DOCTRINE FORJOINT RIVERINE OPERATIONS

SEPTEMBER 1991

TEST PUBJOINT PUB 3-06

TEST PUB

Reply ZIP Code: Joint Test Pub 3-0620318-7000 11 September 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution list

Subject: Joint Test Pub 3-06, "Doctrine for Joint RiverineOperations"

1. This test publication contains proposed joint doctrine toguide the activities and employment of the Armed Forces of theUnited States in conducting joint riverine operations.

2. Joint test publications are developed and issued in accordancewith Joint Pub 1-01. This test publication has been staffed withthe Services and combatant commands. It is now ready to undergoevaluation in the field. After a thorough evaluation isaccomplished, and feedback from the evaluation process isconsidered, the publication will be implemented under theprovisions of CJCS MOP 9.

3. The lead agent for this publication is the US Navy. The JointStaff doctrine sponsor is J-7.

Enclosure

Distribution:

By Secretary, Joint Staff:

Joint Staff OSD NSA DCA DMA FEMAJSTPS DIA DNA CIA US Coast Guard (G-ODO)NDU (CS) NWC (NWFA) ICAF (ICWA) AFSC (DAO)

Ten copies each to: Offices of CSA (DAMO-FDQ), CNO (OP-607), CSAF(XOXWD), CMC (PL-68)

Ten copies each to:

USCINCLANT (J-32)USCINCCENT (CCJ5-0)USCINCEUR (ECJ5-D)CINCFOR (FCJ3-FC)USCINCPAC (J318)USCINCSO (SCJ5-PSD)USCINCSPACE (SPJ5X)USCINCSOC (SOJ5-J)CINCSAC (XPXP)USTRANSCOM (TCJ3/J4LL)

Additional copies may be obtained from the Joint Doctrine andAllied Interoperability Division (JDAID), Operational Plans andInteroperability Directorate (J-7), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.20318-7000.

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RECORD OF CHANGES FOR JOINT TEST PUB 3-06(DOCTRINE FOR JOINT RIVERINE OPERATIONS)

RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

While this publication is in the "Test Pub" stage, changerecommendations should be submitted through the chain of commandto the Joint Doctrine and Allied Interoperability Division,Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), JointStaff, Washington, DC 20318-7000, in accordance with guidanceprovided in Joint Pub 1-01.

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PREFACE

1. Purpose. This publication sets forth doctrine to govern theconduct of joint riverine operations of the Armed Forces of theUnited States. It provides guidance for the planning andexecution of joint riverine operations. Further, this doctrine isintended to facilitate interoperability between the Servicesconducting joint riverine operations.

2. Application

a. Doctrine established in this publication applies tocommanders of unified and specified commands, subordinateunified commands, joint task forces, and components. Thedoctrine and guidelines contained herein provide for theplanning and execution of joint riverine operations across theoperational continuum, from peacetime competition through war.

b. If conflicts arise between the contents of thispublication and the contents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence unless the Chairman, JointChiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specificguidance.

3. Scope. The doctrine herein applies to joint riverineoperations from the planning stage to the termination stage. Sincethe tasks to be performed in any riverine operation arefunctionally the same, the doctrine is applicable to all riverineoperations. It is written for those who:

a. Provide strategic direction to joint forces (Secretary ofDefense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commandersof combatant commands).

b. Employ joint forces (commanders of unified commands,sub-unified commands, or Joint Task Forces).

c. Support joint forces, or who are supported by joint forces(commanders of specified commands, component commands, jointtask forces, and Chiefs of the Services).

4. Basis. This publication was sponsored by the Joint Staff anddeveloped by the US Navy, in coordination with the Services,unified and specified commands, and the Joint Staff, for use bythe US Armed Forces.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I CONCEPT................................................ I-1

Concept of Joint Riverine Operations.................. I-1Types of Joint Riverine Operations.................... I-5Composition of Force.................................. I-9

II COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION.............................. II-1

General.............................................. II-1Initiating Directive for Joint Riverine Operations... II-1Joint Riverine Force Organization.................... II-4

III APPROACH TO PLANNING..................................III-1

Basic Considerations.................................III-1Concurrent Planning..................................III-5Detailed Planning....................................III-6Planning Procedures..................................III-8Basic Decisions......................................III-10Rehearsals...........................................III-20Operations Security..................................III-21

IV Special Operations PLANNING............................ IV-1

Special Operations................................... IV-1

V SUPPORTING ARMS PLANNING............................... V-1

Fire Support Planning................................. V-1Supporting Arms Requirements.......................... V-3Fire Support Coordination............................. V-4Special Considerations................................ V-6Air Operations.........................................V-9

VI INTELLIGENCE PLANNING................................ VI-1

Scope of Intelligence Planning...................... VI-1Intelligence Planning Responsibilities.............. VI-2Intelligence Sources and Collection................. VI-8Environmental Considerations........................ VI-8Sociological Considerations.........................VI-11Security............................................VI-12Intelligence and Counterintelligence Estimates......VI-12The Intelligence Annex..............................VI-13Joint Riverine Force Intelligence Support...........VI-13

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VII COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING..............................VII-1

Scope and Requirements..............................VII-1Considerations......................................VII-1Responsibilities....................................VII-8Communications Security.............................VII-9Communications Deception and Countermeasures.......VII-11The Communication Plan.............................VII-11

VIII LOGISTICS PLANNING................................. VIII-1

Scope............................................. VIII-1Logistic Planning Considerations.................. VIII-1Logistic Planning Responsibilities................ VIII-9Logistic Plans....................................VIII-11Medical Planning..................................VIII-14Engineer Planning.................................VIII-16Base Development Planning.........................VIII-18

IX SUPPORTING OPERATIONS PLANNING........................ IX-1

Definition and Authority............................. IX-1JRF Operations....................................... IX-1Logistics Operations................................. IX-2

X EMERGENCY ACTIONS, DISASTER CONTROL, AND COMBATSEARCH AND RESCUE...................................... X-1

Effect of Environment and Organization................ X-1Emergencies Aboard Riverine Craft..................... X-1Disaster Control and Emergency Assistance............. X-3Combat Search and Rescue.............................. X-5

XI TACTICAL GUIDANCE..................................... XI-1

General Considerations............................... XI-1Movement of the Joint Riverine Force................. XI-1Joint Riverine Afloat Base Movement.................. XI-3Measures to Prevent Mutual Interference.............. XI-5Command and Control Facilities....................... XI-9

XII RIVERINE ASSAULT OPERATIONS.......................... XII-1

Scope............................................... XII-1Tactical Loading.................................... XII-1Movement of the Assault Force....................... XII-4Landing, Assault, Pursuit, and Explotiation

Operations......................................... XII-8Planned Withdrawals.................................XII-18

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XIII WATERWAY INTERDICTION, SURVEILLANCE, BARRIER, ANDSECURITY OPERATIONS................................. XIII-1

Purpose............................................ XIII-1Tactical Considerations............................ XIII-4

XIV ANCILLARY OPERATIONS................................ XIV-1

Scope of Operations................................. XIV-1Reconnaissance and Waterway Clearance............... XIV-1Joint Riverine Base Security........................ XIV-2Mine Warfare Operations.............................XIV-13Salvage Operations..................................XIV-15Cover and Deception.................................XIV-17UW and Direct Action Operations.....................XIV-18Psychological Operations............................XIV-20Civil Affairs.......................................XIV-21

XV LOGISTICS............................................. XV-1

Logistics Support Provided to the JRF................ XV-1

APPENDIX

A US Navy Riverine Assets................................ A-1B US Army Riverine Assets................................ B-1C US Coast Guard Riverine Assets......................... C-1D US Marine Corps Riverine Assets........................ D-1

GLOSSARY

Part I--Abbreviations and Acronyms.........................GL-1Part II--Definitions.......................................GL-2

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CHAPTER I

CONCEPT

1. Concept of Riverine Operations

a. Joint riverine operations integrate and employ varioustypes of ground, maritime, air, and special operationsforces in a concerted effort to gain and/or maintaincontrol of riverine, coastal, or delta areas. Theseoperations will be conducted under the command of a singlejoint riverine force commander (CJRF). Command andorganization will be in accordance with Chapter 3 of JointPub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)." Theestablishing authority may organize on an area, function,or Service basis. This doctrine is not intended to directthe use of either Service or functional components.Service command and organization responsibilities are wellestablished. Functional relationships are less wellunderstood. Therefore, this publication provides guidancebased on functional relationships wherever appropriate.

b. The riverine area is an inland or delta areacomprising both land and water, characterized by limitedland lines of communication with extensive waterways thatprovide natural routes for transportation andcommunications. Where navigable waterways exist and roadsdo not, or where forces are required to use waterways, aneffective program to control the waterways and/orinterdict hostile movement becomes paramount. Theriverine area requires unique capabilities and tactics toachieve success against hostile forces.

c. The primary advantage of a joint riverine force (JRF)is its ability to concentrate a mix of forces effectivelyfor operations in the riverine area, including the abilityto attack selected targets throughout that area. Riverineoperations exploit the advantages of the waterways formovement, capitalizing on mobility to find, fix, anddestroy hostile forces. Surface mobility is achievedprimarily by riverine craft maintaining control of waterLOCs and providing combat support and combat servicesupport.

d. Because of the inherent waterborne mobility and uniquecapabilities of a riverine force, it is

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appropriate to concentrate these forces on their primaryriverine role, rather than divert them to maintainingterritorial control beyond the limits of a riverine area.However, JRFs can contribute to wide-area territorialcontrol by performing the riverine operations set forth insubparagraph 1f below, in support of other forces.

e. Environmental factors that can affect the compositionand employment of the JRF include:

(1) Shallow water.

(2) Large tidal range.

(3) Swift currents.

(4) Narrow waterways.

(5) Natural or man made obstacles.

(6) Bridges.

(7) Lack of suitable areas for ground force maneuver,staging, and/or resupply.

(8) Concentrations of population (friendly, hostile,or neutral) along the waterways.

(9) Dense vegetation, and in some cases, essentiallyimpassable riverine terrain.

f. The entire riverine operation may include:

(1) Intelligence collection.

(2) Planning.

(3) Embarkation of troops and equipment.

(4) Patrol/barrier, interdiction, and surveillanceoperations.

(5) Riverine assault operations.

(6) Close fire support.

(7) Suppression of enemy air defenses.

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(8) CAS.

(9) Naval surface support.

(10) Repositioning of forces.

(11) Resupply of the riverine force until terminationof the operation.

(12) Support for PSYOP and civic action programs.

(13) Reembarkation or withdrawal.

(14) Support for FID.

(15) Offensive or defensive mining and minecountermeasures.

(16) Support of humanitarian requirements anddisaster relief.

g. A riverine operation may include helicopter operationsconducted by elements of the JRF, including heliborne,airborne, and ground operations conducted by other forcesin conjunction with JRF operations.

2. Types of Riverine Operations. The JRF conducts operationsin areas where local response may range from hostile action toa friendly welcome. The two general types of riverineoperations, assault and interdiction, are defined below anddescribed in Chapters XII and XIII.

a. Assault. These operations employ maritime, ground,air, and/or SOF to achieve one or more of the followingobjectives:

(1) Establish control of waterways in a geographicarea.

(2) Establish control of land areas, population, andresources.

(3) Locate and destroy hostile forces, enemyinstallations, and enemy supplies.

(4) Establish and secure an area for a combat supportbase.

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b. Waterway Interdiction, Surveillance, Barrier, andSecurity Operations. These operations employ ground,maritime, air, and/or SOF to achieve one or more of thefollowing objectives:

(1) Protect friendly LOCs.

(2) Deny hostile forces the use of waterways.

(3) Collect intelligence information.

(4) Perform security assistance missions.

(5) Enforce population and resources control.

c. Supporting Operations. Guidance for commandrelationships of attachment and support is outlined inJoint Pub 0-2 "Unified Action Armed Forces". Operationsin support of the JRF may be required. Although thesesupporting operations normally will be at the request ofthe CJRF, they will be directed by higher authority andmay be conducted inside or outside the JRF area ofoperations. The commander of forces conducting supportingoperations will coordinate with the CJRF. Examples ofsupporting operations are:

(1) Feints or demonstrations intended for purposes ofdeception.

(2) Isolation of the area of operation byinterdiction of enemy forces.

(3) Operations to assist gaining or maintaining air,ground, or maritime superiority.

(4) Air, surface, or SO to secure information.

(5) PSYOP and UW operations.

d. Operations conducted by elements of the JRF in theriverine area (or en route to an objective area) beforeriverine assault forces arrive are considered preassaultrather than supporting operations. Examples of suchoperations are waterway patrol and interdiction, minecountermeasures, obstruction clearance, and swimmerdetection and defense.

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e. Supported Operations. Riverine operations arefrequently conducted as an adjunct to an amphibiouslanding; however, these operations may also be conductedin support of other commands or with other commands inmutual support. The CJRF must remain prepared to conductshort-term or protracted operations in support of taskingsby the theater, combatant, or joint force commander. Inparticular, the JRF area of operations may overlap or beadjacent to the naval coastal warfare (see Joint Pub 3-10)area of operations. If such a situation occurs, a programof mutual support with early liaison will benefit bothcommands. The following areas of mutual concern should becoordinated closely:

(1) Intelligence collection.

(2) Base location, including a possible joint commandpost.

(3) Patrol or barrier, interdiction, and surveillanceoperations.

(4) Security.

(5) Assault operations.

(6) Supporting arms.

3. Composition of Force. The composition of the JRF will bedetermined by the assigned mission, special characteristics ofthe particular riverine area of operations, and enemycapabilities. Interoperability of C3 systems within the JRFis a primary consideration. For detailed information onService riverine assets and capabilities, see Appendies Athrough E.

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CHAPTER II

COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION

1. General

a. Guidance on the exercise of COCOM and OPCON isprovided in Joint Pub 0-2. A commander of a unifiedcommand, in the exercise of COCOM, has full authority toorganize and employ commands and forces considerednecessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON will beexercised through the commanders of subordinateorganizations, normally through the Service componentcommander.

b. The CJRF’s staff should be allocated so that Servicerepresentation generally reflects the overall compositionof the force. The staff will usually be sourced fromwithin the JRF, at the discretion of the CJRF.

2. Initiating Directive for Joint Riverine Operations

a. An initiating directive from the commander havingoverall responsibility for the operation directs the MRF.The directive may be an OPLAN or OPORD, a letter ofinstruction, or an order to execute an already existingplan or order.

b. The initiating directive:

(1) Establishes the JRF and assigns the mission.

(2) Defines command relationships.

(3) Defines the AO.

(4) Provides an operation nickname or code word andsets target dates to execute the operation.

(5) Contains instructions on the allocation,employment, and control of special ordnance.

(6) Provides information or assigns responsibilityfor the conduct and coordination of combat, combatsupport, and combat service support and of SpecialOperations (SO) related to or in support of theriverine operations.

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(7) Provides instructions governing termination ofriverine operations and, if feasible, commandarrangements and disposition of forces to occur atthat time.

(8) Provides information concerning possibleoperations to be conducted after termination ofriverine operations.

(9) Provides communications-electronics instructionsto ensure that joint interoperability requirements aresatisfied.

(10) Provides special instructions on ROE.

(11) Provides for coordination with other forceswhose operations affect the JRF or the AO.

(12) Deconflicts simultaneous operations within theAOR.

(13) Provides instructions for combined operationswith indigenous military and paramilitary forces, ifneeded.

(14) Provides instructions for civil-militaryoperations, if needed.

(15) Contains instructions concerning intelligencesupport responsibilities, including joint orService-component intelligence productionresponsibilities, and clarifies JRF intelligencetasking authority.

(16) Contains instructions concerning tacticalcounterintelligence support responsibilities.

3. Joint Riverine Force Organization

a. The combat commander, or his appropriate subordinatecommander, having overall responsbility for the operationwill designate the CJRF. The objective in organizing forriverine operations is the formation of a fully integratedcombined arms force specifically tailored to provide thenecessary mobility, unity of effort, and fire superiorityto achieve the assigned task. The force may be organizedalong either functional or Service component lines, asbest suited to meet the mission. Service componentorganization is the norm. Figure II-1a

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provides a sample task organization along functionallines, Figure II-1b provides a task organization alongservice component lines.

b. This publication is written to support execution ofriverine operations in both functional and Servicecomponent organizations.

+------+| CJRF |+---+--+

---------------------------------------------------------------- --------- --------- -----------

| Air | | Ground | |Maritime | | Special ||Component| |Component| |Component| |Operations |

--------- --------- --------- | Component|-----------

Figure II-1a Sample JRF Task Organization (Functional)

------| CJRF |

------

---------------------------------------------------------------------- --------- --------- ----------- -----------

|Com Army | |Com Naval| |Com Air | Com Marine | Special ||Forces | |Forces | |Forces | Forces |Operations |

--------- --------- --------- ------------ | Component|-----------

-------MAGTF

-------

Figure II-1b Sample JRF Task Organization (Service Component)

b. A typical riverine assault or patrol group wouldnormally consist of the following elements:

(1) C3I.

(2) Assault.

(3) Combat.

(4) Combat service support.

(5) Craft with assigned crews capable of liftingtroops and supplies.

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(6) Mine countermeasures craft with assigned crews.

(7) Fire support craft with assigned crews.

(8) Escort craft with assigned crews.

(9) Aircraft support.

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CHAPTER III

APPROACH TO PLANNING

1. Basic Considerations. Planning for riverine operations isa continuous process from receipt of the initiating directiveto termination of the operation. It necessitates concurrent,parallel, and detailed planning by all participating forces.Plans must be detailed enough to give all participantscomplete information, while being simple and flexible enoughto be modified as the tactical situation changes.

a. Plans for a riverine operation will be based on themission, forces available, and intelligence concerninghostile forces, terrain, and weather.

b. The assigned mission must be analyzed to identifyspecific and implied tasks. A coordinated plan must bedeveloped for the accomplishment of each of these tasks.The concept of operations must be such that the operationcan be supported by the forces available and, therefore,must be examined by all commanders concerned to determineits feasibility in this respect. The concept ofoperations, commander’s intent, and commander’s guidancemust be promulgated by the CJRF in the planning phase tofacilitate detailed planning.

c. Enemy capabilities, limitations, and modes ofoperation must be estimated. Information on the enemyorder of battle must be updated and refined during theplanning phase of the operation.

d. Weather, terrain, and hydrography take on significantimportance in riverine operations. Under somecircumstances, they may even be controlling factors in anyconcept of operations. Consequently, thorough knowledgeand consideration of the environment are extremelyimportant in planning riverine operations. Because of theproblems associated with position location and orientationin various environments, use of gridded aerial mosaicsshould be considered to supplement topographic maps.

e. Mine countermeasures and obstruction removal arecritical considerations when planning for riverineoperations.

