JP 3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception

31 May 1996

Joint Doctrinefor

Military Deception

Joint Pub 3-58

PREFACE

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1. Scope

Military deception operations areconducted by the commanders of combatantcommands and subordinate joint forces insupport of overall campaign objectives. Thispublication provides fundamental guidanceand principles for the planning and executionof military deception at the combatantcommand and/or subordinate joint force level.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other joint forcecommanders and prescribes doctrine for jointoperations and training. It provides militaryguidance for use by the Armed Forces inpreparing their appropriate plans. It is not theintent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

WALTER KROSSLieutenant General, USAFDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v

CHAPTER IGENERAL

• Policy........................................................................................................................ I-1• Definition.................................................................................................................. I-1• Applicability ............................................................................................................. I-1• Deception and the Principles of War.......................................................................... I-2• Principles of Military Deception................................................................................ I-2• Coordination with Civil and Public Affairs................................................................ I-3

CHAPTER IIMILITARY DECEPTION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE

• Command and Control Warfare (C2W).................................................................... II-1• Military Deception as an Element of C2W............................................................... II-1• Deception’s Relationship to Intelligence and the Other C2W Tools.......................... II-2• C2W Planning and Deception.................................................................................. II-5

CHAPTER IIIROLES, COORDINATION, AND TRAINING

• Roles ...................................................................................................................... III-1• Coordination.......................................................................................................... III-1• Training ................................................................................................................. III-4

CHAPTER IVMILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING PROCESS

• Deception Planning................................................................................................ IV-1• The Deception Planning Process............................................................................ IV-2

CHAPTER VMILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING AND THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESSES

• Integration............................................................................................................... V-1• Planning Considerations.......................................................................................... V-1• Deception Planning and the Joint Planning Processes............................................... V-2

APPENDIX

A Explanation of Military Deception Terminology.............................................. A-1B Suggested Background Readings...................................................................... B-1

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C References........................................................................................................ C-1D Administrative Instructions.............................................................................. D-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms.................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions............................................................................... GL-2

FIGURE

I-1 Categories of Military Deception.................................................................... I-1I-2 Principles of Military Deception..................................................................... I-3II-1 Command and Control Warfare Tools............................................................ II-3III-1 Coordination Within a Joint Staff................................................................ III-2IV-1 The Deception Planning Process................................................................. IV-3IV-2 Deception Event Schedule........................................................................... IV-7V-1 Deliberate Planning Process......................................................................... V-3V-2 Crisis Action and/or Campaign Planning Process......................................... V-4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Discusses Fundamental Principles of Military Deception

Covers Military Deception and Command and ControlWarfare

Explains Roles, Coordination, and Training

Outlines the Military Deception Planning Process

Covers Military Deception Planning and the Joint PlanningProcess

General

Military deception is defined as being those actions executedto deliberately mislead adversary military decision makersas to friendly military capabilities, intentions, andoperations, thereby causing the adversary to take specificactions that will contribute to the accomplishment of thefriendly mission. Military deception can be employed duringall phases of military operations. Joint force commanders(JFCs) use military deception to accomplish their missions byattaining surprise, security, mass, and economy of force. Sixprinciples of military deception provide guidance for planningand executing deception operations. These principles includefocus, objective, centralized control, security, timeliness,and integration. Military deception efforts should becoordinated with civil affairs (CA) and with thosepsychological operations (PSYOP) activities that support CAto ensure that deception does not inadvertently undermine therelationships with civilian population or with host-nationmilitary authorities. Deception operations that have activitiespotentially visible to the media or the public should becoordinated with the appropriate public affairs officers toidentify any potential problems.

Military deception isapplicable at each level ofwar and across the rangeof military operations.

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Command and control warfare (C2W)is the integrated useof operations security (OPSEC), military deception, PSYOP,electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutuallysupported by intelligence to deny information to, influence,degrade, or destroy adversary command and control (C2)capabilities while protecting friendly C2 capabilities againstsuch actions. Military deception conducted in support ofjoint operations seeks to influence adversary militarycommanders and to degrade their C2 capabilities.Intelligence and counterintelligence are critical to deceptionduring the planning, execution, and termination phases of everydeception operation. Military PSYOP is a systematic processof conveying tailored messages to a selected audience. OPSECis the process for denying adversaries information aboutfriendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling,and protecting the generally unclassified evidence of theplanning and execution of sensitive activities. EW is anymilitary action involving the use of electromagnetic anddirected energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or toattack an adversary. Physical destruction can supportdeception by shaping an adversary’s intelligence collectioncapability through destroying or nullifying selected intelligencesystems or sites.

Commanders, operational planners, military deception plannersand other planners must coordinate their actions and plans toensure unity of the overall mission. The JFC is responsiblefor providing guidance concerning the dissemination ofdeception-related information. Deception planners developneed-to-know criteria that permit necessary coordination whilelimiting the number of individuals with knowledge of thedeception. Joint force commanders should ensure that theirstaffs and units receive training in deception. Staff trainingcan be accomplished during command post exercises, wargames, and conceptual exercises during the preparatory andexecution periods of field exercises or routine forwarddeployments. Deception planners must possess fertileimaginations and the ability to be creative while using andunderstanding each component of deception and C2Wcapabilities.

When supporting jointoperations, militarydeception is done inconjunction with theoverall command andcontrol warfare effort.

Military deception and itssupporting actions must becoordinated with higher,adjacent, subordinate, andsupporting staffs.

Military Deception and Command and Control Warfare

Roles, Coordination, and Training

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Executive Summary

Deception planning is an interactive process that requirescontinual reexamination of its objectives, target, stories,and means throughout the planning and execution phases.Deception planners must be prepared to respond to thedynamics of the situation and of their own headquarters andthey can not solely rely on diagrams and flow charts. At eachstage of planning, the deception planners must carefullyconsider the risks involved versus the possible benefits ofthe deception. Determining factors include deception failure,exposure of means or feedback channels, and unintendedeffects. Mission analysis, guidance, staff deception estimates,commander’s deception estimates and plan development(including completing the story, identifying the means,developing the event schedule, identifying feedback channels,and developing the termination concept) are all important stepsin the military deception process. A sixth step of reviewingand approving the completed deception plan is overseen bythe commander as part of the normal operation plan reviewand approval process.

The need to conduct adequate coordination duringdeception planning must be balanced against the need tomaintain the secrecy required for effective deceptionoperations. Deliberate planning involves the Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System process, normally used duringpeacetime to develop operation plans and operation plans inconcept format. Crisis action planning is used during time-sensitive situations to rapidly develop plans and orders. Acampaign plan describes how tactical, operational, and strategicactions are connected in time, space, and purpose. Campaignplans are normally not created until the Execution PlanningPhase of crisis action planning.

The key factor that mustbe considered duringdeception planning is risk.

Deception planning is anintegral part of the jointplanning processes.

Military Deception Planning and the Joint Planning Processes

Military Deception Planning Process

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Military deception is used to deliberately mislead adversarymilitary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities,intentions, and operations and is employed during all phasesof military operations. Military deception is done inconjunction with the overall command and control warfareeffort. Commanders, operational planners, and militarydeception planners must work together to ensure unity of theoverall mission. The military deception planning process isprepared by following six steps of mission analysis, guidance,staff deception estimates, commander’s deception estimates,plan development, and review and approval. Deceptionplanning must also be an integral part of the joint planningprocess.

CONCLUSION

increase the potential for successfuldefense against anticipated adversaryactions or to increase the potential for thesuccessful initiation of offensive action.The prehostilities phase starts with thenotification to commanders to readyforces for military operations (e.g., recallof personnel; fueling units; loading ofweapons; improving materiel readiness;mission-related exercises and rehearsals;and deployments, build-ups, and

“I make the enemy see my strengths as weaknesses and my weaknessesas strengths while I cause his strengths to become weaknesses and discoverwhere he is not strong . . . I conceal my tracks so that none can discernthem; I keep silence so that none can hear me.”

Sun TzuThe Art of W ar, c. 500 BC

CHAPTER IGENERAL

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1. Policy

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(CJCS) Instruction 3211.01A, “Joint MilitaryDeception,” provides joint policy guidance formilitary deception. Reference should be madeto that document for information concerningresponsibilities relating to military deceptionand for specific procedures and restrictionsrelating to military deceptions planned andconducted in support of joint operations.

2. Definition

Military deception is defined as beingthose actions executed to deliberatelymislead adversary military decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities,intentions, and operations, thereby causing theadversary to take specific actions (orinactions) that will contribute to theaccomplishment of the friendly mission. Thefive categories of military deception areshown in Figure I-1.

3. Applicability

a. Military deception is applicable at eachlevel of war and across the range of militaryoperations.

b. Military deception can be employedduring all phases of military operations.

• Prehostilities Phase: Deceptionsconducted during the prehostilities phaseof military operations are intended to

Figure I-1. Categories of Military Deception

CATEGORIES OFMILITARY DECEPTION

Strategic MilitaryDeception

Operational MilitaryDeception

Tactical MilitaryDeception

Service MilitaryDeception

Military Deception inSupport of Operations

Security

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disposition of forces and sustainmentresources). Deceptions during this phasemay be used to mislead adversaries as tothe strength, readiness, locations, andintended missions of friendly forces.

• Lodgment, Decisive Combat andStabilization, and Follow-ThroughPhases: These phases of militaryoperations start when forces move toexecute assigned missions and endwhen the objectives of the operationare achieved. Deceptions in these phasesmay be used to mislead the adversary asto the time and location of theintroduction of forces into the theater ofoperations, the location of the main effort,and the command’s operationalobjectives.

