalised” and branded individualism characteristic of consumption in the early twenty first century has begun to give way to a more holistic notion of self fulfilment. Educational attainment has continued to improve and most young people see a university education as a right, albeit one that will leave them saddled with significant debts. There has, in recent years, been a return in some quarters to a 19th century notion of education as a means of self-improvement rather than simply as a means of getting a job. Life expectancy at birth has continued to rise, with men now living well into their late 80s and women often making it into their 90s. Heart disease remains the main cause of death among both men and women, although a greater focus on personal wellbeing has recently helped to reduce levels of obesity and similar lifestyle-related diseases.

4.2.3 Scenario C – Strong Government Drivers & Specification

Scenario C - Strong Government

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Overall optimism


Values

Spending andConsumption


Security Threats

Technology

Resources

Climate Change

Government

Housing

Population

The chart illustrates the quantified specification of the scenario, as per the explanation provided in Section 4.1. Each bar represents a score of between 1 and 10. With 5 as the mid-point, scores of 5 produce no bar. The colour variation has no significance; it is intended merely as a visual aid.

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Overview Faced, in the early twenty first century, with the overwhelming evidence of climate change, the British Government has led the campaign, sustained over the past twenty five years, to transform the UK economy. Facilitated by a willing and profit-oriented private sector, successive waves of regulation, legislation and revisions to the tax system have been largely successful in both maintaining the growth in living standards required for electoral success and in reducing emissions of CO2 required to save the planet. Economic growth, in the traditional sense, has been maintained at or around the long run average over the past twenty five years, although there have been a couple of “mini-recessions” as particular sectors of the economy were forced to adapt more quickly to the requirements imposed by carbon trading. By and large, the citizens and consumers of Britain have accepted that the “price” of achieving an environmentally sustainable future has been to cede more authority to a strong government, and whether by luck or judgement most of the governments since 2005 have used their strength effectively. Summary The Economy The UK economy has adapted well to the new environment of high resource costs, and has managed to continue to deliver a politically and socially acceptable level of employment. It has managed, too, through an aggressive programme of government intervention, to adapt to the challenges of mitigating climate change. By and large, GDP growth has kept close to its long run average over the past couple of decades, although low growth in the past few years has raised concerns about the continued viability of the present policy path. With some minor fluctuations, interest rates have been low and relatively stable since the late 1990s, despite the impact of rising resource costs. Underlying figures show that consumer confidence remains reasonably robust. For instance, spending on leisure services – generally thought of as a luxury and often a sector that has struggled in previous recessions – has remained strong. British industry has been in almost continual decline since the 1970s and numbers of manufacturing jobs have continued to fall in recent years, despite the emergence of new technologies. High labour costs and a weak domestic market mean many products in this sector are imported from abroad, sometimes from British-owned firms. Britain’s deep water ports have also experienced resurgence as rising fuel costs have made shipping a more attractive prospect. Plans are underway for privately funded expansion of the high speed rail connection to mainland Europe to allow UK ports to act as freight ‘gateways’ to the rest of Europe. British agriculture has benefited from the higher costs of transporting goods but high labour costs continue to prevent significant growth in this area. Some farmers have moved to take advantage of changing climate patterns to grow produce previously unsuited to UK conditions and organic production has grown considerably. Overall, however, the long-term decline of British agriculture has left the sector ill equipped for such developments. The diversification into tourism and other experience-based businesses that occurred between 1990 and 2020 has had a long-term effect on UK farmers’ ability to increase production.

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Services continue to account for by far the largest proportion of GDP, with leisure services showing strong growth since the beginning of the century. In terms of transport, the growth in rail travel seen during the 20 years to 2010 levelled off as the system struggled to provide additional capacity without government intervention. More recently, significant government and private investment in infrastructure has seen numbers begin to increase once again. Persistent terror attacks on the rail network have had some impact on passenger numbers, with initial short-term losses becoming more enduring with each incident. The environment Some areas in the UK, particularly along the south and east coasts, are now experiencing winter rainfall as much as 20 per cent higher than they were at the end of the twentieth century10. In the south east, summer precipitation has fallen back by around 10 per cent. Summer temperatures in the South East now average around 1.5 degrees higher than they did in 1990. In terms of flood risk, the greatest impact of these changes is felt in the South West and North West of England and the West coast of Scotland, though tidal areas and river plains across the UK are also affected. Warmer summers are accentuating air pollution, which has traditionally fluctuated considerably depending on weather patterns, although overall emissions have fallen as government initiatives have seen a switch to cleaner technologies. Climate change has seen a number of new plant and animal types found in the UK, but many species have also disappeared or become rare. New organisms have also brought with them new diseases, which have affected some indigenous species. Government intervention and pressure has reduced packaging and the vast majority of this waste is now recycled. Rising resource prices have incentivised businesses to cut down on waste and improve efficiency. Technology has allowed many electrical goods to be made far smaller than they were 25 years ago. Society Society is fragmented and disjointed, although there are signs of growing cohesion in certain groups. Nonetheless, communities are often inward-looking and distrustful of non-members. Educational attainment has continued to improve and most young people see a university education as a right, albeit one that will leave them saddled with significant debts. There continue to be strong links between areas of depravation and low grades, poor health and high levels of crime. Life expectancy at birth has continued to rise, with men now living well into their late 80s and women often making it into their 90s. Heart disease remains the main cause of death among both men and women and a focus on material consumption rather than personal well being has made problems like obesity difficult to tackle.


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4.2.4 Scenario Drivers Compared

Drivers Scenario Scores A:

Blinkered Evolution

B: Civic

Renewal

C: Strong

Government Population – all scores identical, for ease of comparison

5 5 5

Housing patterns – a scenario in which more households have high waste per head has been given a higher score, and vice versa.

7 3 5

Government – a high value indicates a strong government, a low value indicates a laissez-faire and/or weak government.

3 4 9

Climate change –a high value indicates that the impacts of climate change are increasingly severe and apparent, a low value the opposite.

8 7 7

Resources – this is essentially concerned with the price of (natural) resources – a high value indicates a world in which resource costs are high, a low score the opposite.

9 8 8

Technology – high impact technology (impact in terms, principally, of its effects on lifestyles) is ascribed a high value, low impact technology a low value.

3 8 4

Security threats – a future in which security threats (both real and perceived) are severe is given a high value, while a less security conscious future is given a low score.

6 5 7

Employment and Real incomes – higher values for a scenario in which real incomes have grown steadily throughout the period to 2030; low values for a scenario in which growth is either weak, peters out or even declines.

5 6 4

Spending and Consumption – low values for futures in which consumption is predominantly dematerialised, high values for futures in which consumption is largely material (i.e. there is a focus on the consumption of things).

8 3 5

Societal Values – high scores for a future in which social values/priorities/preferences have become more concerned with personal well-being/development (potentially even spirituality and/or self-actualisation etc), low values for futures in which the culture of consumption/status/envy dominates

3 7 4

Family & social capital – high values for more collective/communitarian/socially inclusive futures; low values for more individualistic/atomised futures.

2 8 4

Optimism – this is a composite indicator of the overall ‘state of society’, with a high value indicating an optimistic/confident outlook, whereas a low value indicates timidity or fear or uncertainty.

3 8 5

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In overall summary form, the scenarios can be expressed as follows:

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4.3 Lifestyles The portmanteau term “lifestyle” captures, as the earlier analysis and argument indicates, a breathtakingly wide array of factors. Endeavouring to summarise how lifestyles might look in 2030, under each of three scenarios, whilst capturing this complexity and without descending into the kind of trite neologisms beloved of the marketing industry, is a particular challenge. Furthermore, given the need to link the analysis to a quantified system, and so as to ensure that potential wider applicability of this work, it is important to be able to relate lifestyles to “standard” classifications of households. We concluded that, in fact, lifestyles in 2030 can be expressed in three ways in this study: • Via the scenario narratives themselves (in Section 4.2) • Via a “pointillist” or sketch form in this section • Via the detailed waste analysis in Section 5 Thus, rather than there being a single place in this report where lifestyles are set out in final and specific detail, it is through the more holistic manner proposed earlier that we think lifestyles can best be captured and transmitted. In this section, therefore, we have, firstly, identified seven key households types (selected on the basis of the “characters of households” and “drivers of waste composition” analysis discussed earlier) through which to consider lifestyles: • Young households (headed by those under 30) • Middle age households (headed by those between 30 and retirement age) comprising

multiple adults, predominantly families • Middle age single person households (including single parents) • Older households (headed by those of retirement age) • Low income households (the bottom quintile) • Middle income households (the three middle fifths) • Upper income households (the top quintile) Secondly, for each of these household types, we have prepared a “pointillist sketch”, a selection of key phrases and lifestyle events that between them provide a flavour of the lifestyles in question. So as to demonstrate how this works – and, indeed, to give the reader/user an opportunity to challenge the approach – this section begins with a presentation of lifestyles in 2005, before moving, in turn, through the three 2030 scenarios. Note, of course, that the full details of the scenarios are presented in Appendix 4.

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4.3.1 Lifestyles 2005 Introduction Lifestyles in 2005 are, at one level, as diverse as Britain’s population. Compare the lifestyles of poorly educated young white men in East London with young professional women working in the “knowledge economy” along the M4; or former miners in industrial South Wales compared to recent graduates working in the newly revitalised centre of Manchester; or migrant workers in East Anglia compared to the commuter belt of Cheshire; and so on. Contemporary UK lifestyles somehow both embed all the “key drivers” referred to above, and simultaneously create those drivers. In the 1960s, for example, the first supermarkets appeared in town centres. As car ownership began to grow, new supermarkets – in prosperous parts of Britain, where car ownership was high – moved “out of town”. More people wanted to shop in the supermarkets, increasing the number of reasons for having a car. Car ownership and the location (and size) of supermarkets developed together, or “co-evolved”, throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s, such that in 2005 both the car and the supermarket are completely embedded features of most people’s lifestyles. (Even in this example, of course, there are important and in some cases large exceptions. Up to a third of UK households do not, in fact, own a car. Many communities continue to shun supermarkets, preferring street markets, specialist shops, farmers’ markets and so on.) Similarly, even the methods of classifying lifestyles – using Acorn or Mosaic, or “ABC1s and C2DE”, or by socio-economic class, or by this month’s marketing buzzphrase – reveal the complexity of what is under consideration and the peril of excessive simplification. On the basis of our review and analysis of the relationship between lifestyles (defined loosely and largely) and waste, and following discussion with Defra on how the results from this research are most likely to be used, we have analysed lifestyles in terms of household composition (age, size and presence or otherwise of children) and by income. Age & Status Young (under 30) Relatively few young people are able to form households in 2005, given the prohibitive cost of housing relative to salaries. There are, nevertheless, more than two million households in this group, many of them “multi-adult” households. Lifestyles are characterised by:

shopping, fashion, education & university, finding a job & career development, digital entertainment, mobile phones, single parentdom, drugs, mental health issues, debt, short-haul holidays, ready-meals, family homes, renting, anti-social behaviour, crime, gay culture, music, anxiety, issue politics, group living

Middle aged (30-retirement) & cohabiting Much more numerous and diverse than the young – there are close to 9 million households in this group compared to little more than 2 million households headed by individuals aged under 30 – the middle aged in this group have lifestyles characterised by:

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children, mortgages, shopping, housing & home making, gardening, television, DVDs, schools, commuting, cars, fitness, pensions & savings, DINKies (double income no kids), food & diet, furniture & furnishings, stability, annual holidays

Middle aged (30-retirement) and single Set to be the most rapidly growing group in society over the next quarter century, there are already around 4.7 million households made up of single ‘middle-aged’ individuals. Lifestyles characteristics are:

Single parent-dom, mortgages, shopping, disposable incomes, housing & home making, gardening, DVDs, schools, commuting, cars, fitness, pensions & savings, food & diet, furniture & furnishings, annual holidays

Older (retired plus) Currently numbering around 5.5 million, and critically distinguished between the single (2.75 million) and those still in couples, characteristics for this group are:

grandchildren, retirement, poverty, equity withdrawal, travel, pensions, benefit dependency, community, family visits, bingo, “grey panthers”, sickness/frailty, accommodation, shopping, holidays, experiences rather than goods

Income Poor (bottom income quintile) With average weekly household incomes of below £18311, the poor in 2005 have lifestyles characterised by:

benefits system, marginalisation, poor skills/education, diet/obesity, smoking, cash economy, debt, television, buses, isolation, community, crime, uncertainty/instability, short-termism, DVDs, cinema

Middle incomes Average household incomes in this group range from £183/week to £828/week, with a broad range of lifestyle themes:

secure employment, good education, newspapers, internet, credit cards, shopping, cars, holidays, DVDs, cinema, television, books, gardening, organic food, good health

Rich (top quintile) With weekly incomes above £828, Britain’s wealthy have lifestyles comprising:

multiple holidays, multiple cars, multiple homes, leisure spending, eating out, detached houses, inheritance, theatre, private education, private healthcare, high quality fixtures & fittings

11 Family Spending, ONS, 2003-4

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4.3.2 Lifestyles 2030 – Scenario A – Blinkered Evolution Introduction Lifestyles in 2030 are even more diverse than was the case in 2005. High income professionals in the Greater South East are almost completely inoculated from the urban enclaves of immigrants in London; middle income pensioners enjoy holidays and healthcare available only to the very rich just thirty years ago, while poorer pensioners endure support levels worse than those experienced by their parents; young people now spend nearly fifteen adult years in a “responsibility free zone” before taking on marriage, mortgages and babies, and have adapted to a level of sustained immediate gratification that even their e-generation parents find challenging. Of course, many aspects of lifestyles remain both common across groups, and also over time. Key characteristics are: Age & Status Young (under 30) Relatively few young people are able to form households in 2030, given the prohibitive cost of housing relative to salaries. Lifestyles are characterised by:

shopping, fashion, education & university, finding a job & career development, on-line life, digital entertainment, body modification, single parentdom, drugs, mental health, debt, immersion experiences, ready-meals, family homes, renting, anti-social behaviour, crime, gay culture, music, anxiety, issue politics

Middle aged (30-retirement) & cohabiting Almost unchanged in number since 2005 – there are some 8.8 million households in this group compared to 2.3 million households headed by individuals aged under 30 – the middle aged in this group have lifestyles characterised by:

children, mortgages, shopping, housing & home making, gardening, on-line entertainment, schools, new urbanism, caring for elders, commuting, cars, fitness, pensions & savings, DINKies, food & diet, wine, furniture & furnishings, anxiety, security, annual holiday, political apathy

Middle aged (30-retirement) and single The most rapidly growing group in society over the past quarter century, there are now approaching 6.8 million households comprising a single middle-aged individual. Lifestyles characteristics are:

Single parent-dom, mortgages, shopping, disposable incomes, housing & home making, gardening, online entertainment, schools, drugs, adult education, new urbanism, commuting, cars, fitness, pensions & savings, music, food & diet, furniture & furnishings, annual holidays

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Older (retired plus) There are now approaching 3.5 million households with a married or co-habiting couple aged more than 65, and more than 4 million households comprising a single person above that age. Lifestyle characteristics for this group are:

grandchildren, retirement, poverty, equity withdrawal, local travel, pensions, benefit dependency, community, family visits, the internet, “grey panthers”, fitness & sport, sickness/frailty, accommodation, shopping, holidays, experiences rather than goods


benefits system, marginalisation, poor skills/education, diet/obesity, smoking, credit cards, debt, internet, brands, buses & trams, isolation, community, crime, uncertainty/instability, short-termism, holidays, floods

Middle incomes Average household incomes in this group range from £340/week to £1,500/week, with a broad range of lifestyle themes:

secure employment, private education, e-newspapers, internet, biometric finance, shopping, buses & cars, holidays, immersion experiences, cosmetic surgery, books, gardening, organic food, good health

Rich (top quintile) With weekly incomes above £1,500, Britain’s wealthy have lifestyles comprising:

multiple holidays, multiple cars, multiple homes, leisure spending, genetic enhancement, eating out, domestic employees, detached houses, inheritance, theatre, private education, private healthcare, high quality fixtures & fittings

4.3.3 Lifestyles 2030 – Scenario B – Civic Renewal Introduction Lifestyles in 2030 have begun to converge, after a prolonged period in which lifestyle patterns had been becoming progressively more and more diverse. Common appreciation of the scale of the environmental challenge, and the progressive discovery of the benefits of joint action, are working together to rebuild common value sets.

12 Real, assuming compound growth of 2.5% pa 2005-2030

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Nevertheless, wide income disparities persist, and lifestyles still vary considerably: Age & Status Young (under 30) Relatively few young people are able to form households in 2030, given the prohibitive cost of housing relative to salaries, although “group” living has become more common. Lifestyles are characterised by:

shopping, fashion, volunteering, education & university, finding a job & career development, travel, on-line life, digital entertainment, body modification, meditation, single parentdom, drugs, mental health, debt, immersion experiences, ready-meals, family homes, renting, anti-social behaviour, crime, gay culture, music, issue politics

Middle aged (30-retirement) & cohabiting Almost unchanged in number since 2005 – there are around 8.8 million households in this group compared to little more than 2 million households headed by individuals aged under 30 – the middle aged in this group have lifestyles characterised by:

children, mortgages, shopping, housing & home making, gardening, on-line entertainment, theatre, schools, new urbanism, caring for elders, community development, commuting, cars, fitness, pensions & savings, DINKies, food & diet, wine, furniture & furnishings, security, annual holiday

Middle aged (30-retirement) and single The most rapidly growing group in society over the past quarter century, there are now more than 6.5 million households comprising a single middle-aged individual. Lifestyles characteristics are:




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benefits system, marginalisation, poor skills/education, diet/obesity, smoking, credit cards, debt, internet, friends, buses & trams, isolation, community, crime, uncertainty/instability, short-termism, holidays, floods


secure employment, private education, e-newspapers, internet, biometric finance, shopping, buses & cars, holidays, immersion experiences, cosmetic surgery, books, gardening, organic food, good health


multiple holidays, multiple cars, multiple homes, leisure spending, genetic enhancement, eating out, domestic employees, detached houses, inheritance, theatre, private education, private healthcare, high quality fixtures & fittings

4.3.4 Lifestyles 2030 – Scenario C – Strong Government Introduction Lifestyles in 2030 are even more diverse than was the case in 2005. High income professionals in the Greater South East are almost completely inoculated from the urban enclaves of immigrants in London; middle income pensioners enjoy holidays and healthcare available only to the very rich just thirty years ago, while poorer pensioners endure support levels worse than those experienced by their parents; young people now spend nearly fifteen adult years in a “responsibility free zone” before taking on marriage, mortgages and babies, and have adapted to a level of sustained immediate gratification that their e-generation parents find challenging. Of course, many aspects of lifestyles remain common across groups and over time. Key characteristics are:


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Age & Status Young (under 30) Relatively few young people are able to form households in 2030, given the prohibitive cost of housing relative to salaries. Lifestyles are characterised by:

shopping, fashion, education & university, finding a job & career development, on-line life, digital entertainment, body modification, single parentdom, drugs, mental health, debt, immersion experiences, ready-meals, family homes, renting, anti-social behaviour, crime, gay culture, music, anxiety, issue politics

Middle aged (30-retirement) & cohabiting Almost unchanged in number since 2005 – there are around 8.8 million households in this group compared to some 2.3 million households headed by individuals aged under 30 – the middle aged in this group have lifestyles characterised by:

children, mortgages, shopping, housing & home making, gardening, on-line entertainment, schools, new urbanism, caring for elders, commuting, cars, fitness, pensions & savings, DINKies, food & diet, wine, furniture & furnishings, anxiety, security, annual holiday, political apathy

Middle aged (30-retirement) and single The most rapidly growing group in society over the past quarter century, there are now approaching 6.8 million households comprising a single middle-aged individual. Lifestyles characteristics are:




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benefits system, marginalisation, poor skills/education, diet/obesity, smoking, credit cards, debt, internet, brands, buses & trams, isolation, community, crime, uncertainty/instability, short-termism, holidays, floods


secure employment, private education, e-newspapers, taxes, internet, biometric finance, shopping, buses & cars, holidays, immersion experiences, cosmetic surgery, books, gardening, organic food, good health


multiple holidays, multiple cars, multiple homes, leisure spending, high taxes, genetic enhancement, eating out, domestic employees, detached houses, inheritance, theatre, private education, private healthcare, high quality fixtures & fittings

These lifestyle sketches are further summarised in the table overleaf.


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Lifestyles in the Scenarios – Summary Overview

Scenarios Household Types “2005” A: Blinkered Evolution

2030 B: Civic Renewal 2030 C: Strong Government

2030

Young Households (<30)

Around 2.1mn households; conspicuous consumption and convenience

Around 2.3mn households15, consumption & convenience remain paramount

Slightly fewer households than in Scenario A, pro-environmental behaviour increasingly widespread

Around 2.3mn households, consumption & convenience remains priorities, some constraints on behaviour

Middle-age groups – multiple adults

Around 9mn households, “home-making” and security, family life are key concerns

Around 8.8mn households, home-making and security remain dominant, general levels of anxiety increased

Around 8.8mn households, family and caring responsibilities increasingly important, less wasteful than in Scenario A

Around 8.8mn households, home-making and security paramount, waste impacts constrained by regulation

Middle-age groups – single adults

Around 4.7mn households, single-parenting significant

Around 6.8mn households, most of the increase since 2005 among groups with higher disposable income

Fewer households than in Scenario A with increase in “communal” living, but high incomes and wasteful behaviour still widespread

Around 6.8mn households, particular effects from regulatory constraints on single parent households

Older households (>65)

Around 5.6mn households, income issues for many, low material consumption

Around 7.9mn households, increase particularly among the elderly, poverty issues considerable

Slightly fewer households than in Scenario A, poverty remains significant, some increase in pro-environmental behaviour

Around 7.9mn households, poverty issues among the elderly, resistance among many to regulatory constraints

Low income quintile

Income <£183/wk, poverty issues, low consumption, low waste

Income <£340/wk16, poverty issues less than in 2005 but still significant

Income <£265/wk, poverty still significant, but improved community well-being

Income <£340/wk, poverty considerable, short-termism widespread

Middle income three quintiles

Income between £183 and £828/wk, high discretionary spending, high waste

Income between £340 and £1,500/wk, many in this group now living the “luxury” lifestyles of 2005

Income between £265 and £1,200/wk, increasing numbers of “green” households, but luxury lifestyles for many

Income between £340 and £1,500/wk, luxury lifestyles widespread, worst environmental impacts ameliorated by regulation

High income quintile

Income >£828/wk, luxury lifestyles, multiple cars/homes, high waste

Income above £1,500/wk, considerable leisure expenditure, lifestyles internationalised

Income above £1,200/wk, waste impacts less than in Scenario A, but many households disconnected from wider society

Income above £1,500/wk, lifestyles largely immunised from national regulations, high waste impacts

15 Household numbers derived from Government Actuary’s Department projections to 2026, available via www.gad.gov.uk . 16 Income, in real terms, assumed to grow by 2.5% pa in A and C, and 1.5% pa in B.