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f. Plans for countering an ambush will depend on whetherthe JRF is to force passage through the ambush or to landand destroy the ambushing force. If the mission of theJRF specifies the destruction of ambushing forcesencountered en route, plans for landing combat elementsashore could be required.

g. Logistic plans should include equipment, levels ofsupplies to be embarked, resupply, and evacuationinstructions. In general, embarked troops should beequipped for highly mobile operations. The remainingsupplies and equipment should remain with the JRF,consistent with its resupply capability. Detailedlogistic planning is covered in Chapter VIII.

h. Supporting arms plans will be developed in consonancewith the scheme of maneuver. Detailed supporting armsplanning is covered in Chapter V.

i. Civil affairs and civic action plans must be developedin coordination with the local government.

j. The JRF should plan and conduct its operations inaccordance with international law. This includes the Lawof War Program (such as the rules for targets andprotection of noncombatants) domestic US laws andregulations, and laws pertaining to military justice,claims, and disposition of captured property. Training ofriverine forces should ensure knowledge by members,commensurate with their duties and responsibilities, ofthe principles and rules of the Law of Armed Conflict,including the duty to report alleged violations. ROEshould delineate the circumstances and limitations underwhich US forces will initiate and/or continue combatengagement with enemy forces. The Law of Armed Conflictprovides the framework within which US ROE are forumlated.Because ROE also reflect operational, political, anddiplomatic factors, they often restrict combat operationsmore than the requirement of international law alone. Therationale for this restiction is that the originalstatement on US ROE confused military justice terminology(e.g., search and seizure) and the Geneva Convention onPOWs with the ROE pertaining to use of force. The revisedparagraphs more clearly define the applicable legalconcepts and terms.

k. If assigned forces have not had previous experienceor training in riverine operations, plans should provide

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for training of joint and subordinate riverine commandersand staffs in the peculiarities of riverine operationsplanning and coordinating. This training should includejoint training, if feasible, and training in control andcoordination of assault craft, direct and indirectgunfire, mine courtermeasures, helicopter gunships, andfixed-wing aircraft in the often densely vegetatedriverine environment. If possible, ground forcesscheduled for riverine employment should conductadvance-maneuver training in a similiarly difficultriverine terrain environment.

l. Communications plans will be developed in consonancewith the concept of operations.

2. Concurrent Planning. Each echelon of the JRF shouldparticipate in the development of a joint riverine OPLAN. Toexpedite the preparation of plans, major commanders should bedesignated as soon as the decision has been reached to conducta riverine operation. Early and efficient assembly of assaultcraft, support craft, ships, aircraft, and other resourcesnecessary to the operation depend on expeditious and thoroughconcurrent planning. Initial planning must be originated bysubordinate commanders on the basis of preliminary informationprovided in concepts of operations, outline plans, warningorders, planning memorandums, and decisions emanating fromhigher authority. The recommendations and estimates ofsubordinate commanders produced often incluence the finalplans and decisions of senior commanders.

3. Planning by Parallel Chains of Command. The concurrentparticipation by joint forces requires coordinated planningbetween corresponding echelons of command. Basic decisions,even those primarily the responsibility of an individualcommander, must be reached on the basis of understanding themission, objectives, tactics, capabilities, and limitations ofthe command. At the higher command levels, parallel planningcommences with the inception of the operations. At the lowerlevels, it usually begins on receipt of an initiatingdirective and continues for successive operations. Commandersother than those assigned to the MRF, may be directed byhigher authority to provide necessary liaison for planning andcoordination of supporting operations.

a. Detailed planning. Detailed plans must be made formovement, base support, and logistics, as well as foroperations to be conducted, including air support.

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Specific attention should be given to the water movementand assault. When appropriate, this should include closeintegration and optimum employment of assault craft withthe assault element scheme of maneuver and correlationwith helicopter assault planning.

b. Collection and Dissemination of Intelligence.Current, accurate intelligence is a prerequisite to soundplanning; therefore, prompt collection of essentialinformation is necessary for timely development of plans.Collection can be complicated by the following factors:

(1) The objective area may be relatively inaccessiblebecause of location and/or enemy defense.

(2) Real-time enemy information may not be available.

(3) Many available collection agencies are not partof the JRF.

(4) The necessity to avoid revealing futureoperations may require extensive compartmentalizationby collecting agencies.

(5) Sufficient time may lapse between the start ofplanning and the execution of the operation that theenemy situation and characteristics of the area maychange significantly.

(6) Specific provisions must be made to ensure thattimely, accurate intelligence is disseminated by themost rapid means available.

c. Security. Security of planning is the responsibilityof all echelons of command. The assembly of staffs andthe concentration of forces tends to disclose the natureof projected operations, making concealment difficult.Special attention must be given to OPSEC.

4. Planning Procedures

a. In planning, decisions by a commander at one level mayaffect the plans of other commanders on the same or otherlevels. To keep all commanders and staffs informed duringthe planning phase, there must be early and continuousdissemination of planning data by each commander to hissenior, subordinate, and corresponding echelon commanders.Early exchange of liaison officers is also desirable.

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b. The basic documents employed in planning for a jointriverine operation are set forth in the followingsubparagraphs:

(1) Planning Directive. Following receipt of theinitiating directive, the CJRF issues a planningdirective to ensure that interdependent plans will becoordinated, will be completed in the time allowed,and will not overlook importance aspects. Theplanning directive specifies the principal plans to beprepared. It also establishes time limits for thecompletion of each major step in the planning processfor the force headquarters and major forces assigned.The planning directive contains the commander’sanalysis of the overall mission, previous decisionsabout related operations, relevant assumptions, andthe necessity for alternate plans.

(2) Planning Schedule. Using the planning directiveas a guide, each commander prepares a schedule ofplanning events for his force.

(3) Planning Memorandums. As additional information,guidance, and instructions are received, commandersmay issue planning memorandums in advance of thepreparation of formal plans to ensure that subordinatecommanders are informed of all available details thatwill affect their planning.

c. Planning for Continuing Operations. Planning forcontinuing riverine operations will follow the basic stepsoutlined herein; however, once SOPs have been established,planning is normally abbreviated and less formal incontext and may use the technique of fragmentary orders.

d. Distribution of Draft. Drafts of OPLANs and OPOEDs,or portions thereof (such as annexes and appendixes),should be distributed to other commanders as appropriateto keep them abreast of current planning for theoperation.

5. Basic Decisions. Basic decisions must be made at thehighest level within a JRF before detailed planning for ariverine operation can proceed. Since the factors on whichthese decisions must be based are interrelated, and since thedecisions will have some effect on every element of the JRF,each factor must be considered from the viewpoint of allparticipants. This section deals with these basic decisions,

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delineates the participation of various commanders in makingthem, and sets forth considerations affecting them.

a. Determination of Mission Taskings and AO. Theinitiating directive will normally specify the AO and themission. Mission taskings are promulgated by the CJRF tosubordinate commanders to initiate detailed planning forspecific objectives in support of the given mission.

(1) If the mission assigned the JRF by the initiatingdirective does not include a clear designation of thearea or areas to be controlled, the CJRF may selectthe area best suited to accomplish the assignedmission.

(2) For complementary supporting operations, the CJRFmay further subdivide the area of operations; this maybe necessary if the objective areas are so widelyseparated as to preclude effective control by a singlecommander. These areas should be large enough toinclude land areas and waterways necessary formaneuver and support of the force and thereconnaissance and surveillance needed for targetacquisition and security. Primary consideration isgiven to terrain, hydrography, and enemy combat powerand modes of operations.

b. Concept of Operations

(1) Scope. The concept of operations embodies thescheme of maneuver and plan of supporting fires. Itincludes:

(a) Allocation of forces.

(b) Landing areas.

(c) Subsequent maneuver.

(d) Objectives.

(e) Tactical control measures.

(f) Plan of supporting fires (surface and air).

(g) Alternate or contingency plans.

(h) Designation of main effort.

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(i) Promotion for unity of effort.

(j) Tasks to JRF components.

(k) Priority of organic intelligence collectioneffort.

(2) Principal Considerations. Principalconsiderations in the formulation of the concept ofoperations are:

(a) Mission.

(b) Enemy capabilities and limitations.

(c) Terrain, climatology, and hydrography.

(d) Forces available.

(e) Logistic supportability.

(f) Fire support available.

(g) Nature and extent of landing areas,helicopter landing zones, and terrain suitablefor fire support bases.

(3) Selection of Riverine Landing Areas and Sites.The CJRF selects the riverine landing areas based onthe recommendations from the land subordinatecommanders. Landing areas are segments of a riverbank or similar feature on which troops, supplies, orequipment can be landed by watercraft. A riverlanding area contains one or more points at whichindividual craft can land and disembark troop units.Whenever possible, river landing areas are selected toavoid opposition and facilitate the rapid and orderlydebarkation of ground combat units. Primaryconsiderations in the selection of riverine landingareas are:

(a) Scheme of maneuver.

(b) Enemy situation.

(c) Hydrography.

(d) Obstacles.

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(e) Terrain river bank.

(4) Selection of Waterway Routes and Patrol Areas.To select the most favorable waterway route and/orpatrol areas, multispectral imagery from satellitescan provide current information on area hydrographyand terrain/bank characteristics. Primaryconsiderations in the selection of waterway routesbetween the mobile riverine base and the selectedlanding areas are:

(a) Asset capabilities and limitations.

(b) Mission objective.

(c) Hydrography.

(d) Enemy capabilities.

(e) Capabilities to support primary andalternate plans.

(f) Terrain/bank characteristics.

(5) If not prescribed by the CJRF, waterway routesare selected by the maritime component commander incoordination with the ground and/or SO componentcommanders.

(6) Selection of Helicopter Landing Zones. Theprimary considerations in selection of helicopterlanding zones are:

(a) The concept of operations.

(b) Enemy capabilities, disposition, and knowncounterhelicopter tactics.

(c) Friendly capabilities to suppress enemy airdefenses and to provide air, artillery, and navalgunfire support for ground operations.

(d) Ease of identification from the air.

(e) Firm, dry ground suitable for landinghelicopters (this frequently may not beavailable). Accurate data on the depth of waterin inundated landing zones and the location of

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minor waterways within the landing zones isessential to prevent unnecessary loss of life andinordinate delay in troop reorganization uponlanding when jumping from hovering helicoptersbecomes necessary.

(f) Adequate obstacle clearance for approach anddeparture routes.

(g) Advice and recommendation of subordinateforce commanders.

(h) Potential for establishment of combatservice support area.

c. Selection of Base Sites

(1) Criteria. The CJRF selects the sites of riverinebases, either ashore or afloat, based on the mission,concept of operations, and recommendations ofsubordinate force commanders. Riverine base sitesmust meet the following criteria:

(a) Be within an area that can be defended byavailable forces without jeopardizing theoffensive capabilities of the JRF.

(b) Be able to provide for mooring assignedships and craft and, when necessary, sufficientarea and facilities to accommodate forces ashore.

(c) Be within operational and communicationsrange of deployed elements of the JRF so the basesite can facilitate its logistic support as wellas serve as a C3 center.

(d) Have the potential for deployment of combatservice support.

(2) Other Factors to be Considered are:

(a) If the mobile riverine base element does notinclude a helicopter landing capability, it maybe desirable to locate the afloat base, if one isestablished, adjoining a land area suitable forstaging and loading helicopters.

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(b) Defense plans should permit rapidestablishment of defense on land and alongwaterways.

(c) Mine countermeasures and antiswimmerdefenses must be provided.

(d) The location of the afloat base ofoperations, if one is established, should permitsafe passage of other waterway traffic.

(e) Alternate waterway traffic routes should beavailable to the base.

d. Selecting Tentative Operating Dates and H-Hours

(1) The Joint Riverine Force Commander. The CJRFselects tentative operating dates and H-hours afterconsultion with land, maritime, air, specialoperations component commanders, and other commanders,as appropriate. During planning, tentative operatingdates for operations are based on:

(a) Availability of forces.

(b) Readiness of forces.

(c) Present and projected enemy situation.

(d) Seasonal climatology in the AOs.

(e) Local tides and currents.

(f) Directives of higher headquarters.

(g) Requirement to coordinate with otherfriendly forces.

(2) Principal Factors. The principal factors inselection of tentative H-hours are:

(a) Known enemy routine.

(b) Duration of daylight.

(c) Need for tactical surprise.

(d) Concept of operations.

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(e) Favorable conditions of wind, current, tide,and phases of the moon.

(f) Requirement to conduct certain operations ormovements during hours of darkness.

(g) Most effective employment of supportingarms.

6. Rehearsals

a. Rehearsals are designed to test command structures,communications, fire support, information flow, andadequacy of plans. The complex interdependence of jointforces in riverine assault operations makes rehearsalsessential if the forces involved have not previouslyoperated together in riverine operations.

b. Rehearsals may take the form of maneuvers, commandpost exercises, or communications exercises.

c. Early in the planning phase, a decision must be madewhether to conduct a rehearsal. If a full scale maneuveris not feasible, a rehearsal of communication plans, firesupport procedures, and information flow should beconducted as a minimum.

7. Operations Security. Operations security (OPSEC) is aprocess of analyzing friendly actions attendant to militaryoperations to identify those actions that can be observed byadversary intelligence systems, determining which indicatorshostile inteligence systems might obtain that could beinterpreted or pieced together to derive critical informationin time to be useful to adversaries, and selecting andexecuting measures to eliminate or reduce the vulnerabilitiesof friendly actions to adversary exploitation. OPSEC measurescover a spectrum ranging from routine protection of classifiedmaterial through protection of classified transmissions duringan operation.

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CHAPTER IV

SO PLANNING

1. Special Operations. SO may be conducted in support ofriverine operations. For example, SOFs can perform specificmissions in support of assault, riverine patrol, andreconnaissance operations. As a category or form of warfare,SO is characterized by a unique set of objectives, weapons,and forces (Joint Pub 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint SpecialOperations"). A mission under a certain set of environmentalconstraints may require the application of SO skills andtechniques.

2. Missions. SOF can perform five principal missions insupport of the JRF (explained in detail in Joint Pub 3-05):UW, DA, SR, FID, and CT.

3. Planning Considerations. Planning considerations for SOin support of a JRF begin on receipt of the initiatingdirective. Because of the unique considerations involved inthe conduct of an SO, the CJRF must have personnel with SOexperience assigned or attached to the JRF joint Staff. Thisexpertise can also come from a Joint Special Operations TaskForce. The planning of an SO without current SO expertisewithin the planning staff may seriously jeopardize the successof the mission. A detailed list of planning considerationsfor the employment of SOF is provided in Appendix D, to JointPub 3-05. Also see Joint Pub 3-05.5, "Joint SpecialOperations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures," foradditional planning considerations.

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CHAPTER V

SUPPORTING ARMS PLANNING

1. Fire Support Planning

a. Commander, Joint Riverine Force. The CJRF isresponsible for coordination of all fire support planning.The CJRF normally establishes fire support coordinationelements at subordinate or appropriate echelons. Theseelements should provide the capability to transfer firesupport coordination/control from afloat to shore andback, as required. For fire support coordination withcommands not within the JRF, or with higher echelons, theCJRF should ensure that the requisite liaison isestablished with these commands. See Joint Pub 3-09,"Doctrine for Joint Fire Support."

b. Subordinate Commanders. The JRF component commandersare responsible for preparing the supporting arms plans tosupport their operations. Through the CJRF, thesecommanders request support from other JRF components.Subordinate component commanders will provide liaisonofficers, as required, to supported or supportingcomponents as the situation dictates.

c. Selection of Targets. Target selection is the prerogativeof the commanders being supported, subject to the ROE and lawof war.

d. Target Classification and Priority. Coordinatingsupporting arms requires specific analysis of all targetsand a determination on methods to be used for theirdestruction, suppression, or neutralization. Thisanalysis of targets allows determination of bothclassification and priority. Planners should be awarethat the Services have different procedures for targetclassification and priority.

e. Classification. Classification is assigned to targetsas they are added to the target list. A general policyfor classification of targets to be attacked by supportingarms should be promulgated by the CJRF. Usually, targetsare grouped according to their classification.

f. Priority. Priority is assigned to each target,indicating the desired sequence of attack. The supportedcommander recommends target priorities for targets thatare primary concerns of his force.

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g. Selection of Means. The selection and allocation ofwhich supporting arms will deliver fire support is afunction of the CJRF or a CJRF designated representative.The proposed selections, allocations, and availability offire support means are interdependent, and constantliaison and exchange of information on the subject areessential.

2. Supporting Arms Requirements

a. Maritime Forces Requirements. Operations such asriverine force movement, hydrographic survey, removal ofunderwater obstacles, minesweeping, sensor employment, andpatrols could require support from all supporting arms.Definite provisions should also be made for artillery,aircraft, and suitable water craft to maintain protectivescreens for the mobile riverine base element. Maritimeforces will require fire support from artillery, navalsurface fire, and fixed- and rotor-winged aviation.

b. Ground Forces Requirements. Ground forces may requirereconnaissance, artillery, RAC fire, naval surface fire,and air support before, during, and after the initiallanding to destroy, suppress, or neutralize hostile forcescapable of opposing the assault and to provide coveringscreens. Ground forces fire support plans may include:

(1) Artillery fire plan.

(2) Assault craft gunfire plan.

(3) Naval surface fire plan.

(4) Air support plan.

c. Aviation Forces Requirements. Aviation forces mayrequire assistance in security of forward landing zones,suppressing enemy air defenses (SEAD), recovering downedaircrews, and searching landing zones/bases.

d. Special Operations Forces. SOF may require supportingarms to cover insertions, extractions, movements, oractions at the objective area.

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3. Fire Support Coordination

a. Plans for the supporting fires of artillery, RAC,naval gunfire ships, and aircraft must be coordinated toensure those arms are economically employed with maximumeffectiveness and the requisite degree of safety.Coordination in planning is achieved by:

(1) Avoiding unnecessary duplication of missions.

(2) Adhering to call for fire procedures.

(3) Eliminating mutual interference betweensupporting units.

(4) Ensuring that each means of support is employedon missions best suited to its capabilities consistentwith the situation, time available, relative amountsand types of ammunition on hand, and ammunitionlogistics considerations.

(5) Assigning responsibility for control of fires tothe lowest echelon having the necessary C2 of thesupporting arms.

(6) Assigning responsibility for final coordinationof fires to the lowest echelon able to effect completecoordination for the particular mission. Fires arecoordinated at each echelon to the degree with whichthat echelon is affected by the mission.

(7) Maintaining common system of target designationused by all supporting arms.

(8) Understanding completely the ROE.

b. The defeat of hostile force with minimum loss ofnoncombatant lives and property in densely populated areasrequires a thorough understanding of the ROE establishedby higher authority. ROE within a riverine area may varyfrom locale to locale because of social and/or politicalconsiderations.