• Posthostilities and RedeploymentPhase: The posthostilities andredeployment phase starts when forcesredeploy or withdraw or consolidatecontrol over an area. It may merge withthe prehostilities period of the nextmilitary operation. Deceptions may beconducted to support redeployment or

withdrawal operations, to protectsensitive operational capabilities frombeing revealed, and to establish favorableconditions for subsequent militaryoperations.

4. Deception and the Principlesof War

Military deception is a tool to be used byjoint force commanders (JFCs) to assist themin accomplishing their missions. Militarydeception assists a commander in attainingsurprise, security, mass, and economy of force.Military deception supports militaryoperations by causing adversaries tomisallocate resources in time, place, quantity,or effectiveness.

5. Principles of MilitaryDeception

Just as the principles of war provide generalguidance for the conduct of militaryoperations, six principles of militarydeception (see Figure I-2) provide guidancefor planning and executing deceptionoperations.

Deception was a critical factor in the success of the Normandy invasion,causing the German command to commit several critical errors in judgement.

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General

a. Focus. The deception must target theadversary decision maker capable of takingthe desired action(s). The adversary’sintelligence system is normally not thetarget. It is only the primary conduit used bydeceivers to get selected information to thedecision maker.

b. Objective. The objective of thedeception must be to cause an adversary totake (or not to take) specific actions, notjust to believe certain things.

“It is very important to spread rumorsamong the enemy that you are planningone thing; then go and do somethingelse . . .”

The Emperor MauriceThe Strategikon, c. 600 AD

c. Centralized Control. A deceptionoperation must be directed and controlledby a single element. This approach isrequired in order to avoid confusion and toensure that the various elements involved in

the deception are portraying the same storyand are not in conflict with other operationalobjectives. Execution of the deception may,however, be decentralized so long as allparticipating organizations are adhering to asingle plan.

d. Security. Knowledge of a force’s intentto deceive and the execution of that intent mustbe denied to adversaries. Successful deceptionoperations require strict security. Need-to-know criteria must be applied to eachdeception operation and to each aspect ofthat operation. Along with an activeoperations security (OPSEC) effort to denycritical information about both actual anddeception activities, knowledge of deceptionplans and orders must be carefully protected.

e. Timeliness. A deception operationrequires careful timing. Sufficient timemust be provided for its portrayal; for theadversary’s intelligence system to collect,analyze, and report; for the adversary decisionmaker to react; and for the friendly intelligencesystem to detect the action resulting from theadversary decision maker’s decision.

f. Integration. Each deception must befully integrated with the basic operation thatit is supporting. The development of thedeception concept must occur as part of thedevelopment of the commander’s concept ofoperations. Deception planning should occursimultaneously with operation planning.

6. Coordination with Civil andPublic Affairs

a. Civil Affairs

• Civil Affairs (CA) operations areconducted as part of the overall USpolitical, military, economic, andinformational effort and may occurbefore, during, or subsequent to othermilitary operations. CA operations areconducted to gain maximum support for

PRINCIPLES OFMILITARY DECEPTION

Focus

Objective

Centralized Control

Security

Timeliness

Integration

Figure I-2. Principles of Military Deception

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US forces from the civilian population.CA contributes to the success of militaryoperations and projects a favorable USimage throughout the operational area.

• Military deception efforts should becoordinated with CA and with thosepsychological operations (PSYOP)activities that support CA to ensure thatdeception does not inadvertentlyundermine the relationships with thecivilian population or with host-nationmilitary authorities. Additionally,failure to consider CA could result inthe compromise of deception plans.

b. Public Affairs

• Deception operations will not

intentionally target or mislead the USpublic, the US Congress, or the USnews media. Misinforming the mediaabout military capabilities andintentions in ways that influence USdecision makers and public opinion iscontrary to Department of Defensepolicy.

• Deception operations that haveactivities potentially visible to themedia or the public should becoordinated with the appropriate publicaffairs officers to identify anypotential problems. Coordination willreduce the chance that public affairsofficers will inadvertently revealinformation that could undermineongoing or planned deceptionoperations.

OPERATION BODYGUARD

The use of deception preceding and throughout the invasion of Normandywere in fact a combination of deception operations intended to deceiveGermany regarding where the actual location of the invasion would occur. Inthis regard, the primary intent was to deceive regarding one’s intentions,although certainly the use of deception regarding capabilities was employedas well. The overall deception strategy for a number of cover and deceptionoperations for the invasion of Normandy was code-named “BODYGUARD.”

The intent of BODYGUARD was twofold. First, it would cause Hitler to dispersehis forces throughout Europe so that he would have insufficient strength todefeat the amphibious assault on Normandy. Second, it would delay Hitler ’sresponse to the actual invasion by confusing and suppressing German signalsintelligence (SIGINT) and administrative systems. In order to achieve theseobjectives bodyguard would fabricate an extremely credible war plan whichwould ultimately mislead Hitler regarding the time and place of the invasion.Certainly an overall war plan could not simply be handed over to the Germans,but would have to be leaked in small and subtle ways if was to be believed.BODYGUARD consisted of 36 subordinate plans and associated strategiesthat were ultimately designed to convince the Germans that the allies wouldcontinue a peripheral strategy and would be unable to attempt a cross channelattack prior to July 1944.

The primary operational deception plan for BODYGUARD was “OPERATIONFORTITUDE,” which was the most ambitious of the deception operations inWW II. This broad plan, covering deception operations in the European theater,had three formally defined objectives.

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These objectives were: to cause the Wehrmacht (German intelligence) to makefaulty strategic dispositions in north-west Europe before NEPTUNE (Normandyinvasion) by military treats against Norway; to deceive the enemy as to thetarget date and the target area of NEPTUNE; and to induce (the enemy to make)faulty tactical dispositions during and after NEPTUNE by threats against Pasde Calais.

To accomplish these objectives, FORTITUDE was divided into two parts.FORTITUDE NORTH was aimed at Norway and other Scandinavian countriesand was designed to tie down twenty-seven German divisions by leading theGermans to expect a joint British, Russian and American invasion. FORTITUDESOUTH was aimed at projecting an invasion force towards Pas de Calais whilealso convincing the Germans that Normandy was only a diversion.

SOURCE: John C. Scorby Jr. Operational Deception: Historical Retrospect and Future Utility

Naval War College, 1993

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CHAPTER IIMILITARY DECEPTION AND COMMAND AND

CONTROL WARFARE

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1. Command and ControlWarfare (C2W)

a. C2W is the integrated use of OPSEC,military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare(EW), and physical destruction, mutuallysupported by intelligence to deny informationto, influence, degrade, or destroy adversarycommand and control (C2) capabilities whileprotecting friendly C2 capabilities againstsuch actions. The synergistic application ofthe five C2W tools magnifies their combatpower. This synergism is the essence ofC2W.

b. While the objective of C2W in manysituations may be to “decapitate the enemy’scommand structure from its body of combatforces” (CJCS memorandum of policy [MOP]30, “Command and Control Warfare”), thisis not always the case. There will be situationswhere it is more advantageous to leaveadversary commanders, who are known to bevulnerable to being influenced by deceptionoperations, in complete control of their forces.In these situations, deception may be themain thrust of the C2W operation, whilethe other C2W tools would be used to controlthe adversary commander’s ability to see thebattlefield.

2. Military Deception as anElement of C2W

Military deception as an element of C2Wshould focus on causing the adversarycommander to incorrectly estimate the

situation in the operational area with respectto friendly force dispositions, capabilities,vulnerabilities, and intentions. It may only benecessary for a deception to cause theadversary commander to hesitate in makingdecisions during a critical time in theoperations in order for a deception to“succeed.”

a. Military Deception in C2-attack. Theadversary commander is the target formilitary deception in support of C2-attack.Some of the military deception goals of C2-attack should be to instigate the following.

• Cause the adversary commander toemploy forces (including intelligence) inways that are advantageous to the jointforce.

• Cause the adversary to reveal strengths,dispositions, and future intentions.

• Overload the adversary’s intelligenceand analysis capability to createconfusion over friendly intentions toachieve surprise.

• Condition the adversary to particularpatterns of friendly behavior that can beexploited at a time chosen by the jointforce.

• Cause the adversary to waste combatpower with inappropriate or delayedactions.

“Though fraud [deception] in other activities be detestable, in the managementof war it is laudable and glorious, and he who overcomes an enemy by fraudis as much to be praised as he who does so by force.”

Niccolo MachiavelliDiscourses, 1517

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b. Military Deception in C2-protect.Military deception can help protect the jointforce from adversary C2-attack efforts.Deception that misleads an adversarycommander about friendly C2 capabilitiesand/or limitations contributes to C2-protect.An adversary commander who is deceivedabout friendly C2 capabilities and limitationsmay be more likely to misallocate resourcesin an effort to attack or exploit friendly C2systems.

3. Deception’s Relationship toIntelligence and the OtherC2W Tools

As part of the C2W warfighting strategy,military deception conducted in support ofjoint operations seeks to influence adversarymilitary commanders and to degrade theirC2 capabilities. When supporting jointoperations, military deception is done inconjunction with the overall C2W effort.It reinforces and is reinforced by the executionof other C2W tools. (See Figure II-1.)

a. Deception and Intelligence

• Intelligence and counterintelligenceare critical to deception during theplanning, execution, and terminationphases of every deception operation.Intelligence and counterintelligenceperform the following essentialfunctions for deception planners.

•• Identify adversary decision makersand assess the vulnerability of thedecision makers to deception.

•• Determine the adversary’sperceptions of friendly capabilities andpossible courses of action.

•• Provide estimates of adversaryactions under differing scenarios and wargame possible outcomes with thedeception planner.

•• Establish and monitor feedbackchannels to evaluate success of thedeception operation through observationof the adversary’s reaction.

•• Identify adversary informationgathering capabilities and communication

The use of deception on the part of General Schwartzkopf's staff was a criticalfactor in the outcome of Operation DESERT STORM.

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systems to determine the best deceptionconduits.

