Military Thought and Development Between the

Wars

Tactical and operational questions for the future . . .

• How is maneuver possible on the modern battlefield?

• What is the proper role of the tank?• What is the proper role of the airplane?• All of these questions will be addressed in

the 1920’s and 1930’s.

Britain

• J.F.C. Fuller– Tanks could replace infantry and cavalry;– Future land battles would be similar to naval

battles

• B.H. Liddell Hart:– Argued conversion to a “New Model Army”– Balanced tank-infantry force

B. H. Liddell Hart:

The “indirect approach”

• First appeared in 1929 in The Decisive Wars of History

• “Effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent’s unreadiness to meet it.”

• “In most campaigns the dislocation of the enemy’s psychological and physical balance has been the vital prelude to a successful attempt at his overthrow.”

France

• Confrontation between visions of mobile warfare and static defense.

• General Jean-Baptiste Estienne– Tanks should form a separate organization– Tanks would perform the role of cavalry

• Marshal Philippe Petain – Reliance of static defense– Centralized command and control

1930’s: Proponents of mobility and mechanization take control

• General Maxime Weygand• General Maurice Gamelin• Colonel Charles DeGaulle

• Problems:– Financial weakness– Diminished recruit pool

Germany

• Hans von Seeckt rebuilds the German army.

• January 1927:“Armored, quickly moving tanks most probably will become the operationally decisive weapon.”

Werner von Fritsch

German General Staff’s “Young Turks” • Joachim von Stulpnagel• Werner von Blomberg• Heinz Guderian

Gerd von Rundstedt

Opposed bythe “Infantry

Generals”

Soviet Union

• Soviet military thinking driven by the Red-White civil war, not the Western Front

• Conflict between professionals and “Red Commanders”

Major personalities

• Mikhail Tukhachevsky – Revolution could be exported on

the bayonets of the army.

• Boris Shaposhnikov – The army could not defend the nation alone– General staff was an extension

of the political apparatus.– Mozg Armii

Vladimir Triandafillov

• Successive operations

Regroup,New Attack

Successive Operations

Italy Guilio Douhet

• Command of the Air (1921)• No distinction between combatants and non-combatants.• Successful ground offensive no longer possible.• Speed and altitude make it impossible to defense against

air power.• True objectives:

government and population centers.• Nations need separate air forces built

around long-range bombers.

United States

• Billy Mitchell – His ideas were similar to Douhet’s but he

stressed:• An autonomous air force• Centralized control of

all air assets

Mitchell’s Court Martial

• "There are those in Washington who should be severely taken to task and court-martialed for their deliberate neglect of aviation.”

• He blamed Washington for:• "Incompetence, criminal negligence, and almost

treasonable administration of the national defense"

• Guilty – Suspended from rank, pay, and command for 5

years.– Resigned, died in 1935

LTC Pete Ellis, USMC

• Advance Base Operations in Micronesia

• War with the Japanese was likely.

• The real function of the USMC: Seize operating bases for the Navy