4. Special Considerations. Commanders at all levels shouldconsider certain factors unique to the employment ofsupporting arms in a riverine area.

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a. Artillery. Current Service doctrine for theemployment of artillery is applicable in the riverinearea; however, planning must consider factors unique tothe area, which may include:

(1) Ability of surface craft or barges to providemobility and/or firing platforms.

(2) Requirements to pre-position artillery in advanceof assault operations to avoid premature disclosure ofthe planned operation.

(3) Firing positions of limited size that may dictatethe number and caliber of weapons employed.

(4) Lack of firing positions in defilade.

(5) Absence of survey control and concurrent use ofobserved fire gunnery procedures.

(6) Limited ground observation.

(7) Requirement for helicopter-transportableartillery firing platforms for use in inundated areas,if barge-mounted or boat-mounted artillery is notavailable. Because of the hydrography, area fireweapons play a greater role in fire support thanprecision fire support. In addition, specialconsideration for weapon fuzing must be made.

(8) Difficulty in defining unit boundaries.

(9) Requirement to provide mutual support in theevent of split battery operations.

b. Assault Craft Gunfire. Fire support planning mustinclude a system for control and coordination of riverineassault craft fire in supporting the scheme of maneuver.

c. Naval Gunfire. The demoralizing effect of navalgunfire, combined with the difficulty of providingartillery fires in the normal volume, justifies heavy useof naval gunfire whenever range permits. In delta areas,the distance naval gunfire can extend inland may berestricted by mud flats and sandbars extending severalmiles to sea. Under optimum conditions, ships may be ableto provide support from principal rivers.

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d. Observation of Fire. Lack of vertical relief in mostriverine areas severely limits surface observation andadjustment of supporting fire. Ground observers mustposition themselves to accurately direct effective fire.Unusual dependence on aerial observers may be essential.

e. Special Operations. The SR capability of SOFs canprovide vital information for target selection,acquisition, fire adjustment, and battle damageassessment, which can augment supporting arms operationsnormally available to conventional forces.

5. Air Operations. Present doctrine, tactics, techniques,and equipment for aviation are readily adaptable to riverineoperations. Although present publications do not address theterm "riverine," they provide most of the information anddoctrinal guidance required to plan and execute the airportion of riverine operations. Therefore, this section willbe limited to aspects of air operations that are unique,require emphasis, or result from recent developments andadvancements in technology.

a. Organization. The composition of aviation elementsassigned to support riverine operations is determined bythe mission, enemy threat, operational environment,available resources, and support requirements.

b. Helicopter Support. The helicopter plays a vital rolein riverine operations. The JRF must have the capabilityto conduct air reconnaissance, air surveillance, airsupport, evacuation operations, airborne control, armedescort, and close-in fire support. If there is noriverine land base of operations, provisions must be madeto include a helicopter support ship in the riverine baseelement. As a minimum, the JRF must be able to providelanding platforms, fuel, emergency repairs, and ammunition.

c. Close Air Support. CAS for waterborne units will beprovided by using current doctrine, principles, andprocedures. Effective CAS requires distinct marking offriendly elements as well as positive and reliablecommunications between the supported unit and theattacking aircraft. Aircraft must be under control of thefire support coordinator when delivering ordnance toensure the safety of friendly forces. Control measuresmust be sufficient to help ensure coordination of fireamong forces and safety of friendly forces. Although

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both preplanned and on-call CAS missions are envisioned,the nature of the threat to waterborne units emphasizesthe need for immediately available CAS.

d. Air Interdiction. AI operations can be an especiallyeffective method of attacking hostile movement inriverine, coastal, or delta areas. Often, air-deliveredmines are more effective for interdiction than directlydelivered munitions such as bombs, because mines continueto be effective after delivery aircraft have left thearea. Also, enemy uncertainty regarding the presence ofmines can result in excessive delays, diversion ofresources into time-consuming mine countermeasures, andreduced enemy morale. AI employing mines shouldcomplement surface riverine operations.

e. Supporting Arms. Supporting arms are used during thelanding attack primarily for close support of the riverineassault force and require the coordinated employment ofartillery, assault craft fire, naval gunfire, and CAS.The use of supporting arms will be in accordance withcurrent joint and Service doctrine, tactics, techniquesand procedures.

(1) Artillery. Standard artillery procedures shouldbe followed and each battery should be capable ofconducting independent fire direction from craft,barges, or ashore.

(a) The use of all means of mobility is a keyfactor when employing artillery in riverineoperations because artillery frequently must berepositioned before the assault landing. Thisusually requires that artillery displacements besupported by air and other artillery duringmovement. Additional security forces may berequired as temporary augmentation to thedisplaced unit.

(b) Lack of adequate position areas may deny useof the quantity and caliber of artillery normallydictated by hostile strength and areacharacteristics. Positions will usually berelatively small and established in insecureareas. The absence of firing positions indefilade, lack of cover and concealment, and

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positioning in insecure areas will frequentlyrequire use of direct-fire techniques and heavyexpenditures of anti-personnel ammunition forself-defense.

(c) Because of the lack of survey control andconcurrent meteorological data, adjusted fireswill be the primary method used to obtain maximumeffect on the enemy.

(d) Artillery batteries may be deployed byeither surface craft, helicopters, or on bargesthat act as firing platforms.

(e) Buoy markers should be placed on artilleryweapons and prime movers to facilitate possiblesalvage operations.

(f) Positions selected for either land- orafloat-based fire support should allow forproviding fire support for the maneuver forcewhile enroute to or from the AO.

(g) Normally, the lack of commanding terrain inthe AOs increases emphasis on aerial observation,particularly during waterborne movement. Acombination of aerial observers and forwardobservers on the ground allows the best artillerycoverage, coordination, and surveillance of thebattle area.

(h) Support of water movements and patrolsrequires special emphasis on replotting targetsand establishment of control points from whichfiring data can be transferred.

(2) Assault Craft Gunfire. Assault craft gunfire canprovide direct and indirect fire to the ground force.These craft deliver direct fire with a wide variety ofautomatic weapons. Craft can also provide indirectfire support with naval mortars installed on selectedcraft. A high degree of coordination is required toprovide support of troops ashore.

(a) The riverine ground component commander isresponsible for coordination of all fires, includingassault fires, in support of operations ashore.

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(b) Once troops begin landing, all assault craftfire into the AOs must be either delivered at therequest of the supported unit or cleared by theon-scene commander of the assaulting forces.

(3) Direct-Fire Support. Assault craft providingdirect fire in support of a specified ground unit forone phase of an operation will also normally be indirect support of that unit. The boat unit commanderadvises the supported commander concerning thecapabilities of assault craft weapons. These weaponsmay be given neutralization, interdiction, harassing,or destruction fire missions. They may augmentinfantry weapons with fires through gaps in friendlyfires. Whatever the mission, fires must be executedin coordination with the supported unit commander’sfire support plan.

(4) Indirect Fire Support

(a) Craft equipped with indirect fire weaponsmay be employed as a fire unit. With all craftin close proximity, one can direct the fires ofall to provide supporting indirect fires.

(b) Normally, indirect fire will be observed byan aerial or ground observer who can communicatedirectly with supporting boats or through theground unit fire-support coordination center.

(5) Naval Surface Support

(a) Naval surface support can be used forriverine operations. For current doctrine andprocedures refer to NWP 22-2.

(b) Shore fire control parties are assigned toground forces, as required.

(6) Close Air Support. CAS will be provided, usingcurrent doctrinal principles and procedures.

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CHAPTER VI

INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

1. Scope of Intelligence Planning

a. The nature of the riverine AOs places an increasedimportance on intelligence. Intelligence planning must bedesigned to give commanders accurate and timelyinformation concerning the enemy threat and the status ofthe AOs in order to assist him in the determination ofobjectives and operations planning.

b. Intelligence planning for riverine operations isdivided into three phases:

(1) Determination of intelligence requirements andplanning for the collection, processing, anddissemination of that intelligence required foroperational planning.

(2) Preparation of the Intelligence Annex to OPLANsor OPORDS.

(3) Preparation and dissemination of intelligence plans,estimates, reports, and summaries during operations.

2. Intelligence Planning Responsibilities

a. Upon receipt of a mission, the CJRF initiates planningprocedures. He prepares an estimate of the situationbased on the mission and available intelligence on thearea of operations. With the assistance of theintelligence officer, J-2, he identifies intelligence gapsand requirements for update/currency. These are levied onJRF intelligence organizations for collection, analysis,production, and dissemination; those that cannot beaccomplished by JRF assets are validated and passed up thechain of command. Each level of command responds and/orpasses the unsatisfied requirements until they reach thenational level agencies.

b. The CJRF tasks subordinate intelligence units withcontinuing intelligence or special collection missions andrequests higher headquarters to execute such missionrequirements that are beyond the capabilities ofsubordinate units. Additionally, he directs requirementsfor finished intelligence products to include priorities.

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c. Responsibilities of Component Commanders. JRFcomponent commanders are responsible for:

(1) Determination of intelligence requirements forplanning and making these requirements known to theCJRF through the submission of intelligencerequirements requests.

(2) Collection and processing of information anddissemination of intelligence to major elements of theJRF.

(3) Establishing liaison with subordinateintelligence units and the JRC to assist in thecollection, production and dissemination ofintelligence.

(4) Obtaining and distributing maps, charts,photographs, and special intelligence materials.

(5) Preparation of intelligence estimates.

(6) Security and counterintelligence measures, inaddition to those specified by higher authority.

d. Intelligence Requirements. The CJRF requires current,useable intelligence in a timely manner in order to planand direct operations, achieve mission success, andprotect his force. While some intelligence needs are onetime, many are recurrent or standing. New requirementsare submitted via intelligence channels for validation bythe chain-of-command. The following is a list of generic,standing requirements.

(1) Hydrographic information, including waterwaydepth, length, width, bottom composition, tidalranges/currents, and bank characteristics (e.g.,length, bedrock/soil composition and trafficability).

(2) Navigational hazards, including natural andmanmade waterway obstacles such as vegetation, debris,fish traps, and barricades.

(3) Location of bridges and clearances underneathbridges.

(4) Real-time locations, capabilities, limitations,activities, and probable courses of action of enemyunits in the objective area.

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(5) Loading, departure, and delivery points forhostile watercraft.

(6) Routes followed by the enemy on inland waterways,including staging areas.

(7) Evasion tactics used by the enemy, includingcamouflage and deception.

(8) The enemy logistic system, with emphasis onwaterborne transport routes.

(9) Location of arms and supply caches.

(10) Identification of warning systems used by theenemy against patrol craft.

(11) Identification of points where the enemy usuallycrosses rivers and canals.

(12) Identification and capabilities of enemywatercraft. Emphasis should be placed on determiningwhether they are owned by the enemy or are impressedfrom the local populace.

(13) Enemy swimmer capabilities, equipment, andmethods of operation.

(14) Enemy mining, including tree-mounted directionalantipersonnel mines, ambush operations (withparticular emphasis on early warning of ambush sites),and mining tactics.

(15) Enemy tactics concerning antipersonnel devicessuch as command and trip-wire-detonated claymoremines, grenades, traps, camouflage pits, and stakes orspikes driven into the ground.

(16) Location, capabilities, and tactics employed byenemy antiaircraft elements.

(17) Identification of enemy intelligence andcounterintelligence elements in the AO.

(18) Susceptibility of the populace to pressure fromthe enemy to provide information on friendly forcesand operations.

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(19) Identification of guerilla, paramilitary, orsimilar groups in the objective area.

(20) Identification of individuals, groups, ororganizations in the objective area that may beexploited by the enemy for espionage, sabotage, orsubversive activities or by friendly forces forintelligence.

(21) Weather, including temperature, precipitation,humidity, visibility, wind, fog, cloud cover, iceincidence (including normal locations and thickness ofsurface ice in specific weather/temperatureconditions), and the effect of weather at variousseasons on the river’s characteristics.

(22) Astronomical conditions, including sunrise,sunset, moon rise, moon set, and phase of the moon.

(23) Identification of civilian uses of waterways,including type of craft, traffic pattern and density,and civil registration and licensing system.

(24) Determination of medical characteristics of theAO, including plant and animal ecology, terrain,climatological and disease incidence data, andsanitary conditions ashore.

(25) Identification of helicopter landing zones.

3. Intelligence Sources and Collection. All sources andmethods of collection should be applied. Riverine Operationsare generally conducted in areas of heavy vegetation and thatchange regularly due to the action of river water, tides andstorms. As a consequence, hydrographic charts and maps becomeoutdated. In order to obtain current map and chartinformation the full range of human, imagery, and uniquesensor collectors may have to be applied to gain the requisiteintelligence to support operations.

4. Environmental Considerations

a. Requirements. Terrain analysis and routereconnaissance have a direct effect on operationalplanning. Detailed intelligence is necessary on the widthand depth of waterways, velocity and nature of currents,tidal changes, bottom characteristics, gradient

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of possible river landing sites, condition of the banks,location of debris, vegetation, obstacles, and topography.Accurate intelligence concerning terrain and hydrographicconditions is generally lacking. The physicalcharacteristics of a riverine environment are not stable,as stream courses may change and sand bars constantlyshift positions.

b. Characteristics of Waterways. Major rivers and inlandwaterways can be placed in one of the followingcategories:

(1) Headwaters or Upper Sector (Type 1). In thiscategory, the river is variable, unpredictable, andusually not navigable by motorized craft.

(2) Central Valley or Middle Sector (Type 2). Thewaters in this category can usually be navigated bysmall motorized craft. The upper portions of thistype of waterway have river bedrock formations andconditions similar to the headwater sector. Multiplechanneling often occurs in the lower portion of thistype of waterway. Accurate information becomes moresignificant because deep channels are either scarce ornonexistent in multiple channeling areas. The channelwith the strongest current is usually the deepest.

(3) Delta or Lower Sector (Type 3). This category isthe widest part of the river. The current is usuallyslower than upstream and may change or even reversewith the tide. Channels that are navigable by shipsare often found in the lower sector. Numerouslow-lying islands and locations where the primary orsecondary river channels double back exist in thistype of waterway; therefore, this category requiresspecial attention and tactics.

(4) Canals (Type 4). Canals may be encountered andused in an operation. Since canals are manmade, theircharacteristics are usually predictable, and they areoften navigable by shallow draft boats. Entrances andexits are the critical points on canals, and specialemphasis should be placed on obtaining informationabout these areas. It should be noted that enemytactics include using deceptive mud or wood barricadesto open or close manmade canals.

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c. Biological and Medical Factors. Biological andmedical factors must be included in the intelligenceassessment. Information on diseases endemic to the area,such as malaria, cholera, typhus, and so forth, should beprovided. Harmful insects and poisonous snakes, marinelife, leeches and other parasites, and harmful plantsnative to the area must also be identified. Otheranticipated medical problems, such as intestinaldisorders, immersion foot, and conjunctivitis, that may becontracted by personnel living and operating in the area,and general health and sanitation standards must beidentified.

d. Weather. Adverse weather conditions can eitherenhance or degrade riverine operations, and the ability topredict weather conditions accurately in a given localemust be included in the intelligence estimate. Forexample, although the reduced visibility caused by heavyrains or fog can be exploited in the movement of ariverine assault force, the detrimental effects of severeweather on communications, river navigation, forceintegrity, and safety may outweigh any potential benefitsderived. Further, seasonal or other prolonged periods ofextreme weather (i.e., heat, cold, rain, etc) may have asignificant effect on the endurance and alertness ofassigned personnel, as well as contribute to degradedperformance of equipment.

5. Sociological Considerations. In a riverine area,extensive river and canal systems are the principal LOCs. Thepopulation tends to settle along these waterways, which areoften their only LOCs. Civilian traffic and congestedsettlements provide cover for clandestine movements by hostileforces and help to conceal their mining and ambush efforts.Sociological and civil conditions are tied closely to thephysical characteristics of the environment. Waterways may beused extensively by local government agencies to establish andmaintain control in the riverine area.

6. Security

a. Efforts to maintain the security of tacticaloperations may be hampered because the forces involvedwill be under observation by the local population, aportion of which may support the enemy. In thesecircumstances, every individual and unit must understandand practice security measures.

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b. To prevent sabotage, security of the riverine basemust be maintained, since absolute control of waterways isusually not possible. Only carefully screened, essentialcivilians, excluding those with appropriate securityclearances and those previously determined not to requirean escort, should be permitted inside land or afloat baseareas, and they must be kept under constant control andsupervision. The CJRF’s enforcement of curfews on waterwayare by time and area, and enforcement in coordination withexisting authorities is an effective security measure.

7. Intelligence and Counterintelligence Estimates. The CJRFis responsible for maintaining the intelligence andcounter-intelligence estimates. These estimates should analyzeenemy activity and the counterintelligence threat to riverineforces, and they should provide appropriate recommended plansto neutralize threats, using both passive and active securitymeasures, and aggressive counterintelligence operations.

8. Intelligence Annex. The Intelligence Annex to the OPORDor OPLAN should be formatted in accordance with JOPS Volume IIand should be a means of disseminating information andintelligence concerning collection management, intelligencetasks assigned (i.e., collection, reporting, disseminaiton,sensor employment, etc), and other tasks or procedures, asnecessary. At the JRF level, the Intelligence Annex includesthe reconnaissance/surveillance plan, reference to currentintelligence estimates and summaries, special reports, andstudies on the enemy and enemy AOs (particularly, thosestudies concerned with weather, terrain, hydrography,sociology, economics, and politics). If not previouslydistributed, such studies are included as appendixes to theIntelligence Annex.

9. Riverine Force Intelligence Support. In support of theintelligence mission, all components of the JRF willaccomplish the following tasks:

a. Collect and report any information which couldsupport the current operations and the Essential Elementsof Information of the JRF.

b. Develop the capability to meet collection requirementsassigned by higher authority with available assets.

c. Evaluate collected information in accordance with unitcapability.

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d. Maintain a capability to report and disseminatecollected intelligence rapidly.

e. Conduct intelligence liaison with other US andfriendly forces, when feasible and as operations permit.

f. Determine and request from higher authority thoseintelligence requirements that cannot be satisfied byorganic JRF collection assets.

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CHAPTER VII

COMMUNICATIONS PLANNER

1. Scope and Requirements

a. Riverine operations require reliable, secure, andrapid communications systems. Several special forms ofcontrol and lateral communications between elements of theforce must be exercised in the execution of common orcoordinated functions.

b. Flexibility. The JRF communications system must beflexible enough to support modified or new taskings.Common facilities must be used where practical to decreasefrequency requirements. Alternate methods ofcommunication other than electrical must be exploited toensure the most rapid and secure delivery of informationbetween widely dispersed forces.