•• Penetrate adversary OPSECmeasures and deceptions in support ofC2-protect.

• Deception planners must keepintelligence analysts aware of ongoingdeception operations. The analysts mustlook for feedback about the operationand consider the impact, both intendedand unintended, of those operations asthey seek to identify possible futureadversary courses of action.

b. Deception and PSYOP

• Similar to military deception, militaryPSYOP is a systematic process ofconveying tailored messages to aselected foreign audience. It promotesparticular themes that result in desiredforeign attitudes and behaviors that canaugment US efforts to achieve specificobjectives. PSYOP normally targetsgroups while deception targets specificindividuals. An individual targeted bydeception may also be part of a PSYOPtarget group.

Figure II-1. Command and Control Warfare T ools

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE TOOLS

- produces the desiredforeign attitudes andbehaviors that can

augment US efforts toachieve specific objectives

PsychologicalOperations

- uses electromagneticand directed energy to

control theelectromagnetic spectrum

- denies adversariesinformation about friendlycapabilities and intentions

OperationsSecurity

- protects the development,acquisition, and

deployment of physicaldestruction systems

PhysicalDestruction

Electronic Warfare

- seeks to influenceadversary military

commanders and degradetheir C2 capabilities

Deception

Intelligence

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• Groups that might be suitable fortargeting by PSYOP in support ofdeception operations include adversarycommand groups, planning staffs,specific factions within staffs,nonmilitary interest groups who caninfluence military policies and decisions,and intelligence systems analysts.

• Through the skillful use of associatedtruths, PSYOP can magnify the effectsof and reinforce the deception plan.Dedicated PSYOP dissemination assetscan discretely convey intendedinformation to selected target audiencesthrough appropriate “key communicator”backchannel networks.

• PSYOP actions convey informationnot only to the intended target audiencesbut also to foreign intelligence systems.Therefore, PSYOP objectives andactions must be consistent with theother C2W objectives and actions.

• Additionally, some deception actions willnot only convey information to thedeception target but also to the PSYOPaudience. This provides the opportunityfor mutual support if deception andPSYOP are carefully coordinated.

c. Deception and Operations Security

• OPSEC is the process for denyingadversaries information about friendlycapabilities and intentions by identifying,controlling, and protecting the generallyunclassified evidence of the planning andexecution of sensitive activities. Thisunclassified evidence (called OPSECindicators) is created by friendlydetectable actions or is available in open-source information.

• OPSEC measures are those actions thatorganizations take to control theirOPSEC indicators. This is done to deny

critical information to an adversary.Critical information is that informationan adversary requires to counter friendlyoperations.

• OPSEC and deception have much incommon. Both require the managementof indicators. OPSEC seeks to limitan adversary’s ability to detect orderive useful information fromobserving friendly activities. Deceptionseeks to create or increase the likelihoodof detection of certain indicators inorder to cause an adversary to derive anincorrect conclusion.

• Deception can be used to directlysupport OPSEC. Cover stories provideplausible explanations for activities thatcannot be hidden. False vehicle oraircraft markings disguise thedeployment of specific forces. Majordeception operations create numerousfalse indicators, making it more difficultfor adversary intelligence analysts toidentify the real indicators that OPSECis seeking to control.

• The OPSEC process supportsdeception. The OPSEC processidentifies the key questions aboutfriendly capabilities and intentions towhich adversary commanders needanswers in order to effectively prepareto counteract friendly operations. Theprocess also identifies the criticalinformation that answers many of thosequestions. Deception planners set out toprovide another set of answers to thosequestions—answers that provide theadversary with plausible information thatinduces certain desired actions.

• An OPSEC analysis of a plannedactivity or operation will identifypotential OPSEC vulnerabilities.Those vulnerabilities may be useful todeception planners as possible conduits

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for passing deceptive information to anadversary.

• Deception actions often need their ownOPSEC protection. The existence of adeception operation in and of itself mayconvey OPSEC indicators that reveal tothe opposing commander the actualfriendly intentions. An OPSEC analysisof the planned deception is needed toprotect against just such an inadvertentor unintentional outcome.

d. Deception and EW

• EW is any military action involving theuse of electromagnetic and directedenergy to control the electromagneticspectrum or to attack the enemy.

• Deception, in conjunction with OPSEC,supports EW operations by being usedto protect the development, acquisition,and deployment of sensitive EWcapabilities. Deception can also be usedto support the employment of EW unitsand systems.

• In turn, EW can be used to supportdeception. Electromagnetic deceptionis a form of electronic attack and atechnical means of deception. EW canbe used in support of feints,demonstrations, and displays. Thepositioning of a majority of a command’sEW systems in a particular area can beused to create an indicator of thecommand’s intended main effort. Thedisruption of an adversary’s intelligenceand command communicationscapabilities can facilitate the insertion ofdeceptive information. EW attacks onintelligence collection and radar systemscan be used to shape and control theadversary’s ability to see certainactivities.

• EW planning should be closelycoordinated with deception andintelligence planners to ensure that EWdoes not disrupt any adversary C2systems that are being used as deceptionconduits or that are providing intelligencefeedback.

e. Deception and Physical Destruction

• The relationship of deception andphysical destruction is very similar tothat of deception and EW. Deception,used in conjunction with OPSEC, canbe used to protect the development,acquisition, and deployment of physicaldestruction systems. It can mislead anadversary as to the true capabilities andpurpose of a weapon system.

• Physical destruction can supportdeception by shaping an adversary’sintelligence collection capability throughdestroying or nullifying selectedintelligence systems or sites. Attackscan be used to mask the main effort fromthe adversary.

4. C2W Planning and Deception

a. The organizational structure to plan andcoordinate C2W should be sufficientlyflexible to accommodate a variety of planningand operational circumstances. To besuccessful, C2W should be an integral partof all joint military operations . This requiresextensive planning and coordination amongmany elements of the joint headquarters,component staffs, and other US Governmentdepartments and agencies to ensure that C2Woperations are fully integrated with otherportions of operation and campaign plans.

b. How the staff is organized to plan andcoordinate C2W is the joint forcecommander’s prerogative. Since joint force

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commanders are supported by staffs withdiverse structure, scope of responsibilities, andsupporting infrastructure, there is no single“correct” way to organize personnel to planand execute C2W.

c. The principal types of joint staffs thatmay be involved in C2W planning are thecombatant command staffs, subordinateunified command staffs, and the joint taskforce staffs. The circumstances in which thesetypes of staffs conduct C2W planning mayaffect the optimal organization required tocarry out their duties.

d. Joint force staffs already haveorganizations (staff elements and/orcomponents) that are tasked to manage theelements of C2W. The JFC should establishmechanisms to effectively coordinate theefforts of these organizations to build andexecute a synergetic C2W plan that supportsthe commander’s mission and concept ofoperations. There are a number of ways forthe JFC to organize the staff to ensure thatC2W efforts are fully coordinated. Some ofthe staff organization options for C2Winclude the following.

• Conduct C2W planning during existingdaily planning meetings, such as theOperations Planning Group used on somestaffs. This is done to ensure macro-level synchronization of the elements ofC2W. After macro-level synchronizationis accomplished, detailed coordinationcould be conducted directly betweenaffected staff elements and components.

• Form a C2W cell of selectrepresentatives from each of the staffelements and components responsible forthe five elements of C2W, other staffrepresentatives as required, andsupporting agency augmentees. This cellwould conduct brainstorming tosuccessfully merge the five elements ofC2W into a synergistic plan. The cellwould be a coordinating body and relyon the staff elements and/or componentsthat are represented in the C2W cell tocarry out the detailed support necessaryto plan and execute C2W.

e. Joint Pub 3-13.1, “Joint Doctrine forCommand and Control Warfare (C2W),”describes the C2W planning process in detail.

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THE 5th WIRELESS GROUP - ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

During the period just prior to the allied invasion of German-held territory atNormandy, a special electronic unit, the 5th Wireless Group, was formed tohelp with the deception plan for the invasion. By this point in the war theGermans had no air cover available for aerial reconnaissance and were relyingcompletely on wireless transmissions. The 5th Wireless Group utilized a newlydeveloped transmitter which allowed a group of people to effectively simulatean entire network of people taking part in exercises.

Before writing the scripts for transmission, 5th Wireless Group observedgenuine exercises, both land and amphibious, taking place in Yorkshire andoff the coast of Scotland. Scripts were then prepared, rehearsed, and“performed” using troops stationed in the area to record the exercises. Greatcare was taken in ensuring authenticity including, interestingly enough, takingcare that it was not “too perfect.” In real conversation, script writers noticed,there were phrases missed, requests for repetition, conversations overlapping,etc. Every attempt was made to make the exercises seem genuine, even if itmeant adding a little confusion.

These exercises were an integral part of FORTITUDE SOUTH, the operationdesigned to convince the German command of the invasion from the Pas deCalais. Once the deception was completed and the invasion of Normandyproven successful, 5th Wireless Group was also deployed to Europe to assistin deception regarding troop movements. It continued to serve as an importantfactor in deception until the defeat of the German forces.

SOURCE: Martin Young and Robbie StampTrojan Horses: Deception Operations in the Second W orld W ar

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2. Coordination

“Success in war is obtained byanticipating the plans of the enemy, andby diverting his attention from our owndesigns.”

Francesco Guicciacardini1483-1540

a. Military deception and its supportingactions must be coordinated with higher,adjacent, subordinate, and supporting staffs.

b. Within a joint staff, coordination isrequired between the deception and C2Wplanners on the operations staff and theplanners and analysts in the intelligence staff(see Figure III-1). Also, within the constraintsof the need-to-know criteria, deceptionplanners may need to coordinate with otherstaff elements such as logistics and/orcommand, control, communications, andcomputer (C4) systems.

c. Despite coordination requirements,knowledge of information relating to plannedand ongoing deception operations must berestricted to only those personnel who meetthe strictly defined need-to-know criteria.