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http://www.gad.gov.uk/


4.4 Key Linkages Linkages between this present research and other projects are important for two reasons: on the one hand, the linkages provide context for the work (an understanding of which is vital if this R&D project is to make a useful contribution to Defra and its stakeholders); on the other, awareness of complementary activity ensures a minimum of duplication and a maximisation of synergy. Three elements, in particular, act as context for the present work17: • “Environmental Scenarios for the UK”, produced by Henley Centre Headlight Vision

for the Environment Agency & Defra and published in summer 2006 • “A Model of Household Waste Composition”, developed by AEAT Technology and the

Future Foundation for Defra as a waste R&D project (WRT 218) and completed in summer 2006

• The development of the revised Waste Strategy for England and Wales, issued for

public consultation earlier this year and (at the time of writing) scheduled for publication in early 2007

Each of these has had an effect upon the Brook Lyndhurst research. Environmental Scenarios This scenario-planning exercise looked across the whole of the national environmental picture – including waste, energy, the natural environment and so forth – over the period to 2030. Using established scenario-planning techniques, the work developed a set of four scenarios as devices to help policy makers (and others) explore possible futures for the UK. The inception of the Brook Lyndhurst research was delayed so as to ensure that, as far as possible, it could build upon rather than duplicate the Henley work. This has in large part succeeded. Although there are three Brook Lyndhurst scenarios compared to the HCHV’s four and, although the precise specification for the scenarios differs, there is a broad “mapping” between the scenarios, as follows:

Brook Lyndhurst Henley Centre “Blinkered Evolution” is similar to “Jeopardy”

“Civic Renewal” is similar to “Restoration” “Strong Government” is similar to “Alchemy”

(The Henley Centre scenario excluded from this list is “Survivor”, a scenario predicated on calamitous economic events. By contrast, all three Brook Lyndhurst scenarios [and, indeed, their Henley analogues] represent plausible evolved systems) It is important to stress that these mappings are indicative; there are important areas of detailed difference between the scenarios. The Brook Lyndhurst scenarios, for example, have very explicitly been designed so as to throw light on waste-related phenomena, and although the detail of this only becomes apparent further down in the

17 There are, of course, any number of relevant research studies and policy developments that are, potentially at least, of relevance to this R&D project. In particular, given the “lifestyles” focus, there is a very extensive and ongoing literature associated with this area of work – see the bibliography included among the appendices.

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unpacking of the scenarios, there are nevertheless “upstream” consequences (e.g. in the priority given to some key drivers). It is also important to acknowledge that, given the uses (and abuses) of scenario planning, all seven scenarios can be in principle be deployed within the same “scenario planning” context. At this point there is a useful example of “synergise, don’t duplicate”: accompanying the published Henley Centre work is an extensive “How To...” guide, expressly setting out the means by which the scenario material can best be deployed. Given such comprehensive and up-to-date guidance, the Brook Lyndhurst work will not be preparing similar material. A Model of Household Waste Composition Commissioned simultaneously with the Brook Lyndhurst research, the AEAT/Future Foundation research comprised (predominantly) the construction of a computer-resident model that gives projections of detailed household waste composition out to 2020. The relationship between this work and the Brook Lyndhurst research has been touched upon earlier, and forms the basis for the quantitative expression of the scenarios presented in the next section. National Waste Strategy Quite rightly and properly, the update of the National Waste Strategy – which has been proceeding during the conduct of this R&D project - has been seeking to draw upon a range of research inputs. Evidence-based policy needs to take account of likely future paths as much as it does historical developments. The extent to which this Brook Lyndhurst and other R&D projects have influenced the Strategy will become clearer at the time of its launch; but at this stage it is appropriate to acknowledge a two-way flow of information between the Brook Lyndhurst team and the strategy development team. It is hoped that this present work has been enhanced by this dialogue; and vice versa.

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5

5.1

WASTE & LIFESTYLES

Introduction In this section of the report, we draw together two major strands of the research: • The lifestyles analysis in each of the three scenarios • The waste computation based on the AEAT/FF model The presentational method is relatively complex, and needs careful explanation in this introduction. In terms of presentation, we have elected to follow the structure set out in the AEAT/FF model. This begins with “Waste by Source”, which identifies tonnes of material in terms of their origin (in either shops (both physical and online), gardens or unsolicited). This “waste by source” classification is exhaustive (in that it captures all possible sources of household waste) and captures both product and packaging. It covers (beginning with largest in terms of tonnages, and descending): • Solid Edibles (i.e. food, excluding meat & fish) • Green Waste • Household Items (non electrical) • Paper Items • Liquids • Clothing & Textiles • Electrical Goods • Meat & Fish • Garden Products In Section 5.2, below, we set out, in detail, the key lifestyle drivers influencing these waste sources, the variations under the three scenarios, and the quantified results. The AEAT/FF model converts these “waste by source” classifications into “waste by stream” classifications. It does this for both the product AND packaging elements, and does so on the basis of calibrated assumptions on the structural mix of materials in the various component parts of the waste sources18. The waste streams are (again, in descending order of size):

18 These assumptions can, in principle, be varied under Scenarios. Having reviewed them, however, Brook Lyndhurst concluded that it would be inappropriate to do so at this stage, since it would become increasingly difficult to establish which scenario assumptions were having what effect; and, in addition, because our broad conclusion having reviewed packaging trends was that there seems little prospect of any dramatic change in packaging solutions over the next fifteen years or so.

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• Kitchen & general household

• Textiles

• Plastic

• Scrap metal/white goods

• Glass

• Wood

• Paper & board

• Garden

• Metal packaging

In Section 5.3, the results are presented for these streams, for each of the three scenarios. Finally, in Section 5.4, we reprise the presentation of key results for the purposes of comparing the Scenarios19. Two important additional points should be borne in mind when considering the material in this section of the report. Firstly, the qualitative scenarios extended to 2030, however the AEAT/FF model extends only to 2020. The quantitative results tend, therefore, to under-represent some of the more extreme possibilities hinted at by the scenarios; this is particularly the case where changes in behaviour could be expected to accumulate or accelerate over time20. Secondly, the [historic] data used in the AEAT/FF model were the most recent available as at spring 2006; whilst the scenario results were produced in autumn 2006. Since that time, new data on household waste arisings have been issued. These most recent data have cast doubt on the assumptions made within the model about short-term rates of growth in household waste. As a result, the figures presented throughout this Brook Lyndhurst report must been interpreted with the expectation that they will need to be revised once the AEAT/Future Foundation model has been updated in the light of new data. This may affect the short-term results in particular: the overall pattern and distribution of the three scenarios will remain intact; so too, of course, will the full qualitative scenarios. Note also that the figures refer to England only.

5.2

Waste by Source In the following sections, scenario forecasts are given alongside figures for 2005. It should be noted that, since the AEAT/Future Foundation model contained base data for 2004, separate 2005 figures had to be generated using the assumptions within each scenario. This has resulted in some small differences in the 2005 ‘base’ figure between scenarios.

19 For ease of comparison, colour schemes are consistent throughout the presentation: Scenario A is always Dark Blue (prints out nearly black); Scenario B is Bright Pink (prints out mid-grey) and Scenario C is Bright Yellow (prints out pale grey). No significance is intended nor should be supposed as a result of this colour scheme. 20 See “Triggering Widespread Adoption of Sustainable Behaviour”, Behaviour Change Guide #4, Brook Lyndhurst for Defra 2006, for a discussion of this phenomenon.

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5.2.1 Solid Edibles (excl Meat & Fish)21 In 2005, this waste stream was estimated22 to account for: • 28.6 percent of household waste • 7.74 million tonnes • 6.83 kilogrammes per week per household Key Drivers Beyond basic human needs, the principal factors influencing the actual consumption of food are: • Incomes – higher incomes tend to increase both the quantity of food, and then its

quality • Health – concerns about fitness, obesity, body-image and so forth influence food

choices • Price – cheaper food makes more food accessible at any given level of income • Convenience – in modern, busy lifestyles, great significance is attached to

convenience, both in terms of shopping for food (supermarkets, internet shopping) and eating food (the rise of ready meals, eating out)

• Environmental & ethical issues – are at present a minority concern, but which

appear to be growing Given these issues, factors influencing the volume of food-related waste are23: • The balance between volumes purchased (under the pressure of marketing, buy one

get one free offers, rising portion sizes, family budgets etc) and the volumes eaten. • Eating habits, including ready-meals, the extent to which food is prepared in the

home, the prevalence of cooking etc • The volume and nature of packaging • Storage issues, including knowledge, refrigeration, household management

(whether people attempt to re-use leftovers etc) • Psychological, cultural and social factors associated with over-consumption,

household management, beliefs about “wasting food” and so forth. 21 All comments made in this section are derived from the totality of the research, and are not, in general, separately referenced. 22 All figures given are derived from the AEAT/FF model, referenced elsewhere. The relationship between the AEAT/FF estimates and other estimates of household waste composition is discussed elsewhere. 23 Food waste is the subject of considerable research attention at present (Dec 06), with both Defra and Wrap, for example, undertaking major investigations. This interest reflects both the policy-level awareness of the importance of food-related waste in the municipal waste stream, and the fact that remarkably little is known about food-waste (its detailed composition, the behavioural and other drivers that shape it, householder attitudes towards it, how behaviours might change, and so forth). As throughout this scenario-planning exercise, analysis in this section takes the form of “best guess given the current state of play”

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An additional, and hugely important factor, is the issue of the location in which food is eaten. There are several possibilities: • Food is bought [from a supermarket or equivalent], brought into the home,

prepared at home, eaten in the home and waste arisings are disposed of at home • Food is bought [from a supermarket or equivalent], brought into the home,

prepared at home, eaten OUT of the home (e.g. in the office at lunchtime) and SOME of the waste occurs at home and some occurs in the office

• Food is bought [from a fast-food store or equivalent], brought into the home, eaten

in the home and the waste arisings occur in the home • Food is bought in a fast-food store or restaurant, eaten in [or near] the commercial

premises and waste arisings occur in [or near] those commercial premises. Simplistically, this boils down to: if the number of people eating in restaurants increases and the number eating at home decreases, then – ceteris paribus - waste will be diverted from the household waste stream (and, of course, vice versa). This leads to a final issue, effectively concerned with the supply-chain. The production of food inevitably leads to the production of waste, but it is a function of the structure of the system as to where in the supply chain that waste occurs24. For example, the move to ready meals means that – again, other things being equal – potato peelings are being produced in a single factory rather than a thousand kitchens, and thus household waste goes down; the move to “shelf ready packaging” converts secondary and tertiary packaging into primary packaging, and therefore pushes waste out of the shop and into the home. Not only this, but in addition to the location of the waste shifting, so does the volume (though this is far less predictable). To use the potato example once again, a single factory is likely to be far more efficient in allocating potatoes per serving, whereas individual households may often cook too much. This last point highlights both the complexity of the issue – it involves both scale and distribution – as well as the potentially paradoxical implications of change. A [superficially] more sustainable food system, in which more householders cook more food themselves, may mean not only that household waste goes up (assuming that increased peelings etc outweigh declines associated with less packaging) but also that total waste25 goes up (on the assumption that economies of scale mean that it is more efficient to deal with the peelings from a thousand households’ potatoes in one go rather than separately). The Scenarios In each of the three scenarios, there is a range of both upward and downward pressures that will influence the volume of household food-related waste. These are presented below, referring both to product factors (the food itself) and packaging factors.