2. Considerations

a. In as much as the JRF may contain maritime, ground,air, and SOF components, and since information and ordersmust be provided to all elements of the JRF, a jointcommunications plan should be prepared. Accordingly,planning should be a joint effort and carefullycoordinated at each echelon of command in order to meetthe requirements of the force.

b. All communications requirements tasked to units not apart of the JRF must be thoroughly coordinated.

c. The communications requirements of the JRF vary withthe size and composition of the force. Planning to meetthese communications requirements commences with otherplanning and is conducted concurrently. It also includesensuring that communications are adequate to support theplanning process itself. The following factors must becarefully considered during the planning process:

(1) Each component of the JRF must havecommunications compatible with the tactics andtechniques employed. The channels provided mustensure effective exercise of command, coordination ofsupporting fire, and administrative and logisticsupport. Because of the dissimilar nature of theforces involved, additional circuits may be requiredto permit the desired degree of C2.

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(2) Elements of the JRF may operate in widelyseparated areas during some phases of the operation.Communications capabilities of major units must beadequate to support all operations.

d. Environmental Effects and Operating Conditions.Environmental effects may vary widely between areas ofoperation; however, some problem areas in planning remainconstant. For example, vegetation absorbs radiated radiofrequency energy, and terrain may mask receiving stations.A study of the specific physical environment, withemphasis on the adverse effects of weather, geography,vegetation, and terrain may enable communications planningto overcome some of the limitations imposed.

e. Climatology. Climate will affect equipment and radiopropagation characteristics. For example, hightemperatures and humidity normally associated withriverine operations will reduce both shelf life andoperating life of batteries and will decrease the poweroutput and sensitivity of radios.

f. Terrain and Vegetation. Flat terrain generallypermits greater operating ranges to be obtained withline-of-sight, VHF, and UHF communications. However, indelta areas, the dense vegetation frequently encounteredalong these waterways will absorb transmitted energy andreduce the usual terrain advantages. To overcome theabsorbent effects of vegetation, antennas should be raisedabove the tree tops, if possible. Additionally, antennasthat provide horizontal polarization may be used to lessenthe effects of vegetation absorption.

g. Equipment. The communications equipment used byground force units has been developed specifically for theground environment. Equipment of mobile ground forces isusually portable, lightweight, easy to operate, equippedwith several options of antennas and transmitting andreceiving devices, rugged, and resistant to environmentalconditions. Communications equipment employed by sectionsof the JRF must have compatible components, parts, andtest equipment to reduce logistic support problems.Planning for the choice of communications media willrequire consideration of the following:

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(1) Radio. In view of the wide dispersion of forces,and the inherent mobility of the JRF, radio is theprimary means of communications. Radio nets must bestructured to support the tactical organization.

(2) Wire. The only foreseeable use of wirecommunications is for intrabase use. The areacommander coordinates requirements and providesexternal integrated wire and radio communications.

(3) Multichannel Radio Systems. Tacticalground-based multichannel radio systems arecharacterized by directional line-of-sightpropagation, which may serve to minimize theprobability of enemy interception, jamming, anddirection finding. However, since multichannelequipment transmitters must be continuously keyed andsince it may not always be possible to orientdirectional antennas away from enemy listeningstations, the vulnerability of multichannel radiosystems to interception, jamming, and radio directionfinding is increased. With these constraints in mind,multichannel radio systems can support the variouscomponents of the JRF.

(4) Signal Communications. Signal communications,judiciously employed by ships and craft in a riverineenvironment, may offer significant advantages to themaritime component commander. The use of semaphore,flag hoist, directional flashing light, infraredflashing light, and/or hand signals can be aneffective means of communication, even in theconfusion and uproar of an ambush. In addition, theuse of signal communications with brevity or codewords can be an effective, simple means of "secure"communications.

(5) Messenger Service. Bulky materials such as maps,overlays, charts, and lengthy low-precedence messagetraffic can be economically delivered by aircraft orby watercraft couriers. A planned courier systemshould take advantage of the numerous liaison andlogistic craft that support the riverine force awayfrom its base. A well-planned system will relieve theradio communication networks of much superfluoustraffic and permit rapid radio transmission ofessential messages.

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(6) Air Drops. Message air drop and pickuptechniques are satisfactory for use in riverineoperations. There are simple procedures that involvemarking the pickup site, indicating wind direction,and rigging the pickup device.

(7) Airborne Radio Retransmission or SatelliteCommunications. Airborne radio relay or satellitecommunications techniques can be employed to extendradio communications. This technique can extend therange of the effects of terrain, such as masking orabsorption.

(8) Sound Communications. Sound amplifiers areparticularly effective in a riverine environment.Relatively low-level audio signals are capable oftraveling great distances over water and flatmarshlands. Extensive use of helicopter-mounted soundsystems are useful in PSYOP and civic action programs.

g. Radio Circuit Requirements

(1) C2 Craft. The C2 craft assigned to the JRF musthave adequate communications facilities to meet therequirements of the force as a whole.

(2) River Assault Craft. RAC must have adequatecommunications facilities for control of waterbornemovement and support of the overall scheme ofmaneuver. A minimum of two transceivers will berequired for riverine operations.

3. Responsibilities

a. The CJRF:

(1) Determines and consolidates communicationsrequirements for the JRF as a whole.

(2) Acquires and assigns the necessary technicalfacilities to subordinate elements of the force.

(3) Determines, consolidates, and coordinates theECCM requirements of all participating forces.

(4) Promulgates guidance for cover and deceptionplans for the operation.

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(5) Provides requirements for establishingcommunications liaison between commands of theparticipating forces for communications planning.

(6) Prepares and promulgates a complete andcoordinated communications plan.

(7) Assigns frequencies and call signs.

b. Component commanders:

(1) Determine and submit requirements for use ofcommunications facilities controlled by higherheadquarters.

(2) Develop EW plans and requirements for EW support.

(3) Provide planning coordination requirements tosubordinate JRF units and supporting forces.

(4) Develop and promulgate a complete and coordinatedcommunications plan to support the plan of the CJRF.

4. Communications Security. The CJRF is responsible forCOMSEC. This is accomplished by the development ofcommunications security plans and procedures that shouldconsider the following:

a. The use of earphones and voice-muffling devices onvoice circuits and continuous wave transmission, whenpracticable.

b. Communications should be prepared and authenticated toprevent analysis and imitative deception by the enemy.

c. Since recognition and identification signals maybecome known to the enemy, they should only be regarded asevidence -- but never as proof -- of friendly identity.

d. Visual communications may be used in preference toradio communications, when practical.

e. When communicating by light, care should be taken touse light of minimum brilliance and to employ properdirectional procedures.

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f. Locally generated substitution and authenticationcodes not approved by the National Security Agency willnot be used.

g. Secure voice equipment should be used on all tacticalradio nets and as practical on administrative nets. Atleast one tactical radio net common to all units will bekept uncovered for emergency communications. Code changeswill be made as directed by the CJRF.

5. Communication Deception and Countermeasures. The scope ofemployment of imitative communications deception is usuallyspecified in directives from higher authority. In the case ofmanipulative communications deception, the CJRF may initiateit if he has the available assets and if he has thoroughlycoordinated the effect beforehand.

6. The Communications Plan. The JRF communications plan isbased on the operation and administrative plans that itsupports. The communications plan fulfills the requirementsof the operation in terms of circuits, channels andfacilities, and policies, and it governs the procedures foroperation and coordination of the overall system. The plan isprepared in detail to facilitate its use at all echelons andnormally includes:

a. General coverage of the communications situation,guiding principles, and the concept of operationalemployment.

b. The communications mission.

c. Delegation of tasks and responsibilities.

d. Detailed instructions relative to the organization,installation, operation, and coordination of thecommunications system.

e. Assignment and use of call signs, frequencies,cryptographic aids, and authentication systems.

f. Instructions on countermeasures, cover and deception,security, recognition and identification, and otherspecial communications and electronics functions.

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g. Instructions concerning communications and electronicslogistic support.h. Instructions for medical evacuation that arecompatible with all deployed units and medical aid craft.

j. Special planning considerations to ensure jointcoordination in the allocation, use, and monitoringresponsibilities of frequencies.

7. Rehearsals. Full rehearsals of the communications planare important to identify unrealistic requirements andidentify COMSEC weaknesses.

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CHAPTER VIII

LOGISTIC PLANNING

1. Scope. The mission of the JRF will determine the logisticsupport required. Although accepted principles remaingenerally valid for riverine operations, variation from normallogistic techniques may be necessary to cope with the riverinearea. Consideration must be given to special items ofequipment; prescribed loads; levels of supplies; distribution;services; and engineer, maintenance, transportation, andmedical support. This chapter deals wioh logistic planningmatters peculiar to a riverine area of operations that mayrequire special emphasis.

2. Logistic Planning Considerations

a. The CJRF will coordinate all logistic support.Although the extent of the logistic control exercised bythe CJRF will be established by his commander, suchcontrol will normally be limited to what is necessary tomeet logistic needs essential to the success of them ssion. The CJRF must constantly strive for economicsand efficiencies of efforts.

b. Logistics is a Service responsibility, and eachcomponent of the JRF must ensure that appropriate supportis provided by the parent Service or through validatedagreements established during the planning phase.

c. Each Service is responsible for the logistic supportof its own forces in a combatant command, except whenlogistic support is otherwise provided by agreements orassignments for common servicing, joint servicing, orcross-servicing. Logistic procedures at all levels mustprovide for coordinated and continuing support, includingthe use of common facilities by Service component forcesin the riverine AOs. For detailed information on jointlogistic planning, see Joint Pub 4-0, "Logistics Supportof Joint Operations."

d. Logistic planning to support riverine operations isdivided into two categories:

(1) Logistic support provided to the JRF fromexternal sources.

(2) Organic logistic support provided by the JRF.

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e. A characteristic of logistic support in riverineoperations is the near total reliance on ships and smallcraft to provide not only transportation, but alsostorage, maintenance, and billeting facilities. Theafloat basing of logistic support, either riverine or seabased, increases flexibility and provides facilitiesessential to the conduct of riverine operations whilereducing security requirements.

f. Logistic Functions. Logistic planning for riverineoperations must provide for the following:

(1) Embarkation of personnel and equipment in theriverine afloat base of operations.

(2) Tactical loading of personnel and supplies fromthe riverine base of operations to assault craft.

(3) Establishment and maintenance of an inter-Servicelogistic support system.

g. Logistic Planning Factors. The following factorsexert a marked influence on logistic planning for riverineoperations:

(1) Number of units to be supported.

(2) The availability and accountability of equipment.

(3) The size of the area over which the equipment isto be distributed.

(4) Type of equipment essential to the success of themission.

(5) Length of time before equipment is readilyavailable.

(6) Source of resupply.

(7) Base defense plan.

(8) Character and expected duration of thecontemplated operation.

(9) Distance of the area of operations from theriverine base and of the base from its sources ofsupply.

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(10) Freedom from the enemy disrupting supply lines,both maritime, aerial, and land.

(11) Availability of logistic means.

(12) Progressive increase in the level and form oflogistics support that may be required in the AOs.

(13) Climatology and astronomical conditions for the AOs.

(14) Terrain and hydrography in the AO.

(15) Availability of host nation resources.

(16) Support required for enemy POWs and the civilianpopulation.

(17) Medical support requirements.

(18) Helicopter landing-site availability.

(19) Support required for SOF and other uniqueelements that employ SOFs peculiar equipment.

(20) Durability and suitability of emergency and lifesupport equipment for the climatic and hydrographicconditions.

h. Riverine Base of Operations

(1) Requirements. Even when a JRF is introduced intoan AO by means other than amphibious shipping, or whenriverine operations are conducted after termination ofthe amphibious operation, a riverine base ofoperations is established. The base may be locatedafloat or ashore.

(a) Forces assigned to the riverine base ofoperations should be capable of performing allessential logistic functions so that the JRF islogistically self-sufficient except for periodicresupply and major maintenance on equipment.

(b) Whether the base is afloat or on land,storage and maintenance space will normally be ata premium in the riverine area. Space within

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shallow-draft ships and craft used to formriverine bases is limited and must be usedefficiently. Supply and maintenance operationsof the component services must be integrated topermit maximum use of space available.

(c) Afloat basing, sea or riverine, allows formaximum support and flexibility while placingonly the requisite forces ashore. Riverineafloat basing reduces security requirements andprovides excellent facilities for C2,maintenance, billeting, medical, and helicopteroperations. However, storage space on most shipssuitable to riverine operations is limited.Multiple platforms for helicopter operationspermit launching of forces from diverselocations, adding maneuverability to the groundforces and to the operation’s deceptive plan.Optimum logistic support may be attained througha combination of both types of afloat basing.

i. Transportation. In a riverine area, an adequate roadsystem capable of handling heavy logistic traffic normallydoes not exist. Railroads are either nonexistent or verylimited, and they are easily interdicted. Airfields arescarce and usually inadequate for handling heavy loads.Consequently, unusual dependence is placed on watertransportation, using the existing network of rivers andcanals. In general, bulk movements of supplies,personnel, and equipment to support riverine operationswill be accomplished principally by water.

(1) Ships and craft for riverine logistic supportmust be of shallow draft. For either afloat or landbases, these craft may be required to transportresupply items from the designated source to suchbases. It is usually preferable to provideadditional ships or craft to shuttle between theriverine base and its sources of supply (serviceforce ships, shore-based depots, or other sources),rather than to move ships of an afloat base to thedepots for resupply. Such movements will normallylessen the capability of the base to providecontinuous support of tactical operations. Ingeneral, the degree of logistic support, which can be

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provided by a riverine afloat base of operations, willdepend on the amount and type of resupply shippingavailable, as well as the composition of the maritimeriverine base element.

(2) Helicopters are especially well-suited forresupply and evacuation missions because of theirspeed and high degree of flexibility.

3. Logistic Planning Responsibilities. The CJRF and hiscomponent force commanders have specific and complementarylogistic planning responsibilities.

a. Joint Riverine Force Commander. The CJRF isresponsible for:

(1) Determining overall logistic requirements of theJRF, including units, special equipment, and shipping.

(2) Allocating the means to meet logisticrequirements of the JRF.

(3) Planning for coordination of logistic support.

(4) Providing base development planning.

(5) Approving component commander’s logistics,embarkation, and tactical loading plans.

b. Component Commanders. The subordinate componentcommanders of the JRF are responsible for the following:

(1) Developing plans, in coordination with the CJRFand other JRF component commander for theaccomplishment of logistic functions.

(2) Determining logistic requirements of theircomponents, including special equipment and shippingrequirements.

(3) Determining transportation requirements, andrequesting support, through the CJRF, from othercomponents as required.

(4) Developing plans, in coordination with thesupporting commander, for assembly, embarkation, ortactical loading of personnel, supplies, and equipmentaboard riverine assault craft, ships, or aircraft asappropriate.

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(5) Providing logistic support for component forcesdeployed in forward operating areas.

(6) Accomplishing logistic and support requirementsand function, assigned by the CJRF.

(7) Allocating resources of their forces to meetconsolidated logistic requirements.

(8) oroviding Service-peculiar items to othercomponents as required.

4. Logistic Plans

a. Only logistic planning affecting the JRF as a whole isset forth in this chapter. Service and individualcomponent logistic planning guidance will normally befound in service SOPs and specific OPLANs or OPORDs.

b. Embarkation and Loading Plans. The planning tasksenumerated for embarkation and loading refer onl to thatphase during which the ground components, together withtheir supplies and equipment, initially embark on assignedshipping of the JRF. Plans for tactical loading are setforth in Chapter XII.

c. Supply

(1) Requirements. Supply planning is accomplishedunder two major categories:

(a) Initial supply. This comprises the level ofsupplies carried by the JRF in order to providethe required support for riverine operations.Riverine craft should carry sufficient quantitiesof Classes I, III, and V supplies to accommodateall embarked personnel for the length of theoperation.

(b) Resupply. This is replenishment of theJRF’s level of supplies or from the riverinebase of operations to an objective area forsupport of tactical operations. Resupply ofthose forces operating away from the riverinebase will be accomplished by riverine assaultcraft, aircraft, or riverine ground forcevehicles, as appropriate. Pre-positioned loadsof ground component supplies aboard riverine

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assault craft will substantially increaseflexibility and responsiveness of resupply forhigh-use items.

(2) Responsibility. Coordination of supply supportfor the JRF is the responsibility of the CJRF.

(a) The originator of the initiating directivemay assign responsibility for providingcommon-item supplies. If this responsibility isnot assigned in the initiating directive, theCJRF should encourage component commanders toconclude appropriate cross-servicing agreementsfor supply as early as practical.

(b) Service-peculiar supply items will be theresponsibility of the Service concerned.

(c) If the riverine base of operations isafloat, the riverine maritime component commanderwill develop a plan for storing and distributingsupplies. If a riverine land base is employed,the riverine ground component commander willnormally be assigned this function.

(3) Maintenance. Riverine component commandersretain responsibility for maintenance of assigned andorganic equipment.

(a) Space limitations dictate the merging ofmaintenance facilities to the maximum extentfeasible. If maintenance responsibilities arenot assigned in the initiating directive,component commanders should be encouraged toconclude cross-servicing agreements at an earlystage.

(b) To conserve space, maximum use of mobilemaintenance teams should be planned.

(c) Maintenance and overhaul schedules forassigned ships, boats, aircraft, and vehiclesshould be developed early in the planning phaseand be provided to operational planners tofacilitate forecasting of operationalavailability. Operational planners must be keptadvised of changes to the forecast availability.

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5. Medical Planning. Coordination of medical planning forriverine operations is the responsibility of the CJRF. Inaddition to the general health of the force, plans mustprovide for early, adequate, and definitive treatment ofcasualties as outlined in Joint Pub 4-02, "Doctrine for HealthService Support in Joint Operations". This latter requirementis the principal goal of medical planning. Medical facilitiesin the afloat base of operations may be the only onesreasonably accessible.

a. Medical Planning Considerations

(1) Overall mission of the JRF and the supportingmedical mission.

(2) Policies of higher commands.

(3) Characteristics of the riverine AO, includingplant and animal ecology, terrain, climatology,disease incidence data, sanitary conditions, andavailable cover.

(4) Preventive medicine, hygiene, and sanitationmeasures that must be instituted before and during theriverine operation. This should includerecommendations on the type of preventive measuresthat ground maneuver units must take to operate in ariverine environment.

(5) Physical and psychological factors affecting ownpersonnel.

(6) LOCs and evacuation routine.

(7) Evacuation policies and treatment procedures.

(8) Specific medical supplies required.

(9) Size and types of forces involved and theirtactical employment.

(10) Estimated numbers and types of casualties basedon the projected strength and type of enemy oppositionand on the character, probable duration, andobjectives of the riverine operation.

(11) Medical personnel available and status oftraining, including adequacy of medical facilities.