• The JFC is responsible for providingguidance concerning the disseminationof deception-related information. Duringmultinational operations, the JFC must

CHAPTER IIIROLES, COORDINATION, AND TRAINING

III-1

1. Roles

a. Commanders. JFCs make militarydeception an integral part of their planning.They assign C2W and military deceptionobjectives, direct coordination amongsubordinate, supporting, and componentcommanders, and redirect and organizeforces to ensure unity of the overall effort.

b. Operational Planners. Operationalplanners oversee C2W and deceptionplanning. They incorporate C2-attack andC2-protect concepts (including deception)into operations estimates. They recommendC2W courses of action to commanders forconsideration. They supervise the planningand execution of deceptions.

c. Military Deception Planners. Deceptionplanners take the JFC’s guidance and developit into a detailed deception plan. Theyintegrate the deception plan with the basicoperation plan and with the other C2W tools.Deception planners ensure that theircommand’s deception capabilities are used tothe fullest extent possible.

d. Other Planners. All joint staff planners,not just the deception planners, consider usingmilitary deception when they develop theircourses of action. Additionally, they supportdeception planning by providing subjectmatter expertise.

“In his movements the general should act like a good wrestler; he shouldfeint in one direction to try to deceive his adversary and then make good useof the opportunities he finds, and in this way he will overpower the enemy”.

The Emperor MauriceThe Strategikon, c. 600 AD

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be particularly sensitive to informationrequirements and concerns of the non-US members.

• During planning, deception plannersdevelop need-to-know criteria thatpermit necessary coordination whilelimiting the number of individuals withknowledge of the deception. Only a few

individuals require access to the entiredeception plan. Others require onlyknowledge of limited portions of theplan. The need-to-know criteria shouldaddress these different levels of requiredaccess.

d. Deception operations can benefit fromnormally occurring activity provided that the

Figure III-1. Coordination Within a Joint Staff

Care must be taken that normally occuring activity fits the deception story;deception and OPSEC planners must take these activities into accountin their planning.

COORDINATION WITHIN A JOINT STAFF

IntelligenceStaff Planners and

Analysts

OperationsStaff Deception and

Command& Control Warfare

Planners

Coordinates with other staff elementswithin the constraints of the need-to-

know criteria

CoordinationRequired

III-3


activity fits the deception story. Conversely,actual operations have the potential to createOPSEC indicators that pose a threat to theeffectiveness of deception operations. Thesereal indicators may conflict with thedeception story. Deception and OPSECplanners will have to coordinate withorganizations that create these indicators tolimit potential adverse effects or to maximizetheir deception potential.

e. In some situations, a joint force maylack the capability to convey certain typesof deceptive information to the adversary.Other organizations, however, may have therequired capability. PSYOP organizations can

discretely convey tailored messages toselected target audiences through appropriate“key communicators” backchannel networks.Deception planners should conduct thecoordination required to obtain the necessarysupport from those organizations and tointegrate, coordinate, and deconflict deceptionand actual operations.

f. Deception planners should be supportedby assigned liaison officers from intelligenceand counterintelligence organizations. Theliaison officers will provide all-sourceestimates upon which to base plans and real-time all-source feedback about theeffectiveness of deception actions.

PLANNED DECEPTION - BATTLE OF ALAMEIN

General Charles Richardson, a member of General Montgomery’s staff givenresponsibility for planning deception before the Battle of El Alamein,considered several factors in executing the operation.

Richardson’s first priority was to create a deception to convince GeneralRommel that the attack would be coming from the south; secondly, that itwould occur later than the actual target date. To that end, Richardson puttogether a plan of concealment and deception. In order to create the illusionof a southern attack, “spoof” assembly areas were put together in rear areas,while preparations in the forward area such as petrol and ammunition dumpswere camouflaged. Petrol, which was provided in tins of two feet by ten inchessquare, was brought up at night and arranged to resemble fire trenches ratherthan lying on the ground in a dump as usual.

Water pipelines played a major role in clouding the time factor. Richardsonknew that the enemy would be watching such construction and using it as ajudge for when work would be completed; in order to use this observation totheir advantage, the camouflage crew used empty petrol tins to create theeffect of a pipeline gradually being completed. To enemy surveillance camerasit appeared that construction on the water pipelines would not be completeduntil ten days after D-Day.

Other deception plans were being carried out simultaneously. A dummy petrol,food and ammunition dump was placed in the rear in the south in order tobolster Rommel’s impression of a southern attack; meanwhile, ammunitionsdumps at the front were enlarged and camouflaged. Legitimate armoredformations were moved to the front at night, where they were concealed fromdetection by sunshields. They were replaced by dummy formations. Dummyartillery units placed in the south not only served in the initial deception but,when they were discovered to be shams during the battle, were promptlyreplaced with genuine artillery and mounted a surprise counterattack.

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3. Training

Joint force commanders should ensurethat their staffs and units receive trainingin deception. Additionally, joint operationaland deception planners should receiveappropriate deception training. Staff trainingcan be accomplished during command postexercises, war games, and conceptualexercises during the preparatory and executionperiods of field exercises or routine forwarddeployments. Seminars, briefings, and othersuch activities can also be used for trainingboth individuals and staffs. Unit training canbe conducted during exercises.

a. Joint Force Commanders and Staffs.To effectively plan and execute militarydeceptions, commanders and their staffsshould understand the following.

• The role of military deception in C2W.

• Deception’s value as a force multiplierand as a cost effective tool for achievingoperational objectives.

• What is required to plan and executeeffective deception.

• The policies that govern the use ofdeception.

b. Joint Operational Planners. Thoseassigned as operational planners shouldunderstand the following.

• The process for addressing militarydeception during preparation of staff andcommanders estimates and theorigination of courses of action (COAs).

• The broad range of what can and cannotreasonably be executed as deception.

• How the other C2W tools supportdeception.

• Deception’s role in military history.

c. Deception Planners. The selection andtraining of deception planners are critical.It is essential that military deception plannerspossess fertile imaginations, because theability to create and execute an effectivedeception often depends upon the creativityused to develop and maintain a story.Deception planners must possess thefollowing abilities.

• Understand each component’sdeception and other C2W capabilities.

• Be intimately familiar with theircommand’s assigned missions andoperational area.

• Understand the concepts of centers ofgravity, calculated risk, initiative,security, and surprise.

• Understand friendly and adversaryintelligence systems and how theyfunction.

In addition to the planned deception, the RAF kept the Luftwaffe’s TechnicalReconnaissance from gaining a clear picture of the ground operations. TheGerman command was so completely fooled by the deceptions that GeneralRommel was away when the battle started. It was several days beforereinforcements could be moved up from the northern sector.

SOURCE: Martin Young and Robbie Stamp Trojan Horses: Deception Operations in the Second W orld W ar

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• Possess technical understandings ofintelligence sensors, the platforms onwhich they deploy, their reportingcapabilities, and associated processingmethodologies.

• Understand the psychological andcultural factors that might influence theadversary’s planning and decisionmaking.

• Understand potential adversaries’planning and decision making processes(both formal and informal).

• Understand the specialized C2Wdevices and weapon systems that areavailable to support the deception.

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CHAPTER IVMILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING PROCESS

IV-1

1. Deception Planning

a. As with all joint planning, deceptionplanning is an iterative process that requirescontinual reexamination of its objectives,target, stories, and means throughout theplanning and execution phases. Althoughdiagrams of planning processes are useful inaiding the understanding of the relationshipof the individual elements of the process, itmust be remembered that processes areseldom as linear as diagrams or flow chartsmay imply. Deception planners must beprepared to respond to the dynamics of thesituation and of their own headquarters.

b. Chapter V, “Military DeceptionPlanning and the Joint Planning Process,”discusses how the military deceptionplanning process relates to the major jointplanning processes. Appendix B, “Explanationof Military Deception Terminology,”discusses the unique deception terminologyused in this chapter.

c. A key factor that must be consideredduring deception planning is risk. At eachstage of deception planning, the deceptionplanners must carefully consider the risksinvolved with using deception. Theoverriding consideration in risk analysis is thecomparison between the risk taken and thepossible benefits of the deception. Majordetermining factors include the following.

“To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind anddeaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distractionby creating confusion in their minds.”

Mao Tse-TungOn Protracted W ar, 1938

• Deception Failure. Deceptions may failfor many reasons. It is possible that thetarget will not receive the story, notbelieve the story, be unable to act, beindecisive even if the story is believed,act in unforeseen ways, or may discoverthe deception. The failure or exposureof the deception can significantly affectthe friendly commander’s operationalactivities. For this reason, a commandermust understand the risks associatedwith basing the success of anyoperation on the anticipated success ofa deception.

• Exposure of Means or FeedbackChannels. Even if a deception issuccessful, the deception means orfeedback channels that were used maybe compromised. The risk ofcompromise of sensitive means andfeedback channels must be carefullyweighed against the perceived benefitsof a deception operation.

• Unintended Effects. Third parties (e.g.,neutral or friendly forces not read intothe deception) may receive and act ondeception information intended for thedeception target. Deception plannersmust ensure that they are knowledgeableabout friendly operational planning at thejoint and multinational force level and atthe component level in order to minimizethe risk to third parties.

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DECEPTION OPERATIONS PLAN IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Throughout the planning process [during DESERT SHIELD and DESERTSTORM], CINCCENT emphasized the need for a comprehensive plan to deceiveIraqi forces regarding Coalition intentions and to conceal the Coalition schemeof maneuver. The deception plan was intended to convince Iraq that theCoalition main attack would be directly into Kuwait, supported by anamphibious assault. The plan also sought to divert Iraqi forces from theCoalition main attack and to fix Iraqi forces in eastern Kuwait and along theKuwaiti coast.