24 This is, in fact, a general issue affecting other forms of waste, too, but it is being raised here partly because this is the first waste stream considered in detail in this report, and partly because the issue is especially significant for food. 25 This research programme is, of course, concerned with household waste; but, where relevant, mention is made of wider waste implications.

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Scenario A – Blinkered Evolution Upward Pressures Product • Continued strong economic growth over the period both sustains overall spending

levels on food and encourages progression towards higher “value added” foods (premium brands, ready meals, treats etc)

• The same economic growth supports a more rapid increase in the number of single

person households, which serves to increase the total volume of food waste (since smaller households are, in general, less “efficient”)

• In both cases, these effects outweigh the more general impacts of increased

resource costs. • The generalised culture of consumption is maintained, such that “wasting food” is

both financially and psychologically very affordable. Throwing away food that is cooked but uneaten and/or that is past its sell-by-date is widely acceptable for the dominant lifestyle groups.

• Older age cohorts, increasing in number, pursue experience lifestyles and (relative

to their equivalents today) increase their reliance on ready meals. • Home composting remains a minority interest, limited by the commitment to

convenience of most lifestyle groups Packaging • “Trading up” – the shift to higher-value brands and sub-brands – generally involves

an increase in the weight of packaging per unit of food consumed. The generalised shift in spending behaviour thus brings an accelerated increase in packaging volumes.

• Key lifestyle groups, notably the rapidly growing “middle aged singles” increasingly

spend on highly-packaged component items – novelty foods, fashion foods, pre-fabricated dinner party foods and so forth.

Downward Pressures Product • High and middle income groups maintain the trend of the past twenty years, and

steadily increase the frequency with which they eat out rather than at home. • Middle-aged singles and older couples, of all incomes, increase their consumption of

pre-prepared foods, and thus throw away fewer peelings etc. • Older age group households experience tighter financial circumstances than their

equivalents today (reflecting the “debt catch up”, poorer pension returns etc) and throw away less food on economistic grounds.

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Packaging • Slow but steady improvements in technology, as well as resource-cost pressures,

continue the downward pressure on the average weight of packaging per calorie of food.

• Internet shopping, in particular for the middle-aged family households, begins to

facilitate reductions in packaging (as similar items are assembled into single packs for home delivery).

Resultant In this scenario, food waste and its associated packaging, which has been increasing steadily over the past twenty five years, increases more quickly than trend. Scenario B – Civic Renewal Upward Pressures Product • Economic growth continues to increase the overall demand for food, but lower

growth rates (than trend) dampens the increase compared to Scenario A. • The shift in consumer preferences towards “more sustainable” food – particularly

among older age groups – drives continued growth in demand for organic foods, as well as increases in the numbers buying groceries from farmers’ markets. These serve to bring an increase in the volume of the inedible fraction of food waste (peelings etc) arising in households.

• The increase in single person households, particularly among the numerically

dominant middle-aged groups, is slower than in Scenario A, but still serves to increase the volume of food-related waste.

Packaging • “Trading up” – the shift to higher-value brands and sub-brands – continues to take

place in Scenario B, particularly among younger age groups, and among the newly well-off. This, as in Scenario A, serves to provide an upward pressure on packaging volumes.

• As in Scenario A, though to a lesser extent, key lifestyle groups, notably the rapidly

growing “middle aged singles” spend increasing amounts on highly-packaged component items – novelty foods, fashion foods, pre-fabricated dinner party foods and so forth.

Downward Pressures Product • The “zeitgeist” surrounding food increasingly puts a premium on food skills;

families, in particular, become more efficient in their food management and throw away fewer leftovers and throw away fewer items that have gone beyond the sell-by date.

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• The relative decline in the price of food comes to an end, as a result of a mix of transport costs [related to energy and commodity prices] as well as the costs of delivering more sustainable produce. This acts both to suppress the volume of food purchased, and the willingness of consumers to throw it away.

• High and middle income groups maintain the trend of the past twenty years, and

steadily increase the frequency with which they eat out rather than at home. Indeed, the focus on “experiences” rather than “goods” prompts some modest acceleration in this trend.

• Older age group households experience tighter financial circumstances than their

equivalents today (reflecting the “debt catch up”, poorer pension returns etc) and throw away less food on economistic grounds.

• Home composting rates increase, particularly among middle-aged families, and

older age groups. Though limited to those with gardens, the increase in both the numbers home composting and their effectiveness is sufficient to depress food-related waste arisings.

Packaging • Consumer pressure to reduce packaging becomes progressively more intense, and

most packaging providers embed “lightweighting” into their business models. • Loose items become more popular, particularly among the young, reducing demand

for packaging. Resultant In this scenario, downward pressures outweigh upward pressures, and volumes of food-related waste decrease over the period, and at an appreciable rate. Scenario C – Strong Government Upward Pressures Product Upward pressures here are similar to those under Scenario A. However: • Economic growth is slightly lower than in Scenario A, dampening the upward

pressure. • The generalised culture of consumption is maintained, but regulatory pressure

tempers some of its worst excesses. Packaging As for product waste, upward pressures are similar to Scenario A.

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Downward Pressures Product Downward pressures here are similar to those under Scenario A. However, in Scenario C: • Significant government action on home composting dramatically increases the

proportion of food waste that is treated at home, diverting it from the municipal waste stream (though food waste collections, which are also promoted, tend to have the opposite effect).

Packaging As before, except that in this case: • Strong regulatory and fiscal incentives promote rapid and sustained reductions in

average package weights, across all packaging types. Resultant In this scenario, food-related waste increase over the period to 2020, but at a lower rate than in Scenario A. The Results 000s tonnes Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 2005 Total 7739 7546 7699 Product 5697 5519 5673 Packaging 2042 2027 2026 2020 Total 9844 5810 8914 Product 7920 4256 7217 Packaging 1924 1555 1697 Change (tonnes) Total +2105 -1736 +1215 Product +2223 -1263 +1544 Packaging -118 -472 -329 Change (%) Total +27 -23 +16 Product +39 -23 +27 Packaging -6 -23 -16 Kg/household/wk 2005 6.8 6.8 6.8 2020 7.6 4.6 7.0 Highlights: • The “behaviour change” effects in Scenario B are dramatic, but are clearly a result

of the assumptions behind the scenario. They nevertheless powerfully illustrate that a 2kg per week drop in household food waste would reduce household waste arisings by more than 1.7 million tonnes by 2020. While this may be an ambitious goal, using the scenarios in this way illustrates what there is ‘to play for’ – such is the size of food waste as a percentage of total tonnages, even less significant drops could result in an overall drop in household waste at a time when household numbers are likely to ‘naturally’ increase waste. The key point here, however, is behaviour change – the feature that differentiates Scenario B from the other two futures examined here.

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• Packaging waste falls in all three scenarios – but its small size relative to product

waste (in terms of tonnes) ameliorates its significance. • Average household waste per week increases only slightly in Scenario C – but, allied

to increases in household numbers, this equates to an increase of more than 1.2 million tonnes of food-related waste.

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Scenario AScenario BScenario C

5.2.2 Green Waste In 2005, this waste stream is estimated to have accounted for: • 23.0 percent of household waste • 6.20 million tonnes • 5.5 kilogrammes per week per household26 Key Drivers In the case of “green waste” (that is, waste originating in and from gardens) key drivers are: • The number of gardens, in turn a function of the number of residences and the

proportion of those residences that are houses, flats etc. Other things being equal, more gardens equal more garden waste.

• The type of gardens – i.e. the extent to which gardens involve plants rather than

decking etc. Other things being equal, more heavily planted gardens equal more garden waste.

26 In fact, the AEAT/FF model is based on a 2005 estimate of 8.3 kg/hh/wk, and 27% home composting. This gives a figure of 6 kg/hh/wk for households with a garden, 5.5 kg/hh/wk across ALL households.

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• The extent and type of gardening – whether gardening takes place regularly or infrequently, the balance between e.g. ornamental gardening and the growth of vegetables, and the extent to which gardening is a “planting and nurturing” as opposed to “outdoor room” gardening (in which plants are bought pre-grown). The waste impact here is more ambiguous – more regular gardening may result in more efficient gardening and thus less waste, or it may produce more (in aggregate) pre-desiccated clippings; equally, more regular gardening may correlate with higher propensities to compost (see below).

• Climate is a major determinant of the speed at which green things grow. Changes

in climate may change both the rate of growth (influencing the volume of waste for any given pattern of gardening) as well as the types of things grown (in turn with potentially differential waste consequences).

• Home composting clearly and straightforwardly affects the volume of residual

garden waste – other things being equal, higher rates of composting equals less garden waste entering the municipal waste stream.

The Scenarios In each of the three scenarios, there is a range of both upward and downward pressures that will influence the volume of garden waste. These are presented below, referring solely to product factors (since there is no packaging associated with garden waste27). In the case of Garden Waste, there are two influential factors that are assumed to be the same under all three scenarios: • Households with Gardens – at present, some 91% of English households are

estimated to have a garden. There are a variety of reasons for supposing that a high proportion of dwellings built over the coming two decades will NOT have gardens: the two most powerful are the focus on developing on brownfield sites, typically28 in urban settings where gardens are less likely; and the increase in the proportion of homes that are flats rather than houses (to cater for the rise in single person households) which are less likely to have gardens29. However, by 2020, and even 2030, the overwhelming majority of dwellings will still be accounted for by those that already exist; as a result, in all three scenarios, it is assumed that 90% of households will have gardens by 2020.

• Climate Change – although reactions to climate change will differ between the

three scenarios, the extent of climate change itself is assumed to be the same in all three scenarios. Broadly, warmer, wetter winters could be expected to have an upward pressure on garden waste (since green things will continue growing when previously they may have been dormant); while hotter, drier summers will have a downward effect (since green things will not be growing either rapidly or at all, when previously they would have been). On balance, we have concluded that a net downward effect will dominate, on two grounds: firstly, progressively drier

27 Packaging associated with the process of managing the garden – such as seed packets, fertiliser bags etc – is captured under “Garden Products”, below. 28 Anecdotally, it seems that sites such as ex-military facilities, often in highly rural locations, are classified as “brownfield sites”, and developments on such sites are likely to be more traditionally English with respect to gardens. 29 Of course, these kinds of developments might well increase the number of communal gardens and/or small urban parks – both of which will undoubtedly produce green waste, but which are, needless to say, outwith the household waste stream. This is another example of the issue raised in the case of food waste, where the [artificial] divide between waste origins serves to obscure a possible problem.

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conditions during the key growing period of spring will reduce the growth of (indigenous/native) plants in English gardens; second, gardeners will shift towards plants better suited to the newly evolving environment, which will typically involve an increase in the proportion of e.g. succulents (that shed leaves less frequently etc). All three scenarios therefore assume average weekly garden waste falling from 8.3 kg/hh/wk to 7.5 kg/hh/wk. This assumption precedes any and all other adjustments within the quantitative model.

Scenario A – Blinkered Evolution Upward Pressures • Gardening will increase in popularity as a leisure choice among older, particularly

retired households, putting upward pressure on green waste. • Home composting will remain a “niche” activity, with the long-term decline in

participation arrested but not reversed. (Broadly speaking, increases in composting among older households will be cancelled out by falling rates of composting among the numerically dominant middle-age family household groups.)

• The garden will increasingly be seen as an “outdoor room”, particularly by the

rapidly rising single-person middle aged households, and by the higher income groups, with “makeovers” more popular and more waste-generating30.

Downward Pressures • Time pressures, particularly on key working age household groups (families, middle-

age singles, middle income) will maintain the decline in interest in gardening, and sustain the shift towards hard-surface solutions.

• (This will be augmented by reactions to climate change, with it becoming more

straightforward, from an ‘aesthetic’ point of view, to leave the garden alone for longer periods.)

Resultant In this scenario, the downward pressure on green garden waste, principally as a result of climate change, is slightly outweighed by the upward pressures from lifestyle changes, and green waste therefore increases, but more slowly than in the past. Scenario B – Civic Renewal Upward Pressures • Gardening increases in popularity as part of the general “bottom up” shift towards

more sustainable lifestyles, among older household types, and as a lifestyle choice among family households.

• In particular, gardening associated with the growing of food experiences something

of a renaissance, especially amongst young householders, poorer older households and some single person middle aged households.

30 There is a possible issue here about the extent to which such makeovers will be undertaken by householders themselves, or contractors; and, in turn, the extent to which associated waste will enter the household, municipal or I&C waste streams. For simplicity’s sake (!) we have assumed no net diversion as a result of this trend.

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• Composting rates stabilise, but do not rise markedly, partly because of perceived “hassle” factors, partly because many households – especially younger households, poorer households and older-person households, feel they are “doing their bit” in other ways.

Downward Pressures • Some “community” level gardening begins to develop by 2020, with neighbours

pooling their resources to manage each others gardens. This has a modest downward pressure on green waste.

• More importantly, there are, in this Scenario, 500,000 fewer households with

gardens compared to Scenario A, as a result of the slower rate at which new households are formed (by, primarily, single people).

Resultant In this scenario, green garden waste increases, but below historic trend rates and at a rate slightly below that in Scenario A. Scenario C – Strong Government Upward Pressures Upward pressures in this instance are the same as in Scenario A. Downward Pressures Downward pressures in this instance are the same as in Scenario A, with the key addition that: • In Scenario C, government takes strong action to promote home composting. This

is partially successful, mainly among middle-income and middle-aged groups. As a result, composting rates in this scenario are well above those in Scenario A or B.

Resultant The increase in household numbers, and upward behavioural pressures, are balanced by the effects of climate change and the promotion of composting; as a result, green garden waste in this scenario remains flat over the period to 2020. The Results 000s tonnes Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 2005 Total 6202 6194 6197 2020 Total 6621 6470 6114 Change (tonnes) Total +419 +276 -83 Change (%) Total +6.8 +4.5 -1.3 Kg/household/wk (all) 2005 5.5 5.5 5.5 2020 5.1 5.1 4.8 Kg/household/wk (with gardens)

2005 6.0 6.0 6.0 2020 5.7 5.7 5.3

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Highlights: • The range of futures emerging from these analyses is much narrower than in the

case of foodstuffs. • An apparently small shift in the extent of home composting has an important effect

in Scenario C. However, the “small” is more apparent than real: the composting rate in the Scenario rises from 27% to 28.9% which, allied to the increase in household numbers expected over the period, equates to persuading the equivalent of an additional 1 million householders to take up composting.

• The actual effect of climate change will be critical. Our analysis suggests that it has

the potential to dwarf any upward or downward shifts arising from either household behaviour changes OR government promotion of composting.

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5.2.3 Household Items In 2005 this category, which excludes electrical items (i.e. WEEE), was estimated to account for: • 20.9 percent of household waste • 5.6 million tonnes per year • 5.0 kilogrammes per week per household Key Drivers This waste source is the archetypical “mixed bag”: it includes spare parts for cars, jewellery, medical equipment, CDs, games, sports equipment and crockery. It also includes nappies. However, in terms of tonnes, it is dominated by two types of waste:

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furniture & furnishings, and carpets & floor-coverings, between them accounting for more than half of this waste stream. In what follows, the focus is upon these main elements. • Consumer spending is the primary driver of demand for items in this category.

Many of the items in this category are “discretionary” and expenditure upon them is disproportionately affected by wider economic conditions (that is to say, spending tends to fall back further than the average during downturns, and to increase by more than the average during upturns).

• Fashion, in a broad sense, is also significant: the extent to which householders

believe it is important to have fashionable examples of the goods in question can push demand up, or down, relative to overall demand.

• There is an important link here both to the power of marketing (the promotion of

possible purchases) and technology (the development of possible purchases)31. • Housing numbers are a major factor: an increasing number of households inevitably

implies more furniture, more floor-coverings and so forth. • The state of the housing market more generally has an impact, but in ambiguous

ways. Periods of high housing market turnover tend to push up demand; but periods of low turnover can also push up demand, as householders “compensate” for being unable to move by spending on home improvements.

• Product quality and longevity is also important. Other things being equal, longer-

lasting items enter the waste stream less frequently, thus reducing waste. • In general, items in this category are subject to multiple potentially conflicting (or

ambiguous) drivers. For example, as average household incomes rise, householders could buy more expensive sofas, that last longer, which means they both buy fewer sofas (reducing waste) and throw sofas away less often (ditto). Or, as average household incomes rise, householders choose to replace their sofas more frequently (so as to ensure they have the most fashionable sofa), thus increasing waste.

The Scenarios Scenario A – Blinkered Evolution Upward Pressures Product • Steady and sustained growth in consumer spending drives high levels of demand for

goods in this category throughout the period to 2020. • A housing market characterised by continued wealth/debt generation will tend to

fuel sustained demand for such goods. • Middle income groups, in particular, devote increasing shares of their income on

items in this category (in part to maintain “status”, in part because alternative discretionary spending, particularly foreign travel, becomes more expensive).

31 During a seminar conducted during this research with experts from the packaging sector, a participant suggested that he could not think of a single example of a new technology that had served to reduce waste; no one at the seminar was able to disagree.

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• The increase in household numbers drives up demand significantly. • The crucial “middle aged single person households” increasingly adopt “fashion

furniture” preferences, and average replacement cycles accelerate across households as a whole. This increases both the volume and rate of arrival of waste.

Packaging • The main upward pressure on packaging comes from the volume of goods

purchased. Downward Pressures Product • High income households increasingly buy higher quality items, with longer lifespans.

This tends to suppress the volume of waste. • Trading in second-hand household goods through schemes such as e-bay becomes

more popular, and acts as a suppressant on waste volumes. There is an important cohort effect, with younger family households increasingly using such trading schemes, but older families and older households generally relatively unaffected in the period to 2020. (This cohort effect will continue, such that the effect of this change will become more pronounced by 2030.)

• Older households tend to demand fewer goods in this category, and the increase in

their number acts as a net downward pressure. • Increasing resource costs – including, but not limited to oil-based products – act to

suppress demand, and thus waste. (However, the effect is muted, since consumers simply substitute for an alternative that delivers the same psychological ‘benefit’.)

Packaging • Resource costs apply continuous pressure on providers and users of packaging, and

“lightweighting” becomes increasingly mainstream. • Tight operating margins for retailers (and others in the supply chain) serve to place

commercial attention on packaging costs, reinforcing the effects of resource costs. Resultant The tonnage of household items grows rapidly throughout the period to 2020; it increases more quickly than any other waste source, and by the end of the period has become the largest component of the household waste stream, accounting for 27% of household waste. Scenario B – Civic Renewal Upward Pressures Product • The increase in the number of households drives up demand for most goods in this

category.

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• Consumer spending growth is much lower than in Scenario A, such that the growth in demand for these goods is correspondingly lower. Consumer spending nevertheless comprises an upward pressure on the waste stream.

Packaging • As in Scenario A, the principal upward force on packaging comes from the volume of

goods purchased. Downward Pressures Product • The increasing preference for more sustainable lifestyles, particularly among middle-

income and middle-aged groups, leads away from the pursuit of fashion as a driver for demand.

• Wealthier households, in particular, buy higher quality and longer lasting items,

producing a net downward pressure on waste. • Electronic trading in second-hand goods becomes well established, among younger

households, families and lower and middle income groups. • Increased resource costs, allied to the general sentiment in favour of more

sustainable consumption, acts as a general dampener on demand for goods in this category.

• There is a modest revival in attitudes towards repairing rather than replacing items,

particularly among lower income households, and older households (who “rediscover” the thrift of their parents).

Packaging • Allied to the general downward pressure from increased resource costs, is a more

generalised consumer-led pressure to minimise packaging on environmental grounds. Increasing numbers of retailers remove the packaging following delivery, further depressing the volume of packaging waste entering the household waste stream.

Resultant Volumes continue to increase in the short term, but the increases in household numbers and slow economic growth are compensated for by changing consumer habits which begin to take effect more obviously from about 2011 onwards (since there is a lag between changes in attitude and its subsequent manifestation in behaviour). Thereafter, waste volumes stabilise. Scenario C – Strong Government Upward Pressures Product Upward pressures are largely the same as in Scenario A. However: • The phenomenon of “fashion furniture” is restricted to upper income groups, such

that the effect is more muted than in Scenario A

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Packaging Upward pressures are largely the same as in Scenario A. Downward Pressures Product In addition to the factors identified for Scenario A: • Government regulation succeeds in promoting re-use for some items in this

category; and tax breaks on leasing schemes further reduce the amount of material (against a background in which purchasing patterns are largely maintained) diverted from the household waste stream.

Packaging Similarly, and in addition to the issues identified for Scenario A: • Regulatory pressure on the packaging industry further bolsters the market pressure,

and packaging weights fall more quickly than in Scenario A. Resultant Household items rise rapidly as a share of total household waste, but not as quickly as in Scenario A. The Results 000s tonnes Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 2005 Total 5638 5577 5626 Product 4969 4927 4966 Packaging 669 649 660 2020 Total 10257 7022 9269 Product 9246 6404 8475 Packaging 1011 618 794 Change (tonnes) Total 4619 1445 3643 Product 4277 1477 3509 Packaging 342 -31 134 Change (%) Total +81.9 +26.0 +64.8 Product +86.1 +30.0 +70.7 Packaging +51.1 -4.8 +20.3 Kg/household/wk 2005 5.0 5.0 5.0 2020 7.9 5.5 7.2 Highlights: • This is an area of the waste stream where the effects of “western consumerism” are

most apparent. The rates of growth, and the tonnage implications, are, at a minimum, sobering.

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• Perhaps most remarkable is that even in the most optimistic scenario32, Scenario B, household items in the waste stream have increased by nearly one and a half million tonnes per year by 2020, an increase of more than a quarter.

• On a cumulative basis, the Scenario B figures imply that over the period 2006-2020

inclusive, just over 100 million tonnes of household items will enter the waste stream and need treatment or recycling. For Scenario A, the figure exceeds 120 million tonnes; over the period 1991-2005, the total is estimated to have been just over 62 million tonnes.

• Against such figures, the packaging portion of the problem perhaps looks incidental.

In all three scenarios, packaging waste falls slowly as a proportion the total to 2020. There is, nevertheless, a marked difference between an annual increase of 342,000 tonnes, and the much lower rate in Scenario C, or even the small declines in Scenario B.

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5.2.4 Paper Items In 2005, this waste stream – which comprises predominantly books, newspapers, magazines and mail33 - was estimated to account for: • 9.3 percent of household waste • 2.5 million tonnes • 2.2 kilogrammes per week per household

32 In general we have studiously avoided using qualitative judgments of the Scenarios, but in this instance it seems appropriate. 33 It is important to note that this item captures “paper based products” NOT paper-based packaging – this is discussed later.

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Key Drivers This waste stream comprises two main elements: paper-products arriving in the home having been purchased; and those that arrive unsolicited. • In terms of purchasing, the key driver is consumer spending, and the relative

preference for paper as a medium of transmission as opposed to other media. In broad terms, a long-term shift away from paper and towards electronic media has been underway for some years. Although book sales and some magazine sales have held up, the newspaper market in particular has been in long term decline. The roles of television, computers and, in particular and most recently, the internet are instrumental here.

• In terms of free newspapers and direct mail – the two principal “unbidden” paper

items entering the home – contrary forces are in play. In the case of free newspapers, a similar long term decline is in place (a vicious circle in which falling readership reduces the interest of advertisers, thus reducing the financial case for free newspapers, and thus their number, and thus accelerating the decline in readership). This has been countered by a recent rise in more mainstream free papers, particularly in metropolitan areas, while direct or junk-mail has been on an upward path for some years. It seems that the costs – of database access and management, and of printing and production – continue to fall relative to the benefits; while the targeted nature of this form of advertising appeals to advertisers (in contrast to the rather crude instrument of newspapers).

The Scenarios The outcomes for paper-based products are very similar for all three scenarios, because the key drivers are expected to develop in very similar ways in all three. Upward Pressures (in all three scenarios)34 • Increased income continues to drive demand for books, particularly among middle-

income groups and older households. Slight variation occurs between the scenarios on the basis of differential income growth and differential household numbers, with book demand highest in Scenario B (reflecting the developing and widespread preference for “experiences”).

• Niche demand for magazines continues to grow slowly. • Advertisers – at both local and national level - continue to see net benefit from

direct marketing, and direct mail volumes maintain their trend growth. Increased household numbers further bolster growth. Some restrictions occur in Scenario C as a result of government action.

• Consumers feel under less pressure in all three Scenarios to adopt “low

consumption” of paper products on environmental grounds, since they perceive that they are “doing their bit” through recycling.

Downward Pressures • The progress of the internet – in terms of its penetration across all household types,

including low income groups; in terms of the increasing speed of use; and in terms

34 No reference is made here to the packaging of paper products – despite the rise in wrapping newspapers in plastic, packaging accounts for less than 0.1% of total waste in this category.

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of the development of broader ranges of services – continues to supplant paper products as a medium.

• Demand for newspapers falls inexorably across all household types. Resultant In all three scenarios, paper-based product waste falls slowly across the period to 2020. The Results 000s tonnes Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 2005 Total 2499 2492 2495 2020 Total 2025 1929 1972 Change (tonnes) Total -474 -563 -523 Change (%) Total -19.0 -22.6 -21.0 Kg/household/wk (all) 2005 2.2 2.2 2.2 2020 1.6 1.5 1.5 Highlights: • Results in all three scenarios are very similar, since the key drivers of change are

similar in all three futures. • A decline in annual waste arisings of around one fifth is expected over the period,

the main impact of which may well be upon the recycling market.

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5.2.5 Liquids Like “Household Items”, this is a mixed group of items, which in 2005 is estimated to account for: • 7.1 percent of household waste • 1.9 million tonnes per year • 1.7 kilogrammes per week per household Key Drivers The principal elements of “Liquids” (together with their estimated 2005 shares of total mass purchased) are: • Fruit juices & other soft drinks (58.7%) • Liquid fuels35 (16.9%) • Beer (13.1%) • Wine (6.5%) • Coffee, tea and cocoa (3.0%) • Spirits (1.8%) Key issues here are as follows: • The majority of “product waste” from this category does not normally enter the

household waste stream, since it is generally disposed of down the sink. Nevertheless, some residual liquids inside packaging will enter the waste stream and, given their density (and, in the case of fuels, toxicity) they will pose a waste management challenge.

• The focus here, however, is upon the packaging element, which both forms the

majority of the waste generated (around two thirds) and offers fewest opportunities for diversion from the municipal waste stream.

• “Liquid fuels” is driven by very different issues compared to the other elements –

namely, the number of households using such fuels for heating. • All the remaining elements, like “Food” above, have basic human need as a driver,

but are propelled in addition by:

Leisure choices, and the status of drinking within lifestyles

Health issues, with contrary drivers – recent years have seen, for example, a dramatic increase in demand for bottled water AND an increase in demand for alcohol

• Marketing of drinks, particularly alcohol and soft drinks, seems to make a significant

difference. The proportion of the “liquids” sector accounted for by soft drinks has risen steadily and rapidly in recent years.

• Furthermore, and as with food, there are important issues associated with the

location of drinking, and subsequent impacts on the “origin” of waste arisings.

35 These exclude fuels bought for the purposes of transport.

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The Scenarios Scenario A – Blinkered Evolution Upward Pressures Product • Sustained growth in the economy fuels a double shift, with consumers buying more

liquids in general, and higher value drinks in particular. • Health concerns, especially among middle-income groups, and older households,

support continued rapid growth in the soft drinks market, particularly of water and other drinks perceived as being healthy.

• Alcohol demand continues to grow – single person households in the middle aged

band, in particular, sustain increases in the demand for wine – but the growth rates are slower than for soft drinks.

• Demand for liquid fuels rises in line with the growth in household numbers. Packaging • “Trading up” by consumers puts upward pressure on packaging (in the spirits

market, for example, heavier bottles are more attractive to consumers, and the increasing numbers of high and middle income households move towards such bottles). Luxury versions of “basic” drinks become more popular and, typically, include more packaging per unit of liquid.

• Increasing resource costs, particularly oil, prompt some shifts away from plastics

towards heavier solutions, but this effect is muted by the more generalised impact of increased resource costs and the slow emergence of bio-plastics.

• The progress of bio-plastics, initially in niche markets, acts to boost weights, since

early movers turn out to be heavier on a ‘like-for-like’ performance basis. • As with paper, householder perceptions that glass is environmentally “OK” because

of recycling, act to sustain consumer demand and increase packaging weights. Downward Pressures Product • There are few downward pressures – in instances where demand for one type of

drink subsides, it tends to be replaced by increased demand for another. • Increased eating out, among middle and upper income households, and especially

among the rapidly increasing single middle aged households, diverts waste away from the household. Some diversion also occurs, among working age households, out of the home and into the workplace, but this is a small effect only.

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Packaging • Resource costs, as for other waste sources, act as a downward pressure on

manufacturers and retailers. (These are, however, muted, given the power of consumer demand.)

Resultant Demand continues to grow on its trend path i.e. growing more quickly than consumer spending generally, with concomitant implications for waste. Scenario B – Civic Renewal Upward Pressures Product • Lower economic growth than in Scenario A pushes demand for liquids up by less

than in that Scenario, but growth is nevertheless significant. • Health concerns are more pronounced than in Scenario A, particularly among lower

and middle income groups, and among the older population. There is thus more of a shift towards soft drinks and away from alcohol.

• Lower household growth eases the growth in demand for liquid fuels, but they

nevertheless rise. • Eating out, particularly by families, tends to happen less than in Scenario A, acting

to push up domestic arisings (relative to that Scenario). Packaging • Upward pressures are very similar to those in Scenario A, but the “trading up”

phenomenon is less pronounced, confined mainly to higher income groups. • The “we can recycle it so we don’t need to cut back our consumption” mindset,

particularly among middle age family households, acts as an upward pressure on packaging.

• Growing awareness of the carbon impact of plastics, particular among the young,

prompts some consumers to move towards alternative packaging, with upward effects on tonnages.

Downward Pressures Product • Downward pressures are similar to those in Scenario A. Packaging Consumer resistance to packaging generally, as environmental concerns become more pronounced, exerts downward pressure on packaging weights. Resultant Waste volumes increase, but by less than Scenario A.

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Scenario C – Strong Government Upward Pressures Product Pressures in this instance are the same as in Scenario A. Packaging As for Scenario A Downward Pressures Product As for Scenario A. Packaging As for Scenario A, except that: • Government action on packaging regulations means that more packaging can be

composted and, allied to the promotion of home composting generally, this serves to increase diversion from the household waste stream.

Resultant Waste increases rapidly over the period to 2020, but a little below that seen in Scenario A. The Results 000s tonnes Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 2005 Total 1915 1891 1904 Product 722 707 720 Packaging 1194 1183 1184 2020 Total 3393 2723 3077 Product 1317 945 1267 Packaging 2065 1778 1810 Change (tonnes) Total 1468 832 1173 Product 595 238 547 Packaging 871 595 626 Change (%) Total 76.7 44.0 61.6 Product 82.4 33.7 76.0 Packaging 72.9 50.3 52.9 Kg/household/wk 2005 1.7 1.7 1.7 2020 2.6 2.1 2.4 Highlights:

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• Waste seems set to increase, and relatively rapidly, in all three scenarios. In the worst case – Scenario A – waste by 2020 is running nearly 1.5 million tonnes per annum ahead of its 2005 estimate.

• Packaging is the most significant element of waste related to the consumption of

liquids, and average downward trends in weight per unit of liquid are overwhelmed by the increase in consumer demand, and the increase in household numbers, in all three scenarios.

• Most of the observed effects come from rapid growth in the demand for soft drinks,

especially water – by 2020, in Scenario A, nearly two thirds of all “liquids” waste comes from this category.

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5.2.6 Clothing & Textiles Like “Household Items”, this is a mixed group, which in 2005 was estimated to account for: • 6.3 percent of household waste • 1.7 million tonnes per year • 1.5 kilogrammes per week per household Key Drivers Comprising predominantly clothes (67%), household textiles (24%) and shoes (8%), this category is driven by a relatively narrow group of factors: • Consumer spending is the most significant and, within that, the vagaries of fashion.

Alongside electrical equipment (see below) and elements of “household items” (see

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above), this sector of spending and thus waste generation is most heavily shaped by the western consumption ethic.

• Price and income effects are complex. The availability of cheaper clothing in the UK

has tended to boost demand, with some consumers and some retailers participating in a “disposable” culture in which clothing items are bought with the intention of being worn only a very few times before being replaced.

• Conversely, rising incomes facilitate the purchase of more expensive items that,

ceteris paribus, should last longer. • So far, it seems that both effects are in operation, and wardrobes are becoming

fuller. • This highlights another issue affecting waste flows, that is, the average period of

time between purchase and disposal. (This is discussed in more detail under “Household Items”, above).

• Spending on, and disposal of, household textiles (curtains, bed-linen etc) is driven

by a similar range of factors to “Household Items”. The Scenarios No special attention is paid to “packaging” in this sector; packaging in 2005 accounted for a little over 3% of total waste arising from this category. Scenario A – Blinkered Evolution Upward Pressures • Strong economic growth continues to fuel rapid rates of spending growth on

clothing. The regime of fashion accelerates, with ever more items brought into play and, more significantly, more types of consumer brought into the mix. In particular, single person middle aged households accelerate their spending on these discretionary items; and older households (the “active elders”) increase their spending on such items.

• Increased spending on “disposable” clothes accelerates the throughput of clothing,

impacting on the waste stream. • The increase in single person households more generally fuels an increase in

demand, particularly for household textiles. Downward Pressures • Although clothing continues to become progressively cheaper for a few more years,

increasing resource costs and, in particular, the changing circumstances of international trade (in which, principally, Chinese and Indian labour markets start to become more expensive) mean that clothing costs cease falling by the end of the period in question. This begins to slow down the rate of increase in demand for clothing in Britain, especially among younger and poorer household groups.

• The level of consumer debt periodically tempers discretionary spending among lower

income households, but this is generally short-lived and outweighed by the wealth effects generated by house price increases.

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• “Trading up” occurs among many middle and most upper income households, who thus maintain increased rates of spending but produce less total volumes of material.

Resultant Demand grows rapidly over the period. By 2020, the weight of waste clothing disposed of each year is more than double the 2005 level. Scenario B – Civic Renewal Upward Pressures • Consumer spending grows at a lower rate in this Scenario, but still at a sufficient

rate to fuel sustained increases in spending on clothing. In particular, the majority of younger and middle aged households maintain their commitment to “fashion”.

• Household numbers, too, increase but at a lower rate than in Scenario A, with a

corresponding gentler upward pressure on demand for, in particular, household textiles from single person households.

Downward Pressures • The generalised shift towards more environmentally friendly living exerts a subtle

but pervasive downward pressure on clothing sales. Some household groups – notably the young and the old – increasingly turn away from cheap and disposable clothing; re-use and repair, particularly among lower income groups, gains ground (and, among some middle income groups, such thrift becomes increasingly “cool”); trading clothing on e-bay (and similar) gains credibility, too.

• “Trading up” effects are subtly changed, too, with middle aged and middle income

single person households increasingly wanting to display the fact that they are buying fewer, but higher quality clothing. The average lifespan of clothing increases over the period to 2020 as a result.

• Price effects are similar to those under Scenario A, but the lower rates of economic

growth in Scenario B mean that the impacts of increased resource prices are more obvious.

Resultant Spending on clothing & textiles is maintained throughout the period, but at rates well below those in Scenario A. Waste arisings are correspondingly above 2005 levels, but not to the degree seen in Scenario A. Scenario C – Strong Government Upward Pressures • Upward pressures are similar to those in Scenario A, tempered by slightly lower

growth rates in consumer spending. The general model of “capitalism as usual” however ensures a maintenance of the fashion-based consumption paradigm.

Downward Pressures • In addition to the factors cited under Scenario A, Scenario C includes efforts by

government to restrict the waste consequences of consumer spending. These

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include efforts to promote re-use (principally by encouraging the charitable re-distribution of nearly-new clothing, and by diverting household textiles away from the municipal waste stream). These are partially successful.

Resultant Waste increases rapidly over the period to 2020, but a little below that seen in Scenario A. The Results 000s tonnes Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 2005 Total 1705 1704 1703 Product 1646 1646 1644 Packaging 59 58 59 2020 Total 3518 2603 3120 Product 3420 2542 3043 Packaging 98 61 77 Change (tonnes) Total 1813 899 1417 Product 1774 896 1399 Packaging 39 3 18 Change (%) Total +106.3 +52.8 +83.2 Product +107.8 +54.4 +85.1 Packaging +66.1 +5.2 +30.5 Kg/household/wk 2005 1.5 1.5 1.5 2020 2.7 2.0 2.4 Highlights: • Potential growth in this waste stream is dramatic. In Scenario A, annual arisings

more than double by 2020; even in Scenario B, annual arisings increase by more than half.

• The envisaged government restrictions in Scenario C make little difference; more

than 1.4 million tonnes of waste annually are still being generated in this Scenario. Nevertheless, the difference between the Scenarios is also instructive: it suggests that there is at least scope for bringing about significant change.

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5.2.7 Electrical Goods This group of items was estimated to account in 2005 for: • 3.0 percent of household waste • 0.8 million tonnes per year • 0.7 kilogrammes per week per household Key Drivers • The powerful combination of technological innovation and consumer preferences for

novelty are the key drivers of growth in this category. • Falling prices, particularly for entertainment items and ICT equipment, have fuelled

growth in demand. • Important parts of the sector – notably white goods such as refrigerators – are

dependent both upon the number of households and the same kinds of forces set out for “Household Items”, above.

The Scenarios Scenario A – Blinkered Evolution Upward Pressures Product • Powerful growth in consumer spending, coupled with continued technological

development (itself focused on making and meeting consumer demand) provides an overwhelming upward force in this category.

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• Product evolution, and the pressure to have the “new” version – of a progressively

wider groups of products – is pervasive. • All household types are subject to this pressure: middle and upper income groups,

and single person middle age groups, in particular, fuel the growth in demand. • Almost in defiance of rising resource costs, spending on electrical and electronic

equipment persists; indeed, they emerge as a key substitute for “holidays foregone”, among families in particular.

• Rising household numbers, particularly single person households in the middle and

older age bands, drive demand for white goods, ovens etc. • Take-back schemes under WEEE legislation are successful, and temper demand

slightly, but more generally facilitate increased consumption since consumers, of all types, believe that the environmental problem is being addressed.

Packaging • Internet shopping (unlike food, where the effect is likely to be opposite) tends to

increase the need for packaging per unit of purchase. Downward Pressures Product • Some technological convergence occurs, with multi-function items increasingly

common. However, these are both physically small (and thus weigh very little) and are subject to very high replacement rates – in both cases, ameliorating or even overturning any downward effect on waste volumes.

• Nevertheless, many items do indeed shrink, thus reducing the tonnages associated

with their consumption. • Older household groups do not share the wider pattern of interest in buying

“gadgets” and are less likely to have high replacement cycles for white goods. Their increased share of total spending therefore tends to suppress aggregate demand.

• Trading up affects some goods (such as hi-fis) among middle and upper income

households, reducing the tonnages of waste somewhat. • Trading through electronic exchanges (and, indeed, through other means) helps to

take the edge off demand, but the consumer need for “new” is virtually unassailable in this scenario; indeed, as incomes rise, ever more households adopt the “buy new” behaviour as a right that had previously been denied them.

Packaging • As in other areas of expenditure, rising resource costs and tight operating margins

keep steady pressure on manufacturers and retailers to lightweight their packaging wherever possible.

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Resultant Demand grows more rapidly than for any other form of waste-generating spending; annual waste arisings by 2020 increase by 133% compared to 2005. Scenario B – Civic Renewal Upward Pressures Product • Despite slower growth in consumer spending, and (by the end of the period, at

least) a developing re-direction of technological innovation away from the consumer of goods, consumer desires provide an overwhelming upward force in this category.

• Product evolution, and the pressure to have the “new” version, is resisted by only a

few consumers, notably the young (for whom the new cool of environmentalism slowly includes reduced consumption of gadgets) and the old (for whom the products are, in addition, increasingly expensive and depressingly complex).

• Spending on electrical and electronic equipment emerges as a key substitute for

other behaviours foregone on environmental grounds (notably flying), especially among families, middle age single households and middle and upper income groups.

• Rising household numbers, particularly single person households in the middle and

older age bands, drive demand for white goods, ovens etc, albeit at lower rates than in Scenario A.

• Take-back schemes under WEEE legislation are successful, and temper demand

slightly, but more generally facilitate increased consumption since consumers, of all types, believe that the environmental problem is being addressed.

Packaging • Upward pressures are similar to those in Scenario A, lessened somewhat by the

generalised lower rates of spending growth in Scenario B. Downward Pressures Product • Rising resource costs and changed international trade (involving, in particular, China

and India) brings to an end the era of permanently falling prices for electrical and electronic equipment. For the first time in two generations, prices begin to limit demand. This affects low income groups, in particular.

• Repair and maintenance begins to re-emerge as a “socially legitimate” activity,

though this affects only major white good items (smaller electronic items continue to be irreparable).

• Trading through electronic hubs (and, indeed, through other means) becomes

increasingly widespread, including among older households, and acts as the single biggest limitation on the growth in demand.

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Packaging • In addition to the factors applicable in Scenario A, preferences among the more

environmentally aware household types – younger households, older households, families – puts pressure on producers and retailers to reduce packaging.

Resultant Spending (and, by extension, waste generated) grows rapidly – more rapidly than for any other category in Scenario B – though less rapidly than in Scenario A. Scenario C – Strong Government Upward Pressures • Upward pressures are similar to those in Scenario A, tempered by slightly lower

growth rates in consumer spending. Downward Pressures • In addition to the factors cited under Scenario A, Scenario C includes efforts by

government to restrict the waste consequences of consumer spending. These include:

• Efforts to reduce packaging waste through regulatory pressure (which are partially

effective) • Efforts to promote re-use (principally by offering tax breaks to enterprises that

repair and refurbish electrical and electronic equipment). These, too, are partially successful.

Resultant Waste increases rapidly over the period to 2020, but a little below that seen in Scenario A. The Results 000s tonnes Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 2005 Total 800 798 798 Product 713 713 713 Packaging 87 85 85 2020 Total 1862 1413 1616 Product 1700 1310 1495 Packaging 161 103 121 Change (tonnes) Total 1062 615 818 Product 987 597 782 Packaging 74 18 36 Change (%) Total +133 +77 +103 Product +138 +84 +110 Packaging +85 +21 +42 Kg/household/wk 2005 0.7 0.7 0.7 2020 1.4 1.1 1.3

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Highlights: • Potential growth in this waste stream is more dramatic than for any other source of

waste. In Scenario A, annual arisings more than double by 2020; and in Scenario B, annual arisings increase by more than three quarters.

• The envisaged government restrictions in Scenario C make little difference; waste

arisings more than double in this Scenario.

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5.2.8 Meat & Fish Meat & Fish in 2005 comprised: • 1.8 percent of household waste • 0.5 million tonnes per year • 0.4 kilogrammes per week per household All key drivers, and the variations under the three scenarios, as are for “Edible Foods”, except: • In all three scenarios, health concerns serve to suppress the growth in consumption

of meat and fish in comparison to other foodstuffs • In Scenario B, consumer concerns about falling fish stocks, and the carbon footprint

of meat, prompt a marked take up of vegetarian eating habits. This particular affects younger householders, middle income households and single person middle aged households.

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Results 000s tonnes Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 2005 Total 485 473 483 Product 370 359 369 Packaging 115 114 114 2020 Total 571 350 546 Product 472 269 457 Packaging 100 81 88 Change (tonnes) Total 86 -123 63 Product 102 -90 88 Packaging -15 -33 -26 Change (%) Total +17.7 -26.0 +13.0 Product +27.6 -25.1 +23.8 Packaging -13.0 -28.9 -22.6 Kg/household/wk 2005 0.43 0.43 0.43 2020 0.44 0.28 0.43 Highlights: • In tonnage terms, this is a small category, and even relatively significant differences

in percentage growth (or decline) correspond to relatively small movements in tonnes of waste arising.

• Nevertheless, the rise in vegetarianism conjectured for Scenario B has an obvious

and marked effect.

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5.2.9 Garden Products This final category is extremely small, and detailed results have not been included here (in part so as to avoid the possibility of “spurious precision”. In 2005, the sector accounted for: • 0.1 percent of household waste • 28,000 tonnes per year • 0.02 kilogrammes per week per household In Scenario A, total tonnage increases to 44,000 tonnes of waste by 2020; in Scenario B to 32,000 tonnes, and in Scenario C to 33,000 tonnes.

5.3 Waste by Stream The “waste by stream” results have, as explained above, emerged directly from the AEAT/FF model, on the basis of the scenarios and lifestyle assumptions encoded in terms of “waste by source”. Results are therefore presented graphically, for each waste stream, below.

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Garden Waste

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5.4 Summary of the Waste Composition Scenarios There are two main ways of summarising the “waste by source” scenario results. In the first chart, the various waste sources are shown (ranked by their size in 2005) in terms of their total arisings in 2005 and, for each scenario, in 2020.

Scenarios ComparedTotal Arisings

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Paper items Liquids Clothing andtextiles

Electricalgoods

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2005Scenario AScenario BScenario C

The second chart shows changes in tonnages over the period, ranked by the scale of changes in Scenario A.

Scenarios ComparedChanges 2005-2020

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Similarly, the “waste by stream” results can be summarised:

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Garden Paper andboard

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Scenarios ComparedChanges 2005-2020

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6

6.1

CONCLUSIONS

Key Points Perhaps more than anything, this scenario-planning exercise reveals the sheer complexity of the relationship between the kinds of lifestyles lived by modern householders and the scale and kind of waste that emerges from households. The complexity is brutally reduced to just four charts, showing the tonnages associated with different waste sources and waste streams under the three scenarios. Three waste sources, by virtue of their size, dominate the overall picture in 2020: food waste, garden waste, and household items. Of these, garden waste volumes emerge as relatively invariant between the three scenarios. Even where strong government intervention is presumed, waste volumes remain high by 2020. This is clearly a potentially very significant challenge. More and more households mean more and more waste – particularly from the three dominant waste sources. In some cases, the detailed analysis reveals that falls in “waste per household” are wiped out by increases in household numbers. It needs also to be acknowledged that, despite the importance attached to – for example – waste electrical and electronic equipment, increased waste from this source is simply dwarfed by what happens to the “big three”. From a tonnes point of view, food habits, gardens and the purchase and disposal of household items are what count. Food waste and household items, by contrast, exhibit very different patterns under the scenarios. Waste household items may, if Scenario A is an indicator, almost double in the period to 2020, driven forward by householders’ unending appetite. Even under the apparently radical conditions of Scenario B – in which economic growth is well below trend, and consumers shift towards experiences rather than goods – household item waste increases by close to 1.5 million tonnes per annum by 2020. For food waste, on the other hand, the assumptions behind Scenario B bring about a decline in waste arisings. This is, clearly, a strong assumption, and perhaps an unlikely one. However, examining the detail of the household types and food-behaviour that lies behind the assumption suggests that it is not, in fact, impossible – and that, as the charts expose, in the absence of reductions somewhere, total household waste would otherwise rise inexorably. This is illustrated in a smaller way when looking at “clothing & textiles” and “electrical goods”. Both these categories are driven predominantly by discretionary consumer spending; if sustained growth in consumer spending is assumed, then waste growth from these items is assured. It is difficult to envisage how, for example, government action could arrest even the pace of growth. Even more worryingly, however, even under the strictures of Scenario B waste from these two sources grows strongly over the period to 2020. A series of downward pressures, from a selection of lifestyle types, is simply insufficient to do more than ameliorate the overall upward trend. A similar story applies to “liquids” – i.e. soft drinks. By and large, the reductions in arisings in Scenario B are greater than those in Scenario C. At one level, this reflects no more than the assumptions made to specify the models used to produce the data. At another, however, it reflects an important truth: that government regulation has little recent experience of managing demand, and the kinds

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of government intervention conjectured in Scenario C are predominantly supply side measures. This, ultimately, will be inadequate: it is the pattern of demand, through lifestyles, that so powerfully drives the dominant waste sources and streams. When consumers decide to change their habits, however, as conjectured in Scenario B, the impacts are more profound. They may not, perhaps, happen as quickly as 2020, which is why we originally identified 2030 as the horizon for our qualitative research, since it gave time for more profound changes to take place in society. Perhaps, in the end though, it is possible to be optimistic. As shown in the graph below, Scenario B suggests that, if not a “zero waste UK”36, then the prospect of a zero-waste-growth UK is not entirely unrealistic. The challenge is how to enable, encourage, engage householders, demonstrating to them how they can make the changes in their lifestyles that are required.

Total Household Waste

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6.2

Policy Implications As we discussed at the beginning of this report, it is not the goal of a futures exercise to provide hard and fast answers. It would be foolhardy to treat the scenarios presented here as verbatim predictions of the future. Certainly, some aspects may prove to be right, but that is really neither here nor there. This research must be judged not on the efficacy of its crystal ball gazing, but on whether or not it broadens horizons, advances thinking and introduces ideas not previously considered. Though the means have at times been complex, what has been achieved in this report is actually very simple. Through gaining a full understanding of the present, we have been able to grasp our ‘universe’ – particularly, in this case, in relation to lifestyles and household waste. We have then used our knowledge of this universe, and the current trends at play within it, to make some informed guesses about what may or may not happen in the future. All very well, but how can this help policy makers?

36 “A Zero Waste UK”, IPPR and Green Alliance, October 2006

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Making sense of it all First and foremost it is hoped that this report communicates in a reasonably succinct and clear fashion a subject that has been the focus of our thinking for more than 12 months. Though our lifestyles ‘universe’ is complex and amorphous - which makes describing even the present something of an endless task - we can attempt to convey a sense of things – a concept at least of where the boundaries might lie and thus, what might take place in between. If this research helps to develop an understanding of what may be, it will have achieved a great deal. Measuring possible futures Secondly, we are fortunate in that we are not drawing up narratives of the immeasurable; we are taking about waste and more accurately still, household waste. We have ways (albeit lacking in detail and finesse at present) of measuring household waste - by weight, by material, or both - that will still be valid in years to come. By envisaging possible lifestyles in 20-30 years and the impacts they might have on waste, we are able to present a vision of waste in the future in terms that are meaningful now. It has therefore been crucial that the three scenarios explore different (but importantly, possible) futures, in order to ensure that as broad a range of circumstances are considered as possible. Then, by comparing the outcomes of the three scenarios in terms of tonnes of a given material, we are able to assess not only the degree of certainty surrounding a particular outcome (if the same thing were to happen in every scenario for a particular material, we might suppose the likelihood of it happening in reality was fairly strong), but also the impact of changes of different kinds and sizes. Scenarios: pick your own The three scenarios we have set out here should not, under any circumstances, be viewed as set in stone. They are the subjective products of the minds that wrote them - indeed they have been subject to fierce discussion within the Brook Lyndhurst team. They are sandwiched and shaped by myriad assumptions and imponderables, so it is inevitable – desirable, even – that readers disagree with some or all of them. Where this research comes into its own is in linking with the AEAT/Future Foundation model, setting parameters in which policy makers can test their own qualitative interpretations as they are spawned from our narratives. Bearing this in mind, it was never intended to form policy conclusions based upon our scenarios alone. It is clear that all three – each representing a different storyline of the future – lead to different waste tonnages and compositions. Scenario A (‘blinkered evolution’) would generate the most waste; scenario B (‘civic renewal’) the least, while scenario C (‘strong government’) sits somewhere in the middle and, depending on how strong ‘strong government’ actually is, will behave more like one of these scenarios than the other. This is not surprising – you would not expect a scenario titled ‘blinkered evolution’ to result in waste reductions. What this exercise has highlighted though, is the contradictions within such stories. It might be that in a ‘civic renewal’ scenario, in which the population became less focused upon material goods and focused more on well being and experiences, that consumption of ‘fashion items’ might fall. This research forces us to ask, what then? If people associate home improvements with a sense of well being, spending less time shopping for the latest stereo equipment and more time with a saw or paintbrush, we might achieve a net gain in terms of household waste – certainly in terms of tonnes. We have already seen that electrical goods make up a relatively small proportion of household waste by weight, whereas waste from DIY is much higher. There are two points here.

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Firstly, this research has highlighted the importance of particular types of waste in terms of tonnage. Organic waste – food and garden - and household items, make up a significant proportion of household refuse. Small lifestyle changes in some areas can therefore make a big difference to quantities of waste entering the household waste stream. Equally, major changes in other areas – disposable PCs for instance – would have less effect due to the fact that electrical waste makes up a relatively small amount of waste overall. Secondly, and linked to this first point, our three scenarios show the importance of behaviour change if substantial reductions in waste are to be achieved. This is a difficult area for government policy, which has traditionally (and particularly since the 1980s) shied away from telling people how they should conduct their lives. This research emphasises the urgency of the question – what role should the government have in changing our behaviour if such changes are key to reducing waste?

6.3 Final Remarks Perhaps inevitably, there is a series of issues and thoughts that have not found their way into the main body of the analysis and yet still appear to be of potential value in the context of a scenario planning exercise. We conclude this report with three of the most interesting: • The reliance on tonnes – there are at least two other ways of quantifying waste:

in terms of money, or carbon. The market mechanisms that currently treat waste depend in large part on money rather than tonnes; while a shift to carbon-based accounting, certainly by 2030 and probably by 2020 seems inevitable. In both cases, the bar charts presented at the end of this report would look very different, implying potentially very different conclusions and lines of policy development. An extremely useful and interesting exercise could therefore be to “convert” these results into money and/or carbon. For more on this, see Appendix 7.

• The complexity of waste – whilst some waste streams seem set to remain

reasonably straightforward into the future – green waste, for example, and paper – others, such as waste electrical and electronic equipment, and plastic (with the progression of [various forms of] bio-plastic) seem set to become more complex. The progress of “cosmeceuticals”, the possibility of bio-engineered products and – although for the purposes of this exercise we believe this last possibility remains beyond the planning horizon – nano-waste, all spell still further complexity. Simple “tonnes” looks increasingly crude in the face of such developments.

• Spatial issues – this study has focused at national level, and has taken no account

of regional variation, nor the variation that might occur between urban and rural locations. In the event that further development of this kind of work is considered appropriate, then developing more sophisticated methods for calibrating results so as to suit spatial variation in household structure will be required.

Documents

Defra Waste & Resources R&D Programme Lifestyle Scenarios ...randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=WR0104_7293_FRP.pdf · Programme Lifestyle Scenarios & Waste Composition The