Culture and Military Doctrine- France Between the Wars

Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the WarsAuthor(s): Elizabeth KierSource: International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring, 1995), pp. 65-93Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539120 .Accessed: 04/11/2013 11:12

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Culture and Elizabeth Kier Military Doctrine

France between the Wars

Offensive military doctrines threaten international stability' World War I vividly illustrates how a crisis can spark a major war that might have been avoided if the major players had had defensive rather than offensive doctrines. Similarly, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Army's offensive doctrine in Europe fueled the arms race and heightened threat perception. The choice between offensive and defensive military doctrines is at least as important now as during the Cold War. Al- though restructuring military doctrines along defensive orientations will not erase ethnic hostilities or suspend territorial appetites, it could remove one of the structural impediments to cooperation in the post-Cold War world. Yet an adequate explanation for why states choose offensive or defensive military doctrines remains elusive.

Many scholars credit civilian policymakers with formulating doctrine well- suited to the state's strategic environment, and blame the armed services' parochial interests for the sometimes disastrous choice of offensive doctrines.2 However, using illustrations from doctrinal developments in the French army during the 1920s and 1930s, this article challenges this portrait of the role of civilians and military in choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. Even during times of increased international threat, I argue, the international system is indeterminate of choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines; civilians intervene infrequently in doctrinal develop-

Elizabeth Kier is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley.

I would like to thank Martha Finnemore, lain Johnston, Susan Peterson, Alan Rousso, Jack Snyder, Steve Weber, and especially, Jonathan Mercer for their thoughtful comments and criticism. Thanks also to Cate Knapp for research assistance. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1993.

1. For discussions and debate about the destabilizing effects of offensive military doctrines, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; Stephen Van Evera, "The Causes of War" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1984); and numerous articles in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, and Stephen Van Evera, eds., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War, rev. and exp. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991). 2. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1984);

International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93 ? 1995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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International Security 19:4 | 66

ments; and most important, civilian concerns about the military's power within the state often have the greatest effect on doctrinal developments.

In addition, the French case highlights the analytical limitations of assuming that military organizations prefer offensive doctrines; concerns about increas- ing their size, autonomy, and prestige do not, I argue, drive doctrinal developments within the military. Not only do these goals have little to do with type of military doctrine, but military organizations often forfeit the attainment of these goals. This is true even in the case of the preference for greater resources. Furthermore, without civilian prompting, military organizations often ostracize those officers advocating a more offensive orientation, and willingly and dogmatically endorse defensive doctrines.

In this article, I argue that choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines are best understood from a cultural perspective.3 There are two parts to my argument. First, military doctrine is rarely a carefully calculated response to the external environment. Instead, civilian policymakers have beliefs about the military's role in society, and these beliefs guide civilian decisions about the organizational form of the military Civilian decision-makers must first address their concerns about the domestic distribution of power before they consider international incentives. These civilian decisions affect later doctrinal developments.

Second, military organizations do not inherently prefer offensive doctrines: their preferences cannot be deduced from functional characteristics and gener- alized across all military organizations. Military organizations differ in how they view their world and the proper conduct of their mission, and these organizational cultures constrain choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. In particular, the military's organizational culture guides how it responds to constraints set by civilian policymakers. Understanding vari- ations in organizational behavior requires an analysis of cultural characteristics and of how these characteristics shape militaries' choices between offensive and defensive doctrines.

In adopting a culturalist approach to the question of the determinants of offensive and defensive doctrines, this article is part of a larger debate in the social sciences between the intersubjective, cultural, and constructivist ap-

3. For a full discussion of the ideas presented in this paper, see Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).


Culture and Military Doctrine | 67

proaches and the more conventional structural, functional, and "rationalistic" methods. While the former approach never disappeared, we have recently seen a resurgence of interest in the influence of ideational factors on political phe- nomena, especially in international relations scholarship.4

Those using a culturalist approach argue that actors' preferences cannot be deduced from structural conditions or functional needs. In many instances, we must understand an actor's culture in order to make sense of its choices. Independent exigencies such as the distribution of power, geographic factors, or technological discoveries are important, but culture is not simply derivative of functional demands or structural imperatives. Culture has independent explanatory power. This is especially the case in choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines: the preferences the civilians and the military bring to doctrinal decisions respond to cultural more than to structural or functional characteristics. Preferences are endogenous; they must be understood within their cultural context.

The first section of this article outlines the roles both of domestic politics and of the military's organizational culture in the origins of military doctrine. The next section uses this argument to explain doctrinal developments in the French army during the 1920s and 1930s.5 This is followed by an elaboration of how culture affects choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines, and a discussion of methodological strategies for gauging culture's explanatory power. I then assess the most powerful alternative explanations of choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines, and close with a brief discussion of policy implications.

Culture and Doctrine

I argue that military doctrine is primarily the product of domestic political and organizational factors. Civilian elites hold beliefs about the nature of military force and the military's role in society These beliefs-such as the value of

4. For example, see Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Com- munity," in Beverly Crawford, ed., The Future of European Security (Berkeley: International and Area Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1992); Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-426. 5. The arguments presented in this article are based on a study of the French and British army and air force during the interwar period. For a discussion of case selection see Kier, Imagining War.



conscription or of a particular type of army-establish constraints. But these constraints do not determine choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. Instead, it is how a military's organizational culture responds to these constraints that determines doctrine. Other militaries would not respond similarly; constrained within an organization that has powerful assimilating mechanisms, the officer corps "sees" only certain doctrinal options. Domestic politics set constraints; the military's culture interprets these constraints; the organizational culture is the intervening variable between civilian decisions and military doctrine.6

THE DOMESTIC BALANCE OF POWER

Military doctrine is about state survival, but military policy also affects the allocation of power within the state. Thus, designing military policy requires that policymakers consider, first and foremost, how the distribution of power at the domestic level affects their own interests.

Civilian choices in military policy often reflect fears about the distribution of power within the state. In Britain, for example, civilians have sought for centuries to avoid the creation of an efficient and centralized army that could threaten parliamentary sovereignty Any potential increase in military efficiency would have to yield to civilian insistence on stifling the growth of a strong military caste whose interests might be at odds with the state. Similarly, the relatively poor condition of the Austrian army in the 1890s corresponded to the Magyars' fears of the domestic repercussions of a strong army, and not to the requirements of Austria's position in the international system.7 It is hardly surprising that Madison and Hamilton devoted substantial portions of The Federalist Papers to explaining that the proposed military institutions would not threaten domestic interests.8

Such concerns about the distribution of power within the state become institutionalized and shape decision-makers' views of military policy In many instances, they persist past their initial formulation, so that when civilians make decisions about military policy, their choices reflect their country's past experience with the armed services and the role that the military played in securing a particular distribution of power within the state.

6. I have used Barry Posen's definitions of offensive and defensive military doctrines. See Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 13-15. 7. FR. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: the Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 255. 8. For example, see Nos. 8, 24, and 26 by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers, Clinton Rossiter, ed. (New York: New American Library, 1961).



To capture the role of domestic politics in choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines, I focus on political-military subcultures; that is, civilian policymakers' beliefs about the role of armed force in the domestic arena. The composition of the subculture varies from state to state and among political actors in a state; at its heart are a number of important questions about the military's power within the state. For example, what is the perception of the role of the military in society? Do domestic political actors fear the latent force inherent in military organizations? Many of the answers originate in each state's experience with the military in the state-building process.

In some countries, all important political actors share the same view of the military In the 1920s and 1930s, this was the case for Great Britain, where there was general agreement across the political spectrum about the role of the armed forces in society In other countries, as in France during the same period, there are several competing conceptions. As discussed later, whether there is one or more than one subculture affects the causal role of cultural factors. However, in either case, civilian decisions rarely determine doctrine; the military's organizational culture works within the constraints set by civilians.

THE MILITARY S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Borrowing from the work on organizational culture, I argue that making sense of military choices between offensive and defensive doctrines requires an understanding of the military's culture.9 Organizations' perceptions of their world frame their decisions; this is particularly true of "total" institutions like the military. Few organizations devote as many resources to the assimilation of their members. The emphasis on ceremony and tradition, and the development of a common language and esprit de corps, testify to the strength of the military's organizational culture.10

The culture of an organization shapes its members' perceptions and affects what they notice and how they interpret it: it screens out some parts of reality while magnifying others. I define organizational culture as the set of basic assumptions and values that shape shared understandings, and the forms or practices whereby these meanings are expressed, affirmed, and communicated

9. For useful introductions into the work on organizational culture, see Andrew Pettigrew, "On Studying Organizational Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1979), pp. 570-581; and the following special issues: Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (September 1983); and Organization Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1986). 10. For an application of this concept to security studies, see Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War H (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, forthcoming 1995).



to the members of an organization. I have divided the components of the military's culture into the values and attitudes relevant to the military's relationship with its external environment, and those that affect the internal work- ings of the organization. For example, what is the military's relationship with the state? Does it feel accepted and valued by dominant political actors? Similarly, what skills do the officer corps value: do they model their behavior on the modern-day business manager or the warrior and heroic leader?

Determining the culture of a military organization requires an extensive reading of archival, historical, and other public documents, including curricula at military academies, training manuals, personal histories of officers, internal communications in the armed services, and leading military journals. It is important to look for who or what is considered deviant or taboo in the culture and what it is about such people or beliefs that conflicts with the organization's culture.

Militaries' beliefs shape how the organization responds to changes in its external environment, but not all militaries share the same collection of ideas about armed force.11 Not all military organizations would react similarly to the same constraints set by civilian policymakers. For example, although a civilian decision about the length of conscription severely constrained what the French army thought was possible, differing lengths of conscription has had little effect on German or British army choices.

"Military culture" does not mean military mind; it does not refer to a general set of values and attitudes that all militaries share. All military organizations can be classified according to a basic set of components, but not all military organizations share the same mixture of values and attitudes. Nor is this an argument about strategic culture.12 Organizational culture refers to the collec- tively held beliefs within a particular military organization, not to the beliefs held by civilian policymakers. Finally, organizational culture is not the primor- dial notion sometimes found in analyses of strategic culture: the military's organizational culture is not equivalent to the national character.13 The military's culture may reflect some aspects of the civilian society's culture, but this

11. The military's organizational culture influences how it interprets all incoming information, whether from the domestic or the international environment. 12. For example, see Alastair I. Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming 1995). 13. Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 5-31.



is not necessarily the case. The military's powerful assimilation processes can displace the influence of the civilian society.14

Focusing exclusively on either domestic politics or the military's organizational culture provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient explanation of choices between offensive and defensive doctrines. Choices by civilian policymakers set constraints-the length of conscription or type of army-but these constraints do not determine doctrine. Instead, a military's organizational culture must work within these constraints. But the organizational culture alone also does not explain doctrine. There must be some change in the external environment of the organization-primarily as a result of domestic politics-to which the organizational culture reacts.

French Military Doctrine, 1919-39

The Maginot Line has come to symbolize the highly defensive doctrine that the French army took to war in 1939. The events that led to the construction of the Maginot Line and its accompanying operational doctrine resulted from domestic conflict over military policy and the limits imposed by the French army's culture. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the left and right had fought over the organizational form of the army While the right demanded a professional army that, in its view, could insure domestic order and stability, the left feared that a professional army would do the bidding of the reactionary segments of society, and believed that only militia or reserve forces could guarantee the survival of the French Republic.15 Driven by this preoccupation, a coalition of center and left-wing parties reduced the length of conscription to one year in 1928.

This civilian decision did not force the French army to adopt a defensive doctrine. The politicians established the organizational form of the army, but it was the French army's organizational culture that sealed France's fate. An- other military organization could have responded differently to a constraint that, in the French army's eyes, left them only one option. Despite evidence

14. Although this article does not address the origins of military culture, it highlights two important issues: that culture is not merely a reflection of structural conditions, nor is it simply being used instrumentally. For an extended discussion of the origins of military cultures see Kier, Imagining War. 15. Standing or professional armies are composed of volunteer (regular) soldiers serving during peacetime and war; conscript and militia armies are composed of citizen-soldiers who are normally employed in the civilian sector but are liable for military service during a national emergency.



from the German army, French officers could not see that conscript armies were good for anything but defensive doctrines. In their view, only years of service could endow a soldier with the necessary skills for offensive warfare.

Despite the compelling strategic environment, French policymakers responded to domestic, not international factors when deciding on the organizational structure of the army The reduction in the term of conscription to one year responded to the left's fear of domestic threats, not to German capabilities or alliance diplomacy The army reacted to this decision within the constraints of its organizational culture. Instead of choosing an offensive doctrine as posited by functional arguments, the French army adopted a defensive doctrine.

COMPETING POLITICAL-MILITARY SUBCULTURES

Within months of the signing of the 1918 Armistice, the old political struggle reemerged between the French left and right over the organizational form of the French army The left called for an army based on short-term conscripts.16 In the left's view, it was imperative that the army not be a separate caste, isolated from society and imbued with military values. If the army were able to retain the conscript for several years, it would be able to elicit passive obedience and to use this force for domestic repression. A writer in L'Humanite explained that, "the fear of a popular army tied to the masses haunts the chief of staff. As class warfare worsens, the army leaders increasingly attempt to recruit soldiers whom they hope to make into docile instruments." 17 In the left's view, it was only by eliminating the professional army that the threat to French democracy would diminish.

Fear of the latent domestic force of a professional army had dominated leftist rhetoric and legislative agendas since the Franco-Prussian war. The left's military projects ranged from the establishment of a purely militia force to an army composed primarily of reserves with a small professional core. Integral to each position was a short length of conscription and the abolition or subordination of the professional component of the army During parliamentary debates over the length of conscription in the early 1920s, a radical socialist declared that "it is necessary that France have the army of its policies; but I do not want France

16. For illustrations of the left's subculture see Jean Jaures, L'armee nouvelle (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1977); and Joseph Monteilhet, Les Institutions militaires de la France (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1932). 17. Paul Vaillant-Couturier, "Obeissance passive et l'armee de metier," L'Humanite, July 5, 1934, p. 1.



to carry out the policies of her army."18 The left feared the repressive power of a professional army

In contrast, the French right preferred the retention of a professional army The right, too, believed that the number of years that the soldier served in the ranks determined whether or not the army could be relied upon to maintain the status quo. In a domestic crisis, only soldiers toughened by many years of strict discipline could be depended upon to guarantee social stability and the preservation of law and order. Creating citizen-soldiers would, in their view, strengthen the revolutionary forces in society In the nineteenth century, Louis Adolphe Thiers declared that he did not want "obligatory military service which will enflame passions and put a rifle on the shoulder of all the socialists; I want a professional army, solid, disciplined, and capable of eliciting respect at home and abroad."19

Whereas the left sought to avoid a deep divide between the army and society by minimizing the length of conscription, the right wanted to keep the conscript under arms for at least two years. While the right agreed that a shorter military service was sufficient to train soldiers in the technical aspects of the trade, it argued for more time to create the necessary obedience.20 Before the parliament, Horace de Choiseul explained this process: "A soldier that has served for one year has learned without doubt to use his weapons, but he has not learned to obey; his character has not been subjugated, his will has not been broken; he has not yet become what makes an army strong: obeissance passive."21 Developed in the eighteenth century to fight against insubordination and insure obedience whoever the adversary, this autocratic conception of command insured, in Gouvion-Saint Cyr's words, that orders should be followed "literally, without a murmur or hesitation."22

Remembering the worker's revolt of 1848 and hardened by their experience during the Commune, the right felt that one of the army's chief tasks was to preserve peace at home. As the Germans were approaching Paris in 1940,

18. Quoted in Edouard Bonnefous, Histoire politique de la Troisieme Republique, Vol. 3, L'apres-guerre (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), p. 311. 19. Quotation from Joseph Monteilhet, "L'avenement de la nation armee," Revue des e'tudes Napoleoniennes (September-October 1918), p. 51. 20. General Jules Louis Lewal, Contre le service de deux ans (Paris: Librairie Militaire de Baudoin, 1895), pp. 46-52 and 77; and Richard D. Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 85-87. 21. Quoted in Monteilhet, Institutions militaires, p. 166. 22. Quoted in Serge William Sherman, Le corps de officiers franqais sous la deuxieme republique et le second empire (These presentee devant l'universite de Paris IV, 18 December 1976), p. 718.



General Maxime Weygand, the commander in chief of the French army, reveal- ingly declared that "Ah! If only I could be sure the Germans would leave me the necessary forces to maintain order!"23

Although French civilians of both right and left were acutely aware of their weakness relative to Germany, it was their perception of domestic rather than international threats that shaped the pivotal decision about the French army's organizational structure. A collection of center and left-wing parties captured the parliament in 1924, and within three years adopted a series of bills that established the organizational structure of the army The left's agenda had triumphed; the length of conscription was reduced to one year. The reason for the left's rejection of the longer service had nothing to do with Germany, Britain, or the Eastern allies. As the head of the Socialist Party, Leon Blum, warned, a longer term of service would "be a danger for republican liberties, that is to say for domestic peace."24

THE FRENCH ARMY S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

The French army objected to the shorter term of service, but once it was adopted, the army had no choice but to design a doctrine around this decision. However, nothing about a shorter length of service objectively required the switch in 1928 to a defensive doctrine. The French army had an offensive orientation in the 1920s, and this could have continued; an offensive doctrine was objectively possible. The French army did not suffer from a lack of financial support; the requisite material for armored warfare could have been acquired. Nor were they unaware of offensive alternatives. The French army was well versed on doctrinal developments in Germany, and had its own advocates of offensive mechanized warfare. French civilians neither demanded a defensive doctrine nor actively participated in the formation of army doctrine. Even construction of the Maginot Line left open offensive possibilities; indeed, the fortifications were initially conceived to support offensive operations. The French army had the money, ideas, and freedom to adopt an offensive doctrine, but it instead chose a defensive doctrine. Its organizational culture would not allow otherwise.

The French army could not imagine an offensive doctrine with short-term conscripts. For the French officer, one-year conscripts were good for only one thing: a defensive doctrine. In the army's view, "young troops" could only be

23. Quoted in Brian Crozier, DeGaulle: The Warrior (London: Eyre Methuen, 1973), p. 97. 24. Leon Blum, "A bas l'arm6e de m6tier!" Le Populaire, December 1, 1934 (emphasis added).



engaged "methodically"; they could not handle sophisticated technology or new methods of warfare, nor could they demonstrate the type of elan necessary for offensive actions. To most French officers, a one-year term of conscription reduced the army to marginal value. As an officer explained, "short term conscripts [are].... in the end, a myriad of men, ready for everything, good at nothing, whose average output is very low; morose, fussy, and passive."25 In 1930 General Antoine Targe noted that "only a professional army could go beyond our frontiers. . . . A militia army is appropriate for the defense of prepared positions, not maneuver."26

With only short-term conscripts, General Henri Mordacq explained, "it was absolutely impossible to give our troops an instruction responding to the demands of modern warfare."27 The vice president of the Superior Council of War and inspector general of the army, General Weygand, agreed about the marginal value of the French conscript army, saying in 1932, "The character and the possibilities of the French army were profoundly modified the day that France adopted military service of less than two years.... Today's army is much weaker and less prepared to fight than the army in 1914."28 Representing only quantity, short-term conscripts could not be entrusted with offensive operations.

It is important to note that not all military organizations shared the French officer corps' evaluation of conscript or reserve forces. For example, the Ger- man army did not agree. While Joseph Joffre was declaring that "under no circumstances will we absorb the reserve formations in the active units," the German army was stating that "reserve troops will be employed in the same way as the active troops."29 In other words, an officer assimilated into the German army would have reacted differently to the reduction in the term of conscription. It was not the "objective" value of a conscript army that determined French doctrine.

Charles DeGaulle's advocacy of an offensive doctrine in the 1930s raises questions about this argument. DeGaulle was a French officer, assimilated into the culture of the French army, calling for the adoption of an offensive doctrine

25. Capitaine G. (pseud.), "L'arm6e nouvelle et le service d'un an," Revue militaire geine'rale (August 1921), p. 594. 26. General Antoine Targe, La garde des frontieres (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle, 1930), pp. 87 and 95-96. 27. General Henri Mordacq, La defense nationale en danger (Paris: Les editions de France, 1938), p. 2. 28. Service historique de l'arm6e de terre (SHAT), 1 N 42, file 2, Etat-major Maxime Weygand, Conseil Sup6rieur de la Guerre (CSG), "Rapport sur l'6tat de l'arm&e," May 1932. 29. Jean Feller, Le dossier de l'arme'e franqaise (Paris: Librairie Academique Perrin, 1966), p. 65.



after the reduction in the length of conscription. This seems to suggest that the reduction in the length of conscription was not decisive. Yet a closer look at DeGaulle's campaign illustrates both the strength of the French army's culture and the importance of domestic politics.

DeGaulle was convinced that France's defense depended on the adoption of a new offensive doctrine, yet he endorsed these offensive operations only if they were coupled with a special force of 100,000 professionals serving six years of military service. As a product of the organizational culture of the French army, DeGaulle could not imagine entrusting young, unseasoned troops with the tasks involved in offensive mechanized warfare. Only professional soldiers, he believed, possessed the skill and training to implement lightning armored attacks. DeGaulle persisted in holding this belief even though he was well aware of the political hurdles to the creation of a professional force of long- serving soldiers.

The reception that DeGaulle's ideas received in the French army further reveals the link between a professional army and an offensive doctrine in the organizational culture of the French army The high command was not per- suaded. A primary reason for their rejection of DeGaulle's ideas was that the creation of the specialized corps would, in their view, cut the army in two.30 Because the officer corps could not imagine a way for the conscript army to implement DeGaulle's proposal, adopting this new doctrine would require taking the army's professionals out of the conscript army, leaving it stripped of its professional officers, with little if any combat value. The French officer corps could only accept the package of DeGaulle's ideas; separating the offensive doctrine from a professional army was inconceivable. Either these concepts were to be implemented by professional soldiers, or not at all.

DeGaulle's campaign also reveals the impact of domestic politics. The left was not pleased with DeGaulle's proposal. A commentator in a leftist magazine captured this sentiment when he referred to DeGaulle's proposed force as "hand-hired killers of which each possess all the aptitudes of murder and all the extraordinary instruments to kill." He asks, "when will this army then march on Paris?",31 This fear of the domestic ramifications-and not whether these ideas were most suited to repel a German attack-emerges time and

30. General Eugene Debeney, "Encore l'arm6e de m6tier," Revue des deux mondes (July 15, 1935), pp. 285-290; and General Maxime Weygand, La France est-elle defendue? (Paris: Flammarion, 1937), p. 23. 31. Jacques Lefrancq and Leo Moulin, "Dialogue sur l'arm6e de la classe 15 a la classe 25," Esprit, Vol. 32 (May 1935).



again in the leftist press and parliamentary debate. In discussing DeGaulle's project, Leon Blum exclaimed that "in order to save the national independence of France, you are risking the loss of her domestic liberty."32 Similarly, Edouard Daladier, the leader of the Radical Socialist Party, worried that a professional army might be "more dangerous than one might believe for the security of our nation."33 Not surprisingly, however, the extreme right welcomed DeGaulle's proposal for a professional army.34

Even though the international environment had become dramatically more threatening, the domestic political divide persisted. Domestic considerations determined the army's reliance on a mass conscript army Once this constraint was set, the French army could see only one possibility DeGaulle and the French army were incapable of decoupling offensive concepts from a professional army, yet insisting on a professional force doomed DeGaulle's efforts, because such a force was politically impossible. The French were trapped; the left would not accept a professional army and the army could not imagine an offensive doctrine without one.

Culture as an Explanation

This section explores two important issues raised by my argument about the role of culture in doctrinal developments: first, how does culture-both the political-military subcultures and the military's organizational culture-affect outcomes? Second, how can one have confidence in these cultural explanations?

I argue that the number of subcultures affects the causal role of the political- military subculture. Some states have only one subculture-during the interwar period, the British civilians concurred on fundamental questions about the domestic position of the armed forces-while others have two or more competing subcultures, e.g., during the same period in France. Both show the importance of ideational factors, but they work in different ways.35

32. Quoted in Feller, Dossier de l'armee francaise, p. 218. 33. Quoted in Pierre Hoff, Les programmes d'armement de 1919 2 1938 (Vincennes: Service historique de l'armee de terre, 1982), p. 157. 34. General Alfred Conquet, L'Enigme des blindes (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1956), pp. 62 and 71; Hoff, Programmes d'armement, p. 141; and Ladislas Mysyrowicz, Anatomie d'une defaite (Laussane: Editions de l'age d'homme, 1983), pp. 237-238 and 248. 35. This discussion draws heavily on Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 1986), pp. 273-286.



If there are competing subcultures, the subculture works more like an ideology, "as a highly articulate, self-conscious belief system, aspiring to offer a unified answer to social action."36 It is coherent and consistent. In France, both of the opposing subcultures contained explicit policy prescriptions about the organizational form of the army; the left wanted short-term conscripts, the right a professional army The ideologies play a direct and visible role in determining military policy

In contrast, where there is only one political-military subculture, this consen- sus resembles "common sense." Free from having to justify or defend itself against a competing set of beliefs, consensual subcultures contain fewer explicit directives for action. In Britain, for example, it is taken for granted that the country does not want a strong standing army independent of legislative control, but the specifics of military policy are not articulated. The independent role of culture is more difficult to determine and has a weaker, less direct control over action. But culture is important: it constrains action by establishing what is "natural." It gives us our common sense, but it also screens out parts of reality by limiting what we see and even what we can imagine.

The presence of one or more than one subculture also affects how civilian intervention in doctrinal developments corresponds to systemic imperatives. Where there is only one subculture, the civilians will not be consumed with domestic battles over military policy and, as a result, their decisions are more likely to reflect the external environment. Where subcultures compete, civilian decisions are more likely to respond to domestic considerations.37

But why call the civilians' choices "cultural" rather than "interests"? Because "interests" do not tell the whole story; we must understand the meaning-or cultural connotations-that actors attach to certain policies. Similar social- economic positions do not necessarily mean similar policy positions across national boundaries. We cannot assume that all left-wing parties, like the French in the 1920s, fear a professional army, nor that all right-wing parties do not want a conscript army There is nothing inherent in a conscript or militia army that makes it a force for the left. The types of armies that the British left and the French left imagined to be in their interests are opposite. For the French left, conscription expressed community spirit, equality, and most important, it insured against the growth of a praetorian guard. For the British left, conscrip-

36. Ibid., p. 279. 37. For a discussion of potential hypotheses about the origins of offensive and defensive doctrines, see Kier, Imagining War.



tion attacked individual liberty and was a tool of continental imperialism. Whereas the French left liked militia forces; the American left feared them, and with good reason. Although militias in the United States had been in decline since the 1820s, they underwent a dramatic revival in the late 1870s, especially after the great railroad strike of 1877. Strikebreaking became the militia's main function, and states with large working-class populations took the lead in the militia's revival.38 In 1892, Samuel Gompers declared that "membership in a labor organization and a militia at one and the same time is inconsistent and incompatible."39

The very social forces that opposed reliance on a conscript army in France -the Right-mobilized in support of this system in both England and the United States.40 In the early part of this century, the American left bitterly attacked proposals for national service and instead advocated the creation of a well-equipped and volunteer professional force. What the U.S. left supported, the French left opposed (and the French right supported). To make sense of these choices, we must understand the meanings attached to policies; that is, we must examine the relevant cultures.

How does the military's organizational culture affect doctrinal developments? Traditional cultural approaches assume that culture shapes action by supplying the ultimate ends or values; actors change their behavior to achieve these ends.41 This is end-guided action: the means vary, but the goal (provided by the culture) remains constant. Instead, I adopt the approach developed by the sociologist Ann Swidler, who argues that culture provides means, not ends; culture provides a particular (and limited) "way of organizing action."

There is no a priori preference for an offensive or a defensive doctrine within a military culture. Instead, the culture contains certain approaches to a variety of issues that provide each military with a finite number of ways to order behavior. In Swidler's words, every culture contains "tool kits" or a "reper- toire" of ways to organize behavior. For example, the British and German armies have different assumptions about how to structure command patterns. The command patterns in the British army closely resembled the hierarchical

38. Barton C. Hacker, "The United States Army as a National Police Force: The Federal Policing of Labor Disputes, 1877-1898," Military Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 1969), p. 259. 39. Stephen Skrowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities 1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 105. 40. John Whiteclay Chambers, "Conscripting for Colossus: The Progressive Era and the Origins of the Modern Military Draft in the United States in World War I," in Peter Karsten, ed., The Military in America: From the Colonial Era to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1980). 41. Swidler, "Culture in Action," pp. 274-278.



arrangement of the English gentry; the idea of a subordinate exercising initiative was practically unthinkable.42 In contrast, the Prussian army's concept of auftragstaktik endorsed a degree of decentralization, initiative, trust, and mutual respect that was unheard-of in the British army.43

During the 1930s the French army did not value a defensive doctrine and thus adopt one. That would be end-driven behavior. Instead, the organizational culture contained a set of elements that limited the possible types of action. The army choose the doctrine that corresponded with the possibilities contained within its culture. If the French army's culture had contained different assumptions about the value of short-term conscripts, it might have adopted an offensive doctrine.

This view of culture's explanatory role allows for change in the dependent variable-doctrine-despite continuity in the intervening variable, culture. The culture remains relatively static, but constraints set by the independent variables-technology or domestic politics-vary The organization continues to think along the lines set by its culture and integrates exogenous changes into its established way of doing things. The outcomes (doctrine) may change but the means (its culture) of getting there stay the same. In France and Britain, each army's culture remained relatively static, yet doctrines shifted radically, from offensive prior to World War I to defensive prior to World War II. To explain this, we must look at how the British and French armies' (static) organizational cultures incorporated (changing) variables in their external environment.

The change in French doctrine is straightforward. In 1913 the parliament increased the length of conscription to three years; in 1928 it reduced the conscription period to one year. After 1913 the French army had the type of conscript that its culture assumed capable of executing offensive operations. After 1928 and the reduction in the length of conscription, it could imagine only defensive operations.

We see a similar pattern in the British army, except that this time the exogenous change came from technology, not from domestic political con-

42. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortune: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 240; and Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-first Century Warfare (London: Brassey's Defense, 1985), pp. 228-234. 43. Eugene Carrias, La Pense'e militaire allemande (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), pp. 268-272; and General Robert Vial, "Les doctrines militaires francaises et allemandes au lende- main de la premiere guerre mondiale," in L'influence de l'ecole superieure de guerre sur la pensee militaire fran,aise de 1976 2 nos jours (Paris: Ecole militaire, May 13-14, 1976), pp. 124-125.



straints. When going on the offensive was a matter of bravery and morale, the British army could imagine charging forward and overcoming the opposing forces, and so the British army entered World War I with an offensive doctrine. However, the defensive stalemate in Northern France showed that this was no longer possible. The British army could have responded by incorporating new technology or tactical changes into an offensive doctrine. If it had, this would have been value-driven or end-driven behavior: a change in means in order to continue achieving the same valued end (an offensive doctrine). This is not what they did; in the decades after World War I, the British army endorsed a defensive doctrine. The British army incorporated the enhanced firepower and mobility into their organizational culture, that is, their existing ways of organizing action. As in the French case, the means (or culture) stayed constant; the end (or doctrine) changed as the culture responded to exogenous factors. This explains how something relatively static (organizational culture) can help explain change: there must be some change in the external environment of the organization to which the organizational culture reacts.

CULTURE S CAUSAL AUTONOMY

But how can we have confidence that culture really explains change? This is important because culture is often used instrumentally, or is all consequence rather than cause. Political entrepreneurs can use culture as much as they may be unknowingly constrained by it. For example, one might mistakenly assume that London's unwillingness to adopt a continental commitment was part of its strategic culture. The "British Way of Warfare" called for a maritime strategy and gained considerable currency during the interwar period. However, this "tradition" was not a sincere assumption about British national interests, but instead a myth manipulated by British civilians to lobby for a policy that they desired for other reasons. The "British Way of Warfare" was a politically inspired, not a culturally determined myth.44

There are several strategies to help assess culture's causal power. First, culture must do more than simply reflect structural or functional conditions or other "objective" criteria; we must find individuals or groups who share the same situational constraints but reach different conclusions. We already saw the various ways in which the left evaluates conscription. We also saw that the

44. Britain's reluctance to make a continental commitment in the 1930s was the result of a conscious decision not to tax the peacetime economy, not of cultural blindness. For a development of this argument, see Kier, Imagining War.



German and French armies have very different evaluations of the value of reserve or conscript forces.

The contrasting positions of the French and British delegations at the Ver- sailles negotiations is another example. Both countries shared the same objective interest in the same context: reducing the military threat posed by Germany. France proposed that Germany rely solely on a conscript army. A French officer wrote that it "would be better to let Germany have a relatively numerous army without seriously trained officers, than a smaller army of well-tried, proven officers that Germany will have and which I fear she will know how to make use of."45 Britain reached the opposite conclusion. Lloyd George worried that with a conscript army "Germany will train 200,000 men each year, or two million in ten years. Why make a gift to them of a system which in fifteen to twenty years will give Germany millions of trained soldiers?"46 Lloyd George insisted that only the imposition of a professional army could harness German military power.47 Both countries sought to contain Germany's offensive potential, but they proposed opposite prescriptions.

A second way to demonstrate culture's causal role is to show that the culturally derived preferences were not used instrumentally to achieve other goals. Otherwise, we can have little confidence that the "culture" was not invoked as a justification for a policy chosen for other reasons. For example, how can we know that the French army really believed that short-term conscripts and a defensive doctrine were inseparable could this belief have been instrumental? Some of the best evidence comes from the French army's esti- mate of the German army prior to World War I. The French army's belief that conscript forces could not undertake offensive actions prevented them from believing-despite intelligence reports-that the Germans would attack with the forces that they did. Because they could not imagine short-term conscripts leading offensive operations, they dismissed intelligence reports showing that the Germans would use "young troops" in the front lines. This caused the French army to underestimate the strength of the German offensive by 20 corps. Whatever the outcome of the future battle, the French army's belief in

45. Quoted in Pierre Miquel, La paix de Versailles et l'opinion publique fran,aise (Paris: Flammarion, 1972), p. 258. Also see Ministere des affaires etrangeres, Documents diplomatiques fran,aise 1932- 1939, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1969), p. 569. 46. Quoted in Miquel, Paix de Versailles, p. 256. 47. Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Le service militaire obligatoire.... est-il une institution de gauche?" La Voix (February 9, 1930), p. 8; and Pertinax (pseud. Andr6 G6raud), "Le d6sarmement radical de l'Allemagne est d6cid6," Echo de Paris (March 11, 1919).



the relative incompetence of short-term conscripts was not in its interest; it is not in the military's interest to underestimate the strength of opposing forces.48 Thus we can see that the French army's evaluation of short-term conscripts was sincere.

One can make a similar argument about DeGaulle. DeGaulle was convinced that defending France depended on the adoption of an offensive doctrine. DeGaulle also knew that the creation of a professional force was politically impossible. Yet he continued to advocate the coupling of an offensive doctrine with a professional army If DeGaulle's estimation of the value of short-term conscripts had not been sincere, he would have dropped it in order to pursue the offensive doctrine that he felt was in France's national interest.

The British army during the interwar period is another example of a military organization making decisions that were not in its interest as commonly understood. Although continually suffering from a lack of financial support, the British army rejected the ideas of the advocates of armored warfare, even though adoption of this offensive doctrine would have given them a much stronger rationale for increased expenditures. In other words, where its bureaucratic interests for greater resources diverged from its cultural predisposition, culture won. If the British army's culture had led it to adopt a doctrine that required greater resources (that is, if cultural and bureaucratic interests con- verged) we would have less confidence that it was the culture that led to its doctrinal choice. But instead, the British army adopted a doctrine that went against its bureaucratic interest.

Stressing the importance of contrasting culturally and functionally derived interests should not let us lose sight of the central argument in this article, or fall into the trap of treating interests and culture as separate factors. To argue that culture matters is not to argue that interests do not. Culture and interests are not distinct, discrete, competing factors. Actors' definitions of their interests are often a function of their culture. Artificially dividing interests and culture into separate categories obscures culture's explanatory role; it leads theorists wedded to interest-driven or power political approaches to discount cultural analyses as naive. But discounting culture is itself naive. The French army is not putting some lofty cultural aspiration above its organizational needs or the

48. Although militaries may exaggerate the strength of an adversary's forces to make their sub- sequent victory more laudable or their defeat more understandable, it is not in the military's interest to underestimate the opposing forces when designing strategic plans.



defense of France. How the French military defined its interest was a function of its culture.

Contending Approaches

Barry Posen and Jack Snyder conducted what have become classic studies of the origins of offensive and defensive military doctrines. Although these two scholars disagree on the role of domestic politics and the explanatory weight of organizational factors, both see the international system as providing accurate cues for civilian intervention in doctrinal developments. Snyder argues that it is the civilian policymakers' absence from the decision-making process that allows the self-serving doctrines of the military to take root. Posen accords an active role to civilians, arguing that as the international system becomes more threatening, civilians increasingly intervene in doctrinal developments in accordance with systemic imperatives. The civilians are painted as the cham- pions of the national interest and the principal architects of well-integrated military plans, while the military is portrayed as pursuing its organizational interests and adopting offensive doctrines that may be poorly integrated with the state's grand strategy The following section briefly examines these two propositions, as well as the most popular explanation for France's defensive doctrine, the lessons of World War I.

CIVILIAN DECISIONS AND THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

The argument that civilian intervention corresponds with the dictates of the international system has weak theoretical and empirical foundations; it exag- gerates the power of systemic imperatives and the wisdom of civilian partici- pation. This is true even in an easy case such as France during the interwar period. If there is any case where the international system should determine a state's doctrinal orientation, this is it. Paris understood the nature of the German threat and devoted extensive resources to insuring France's security France spent twenty years preparing for the German assault. Yet it was domestic politics, not international incentives, that drove the civilian decision that severely constrained doctrinal developments.

As compelling as the international system may have been, it cannot account for doctrinal developments in France. And in general, the international system does not provide determinate explanations for choices between offensive and defensive doctrines. Although revisionist states require offensive doctrines, both offensive and defensive doctrines can defend a status quo state. Even the



prospect of fighting a two-front war provides several alternatives. The Schlief- fen Plan's double offensive is one possibility, but as Jack Snyder pointed out, Germany could have chosen "a positional defense of the short frontier in the west, combined with either a counteroffensive or a positional defense in the east."49

Scott Sagan argues that the international system makes offensive doctrines necessary to honor alliance commitments.50 During the interwar period, however, France's inability to launch an offensive into Germany in order to provide relief to her Eastern allies demonstrates how easily systemic "imperatives"- and in particular the one that Sagan cites-may be overruled. Similarly, Snyder argues that the offensives adopted by both France and Germany prior to World War I were counterproductive to the strategic interests of their allies.5'

More important, a state's position in the international system is indeterminate of doctrine: France's relative weakness could be used to explain both its offensive orientation during the 1920s and its defensive orientation in the 1930s. In the decade immediately following World War I, the French sought to strike offensively to end the war quickly before Germany could mobilize its superior economic strength. A long war of attrition would only have resulted in the eventual triumph of Germany's superior economic strength and industrial mobilization. An official report in the early 1920s explained that "an offensive conception was the only one that would permit us to compensate for the inescapable causes of our weakness which result from the inferiority of our population and industrial strength."52

In the following decade, this argument was turned on its head. Now, it was said, France must stay on the defensive in the opening battles of a conflict with Germany, and throw all its resources into defeating the initial German assault. France's only hope, it was argued, was that the initial resistance to a German offensive would provide the necessary time for the injection of allied assistance. France could only win a long war. In other words, France's relative weakness justified an offensive orientation in the 1920s and a defensive doctrine in the 1930s. French policymakers were not misguided, nor did they misunderstand France's strategic position: both an offensive and a defensive posture were

49. Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, p. 191. 50. Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," International Security Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-177. 51. Jack Snyder, "Correspondence: The Origins of Offense and the Consequences of Counter- force," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Winter 1986/87), pp. 190-191. 52. Quoted in General Paul-Emile Tournoux, Haut Commandement, gouvernement et defense des frontiWres du Nord et de l'Est, 1919-1939 (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1960), p. 334.



sensible responses to the systemic demands on a relatively weak state. The choice between them requires us to look beyond the international system.

At first glance, there may appear to be a strong correlation between German power and French doctrine. Germany is relatively weak in the 1920s and the French army has an offensive orientation; Germany is strong in the 1930s and the French army has a defensive doctrine. However, the correlation is illusory. It did not take German rearmament to make the French respond to German power. The French sought to use the Versailles negotiations to harness German power, and the series of alliances that Paris concluded with Eastern Europe belies any notion that it took Hitler's rise to power to wake the French to the potential threat on their doorstep. More important, France switched to a defensive doctrine in 1929, five years prior to Hitler's seizure of power, seven years prior to the reinstatement of conscription, and eight years prior to the remilitarization of the Rhineland. There is no correlation between French doctrine and German power: the French army switched to a defensive doctrine long before Germany had begun to rearm.

Given the indeterminacy of the international system, it is easy to understand why dramatic doctrinal shifts may occur in the absence of systemic variation, or why changes in the international system may not lead to shifts in states' doctrinal orientations. Although the systemic constraints facing France and Britain before World War I and World War II were similar, both countries changed their doctrines from offensive to defensive. Similarly, the U.S. Army's adoption of Air Land Battle in 1982 shifted American doctrine from a defensive to an offensive orientation, despite the lack of any significant transformation in the international system.

Even if the international system prescribed certain doctrinal responses, civilians rarely intervene directly in the military's choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines, even during periods of international threat. In Britain and France during the interwar period, civilians did not directly choose the army's doctrinal orientation. The French parliament's decision to reduce the length of conscription led to the adoption of a defensive doctrine, but this was not the legislators' intent. French civilians were preoccupied with the organizational structure of the army, but they felt that doctrinal decisions were beyond their purview.53 British civilians took a similar approach.54

53. Robert Allan Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1985), p. 164. 54. Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 41.



Barry Posen provides a sophisticated defense of balance-of-power theory's ability to explain French army doctrine during the interwar period. Posen argues that due to France's relative weakness, French policymakers focused on external balancing, and in particular on gaining British support to allow France to "pass the buck." This required, according to Posen, the adoption of a defensive doctrine in order to avoid appearing bellicose in British eyes. How- ever, this logically compelling argument has empirical problems. First, although France did seek Britain as an alliance partner, Posen provides no evidence that the political repercussions of an offensive doctrine concerned French or British statesmen, or that a desire to avoid antagonizing Britain motivated French action. In fact, France was more than willing to risk British displeasure across a whole spectrum of issues. On an economic front, for example, the French attempted to exploit their ability to undermine the international monetary regime and to weaken its leader, Great Britain.55 In foreign policy, the British were far from pleased with French behavior during the Chanak Crisis and the occupation of the Ruhr. In military policy, French war plans were explicitly designed to draw Germany into Belgium, in order to threaten the security of the British isles. If French policymakers desired a defensive doctrine in order to present a reassuring image to their British allies, why did French war plans continue to be offensive until 1929?

Second, if external balancing took precedence, British reluctance to make a continental commitment should have encouraged France to seek alternative sources of assistance. Paris could have insured that France would have the military capabilities necessary to honor existing alliance commitments in East- ern Europe, or could have allied France with the Soviet Union; it did neither.

Finally, there is little support for the claim that French policymakers sought to "pass the buck" through external balancing. To the contrary, there is evidence that French civilians strongly objected to such an idea. During a meeting of the Superior Council of War in December 1927, one of the military officers re- marked that France could only aid itself with the help of allies. The civilian Minister of Defense quickly responded that such a remark was extremely serious, useless, and dangerous.56 France did of course seek allied support, but to accuse Paris of buck-passing ignores the substantial financial resources devoted to French defense spending throughout the interwar period, even

55. Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming 1995). 56. SHAT, 1 N 20, R&eum succinct des seances du Conseil Superieur de la Guerre, December 14, 1947.



during economic crises and left-wing governments. Similarly, for a country intent on buck-passing, we have the curious situation of a British general hinting to the French in 1937 that they should request additional support from the British government.57

Contrary to what one would expect from balance-of-power theory, much of civilian behavior in France during the 1930s seemed immune to the quickening pace of international events. Many of Hitler's policies severely compromised France's security system, but French civilians did very little to realign French doctrine with the new strategic realities. This does not mean that civilian decisions are not important to doctrinal developments. They frequently are. But we should remember that military policy is not exclusively about external threats; power politics at the domestic level can play an important role.

THE MILITARY S BUREAUCRATIC INTERESTS

According to a functional logic, offensive doctrines are powerful tools in the organization's pursuit of greater certainty, resources, autonomy, and prestige; this leads military organizations to prefer offensive doctrines. However, both offensive and defensive doctrines can satisfy many of the posited desires of military organizations. For example, while Posen and Snyder argue that the preference for the reduction of uncertainty encourages the adoption of offensive doctrines, defensive doctrines can also be very effective means of struc- turing the battlefield and reducing the need to improvise. For example, an integral aspect of the French army's defensive doctrine prior to World War II was the concept that the French termed the "methodical battle." Instead of allowing for initiative and flexibility, la bataille conduite insured tightly control- led operations in which all units adhered to strictly scheduled time tables. As a German officer explained, "French tactics are essentially characterized by a systematization which seeks to anticipate and account for any eventuality in the smallest detail."58 The French army's defensive doctrine maximized the centralization of command and reduced spontaneity to a minimum.

57. John Dunbabin, "British Rearmament in the 1930s: A Chronology and Review," Historical Journal, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1975), pp. 587-609. For a critique of the argument that British desires determined French foreign policy, see Anthony Adamthwaite, "France and the Coming of War," in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker, eds., The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983). 58. Quoted in Alvin D. Coox, "French Military Doctrine 1919-1939: Concepts of Ground and Aerial Warfare" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1951), p. 108. Posen argues, although for different reasons, that the French army adopted a defensive doctrine because it would reduce uncertainty. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 118.



Similarly, military organizations can also use defensive doctrines to maxi- mize their autonomy from civilian interference. The French army's endorse- ment of a defensive doctrine after 1929 is partly attributable to it being part of larger package that allowed the army to retain what it most treasured, a small (and relatively autonomous) professional force. In fact, with the exception of the air force, the connection between autonomy and offensive doctrines is not strong. Civilians, especially those in the foreign office, could be more likely to interfere in military planning if these operations included offensive strikes into a foreign country Civilians are unlikely to take a hands-off approach if their armed forces are invading a neighboring country.59

Air forces have exploited plans for strategic bombing, an offensive doctrine, to insure their independence. During the 1920s and 1930s, both the French and British air forces used offensive doctrines in their efforts to obtain institutional autonomy. However, the extent to which each service manipulated its doctrinal preferences to defeat the army's and navy's attack on its independence does not correspond to the expectations of a functional perspective. While the French air force fought bitterly, and unsuccessfully, for its independence, French air- men only half-heartedly endorsed the offensive doctrine that, according to a functional argument, could have furthered their quest for autonomy 60 In contrast, the Royal Air Force gained institutional autonomy relatively easily, but remained enamored of strategic bombing long after it had cemented its independent status as the third service.61

Even when military organizations could gain greater resources, autonomy, or prestige through the adoption of an offensive doctrine, they often fail to do so. This is true even in such easy cases for a functional analysis as that of the French army Throughout the 1930s, the French army was exposed to the ideas of mechanized warfare and was free from civilian interference. The French army's desire for autonomy from the civilian sphere could hardly be more extreme. With the recurrent instability of the Third Republic, the rise of the left, and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, the army became increasingly fearful of the republic. If military organizations seek autonomy by adopting offensive

59. I thank Scott Sagan for suggesting this point. 60. Pierre Le Goyet, "Evolution de la doctrine d'emploi de l'aviation francaise entre 1919 et 1939," Revue d'histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale, Vol. 19, No. 73 (January 1969); and General Charles Christienne and General Pierre Lissarrague, Histoire de l'aviation militaire franqaise (Paris: Ecole Militaire, 1984). 61. Barry D. Powers, Strategy Without a Slide Rule: British Air Strategy 1914-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).



doctrines, we should see it here. The French army had the (functional) need for autonomy, and the money, ideas, and freedom from civilian intervention necessary for the adoption of an offensive doctrine. Nevertheless, the French army became increasingly committed to a defensive doctrine.

Still more surprising from a functional perspective is the budgetary behavior of the British military during the interwar period; all three services show a budgetary modesty that baffles a conventional evaluation of organizational interests. Not only did the British army ignore the financial benefits who adoption of an offensive doctrine could have brought, but all three British services also submitted modest budget requests. In fact, it was the civilians who consistently prodded the military chiefs to submit larger budget requests, leading one participant in the rearmament debate in the mid-1930s to comment that he found it "curious how, all throughout, the Chiefs of Staff have been the moderating influence.'62 Similarly, in 1936 the Popular Front government in France increased the army's budget request by fifty percent, augmenting the application by the Chief of the French General Staff, General Maurice Gamelin, with an additional 5 billion francs.63

Finally, generalizing that military organizations prefer offensive doctrines makes it difficult to explain, without reference to cultural factors, why military organizations adopt-sometimes dogmatically-defensive doctrines. They do this on their own initiative, without civilian prodding, and despite adequate knowledge of and resources for the development of an offensive doctrine. In the French case, the civilians did not intervene in doctrinal developments to force a defensive doctrine upon a reluctant high command. From the mid- 1930s, it was the civilians who were voicing support for a more offensive orientation. Nevertheless, the French army ignored these calls and instead became increasingly committed to a defensive doctrine and ostracized those officers calling for a more offensive orientation. The British army also margi- nalized those officers advocating the offensive use of massed tanks.64

62. Quoted in Wesley Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 29. Also see Uri Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-1939 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1980), pp. 58-68; and Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1977), p. 67. 63. Robert Frankenstein, "A Propos des aspects financiers du rearmement francais," Revue d'histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale, No. 102 (April 1976), p. 7. 64. Bond, British Military Policy, pp. 53 and 183-185; Major Kenneth Macksey, Armoured Crusader: A Biography of Major General Sir Percy Hobart (London: Hutchinson, 1967), pp. 135, 141-147, 152, and 178.


Culture and Military Doctrine I 91

THE LEGACY OF VERDUN

The lessons of World War I seem to explain why the functional explanation cannot account for the French army's adoption of a defensive doctrine. Accord- ing to this argument, the 1920s and 1930s are an exceptional period: emerging from the carnage of the Great War, perceptions of the offense-defense balance were so skewed that an otherwise accurate generalization-that military organizations prefer offensive doctrines-does not apply. Given the French army's doctrine in 1939, it seems plausible that the leadership of the French army, marked by the bloody experiences of World War I, had prepared for a rematch of the last war. This is a myth. The French army did not simply reapply the defensive lessons of the Great War. There was an extensive debate over doctrinal developments in the 1920s. The French army eventually adopted a doctrine reminiscent of the defensive stalemate in northern France, but the "lesson" of the trench warfare was far from universally endorsed.

In the decade immediately following the armistice, the French military elite debated the potential use of prepared positions and in particular, whether the fortifications would serve offensive or defensive functions.65 While Marshal Petain and General Buat argued that fortifications were primarily defensive, Generals Berthelot, Debeney, Fillomeau, Foch, Guillaumat, Joffre, and Mangin rejected the notion of a continuous frontier and instead argued that fortified regions should serve as centers of resistance to facilitate offensive actions. The proposal creating a commission to study the use of fortifications in 1925 specified that the prepared positions would be used in offensive operations, and the commission's report two years later stated that the fortified regions would serve as a base for French operations into Germany.66 The debate continued for almost a decade. A leading historian of the Maginot Line states that this extended debate shows the "markedly offensive spirit of the French high command."67

The discussions about the potential of mechanized warfare further reveal the extent to which the French army was open to offensive warfare. In the early 1920s, the military journals and academies were alive with debate on the

65. For example, see SHAT, 1 N 20, R&eum succinct des seances du CSG, May 17, 1920. Also see Judith Hughes, To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920s (Cam- bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 200-204; and especially Tournoux, Defense des frontieres. 66. SHAT, 1 N 20, Resume succinct des seances du CSG, December 15, 1925; Tournoux, Defense des frontieres, pp. 53-54. 67. Tournoux, Defense des frontieres, p. 36.



potential for massed armor, the army training grounds were actively engaged in experimentation,68 and many influential officers saw mechanization as a way to break out of the defensive stalemate that dominated the last war.69

The call for offensive striking power was no mere wish list. Far from planning to wait behind reinforced concrete, French war plans in the 1920s were unequivocally offensive. If a conflict with Germany occurred, the French in- tended to bring the battle to Germany and divide the country in two. These offensive plans were later superseded by increasingly defensive plans, but the initial reaction to the threat of a resurgent Germany was to plan once again for offensive strikes beyond the French frontier.70 Such plans contradict the notion of an army overwhelmed by the defensive lessons of World War 1.71

The lessons of history are multiple, and are frequently invoked after a particular policy has been taken. They are not the source of the policy itself. The French army did not adopt a defensive doctrine in the interwar years because of the trench warfare of World War I. However, once this defensive orientation had been chosen, history was invoked to justify or bolster the chosen policy As Jack Snyder aptly stated in his study of the myths of empires, "it is more accurate to say that statesmen and societies actively shape the lessons of the past in ways they find convenient than it is to say they are shaped by them."72

Conclusion

This is not a call for the wholesale adoption of cultural analyses. Structural and functional analyses are valuable tools for understanding international politics. Indeed, the normative and political rationale for understanding the determinants of offensive and defensive military doctrines stems from a structural

68. For example, see Colonel Charles-Armand Romain, "La reorganisation de l'armee: les chars de combat," Revue de Paris, Vol. 29, No. 5 (October 15, 1922), pp. 868-871; and Major Joseph Doumenc, "Puissance et mobilite," Revue militaire franqaise, Vol. 9 (January-March 1923). 69. For discussions of mechanization in the French army, see Jean Delaunay, "Chars de combat et cavalerie," Revue historique des armies, Vol. 155 (June 1984); Hoff, Programmes d'armement; and Henry Dutailly, "Motorisation et mecanisation dans l'armee de terre francaise," Revue internationale d'histoire militaire, Vol. 55 (1983). 70. Jean Doise and Maurice Vaisse, Diplomatie et outil militaire (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1987), pp. 269 and 276; and Tournoux, Defense des frontires, pp. 332-335. 71. For further discussion of France's shift from an offensive to a defensive orientation during the interwar period see Doise and Vaisse, Diplomatie et outil, pp. 275-256; Doughty, Seeds of Disaster, p. 67; Hoff, Programmes d'armement, pp. 153 and 268; and Hughes, Maginot Line, p. 198. 72. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 30.



constraint: offensive military postures are structural impediments to coopera- tive relations among states. Nevertheless, functional and structural analyses cannot adequately explain choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. If we want to control doctrinal developments, we must understand the civilians' political-military subculture and the military's organizational culture.

This study offers three lessons to policymakers interested in restructuring their armed forces along more defensive lines. First, decision-makers can take solace in the knowledge that the structure of the international system does not dictate either an offensive or a defensive orientation. Status quo states can do what they want. Second, policymakers must recognize the highly political nature of any enterprise to restructure the armed services. For domestic political reasons, certain types of military policies appeal to certain sectors of society. These preferences may reflect contemporary stakes or they may seem outdated, but in either case, they constrain policy options and must be taken into con- sideration.

Finally, policymakers should resist blaming the military for the adoption of offensive doctrines. They should not assume that all military organizations prefer offensive doctrines, or that military resistance to doctrinal change stems from attempts to protect the offensive doctrine itself. It may not be the offensive aspect of their doctrine that the military seeks to safeguard, but instead some part of its traditional way of doing things whose preservation is, for these officers, integral to the successful execution of their mission.

Changing military doctrine from offensive to defensive is as important as it is difficult. Status quo states can choose defensive doctrines regardless of their position in the international system, but the absence of structural requirements does not mean that doctrinal change is easy. Two powerful barriers remain. First, civilians worry about domestic security before external security-without the former there is no need to worry about the latter. They will worry about the disposition of the military and how it bears on the domestic distribution of power. Second, the military's culture limits what they imagine is possible. Changing military doctrine is hard, but it is harder still if we neglect culture's role.


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Issue Table of ContentsInternational Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring, 1995), pp. 1-192Volume Information [pp. 190-192]Front Matter [pp. 1-2]Editors' Note [pp. 3-4]Does Strategic Culture Matter?Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters [pp. 5-31]Thinking about Strategic Culture [pp. 32-64]Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars [pp. 65-93]

"Bismarck" or "Britain"? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity [pp. 94-117]The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings [pp. 118-144]Review: Overextension, Vulnerability, and Conflict: The "Goldilocks Problem" in International Strategy (A Review Essay) [pp. 145-163]CorrespondenceThe Democratic Peace [pp. 164-184]

Books Received [pp. 185-189]Back Matter