Among the activities planned to support the deception were Navy feints anddemonstrations in the northern Persian Gulf, Marine landing exercises alongthe Gulf and Omani coast, positioning of a large amphibious task force in theGulf, and air refueling and training activity surges that desensitized the Iraqisto the real pre-attack buildup. The absence of air attacks on some westerntargets was also to contribute to the impression that the Coalition main attackwould come from the vicinity of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border and from the sea.This impression was to be reinforced by USMC and Joint Forces Eastoperations south of Kuwait to fix Iraqi divisions along Kuwait’s southern border.Raids and some SOF activities were expected to contribute to SaddamHussein’s confusion as the most likely location for the main attack.

SOURCE: Final Report to CongressConduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

2. The Deception PlanningProcess

See Figure IV-1.

a. Step 1: Deception Mission Analysis.Deception mission analysis is conducted aspart of the overall mission analysis that isdone by a JFC following receipt of a newmission. The JFC, assisted by the staff, studiesall available information about the mission,the proposed operational area, and thepotential adversaries. During the analysis, theJFC considers how deception can supportthe accomplishment of the mission.Deception may not be applicable to everysituation, but it must be considered, especiallyat the operational level. Even in situationswhere operational or tactical deceptions areinappropriate, there will normally be a rolefor military deception in support of OPSEC.

b. Step 2: Deception PlanningGuidance. After completion of the mission

analysis, the commander issues planningguidance to the staff. In addition to otherguidance, the commander states the deceptionobjective for the operation. The commandermay go on to provide additional guidanceconcerning specific deception COAs that thestaff should address when preparing estimates.

c. Step 3: Staff Deception Estimate

• The deception estimate is conductedas part of the operations estimate.Working with the operational planners,the other C2W planners, and intelligenceanalysts, the deception planners gatherand analyze information relating to theadversary. They identify the keydecision makers and study all availableinformation relating to their backgroundsand psychological profiles. Theyconsider the adversary’s C2 system anddecision making process. They study itsintelligence collection and analysiscapabilities. They identify any

IV-3


preconceptions that the adversaryleadership may have about friendlyintentions and capabilities. With theintelligence analysts, the deceptionplanners seek to identify any COAsthat the adversary may have adoptedor has under consideration.

• Intelligence analysts from the JointStaff Intelligence Directorate play acritical role in developing thedeception estimate.

•• They identify the current possible(and, when justified by the evidence,probable) adversary COAs and theadversary’s rationale for taking thoseactions.

•• Analysts help the deceptionplanners understand how the adversarydecision makers, their staffs, and trustedadvisors perceive friendly capabilitiesand intentions and how the adversary islikely to react to the deception.

•• They explain how the adversaryprocesses, filters, ascribes meaning to,and uses information.Figure IV-1. The Deception Planning

Process

General Eisenhower's thorough analysis of the German High Command was acrucial element of the deception planned in support of the Normandy Invasion.

THE DECEPTIONPLANNING PROCESS

Deception Mission Analysis

Deception PlanningGuidance

Staff DeceptionEstimate

Commander's DeceptionEstimate

Deception PlanDevelopment

Deception Plan Review andApproval

STEP 1

STEP 2

STEP 3

STEP 4

STEP 5

STEP 6

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• On the basis of the information developedduring the initial estimate process, thedeception planners, working directlywith the operation planners and the otherC2W planners, develop severaldeception COAs. The proposeddeception COAs must each be capableof accomplishing the commander’sdeception objective. They must beintegrated with the operational COAsthat are being developed.

• A deception COA will restate thedeception objective and identify theproposed deception target and the desiredperception. It will outline the deceptionstory that would be used to create thedesired perception and identify, ingeneral terms, possible deceptionmeans.

• In many cases, actual COAs developedby the operational planners will providethe basis for deception COAs. UsingCOAs developed by operational plannershelps to ensure that the deception COAswill be feasible and practical militaryoptions. Additionally, the proposeddeception COAs should seek topromote actions that the adversary isalready conducting or is believed to beconsidering.

• The strengths and weaknesses of eachof the proposed deception COAs areanalyzed. Some of the majorconsiderations are feasibility, impact onactual operations, and security. How thedeception COAs support the overallC2W concept of operations is alsoconsidered. Planners preparing logistics,personnel, and intelligence estimatesmust also determine if the concepts theyare examining can support the proposeddeception COAs and to determine thepotential impact of the deceptions on theirability to support the operational mission.

• In the final phase of the estimate process,the operational planners considerdeception during their comparison of theproposed friendly operational COAs.The ability of deception along with theother C2W tools to support a particularfriendly COA should be one of thefactors considered when determiningwhich proposed COA should berecommended for adoption by the JFC.

d. Step 4: Commander’s DeceptionEstimate

• Using the staff estimates as a basis, theJFC conducts an estimate. The JFCselects an operational COA fordevelopment into an operation plan ororder and issues any necessary additionalguidance. At the same time, the JFCselects the supporting deception COA.

• The JFC’s decision becomes thebasis for the development of theselected deception COA into acomplete plan or order. As in the othersteps in the process, the deceptionplanners work very closely with otherplanners to ensure that the deception planand the operational plan are mutuallysupporting.

• The component deception planners, ifnot already participating, should bebrought into the planning process at thispoint to ensure that their units can supportthe plan.

e. Step 5: Deception Plan Development.Developing a complete deception plan is themost time-consuming part of the planningprocess. There are five major actions in thisstep: complete the story, identify the means,develop the event schedule, identify feedbackchannels, and develop the terminationconcept.

IV-5


• Complete the Deception Story

•• During the estimate, an outlinedeception story was developed. Thatoutline now needs to be transformed intoa fully developed story. The deceptionplanners must identify all the actionsthat the adversary’s intelligence systemwould expect to see if friendly forceswere actually executing the deceptionstory. The deception planners willrequire the assistance of operational,logistics, and C4 systems planners toensure that all normal activities areidentified.

•• A key element to be considered indeveloping the deception story is time.The deception planners must determinehow much time is available to presentthe deception story and estimate howlong will be required for the deceptiontarget to make the decision to take thedesired action. The available time maydetermine the scope and depth of thestory. The following time related issuesshould be analyzed during thedevelopment of the deception story: (1)Time of Maximum Disadvantage.When is the adversary’s action (orinaction) required: tomorrow, next week,or next month? The scope of thedeception operation may be limited bythe amount of time available for itsplanning and execution. (2) TheDeception Target. Is the target cautiousor bold? Will the target react to initialindicators, or will the target demandextensive confirmation through otherintelligence sources before reaching adecision? How long does it normallytake the target to make a decision? (3)Opposing Force Execution. Once thedecision is made, how long will the targetneed to formulate and issue an order?How long will it take the adversary toperform the desired action? For example,if the deception objective is the

movement of an enemy squadron to somedistant point, time must be allowed forthe deception target to issue themovement order and for the squadron toreceive and execute the order. (4)Intelligence Processing. How muchtime should be allowed for theadversary’s detection and collectionsystems to collect, analyze, and providethe deception target the false intelligencecreated by the deception? This will varydepending of the target’s level ofcommand. (5) Execution of theDeception Tasks. When must displays,demonstrations, feints, and other actionsbegin to be observable by the adversary’sintelligence system? How long shouldeach last?

• Identify the Deception Means. Oncethe story is fully developed, the deceptionplanners identify the means that will beused to portray the story. This actionrequires a detailed understanding of theadversary’s intelligence system and offriendly force operations.

•• Determine Adversary’s Detectionand Collection Capabilities. The firstaction in means selection is determiningthe adversary’s detection and collectioncapabilities. (1) Adversary detection andcollection systems vary greatly in theircapabilities. The intelligence staff canprovide multidiscipline counterintelligenceproducts that will identify a particularadversary’s capabilities. (2) Mostintelligence collection systems includeat a minimum human intelligence, open-source intelligence, and some signalsintelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. Moresophisticated systems will include aerialand satellite reconnaissance as well asextensive SIGINT capabilities. (3) Eachadversary must be studied to determineits particular collection capabilities. Ifpossible, a determination should also bemade as to which intelligence capability

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the deception target most relies upon forinformation during decision making.

•• Identify Indicators. The secondaction in means selection is to determinethe specific indicators that are associatedwith the activities needed to portray thedeception story. The collection ofindicators associated with a particularunit or activity is commonly referred toas a unit profile . The profile is morethan just a listing of equipment. Theoperational patterns (where, when, andhow normal activities occur) associatedwith a unit or activities are also part of aprofile. (1) This action requiresdetailed knowledge of friendlyoperations. If, for example, the plan callsfor the electronic portrayal of a carriertask force, the deception planners mustknow what emitters are normallyassociated with that element. (2) If themain command post of an Army heavymaneuver brigade is to be portrayedelectronically and visually, then theplanner will need to know not only whatcommunications systems are found inthe command post but also how manyvehicles and of what types, how manytents, and where and in what pattern thevehicles and tents are normally located.(3) Units of similar sizes can have verydifferent profiles. Marine air-groundtask forces (MAGTFs) and Armymechanized brigades have differentprofiles because of different equipmentand communications systems. Alogistics brigade’s profile differs fromboth not only because of equipmentdifferences but also because of where andhow it normally operates on thebattlefield. (4) Indicator and profileinformation should be available from thecomponent deception planners. Anadditional source is OPSEC programofficers. They are also concerned aboutindicator and unit profiles. (5) Tofacilitate planning, joint deception

planners, working with componentplanners and OPSEC program officers,should develop friendly unit indicatorand profile data bases.

•• Compare Capabilities to Indicators.The next action is to compare theadversary’s intelligence collectioncapabilities to the appropriate indicators.Those indicators that cannot be collectedby the adversary will not requireportrayal. If it is known that theadversary places a higher value oninformation received from certainintelligence sources than from others,then those indicators that can be collectedby the valued sources should beemphasized.