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(12) Medical needs for the civilian population andenemy POWs.

(13) Need for medical units, including surgicalteams.

(14) Use of specifically designated and outfittedriver assault craft and helicopters to provideambulance facilities.

(15) Use of specific ships designated as hospitalships to meet anticipated hospitalizationrequirements. These ships should be capable ofproviding surgical, morgue, and holding facilities.

(16) The use of specially configured craft as medicaltreatment and evacuation stations.

6. Engineer Planning

a. The mission of engineer units will be diversified.Engineer units normally operate under the centralizedcontrol of the CJRF when stability permits; however, asunits become more dispersed and support requirements morevaried, decentralized employment of engineer teams will berequired to a greater extent. Engineer unit commandersmust plan for and be prepared to accomplish their missionwith little, if any, of their heavy equipment because ofthe environment in the riverine AO. Joint Pub 4-04,provides additional guidance concerning joint engineersupport.

b. Engineer Tasks. Engineer planning for riverineoperations may include the following special tasks:

(1) Providing engineer reconnaissance.

(2) Obstacle breaching, including underwaterobstacles.

(3) Removing and/or raising bridges that are anavigational hazard.

(4) Constructing and preparing riverine landingsites.

(5) Constructing and preparing of fire support bases.

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(6) Installing obstacle and/or barriers.

(7) Providing survey control.

(8) Preparaing helicopter landing zones.

(9) Maintaining and repairing of canals and waterwaysystems.

(10) Detecting and neutralizing mines and boobytraps.

(11) Clearing vegetation and destruction from fieldand firing fortifications at potential ambush sites.

(12) Destroying facilities and/or specific locationsof value only to the enemy.

(13) Supporting civic action programs.

(14) Constructing forward operating base(s) ashore.

7. Base Development Planning. Base development planning mayinclude the necessity to create new dry ground by dredging orinstalling drainage systems.

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CHAPTER IX

SUPPORTING OPERATIONS PLANNING

1. Definition and Authority

a. Operations in support of the JRF may be required. Thecommander of forces conducting supporting activities willcoordinate with the CJRF.

b. The principles in Chapter V regarding air, helicopter,and CAS operations also apply to the conduct of supportingoperations.

2. JRF Operations. Supporting operations may include:

a. Amphibious operations. (Joint Pub 3-02)

b. CAS or aerial observation. (Joint Pub 3-09)

c. Reconnaissance/surveillance and demolition. (JointPub 3-55)

d. Naval gunfire support. (NWP 22-2)

e. Coastal surveillance. (NWP 13-1)

f. Harbor clearance. (Joint Pub 3-15)

g. Search and rescue. (Joint Pub 3-50; 3-50.2)

h. Unconventional warfare. (Joint Pub 3-05)

i. Those SO listed in Chapter IV when conducted by SOFsexternal to the MRF.

j. Artillery support. (Joint Pub 3-09)

k. Intelligence support. (Joint Pub 2-0)

l. Engineer support. (Joint Pub 4-04)

m. Air defense support. (Joint Pub 3-01.3)

n. CBR support. (Joint Pub 3-11)

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o. EW support. (Joint Pub 3-51)

p. PSYOP deception. (Joint Pub 3-13)

q. Suppression of enemy air defenses. (Joint Pub 3-01.4)

3. Logistic Operations. Principles set forth in ChaptersVIII and XV apply equally to supporting logistic operations.

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CHAPTER X

EMERGENCY ACTIONS, DISASTER CONTROL,AND COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

1. Effect of Environment and Organization

a. Environmental conditions in riverine operations andthe unique composition of the JRF may require certainmodifications to normal contingency procedures.

b. The following paragraphs concern aspects ofemergencies, disaster control, and combat search andrescue as they apply to riverine operations.

2. Emergencies Aboard Riverine Craft

a. Man Overboard. All craft will be prepared for a manoverboard. Frequent drills are required to trainpersonnel to quickly react to a man overboard. Rapidsmall craft action is normally required in riverinecurrents in order to be effective. Flexible SOPs forrescuing a crewman must be clearly understood andrehearsed because an entire craft and crew should notnormally be placed in jeopardy for a crewman being sweptby the current into a known ambush.

b. Fire. Depending on the severity of the fire, it mayor may not be necessary to debark troops. If it isnecessary, rehearsed emergency debarking procedures willbe followed and designated craft will assist with debarkationand fire fighting support. The possibility for groundinga craft that has caught on fire should be considered.

c. Mechanical Problems. All riverine craft and shipsshould be prepared to tow other craft and ships in theevent of a breakdown.

(1) In the event of a breakdown that requires slowingthe entire formation, a decision will be made whether todeclare the disabled ship a "straggler" or slow theformation. An escort detachment for stragglers may benecessary.

(2) Preselected and temporary anchorages may be usedin the event a slowed speed of advance detains thewhole formation and prevents it from reaching itsdestination on schedule.

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d. Emergency Relocation. An emergency relocation is anextremis relocation of the afloat base of operationsforced by enemy action or inclement weather conditions.If forced by enemy fire, it may be necessary to execute aplanned withdrawal of shore perimeter defense troops andequipment, disposal of inoperable craft, and emergencydestruction of classified material. If a riverine assaultoperation is in progress, a subsequent rendezvous will beconducted in accordance with instructions given in theOPORD.

3. Disaster Control and Emergency Assistance

a. Procedures. Disaster control and emergency assistanceprocedures are executed in accordance with currentdirectives and SOPs.

(1) The CJRF is responsible for:

(a) Conducting disaster control measures andoperations in areas where the force is located.

(b) Rendering assistance in local emergencies toother US agencies and activities.

(c) Rendering assistance to the friendly localgovernment and population in emergencies.

(2) The CJRF will be prepared to provide disastercontrol forces, to the extent possible, on the basisof noninterference with essential operations.

b. Coordinating Instructions. The CJRF:

(1) Supports other commanders, as requested, byproviding forces and material assistance consistentwith the requirements of the mission.

(2) Exercises economy of forces consistent with themission assigned.

(3) Supports disaster recovery operations of other USand friendly government agencies consistent with therequirements of the mission at hand.

c. Riverine component commanders. The commanders will:

(1) Coordinate plans, training, and operations forevacuation and disaster recovery with foreign

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military and civil defense authorities as directed byhigher authority.

(2) Provide for own disaster control operations, asappropriate.

d. C2. Control of forces in actual emergencies and intraining operations rests with the riverine componentcommander. During an emergency, additional forces may beprovided for temporary augmentation. OPCON of theseaugmenting forces will normally be given to the commanderwhose forces are being augmented.

e. Communications. Commercial communications facilitiesmay be used to augment government facilities, as requiredand available.

4. Combat Search and Rescue. CSAR is a specific taskperformed by rescue forces to effect the recovery ofdistressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations.

a. Execution. CSAR operations should be conducted inaccordance with Joint Pub 3-50.2, for joint search andrescue.

b. Responsibility. The CJRF assumes specificresponsibility for direction of CSAR operations for forceswithin the riverine AO. The commanders of adjacent jointand Service commands are responsible for conducting CSARin support of their own operations. This does not alterthe mutual responsibility to provide CSAR support toadjacent commands as circumstances may require andoperations permit. This mutual support should becoordinated through respective joint/component rescuecoordination centers or through exchanged liaisonpersonnel.

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CHAPTER XI

TACTICAL GUIDANCE

1. General Considerations. This chapter contains doctrinespecifically directed toward riverine assault operations;waterway interdiction; and surveillance, barrier, and securityoperations.

2. Movement of the Joint Riverine Force

a. The JRF has two types of movement: nontacticalmovement, such as the relocation of the force to a newbase of operations; and tactical movement, includingriverine operations. Any movement of the JRF or itssubordinate elements must be controlled and coordinated.Standard tactical control measures, such as checkpoints,phase lines, boundaries, and objectives, may be used. TheCJRF must ensure that the location and purpose of controlmeasures are understood by all elements of the JRF.

b. Security of the forces during movement is a primaryconsideration during planning.

c. Enemy threats during movement include water mines,water obstacles, ambushes, and harassing fire. Armedhelicopters should be used to escort all water movements,because they can provide reconnaissance, fire support, andcommunications relay. On-call CAS should be availablewhen required. Whenever possible, waterborne movementsshould be preceded by reconnaissance and security operationsconducted by all available means. Troops should be thoroughlybriefed on security plans, with emphasis on counterambushreaction plans and maximum use of security measures.

d. Plans should include:

(1) Designation of counterambush maneuver elements.

(2) C2 measures.

(3) Fire support.

(4) Security.

(5) Identification and recognition of committed elements.

(6) Recovery and reorganization of the committed force.

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e. Provisions must be included for security of craft whenthe ground force elements have been committed tocounter-ambush missions. Actions may range from completecommitment of the waterborne force to evasive action andcontinuing movement. Responsibility for immediate actionrests with the commander designated by the CJRF.

f. During water movement, RAC should be organized toprovide an advanced guard, including mine countermeasurescraft, flank and rear guards, and a main body. Thisfacilitates control and provides tactical integrity of themain body. The objective of the organization for movementis to provide uninterrupted movement and security for theentire force.

3. Joint Riverine Afloat Base Movement

a. The riverine afloat base of operations normally willbe relocated as tactically necessary and to better supportriverine operations.

b. The limited hydrographic data available on most riversand tributaries, as well as rapidly shifting depth, sandbars, and mud banks, make river navigation difficult.Strong currents are not unusual. Navigational aids may befew and inaccurately charted; ships should ensure thatnavigation charts are corrected to include the latestavailable data. Commanding officers of ships and officersin charge of craft must exercise caution in navigatingisland waters. Navigation teams must be well trained andhighly proficient in piloting.

c. During all movements, each element of the riverineassault force will be escorted by designated RAC. Riverswill be swept for mines along the movement route where acredible threat of mining exists. Ground units may bepre-positioned in high threat areas along the route ofadvance. Air and artillery support should be available.Ships of the force will take hostile targets ashore underfire only as permitted by the ROE. Caution must beexercised at all times to ensure that any firing does notendanger other friendly craft or troops ashore.

d. RAC will be stationed in accordance with the movementorder for each change in location of the riverine base.Escort combat craft may be used for:

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(1) Predeployment along the route in locations ofgreatest threat.

(2) Forward, rear, and flank escort.

(3) Establishment of base defense patrols andclearance of new anchorage areas.

(4) Minesweeping in areas of suspected miningthreats.

e. River assault squadron units that are not engaged inescort of ships during movement of the riverine base, willbe directed to proceed ahead or astern of the formation tothe new base site.

f. An advance force is normally employed duringrelocation of the riverine base. This force includesreconnaissance, minesweeping, engineer, and infantryelements to reconnoiter, clear, and establish initialdefenses at the new base site.

4. Measures to Prevent Mutual Interference

a. Measures to prevent mutual interference should bepromulgated by the CJRF. Mutual interference betweenfriendly units, including aircraft, must be prevented byclose coordination between units conducting riverineassault operations and waterway interdiction andsurveillance and security operations. Informationexchanged between the operations control centers shouldinclude:

(1) Proposed transits of friendly units through areasassigned to other friendly units and frequent (atleast hourly, if possible) position reports of unitsmaking the transit.

(2) Proposed OPLANs in areas where overlaps occur.

(3) Other information that will assist friendly unitsin identifying each other. This coordination mayrequire the establishment of havens and transit lanes.

b. Commanders of forces in adjacent areas, operatingwithin a TAOR, or operating in conjunction with a JRFshould be provided copies of all operation orders. If

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this is precluded by security requirements, provisions forcontinuing liaison with these commanders should be made.

c. Commanders should ensure that pre-operations briefingsinclude:

(1) All available information about friendly unitsthat may be encountered.

(2) Applicable intelligence reports.

(3) Challenge and reply codes/deconflictionprocedures.

(4) Light-array sequencing.

(5) Established havens and transit lanes.

(6) Chain of OPCON.

(7) A review of ROE.

(8) All known environmental information (tides,currents, moon, terrain, etc.).

(9) Replenishment information.

(10) Rally points.

(11) Communications instructions.

(12) Supporting arms coordination.

(13) Combat service support arrangements.

d. This information should be updated as additional databecome available.

e. Particular caution must be taken near operation areaboundaries. All available means should be used todetermine the hostile character of any contact beforecommencing destruction fire. Strict compliance with localROE is mandatory.

f. Ambushes established by friendly forces must becoordinated with appropriate operations centers.

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g. To prevent firing on friendly craft, regulationsshould be established concerning the movement of craftwithin the riverine base during darkness. The followingconsiderations apply:

(1) A maritime tactical operations center should beestablished by the riverine maritime element commanderto monitor and/or control waterborne traffic in adesignated area. Its location and composition will besuited to the tasking and situation.

(2) Only craft authorized by the maritime tacticaloperations center to be under way should be under way.All craft should be accompanied by at least one othercraft.

(3) Craft authorized to be under way should beprepared to respond immediately to the dailyrecognition and identification code when challenged.

(4) The maritime TOC should advise all patrol unitsconcerned of any authorized craft movements within theriverine base area.

5. C2 Facilities. JRF component commanders should be locatedas near to each other as possible for optimum coordination oftheir actions.

a. Operations Center. The JRF will be configured toprovide C2 facilities for participating forces. This JOCprovides C3 for all JRF operations. Ships that havesubordinate tactical elements of the JRF embarked shouldprovide TOC support for the embarked elements.

b. Similar C2 facilities ashore must be provided if ariverine land base of operations is employed.

c. Other Command Facilities

(1) C2 Craft. These craft are provided as tacticalcommand facilities for subordinate commanders foremployment in forward areas.

(2) Aircraft. C2-configured aircraft (fixed- androtary-wing aircraft) provide platforms for command ofriverine operations. The absence of relief in mostriverine areas severely limits the capability ofcommanders to observe and direct the actions of their

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forces from the surface. JRF component commandersshould have access to airborne command facilities withsufficient communications to control tacticalevolutions and coordinate supporting fires.

(3) Amphibious Vehicles. Amphibian C2 vehicles mayprovide the ground force command posts to beestablished ashore. Unless LVTC-7s (amphibiousassault vehicle-command configured) can be usedjointly, manned shipboard operations centers, and C2boats must be utilized.

(4) Communications. It may be necessary to establishcommunications relay facilities between deployedforces and the riverine base. Such relay pointsprovide for automatic retransmission or for relay ofvoice communications. A C2 craft, aircraft, or groundrelay station may be used. Secure voicecommunications should be available between operationscenters, C2 boats, and C2 aircraft.

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CHAPTER XIIRIVERINE ASSAULT OPERATIONS

1. Scope

a. A riverine assault operation commences when troopsbegin assault loading to depart the riverine base for anoperation and normally terminates when all forces involvedhave returned to the base.

b. In any assault landing against a hostile orpotentially hostile point, several options rest with theassaulting force. In each option, the assault mustsupport and contribute to the ttainment of the mission.The phases of the mobile riverine force assault operationsare: tactical loading, movement, landing, assault,exploitation operations, and planned withdrawal.

2. Tactical Loading. Tactical loading of troop units inriverine assault craft from a land or afloat base must becarefully planned and coordinated. Detailed tactical loadingprocedures must be established and promulgated with the OPORD.Factors that must be considered are:

a. Safety of personnel during loading.

b. Timing.

c. Logistic requirements.

d. Security.

e. Accountability of personnel.

f. Availability of standby craft in the event of amaterial casualty.

g. Tactical Loading Plan

(1) The tactical loading plan is prepared by JRFsubordinate commanders.

(2) Tactical loading of troops into helicopters fromeither land or afloat bases will be in accordance withestablished Service doctrine. The small size ofhelicopter platforms on ships of the mobile riverineforce may require use of helicopter loading zones ashore.

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(3) When loading assault craft, strict communicationssecurity is essential to avoid compromising theoperation. Use of visual signals, either flag hoistor signal lights, to coordinate loading should beconsidered.

h. Loading from a Riverine Land Base of Operations. Thetactical loading plan is based on the scheme of maneuver.Staging is organized to support the loading plan. Stagingareas for loading will be assigned on pontoons or piersand troops should load only into craft moored alongsidepontoons or piers.

i. Loading from an Afloat Base. The procedures forloading from an afloat base into RAC are the same as thosefrom a land base except that:

(1) The staging area is a designated area number onthe side of a pontoon or a ship’s hull.

(2) Units remain in their assigned areas untildirected to load into RAC. The boat team leader ofeach wave of RAC must be familiar with the route fromthe loading station to the riverine landing site andmust be prepared to lead his unit when it is calledaway.

j. Safety Precautions. Loading and unloading of troopsis a hazardous operation, especially at night. There isalways a danger of personnel falling into the water andbeing carried away by the current. Where possible, asafety boat equipped with a swimmer in a harness, portablefloodlights (for night landings), and life rings attachedto lines should be positioned close downstream duringloading or unloading operations. Troops and boat crewsmust put on life preservers prior to loading. All combatharness gear will be unbuckled while loading andunloading. To the maximum extent possible, all troopsshould have both hands free; they should pass heavyequipment between river assault craft and pontoon piersprior to loading and unloading.

3. Movement of the Assault Force

a. The movement phase of riverine assault operationsbegins with the start of tactical loading at the riverinebase of operations and ends with the arrival of the mainbody of the assault force in the riverine landing area.

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b. During movement to an AO, unit commanders willmaintain a readiness posture consistent with enemycapabilities and threat.

c. Tactical Organization for Movement

(1) The tactical organization for movement shouldparallel the organization for landing to avoidreorganization on arrival at the river landing area.

(2) The maritime elements of the riverine assaultforce are task organized to provide an advance guard,main body, and rear guard. Essential tasks such asreconnaissance, minesweeping, fire support, trooplift, and escort are assigned to movement groups andunits as appropriate.

d. Preparation for Movement. Prior to departing theriverine base, the subordinate maritime element commanderswill thoroughly familiarize themselves with the waterwaysto be transited. All available navigational information,including depths, river and canal widths, bridges andobstructions enroute, tides, and currents will be studied.The latest intelligence, including the enemy threat enroute, possible mining and ambush locations, populationconcentrations, and shoreline characteristics should beobtained. Before each operation, task group/unitcommanders will be provided with a detailed and currentintelligence estimate of the AO and the movement route.Since independent action is frequently required byindividual boat crews, task group/unit commanders willensure that boat crews are adequately briefed on thetopics discussed in this paragraph.

e. Command and Control

(1) During the movement phase, the commanderdesignated by the CJRF exercises tactical control ofthe forces assigned, normally through the respectiveparticipating component commander.

(2) Control measures employed normally include theuse of water checkpoints and a movement table toregulate the water movement.

f. Techniques. The following techniques may beapplicable during movement to and from the AO:

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(1) Escort. Whenever possible during both daylightand night transport movement, an escort should be

provided. Escorts may be RAC, river patrol boats, orattack helicopters, depending on the tactical situation.Provision of escorts is the responsibility of thecommander of the maritime unit conducting the movement.

