DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S …

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Norfolk Division LIGHTHOUSE FELLOWSHIP CHURCH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-00204-AWA-RJK ) v. ) ) RALPH NORTHAM, GOVERNOR, )

)

Defendant. )

DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL AND

RESPONSE TO UNITED STATES’S STATEMENT OF INTEREST

Mark R. Herring

Attorney General

Erin B. Ashwell (VSB No. 79538) Chief Deputy Attorney General

Victoria N. Pearson (VSB No. 48648) Samuel T. Towell (VSB No. 71512)

Deputy Attorneys General

Jacqueline C. Hedblom (VSB No. 68234) Assistant Attorney General

Toby J. Heytens (VSB No. 90788) Solicitor General

Michelle S. Kallen (VSB No. 93286) Martine E. Cicconi (VSB No. 94542)

Deputy Solicitors General

Jessica Merry Samuels (VSB No. 94542) Assistant Solicitor General

Zachary R. Glubiak (VSB No. 93984) John Marshall Fellow

Office of the Attorney General 202 North Ninth Street Richmond, Virginia 23219 (804) 786-7240 – Telephone (804) 371-0200 – Facsimile [email protected]

Case 2:20-cv-00204-AWA-RJK Document 36 Filed 05/07/20 Page 1 of 39 PageID# 288

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT ................................................................................................................................. 2

LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 8

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 9

I. This Court lacks authority to issue the requested injunction against the Governor ...........9

Lighthouse’s federal claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment ......................10

The Eleventh Amendment bars this Court from enjoining the Governor based on alleged violations of the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom .............................13

Lighthouse lacks standing to raise either its federal or state claims because the temporary gatherings restriction applies to individuals, not entities ........................13

II. Lighthouse’s claims are unlikely to succeed on the merits ..............................................16

A. The temporary gatherings restriction is a good-faith, evidence-based emergency measure deserving of this Court’s deference .........................................16

B. Lighthouse’s various First Amendment challenges would likely fail even under the standards applicable to non-emergency measures ....................................17

1. The Free Exercise Clause ..................................................................... 18

2. The Establishment Clause .................................................................... 24

3. The Free Speech and Assembly Clauses .............................................. 25

Lighthouse’s state law challenge would likely fail even under the standards applicable to non-emergency measures ....................................................................28

III. The balance of equities and public interest factors independently foreclose injunctive relief .................................................................................................................29

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 30

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................... 32


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore Cty, 515 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................................... 14

Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018) ..................................................................................................... 11

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) .................................................................................................................. 14

American Entertainers, L.L.C. v. City of Rocky Mount, N.C., 888 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................... 26, 27

Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 706 F.3d 548 (4th Cir. 2013) ..................................................................................................... 16

Bishop v. Bartlett, 575 F.3d 419 (4th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................................... 13

Capital Associated Indus., Inc. v. Stein, 922 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2019) ..................................................................................................... 23

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) ............................................................................................................ 18, 20

Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) .................................................................................................................. 18

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ........................................................................................................... passim

First Baptist Church v. Kelly, No. 20-1102-JWB, 2020 WL 1910021 (D. Kan. Apr. 18, 2020) .............................................. 24

Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 2002) ............................................................................................... 25, 26

Hall v. Northam, No. CL2000632-00 (Culpeper Cir. Ct. April 30, 2020) ............................................................ 17

Handsome Brook Farm, LLC v. Humane Farm Animal Care, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 556 (E.D. Va. 2016) .......................................................................................... 8

Harris v. McDonnell, 988 F. Supp. 2d 603 (W.D. Va. 2013) ...................................................................................... 11

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) .................................................................................................................. 15


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In re Abbott, No. 20-50296, 2020 WL 1911216 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2020) ..................................................... 13

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) .................................................................................................................... 17

Jesus Christ is the Answer Ministries, Inc. v. Baltimore Cty., 915 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2019) ..................................................................................................... 23

Kobe v. Haley, 666 Fed. Appx. 281 (4th Cir. 2016) .......................................................................................... 11

Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004) .................................................................................................................. 15

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) .................................................................................................................. 24

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .................................................................................................................. 14

Lytle v. Griffith, 240 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2001) ..................................................................................................... 10

Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No. 20-5427 (6th Cir. May 2, 2020) ......................................................................................... 29

McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393 (4th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................... 10, 12

Moore v. City of Asheville, 396 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................................... 15

North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Cooper, 397 F. Supp. 3d 786 (M.D. N.C. 2019) ..................................................................................... 11

On Fire Christian Center, Inc. v. Fischer, No. 3:20-cv-264-JRW, 2020 WL 1820249 (W.D. Ky. April 11, 2020) ................................... 29

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) ................................................................................................................ 9, 13

Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) .................................................................................................................... 26

Ross v. Early, 746 F.3d 546 (4th Cir. 2014) ..................................................................................................... 27

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) ............................................................................................................ 24, 26

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) .............................................................................................................. 16

Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) .................................................................................................................. 15


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Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105 (11th Cir. 1996) ..................................................................................................... 17

South Carolina Wildlife Fed. v. Limehouse, 549 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................................... 11

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) .............................................................................................................. 14

Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 1997) ..................................................................................................... 13

Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012) .................................................................................................................. 21

Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 1994) ......................................................................................................... 9

Tony Alamo Christian Ministries v. Selig, 664 F.3d 1245 (8th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 15

United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971) ............................................................................................. 16, 17

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1989) .................................................................................................................. 25

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. McAuliffe, 147 F. Supp. 3d 462 (W.D. Va. 2015) ...................................................................................... 11

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) ............................................................................................................ 25, 27

Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................................... 10, 11

White’s Place, Inc. v. Glover, 222 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................................. 14

Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) .................................................................................................................... 10

Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) ........................................................................................................ 1, 8, 28, 29

Workman v. Mingo Cty. Bd. of Educ., 419 Fed. Appx. 348 (4th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................... 24, 26

Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2015) ..................................................................................................... 10

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) .................................................................................................................... 15

Constitional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. I .............................................................................................................. passim


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U.S. Const. amend. XI .................................................................................................. 9, 10, 13, 16 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 .............................................................................................................. 9, 16

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. .............................................................................................................. 9 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) .............................................................................................................. 16 Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1627 .......................................................................................................... 12 Va. Code Ann. § 44-146.17(1)...................................................................................................... 12 Va. Code Ann. § 57-1 et seq. ........................................................................................................ 16 Va. Code Ann. § 57-2.02 ........................................................................................................ 28, 29 Va. Code Ann. § 57-2.02(b).......................................................................................................... 28 Va. Code Ann. § 57-2.02(e) .................................................................................................... 28, 29

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d) ................................................................................................................. 8, 30

Other Authorities

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Coronavirus Disease 2019: Protect Yourself .......... 3 Council of State Gov’ts, COVID-19 Resources for State Leaders ................................................. 3 Erin Ailworth & Alexandra Berzon, How Coronavirus Invaded One New York Community: ‘We

Weren’t Expecting It to Be Ground Zero,’ Wall St. J. (Mar. 30, 2020) ...................................... 4 Fenit Nirappil, D.C.’s Patient Zero: A Priest’s Journey from ICU to Reuniting with Family and

Flock, Wash. Post (Mar. 30, 2020) ............................................................................................. 3 Henry Graff & Brent Solomon, Northam: Virginia Set to Begin Reopening Plan May 15, WWBT

(May 4, 2020) .............................................................................................................................. 7 Jeremy Lazarus, Revival Linked to COVID-19, Richmond Free Press (Apr. 30, 2020) ................. 4 Jonathan Shorman, Kansas Has 3 Church-Related COVID-19 Clusters, State Says Amid

Scramble for Supplies, Wichita Eagle (Apr. 6, 2020) ................................................................. 3 Matt Chittum, From Livestreamed Services to Drive-in Worship, Faith Communities Find Their

Way Amid Pandemic, Roanoke Times (Apr. 4, 2020) ................................................................ 6 Michelle Boorstein, Prominent Virginia Pastor Who Said ‘God Is Larger Than This Dreaded

Virus’ Dies of Covid-19, Wash. Post (Apr. 13, 2020) ................................................................. 4 Scott Wilson et al., Coronavirus Creates Conflict for Churches, Where Gatherings Can Be

Dangerous but Also Provide Solace, Wash. Post (Apr. 5, 2020) ................................................ 3 Sharon Otterman & Sarah Maslin Nir, New Rochelle, Once a Coronavirus Hot Spot, May Now

Offer Hope, N.Y. Times (Mar. 27, 2020) .................................................................................... 4 Virginia Dep’t of Health, COVID-19 Cases in Virginia................................................................. 2


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William Wan et al., Experts and Trump’s Advisers Doubt White House’s 240,000 Coronavirus Deaths Estimate, Wash. Post (Apr. 2, 2020) ............................................................................. 17


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INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic has raised extraordinarily difficult questions for elected

officials and policymakers. The virus is deadly and spreads with devastating ease. Well-

intentioned people can infect others without realizing they carry the virus. There is no proven

treatment or vaccine. Millions have been infected and hundreds of thousands have already died.