•• Select Means. Using the results ofthe previous actions in this step,deception planners now select thespecific means that will be used to portraythe deception story. (1) In essence, theselection of deception means is theopposite of selecting OPSEC measures.While the goal of OPSEC is normally toreduce the adversary’s ability to seecertain indicators, deception normallyseeks to increase the visibility ofselected indicators. Both seek tomanage what indicators are being seenby the adversary. OPSEC and deceptionplanners must work closely to ensurecoordinated indicator management. (2)During means selection, coordination isalso required with the EW, PSYOP, andtargeting planners to ensure unity ofeffort . If the deception story dependson the use of certain means, then the EWand targeting planners need to know notto target for destruction or disruption theparticular adversary intelligence systemthat will collect against those means. Forexample, if the portrayal of the deceptionstory is dependent upon falsecommunications, then attacks on theadversary’s SIGINT system must be

IV-7


carefully coordinated with the deceptionplanners. Similarly, PSYOP themes mustbe coordinated with the deception storyto ensure that they are sending the samemessage to the deception target.

• Develop the Deception Event Schedule

•• In this action, the deception means aredeveloped into deception events. Thisrequires identifying when specific meanswill be employed. The objective is toensure that the deception target’sperceptions are influenced in time for thedesired action (the deception objective)to be completed at the most operationallyadvantageous time.

•• The deception planners, incoordination with the operationalplanners and the other C2W planners,develop detailed execution schedulesfor the means that were identified in theprevious action. The schedule identifieswhat is to occur, when it is to take place,where it is to occur, and who is toexecute it.

•• Factors to be considered duringscheduling include: (1) The timing of

actual friendly activities; (2) The timerequired for friendly forces to conductthe deception activity; (3) Where aparticular activity fits in the normalsequence of events for the type operationbeing portrayed; (4) The time requiredfor the adversary intelligence system tocollect, analyze, and report on theactivity; (5) The time required for thedeception target to make the desireddecision and order the desired action; (6)The time required for desired action tobe executed.

•• Events may be grouped to portraydeception actions such as feints anddemonstrations.

•• The deception event schedule ispublished as part of the deception plan.Figure IV-2 is an example.

• Identify the Deception FeedbackChannels

•• Deception planners require twomajor types of feedback about theiroperations. Operational feedbackidentifies what deception information isreaching the deception target. Analytical

Figure IV-2. Deception Event Schedule

DECEPTION EVENT SCHEDULE

ID# Objective Date-timeto Initiate

Action Unit Remarks

29 Simulatepreparation formovementsouth.

131500 1. Establishtraffic controlpoints.

HQ2nd Division

Initiate countersurveillancemeasures toprevent enemyvisual photo reconof notional route.

2. Install radionets.

3. Pass scriptedmessage trafficper scenario.

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feedback identifies what actions thetarget is taking because of thatinformation.

•• All-source intelligence andcounterintelligence about the adversary’sintelligence interests and activitiesprovide indications of the receipt ofdeception information.

•• Observations by friendly intelligenceprovide information about changes in theadversary’s dispositions and actions.Those dispositions are normally the keydeterminant of the success of thedeception. Once operations commence,the adversary’s reactions to friendlyinitiatives are indicators of whether thedeception story is still being believed bythe deception target.

•• Deception planners must coordinatewith the intelligence planners to ensurethat the intelligence needs of deceptionare reflected in the command’s priorityintelligence requirements. Additionally,deception planners should work with theappropriate intelligence analysts to makethem aware of the type of information thatis being sought. Reporting channels shouldbe established between the analysts anddeception planners to facilitate the rapidpassage of feedback information.

•• Deception planneres must alsocoordinate with EW and targetingplanners to ensure that critical sourcesof deception feedback information arenot targeted.

• Develop the Termination Concept

•• Each deception plan must address howthe deception operation will beterminated. Termination planningensures the controlled, orderly release ofinformation relating to the deception.Planning the termination of a deception

operation requires the same care andattention to detail that went into planningthe deception’s execution. Terminationplanning should include contingenciesfor unforeseen events such as thedeception’s premature compromiseforcing its early termination.

•• Controlling the exposure of theexistence of a deception operation or ofelements of a deception may be difficultbecause of the nature of the operation.The deception target will know that it hasbeen fooled. In some cases, it may beuseful to announce the contribution ofdeception to operational successes, if aPSYOP goal is to denigrate theeffectiveness of the deception target orthe adversary leadership.

•• In most cases, however, the fact thatdeception was used during an operationshould be protected, both to allow use ofthe same deception tactics and techniquesduring later operations and to protectsensitive deception means.

•• The termination concept shouldidentify what information about thedeception may be released and when. Itmay provide a cover story shouldquestions be raised about the role ofdeception in a particular operation.Classification and disseminationinstructions for deception-relatedinformation should be provided.

f. Step 6: Deception Plan Review andApproval

• The commander reviews and approvesthe completed deception plan as part ofthe normal operation plan review andapproval process. The need-to-knowcriteria remain in effect, however, andonly a limited number of personnel willparticipate in the deception plan reviewand approval process.

IV-9


• CJCS Instruction 3211.01A, “JointMilitary Deception,” provides theprocedures for obtaining higher levelapproval of deception plans. All joint

deception planners must be familiar withthe procedures in this instruction toensure that their plans are properlyreviewed.

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CHAPTER VMILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING AND THE JOINT

PLANNING PROCESSES

V-1

1. Integration

Deception planning, as part of the C2Wplanning process, is an integral part of the jointplanning processes. It is part of effectiveoperational planning and should not beattempted as an “add on” to the existingplanning processes.

2. Planning Considerations

a. Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol I:(Planning Policies and Procedures)” containsthe detailed requirements for preparingjoint operation plans and orders. Joint Pub5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations,”and Joint Pub 5-00.1, “JTTP for CampaignPlanning,” describe the campaign planning

process. In each planning process, deceptionis addressed as part of C2W in thecommander’s overall concept of operations.The specific deception plan will be part ofAnnex C, “Operations,” of any operation planor order.

b. The need to conduct adequatecoordination during deception planning mustbe balanced against the need to maintain thesecrecy required for effective deceptionoperations. Strict need-to-know criteriashould be established and used to determinewhich individuals should be allowed toparticipate in deception planning. The criteriamay specify separate levels of access tofacilitate coordination, allowing moreindividuals access to the less sensitive aspectsof the deception plan.

“Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when youstrike and overcome him, never give up the pursuit as long as your menhave strength to follow . . .”

Lieutenant General Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson, 1862

The need to conduct adequate coordination during deception must be balancedagainst the need to maintain secrecy.

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3. Deception Planning and theJoint Planning Processes

a. The Deliberate Planning Process.Deliberate planning is the Joint Operation andExecution System (JOPES) process, usednormally during peacetime to developoperation plans and operation plans inconcept format. Deception planning relatesto the JOPES deliberate planning process asshown in Figure V-1.

b. The Crisis Action Planning Process.Crisis action planning is used during time-sensitive situations to rapidly develop plansand orders. Deception planning relates tothe JOPES crisis action planning process asshown in Figure V-2.

c. The Campaign Planning Process

• A campaign is a series of related jointmajor operations that arrange tactical,operational, and strategic actions toaccomplish strategic and operational

objectives. A campaign plan describeshow these operations are connected intime, space, and purpose. Within acampaign, major operations consist ofcoordinated actions in a single phase ofa campaign and usually decide the courseof the campaign.

• Campaign plans are normally not createduntil the Execution Planning Phase(Phase V) of crisis action planning.However, the campaign planning processbegins during crisis action planning,when the supported commanderdevelops the course of actionrecommendation for the nationalcommand authorities (NCA) (Phase III).After the COA is approved by the NCA(Phase IV), the supported commanderprovides specific guidance to the staff.That COA becomes the basis for thedevelopment of a operation order (PhaseV). Deception planning implementationis similar to crisis action planning, asshown in Figure V-2.

V-3

Military Deception Planning and the Joint Planning Processes

Figure V-1. Deliberate Planning Process

DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

Initiation

Concept DevelopmentPhase II

Mission AnalysisDeception Mission Analysis

Step 1

Planning GuidanceDeception Planning Guidance

Step 2

Staff EstimatesStaff Deception Estimate

Step 3

Commander's EstimateCommander's Deception Estimate

Step 4

Plan DevelopmentDeception PlanDevelopment

Phase III

Phase IV Plan ReviewDeception PlanReview and Approval

Phase V Supporting Plans

Commander's ConceptStep 5

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffConcept Review

Step 6

Phase II

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Figure V-2. Crisis Action and/or Campaign Planning Process

CRISIS ACTION AND/ORCAMPAIGN PLANNING PROCESS

Situation Development

Crisis AssessmentPhase II

Phase III

Phase IV

Phase V

Course of ActionDevelopment

Execution Planning

Phase VI Execution

Course of ActionSelection

Deception Mission AnalysisDeception Planning GuidanceStaff Deception EstimateCommander's Deception Estimate

Deception Plan DevelopmentDeception Plan Review and Approval

Phase I

APPENDIX AEXPLANATION OF MILITARY DECEPTION TERMINOLOGY

A-1

1. Deception Terms

Knowledge of military deceptionterminology is necessary for understandingthe deception planning process. Thefollowing paragraphs explain the key termsused in the Chapter IV, “Military DeceptionPlanning Process,” discussion of the planningprocess.

a. Deception Objective

• The deception objective is the desiredresult of a deception operation expressedin terms of what the adversary is to do ornot to do at the critical time and/orlocation.

• Military deception planners mustdistinguish between the JFC’soperational objective and thedeception objective. The JFC’soperational objective is what the JFCwants achieved as the result of friendlyforce operations. The deceptionobjective is the action(s) (or inaction) thatthe JFC wants the adversary to take.