(2) Avoiding Patterns. When operations are beingconducted over an extended period, times of transitsand routes for troop rotation or resupply should bevaried, consistent with operational requirements.

g. Reaction to Unforeseen Situations

(1) Target of Opportunity. Waterborne or landtargets of opportunity may occur during movements toand from the objective area. ROE may require thatauthorization be obtained before engaging suchtargets.

(2) Attack on the Force

(a) If the force is attacked during movement,immediate action will be taken to neutralize thehostile fire. C2 boats and armored troopcarriers (with troops embarked) should clear thearea of attack quickly, unless the decision ismade to assault the enemy. If required, navalgunfire, artillery, and air support will berequested. When the tactical situation permits,a quick-reaction force may be landed to conductfollowup operations. If the decision is made tocounterattack, RAC will land previouslydesignated counterambush forces.

(b) It is always desirable, and often necessary,to control both banks on which riverine forcesoperate. However, it is especially important tocontrol the shore opposite the area wherelandings take place. As a minimum, the oppositeshore must be controlled by fire and, in manyinstances, it will be necessary to have troopsoccupy the opposite shore to provide thenecessary rear security for the landing forcemaking the main attack.

(3) Responsibility. The reaction to unforseensituations is the responsibility of the maritimeelement’s assigned commander--the person responsiblefor accomplishing the assigned mission. However,

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once forces have been landed for ground operations,the authority and responsibility for subsequent actionashore rests with the landing force commander.

4. Landing, Assault, Pursuit, and Exploitation Operations.The landing attack phase begins with the arrival of the mainbody of the riverine assault force in the landing area andends with the seizure of initial objectives. It encompassespreparation of the landing area, landing, initial ground andwaterborne maneuver, and SOs in support of the landing attack.Following the seizure of initial objectives, exploitationoperations are conducted by riverine air, ground, maritime,and/or SOF in accordance with the concept of operations.

a. Task Organization. The organization for landing isdesigned to maintain the tactical integrity of assaultunits, to provide flexibility in reacting to the situationencountered, and to facilitate control of subsequentmaneuver.

b. Landing Plan

(1) Purpose. The landing plan supports the scheme ofmaneuver. It includes the sequence, time and place ofarrival of combat unit(s), combat support and combatservice support units in the landing area(s), andplans for reorganization and securing initialobjectives.

(2) Landing Areas. Landing areas that encompass oneor more riverine sites are selected to avoid preparedhostile defensive positions. Plans for landing inunsecured areas must assume that the units may have toconduct an assault landing. The CJRF selects thelanding area on the basis of initial objectives andplans for subsequent operations and the capability ofassault craft to support the landing attack.Alternate landing areas are selected wheneverpracticable. The selection and location of a landingarea are influenced by:

(a) Mission, size, and draft of the waterborne units.

(b) Enemy situation and capabilities.

(c) Characteristics of the waterways, adjacentland areas, and airspace.

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(d) Available riverine landing sites.

(e) Capabilities and limitations of maritimecraft.

(f) Nature of subsequent ground tacticaloperations.

(3) Riverine Landing Sites. A riverine landing siteis a continuous segment of coastline over whichtroops, equipment, and supplies can be landed bysurface means. The selection of riverine landingsites within the landing area is based on similiarcriteria as the selection of landing areas. If alanding area cannot support multiple landing sites,several elements may have to use the same site inturn.

(4) Landing. The assault landing is an exactingoperation, requiring combat and combat supportelements to be landed as rapidly as possible. Everyelement must be prepared to contribute its combatpower in a coordinated effort to seize and defend thelanding area. Plans for landing, seizure of initialobjectives, and reorganization are preparedconcurrently. They include a scheme of maneuver and afire support plan.

(5) Time. The riverine ground component commander,in coordination with the riverine maritime componentcommander, recommends the time for the waterbornelanding to the CJRF. Consideration must be given tocapabilities of the enemy, weather, tides, visibility,characteristics of watercraft being used, availabilityof fire support and the plan for supporting fires, andthe security of the force in transit. Units may landat first light to take advantage of darkness duringthe water movement and conduct the ground tacticaloperations in daylight. Units may also land at lastlight to facilitate landing and consolidation offorces in daylight and then conduct ground tacticaloperations during darkness. Waterborne landings maybe made at night or under other conditions of reducedvisibility to gain tactical surprise and reduce theeffectiveness of hostile fire. Limitations of nightlandings are:

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(a) Accurate delivery of units to their landingarea is more complicated.

(b) Air, RAC, and artillery fire support may beless effective.

(c) Seizure of initial objective, andconsolidation and reorganization of forces, ifrequired, may be more difficult and time consuming.

(6) Initial Objectives. Rapid assembly andreorganization ashore are essential following thelanding attack. Assignment of initial objectives tosubordinate units will facilitate assembly of the unitsand provide for initial defense of the landing area.Characteristics of initial objectives should include:

(a) Protection from hostile observation andeffective fire.

(b) Sufficient area security for dispersion.

(c) Proximity to assault areas.

(d) Ease of movement in carrying out subsequentground tactical operations.

(e) Ease of identification.

(f) Ability to facilitate the accomplishment ofthe riverine mission.

(g) Tactical advantages for the ground force.

(7) Landing Techniques. In the final approach to theriverine landing site, preparatory fires may bedelivered by artillery, RAC gunfire, CAS, and navalgunfire. Predesignated fire support craft mark thelimits on either flank of the riverine landing site.These craft may beach if conditions permit, in orderto deliver more effective fire as the troops land. AC2 craft should be stationed in the vicinity of thetransport craft. Escort craft are stationed toprotect the transport craft. Escort duties mayinclude establishing patrol barriers up and downstream from the riverine bank site to control waterwayapproaches and along the opposite bank to protect therear flank of the JRF.

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(a) When the transport craft of the first wavereach positions opposite the riverine landingsites, they turn (independently or on signal) andbeach on the shore where troops are landed.After debarkation, the transport craft retract,clear the riverine landing site, and move to actas a blocking force or transit to an assemblyarea by prescribed routes, avoiding interferencewith succeeding waves. During landingoperations, RAC may also provide afloat C2facilities, close fire support, evacuation, andselective resupply.

(b) If available, AAV, e.g., LVTP-7s, may beused to land troops. Depending on the situation,troops may be debarked or stay aboard AAVs toachieve the objective ashore.

(c) After the landing has been completed, RACmay assemble and perform other assigned taskssuch as providing patrol, blocking, minesweeping,or fire support operations. If the riverineground force’s task will entail extendedoperations ashore, all or part of the supportingRAC may be returned to the riverine base.

(8) Scheme of Maneuver. Riverine assault operationsare strike operations. Riverine schemes of maneuverare normally designed to fix, entrap, and destroy ahostile force in a given area of operations. The lackof definite intelligence may make it necessary to basethe selection of objectives on terrain rather than ahostile force location. However, the primaryobjective is the hostile force, not the terrainitself.

(a) Pressure must be maintained once contact ismade, and forces must deploy rapidly to fix thehostile force to an area where maximum firesupport can be used. Riverine ground forceassault units close with and destroy or capturethe hostile force.

(b) Riverine assault operations capitalize onsupporting watercraft capabilities and thetactical flexibility inherent in the continuousavailability of assault support craft to supporttactical maneuver. Riverine craft may:

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1. Transport and support units in the assault.

2. Withdraw or redeploy troops.

3. Act as, or in support of, a blocking force.

4. Transport a raiding force.

5. Carry crew-served weapons.

6. Transport reserves.

7. Perform resupply and evacuation.

8. Serve as a C2 platform.

9. Serve as mobile aid stations.

10. Provide direct and indirect fire support.

11. Evacuate EPW, defectors, and detainees.

12. Perform damage control, salvage, andExplosive Ordnance Disposal operations (on alimited basis).

(c) To take maximum advantage of availablewatercraft and exploit terrain characteristics,planners must consider all possible uses ofwatercraft and water routes when selectingobjectives. They must also determine short-termrequirements for watercraft by other unitsparticipating in the operations, and provide forpre-positioning, security, and control of suchcraft.

(9) Reserve Reaction Force

(a) Planning. The retention of a reserve forceis highly desirable in all riverine operations.Riverine operations normally have destruction ofthe enemy forces as their primary mission and donot orient on terrain objectives to the extentthat most other operations do. Although thereserve force may be committed to assist otherelements of the force, its primary employmentshould be to capitalize on opportunities to

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destroy enemy forces. In this regard, thereserve force can be more appropriately thoughtof as a reaction force. Reaction operationsrequire flexibility, careful planning,coordination, and reliable communications betweenall elements. Reaction forces meet establishedreaction times through planning, rehearsals, andpre-positioning.

(b) Evaluating Requirements. Helicopterreaction forces can deploy directly againstlocated enemy positions and are usually thepreferred type. Elements on airborne alert areexpensive in terms of resource expenditure;therefore, their use is infrequent even thoughthey are the most responsive type of reactionforce. Waterborne reaction forces can beavailable for rapid and effective commitment inthe riverine environment and will often be theonly type available. Reaction forces, in thedesired condition of readiness, are maintained inassembly areas either at land bases or at afloatbases.

5. Planned Withdrawals. The planned withdrawal phase coversthe period between completion of the mission ashore and thecompletion of unloading upon return to the riverine base ofoperations. During the backloading phase of the withdrawal,special attention must be given to security measures toprotect the forces as the strength ashore decreases. Firesupport to cover the withdrawal must be planned, and anadequate reaction force must be designated.

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CHAPTER XIII

WATERWAY INTERDICTION, SURVEILLANCE,BARRIER, AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

1. Purpose

a. Waterway interdiction, surveillance, barrier, andsecurity operations can be conducted by speciallyconfigured subsurface and surface craft and/or aircraft inthe waters and airspace of the riverine area. Theseoperations may be used to gain control of waterwayspreparatory to subsequent riverine assault operations, orthey may be conducted by maritime or air components alone,with ground component elements provided only as a reactionor security element.

b. Waterway interdiction and surveillance and securityoperations serve five basic purposes:

(1) Protect friendly LOCs.

(2) Deny hostile forces the use of waterways.

(3) Collect intelligence information.

(4) Perform security missions.

(5) Enforce population and resource control.

c. To be effective, waterway interdiction andsurveillance and security forces should include bothsurface craft and aircraft. The decision to use surfaceor subsurface craft, as well as deciding what type ofcraft to select, will depend on the environment, enemythreat, and assigned mission. The air and surfaceoperations are mutually supporting and may be conductedindependently or concurrently. During waterwayinterdiction, surveillance, and security operations, closecoordination is required between airborne and waterbornepatrols in the employment of mutually supporting fires.

d. Effectiveness of the combined surface and airborneoperation can be aided by rigid enforcement of curfews andtraffic/zone restrictions, as appropriate.

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e. Air-delivered mines and remote sensors used inconjunction with supporting arms or remotely fireddemolitions is one of several effective methods ofinterdiction offering minimal risk to friendly personnel.

f. Successful accomplishment of waterway interdiction,surveillance, barrier, and security operations may requirepacification of the region.

g. A vital aspect of securing riverine AOs is controllingthe flow of resources, including those introduced fromoutside the country, in order to deny the enemy the meansto wage war. Isolating the enemy from his support maytake away his operational initiative and make his primarytask that of supply. This greatly facilitates theclearing of an area by military forces and assists in theidentification and elimination of indigenous supporters.

h. Effective control of resources requires that all modesof indigenous transportation be controlled, includingthose on waterways and rivers. Effective control of thesmaller rivers and canals in the riverine area can best bemaintained by controlling the banks and adjacentterritory; however, connecting tributaries between majorwaterways may be controlled by patrol-blocking action.Waterway interdiction, surveillance, and security forceswill conduct patrols and inshore surveillance to enforcecurfews and prevent enemy infiltration, movement, andresupply along and across the major waterways of the area.

2. Tactical Considerations. An individual waterwayinterdiction, surveillance, and security operation may becalled a patrol, and it consists of two or more craft inexecution of a specific operation. This section outlines somedoctrinal and tactical considerations. However, these are notall-inclusive, nor do they necessarily apply to all phases ofwaterway interdiction, surveillance, and security operations.

a. Area Familiarization. Prior to initial patrols,commanders should arrange for area indoctrination andfamiliarization for the crew and embarked personnel.

b. Secondary Missions. Waterborne and air patrols may bemodified at times to accommodate requests for combatsupport of forces ashore, including blocking and similaroperations.

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c. Response to Hostile Fire. The response to hostilefire must be governed by the type and volume of firereceived and the ROE in effect. The presence of civilianpopulace and/or other friendly forces in the operationalarea must also be considered. ROE and measures to preventmutual interference must be observed.

d. Mutual Support. Joint air and waterborne operationsand multiple boat patrols are frequently useful inproviding mutual support.

e. Time and Pattern of Patrols. Boats should conduct arandom patrol and not establish a pattern, such as passingthrough the same points on subsequent passes or at regularintervals.

f. Readiness. A high state of combat readiness,appropriate to the area being patrolled, will bemaintained at all times.

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CHAPTER XIV

ANCILLARY OPERATIONS

1. Scope of Operations

a. Riverine ancillary operations are conducted by the JRFas adjuncts to a riverine assault operation or as awaterway interdiction, surveillance, and securityoperation. These operations are normally characterized byemployment of procedures that require special training andequipment. The capability to conduct these operations isgenerally limited to specific units, that have beenassigned primary mission responsibility within the Serviceorganization.

b. The operations set forth in this chapter represent theminimum capability required by the CJRF to conductsustained ancillary operations in a riverine environment.The magnitude of a particular operation, the enemy threat,or terrain considerations may make it necessary to augmentassigned units and provide specialized units in support.

2. Reconnaissance and Waterway Clearance

a. Determination of Waterway Characteristics. Gatheringinformation regarding waterway characteristics is aprerequisite to the proper use of waterways. Sincewaterway characteristics constantly change because ofseasonal effects, this requirement is continuousthroughout the operation. The methods of determiningwaterway characteristics should be included in training,since gathering reliable information involves techniquesthat may not be familiar to all personnel. Surfaceefforts should be coordinated with the aerialreconnaissance plan.

b. Waterway Clearance of Barricades and Obstacles. TheJRF must have a capability for clearing navigablewaterways that have been obstructed by barricades andobstacles. An orderly and continuing barricade-removalprogram is required throughout the riverine environment.Close coordination with local officials is recommendedbefore any barricade or obstacle is removed.

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3. Joint Riverine Base Security. Measures should be taken toprovide an integrated defense for mobile riverine baseelements, troop installations, equipment, lines ofcommunication, and nearby friendly installations.

a. Command Responsibility. The CJRF is responsible forthe security of the riverine base and for integration ofthe local defense plan into the overall area securityplan. The CJRF may designate a base defense commander forall jointly occupied bases. The base defense commanderwill exercise OPCON of all forces assigned for purposes ofbase defense. Plans normally provide for unity of effortand ensure the most efficient use of available means ofdefense. Units will be tasked according to theirrespective capabilities.

b. Base Defense Planning. The riverine base ofoperations should be organized for defense against attackfrom any direction. Plans should provide flexibility andmust position reserves for rapid reaction to any threat.Tasks for ground combat forces and supporting weapons areto detect, engage, and destroy or repel an attackingforce. All elements within the base area should beappropriately tasked and/or assigned sectors ofresponsibility.

(1) The size of the base may limit defense in-depth.Combat outposts and mutually supporting strong pointsforward of the riverine base main defense positionscan be employed to add depth to the defense.Defensive fires should be planned throughout the area.Plans should also include patrols, listening posts,and obstacles.

(2) Plans should be prepared, rehearsed, evaluated,and revised, if necessary, to ensure immediatereaction to any threat.

(3) The ability to disperse is limited in mostriverine base areas. This deficiency must becompensated for by increasing the depth of thesecurity area through aggressive patrolling and theuse of outposts and airborne observers. Otherpassive measures such as using camouflage, varyingnormal routines, and controlling access ofnoncombatants into the base area should be employed.Remotely monitored ground sensors can also increasethe depth of the security area by providing an

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effective warning barrier against infiltrationattempts. Routines must be altered frequently toprevent the disclosure of information about locations,compositions, and habits of the defender.

c. Riverine Base Defense Areas. A riverine base defensearea, which is organized for all-around defense, hasasecurity area, forward defense area, and reserve area.The elements within these areas vary in composition andstrength, as determined by the specific mission,capabilities of the hostile force, terrain, location andsize of the base area, and the strength and capabilitiesof forces available.

d. Security Area

(1) A security area is a reconnaissance andsurveillance area that extends forward from theforward defense area to the limit of employment ofsecurity elements. These elements are far enoughforward to:

(a) Provide timely warning of the enemy’sapproach.

(b) Deny the enemy direct observation and/orfire into the base areas.

(c) Deny the enemy observed mortar fire into thebase area.

(2) Sufficient security element personnel assigned tothe reconnaissance and surveillance area may preventunrestricted observation of the base area and theundetected assembly of enemy forces within strikingdistance of the base, if agressive patrolling isroutinely conducted. The organization of the securityelements provides an appropriate balance of availablecombined and supporting arms. The base operationscenter controls fire and maneuvers and integrates allunits into an effective defense.

e. Forward Defense Area. The forward defense areaencompasses positions and forces necessary to engage theenemy in decisive combat to preserve integrity of theriverine base. Within this area, forces are organized torepel and destroy the enemy force and prevent its entry

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into the riverine base. The forward defense forceprovides defense capabilities to overcome the enemy’sattack capabilities.

f. Reserve Area. The reserve area is the riverine baseitself. For both land and afloat bases, personnel notemployed in the security and forward defense areas areassigned sectors within the reserve area. In addition toforces regularly assigned missions as part of the reserve,all units and personnel not assigned a security or defensemission are incorporated into the defense plan to defendinstallations within assigned sectors.

g. Operations Center. The JRF base operations centercoordinates all forms of maneuver (e.g., patrols) and alltypes of defensive positions with supporting arms andintegrates them into an effective defense. Operations,intelligence, appropriate fire support, and other friendlyforce liaison representatives should be present in theoperations center.

h. Defensive Measures. The JRF is vulnerable tovirtually all direct and indirect fire weapons, with airartillery mortars, antiarmor and antiair weapons, andrecoilless weapons as particularly significant threats.An aggressive plan is required to detect infiltration ofthese weapons and locate their firing positions. Whenformulating the plan for defense from direct fire andguided weapons, the CJRF considers likely firingpositions, intelligence reports, reports by indigenouspersonnel, and resources available. The CJRF also plansdefensive tactics to minimize casualties and damage andoffensive tactics to locate and destroy hostile forces.

i. Defense of an Afloat Base. Although possibly locatedin hostile territory, the riverine base of operationsshould be relatively secure before barracks ships arrive.The base area selected should have enough room to moor theafloat force without impeding the normal flow ofindigenous commercial and military traffic.