Faced with a dire threat, Governor Ralph Northam has had to make difficult decisions to

slow the disease’s spread, protect public health, and save lives. Among those decisions is the one

challenged here: a temporary prohibition on in-person gatherings of more than 10 people.

The Governor recognizes that the restrictions imposed to fight the spread of COVID-19

have been hard on all Virginians, including religious communities, and he is committed to easing

them as soon as it is safe to do so. But Virginia’s restrictions do not operate in the way plaintiff

and the Federal Government claim, nor has religion been singled out for unfair treatment. To the

contrary, the Governor has issued guidance specifically designed to help religious communities

maintain their communion and worked with religious leaders to find creative solutions to the

challenges of this moment.

Plaintiff claims the Governor has not gone far enough in protecting religious liberty and

seeks to enjoin the temporary gatherings restriction “to the extent [it] prohibits religious worship

services at Lighthouse, or in-person church services at Lighthouse.” Compl. 45. But this Court

lacks authority to issue the injunction plaintiff seeks, and such a ruling would seriously

undermine Virginia’s efforts to resist a once-in-a-century pandemic and threaten irreparable

harm to an unknown (and unknowable) number of people. Neither the United States Constitution

nor the Code of Virginia requires that result, and plaintiff fails to demonstrate its entitlement to

the “extraordinary remedy” it seeks. Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20, 24 (2008).


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STATEMENT

1. In January, Chinese authorities announced a novel coronavirus was likely to

blame for a mysterious, pneumonia-like illness. Decl. of M. Norman Oliver ¶ 4 (attached as

Exhibit 1). Months later, COVID-19 has become a pandemic, killing more than 250,000 and

infecting more than 3.6 million worldwide. ¶ 9. Virginia’s death toll stands at 713—a number

that continues to climb. ¶ 14. More than 20,000 COVID-19 cases have been reported in the

Commonwealth, including over 5,000 new cases last week alone. ¶ 13. And because of

limitations in testing capacity, these figures “likely undercount[] the actual number of positive

cases.” Id.

Accomack County, where plaintiff is located, has been hit particularly hard. With a

population of less than 33,000, Accomack’s 463 cases and 7 deaths represent the second highest

case count per 100,000 residents anywhere in the Commonwealth. Indeed, Accomack has more

COVID-19 cases than thirteen-times-larger Virginia Beach.1

In Accomack and elsewhere, the toll of COVID-19 extends beyond the infected. As

COVID-19 patients require treatment and hospitalization, the burden on the healthcare system

grows. Oliver Decl. ¶¶ 15, 20, 25. Depending on the speed of infection, Virginia could face a

shortage of hospital beds, intensive-care-unit beds, and ventilators. ¶ 15. Such shortages would

place healthcare workers at even higher risk and prevent those needing treatment for unrelated

reasons from accessing care. Id.

2. One thing that makes COVID-19 so deadly is the ease with which it spreads. The

virus is transferred by in-person interactions, either between people in close contact or through

respiratory droplets when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks. Oliver Decl. ¶ 6.

1 Virginia Department of Health, COVID-19 Cases in Virginia,

https://www.vdh.virginia.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited May 7, 2020).


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Evidence also suggests the virus can survive “for hours if not days” on surfaces such as plastic

and metal. ¶ 23. And infected persons may not show symptoms—and thus may not realize they

have contracted the virus—for days, if at all. ¶ 6.

3. Lacking a vaccine or cure, officials have focused on slowing COVID-19’s spread.

According to federal guidance, “[e]veryone should . . . [a]void close contact” by “not gather[ing]

in groups” and “[p]ut[ting] distance between yourself and other people.”2 State officials have

implemented that guidance by closing schools, requiring many businesses to close to the public,

prohibiting gatherings of more than 10 people, and issuing stay-at-home orders.3

Time and again, large gatherings—including in-person religious services—have provided

fertile ground for transmitting this deadly virus. Throughout the United States, “[c]hurches,

temples and other places of worship” have “exacerat[ed] outbreaks” due to the nature of religious

services, “where congregants sit close, take Communion, share hugs and handshakes and pecks

on the cheek.”4 The early spread of the virus in Washington, D.C., was linked to a priest who

distributed Communion before testing positive.5 The community believed to be “ground zero” of

the devastating outbreak in New York traced the virus’s spread to a single person’s attendance at

2 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Coronavirus Disease 2019: Protect Yourself,

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html (last visited May 6, 2020).

3 See Council of State Gov’ts, COVID-19 Resources for State Leaders, https://web.csg.org/covid19/executive-orders/ (last visited May 6, 2020); see also Oliver Decl. ¶ 18.

4 Scott Wilson et al., Coronavirus Creates Conflict for Churches, Where Gatherings Can Be Dangerous but Also Provide Solace, Wash. Post (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/coronavirus-church-services-outbreak/2020/04/05/7f5b63cc-7773-11ea-90ad-819caa48d39f_story.html; see also Jonathan Shorman, Kansas Has 3 Church-Related COVID-19 Clusters, State Says Amid Scramble for Supplies, Wichita Eagle (Apr. 6, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/y9xncmgb.

5 Fenit Nirappil, D.C.’s Patient Zero: A Priest’s Journey from ICU to Reuniting with Family and Flock, Wash. Post (Mar. 30, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/ybhpzugb.


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a synagogue service.6

Virginia has not been spared. An outbreak related to a revival in early March led to at

least one—and as many as six—COVID-19-related deaths.7 In April, the founder of the New

Deliverance Evangelistic Church in Chesterfield died of the virus after holding a “well-

populated” Sunday service just one day before the Governor issued the gathering restriction.8

4. Relying on input from some of the Nation’s leading epidemiologists, doctors, and

economists, Virginia has taken numerous steps to limit COVID-19’s spread. On February 7, the

State Health Commissioner identified COVID-19 as a public health threat. Oliver Decl. ¶ 5. On

March 13, the Governor ordered all K-12 schools closed for two weeks, and, on March 20, the

Governor and State Health Commissioner limited all restaurants, fitness centers, and theaters to

10 patrons. ¶ 17. The virus, however, continued to spread.

On March 23, the Governor issued Executive Order 53 (EO 53) (Compl. Ex. B, Dkt. 1-3).

Emphasizing that “person-to-person contact increases the risk of transmission and community

spread,”9 that Order took various steps to minimize such contacts by prohibiting “all public and

private in person gatherings of more than 10 individuals,” EO 53 ¶ 1 (emphasis added), and

imposing additional restrictions on particular entities. K-12 schools were required to cease “in-

6 Erin Ailworth & Alexandra Berzon, How Coronavirus Invaded One New York Community: ‘We Weren’t Expecting It to Be Ground Zero,’ Wall St. J. (Mar. 30, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/y7hh7f8p; Sharon Otterman & Sarah Maslin Nir, New Rochelle, Once a Coronavirus Hot Spot, May Now Offer Hope, N.Y. Times (Mar. 27, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/yxxf7c5m.

7 Jeremy Lazarus, Revival Linked to COVID-19, Richmond Free Press (Apr. 30, 2020), http://richmondfreepress.com/news/2020/apr/30/revival-linked-covid-19/.

8 Michelle Boorstein, Prominent Virginia Pastor Who Said ‘God Is Larger Than This Dreaded Virus’ Dies of Covid-19, Wash. Post (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2020/04/13/virginia-pastor-church-dies-coronavirus/.

9 As noted below, EO 53 was subsequently amended. The original order signed March 23, 2020 is available at https://www.governor.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/executive-actions/EO-53-Temporary-Restrictions-Due-To-Novel-Coronavirus-(COVID-19).pdf. The substantive provisions at issue in this litigation remain unchanged as of the date of filing.


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person instruction,” and restaurants were directed to close “all dining and congregation areas.” ¶¶

2, 3. Most “brick and mortar retail business[es]” were allowed to stay open so long as they

“limit[ed] all in-person shopping to no more than 10 patrons per establishment.” ¶ 6.

“[R]ecreational and entertainment businesses,” however, were required to temporarily “clos[e] []

all public access.” ¶ 4. “All businesses” were admonished to “adhere to social distancing

recommendations, enhanced sanitizing practices on common surfaces, and other appropriate

workplace guidance from state and federal authorities while in operation.” ¶ 7.

A week later, the Governor imposed additional restrictions in Executive Order 55 (EO

55) (Compl. Ex. C, Dkt. 1-4). Implementing the Governor’s frequent admonitions to stay at

home, the first paragraph of EO 55 directed that “[a]ll individuals in Virginia shall remain at

their place of residence, except as provided below by this Order and Executive Order 53.” ¶ 1.

EO 55 also addressed the temporary gatherings restriction first announced in EO 53.

Whereas EO 53 originally stated that the restriction would last through April 23, 2020, see note

9, supra, EO 55 extended the temporary gatherings restriction to June 10, see EO 55, p. 3.10

EO 55 reiterated that the temporary gatherings restriction applied to “[a]ll public and private in-

person gatherings of more than ten individuals,” and specifically stated that “[t]his includes

parties, celebrations, religious, or other social events, whether they occur indoor or

outdoor.” EO 55 ¶ 2 (emphasis added). EO 55 clarified, however, that “[t]his restriction does not

apply” to “the operation of businesses not required to close to the public under Executive Order

53” or “the gathering of family members living in the same residence.” EO 55 ¶¶ 2 & 2(a)–(b).

5. Throughout the COVID-19 emergency, the Governor has been careful to preserve

10 Other provisions of EO 53 have also been extended through May 14, 2020. See Second

Amended Executive Order 53 (May 4, 2020), https://www.governor.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/executive-actions/EO-53-SECOND-AMENDED-Extension-of-Temporary-Restrictions-Due-To-Novel-Coronavirus-(COVID-19).pdf.


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religious liberty while protecting public safety. None of the Governor’s Orders requires places of

worship to close, prevents public access to churches or other facilities, or blocks services with a

limited number of attendees, and the stay-at-home order specifically permits people to “leave

their residence for the purpose of” “[t]raveling to and from one’s . . . place of worship.” EO 55

¶ 1(f). Virginia’s official coronavirus website also identifies ways that people may continue to

practice their faith, including collectively: “Attendees may travel to their place of worship, park

in the parking lot and listen to the religious message while remaining in their vehicles” so long as

there are “no more than 10 individuals leading the religious ceremony or functioning outside of

the church in support of the religious ceremony.”11 It also identifies ways religious leaders may

continue to administer sacraments and obtain collections. Consistent with these

recommendations, faith leaders have found ways “to engage their followers at a time when they

need their faith the most,” including “using livestreams, recorded sermons on Facebook, personal

outreach, drive-in services in parking lots and videoconference bible study.”12

6. Although they have undoubtedly imposed costs on all Virginians, the measures

undertaken to fight the spread of COVID-19 also have proven effective. Virginians have

“reduced their activities since the Governor declared a state of emergency,” corresponding with a

“reduction[] in the growth rate of COVID-19 cases.” Declaration of Lilian Peake ¶ 8 (attached as

Exhibit 2). The evidence shows “that this reduction in activity in Virginia has reduced

transmission rates by roughly 50%—from 2.2 transmissions per infection before March 15,

2020, to 1.1 after March 15, 2020.” Id.

11 Virginia’s Statewide Stay at Home Order: Frequently Asked Questions at 1–2 (FAQ)

(attached as Exhibit 3). 12 Matt Chittum, From Livestreamed Services to Drive-in Worship, Faith Communities Find

Their Way Amid Pandemic, Roanoke Times (Apr. 4, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/ybmlj6kt (also noting that some places of worship have closed).


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But the current progress is fragile. One model “predicts that lifting social distancing

restrictions too soon can lead to a rapid increase of COVID-19 cases, resulting in a surge of

hospitalizations that has the potential to overwhelm Virginia’s healthcare system.” Peake Decl.

¶ 9. Virginia’s public health officials have therefore warned that, “[e]ven when businesses start

to re-open and the stay-at-home order currently in place is lifted, social distancing will remain

important to the public health response to COVID-19.” ¶ 12.

Heeding that advice, the Governor has announced a multi-phase process to ease the

restrictions imposed by Executive Orders 53 and 55. In Phase I, which the Governor has

indicated may begin as early as May 15, 2020, businesses required to close may be permitted to

open with social distancing measures in place, and the temporary gatherings restriction may be

modified as it applies to faith communities.13

7. The sole plaintiff in this case—Lighthouse Fellowship Church (Lighthouse)—is a

church located on Chincoteague Island. On April 24, Lighthouse filed suit against Ralph

Northam “in his official capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia.” Compl. ¶ 18.

Citing a criminal citation against its pastor on April 5, Lighthouse claimed that the church itself

is entitled to an injunction barring the Governor from enforcing the temporary gathering

restriction on the grounds that it violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution

and the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom. Although Lighthouse did not file suit until more

than a month after EO 53 was issued and 19 days after the pastor was cited, Lighthouse asked

this Court to issue a temporary restraining order barring the Governor from enforcing the

gathering restriction—a measure imposed literally to save lives—without even serving the

13 Henry Graff & Brent Solomon, Northam: Virginia Set to Begin Reopening Plan May 15,

WWBT (May 4, 2020), https://www.nbc12.com/2020/05/04/northam-virginia-set-begin-reopening-plan-may/.


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complaint or affording the Governor an opportunity to respond. See Dkt. 3. This Court denied

Lighthouse’s request and set the matter for full briefing. See Dkt. 10.

On Friday, May 1, 2020, this Court denied Lighthouse’s motion for a preliminary

injunction. Dkt. 16. Lighthouse immediately noticed an appeal, Dkt. 17, and the next day

(Saturday), asked this Court to grant an injunction pending appeal, raising the same arguments

the Court had rejected less than 24 hours earlier. Dkt. 18 at 5 (noting that “this Court has already

determined that Lighthouse’s motion for preliminary injunction fails the relevant test”). And one

day after that—Sunday, May 3, 2020—the Federal Government filed a Statement of Interest

urging the Court to “grant the Injunction Pending Appeal” because “the Commonwealth” “ha[d]

not satisfied its burden” as to Lighthouse’s constitutional claims. Dkt. 19 at 19–20. Governor

Northam notified the Court of his intent to respond, Dkt. 20, and the Court once again set an

expedited briefing schedule, Dkt. 22.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) permits district courts to grant injunctions pending

appeal. A party seeking the “extraordinary remedy” of interim injunctive relief “must establish

[1] that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in

the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and [4] that an

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20, 24 (2008).

Where, as here, a party is seeking relief “that goes beyond maintaining the status quo . . .

while a lawsuit remains pending,” the injunction is classified as “mandatory.” Handsome Brook

Farm, LLC v. Humane Farm Animal Care, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 556, 566 (E.D. Va. 2016); see

id. (describing “[t]he status quo” for these purposes as “the last uncontested status between the

parties which preceded the controversy”) (quotation marks omitted). “Mandatory preliminary

injunctive relief in any circumstance is disfavored, and warranted only in the most extraordinary


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circumstances.” Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 270 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994).

ARGUMENT

For three independent reasons, Lighthouse falls far short of the high bar for proving its

entitlement to mandatory injunctive relief. First, this Court lacks authority to grant Lighthouse

the relief it seeks, both because the Eleventh Amendment precludes an injunction against the

Governor on either federal or state-law grounds and because Lighthouse does not have standing

to challenge the temporary gatherings restriction in any event. Second, even if Lighthouse could

somehow overcome those multiple threshold defects, its various causes of action are unlikely to

succeed on their own terms. Third, Lighthouse has not shown that either the balance-of-equities

or public-interest factors favor granting injunctive relief.

I. This Court lacks authority to issue the requested injunction against the Governor

For purposes of its current request for interim equitable relief, Lighthouse raises two sets

of claims: those alleging violations of the United States Constitution and those alleging violation

of the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom. The Eleventh Amendment bars both. The Ex Parte

Young exception does not authorize suit against the Governor on Lighthouse’s federal claims,

and the rule of Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman precludes relief on its state claims. In

addition, Lighthouse lacks standing to challenge the temporary gatherings restriction on either

federal or state law grounds, because the challenged rule restricts only the conduct of individuals

rather than entities (including Lighthouse).14

14 The complaint raises several claims that the motion for injunctive relief omits, including an

Equal Protection Clause claim, Compl. ¶¶ 147–57; a claim under Article IV, § 4 of the federal Constitution, ¶¶ 158–65; several state constitutional claims, ¶¶ 166–203; and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., see Compl. ¶¶ 204–16. Because Lighthouse did not base its request for interim relief on any of these claims, they are not currently before the Court. In any event, the same jurisdictional defects would preclude injunctive relief on those claims as well.


10

Lighthouse’s federal claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment

1. The Eleventh Amendment “render[s] States immune from being hauled into

federal court by private parties.” Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 2015).

State officers sued in their official capacity—as Governor Northam is here, Compl. ¶ 18—are

“also entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection” because official-capacity suits are in effect

suits against the State. Lytle v. Griffith, 240 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir. 2001); accord Will v.

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (noting that “a suit against a state official

in his or her official capacity” is “no different from a suit against the State itself”).

In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court recognized an exception to

Eleventh Amendment immunity that permits a federal court to grant prospective relief against a

state officer when that officer acts in violation of federal law. As the Court explained, the

exception is based on the “fiction” that an officer who acts unconstitutionally is “stripped of his

official or representative character” and may therefore be “subject[]” to “the consequences of his

individual conduct” in federal court. Id. at 159–60.

Although this doctrine provides an avenue for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief against

States, “[t]he purpose of allowing suit against state officials to enjoin their enforcement of an

unconstitutional statute is not aided by enjoining the actions of a state official not directly

involved in enforcing the subject statute.” Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252

F.3d 316, 332 (4th Cir. 2001) (Gilmore). Accordingly, the Young exception is limited to

situations where a plaintiff can show: (1) a “special relation” between the officer sued and the

challenged policy; and (2) the officer has “acted or threatened” to enforce the policy. McBurney

v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399, 402 (4th Cir. 2010). These requirements ensure both that “the

appropriate party is before the federal court, so as not to interfere with the lawful discretion of

state officials” and that “a federal injunction will be effective with respect to the underlying


11

claim.” South Carolina Wildlife Fed. v. Limehouse, 549 F.3d 324, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2008).

The Fourth Circuit has repeatedly found that actions against a State’s Governor fail to

satisfy the Young prerequisites. In Gilmore, for example, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Virginia’s

Governor from a case alleging constitutional infirmity with five statutes involving the

transportation and disposal of municipal solid waste. “[A]lthough Governor Gilmore [was] under

a general duty to enforce the laws of Virginia by virtue of his position as the top official of the

state’s executive branch,” the Court explained, “he lack[ed] a specific duty to enforce the

challenged statutes.” 252 F.3d at 331. In Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018), the

Fourth Circuit likewise declined to apply the Young exception to a suit against the Governor of

North Carolina, explaining that when a plaintiff sues “to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged

to be unconstitutional, the exception applies only where a party defendant in [such] a suit . . . has

some connection with the enforcement of the Act.” Id. at 355 (emphasis added; quotation marks

omitted). Numerous other decisions from within this circuit have also rejected attempts to sue

state governors under Ex Parte Young. See, e.g., Kobe v. Haley, 666 Fed. Appx. 281, 300 (4th

Cir. 2016); Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. McAuliffe, 147 F. Supp. 3d 462, 467–68 (W.D. Va. 2015);

Harris v. McDonnell, 988 F. Supp. 2d 603, 606 (W.D. Va. 2013); North Carolina State

Conference of NAACP v. Cooper, 397 F. Supp. 3d 786, 800–02 (M.D.N.C. 2019).

2. These precedents preclude this suit against Governor Northam. As in Gilmore and

Cooper, the Governor’s “[g]eneral authority to enforce the laws of the state is not sufficient to

make [him a] proper part[y] to litigation challenging the law.” Gilmore, 252 F.3d at 331

(emphasis added; citation omitted). And, like in those cases, Governor Northam has no specific

authority to enforce Executive Orders 53 and 55. The Code of Virginia authorizes the Governor

to “issue” executive orders, but nowhere does it authorize him—personally—to enforce them.


12

Va. Code Ann. § 44-146.17(1). Nor do Executive Orders 53 and 55 contemplate personal

enforcement by the Governor, either expressly or by implication. To the contrary, the Orders

make violations punishable as a misdemeanor offense, the prosecution of which is committed to

the discretion of Commonwealth’s Attorneys. See Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1627

(Commonwealth’s Attorney has “discretion” to “prosecute Class 1 . . . misdemeanors”); accord

McBurney, 616 F.3d at 399 (Attorney General had no “special relation” to alleged violations of

the Virginia Freedom of Information Act where Commonwealth’s Attorneys are authorized to

enforce the Act). For that reason, the Governor has no “special relation” to the challenged action

for purposes of Young.

The second Young requirement is also lacking here because Lighthouse has failed to

allege—much less demonstrate—that Governor Northam “has . . . acted or threatened to act” to

enforce the gathering restriction. McBurney, 616 F.3d at 402. The complaint makes abundantly

clear that local police, not the Governor, are responsible for enforcement. Compl. ¶¶ 39–53. Nor

has the Governor encouraged local authorities to take action against Lighthouse, its members, its

pastor, or any other faith community. In fact, as Lighthouse’s own exhibit shows, the Governor

has discouraged the approach local authorities are alleged to have taken in this case. See Compl.

Ex. D (Dkt. 1-5) at 1 (“Governor Northam has directed state and local law enforcement to

initially address violations of the [Executive Order] directives with education and warnings.”).

Where a state official has neither “personally” enforced a challenged policy nor “advised any

other [officials] to do so,” the “Young fiction cannot apply.” McBurney, 616 F.3d at 402.

3. The fact that the gathering restriction is found in an executive order rather than a

state statute does not alter the analysis. Facing a challenge to another executive order issued

during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Fifth Circuit held that claims against the Governor of Texas


13

could not proceed. In re Abbott, No. 20-50296, 2020 WL 1911216, at *6–7 (5th Cir. Apr. 20,

2020). Although the Governor had issued the challenged order, the potential penalties were

enforced by health and law enforcement officials. Id. at *6. As the Fifth Circuit explained, “[t]he

power to promulgate law is not the power to enforce it.” Id. Without the latter, the Young

exception did not apply and the Eleventh Amendment precluded the plaintiffs’ claim against the

Governor. Id. 15

The Eleventh Amendment bars this Court from enjoining the Governor based on alleged violations of the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom

It is black-letter law that federal courts may not grant injunctive relief “against state

officials on the basis of state law.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

117 (1984). This rule follows from the logic of Young, which was premised on the need to

promote the supremacy of federal law. Young, 209 U.S. at 160. So where “a plaintiff alleges that

a state official has violated state law,” the premise for the Young doctrine “disappears” and the

Eleventh Amendment applies with full force. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106. Otherwise, a federal

court would be in the position of “instruct[ing] state officials on how to conform their conduct to

state law”—a function not permitted under the Eleventh Amendment. Id.; accord Suarez Corp.

Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 228 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A] claim seeking injunctive relief for a

state official’s violation of state law . . . is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”). The Eleventh

Amendment thus bars this Court from granting an injunction on Lighthouse’s state law claims.

Lighthouse lacks standing to raise either its federal or state claims because the temporary gatherings restriction applies to individuals, not entities

As “the party invoking the jurisdiction of the court,” Lighthouse “bears the burden of

establishing standing.” Bishop v. Bartlett, 575 F.3d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 2009). To satisfy Article

15 Although the Commonwealth joined an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs in In re

Abbott, that brief did not address whether the Governor was amenable to suit under Young.


14

III’s case-or-controversy requirement, a complaint’s allegations must demonstrate that “the

particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” Allen v.

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (emphases added). In contrast, a “generalized interest” shared

by all citizens in “constitutional governance” is inadequate to establish a specific party’s

standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).

1. The only plaintiff in this suit is Lighthouse Fellowship Church. Compl. ¶ 17. But

the challenged action—the temporary gatherings restriction—applies only to people, not entities.

Compare EO 55 ¶ 2 (prohibiting “[a]ll public and private in-person gatherings of more than ten

individuals”) (emphasis added), with EO 53 ¶¶ 2–8 (imposing additional restrictions on various

entities, none of which are churches). The fact that the temporary gatherings restriction is

enforced through criminal sanctions, see EO 53, p. 4; EO 55, p.2, confirms that fact. “[C]riminal

charges are personal in consequence” and therefore do not support an entity’s standing to

challenge an enactment “in its own right.” White’s Place, Inc. v. Glover, 222 F.3d 1327, 1330

(11th Cir. 2000); see also id. (“The corporation itself has not, and could not, be arrested.”). And

because Lighthouse has made no effort to assert that it has suffered any other injuries that are

traceable to the temporary gatherings restrictions (such as loss of funds due to decreased

collections, or loss of standing in the community) it has not established its own standing as

required by Article III. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).

2. Nor could Lighthouse salvage its current claims under a theory of associational

standing.16 As a general matter, courts have recognized that associations may bring suit on behalf

of their members in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert.

16 Lighthouse likewise cannot establish third-party standing. That doctrine applies only

where a plaintiff can show that “the third party cannot effectively protect its own interests.” A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore Cty, 515 F.3d 356, 363 n.3 (4th Cir. 2008). No such allegation has been made—much less supported—here.


15

Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). To prove associational standing, however, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that “its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.” Id.

Lighthouse attempts no such showing. The complaint is not supported by any affidavits

or other competent evidence that specific church members have experienced any harm satisfying

Article III. To be sure, the verified complaint bears Pastor Wilson’s signature and describes

events leading to a criminal summons against him. But any attempt by Lighthouse to rely on

Pastor Wilson to establish its own standing would run headlong into Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37, 41 (1971), which “forbid[s]” federal courts from “enjoin[ing] state court proceedings.” See

also Moore v. City of Asheville, 396 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that Younger applied

where street preacher filed federal suit challenging constitutionality of local noise ordinance

under which he had been cited); Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 133 (2004) (“The doctrine of

Younger v. Harris reinforces our federal scheme by preventing a state criminal defendant from

asserting ancillary challenges to ongoing state criminal procedures in federal court.” (citation

omitted)). Indeed, Pastor Wilson’s pending criminal proceeding, see Compl. ¶ 53—and courts’

“unwillingness to allow the Younger principle to be . . . circumvented,” Kowalski, 543 U.S. at

133—provides yet another reason to conclude that Lighthouse cannot pursue the claims alleged

in the complaint in its own right. See Tony Alamo Christian Ministries v. Selig, 664 F.3d 1245,

1248 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that district court should have abstained under Younger where

church brought claims that overlapped with state-court proceedings of its individual members).17

17 The Court need not reach the standing analysis at all should it conclude that Younger

applies. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (noting that “federal court” need not “decide whether the parties present an Article III case or controversy before abstaining under Younger v. Harris”).


16

II. Lighthouse’s claims are unlikely to succeed on the merits

Even if Lighthouse could overcome the Eleventh Amendment and establish standing, it

still would be unlikely to succeed on the merits of any of its claims. To support its request for

emergency relief, Lighthouse points to two sources of authority: (1) various provisions of the

First Amendment (including the Free Exercise, Establishment, Free Speech, and Assembly

Clauses); and (2) the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, Va. Code Ann. § 57-1 et seq. But not

all executive orders issued to address the threat of COVID-19 are the same, and Lighthouse has

not shown that Governor Northam’s neutral and generally applicable temporary gatherings

restriction violates any of these provisions.18

A. The temporary gatherings restriction is a good-faith, evidence-based emergency measure deserving of this Court’s deference

Lighthouse’s challenges fail at the outset because it does not acknowledge (much less

engage with) the relevant framework. Because “[d]ealing with . . . an emergency situation

requires an immediacy of action that is not possible for judges,” courts have long emphasized

that the elected branches must be able to take decisive actions to address matters of urgent

concern. United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1971). In evaluating the

lawfulness of measures taken during an emergency, the Fourth Circuit has held that “the scope of

[a court’s] review . . . must be limited to a determination of whether the [executive’s] actions

were taken in good faith and whether there is some factual basis for [the Governor’s] decision

18 Although not raised in the current motion, Lighthouse’s RLUIPA, Equal Protection, and

Republican Form of Government claims fail as well. RLUIPA applies to “land use regulation[s]” such as zoning ordinances, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1), not restrictions on individual conduct like the temporary gatherings restriction. See, e.g., Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 706 F.3d 548, 552–53 (4th Cir. 2013). The equal protection claim fails because the challenged restriction applies equally to all gatherings. See infra. And the Supreme Court “has several times concluded that” Article IV, § 4 “does not provide the basis for a justiciable claim.” Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019).


17

that the restrictions he imposed were necessary to maintain order.” Id. at 1281. That standard

reflects the reality that “[i]t is no part of the function of a court” to determine which measures are

“likely to be the most effective for the protection of the public against disease,” Jacobson v.

Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30 (1905), and that “governing authorities must be granted the

proper deference and wide latitude necessary for dealing with . . . emergenc[ies],” Smith v.

Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 (11th Cir. 1996).

It is difficult to imagine a more apt circumstance for applying that framework than the

current emergency. Authorities estimate that 1.5 to 2.2 million Americans might have died had

governments done nothing to stop the virus,19 and a battery of evidence supports the conclusion

that minimizing close, person-to-person contact is necessary to curb its spread. Oliver Decl. ¶ 17.

The Governor’s step-by-step approach refutes any suggestion that he acted arbitrarily or without

due consideration of the difficult issues involved. In short, it is beyond debate that the Governor

acted in good faith in imposing the gathering ban. See Hall v. Northam, No. CL2000632-00, at 2

(Culpeper Cir. Ct. April 30, 2020) (attached as Exhibit 4) (holding that the Governor’s COVID-

19 Orders “are not plainly wrong, grossly negligent, executed in bad faith or issued in violation

of the United States or Virginia Constitutions”). Accordingly, as even the Federal Government

acknowledges, the Governor’s chosen strategy for slowing the spread of COVID-19 and saving

lives warrants deference. Dkt. 19 at 1, 10, 14.

B. Lighthouse’s various First Amendment challenges would likely fail even under the standards applicable to non-emergency measures

For the reasons just explained, this Court’s review of Lighthouse’s claims should reflect

the exigencies of the moment. But Lighthouse’s constitutional claims would also fail under the

19 William Wan et al., Experts and Trump’s Advisers Doubt White House’s 240,000

Coronavirus Deaths Estimate, Wash. Post (Apr. 2, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/vymlmsy.


18

usual standards of judicial review.

Lighthouse raises three different categories of First Amendment objections to the

temporary gatherings restriction: the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the

Free Speech and Assembly Clauses. The Federal Government supports Lighthouse’s claims as to

the Free Exercise Clause. Each of those challenges, however, suffers from the same fundamental

defect: misreading a universal restriction on gatherings as a targeted attack on a particular form

of worship. Because Virginia’s temporary gatherings restriction applies to gatherings—

regardless of their character, location, or any speech-related conduct that takes place at them—

Lighthouse cannot show it is likely to succeed on any of its First Amendment claims.

1. The Free Exercise Clause

a. “[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to

comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes

(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” Employment Div., Dep’t of

Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quotation marks and citation

omitted) (collecting cases). By contrast, “the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if

the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits

conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.

v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (emphasis added).

b. Lighthouse does not (and could not plausibly) allege that the challenged Orders

prohibit gatherings of more than 10 people “because” they are “undertaken for religious

reasons,” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added). To the contrary, EO 53 and EO 55 apply to

“all public and private in person gatherings of” the requisite number of people. EO 53 ¶ 1

(emphasis added); accord EO 55 ¶ 2. And both Executive Orders provide a reason for the

restriction that has nothing to do with the religious motivations of any gathering: slowing the


19

spread of a once-in-a-century global pandemic. See EO 53, p. 1; EO 55, p. 1.

c. Instead, Lighthouse argues that Virginia’s temporary gatherings restriction

discriminates against religious exercise for two reasons. Both lack merit.

i. Lighthouse insists that the gathering restriction is discriminatory because it

specifically mentions “religious” gatherings. Dkt. 3 at 6–7; Compl. ¶ 31. But, as this Court has

already concluded, EO 55 “merely uses religious gatherings as one of several examples of ‘all

public and private in-person gatherings.’” Dkt. 16 at 10. Put differently, the reference is intended

to demonstrate that “all gatherings” really means “all gatherings.” EO 55 ¶ 2; see id. (“All public

and private in-person gatherings of more than ten individuals are prohibited. This includes

parties, celebrations, religious, or other social events, whether they occur indoor or outdoor.”)

(emphasis added). The temporary gatherings restriction draws no distinction between religious

and non-religious “gatherings,” which is precisely what makes it religiously neutral.

ii. Lighthouse and the Federal Government also assert that the temporary gatherings

restriction is not generally applicable because “businesses such as liquor stores, warehouse clubs,

supercenter stores, and even ‘non-essential’ retail stores are exempted from the broad

prohibitions” on gatherings. Dkt. 3 at 7; see Dkt. 19 at 6–7, 14–16. Lighthouse acknowledges

that the Executive Orders “prohibit ‘all gatherings,’” but insist that the Orders “define ‘all

gatherings’ to exclude large crowds and masses of people gathered at numerous businesses and

other non-religious entities.” Dkt. 3 at 8 (emphasis added). According to Lighthouse and the

Federal Government, “‘religious’ gatherings of more than 10 individuals are prohibited, but

large numbers of people may gather at liquor, warehouse, and supercenter stores.” Id.; see Dkt.

19 at 6 (“The Orders, however, permit various secular activities resulting in gatherings of more

than ten people.”). And, having so interpreted the Orders, Lighthouse argues that the failure to


20

specifically exempt religious services shows that the Governor determined that “the

governmental interests [he] seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct

with religious motivation.” Dkt. 3 at 8 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543).20

That argument is built on a misreading of Virginia’s specific COVID-19 Orders. In

particular, Lighthouse and the Federal Government elide the distinction between the temporary

gatherings restriction (which applies to religious gatherings) and the separate, business-related

provisions (which neither expand nor limit the temporary gatherings restriction).

The overarching purpose of both Executive Orders is “minimizing the spread of COVID-

19” by limiting “[u]nnecessary person-to-person contact.” Note 9, supra. Both EO 53 and EO 55

implement that purpose in two steps: first, by announcing a globally applicable restriction; and

second, by announcing more targeted restrictions applicable only to certain organizations or

activities. EO 53, for example, begins by announcing a rule that governs all people in Virginia:

for a limited time, “all public and private in person gatherings” of a certain size are prohibited

regardless of the nature of the gathering or the identity of the people participating. EO 53 ¶ 1

(emphasis added). EO 53 then creates separate and additional frameworks that govern particular

businesses, organizations, and activities—many of which impose restrictions that sweep far

beyond the general restrictions that apply to all gatherings. See, e.g., EO 53 ¶ 3 (requiring

“[c]losure of all dining . . . areas in restaurants,” regardless of the number of people present); ¶ 4

(requiring “[c]losure of all public access” to specifically enumerated “recreational and

entertainment businesses”). In the same vein, EO 55 begins with two universal restrictions (a

20 The Federal Government also suggests that the Orders are not religiously neutral because

there is a “value judgment inherent in providing exemptions for secular activities that impact the Commonwealth’s interests while not providing exemptions for Plaintiff’s religious activities.” Dkt. 19 at 16. No such judgment has been made. As explained in the text, the “exemptions” on which the Federal Government’s argument relies are not exemptions at all.


21

stay-at-home order and temporary gatherings ban), see EO 55 ¶¶ 1–2, and then sets forth

additional restrictions applying to certain entities or locations, ¶¶ 3–5.

Because the temporary gatherings restriction and the business-related provisions operate

independently, any status conferred upon a given business does not alter its employees’ or

customers’ obligation to adhere to the temporary gatherings restriction. Whether a given business

is “[e]ssential,” EO 53 ¶ 5, non-essential, ¶ 4, or “recreational,” ¶ 3, for example, impacts only

the number of patrons permitted inside a given facility at any given time. But those labels have

no impact on whether any employees or customers (if any) may gather once they are inside those

businesses. Even inside an essential retail business (for example, a grocery store), patrons are

still prohibited from congregating in groups of “more than 10 individuals” because the temporary

gatherings restriction forbids “all public and private in person gatherings,” regardless of their

location. EO 53 ¶ 1; accord EO 55 ¶ 2.

This distinction accords with the plain meaning of the term “gathering” and the reasons

Governor Northam has temporarily prohibited them. Cf. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566

U.S. 560, 566 (2012) (“When a term goes undefined in a statute, [courts] give the term its

ordinary meaning.”). “The purpose of any gathering—be it social, religious, or educational—is

to bring people together to communicate and interact with each other for a sustained period of

time.” Oliver Decl. ¶ 22. “By contrast, people who happen to run errands or shop at the same

time do not go to the store with the purpose of staying and interacting with others; instead, they

pick up what they need and leave.” Id. Indeed, “[i]ndividuals observing social distancing

requirements will actually do the opposite of ‘gathering’ when they venture out to gather

supplies—they will intentionally avoid other individuals and maintain as much separation as

possible.” Id. “For these reasons, brief incidental contact at a grocery store or bank poses less of


22

a risk of spreading COVID-19 than a gathering of more than 10 individuals that purposefully

brings people into contact for some duration of time.” Id.

The three photos of superstore parking lots cited by Lighthouse (see Compl. ¶¶ 59–60)

illustrate the point. Simply by visiting those stores, patrons are not “gathering” in any ordinary

sense of the word. Those patrons are not engaged in any sort of “meeting” or “assembly,”21 nor

do they constitute “a party” in which “many people come together as a group.”22 Were they,

however, to “come together as a group” to hold such a “meeting” or “assembly,” those patrons

would violate the temporary gatherings restriction, even if they were located inside an essential

retail business’s facility when they did so. So too would a group of more than 10 employees

“gathering in conference rooms or any other part of [an] office[].” Dkt. 19 at 15.

If there were any doubt about the manner in which the various provisions operate, the

Governor has issued guidance that removes it. That guidance—which is published on Virginia’s

official coronavirus website—specifically explains that, although the Executive Orders also

place certain limits on the operation of businesses, “[t]he Gathering Ban and the restrictions

imposed on businesses and other entities are distinct requirements.” FAQ (attached as Ex. 3) at

2–3. “The Gathering Ban,” it explains, imposes a “mandate on every individual in the

Commonwealth to refrain from congregating in close physical proximity to ten or more other

individuals, regardless of location.” Id. (emphasis added). And although various provisions of

the Governor’s Executive Orders permit more than 10 people to be present at a given “building,

facility, or worksite” at a specific time, the guidance explains that “[t]he mere presence of more

than 10 people working inside a business’ building, facility, or worksite is not a ‘gathering’ so

21 Gathering, Definition (Merriam-Webster), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gathering (last visited May 6, 2020).

22 Gathering, Definition (Cambridge Dictionary), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/ dictionary/english/gathering (last visited May 6, 2020).


https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/gathering

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/gathering

23

long as such individuals do not congregate in a single physical space.” Id. 23

In short, Lighthouse and the Federal Government are simply wrong in asserting that

“liquor stores, warehouse clubs, supercenter stores, and even ‘non-essential’ retail stores are

exempted” from the temporary gatherings restriction, Dkt. 3 at 7, or that “the Orders do not limit

the ability of employees of any non-retail business, including but not limited to professional

services businesses, to gather.” Dkt. 19 at 6. The plain text of the Executive Orders prohibits “all

public and private in person gatherings.” EO 53 ¶ 1 (emphasis added); accord EO 55 ¶ 2.24

d. Because the temporary gatherings restriction is “a neutral government decision of

general applicability,” it “is subject to rational basis review, even [though] it has the incidental

effect of burdening religious exercise.” Jesus Christ Is the Answer Ministries, Inc. v. Baltimore

Cty., 915 F.3d 256, 265 (4th Cir. 2019). That bar is easily cleared here.

“To pass muster under rational basis review, [government action] need only be rationally

related to a legitimate government interest.” Capital Associated Indus., Inc. v. Stein, 922 F.3d

198, 210 (4th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The legitimacy of the

23 The Federal Government likewise misreads EO 55’s second paragraph as “excluding from the ten-person gathering limit any business ‘not required to close to the public under Executive Order 53.’” Dkt. 19 at 6 (quoting EO 55 ¶ 2(a) (emphasis added)). That provision provides that “[t]his restriction”—that is, the prohibition on “in-person gatherings of more than ten individuals”—“does not apply to” two things: (1) “the operation of businesses not required to close to the public under Executive Order 53; and (2) “the gathering of family members living in the same residence.” EO 55 ¶ 2 (emphasis added). Only the (unchallenged) family-members provision is framed as an exception to the ban on “gatherings.” And, as noted in the text, the Governor has made clear the gatherings restriction “is a mandate on every individual in the Commonwealth to refrain from congregating in close physical proximity to ten or more other individuals, regardless of location” and that the role of ¶ 2(a) of EO 55 is simply to underscore that the “mere presence of more than 10 people working inside a business’ building, facility, or worksite is not a ‘gathering’ so long as such individuals do not congregate in a single physical space.” FAQ at 2–3 (emphasis added).

24 Although the complaint also includes a photograph of Governor Northam’s press briefing, Compl. ¶ 58, neither Lighthouse nor the Federal Government argues that governmental efforts to keep the public informed about an ongoing emergency prevent measures to address that emergency from being generally applicable.


24

government’s interest in saving lives and protecting public health during a crisis of this

magnitude cannot reasonably be questioned. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485

(1995) (“[T]he Government [] has a significant interest in protecting the health, safety, and

welfare of its citizens.”); Workman v. Mingo Cty. Bd. of Educ., 419 Fed. Appx. 348, 353 (4th

Cir. 2011) (noting that a “state’s wish to prevent the spread of communicable diseases . . .

constitutes a compelling interest”). And the temporary gatherings restriction is rationally related

to that interest because all available evidence supports the commonsense proposition that

minimizing in-person gatherings helps prevent the spread of a respiratory disease that has proven

to be particularly deadly in crowds. See Oliver Decl. ¶ 20.

2. The Establishment Clause

Lighthouse next re-casts almost precisely the same argument under the Establishment

Clause. See Dkt. 3 at 9–12. Relying on a recent decision involving a different gatherings

restriction issued by a different Governor in a different State, Lighthouse asserts (at 10) that the

temporary gatherings restriction violates the Establishment Clause because “religious gatherings

were ‘targeted for stricter treatment due to the nature of the activity involved.’” (quoting First

Baptist Church v. Kelly, No. 20-1102-JWB, 2020 WL 1910021, at *7 (D. Kan. Apr. 18, 2020)).

As previously explained, Lighthouse is wrong about how Virginia’s temporary gatherings

restriction works. And, even if Lighthouse were right, there would be no violation of the

Establishment Clause (as opposed to the Free Exercise Clause).

There are “three evils” against which the Establishment Clause “afford[s] protection:

sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Lighthouse does not even attempt to argue that Governor Northam has engaged in any of these

activities. Quite the contrary: this entire suit is premised on the contention that the Governor is


25

suppressing religious worship.

As this Court has already concluded, “no reasonable observer would believe the Orders

disapprove of any particular religion or of religion generally.” Dkt. 16 at 18. Nor could Pastor

Young’s citation for violating the Order “reasonably [be] viewed as an ‘excessive

entanglement.’” Id. at 19. Accordingly, Lighthouse has not even identified—much less shown it

is likely to succeed on—a claim under the Establishment Clause.

3. The Free Speech and Assembly Clauses

Lighthouse offers several theories for why the temporary gatherings restriction violates

the First Amendment’s free speech and assembly guaranties. Dkt. 3 at 12–19. 25 None is likely to

succeed. To the extent that the gatherings restriction indirectly restricts speech (by Lighthouse or

anyone else), it represents a permissible content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction.26

a. The temporary gathering restriction is content-neutral, and therefore subject to (at

most) intermediate scrutiny. See Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 512–13 (4th

Cir. 2002). “The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . in time, place, or manner

cases . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement

with the message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Courts

generally determine whether a given restriction is “justified without reference to the content of

the regulated speech,” id., by examining how the regulation defines what is and what is not

25 Although Lighthouse grounds these claims in its “rights to speech and assembly,” Dkt.

3 at 12 (emphasis added), it offers no independent analysis for any right-of-assembly claim. For that reason, this memorandum analyzes the two claims simultaneously.

26 As an alternative rationale, this Court applied the similar test from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1989), which looks to whether a restriction with incidental effects on expressive conduct is “within the constitutional power of the Government . . . furthers an important or substantial governmental interest . . . unrelated to the suppression of free expression . . . [and] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Id. at 376. As the Court concluded, the gathering restriction easily passes that test. Dkt. 16 at 21–22.


26

permissible speech. The Supreme Court has, for example, held impermissible a restriction that

identified prohibited speech “not in terms of time, place, and manner, but in terms of subject

matter.” Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).

The temporary gatherings restriction is not based on the content—or even the existence—

of constitutionally protected speech. That restriction prohibits “[a]ll public and private in-person

gatherings of more than 10 individuals,” EO 55 ¶ 2, regardless of what happens at those

gatherings. Nor does the purpose of the temporary gathering restriction have anything to do with

the content of any speech it may incidentally limit. Accordingly, the “less demanding”

intermediate scrutiny standard applies. Carandola, 303 F.3d at 513.

b. When reviewing content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, courts

“engage[] in a two-part analysis”: “determin[ing] whether the regulation materially advances an

important or substantial interest”; and, if so, “ask[ing] whether the regulation is narrowly tailored

to serve that interest.” American Entertainers, L.L.C. v. City of Rocky Mount, N.C., 888 F.3d

707, 716 (4th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). Both requirements

are satisfied here.

i. The importance of the government’s interest in preserving lives and health during

a global pandemic requires little discussion. “The Government [] has a significant interest in

protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens,” Rubin, 514 U.S. at 485, and a “state’s

wish to prevent the spread of communicable diseases . . . constitutes a compelling interest.”

Workman, 419 Fed. Appx. at 353. The temporary gathering restriction also materially advances

that interest by implementing social-distancing measures designed “to mitigate the spread of the

[virus] and its effects on Virginians.” EO 53, p.1; see also Oliver Decl. ¶¶ 16–17.

ii. Executive Order 53’s temporary gathering restriction is also “narrowly tailored to


27

serve [the relevant] interest.” American Entertainers, 888 F.3d at 716. For these purposes, “[a]

regulation is narrowly tailored . . . if it ‘promotes a substantial government interest that would be

achieved less effectively absent the regulation’ and does not ‘burden substantially more speech

than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.’” Ross v. Early, 746 F.3d 546,

552–53 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). The temporary gatherings restriction

directly promotes the interest in preserving life and safety by implementing targeted social-

distancing measures that reflect the recommendations of public health officials across the

country. See Dkt. 19 at 9 (describing CDC guidelines). And the temporary gathering restriction

does not burden “substantially more speech than is necessary,” Ross, 746 F.3d at 552–53, both

because it is limited in time and because it tracks exactly the 10-person number public health

officials have identified. See Oliver Decl. ¶¶ 18, 21–24. As this Court explained, “[t]he

substantial interest in slowing the spread of this highly contagious virus and saving human life

would be achieved less effectively if more people . . . are permitted to gather in groups larger

than ten.” Dkt. 16 at 25.

c. Finally, the temporary gatherings restriction leaves “open ample alternative

channels for communication of [] information,” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, including all forms of

communication that do not involve being together in person, as well as communication through

in-person groups of fewer than 10 people. And to the extent that gathering in groups of larger

than 10 has advantages over gathering in groups of 10 or fewer, “there is no reason to believe

that these same advantages cannot be obtained through other means, such as gathering in groups

of ten or fewer multiple times per day or week, mailing letters, sending emails, livestreaming

services, posting services on YouTube, Facebook, or other free internet platforms, or deploying


28

some combination of all these methods.” Dkt. 16 at 25 (quotation marks omitted).27

Lighthouse’s state law challenge would likely fail even under the standards applicable to non-emergency measures

Lighthouse’s final argument is that the temporary gatherings restriction violates § 57-2.02

of the Code of Virginia. As previously explained, this Court cannot grant injunctive relief against

state officials based on violations of state law. See p. 13, supra.

Lighthouse’s state law claim also fails on the merits. Lighthouse relies (at 19–20) on Va.

Code Ann. § 57-2.02(b), which provides that “[n]o government entity shall substantially burden

a person’s free exercise of religion” unless the “application of the burden to the person” satisfies

strict scrutiny. But even assuming that a temporary restriction on the number of parishioners who

may attend in-person services at one time constitutes a substantial burden (but see Dkt. 16 at 28–

30), the statute also provides that “[n]othing in this section shall prevent any governmental

institution or facility from maintaining health, safety, security or discipline.” § 57-2.02(e).

The plain terms of § 57-2.02(e) plainly encompass emergency measures taken to preserve

life and curb the spread of a pandemic.28 The temporary gatherings restriction is explicitly

grounded in concerns about “health” and “safety.” § 57-2.02(e). When the Governor announced

the temporary gatherings restriction, he made clear that “[p]rotecting the health and ensuring the

safety of every Virginian is my highest priority.”29 And when the Governor amended EO 53 to

extend some of its provisions, he did so because he found it “necessary to extend certain

27 As this Court observed, Lighthouse’s argument that the temporary gatherings

restriction is “an unconstitutional prior restraint,” Dkt. 3 at 15, fails because there is no prior restraint at issue, Dkt. 16 at 21 n.2. And Lighthouse’s “unconstitutional discretion” claim fails because the Orders are “clearly outside the bounds of [the] case law” on which it relies. Id. at 27.

28 To the extent there is any ambiguity (see Dkt. 16 at 30), it is Lighthouse that “must establish that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.

29 Note 9, supra.


29

measures previously undertaken to ensure the safety and wellbeing of Virginians.” EO 53, p.1.

Through its state law claim, Lighthouse seeks to enjoin precisely the kind of government

action the General Assembly saw fit to protect under § 57-2.02: measures intended to

“maintain[] health [and] safety” of Virginians. Va. Code § 57-2.02(e). If § 57-2.02(e) did not

apply in these circumstances, it is not clear why it would have been included at all.

III. The balance of equities and public interest factors independently foreclose injunctive relief

1. It is important to define the precise “harm” Lighthouse seeks to prevent. No

Executive Order requires Lighthouse to close its doors or prevents it from holding in-person

worship services of 10 people or fewer. Contra Dkt. 3 at 1 (asserting that the Orders prohibit

“gathering for worship services”). No Order prevents Lighthouse from holding an online service.

And here—unlike the situations discussed in various out-of-state cases on which Lighthouse and

the Federal Government rely—there is nothing to prevent Lighthouse from hosting a service of

any size so long as participants stay in vehicles and observe social distancing. See pp. 5‒6,

supra.30 That does not mean, of course, that Lighthouse’s congregants—like others who

generally meet in larger, in-person groups—have experienced no loss. But it does mean that any

harm in this case is limited to the inability to host a service involving more than 10 people.

2. The harm Lighthouse will experience if this Court denies the requested injunction

must be balanced against the catastrophic and permanent harm that others could suffer if the

Court grants one. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. Here, the almost inevitable result of granting the

30 For that reason (as well as several others), the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Maryville

Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No. 20-5427, slip op. (6th Cir. May 2, 2020) (per curiam), does not support injunctive relief. In that case, the Court made clear that it enjoined the executive order in question only insofar as it prevented the drive-in church services. Id. at 9; accord On Fire Christian Center, Inc. v. Fischer, No. 3:20-cv-264-JRW, 2020 WL 1820249 (W.D. Ky. April 11, 2020) (same). Governor Northam’s Orders do not prohibit such activities.


30

requested relief would be increased transmission of a deadly disease for which there is currently

no cure. Indeed, granting Lighthouse the relief it seeks—the ability to meet in gatherings of any

size—could easily transform the very services to which people turn for comfort into the kind of

“hothouses for the virus” that have “exacerbate[ed] outbreaks” across the country. Wilson et al.,

supra note 3. And, of course, the risk posed by large public gatherings is not confined to the

worshipers who choose to participate. Oliver Decl. ¶ 6. Instead, the virus spreads rapidly

throughout communities, and, as healthcare systems become overrun, patients and healthcare

workers suffer. ¶¶ 8, 15, 20, 25.31 In places like Accomack that are already under significant

strain from existing outbreaks, the risk to the healthcare system is all the more severe.

* * *

As this Court has observed, “[i]t is no exaggeration to recognize that the stakes for

residents of the Commonwealth are life-or death.” Dkt. 16 at 32. For that reason and others,

Lighthouse has not shown that it is entitled to the extraordinary relief it seek.

CONCLUSION

The motion for an injunction pending appeal should be denied.

31 For those reasons, it is difficult to fathom (much less calculate) the size of the bond that

would be required to “secure” the “rights” to public health and safety that would be threatened were this Court to grant the requested injunction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d).


31

Respectfully submitted, RALPH NORTHAM By: /s/ Toby J. Heytens Toby J. Heytens

Counsel for Defendant

Mark R. Herring Attorney General

Erin B. Ashwell (VSB No. 79538) Chief Deputy Attorney General

Victoria N. Pearson (VSB No. 48648) Samuel T. Towell (VSB No. 71512)

Deputy Attorneys General

Jacqueline C. Hedblom (VSB No. 68234) Assistant Attorney General

Toby J. Heytens (VSB No. 90788) Solicitor General

Michelle S. Kallen (VSB No. 93286) Martine E. Cicconi (VSB No. 94542)

Deputy Solicitors General

Jessica Merry Samuels (VSB No. 89537) Assistant Solicitor General

Zachary R. Glubiak (VSB No. 93984) John Marshall Fellow

Office of the Attorney General 202 North Ninth Street Richmond, Virginia 23219 (804) 786-7240 – Telephone (804) 371-0200 – Facsimile [email protected]


32

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 7, 2020, a true and accurate copy of this paper was filed

electronically with the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will then send a notification of such

filing to the parties.

By:

/s/ Toby J. Heytens

Toby J. Heytens


Exhibit 1

Case 2:20-cv-00204-AWA-RJK Document 36-1 Filed 05/07/20 Page 1 of 12 PageID# 327












Exhibit 2






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Exhibit 4





Documents

DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S …