• A deception objective is always statedin terms of specific actions, such as“have the adversary move its reserveforce from Point A to Point B prior to H-Hour.”

• A statement such as “have the adversarythink that we will make our main attackon its left flank” is not a deceptionobjective. It is a desired perception (seebelow). Having the adversary decisionmaker think a certain way is importantonly as a step toward getting that decisionmaker to make the decision that willresult in the desired action that is thedeception objective. Thoughts withoutaction are of little military value.

b. Deception Target

• The deception target is the adversarydecision maker with the authority tomake the decision that will achieve thedeception objective.

• Each situation must be analyzed toidentify the adversary commanderwho has the authority to take the desiredaction. For example, if the deceptionobjective is to move an enemy reservedivision from its current position to aposition more favorable to intendedfriendly operations, then the deceptiontarget would be the enemy corps or armycommander. Subordinate commandersdo not normally have the authority todirect their own positioning. They mustbe directed to do so by their commanders.

• The adversary’s intelligence system isnormally not the deception target. Itis a conduit that is used to get deceptiveinformation to the target.

c. Desired Perception

• The desired perception is what thedeception target must believe in order forit to make the decision required toachieve the deception objective.

• Deception operations seek to identifyand then create or reinforce thoseperceptions that will lead the deceptiontarget to make certain decisions.

• Determining the desired perception isdifficult. It requires understanding thetarget’s historical, cultural, and personalbackground. Generally:

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•• It is much easier, and historically moreeffective, to reinforce an existing beliefthan to establish a new one; and

•• The target must believe that it is inits best interest to take the action requiredby the deception objective.

d. Deception Story

• The deception story is a scenario thatoutlines the friendly actions that will beportrayed to cause the deception targetto adopt the desired perception.

• A deception story identifies thosefriendly actions, both real and simulated,that when observed by the deceptiontarget will lead it to develop the desiredperception.

• The story normally takes the form of aconcept of operation statement: “Wewill portray that we are preparing toattack the enemy’s left flank in 3 dayswith two armored divisions reinforced bya MAGTF.” The story does not addressthe means that will be used to portraythe outlined actions.

• The story must be believable, verifiable,consistent, and executable.

•• Believable. The story mustcorrespond to the deception target’sperceptions of the friendly force’smission, intentions, and capabilities.Notional plans or forces that grosslydistort actual friendly capabilities willlikely be discounted. Stories that closelycopy past and already exposed deceptionoperations may not be believed.

•• Verifiable. The adversary must beable to verify the veracity of the storythrough multiple channels. The storymust, therefore, take into account all ofthe adversary’s intelligence sources.

The story must be made availablethrough all or many of those sources.“Windfall” or single-source inputs thatwould provide the entire story, should beavoided. Multiple conduits should beused, with each providing the target asmall piece of the deception story. Thedeception target should perceive thatverification of the story has required fulluse of its intelligence collection andanalysis resources.

•• Consistent. Deception stories shouldbe consistent with the deception target’sunderstanding of actual friendlydoctrine, historical force employment,campaign strategy, battlefield tactics, andthe current operational situation. Thiscalls for the deception element to haveas complete a picture as possible of thedeception target’s level of knowledgeand belief in these areas. The deceptionstory must be consistent with relatedactivities that condition the target topatterns of friendly activity.

•• Executable. As with any course ofaction, the course of action that forms thedeception story must be within thecapabilities of the friendly force as thedeception target perceives them. Thetarget must believe that the friendly forcehas the capability to execute theoperations that are being portrayed by thedeception story.

e. Deception Means

• Deception means are the methods,resources, and techniques that can beused to convey information to thedeception target. There are threecategories of deception means: physical,technical, and administrative. (SeeGlossary)

• Deception means are used to portray thedeception story. They are used to create

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Explanation of Military Deception Terminology

a complete adversary intelligence picturethat supports all aspects of the deceptionstory. Means are tailored to theadversary’s intelligence collectioncapabilities.

• Whether or not the deception target reliesupon any particular intelligence sourceshould be considered when selectingmeans. If the target is known to trustone intelligence source over all others,then means should be selected to exploitthat trust.

• Physical means include displays of troopmovements and concentration, feints anddemonstrations by maneuver units, falselogistic activity, and false headquarters.Technical means include falsecommunications nets, false radaremissions, and the use of smoke and otherobscurants. Administrative meansinclude the staged compromise or lossof classified documents.

• Successful deceptions use the variousmeans in combination to present theadversary’s intelligence system withwhat appears to be a complete picture offriendly activities and intentions. Forexample, a friendly intent to conduct anattack at a particular time and locationcould be portrayed by demonstrationsconducted by combat units (physical),false radio traffic (technical), and thedeliberate loss of portions of theoperation order (administrative).

f. Deception Courses of Action

• Deception COAs are the schemesdeveloped during the estimate processin sufficient detail to permit decisionmaking. At a minimum, a deceptionCOA will identify the deceptionobjective, target, desired perception,story, and, in general terms, means. It

answers the questions: who, what,where, when, how, and why.

• Deception COAs are developed by thedeception planners, working closelywith the intelligence, operations, andother C2W planners, simultaneous withthe development of the actual operationalCOAs.

• In many cases, the deception COAs willbe based on operational COAs thatwere developed by the operationsplanners to ensure that the deceptionstories meet the criteria listed in thepreceding paragraph.

g. Deception Events

• The deception event is a deceptionmeans executed at a specific time andlocation in support of a deceptionoperation.

• For example, a deception means is thepassing of false messages over radio nets.A deception event identifies what unitwould pass the desired message, whenthe unit would broadcast the message,and from where. Deception events aredeveloped during the deceptionplanning process.

h. Deception Action

• A deception action is a collection ofrelated deception events that form amajor component of a deceptionoperation.

• A deception action is a combination ofrelated deception events that are usedto portray a main element of a deceptionstory. The four major types of deceptionactions are feints, demonstrations,displays, and ruses. (See Glossary)

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2. Relationship of theDeception Terms

The deception operation conducted insupport of Operation DESERT STORMprovides an example of how the deceptionterms relate to each other.

a. Commander in Chief, US CentralCommand’s (USCINCCENT’s) deceptionobjective was to “use operational deceptionto fix or divert Republican Guard and otherheavy units away from the main effort.” Thedeception target was the Iraqi senior militaryleadership. The desired perception was that“the Coalition would attack frontally throughKuwait.”

b. Various deception COAs wereconsidered. The deception story for thecourse of action approved by USCINCCENTportrayed the main ground attack as occurringin the Wadi al-Batin area. That attack would

be supported by a Marine amphibious assaulton the Kuwaiti coast.

c. As the deception COA was developedinto a deception plan, it was determined thatall three categories of deception means wouldbe used to portray the story. Specific meanssuch as using electronic and physical decoysto portray notional unit locations andpublicizing the preparations and training foramphibious operations were selected.

d. The execution of the selected means wascoordinated to ensure a consistent and logicalportrayal . Assigned specific times andlocations for execution, the means wereincluded in the deception plan as deceptionevents. Some events were used incombination to create deception actions suchas the 1st Cavalry Division’s feints anddemonstrations in the Wadi al-Batin areaduring the 30 days before the start of theground operation.

APPENDIX BSUGGESTED BACKGROUND READINGS

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1. Deception planning is a creative processthat requires imagination and creativity on thepart of its practitioners. Additionally,deception plans must be carefully tailored foreach situation. For these reasons, thispublication has not provided a list of possibledeception schemes or otherwise attempted tosuggest potential deception courses of actionsfor particular situations.

2. Deception planners and others can benefit,however, from the experiences of earlierdeception operations and from the theoreticalwork being done by academicians on thetopics of deception and surprise.

3. The following is a selected bibliographyof books and periodicals that deal with thesubject of deception.

a. The Art of Deception in War by MichaelDewar (David and Charles, 1989).

b. War, Strategy and Intelligence edited byMichael I. Handel (Frank Cass, 1989).

c. Strategic and Operational Deception inthe Second World War edited by Michael I.Handel (Frank Cass, 1989).

d. "Military Deception in War and Peace"by Michael I. Handel in Jerusalem Paperson Peace Problems, Number 38 (The LeonardDavis Institute for International Relations,1985).

e. Soviet Military Deception in the SecondWorld War by David M. Glanz (Frank Cass,1989).

f. The Double Cross System in the War of1939 to 1945 by J. C. Masterman (YaleUniversity Press, 1972).

g. Deception in World War II by CharlesCruickshank (Oxford University Press, 1979).

h. Strategic Military Deception edited byDonald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig(Pergamon, 1981).

i. D-Day by Jock Haskell, (Times Books,1979).

j. Practice to Deceive by David Mure(William Kimber, 1977).

k. Master of Deception by David Mure(William Kimber, 1980).

l. Soviet Operational Deception: The RedCloak by LTC Richard N. Armstrong(Combat Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College, 1989).

m. Pastel: Deception in the Invasion ofJapan by Dr. Thomas M. Huber (CombatStudies Institute, U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College, 1988).

n. "British Intelligence in the SecondWorld War" by Sir Michael Howard, inStrategic Deception, Volume 5 (CambridgeUniversity Press, 1989).

o. The War Magician by David Fisher(Coward-McMann, 1983).

p. The Wizard War by R. V. Jones (Coward,McMann, and Geoghegan, 1972).

q. Masquerade by Seymour Reit (NALBooks, 1978).

r. Codeword BARBAROSSA by BartonWhaley (MIT Press, 1973).

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APPENDIX CREFERENCES

C-1

The development of Joint Pub 3-58 is based upon the following primary references.