(1) The afloat base ships are subject to a variety ofwaterborne threats, including swimmers, limpet-typemines, drifting contact mines, suicide attack boats,and drifting boats loaded with explosives. The enemymay also attack by air or with direct and indirectweapons.

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(2) Additional considerations in preparing thedefensive plan include:

(a) Congestion of personnel and vulnerability ofthe afloat base as they affect the choice offorces to be used for defense.

(b) Integration of all weapons into acoordinated fire support plan.

(c) Use of surveillance equipment.

(d) Coordination of antiswimmer defenserequirements employing multisensor systems,surface-search, radar, night vision sonar,optics, and waterborne sensors in conjunctionwith explosive weapons, electrical deterrents,and physical barriers.

(e) Designation of a command ship to serve asthe control center. Overall communicationsrequirements must be considered when the TOC isselected.

(f) The use of regular boat patrols to controlindigenous civilian and military traffic anddetect and destroy waterborne attacks byswimmers, drifting mines, or boats.

(g) Contingency plans to provide for situationswhere tide, current, or weather has an influenceon the defense of the afloat base.

(h) Lighting required to perform repair andmaintenance tasks.

(i) Establishment and enforcement of a rivercurfew and a traffic plan to divert or escortriver traffic past the base area anchorage.

(j) Use of boat patrols to protect routes ofcommunications and resupply.

(k) Use of aircraft to conduct aerialreconnaissance.

(3) The use of boat patrols may require forces tooperate on a continuing or periodic basis to achieveand maintain dominance of designated water routes.

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(4) A ships’s crew may require augmentation fromground components in unusual cases to act as sentriesaboard ship (watch standers) and/or boat patrols.Normally, administrative units of the groundcomponents will be tasked for this purpose. Combattroops should be used only in an emergency situation.Ground component personnel will be briefed concerning:

(a) The overall defensive plan, includinglocations of friendly forces, ships, and craft.

(b) Location of all embarked personnel duringgeneral quarters.

(c) Plans for darkening ship and maintainingwatertight integrity.

(d) Specific tide and water conditions thatrequire added security, such as slack tides andperiods of reduced visibility.

(e) Detection and reaction plans against specialthreats with specific instructions on thedetection of swimmers, the approach of indigenouscraft, and the use of defensive measures.

(f) Fire discipline and control procedures forexplosives and individual and crew-servedweapons.

j. Security of Berth and Anchorages. A berth is thelocation of ships and craft secured to a pier or otherwisemade fast to an object for a relatively long period oftime. An anchorage is the location of ships and craft notunder way, whether anchored off a river bank or beached.It is necessary to differentiate between temporary haltsduring movement and periods spent in ports and riverinebases. In the latter case, the enemy will have more timeto prepare any attack, which may consist of swimmers,drifting mines, artillery/mortar fire, or raids.Systematic firing on all suspicious floating debris, useof patrol craft, and detonation of percussion grenades atirregular intervals in the approaches to anchorages may beemployed as defensive measures, if not otherwiserestricted by the applicable rules of engagement.

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(1) Protection against enemy artillery is treated asa counterbattery problem. The ground component isnormally tasked to deploy forces ashore to preventobserved fire from being placed on ships and craft ofthe JRF. Berths and anchorages should be shifted atirregular intervals to avoid preplanned firings.

(2) The adjacent waters should be patrolled by smallcraft. These craft should operate within sight of oneanother to provide mutual support in the event of attack.

(3) Protection against air attack is an area defenseproblem. Airspace control and area air defense shouldbe conducted in accordance with Joint Pub 3-52.

4. Mine Warfare Operations. Riverine mine warfare operationsinclude mining and mine countermeasures when friendly surfaceoperations are vital. Mine countermeasures assume primaryimportance because of the need to keep key waterways open.When friendly surface operations in certain areas are notvital, it may be tactically advantageous to restrict use ofdesignated waterways and disrupt enemy movement by mining.However, waterway control in the riverine AO is normallymaintained by continuous patrol, surveillance, andinterdiction. The environment will impose a variety ofrestrictions and limitations on mine warfare operations ininland waterways.

a. Mine Countermeasures. The first step in minecountermeasures is to assess the mine threat and evaluatecountermeasures that might be employed. It is necessaryto consider the various environmental characteristics,enemy mining capabilities and tactics, ambush threat, andwaterway hydrography. Mine attacks may be conductedagainst river craft in locations where the banks ofwaterways afford protection to the enemy. Mining isfrequently used in conjunction with ambushes.Conventional naval mines or land mines may beencountered. Mines can be constructed from dud ordnancesuch as recoilless rifle shells, mortar shells, andbombs. These mines may be either surface or subsurfacemines, and they are usually bottom moored andelectrically detonated. Time-delay detonation techniquesalso may be used. Contact drift mines may beencountered, as well as boats or rafts loaded withexplosives detonated by time-delay or contact devices.

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Because of their simple construction and low cost,pressure-activated mines may be implanted along shallowwaterways. Limpet-type mines, which might be attached tothe ship or anchor chain by swimmers or drift techniques,constitute a serious threat to an afloat base. Minecountermeasures include all methods that may be used tocounter the threat of an enemy mining effort. One of themost effective countermeasures is to interfere with orrestrict enemy minelaying activities. Patrol,surveillance, and interdiction activities must beemphasized as preventive measures and should be includedin mine countermeasures planning and operations.Countermeasures employed against mines already laidrequire locating the mines. Classification of mines inthe riverine environment is difficult because of waterwaycharacteristics. Therefore, primary emphasis is placed onminesweeping and area clearance. The most effectivecountermeasures against drifting mines, explosive charges,or swimmer-delivered limpet mines is an alert watch andpatrols around the anchorage or base area.

c. Passive Protection. When the threat of drifting minesor explosive charges or swimmer-delivered limpet mines isgreat, the use of nets and/or booms will provide someprotection for anchored ships or craft. However, in swiftriver currents, passive measures are less effective.Mooring tackle must be extraordinarily heavy because thebuildup of floating debris will often carry away even theheaviest equipment. The most effective countermeasureagainst this type of threat is an alert watch and patrolsaround the anchorage or base area.

5. Salvage Operations. Salvage operations require highlyskilled personnel with specialized equipment. The salvageeffort must provide for highly mobile teams that can deploy toremote areas on short notice. A salvage capability isimportant because without it the number of lost craft islikely to be extraordinarily high. Small craft are especiallyvulnerable to accidental flooding. Salvage operations mayalso include the recovery of land and air equipment.

a. Mission of Salvage Units. The mission of salvageunits is to provide salvage, repair, diving, and recoveryservices to the riverine commander. To effectively carryout its mission, the salvage unit must have a mobile liftcapability to transport the assigned heavy craftequipment.

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b. Salvage Support. Salvage personnel are highly trainedand skilled, yet vulnerable, and require area securityfrom the appropriate joint riverine component commander.When requesting salvage support, the commander of the JRFshould provide the following information:

(1) Type of craft or equipment and how sunk.

(2) Water depth, visibility, tide ranges, and seastate.

(3) Security and support available.

c. Salvage Plan. Before commencing a salvage operation,the salvage unit prepares, taking into consideration thefollowing factors:

(1) Should the sunken craft be refloated, removed, ordestroyed?

(2) Can the salvage job be accomplished using locallyavailable assets?

(3) Can adequate security for the salvage forces beprovided?

(4) Is transportation available to bring the requiredequipment to the salvage site?

6. Cover and Deception. Riverine cover and deceptionoperations undertake to deceive the enemy to enhance theability of the JRF to accomplish its mission.

a. Need for Cover and Deception Operations. The need forcover and deception operations in a riverine area is basedon the following factors:

(1) Surprise is essential to a well-planned militaryoperation. Cover and deception provide a means ofachieving the tactical advantage of surprise.

(2) In a riverine area, the JRF may be under constantsurveillance by enemy agents with the capability toexploit communication systems.

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b. Planning Cover and Deception Operations

(1) Cover and deception planning should be conductedconcurrently and in coordination with riverineassault, waterway interdiction, and surveillanceplans. Similiar analysis is required for both theoperations plan and the cover and deception plan.

(2) The units participating in cover and deceptionoperations should be tasked to assist with the planning.

c. Security. Security is paramount in any cover anddeception operation. Distribution of the cover anddeception plan should be limited to those with a specifiedneed to know.

7. UW and Direct Action Operations

a. JRF UW and DA operations are normally conducted withinenemy or enemy-controlled territory by specializedmilitary and paramilitary forces. Resources assigned tothe JRF to conduct UW and/or DA operations normallyoperate clandestinely and are capable of performing thefollowing missions:

(1) Interdict enemy lines of communication.

(2) Destroy or sabotage enemy craft, base areas, andcaches.

(3) Collect intelligence.

(4) Implant and recover sensors.

(5) Disrupt enemy political infrastructure.

(6) Assist with evasion and escape and CSAR offriendly forces.

(7) Conduct special reconnaissance.

(8) Conduct foreign internal defense.

b. The nature of UW and DA operations requires thatparticular emphasis be given to the mutual planningprocess to ensure that operations are generated in supportof the overall mission. UW and DA operations are closelycoordinated with conventional operations being conductedin the same or adjacent areas

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c. Security is of prime importance during the planning,execution, and, in many instances, after a UW and DAoperation. Distribution of UW and DA OPLANs and annexesare normally held to an absolute minimum and include onlythose commands that will be required to support orcoordinate the activities involved.

8. Psychological Operations

a. PSYOP are of major importance to joint riverineoperations. PSYOP personnel and assets can use riverineplatforms for dissemination of materials and messageswithin remote riverine areas. PSYOP are intended toinfluence the behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendlyforeign groups on behalf of the riverine forces objective.PSYOP activities (i.e., posters, leaflets, TV, radio andloudspeakers broadcasts) should be considered a means bywhich the goals of civic actions associated with riverineforces are communicated to the indigenous populace.

b. Initial military operations disrupt commerce andinconvenience or even endanger large segments of the localpopulation. The populace usually has been thoroughlypropagandized by the enemy force. Therefore, indigenousand foreign military forces will likely be greeted withhostility, suspicion, and at best, passive resistance.

c. To obtain the support of the civil population, thewords, deeds, and actions of the military force must becarefully considered for their effect on the populace.The creation of a favorable image of the nationalgovernment and its military forces may foster improvedcooperation of the civilian population.

d. The responsibility for conduct of PSYOP rests withcommanders at all echelons. Policy direction, propagandamaterials, and guidance as to themes, target groups,intelligence, and specified programs are normally providedby higher headquarters. Local commanders should adapt thematerials available to achieve the best effect in theirown areas.

9. Civil Affairs

a. CA operations are activities intended to gainessential civilian cooperation and support or reducecivilian interference in attainment of the military

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objective. They affect the relationship between thecommander’s military forces and the indigenous civilauthorities and people. These operations may requiremilitary forces to perform some or all of the functionsnormally performed by the indigenous government. CA isthe responsibility of the commander, and his relationshipwith the local civil authorities may require him toestablish both personal and organizational contacts.Joint CA operations should be planned and conducted inaccordance with Joint Pub 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint CivilAffairs".

b. Military civic action is one of the major activitiesof CA in a riverine area. It consists primarily ofencouraging the indigenous military forces to participatein projects useful to the local population. US forces mayalso advise or engage in direct civic action. The role ofUS forces should be primarily that of providing skills andmutual assistance not generally available to the host orforeign country’s civilian participants. Such actionserves to improve the image of the friendly militaryforces in the eyes of the population, as well as alleviateor eliminate some of their basic grievances.

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CHAPTER XV

LOGISTICS

1. Logistics Support Provided to the JRF. Logistic supportprovided by external forces must be responsive to the needs ofthe JRF. A system must be established with the capability ofperforming the following functions:

a. Provision and transportation of supplies and equipmentto locations designated by the JRF component commanders.

b. Evacuation of casualties beyond the medical capabilityof the JRF.

c. Operation of maintenance and salvage facilities overand above those authorized by the components of the JRF.

d. Evacuation of POWs and refugees beyond the capabilityorganic to the JRF, or providing humane conditions toenemy POWs or refugees in the event evacuation is notimmediately possible.

2. Logistics Support Provided by the Mobile Riverine Force

a. Basic Consideration. The basic consideration oflogistic support provided by the JRF is to make theassault elements of the force self-sufficient as long aspossible, in relation to the operation.

(1) The prescribed load for individual RAC assignedto a riverine assault element should include food,water, and ammunition for embarked troops. Resupplyof the assault craft in the AOs will depend largely onthe duration of planned operations, as well as thetotal lift capability of resupply craft.

(2) Waterborne craft and aircraft are the normalmeans of resupply.

(3) RAC or assault helicopters should be assigned toresupply craft when transiting especially dangerousportions of the resupply route. The withdrawal ofsurface craft from assault operations for this purposewill temporarily reduce the fire support capability ofthe force.

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b. Supply and Maintenance Functions. The close andconstant association of ground and maritime componentsduring joint riverine operations lends itself to theestablishment and operation of joint facilities thatinclude, but are not limited to, supply, maintenance, andservices support.

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APPENDIX A

U.S. NAVY RIVERINE ASSETS

Graphics for appendix A normally placed here.

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APPENDIX B

U.S. ARMY RIVERINE ASSETS

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APPENDIX C

U.S. COAST GUARD RIVERINE ASSETS

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APPENDIX D

US MARINE CORPS RIVERINE/WARFARE ASSETS

D-1

1. Purpose and Scope. This appendix to provides informationon the application and capabilities of USMC forces in riverineoperations. This appendix contains an explains the basic USMCorganization for combat and the concept and capabilities foremployment of USMC forces in riverine operations. For moredetailed information on USMC doctrine, tactics, techniques,and procedures for planning and executing riverine operations,see NWP 13 (Rev A/FMFM 7-5), "Doctrine for Navy/Marine CorpsJoint Riverine Operations" and FMFM 7-5A, "Marine Air-GroundTask Force (MAGTF) Riverine Operations".

2. Organization

a. Marine Air-Ground Task Force. USMC riverine forcesare fully integrated combined arms MAGTFs tailored toaccomplish specific missions. MAGTFs are capable offunctioning as self-sustaining uni-Service forces underthe operational control of unified, subordinate unified,or joint task force commanders. This tailored forceexploits the combat power inherent in closely integratedair and ground operations and allows the MAGTF commanderto focus the point of effort and strike the enemy at hisweakness. The central operational concept for employing aMAGTF is that it is most effective in battle when used asa strategically mobile, combined arms force under a singlecommander. It provides a balance of combat, combatsupport, combat service support, and/or elements. TheMAGTF is structured and equipped for expeditionaryoperations and has organic weapon systems, amphibiousvehicles, and boats that can be used to exploit themarginal terrain encountered in a riverine environment.

b. Elements of the MAGTF. Although the size andcomposition of a MAGTF will vary with the tacticalsituation and the assigned mission, it will normallyconsist of four major components as described in FigureD-1.

+---------------+|COMMAND ELEMENT|| (CE) |

+-------+-------++----------------------+---------------------+

+------+------+ +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+|GROUND COMBAT| |AVIATION COMBAT| |COMBAT SERVICE || ELEMENT | | ELEMENT | |SUPPORT ELEMENT|| (GCE) | | (ACE) | | (CSSE) |+-------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+

Figure D-1. Organization of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces

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(1) Command Element. The CE is the MAGTFheadquarters. It is composed of the commander, thegeneral or executive and special staff sections, theheadquarters section, and requisite communications andservice support facilities, including the SRI Group orits detachment thereof. The SRI Group provides thecommand, control, and coordination essential foreffective planning and execution of riverineoperations.

(2) Ground Combat Element. The GCE may be composedof combat, combat support, and organic combat servicesupport units organized to conduct riverineoperations. It is constructed around an infantryorganization and varies in size from a unit smallerthan a battalion to one or more Marine divisions,based on the tactical situation and the mission of theMAGTF.

(3) Aviation Combat Element. The ACE may be composedof those aviation units (including air controlagencies), combat, combat support, and organic combatservice support units organized to provide aviationsupport required by the situation. Aviation supportmay include all, or a portion of, the functions ofUSMC aviation in varying degrees based on the tacticalsituation and size of the MAGTF and its mission. Thefunctions of aviation include: air reconnaissance,anti- air warfare, assault support, offensive airsupport, EW, and control of aircraft and missiles.The ACE is organized around an aviation headquartersand varies in size from an aviation detachment to oneor more Marine aircraft wings.

(4) Combat Service Support Element. The CSSE isorganized to provide the full range of combat servicesupport functions and capabilities necessary tosupport the MAGTF. The combat service supportfunctions that may be provided include: supply,maintenance, transportation, general engineering,health services, and services. The CSSE may vary insize from a combat service support detachment to aforce service support group.

D-3

c. Types of MAGTFs. There are four types of MAGTFs thatmay be formed to conduct riverine operation (Figure D-2):

+----------------------+| MEF || COMMAND ELEMENT ||(Commanded by a LtGen)|+----------+-----------+

+----------------------+---------------------++------+------+ +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+| MARINE | | MARINE | | FORCE SERVICE || DIVISION | | AIRCRAFT WING | | SUPPORT GROUP |+-------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+

Figure D-2. Example of a Marine Expeditionary Force

(1) Marine Expeditionary Force. A MEF is the largest(30,000 to 60,000 Marines and sailors) and mostpowerful of the MAGTFs. It may range in size from oneto multiple Marine divisions and aircraft wings,together with a force service support group. A MEF iscapable of conducting sustained independent riverineoperations against the most capable adversarialthreat. The MEF is supported by a Naval ConstructionRegiment. The MEF deploys with 60 days ofsustainment.

+---------------------+| MEB || COMMAND ELEMENT ||(Commanded by a BGen)|+----------+----------+

+----------------------+---------------------++------+----------+ +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+|INFANTRY REGIMENT| | MARINE | |BRIGADE SERVICE|| (Rein) | | AIRCRAFT GROUP| | SUPPORT GROUP |+-----------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+

Figure D-3. Example of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade

(2) Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The MEB, with4,000 to 18,000 Marines and sailors, is normally builtaround a reinforced infantry regiment, an aircraftgroup, and a brigade service support group. It iscapable of rapid deployment by amphibious shipping orstrategic or tactical airlift. The MEB is supportedby a naval mobile construction battalion. It deployswith up to 30 days of sustainment.

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+---------------------+| MEU || COMMAND ELEMENT ||(Commanded by a Col) |+----------+----------+

+----------------------+---------------------++--------+---------+ +-------+-------+ +------+------+|INFANTRY BATTALION| | HELICOPTER | | MEU SERVICE || (Rein) | |SQUADRON (Rein)| |SUPPORT GROUP|+------------------+ +---------------+ +-------------+

Figure D-4. Example of a Marine Expeditionary Unit

(3) Marine Expeditionary Unit. The MEU, with 1,000to 4,000 Marines and sailors, is normally composed ofa reinforced infantry battalion, a helicopter squadronreinforced with deployed and CONUS on-call fixed-wingassets, and a service support group. The MEU isroutinely forward deployed embarked aboard the shipsof an Amphibious Ready Group and is uniquely organizedand equipped to initiate and conduct short-noticeriverine operations. The MEU is task organized,trained, and equipped to conduct a wide variety ofconventional and specialized operations. Foremost isits capability to conduct long-range raids from overthe horizon without electronic emissions, duringperiods of darkness, and under adverse weather or seaconditions. For sustained operations ashore, the MEUmay serve as the forward element of a MEB. The MEUcan also deploy on short notice by a mix of tacticaland strategic airlift. The MEU is supported by anaval mobile construction detachment. MEUs deployedin amphibious shipping normally carry 15 days ofsustainment.

+---------------------+| SPF || COMMAND ELEMENT |+----------+----------+

|+----------------------+---------------------+

+-----+-------+ +-----+----+ +---------+--------+|RIFLE COMPANY| | AVIATION | | COMBAT SERVICE || (Rein) | |DETACHMENT| |SUPPORT DETACHMENT|+-------------+ +----------+ +------------------+

Figure D-5. Example of a Special Purpose Force

D-5

(4) Special Purpose Forces. These forces are small,task organized MAGTFs configured to accomplishmissions for which the MEF, MEB, and MEU are notappropriate. They can be configured, trained, andequipped to conduct a wide variety of conventional andother operations within the riverine environment.They can be deployed by a variety of means, includingamphibious or commercial ships, tactical or strategicairlift, or by organic USMC aviation assets. Theseforces are normally composed of Marines highly trainedin day or night operations, including insert/extract,raid, and strike operations. They may possessextensive surveillance and reconnaissancecapabilities, including unmanned aerial vehicles,radio reconnaissance, and counterintelligence assets,as required. These forces’ can be employed in avariety of missions, including mobile training teams,security assistance operations, and small independentaction forces within the riverine environment.

3. MAGTF Employment

a. General. MAGTFs are trained and equipped with weaponsystems, vehicles, and watercraft that can be employed inthe riverine environment. Although there is an inherentcapability in these forces, the full capability andflexibility of their combat power in riverine operationsis better exploited when employed as part of a Navy-USMCmobile riverine force.

b. Concept of Employment. A MAGTF embarked aboard theships of an ARG is uniquely organized and equipped toinitiate and conduct short-notice riverine operations. Alow profile in the host nation can be maintained byspecifically tailoring the riverine force to the mission.The remaining forces, equipment, and support can be keptaboard an amphibious seabase. Upon establishing aninitial lodgement in the riverine area, the riverine forcecan be reinforced by forces and equipment from sourcesexternal to the ARG/MAGTF should it become necessary toexpand the scope of the operations.

(1) Initial Phase of Employment

(a) The MRF, using assets currently organic tothe ARG/MAGTF, will primarily conduct operationsto protect friendly lines of communications anddeny the use of the riverine area to hostile

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forces through surveillance, interdiction, raids,and/or aggressive reconnaissance, combat, andsecurity patrols. The MRF will also be able toconduct limited PSYOP (through words and actions)and small-scale military civic action projects(expedient road and/or bridge repair orconstruction, minor carpentry, drainage orirrigation improvement, medical or dentalassistance, etc.).

(b) The MRF’s capability to achieve control of ahostile riverine area and its adjoining landareas will initially be limited because the onlysurvivable waterborne troop-carriers and C2 craftare the amphibious vehicles and craft presentlyorganic to the ARG/MAGTF. Lack of specializedmine countermeasures craft, armed escort craft,and fire support craft will also imposeoperational constraints. These initiallimitations can be offset by using innovativetechniques and tactics that capitalize on thecapabilities of organic amphibious vehicles,landing craft, raiding craft, and airborneplatforms. For example:

1. Troop-laden AAVs can operate in theriverine environment under their own poweror be transported in landing craft,splashed, and swum ashore to provide forrapid maneuver of the ground combat element.

2. Light armored infantry with LAVs canalso be rapidly positioned in an inlandriverine environment via landing craft.

3. Barge-mounted artillery, LAVs (mortarvariants) embarked aboard landing craft, andorganic infantry mortars fired from floatingplatforms can provide expedient firesupport.

4. Helicopters can be used to provideairborne command posts, evacuate casualties,lift reaction or raid forces, providesupporting fires, resupply critical

D-7

items, provide aerial observation andadjustment of supporting fires, conductvisual reconnaissance or surveillance, andrelay communications.

5. Radio battalion collection teams and/orradio reconnaissance teams embarked aboardairborne or waterborne platforms can providean enhanced signals intelligence collectioncapability.

6. AAV and LAV command vehicles can operatein the riverine environment under their ownpower or be embarked aboard landing craft toprovide MRF C2.

7. Remote piloted vehicles can assist insurveillance, reconnaissance, andintelligence gathering and relay ofcommunications.

8. Mine hunting from airborne or waterborneplatforms, coupled with aggressivepatrolling to restrict minelaying, can beeffective mine countermeasures.

9. AV8B HARRIERs can provide CAS.

(2) Subsequent Phases of Employment

(a) After friendly LOCs have been secured andhostile use of the riverine area has been deniedas necessary, the MRF could be reinforced withassets that are external to the ARG MAGTF, andthe scope of riverine operations may be expandedto include operations to achieve and maintaincomplete control of the riverine area and itsadjoining land areas. This would involveisolating the riverine area, seizing key terrain,finding and destroying hostile forces, andincreasing the scope of PSYOP and military civicaction projects. Control of the riverine areamay also involve the use of combined actionforces.

(b) The MRF may require reinforcement withadditional assets, including:

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1. Ground, aviation, and combat servicesupport forces and equipment.

2. SOF, including SEALs, special boatunits, civil affairs and PSYOP units.

3. Specialized watercraft for C2 minecountermeasures, armed escort, and firesupport craft.

4. Armored troop-carrying craft.

5. Naval construction forces.

6. Carrier-based aircraft support.

7. Naval gunfire support ships.

4. Summary. MAGTFs, supported by amphibious ships andlanding craft, can conduct sea-based riverine operations.Innovative use of organic equipment will be required tocompensate for the initial lack of specialized riverine craft.Once established in the riverine area, the MAGTF can providethe infrastructure for the phased introduction of externalforces and equipment to facilitate measured increases in thescope of operations.

Remaining pages through D-14 are blank in this file. Figuresare present in the printed version.

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GLOSSARY

PART I -- ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAV assault amphibian vehiclesACE Aviation Combat ElementAI air interdictionAO area of operationsAOR area of responsibilityARG Amphibious Ready GroupASPB assault support patrol boat

C2 command and controlCA civil affairsCAS close air supportCCB command and control boatCE command elementCJRF commander, joint riverine forceCOCOM Combatant Command (command

authority)COMSEC communications securityCSAR combat search and rescueCSSE Combat Service Support ElementCT counterterrorism

DA direct action

ECCM e l e c t r o n i ccounter-countermeasures

EW electronic warfare

FID foreign internal defense

GCE Ground Combat Element

JOC joint operations centerJRF joint riverine force

LAV light amored vehicleLOC lines of communications

MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task ForceMATC mini-armored troop carrierMEB Marine Expeditionary BrigadeMEF Marine Expeditionary ForceMEU Marine Expeditionary UnitMRF Mobile Riverine Force

NSW naval special warfare

GL-1

OPCON operational controlOPLAN operation planOPORD operation orderOPSEC operations security

PBR patrol boat, riverPOW prisoner of warPSYOP psychological operations

RAC riverine assault craftROE rules of engagementRRC Rigid Raiding Craft

SBD special boat detachmentSBU special boat unitSEAL sea-air-landSOF special operations forcesSOP standing operating procedureSPECBOATRON special boat squadronSPF Special Purpose ForceSR special reconnaissanceSRI Surveillance Reconnaissance

Intelligence

TAOR tactical area of responsibilityTOC tactical operations center

UW unconventional warfare

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PART II -- DEFINITIONS*

assault craft gunfire.* Direct and indirect fire provided toforces ashore by naval craft.

command and control craft.* Craft equipped to provide C2facilities for field units and river assault craft.

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter,and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct action mission. In special operations, a specified actinvolving operations of an overt, covert, clandestine or lowvisibility nature conducted primarily by a sponsoring power’sspecial operations forces in hostile or denied areas. (JointPub 1-02).

direct action operations.** Short-duration strikes and othersmall scale offensive actions principally taken by specialoperations forces to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on aspecified target; or to destroy, capture, or recoverdesignated personnel or material. In the conduct of theseoperations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush,or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions;conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritimeplatforms; provide terminal guidance for precision guidedmunitions; and conduct independent sabotage. Also called DA.

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian andmilitary agencies of a government in any of the actionprograms taken by another government to free and protect itssociety from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JointPUB 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force which iscomposed of significant elements of the Army, the Navy or theMarine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of theseServices, operating under a single commander authorized toexercise unified command or operational control over jointforces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander.** A general term applied to acommander authorized to exercise Combatant Command (commandauthority) or operational control over a joint force. Alsocalled JFC.

GL-3

joint riverine force.* A joint or single-Service forcetrained and equipped to conduct riverine operations.

mini-armored troop carrier.* An assault support craft whichprovides troop transport, combat support, and combat servicesupport to the assault elements of the MRF. Also called MATC.

mobile riverine base.* A group of ships, barges, and craftoperating in a riverine area as a base for a joint riverineforce, or elements thereof. Also called MRB.

naval special warfare.* A specific term describing adesignated naval warfare specialty and covering operationsgenerally accepted as being unconventional in nature, and inmany cases, covert or clandestine in character. Theseoperations include utilization of specially trained forcesassigned to conduct unconventional warfare, psychologicaloperations, beach and coastal reconnaissance, operationaldeception operations, counterinsurgency operations, coastaland river interdiction, and certain special tacticalintelligence collection operations in addition to thoseintelligence functions normally retained for planning andconducting special operations in a hostile environment.

naval special warfare group.* The Navy organizations to whichmost naval special warfare forces are assigned for someoperational and all administrative purposes. It consists of agroup headquarters with command and control, communications,and support staff, SEAL teams, special boat squadrons andsubordinate special boat units, and SEAL delivery vehicleteams. The group is the source of all deployed naval specialwarfare forces and administratively supports the naval specialwarfare units assigned to the theater CINCs. The group staffprovides general operational direction and coordinates theactivities of its subordinate units. A naval special warfaregroup is capable of task-organizing to meet a wide variety ofrequirements. Also called NSWG.

naval special warfare task group.* Elements that providecommand, control, and communications for naval special warfareunits deployed in support of fleet commanders, specialoperations commands of unified and subordinate unifiedcommands, and joint special operations task forces. Alsocalled NSWTG.

patrol boat, riverine.* A high speed, armed, and lightlyarmored patrol boat used to conduct riverine interdiction andsurveillance operations. Also called PBR.

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rally point. An area selected for regrouping of forces beforecontinuing; it may be predesignated. Also RP.

riverine area. An inland or coastal area comprising both landand water, characterized by limited land lines ofcommunication, with extensive water surface and/or inlandwaterways that provide natural routes for surfacetransportation and communications. (Joint Pub 1-02).

riverine assault craft.* A generic term applied to the familyof riverine warfare craft. These craft include, but are notlimited to: the patrol boat riverine, mini-armored troopcarrier, landing craft utility, landing craft medium, landingcraft air cushion, rubber raiding craft, rigid inflatableboat, and combat rubber raiding craft. The inventory mayinclude specifically designed US built or indigenous craft.Also called RAC.

riverine assault support elements.* The assault craftelements of the mobile riverine force which provides combatsupport and combat service support to the assault elements ofthe riverine ground force.

riverine assault operations.* Those strike operationsconducted in a riverine area.

riverine forces.* Forces specifically task organized,equipped, and trained to operate in and exploit the uniquecharacteristics of a riverine area.

riverine landing area.* A segment of a waterway that includesone or more riverine landing sites. Both banks of thewaterway may be included in the riverine landing area.

riverine landing point.* A point within a riverine landingsite where one riverine assault craft can land.

riverine landing site.* A specified location along a waterwaywhere one or more riverine craft can embark or disembarktroops, supplies, or equipment.

riverine operation.** An operation conducted by forcesorganized to cope with and exploit the unique characteristicsof a riverine area; to locate and destroy hostile forces;and/or to achieve or maintain control of the riverine area.Joint riverine operations combine ground, maritime, air andspecial operations, as appropriate, and are suited to thenature of the specific riverine area in which operations areto be conducted.

GL-5

riverine patrol operation.* Maritime operation conducted in ariverine environment that typically includes surveillance,interdiction, blocking, and security, and is characterized bythe primary employment of maritime forces.

sea-air-land team. A group of officers and individualsspecially trained and equipped for conducting unconventionaland paramilitary operations and to train personnel of alliednations in such operations including surveillance andreconnaissance in and from restricted waters, rivers, andcoastal areas. Commonly referred to as SEAL team. (Joint Pub1-02)

special boat detachment.* An element of a special boat unit,consisting of combatant craft and assigned crewmen. Alsocalled SBD.

special boat squadron.* Naval command that operates assignedcraft in support of naval special warfare operations asdirected; develops, tests, and evaluates operationalprocedures, techniques, and equipment; improves and documentstactics in coastal and restricted water warfare; maintainsassigned craft and crews in readiness to conduct or supportnaval special warfare; conducts coastal and riverine patroland surveillance; conducts harassment and interdiction ofmaritime lines of communications; and conducts operations toassist in the training of fleet units in anti-patrol boattactics. Special boat squadrons are an arm of the navalspecial warfare groups comprised of several commissionedspecial boat units, each with complementary warfare missionareas. Also called SPECBOATRON.

special boat unit.* Those US Navy forces organized, trained,and equipped to conduct or support naval special warfare andjoint special operations with coastal and riverine patrolboats and other surface combatant craft designed primarily forspecial operations support. Also called SBU.

special operations. Operations conducted by speciallytrained, equipped, and organized DOD forces against strategicor tactical targets in pursuit of national military,political, economic, or psychological objectives. Theseoperations may be conducted during periods of peace orhostilities. They may support conventional operations, orthey may be prosecuted independently when the use ofconventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible(Joint Pub 1-02).

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special reconnaissance operations.** Reconnaissance andsurveillance actions conducted by special operations forces toobtain or verify, by visual observation or other collectionmethods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions,and activities of an actual or potential enemy, or to securedata concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic,or demographic characteristics of a particular area. Theseoperations include target acquisition, area assessment, andpost-strike reconnaissance. Also called SR.

suppression of enemy air defenses. That activity whichneutralizes, destroys or temporarily degrades enemy airdefenses in a specific area by physical attack and/orelectronic warfare. Also called SEAD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical area of responsibility. A defined area of land forwhich responsibility is specifically assigned to the commanderof the area as a measure for control of assigned forces andcoordination of support. Commonly referred to as TAOR (JointPub 1-02).

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military andparamilitary operations conducted in enemy-held,enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory.Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, theinterrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape,subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a lowvisibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelatedaspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly orcollectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usuallysupported and directed in varying degrees by (an) externalsource(s) during all conditions of war or peace. (Joint Pub1-02).

* Unless identified as extracted from Joint Pub 1-02,terminology herein is not standardized within theDepartment of Defense and is applicable only in thecontext of this document.

** Upon final approval of this publication, this term will beincluded in Joint Pub 1-02.

GL-7

INDEX

PAGE

Afloat base movement, riverine XI-2Air drops VII-4Air operations V-5Area of operations, determination of III-5Arms planning supporting V-1Artillery V-4Assault force, movement of the XII-3Assault operations XII-1Attack and subsequent operations landing XII-5Automatic airborne radio retransmission VII-4

Barrier operations XIII-1Base security, riverine XIV-1Base sites, selection of III-9Breakdown or riverine craft X-1

Chains of command parallel III-3Civil affairs XIV-11Close air support (CAS) V-7Collection of intelligence III-3Command and control X-3, XI-5, XII-4Command and organization II-1Command craft VII-4Command during operations II-1Communication deception and countermeasures VII-6Communication plan VII-6Communications planning VII-1Communications security III-13, VII-6Concurrent planning III-2Contingency planning X-1Counterintelligence estimates VI-6Countermeasures, communication VII-6Cover and deception XIV-10

Deception communication VII-6Directive, initiating II-1Disaster control X-2Dissemination of intelligence III-3

Emergencies aboard riverine craft X-1Emergency assistance X-1Emergency sortie X-1Engineer planning VIII-13

Index-1

Environment, effect of VII-2Environmental considerations VI-4Essential elements of friendly

information (EEFI) III-14

Fire support planning V-1Fire X-1Flag hoist VII-3

H-hours, selecting of tentative III-10Helicopter landing zones, selection of III-8

Initiating Directive II-1Intelligence

annex VI-6collection of III-3dissemination of III-3estimates VI-6planning VI-1sources and collection VI-4intelligence support riverine force VI-6

Logistics VIII-1, XV-1

Man overboard X-1Measures to prevent mutual interference XI-3Medical planning VIII-9Messenger service VII-3Mine warfare operations XIV-8Mission objective, determination of III-5Mobile riverine force, movement of XI-1Multichannel radio systems VII-3

Naval gunfire V-4, XII-12

Operating dates, selecting tentative III-10Operations

security III-11ancillary XIV-1

Organization, effect of II-1

Planned withdrawal XII-15Planning III-1

by parallel chains of command III-3concurrent III-3procedures III-4

Psychological operations XIV-11

Index-2

Radio circuit requirements VII-4Radio VII-3Reaction force XII-12Reconnaissance XIV-1Rehearsals III-11Reserve force XII-12River assault craft VII-4River landing areas, selection of III-7River landing sites, selection of III-7Riverine afloat base movement XI-2Riverine base security XIV-1Riverine force intelligence support VI-6Riverine operations, concept of I-1

Salvage operations XIV-9Search and rescue X-3Security, communications VI-6Sociological considerations VI-5Sound communications VII-4Special operations IV-1Supporting arms requirements V-2, XII-12Supporting operations, planning IX-1

Tentative operating dates andH-hours selecting III-10

Terminology IX

Unconventional warfare operations XIV-10

Waterway clearance XIV-1Waterway interdiction operations XIII-1Waterway routes, selection of III-8Wire VII-3

Index-3