1. CJCSI 3211.01A, 15 June 1994, “Joint Military Deception.”

2. CJCSI 3213.01, 28 May 1993, “Joint Operations Security.”

3. CJCS MOP 6, 3 March 1993, “Electronic Warfare.”

4. CJCS MOP 30, 8 March 1993, “Command and Control Warfare.”

5. Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.”

6. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

7. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

8. Joint Pub 3-13.1, “Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W).”

9. Joint Pub 3-51, “Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations.”

10. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”

11. Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”

12. Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”

13. Joint Pub 5-00.1, “JTTP for Campaign Planning.”

14. Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

15. Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (PlanningPolicies and Procedures).”

16. Joint Pub 5-03.2, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II: (Planningand Execution Formats and Guidance).”

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APPENDIX DADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication tothe Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, FortMonroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy,usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Directorfor Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 3-58, 6 June 1994, "Joint Doctrine for MilitaryDeception."

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J33//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________

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5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy(Defense Attache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate JointCommands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

C2 command and controlC2W command and control warfareC4 command, control, communications, and computersCA civil affairsCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCOA course of action

EW electronic warfare

JFC joint force commanderJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

MAGTF Marine air-ground task forceMOP memorandum of policy

NCA National Command Authorities

OPSEC operations security

PSYOP psychological operations

SIGINT signals intelligence

USCINCCENT Commander in Chief, US Central Command

civil affairs. The activities of a commanderthat establish, maintain, influence, or exploitrelations between military forces and civilauthorities, both governmental andnongovernmental, and the civilian populacein a friendly, neutral, or hostile area ofoperations in order to facilitate militaryoperations and consolidate operationalobjectives. Civil affairs may includeperformance by military forces of activitiesand functions normally the responsibilityof local government. These activities mayoccur prior to, during, or subsequent to othermilitary actions. They may also occur, ifdirected, in the absence of other militaryoperations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control warfare. Theintegrated use of operations security, militarydeception, psychological operations,electronic warfare, and physical destruction,mutually supported by intelligence, to denyinformation to, influence, degrade, ordestroy adversary command and controlcapabilities, while protecting friendlycommand and control capabilities againstsuch actions. Command and controlwarfare is an application of informationwarfare in military operations and is asubset of information warfare. Commandand control warfare applies across the rangeof military operations and all levels ofconflict. Also called C2W. C2W is bothoffensive and defensive: a. C2-attack --Prevent effective C2 of adversary forces bydenying information to, influencing,degrading, or destroying the adversary C2system. b. C2-protect -- Maintain effectivecommand and control of own forces byturning to friendly advantage or negatingadversary efforts to deny information to,influence, degrade or destroy the friendlyC2 system. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed tomislead the enemy by manipulation,

distortion, or falsification of evidence toinduce him to react in a manner prejudicialto his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception action. A collection of relateddeception events that form a majorcomponent of a deception operation. (JointPub 1-02)

deception concept. The deception course ofaction forwarded to the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff for review as part ofthe CINC’s Strategic Concept. (Joint Pub1-02)

deception course of action. A deceptionscheme developed during the estimateprocess in sufficient detail to permitdecision making. At a minimum, adeception course of action will identify thedeception objective, the deception target,the desired perception, the deception story,and tentative deception means. (Joint Pub1-02)

deception event. A deception meansexecuted at a specific time and location insupport of a deception operation. (Joint Pub1-02)

deception means. Methods, resources, andtechniques that can be used to conveyinformation to the deception target. Thereare three categories of deception means:

a. physical means. Activities and resourcesused to convey or deny selected informationto a foreign power. (Examples: militaryoperations, including exercises,reconnaissance, training activities, andmovement of forces; the use of dummyequipment and devices; tactics; bases,logistic actions, stockpiles, and repairactivity; and test and evaluation activities).

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PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

b. technical means. Military materialresources and their associated operatingtechniques used to convey or deny selectedinformation to a foreign power through thedeliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration,absorption, or reflection of energy; theemission or suppression of chemical orbiological odors; and the emission orsuppression of nuclear particles.

c. administrative means. Resources,methods, and techniques to convey or denyoral, pictorial, documentary, or otherphysical evidence to a foreign power. (JointPub 1-02)

deception objective. The desired result of adeception operation expressed in terms ofwhat the adversary is to do or not to do atthe critical time and/or location. (Joint Pub1-02)

deception story. A scenario that outlines thefriendly actions that will be portrayed tocause the deception target to adopt thedesired perception. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception target. The adversary decisionmaker with the authority to make thedecision that will achieve the deceptionobjective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

demonstration. 1. An attack or show of forceon a front where a decision is not sought,made with the aim of deceiving the enemy.See also amphibious demonstration;diversion; diversionary attack. (DOD) 2.In military deception, a show of force in anarea where a decision is not sought madeto deceive an adversary. It is similar to afeint but no actual contact with theadversary is intended. (Joint Pub 1-02)

desired perception. In military deception,what the deception target must believe forit to make the decision that will achieve thedeception objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

display. In military deception, a staticportrayal of an activity, force, or equipmentintended to deceive the adversary’s visualobservation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electromagnetic deception. The deliberateradiation, reradiation, alteration,suppression, absorption, denial,enhancement, or reflection ofelectromagnetic energy in a mannerintended to convey misleading informationto an enemy or to enemy electromagnetic-dependent weapons, thereby degrading orneutralizing the enemy’s combat capability.Among the types of electromagneticdeception are: a. manipulativeelectromagnetic deception—Actions toeliminate revealing, or convey misleading,electromagnetic telltale indicators that maybe used by hostile forces. b. simulativeelectromagnetic deception—Actions tosimulate friendly, notional, or actualcapabilities to mislead hostile forces. c.imitative electromagnetic deception—Theintroduction of electromagnetic energy intoenemy systems that imitates enemyemissions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic warfare. Any military actioninvolving the use of electromagnetic anddirected energy to control theelectromagnetic spectrum or to attack theenemy. Also called EW. The three majorsubdivisions within electronic warfare are:electronic attack, electronic protection, andelectronic warfare support. a. electronicattack—That division of electronic warfareinvolving the use of electromagnetic ordirected energy to attack personnel,facilities, or equipment with the intent ofdegrading, neutralizing, or destroyingenemy combat capability. Also called EA.EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent orreduce an enemy’s effective use of theelectromagnetic spectrum, such as jammingand electromagnetic deception, and 2)employment of weapons that use eitherelectromagnetic or directed energy as their

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Glossary

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primary destructive mechanism (lasers,radio frequency weapons, particle beams),or antiradiation weapons. b. electronicprotection—That division of electronicwarfare involving actions taken to protectpersonnel, facilities, and equipment fromany effects of friendly or enemyemployment of electronic warfare thatdegrade, neutralize, or destroy friendlycombat capability. Also called EP. c.electronic warfare support—That divisionof electronic warfare involving actionstasked by, or under direct control of, anoperational commander to search for,intercept, identify, and locate sources ofintentional and unintentional radiatedelectromagnetic energy for the purpose ofimmediate threat recognition. Thus,electronic warfare support providesinformation required for immediatedecisions involving electronic warfareoperations and other tactical actions suchas threat avoidance, targeting, and homing.Also called ES. Electronic warfare supportdata can be used to produce signalsintelligence (SIGINT), both communicationsintelligence (COMINT), and electronicsintelligence (ELINT). (Joint Pub 1-02)

feint. In military deception, an offensiveaction involving contact with the adversaryconducted for the purpose of deceiving theadversary as to the location and/or time ofthe actual main offensive action. (Joint Pub1-02)

military deception. Actions executed todeliberately mislead adversary militarydecision makers as to friendly militarycapabilities, intentions, and operations,thereby causing the adversary to takespecific actions (or inactions) that willcontribute to the accomplishment of thefriendly mission. The five categories ofmilitary deception are:

a. strategic military deception. Militarydeception planned and executed by and in

support of senior military commanders toresult in adversary military policies andactions that support the originator ’sstrategic military objectives, policies, andoperations.

b. operational military deception. Militarydeception planned and executed by and insupport of operational-level commandersto result in adversary actions that arefavorable to the originator’s objectives andoperations. Operational military deceptionis planned and conducted in a theater of warto support campaigns and major operations.

c. tactical military deception. Militarydeception planned and executed by and insupport of tactical commanders to result inadversary actions that are favorable to theoriginator’s objectives and operations.Tactical military deception is planned andconducted to support battles andengagements.

d. Service military deception. Militarydeception planned and executed by theServices that pertain to Service support tojoint operations. Service military deceptionis designed to protect and enhance thecombat capabilities of Service forces andsystems.

e. military deception in support of OPSEC.Military deception planned and executedby and in support of all levels of commandto support the prevention of the inadvertentcompromise of sensitive or classifiedactivities, capabilities, or intentions.Deceptive OPSEC measures are designedto distract foreign intelligence away from,or provide cover for, military operations andactivities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations security. A process of identifyingcritical information and subsequentlyanalyzing friendly actions attendant tomilitary operations and other activities to:a. Identify those actions that can be

GL-5

Glossary

observed by adversary intelligence systems.b. Determine indicators hostile intelligencesystems might obtain that could beinterpreted or pieced together to derivecritical information in time to be useful toadversaries. c. Select and execute measuresthat eliminate or reduce to an acceptablelevel the vulnerabilities of friendly actionsto adversary exploitation. Also calledOPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Plannedoperations to convey selected informationand indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately the behavior offoreign governments, organizations,groups, and individuals. The purpose of

psychological operations is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behaviorfavorable to the originator’s objectives.Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information andcommunity relations activities directedtoward the general public by the variouselements of the Department of Defense.(Joint Pub 1-02)

ruse. In military deception, a trick of wardesigned to deceive the adversary, usuallyinvolving the deliberate exposure of falseinformation to the adversary’s intelligencecollection system. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the pub andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-58 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNELand

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT PUB 3-0

Documents

JP 3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception