Countering Paramilitary & Organised Criminal Influence on YouthA ReviewDuncan Morrow & Jonny Byrne March 2020

Full Report

1

Contents

1.BACKGROUND.............................................................................................................................................................................................3

1.1INTRODUCTIONANDRATIONALE.........................................................................................................................................................................3

1.2‘TACKLINGPARAMILITARISM’INNORTHERNIRELANDANDYOUTHWORK......................................................................................................................6

1.3METHODOLOGY.............................................................................................................................................................................................9

2.YOUNGPEOPLE,‘GANGS’ANDTHE‘RADICALISATION’PROCESS:AREVIEWOFTHEORYANDPRACTICE....................................................10

2.1:YOUNGPEOPLE,‘GANGS’AND‘RADICALISATION’:AREVIEWOFTHELITERATURE.........................................................................................................11

2.2YOUNGPEOPLEAND‘RADICALISATION’...............................................................................................................................................................16

2.3COMPARINGMODELSOFYOUTHWORKINTERVENTION...........................................................................................................................................22

2.4SUMMARISINGTHEAPPROACHESANDMETHODS..................................................................................................................................................43

2.5THE‘FIT’OFINTERNATIONALMODELSTONORTHERNIRELAND?................................................................................................................................47

2.6:EMERGENTTHEMESFROMTHEINTERNATIONALFIELD............................................................................................................................................52

3.TACKLINGPARAMILITARISMINNORTHERNIRELAND................................................................................................................................57

3.1DEFININGPARAMILITARISMINNORTHERNIRELAND...............................................................................................................................................57

2

3.3ATTITUDESTOVIOLENCEANDARMEDGROUPSINCOMMUNITIESINNORTHERNIRELAND.................................................................................................67

3.4THEPRESSURESONYOUNGPEOPLEINCOMMUNITIESINNORTHERNIRELANDWITHAPARAMILITARYPRESENCE....................................................................73

3.5ISTACKLINGPARAMILITARISMAROLEFORYOUTHWORK?.......................................................................................................................................76

3.6YOUTHWORKWHEREPARAMILITARISMISACONTINUINGREALITYINCOMMUNITIES......................................................................................................85

3.7EVOLVINGYOUTHWORKPRACTICETOADDRESSPARAMILITARISMINCOMMUNITIES.......................................................................................................88

3.8COLLABORATIVECOMMUNITYYOUTHWORKFORTACKLINGPARAMILITARISM...............................................................................................................95

3.9CHALLENGESFORYOUTHWORKINADDRESSINGISSUESARISINGFROMPARAMILITARISM.................................................................................................99

3.10MEASURINGSUCCESS?...............................................................................................................................................................................103

REFERENCES....................................................................................................................................................................................................113

TableofTables

Table1:Summarytableofapproachesandinterventionmethodsadoptedbyallprojects...................................................................................45

3

1.Background

InJune2019,ateamatUlsterUniversitywascommissionedbytheCorrymeelaCommunityonbehalfoftheEducationAuthoritytoconduct

researchonthethemeofyoungpeople,youthworkandtacklingparamilitarisminNorthernIreland.Thespecifictaskswere:

• Toresearch/maptheeffectiveandinnovativetheories/practiceof10–12internationalnon-governmentalorganisations(INGOs)and

non-governmental organisations (NGOs)workingwith youth and actively countering factors that create risk vulnerability, and/or

susceptibilityrelatedtoparamilitarism,organisedgangsorcriminality.

• ToenhancetheCPDmodelbyintegratingandtestingtherelevanceofinternationalframeworksandassociatedtoolsthatsupport

thetechnicalskills,capacityandwell-beingoffront-lineworkers.

Thegoalwastoproduceresearchthatcouldshapedebateonthe futureofyouthwork interventiontosupport theTacklingParamilitarism

programme.Thechosenmethodwastoreviewliteratureonbestpracticeacrossanumberofinternationalmodelsofinterventionwithyoung

peopleaffectedbyviolencebyarmedgroupsofvarioussorts,andtoconductfieldresearchinNorthernIreland.Havinganalysedtheresults,

thegoalwas todevelop findingsbasedon the researchanddisseminate those findings througha final report, through thepublicationofa

policybrieftoinformpracticeandthroughaninvitedroundtableofrelevantstakeholders.

1.1IntroductionandRationale

AccordingtotheUnitedNations’(UN)MissingPeacereport:

In2016,anestimated408millionyouth(aged15–29)residedinsettingsaffectedbyarmedconflictororganisedviolence.This

meansthatatleastoneinfouryoungpeopleisaffectedbyviolenceorarmedconflictinsomeway.Estimatesofdirectconflict

deathsin2015suggestthatmorethan90percentofallcasualties involvedyoungmales.However,conflict,crimeandother

4

formsofviolenceimpactyoungpeople’slivesinmorewaysthanmortality.Whileitoftengoesunrecorded,youngpeoplesuffer

from a wide range of short-, medium- and long-term effects ranging from repeated victimization to psychological trauma,

identity-baseddiscriminationandsocialandeconomicexclusion(UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblySecurityCouncil,2018:5).

TheUNalsoacknowledgedthatwhileyoungpeopleaccountforthemajorityofthoseengagedinextremistviolence,onlya‘minuteproportion’

of the youth population is involved in violence. This bringswith it a risk that the focus of policy is placed too easily on the prevention of

extremismandnotenoughontheimportanceofengagingwithyoungpeople.Atitsmostextreme,thishasinvolvedlabellingyoungpeopleas

‘criminals’or‘terrorists’,tothedetrimentofyouthparticipationinpoliticalandsociallife.Asaresult,resourcesaremisallocatedfromservices

thatarenecessarytoaddressthedriversofviolencetowardsanoverlypunitiveapproach,whichmaybelesseffectiveandmorecostlythan

preventativemeasures.Thus:

The political urgency for Governments to respond to the threat of global terrorism has contributed to a discourse inwhich

sweeping characterisations of youth as fundamentally at risk of ‘violent extremism’ have produced unnuanced, counter-

productivepolicy responses.The ‘policypanic’… is furtheralienatingyoungpeople… Insteadofofferingproactiveprevention

approachestoviolentconflict,itriskscementingyoungpeopleintheseroles,givingthemasensethattherearenoalternative

pathwaysavailabletothem(UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblySecurityCouncil,2018:7).

TheUNthereforedrewattentiontothenecessityofensuringnotonlythatviolentextremismwas‘tackled’butthatalternativepathwayswere

developedwithanemphasisonparticipation,economicpotential,educationanddealingwithinjusticeandhumanrights.Thisentailsashift

fromsecurityresponsestoaviolencepreventionapproach,buildingupresilienceandbasedonpartnershipwithyoungpeopleandyouth-led

organisations,andrequiresinvestmentinandinclusionofyoungpeople,aswellasaddressingsecurityconcerns.

5

Youth work necessarily starts from this perspective in its engagement with violent extremism. In principle, all youth work in the area of

peacebuildingisguidedbyUNSecurityCouncilResolution2250onYouth,PeaceandSecurity(December2015),whichcommitsallsignatories,

includingtheUK,toyouthparticipation indecision-makingprocesses,theprotectionofyoungpeople’s livesandhumanrights,promotinga

cultureoftoleranceand interculturaldialogue,engagingyoungpeople indevelopingpeacebuildingstrategiesand investing inyoungpeople

affectedbyarmedconflictthroughemployment,educationandpromotingacultureofpeace.Aboveall,theresolutionmakesclearthatthe

contributionofyouthworkinpeacebuildingisspecific,determinedbyitsfocusonthewell-beingandrightsofyoungpeopleratherthanonthe

political,securityorpolicingaspectsofpeacebuilding.

Thetaskofyouthworkistoaddressextremismfromthestartingpointofcommitmenttothewell-beingofeveryyoungperson.Inrelationto

youthengagementinrelationtoparamilitarybehaviour,thisisimportant:youthworkcannotbepartof‘stopping’asecurityproblemdefined

as young people’s involvement with paramilitarism without reframing that contribution within a commitment to the well-being of young

people. Inotherwords,theproblemisthechallengeofviolence,whichmustbeaddressedthroughallmeansnecessaryratherthan ‘young

people’.Thisisnotaquestionofco-optingyouthworktosecurity,butofachievingsecurityforallthroughyouthworkmethods.

This change in perspective raises a number of critical questions, which frame this research report into youth work practice to reduce

paramilitarism. Inthe first instance,anypolicytotackleparamilitaryviolenceandorganisationthatdoesnotengageyoungpeople,asboth

participantsandvictims,isunlikelytobesuccessful.Inaddition,theroleofyouthworkistocontributetothatgoalfromtheperspectiveofthe

toolsitoffers:howcanyouthworkersandyouthworkasaprofessionpreventandreducetheimpactofviolenceonyoungpeople,andreduce

marginalisationandexclusionasaconsequence?

Thereisnodoubtthat,inNorthernIreland,youngpeopleinsomepartsofthecommunityremaindisproportionatelyatriskofbeingdrawninto

organised violence and crime. The persistence of this circumstance some 20 years after a formal peace agreement (the 1998 Belfast

6

Agreement) has therefore increasingly asked questions of how youthwork practice can evolve to address the potential for harm, to both

victimsandperpetrators.

1.2‘TacklingParamilitarism’inNorthernIrelandandyouthwork

ViolentextremismhasbeenpartofpoliticallandscapeofNorthernIrelandfordecades,drawingondeeply-rootedtraditionsofresistanceand

communitydefencethatpredatethelanguageofviolentextremismbydecadesandevencenturies.However,foralmost30yearsafter1969,

violencebyorganisedandarmedgroupsbecamenormalisedinthesensethatitwaspartoftheeverydayrealityofNorthernIrelandlifewitha

distinctandpersistentrelationshipwithsocialandeconomicmarginalisation,ageandgender.Overwhelmingly,directparticipationinviolent

conflictwasdominatedbyyoungmalesfromdistrictswithevidenceofpersistentmultipledeprivationintheagegroupidentifiedbytheUNas

‘youngpeople’ (15–29).However, therewasadegreeofpolitical tolerationacross thewholecommunity forviolenceexercised forpolitical

purposes,andthedefinitionofsuchviolenceaseither‘criminal’or‘extreme’wascontested.

By 1998, it was acknowledged by the governments of both the UK and Ireland that violence could not be eliminated by counter-security

measures alone. Instead, the governments sponsored a comprehensive political approach, which bore fruit in the Belfast (Good Friday)

Agreementof1998.TheAgreementdirectlyaddressedthequestionofviolenceandorganisationalcontinuity,explicitlydenyinganyfurther

formal or informal political legitimacy for violence and committing all signatories to ‘explicitly peaceful and democratic means’ for the

resolution of disputes. In addition, the Agreement established an international process for the disarmament and disbandment of all

paramilitarygroupsandfortheearlyreleaseofprisonerseschewingpoliticalviolence.

Inpractice,thishasturnedouttobeapoliticallyandpracticallyfraught,contentiousanddifficulttask.TheAgreementitselfwasnotuniversally

acceptedas the finalwordonpoliticaldivision inNorthern Ireland. IrishRepublicanArmy(IRA)disarmamentwasverifiedafteradecadeof

tortuousinternationalnegotiations,andonlythenwasitpossibletoestablishadevolvedpower-sharingsystemofgovernmentforNorthern

7

IrelandandaPolicingBoardendorsedbyallpoliticalparties.However,althoughmuchreduced,anddespitepoliticalconsensus,violenceby

armedgroupshascontinuedtobearealityatcommunitylevelinsomeareas.Ontherepublicanside,groupsopposedtothepeaceprocess

(dissident republicans) continued to claim legitimacy to attackpoliceofficers, andother security personnel remainedunder explicit threat.

Among loyalists, therewas ongoing evidence of recruitment, local activity and participation in intimidation, rioting and other public order

activities. Instability in the power-sharing Executive resulted in many periods of uncertainty and tension, requiring inter-party talks and

interventionfromthegovernmentsoftheUKandIreland.Addedtothis,organisationshavecontinuedtohaveallegedinvolvementincriminal

behaviour, includingattacksonyoungpeopleorothersaccusedofanti-socialbehaviourandforcedevictionofpeople fromtheirhomes. In

September2015,theExecutivewaseffectivelysuspendedfollowingtheshootingofKevinMcGuiganinBelfast,allegedlybyanelementofthe

ProvisionalIRA.AstheIRAhadbeenofficiallydisbandedin2007,anewspotlightwasturnedonthefailuretoendthecultureofparamilitarism

incommunitiesacrossNorthernIreland.

The‘TacklingParamilitarism’programmeemergedfromtheinter-party‘FreshStart’Agreement,whichtookplaceasaresultoftheseevents.

Critically,anduniquely,theprogrammereceivedthefullendorsementofpoliticalpartiesacrosstheExecutivepriortothethree-yearcollapse

of the Northern Ireland political system in January 2017. The risks for and by young peoplewere included as one of 42measures of the

programme.UnderMeasureA4, theEducationAuthorityplacedanOutreachWorker ineachof theeightmostvulnerable ‘Communities in

Transition’acrossNorthernIreland,withaviewtopreventingyoungpeoplefromjoiningparamilitaryorganisations.AccordingtotheExecutive

Action Plan that accompanied the programme: ‘TheOutreachWorkers aim to build relationshipswith youngpeoplewhodonot currently

engage with the youth services and who could be considered as being at higher risk of involvement in paramilitary activity; they deliver

programmesandsupportthatdeveloptheyoungpeople’sresilienceandawarenessofriskfactors.’

Inpractice, theprinciplesofResolution2250wereneverexplicitly referred to inanyof the interviewsor focusgroupsassociatedwith this

researchproject,althoughtheirinfluencecanbeinferredfromtheapproachofworkerstotheprogramme.Withoutexception,however,our

8

respondentswereconsistentinbelievingthatyouthworkwasonlyoneaspectofawiderprogrammetoaddressparamilitaryactivity,culture

andorganisationinNorthernIreland.Inparticular,youthworkcouldnotberegardedasanextensionofpolicing,exceptinthewidestsenseof

upholdingbasicrightsandnon-violencewhileprovidingguidance,encouragementandsupportforyoungpeopleinmakingbetterchoices.In

all cases,youthworkershaddevelopedaveryclearbutsubtleunderstandingof theirprofessionaldemandsand thenatureofprofessional

accountability,especiallyinrelationtotheirpositionas‘adultsoftrust’foryoungpeopleintenserelationshipswiththeircommunitiesand/or

withthepoliceandthewidercriminaljusticesystem.

Ininterviewscarriedoutforthisresearchproject(seePart2)thisapproachwasevident:

‘Ifyoulookatyoungpeoplealoneontheirown,itdoesnotwork.Youhavetolookatthewholecommunitytounderstand

wheretheiryoungpeoplefit.’

‘We–youthworkers–needtodevelopandlearnanewlanguagewithyoungpeoplethatexplainstothemoursafeguarding

roleandengagementwiththepolicebutstillmakeclearthatwearenottouts.Thisisallabouttrust.Youthworkersneedto

havethetrustoftheyoungpeopleandthepoliceandthatisverychallenging.’

TheestablishmentofagroupofyouthworkerswithintheTacklingParamilitarismprogrammealsofocusedattentiononthenatureandscope

ofgoodpractice.Thisresearchwasdesignedtobetterunderstandtheroleandnatureofeffectiveyouthworkinrelationtoyoungpeopleat

riskofengagementwitharmedgroups,whetherasvictimsormembers, identifyingbothopportunitiesforchangeandpersistentriskswhile

also identifying the core elements of good practice. The work was divided into two parts: a desk-based review of a number of relevant

international interventionprogrammes;andasecondelementof fieldwork,whereresearchers interviewedanumberofyouthworkersand

otherstakeholders,witheachgrouphavinghaddirectexperienceandknowledgeofengagingwithparamilitary-relatedissues.

9

1.3Methodology

TheresearchwasconductedbetweenJune2019andJanuary2020andinvolvedamixed-methodsapproach.Initially,theteamcompleteda

literature review that documented 13 international examples of youth work designed to reduce the impact of violence on young people

involvedwitharmedgroups,impactedbyarmedgroupsorpotentiallyattractedtoarmedgroups.

The second phase involved the completion of 16 semi-structured interviews and two focus groups. Interviewees were identified for their

expertise inworkingwithyoungpeopleat risk from involvement inparamilitarism inNorthern Ireland. Ineachcase, the respondentswere

askedtoreflectonthecurrentlandscapeandthefutureriskstothesecurityofNorthernIreland.

For reasons of confidentiality, it is not possible to identify the participants; however, the interviewees included youth workers directly

employed under the Fresh Start programme, youthworkersmanaging the programme, community activistswith a personal knowledge of

communitiesandparamilitarism,membersofyouthorganisationsandotherswithlong-standingexperienceofyouthworkpolicyandpractice.

ThefocusgroupswerearrangedwiththesupportofCorrymeelaandinvolvedarangeofpeoplefromvariousbackgroundsinyouthwork.

Confidentialitywascriticaltotheviabilityofthisproject,andtheresearchteamhastakencaretoensurethatnomaterial isattributedtoa

particularindividualororganisation.Theremainderofthisreportisstructuredaroundtwoparts,whichprovideareviewoftheinternational

literatureandareviewoftheNorthernIrishcontext.Thisisfollowedbyacriticalassessmentofthestudyandanumberofobservations.

10

2.Youngpeople,‘gangs’andthe‘radicalisation’process:Areviewoftheoryandpractice

Thefirstpartofthisreportexaminesmodelsofpracticeestablishedtoengageyoungpeople,outsideNorthernIreland,whoareengagedin

violence.Ithasthreesubsections.Section1summarisessomeofthetheoreticalandphilosophicaldebateswithintheacademicliteratureon

youngpeople,‘gangs’and‘radicalisation’.Thissectionisfurthersubdividedintotwoparts,giventhedifferencesinthemorehistoricalworkon

the social dynamics of youth ‘gangs’ and themuchmore recent focuswithin the context of the ‘War on Terror’, inwhich the concept of

‘radicalisation’hasbeenusedtounderstandtheprocessesthatimpacton‘vulnerable’youngpeoplerequiringprotectionandsafeguarding.

Section2isareporton13casestudiesfromaroundtheworld(includingtheUKandIreland,theUSAandnorthernEurope),highlightingwork1

thattendstofocuseitheronprevention(preventingyoungpeoplefromjoining‘gangs’orbeing‘radicalised’inthefirstplace),orintervention

anddesistance(reducingrecidivism,providingsupporttoleavethestructuresofgangs/armedgroupsorattemptsto‘de-radicalise’them).This

distinctionbetweenpreventionandintervention/desistanceisanimportantonetomakeintermsofdevelopingprojectsthatareclearinwhat

theyareattemptingtoachieve–aclarityofpurposethatwillreduceconceptualconfusion(foryouthworkersandyoungpeople)andincrease

theeffectivenessofwork.

The13exampleshavebeenchosentoprovidearepresentativeoverviewofwork indifferingcountriesandcontextsworkingonprevention

and/ordesistancewithyoungpeople;however,theseexamplesshouldbeviewedasmerelyillustrative(ratherthanexhaustive)oftherangeof

workthat is takingplace.2Therearenumerousotherexamplesofyouthprogrammesworking inasimilar thematicarea,whicheitherhave

1Thesearemostlycommunity-ledyouthprogrammes,butalsodrawupontwostatutoryexamplesbywayofcomparison(theCHANNELmentoringprogrammewhichispartofthePREVENTstrandoftheUKCONTESTcounter-terrorstrategyandtheJ-ARCprogrammetoreducerecidivismamongstoffendersinDublin).AlsoincludedistheCommunityInitiativetoReduceViolence(CIRV)modelinGlasgow;thisapproachisledbytheStrathclydePolice,butwithcommunityinvolvement.2 Forexample, theCHANNELmentoringprogrammehasbeen included for comparativeand informationalpurposes rather thanasoneofbestpractice, as it hasbeenheavilycriticisedonseveralfronts.Theseissueswillbediscussedinsection2.

11

limited information publicly available in relation to them (perhaps due to the sensitivities of the subject area),3 or that have very little

informationinrelationtotheoutcomesoftheproject.Theexamplesthathavebeenselectedhave,therefore,beenchosenonthebasisthat

thereisrequisiteinformationavailableandalso,insomecases,potentiallessons(bothpositiveandnegative)thatcouldbelearntforsimilar

workinaNorthernIrishcontext.

Section3concludesthereviewofthe literatureandpracticeoutsideNorthern Irelandby identifyingnineemergingthemesofbestpractice

arisingfromthecasestudies.

2.1:Youngpeople,‘gangs’and‘radicalisation’:Areviewoftheliterature

‘Gang’researchinaWesterncontextcanbetraceddirectlytotheworkofFrederickThrasherandHerbertAsburyin1920sChicagoandNew

York,respectively(seeFraser,2017).4Thrasher(1927)arguedthat‘gangs’werenotinherentlyanegativephenomenon;rather,theywerean

associationof youngmalepeers in highly populated areaswhere therewas little in thewayof amenities or facilities.5While violence and

conflictcould(anddid)emergein‘gang’activity,thiswasnottheraisond’êtreofjoininga‘gang’foryoungpeople;primarily,itwastoprovide

asenseofpurposeandidentityamidstthesocialdislocationtheyfeltasaresultoftheirdisadvantagedsocio-economicbackgrounds(seealso

ShawandMcKay,1942).Thisfocusonthesociologyofdevianceanddislocationfromsocietywasbuiltuponinseveralstudiespost-WWII,most

notablybyAlfredCohen(1955).Cohensuggestedthat theclasscontextandthe formationofoppositional identities (rich/poor,haves/have

nots)wascrucialtothedevelopmentofyouthgangsindevelopinginner-cityareas.BuildingonthisworkinaUKcontext,StanCohen(1972)

laterfamouslyreferredtothesocietal‘moralpanic’relatingtotheactivitiesofthe‘Mods’and‘Rockers’in1960sEngland,suggestingthatthe

3Forexample,thereislimitedpublicinformationinrelationtodocumentingtheworkofcommunityfundedprojectsengagingwithyoungpeopleaspartofthePREVENTstrandoftheUKGovernment’sCONTESTcounter-terrorismstrategy.4 Throughout this section, ‘gangs’ and ‘radicalisation’ are referred to in inverted commas. This is to reflect the fact that both terms are heavily contestedwithin theacademicliterature.Theycanbothbeusedpejorativelytonegativelylabelyoungpeople,andthereisalsonosingledefinitionofeitherterm.5Boysandyoungmenaremorelikelytojoin‘gangs’andbeinvolvedincriminalactivitiesthanaregirlsandwomen(Messerschmidt,1997).

12

government,mediaandpublic ingeneralalloverplayedtheviolenttendenciesofyoungpeople inthese‘gangs’.Youngpeople inthesetwo

youthsubcultureswereperceivedtobe‘delinquent’bytheadultgenerationprimarilybecausetheydresseddifferently,listenedtodifferent

musicandprioritiseddifferentvaluesthandidpreviousgenerations(ibid.).

Althoughseminalstudies,theworksofThrasherandthetwoCohenshavebeencritiquedonthegroundsthattheypresentarather‘idealised’

presentationof‘gang’life,whichtendstodownplayorminimisetheroleofcriminalityandviolenceinsustainingthe‘gang’asacollective(see

Fraser,2017).6Indeed,theresearchfocuson‘gangs’fromthe1960sonwardsshiftedfromsociologicalapproachestothefieldofcriminology.

Criminologistsbeganconsideringboththesocial significanceofyouth ‘gangs’ to theirmembersaswellasthecriminalactivitieswithwhich

theymaybeengaged(ibid.). ‘Gangs’wereincreasinglyassociatedwithterritory,crimeandviolence(Densley,2013).Inthisvein,andaftera

wide-ranging consultation with youth and community workers, police, criminal justice agency representatives and young ‘gang’ members

themselves,Miller(1975:121)defineda‘gang’as:

A self-formed association of peers, bound together bymutual interests, with identifiable leadership, well-developed lines of

authority, and other organisational features, who act in concert to achieve a specific purpose or purposes which generally

includetheconductofillegalactivityandcontroloveraparticularterritory,facility,ortypeofenterprise.7

Yablonksy(1962)distinguishedbetweensocial,delinquentandviolent‘gangs’,withviolent‘gangs’drawingtheirmembershipprimarilyfrom

‘emotionallydisturbedyouths’(ibid.:21).Thiswouldsuggestthatthereisnotasimpledichotomybetween‘perpetrator’and‘victim’interms

of‘gang’membership;andrecentresearchsuggeststhatyoungmembersof‘gangs’themselvestendtohaveverychallengingpersonal,familial

andsocialcircumstances.IntheirreviewoftenyearsoffieldworkontheissueintheUK,McAraandMcVie(2010)foundthatpersistentand

6InaUKcontext,Scott(1956)andDownes(1966)havealsobeenaccusedofunderstatingthelinksbetweengangsandcrime.7Morerecently,theEurogangacademicresearchnetworkhassimilarlydefinedagangas‘anydurable,street-orientatedyouthgroupwhoseinvolvementinillegalactivityispartoftheirgroupidentity’(vanGemert,2005:148).IntheUK,undertheSeriousCrimeAct2015,‘gangs’havebeendefinedasreferringto‘morethan3people’;andwhichhavecharacteristicsthatallowthememberstobeidentifiedbyothersasadistinctgroup(seeFraser,2017).

13

seriousoffendersof‘gang’violenceweremorelikelythemselvestobevictimsofviolenceandengageinotherharmfulorriskybehaviourssuch

asself-harm,druguseandregularalcoholconsumption.8

Contemporaryworkonyoungpeopleand‘gangs’suggeststhattheystilltendtoforminareasof‘advancedmarginality’,thatis,spaceswhere

thereisalimitedstatepresenceandeconomicmarginalisation,andwhereisolatingsocialconditionsaremorepronounced(Wacquant,2007).

In such contexts, ‘gangs’ may come to constitute an alternative form of social order to the police and the state. It is therefore perhaps

unsurprising that under these conditions, ‘gang’ members are more likely to be involved in serious and violent ‘delinquency’ than non-

members (Thornberry et al., 2003; Bennett and Holloway, 2004). Yet, the evidence would suggest that the links between membership,

criminality and violence are complex, with identities for youngmembers shifting in differing contexts between ‘gangmember’/’non-gang

member’andconventional/criminalactivity(Medinaetal.,2013;Weaver,2015).

Whileitisclearthat‘gangs’existacrossdifferingcountriesandcontexts,whatisnotclearistheactualextentorscaleofthe‘problem’andhow

many young people are involved. Although there are challenges (both ethical and practical) in relying upon self-reported data from ‘gang’

membersthemselvestoestimatethescaleoftheissue,officialdataon‘gangs’andtheirmembershiparealsonotoriouslyunreliable(Rennison

andMelde,2009;Fraser,2017). In2012,therewasestimatedtobemorethan30,000gangswith850,000members intheUS(Egleyetal.,

2014). Inthesameyear,theLondonMetropolitanPoliceServiceidentifiedapproximately260violentyouth‘gangs’ inthecitywhileGreater

ManchesterPolice suggested thereweremore than60 streetgangs inManchester,withalmost900members (HouseofCommons,2015).

Outdatedrecordsandlimitedintelligenceontheinternalstructureof‘gangs’(Katz,2003),andattimesthe‘racialprofiling’ofnon-affiliated

young men from Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) backgrounds (Bjerregaard, 2003; Williams, 2015), suggest that such statistics cannot

necessarilybereliedupon.Yet,theyareoftenutilisedbystatutoryagenciestohighlighta‘growingproblem’intermsofyouth‘gang’violence.

8ForthecontextintheUSandthelinksbetweensocialexclusion,structuralinequality,traumaandcrime,seeThornberryetal.(2003).

14

Thiswasmostvisiblymanifestin2011withthepublicationbytheUKgovernmentofEndingGangsandYouthViolence:ACross-Government

ReportintheaftermathoftheriotsinAugust2011inEngland.Thereportsuggestedthat:

Gangs and serious youth violence are the product of the high levels of social breakdown and disadvantage found in the

communitiesinwhichtheythrive,buttheyarealsoakeydriverofthatbreakdown(HMGovernment,2011a:4).9

Otherthanthemoregeneralcritiqueofthereportforthepejorativeandnegativelabellingofyoungpeoplegenerallywithcriminality(Shute

andMedina,2014),thereisagreatdealofcomplexityinthecausallinkthatisimpliedintheconnectionbetween‘gangs’andviolentcrime:do

(young)peopleengageincriminalityandviolencebecausetheybecomepartofa‘gang’?Inotherwords,isitthestructureofthe‘gang’itself

that drives crime and violence, or do thosewho aremore predisposed to criminality and violence join ‘gangs’? Inwhich case, are acts of

violenceandcriminalitymorerelatedtothepersonalmotivationsanddispositionsofindividualmembersthanthedynamicsofthegroup?

Ifsocialissuesareindeedatthecoreofwhyyoungpeoplejoin‘gangs’,then,logically,dealingwithissuesofinequalityandsocialexclusionwill

helpyoungpeopletoeithernotjoin‘gangs’inthefirstplaceortoleavethem.This‘penalwelfarist’(Garland,2001)approach,baseduponthe

principlesofrehabilitationandsocialsupport,formedthebasisofmuchoftheapproachto‘gangs’inaUSandUKcontextuntilthelastthree

decades,whenafocusonretributivejusticeinordertofightcrimeemerged(Fraser,2017).10Atthecoreofsuchpunitiveapproachesisthe

viewthat‘gang’members(regardlessofage)arerationalagents,whomakeachoicetoengageincriminalactivitiesasaresultofweighingup

the‘pros’and‘cons’inacost-benefitanalysis(Fraser,2017).11

9ThisisverydifferentlanguagefromthatusedbytheLabourgovernmentinits2008YouthCrimeActionPlan,whichmadelittlementionofyouth‘gangs’andnotedthat‘…onlyaminorityofyoungpeopleareactivelyengagedinseriouscrime’(HMGovernment,2008;seealsoFraser,2017:203).10Althoughithasgenerallybeenacknowledgedthatimprisonmentplayedakeyroleinmaking‘gang’structuresmorepermanentintheUSA(seeSkarbek,2014).11Afocusonalawandorderresponse,withsomesecondarywelfaristpolicies,ispromotedbytheCentreforSocialJustice(2018).TheorganisationischairedbyformerConservativePartyleader,IainDuncanSmith.

15

WhilesuchapositionseeminglyrunscountertotheUNConventionontheRightsoftheChild,theageofcriminalresponsibilityandthe‘Beijing

Rules’(whichfocusupondiversionaryactivity,theavoidanceofcriminalisationanddecisionsthataremadeinthebestinterestsofthechild),

theincreasingglobalisationofpolicestowards‘gangs’hasledtocountriessuchastheUKadoptingthosemorepunitiveapproachesthathave

dominatedtheapproachto‘gangs’intheUS(RalphsandSmithson,2015;seealsoCottrell-Boyce,2013).12Whiletheapproachto‘gangs’inthe

US has tended to focus on prevention, intervention (including street and outreach work) and suppression (Fraser, 2017) – the use of

suppressionandpolicingtactics–havebeenincreasinglyprevalent(ibid.).

However, alternative models of dealing with youth ‘gang’ violence have developed, even within the US context. One such model is the

Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV),13 which is a violence-reduction and problem-orientated policing approach to ‘gangs’ that

prioritisespartnershipandmulti-agencyworkingalongsidedeterrencestrategiesthatfocusonasmallnumberofyoungpeoplemostactively

involvedin‘gangs’.Suchapproachesareoftenbasedupon‘thecallin’,wherebyyoung‘gang’membersareaskedtoattendapublicmeeting

and sign a ‘no violence’ contract/pledge, which then allows them to access various health, social, educational and employment support

servicesandresources–providingthey‘holduptheirendofthebargain’(Fraser,2017).Suchanapproachframesviolenceasa‘publichealth

issue’, which can be tackled by statutory agencies and the community working together. A contemporary example of the CIRVmodel in

Glasgowwillbediscussedinsection2.

12Thedoctrineof‘jointenterprise’,usedintheUS,hasbeenintroducedinrecentyearstotheUKandisintendedtoattributeguiltinassistancetowardsacommoncriminalpurpose (Fraser, 2017). Thus far, it hasbeenuseddisproportionately againstBAMEyoungpeople (seeWilliamsandClarke, 2016), and its usehasbeen limitedby theSupremeCourtintheUK.Civil‘gang’injunctionshavealsobeenintroducedintheUKunderthePolicingandCrimeAct2009.Thislegislationstatesthataninjunctioncanbeusedifthedefendanthasengagedin,encouragedorassistedany‘gang-relatedviolence’,andthepolicywasextendedtoinclude14–17-year-olds inEnglandandWalesundertheCrimeandSecurityAct2010(Fraser,2017).13BasedupontheworkofProfessorDavidKennedy.ThismodelhasalsobeenusedinChicago,Indianapolis,LondonandGlasgow.

16

Thediscussionthusfarhasfocusedontheroleofyoungpeoplein‘gangs’–butwhatoftheroleofyoungpeopleinarmedgroupsthatuse

violenceinamoreovertmanner?TheUN-ledChildreninOrganisedArmedViolenceProject(COAV)foundthatthereweresimilarreasonsasto

whysomechildrenandyoungpeoplejoinanarmedgroupindifferingcountriesandcontexts.Thesethemesweresimilartothereasonsfor

joining‘gangs’:marginalisation;livinginareasofhighpopulationdensitywithapoorqualityoflife;ayoungageprofileofthelocalcommunity;

lowlevelsofeducation;andhighlevelsofunemployment(Dowdney,2007).Insuchsettings,armedgroupsmay:

Offerdisfranchisedyouthafast-tracktosomeformofsocial,politicaloreconomicinclusionorbelonging,howeverlimited,and

…offerexcitementandentertainmentinplaceswherethereisoftenlittleelsetodo(ibid.:11).

Theconcernwiththeinvolvementofchildrenandyoungpeopleinviolencerelatesnotonlytocriminalactivityin‘gangs’,oreventhosewars

andcivilconflictswhere ‘child-soldiers’havebeenutilised;suchconcernshavebecomeincreasinglysignificant inthe lastdecadewithinthe

policycontextofthe‘WaronTerror’.Theemergenceoftheconceptof‘radicalisation’andthefocusonpreventingyoungpeoplefromjoining

extremistand‘terrorist’movementshasbeenplacedfrontandcentrestage,inbothpolicyandpractice.

2.2Youngpeopleand‘radicalisation’

Althoughtheterm‘radicalisation’isnowcommonparlanceandassociatedwithviolence,ithasonlybeenpopularisedrelativelyrecentlyinthe

discourseand contextof the ‘WaronTerror’ (Coolsaet, 2019).Historically, tobea ‘radical’wasnotnecessarilyperceived tobeanegative

development,norwas itnecessarilyassociatedwithviolence(BartlettandMiller,2012). Itwasoftenassociatedwithcriticalthinking,which

hadthecapacitytoimprovethe‘humancondition’(AdornoandHorkheimer,1944).Itiswithinthelast15yearsthattherehasbeenadistinct

shiftinhowtheterms‘radical’and‘radicalisation’areused.The2005EUdocumentTerroristrecruitment:Addressingthefactorscontributing

toviolentradicalizationhasbeencreditedwithintroducingtheterm‘radicalisation’intothelexicon(HörnqvistandFlyghed,2012).Themass

17

mediaandpoliticiansinvariousWesternEuropeancountriesadoptedthetermasitseepedintowiderpublicdiscourseintheaftermathofthe

‘terror’attacksinMadridinMarch2004andLondoninJuly2005,andthemurderofDutchfilm-makerTheoVanGoghbyan‘Islamicextremist’

(Sedgwick,2010).

Theuseof ‘radicalisation’now,however,commonlyreferstothosewillingtouse(orsupport) indiscriminateviolencetofurthertheirwider

politicalor religiousagenda (Kundani, 2012).14 Irishpsychologist JohnHorgan (2012)has suggested that the shift away from focusingupon

‘terrorism’towards‘radicalisation’wasasaresultoftheinabilitytoproduceacoherentpsycho-pathologicalprofileofthe‘terrorist’(ibid.).This

led, instead, to a switch from analysing being a ‘terrorist’ to how someone becomes one, in other words, how an individual becomes

‘radicalised’(Horgan,2008).This includedamoveawayfromfocusingupon‘actsofterror’themselvestothethoughtsand ideasthatcould

leadtoviolence(HörnqvistandFlyghed,2012).

Mostconceptualisationsof ‘radicalisation’suggestthat it is ‘aprocessofsocialandpsychologicalchange,which insomecases,canprecede

involvement in terrorism’ (Braddock and Horgan, 2016: 385). This ‘process’ definitionwas adopted by the UK government and used in its

definition of ‘radicalisation’. The June 2011 CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy (updated to its fourth edition in June 2018)15 states that

‘Radicalisation refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism’ (HM

Government, 2011b: 108).One of the benefits of conceptualising ‘radicalisation’ as a ‘process’ at a policy level is that it implies there are

variousincrementalstagesthroughwhichanindividualisrequiredtoproceedbeforetheybecome‘fullyradicalised’.Theoretically,atleast,this

meansthatthereisthepotentialtointerveneinsomeone’slife,typicallywhentheyareyoung,beforetheir‘radical’ideasleadthemtocommit

anactof‘terrorism’.

14MarkSedgwick (2010:480)notes that ‘radicalisation’washardly referredtoby theUKprintmediaprior to2001;yet,press references to ‘radicalisation’significantlyincreasedfrom2005onwards(doublingbetween2005and2006),peakinginusagein2007.15CONTESTfirstemergedin2003andhasbeenupdatedin2006,2011and2018.

18

However,thewiderpsychologicalliteraturequeriesthisdirectlinkbetweenideasandactionsandsuggeststhat‘ideologicalradicalisation’does

notnecessarilyprecedeandleadto‘behaviouralradicalisation’andtakingpartinviolentacts(BjørgoandHorgan,2009;HorganandBraddock,

2010). Insteadof focusinguponthe ‘de-radicalisation’ofbeliefsystems,Horgan(2009)suggeststhatthefocusshouldbeuponencouraging

disengagementfromviolence(seealsoFinkandHearne,2008;SchuurmanandBakker,2016).Aninterestingpracticalexampleofprioritising

disengagementratherthan‘de-radicalisation’istheEXITSwedenproject,whichworkswithyoungpeopleseekingtoleaveneo-Naziandfar-

rightmovements.Thisexamplewillbediscussedatgreaterlengthinsection2.

Afurtherdifficultywiththe‘process’metaphoristhatnotonlydoesitlacktheempiricaldatatosupportsuchsuppositions,butthefocusof

interventiontendstobeattheindividualandpsychologicallevel.Thisapproachminimisesthewiderpolitical,socialandstructuralcontextin

which ‘radicalisation’ occurs (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011; Schmidt, 2014). Reducing the concept to focus purely upon the psycho-

pathologyoftheindividualignoresthepotentialforviewing‘radicalisation’asinvolvingacollectiveinter-groupconflictdynamicof‘us’against

‘them’(McCauleyandMoskalenko,2017),whichintheNorthernIrelandcontextappearsparticularlyrelevant.

InaUKcontext,theCONTEST‘counter-terrorism’policycontainsfourstrands:Pursue,Prevent,ProtectandPrepare.Thefocuswithin‘Prevent’

isuponthe ‘pathway’analogyof ‘radicalisation’asaprocessand theaim is tostop ‘terrorism’,basedona ‘warped’ ideologyorworldview,

beforeitoccurs(Heath-Kelly,2017):

The stated objective of the counter-radicalisation assemblage is to anticipate threat and enable intervention at the earliest

possible stage. In particular, the knowledge practices that cast radicalisation as a social process or continuum suggest the

possibilityofearlyidentificationandinterventioninthelifeworldsofpotentialfutureradicals(DeGoedeandSimon,2013:317).

ThefocusonIslamicextremism,andonMuslimyoungpeopleinparticular,withinthePreventstrandhasledtoaccusationsthatthepolicyis

creatinganew‘suspectcommunity’ intheUKthathasbeendisproportionately impacteduponby‘racialprofiling’, inapolicingandsecurity

19

context (Hillyard, 1993; Hickman et al., 2012; Choudhury, 2017). As part of the pre-emptive ‘counter-radicalisation’ efforts in the UK, the

CHANNELprogrammewasestablished in2007toprovidetargeted interventions(includingmentoring)forthose ‘vulnerable’ individualswho

aredisplayingsignsofbeing‘radicalised’(SukariehandTannock,2015:25).Theveryyoungageatwhichsomeyoungpeoplearereferredtothe

initiative (someunder12yearsold)has,however,beencalled intoquestion (CoppockandMcGovern,2014;Elshimi,2015).16TheCHANNEL

mentoringprogrammewillbeconsideredfurtherinsection2.

InEnglandandWales,theCounterTerrorismandSecurityAct(2015)placesalegaldutyonallpublicbodiesto‘have“dueregardtotheneedto

preventpeoplefrombeingdrawnintoterrorism”’(Choudhury,2017:239).Thisplacesastatutoryrequirementonhealthprofessionals,social

workers,teachers,universitystaff,youthworkersandotherstoreport individualstotheauthorities inthosecases inwhichtheybelievethe

individualtobe‘vulnerable’to‘radicalisation’(SpalekandDavies,2012).17

Anumberofguidesandrisk-assessmentmatrices (nominalscalesorchecklistmenus,suchastheVERA2assessmentscaleused intheUK),

havebeenproducedtoassistfront-linepractitionersspotthesignsof‘radicalisation’(Klausenetal.,2016:69–90;Sarma,2017:281).Typically,

themore‘riskfactors’thataretickedoffonthelist,themore‘atrisk’theyoungpersonistobeing‘radicalised’(HerringtonandRoberts,2012).

Asidefromtheethicalissuesinherentinthe‘enlistmentoftheprofessionsintofunctionsofintelligencegathering’(Ragazzi,2017:172;seealso

StanleyandGuru,2015;SewellandHulusi,2016),whichispresentedasnodifferentfromotherformsofmanagingriskandchildsafeguarding

16Elshimi(2015:121)notesthat:‘Ofthe1,120individualsidentifiedbyCHANNELbetween2007and2010,290wereunder16years,and55wereunder12years(HO2011,59). Therefore, a high proportion of individuals identified by CHANNEL was below the age of 16 years, with some being under 12 years. Ultimately, the CHANNELprogramme, whichmakes de-radicalisation interventions possible, strongly exemplifies the workings of disciplinary technology in the technology of the self.’ Similarly,Coppock(2014,p.118)statesthat:‘TheUKHomeOffice(HerMajesty’sGovernment,2013)reportsthatinthefiveyearsfrom2007to2012,2,500individualswerereferredtoCHANNELprojectpractitionersfor‘support’.Ofthese,over500wereyoungpeople;290wereunder16yearsoldand55wereunder12yearsold.Over90%wereMuslim.IthasbeenreportedthatschoolstudentshavebeenreferredthroughCHANNELaftermakingstrongpro-Palestinianstatements.’17Theintroductionofthelegislationseemstohaveimpacteduponthenumberofreferralsto‘counter-radicalisation’programmessuchasCHANNEL.Indeed,inthefirstyearafterthelegislationcameintoeffectinJuly2015,thenumberofoverallreferralstoCHANNELincreasedby75%(to4,611),whilereferralsfromschoolstaffmorethandoubled(from537to1,121;seeChoudhury,2017:239).

20

(deGoedeandSimon,2013;O’Donnell,2016),thesemeasurementtoolshavebeencritiquedonanumberoffronts.Suchchecklistapproaches

tendtolackempiricalevidencesupportingwhytheyfocusuponvarious‘riskfactors’inparticular18(Sarma,2017).Theyalsorequirestaffwith

verylittleknowledgeortraininginrelationto‘radicalisation’tomakesubjectivejudgements,shapedbyalackofknowledgeorstereotypical

viewsofminorityethniccommunities(Coppock,2014;CoppockandMcGovern,2014;SukariehandTannock,2015;JeromeandElwick,2019).19

Despite numerous criticisms, the UK counter-terrorism strategy has been very influential in the development of similar strategies in other

countries (suchastheUS,which launcheda ‘CounteringViolentExtremism’strategy in2011;seeKlausenetal.,2016).TheBRAVE(Building

Resilience Against Violent Extremism) model of ‘counter-radicalisation’ in the US promotes the ‘public health’ approach to ‘risk’ and

‘vulnerability’ (referred to previously in relation to ‘gangs’), which focuses upon building ‘resilience’ to ‘radicalisation’, in particular by

supporting families toprovide ‘protectivenetworks’ for their childrenwhomaybe ‘vulnerable’ to ‘radicalisation’ (Weineetal., 2009,2016;

Weine,2012;Alyetal.,2014;Mirahmadi,2016).OneoftheprojectsoftheStGilesTrustisbaseduponthisBRAVEModel,albeitinanEnglish

context,andwillbediscussedfurtherinsection2.

Itisimportanttobearinmindthatwhiletheterminologyandconceptsbehindtheworkonyoungpeopleand‘gangs’and‘radicalisation’may

tendtohaveadifferentleveloffocus–theformertendingtoprioritisethesocialcontextandconditionsforjoiningandthelattertendingto

focusontheviolent ideology/ideasof the individual–engagementwithyoungpeople inbotha ‘gangs’anda ‘terrorism’contextultimately

seeks to achieve the same ends: to prevent young people from joining them (prevention); or to support them to leave the life behind

18However,somepupilstakingafamilyholidayhometovisitfamilymembersincountriessuchasPakistanorAfghanistanhavebeenreferredforinterventionincasetheyattended‘terrortraining’camps(seeCoppockandMcGovern,2014).19CoppockandMcGovern (2014:249)note in relation toa guideproduced for theDepartmentof Education inEngland: ‘In LearningTogether toBe Safe:A toolkit tocontribute to thepreventionof violent extremism (Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF), 2008), teachers aregivenadviceon “what canmakea youngpersonsusceptibletoadoptingextremistviewsandsupportingviolence”,asfollows:“maybeginwithasearchforanswerstoquestionsaboutidentity,faithandbelonging;maybedrivenbythedesirefor‘adventure’andexcitement;maybedrivenbyadesiretoenhancetheself-esteemoftheindividual”.’

21

(desistance). There are currently a number of innovative approacheswithin both the ‘gang-related’ and ‘radicalisation’ paradigms that are

seekingtodojustthat.Itistoananalysisofthesecasestudiesthatthisreportnowturns.

22

2.3Comparingmodelsofyouthworkintervention

Projectdetails Keythemes Programmeandactivities Outcomes?

STREET:(StrategytoReach,Empower,andEducateTeenagers)

‘Counter-radicalisation’programmeledbylocalcommunitySalafists.

Brixton,SouthLondon

FundedbyHomeOffice.Theprojectcametoanendinmid-2011whenthenewBritishcoalitiongovernmentchangedstrategywithinthecounter-terrorismpolicy(anddecidednottofundgroups

FocusonPREVENTION

Community-led

TheuniquenessofSTREETwasthatitwasacommunity-ledinitiativebylocalSalafists20inBrixton–withmanystaffandSTREETmentorsbeingfromthelocalcommunityorthemselvesMuslimconverts,likethosetheyworkedwith.

Whoisengaged?

Youngpeople(predominantlyAfro-Caribbeancommunityaged15–25)‘atrisk’ofengagingin‘anti-socialbehaviour,‘gang’violence,or‘terrorism’.Manyyoungpeoplecamefrombackgroundswhereviolence,emotionalorphysicalabuse,lowself-esteem,isolationandlowaspirationswerecommon.

STREET undertook a detailed risk-assessment of a person’s backgroundand potential ‘vulnerabilities’. STREETdeveloped its assessment frameworkforthose‘atrisk’ofengaginginviolentextremism.Staffwereexpectedtohave‘corecompetencies’inatleastthreeoffive‘influencerfactors’:

• Emotionalwell-being;

• Socialexclusionandestrangement;

• Perceivedgrievanceandinjustice;

• Foreignpolicy;

• Religiousextremistideology.

STREETstaffusedtheassessmenttohighlightthestrengthofinfluencerfactorsvis-à-visprotectivefactorsandtailorinterventionsaccordingly.If

EvaluationbyJackBarclayfromtheCentreonGlobalCounter-TerrorismCooperationfoundthatintervieweesfromthestatutorysector(includingthepolice)andalsoacademicswhohadengagedwiththeprojectbelievedtheimpacttobeoverwhelminglypositive.

Theevaluationfoundthefollowingimportantsuccessfactors:

• Anexistingbackgroundincounteringviolentextremismprotectscredibilitywiththelocalcommunityagainstclaimsby‘spoilers’ofa‘governmentfront’;

• Operationalindependencefromstatutorypartnershelpedmaintaincredibility;

• Educated,dedicatedandknowledgeablestaffwiththe

20 A conservative theological branchwithin Sunni Islamwhich is promoted by the governing regime in Saudi Arabia. AsGithens-Mazer and Lambert (2010: 895) note:‘SalafismisdistinctfromotherIslamicreligiousorientations.Itisbased,initsessence,onabeliefthatIslammustreturntoitstwokeysources—theQur’anandtheHadith—andreorientatetheirfaith,beliefandpracticeinordertobelikethe‘CompanionsoftheProphets’.Tothisextent,Salafis(sic)perceiveanyformofreligioustraditionoutsidetheimmediatetextualboundariesofthesesourcesasdeviationsfromthosetenetsmandatedbyGodthroughhisProphet,Muhammad.’

23

withconservativemoralandworldbeliefs,suchastheSalafists,whomayhave‘street-cred’withyoungdisaffectedMuslims).

STREETmaintained‘operationalindependence’fromthestate,whiledevelopingtermsofengagementwithorganisationssuchaspoliticiansandtheYouthOffenderService.Informationwouldnotnecessarilybesharedwiththeotherpartnersunlessdeemednecessary.

Purposeandapproach:

‘Foryou,bypeoplelikeyou.’

STREETstaffandmentorschallengeIslamicextremism‘onthestreet’byadoptingaresponsetailoredtoindividualyoungpersons’needsincluding:

• emotionalwell-being(counselling);

• helpwithemploymentortraining;

• personaldevelopment;

• faith-basedworkto‘motivatepersonalreformandencouragepositivecitizenship’,toprovideamoregroundedandtextualunderstandingofparticularIslamicteachingsonissuessuchascitizenship.

required,STREETstaffdrewonastrongertheologicalinterventioncalledtheDeconstructprogramme–whichaimedtohighlighthowal-Qa’idaandothersusevideosandtheinternetto‘distortthetruth’andputouttheirmessage,regardlessofitsveracity.

• Challenginginfluencesanddecision-makingthatmaycausesomeonetolegitimateviolence;

• Improvingconfidenceandself-belief,increasingresistancetonegativeinfluences;

• Providinga‘safespace’foryoungpeopletodebateproblemsandissuesbotheringthem,andaddressfeelingsofdisempowermentandmarginalisation;

• Unlocking‘socialcapital’ofindividualsthrougheducationalandvocationaltraining.

abilitytochallengeparticularnarratives;

• Robustmethodologicalrigourinriskassessmentprocess;

• Addressingwiderissuesinrelationto‘radicalisation’isimportant–includingpoverty,educationalattainment,mentalhealthandaddiction.

CHANNEL:PartofthePREVENTstrandoftheCONTESTcounter-terrorismstrategy.

Firstpilotedin2007andextendedacross

FocusonPREVENTION(safeguarding)

Multi-agencyapproach

Establishedasgovtpolicy/legislation:

Counter-TerrorismandSecurityActmade‘spottingthesigns’of

• Afterreferral,a‘CHANNELlpanel’isconvened(monthly),chairedbythelocalauthorityandattendedbyeducation,socialservicesandhealthcarerepresentatives.

ImpactassessmenthasproveddifficultasCHANNELfocusesonthepre-criminalspace,atthelevelofideasbefore‘terrorism’orviolentbehaviouroccurs.

• In2017/18,ofthe7,318

24

EnglandandWalesinApril2012.

ParticipationbecameastatutorydutyforlocalauthoritiesinEnglandandWalesundertheCounter-TerrorismandSecurityAct2015.

‘radicalisation’astatutoryrequirementforalllocalauthoritiesinEnglandandWales.

ReferralsforCHANNELcomefrom:police,socialservices,medicalprofessionals(includingGPsanddentists),youthworkers,teachers,universitystaffandsocialworkers.EducationbodiesnowaccountformorereferralstoPREVENTthananyothersector(35%in2017/18).

Trainingsessionsandhandbooksareavailableforstatutorystafftoassistthemtospotthesignsof‘radicalisation’atanearlystage,predominantlyamongstyoungpeople.

Whoisengaged?

CHANNELisprimarilyfocusedonthosewhohaveyettocommitacriminalact,butwhoitisthoughtmaypotentiallydoso.

Aimedatthosedeemed‘vulnerable’to‘radicalisation’tosafeguardthose‘atrisk’ofbeingdrawnintoanyformofextremismor‘terrorism’(includingIslamicorright-wing‘terrorism’).

In2017/18,62%ofthe1,314referralswere20yearsofageoryoungerand86%

• Eachreferralisdiscussed,andasuitable‘packageofsupport’agreed.

• Ifidentified‘vulnerabilities’arenot‘terror-related’,thenthepersonisreferredtoexistingmainstreamsupportservices(mentalhealth,counselling,addiction,etc.).

ParticipationinCHANNELisvoluntary(ifthepersonisunder18,parentalorguardianconsentmustbegained)andissupposedtobeconfidential.

VaryingtypesofsupportareavailableforthosereferredtotheCHANNELprogramme.Theseinclude:

• Mentalhealthservicesupport;

• Educationalandemploymentsupport;

• One-to-oneideologicalortheologicalmentoringfromaCHANNELInterventionProvider.

referralsmadetoPREVENT,18%(1,314)werediscussedataninter-statutoryCHANNELpanel.

• 70%ofthosereferredtoCHANNELweredeemednottorequirespecificintervention.

• 30%(394)receivedsupportthroughtheprogramme,76%ofwhomhavenowlefttheprogramme(298).

Theprogrammehasbeenpoliticallycontentious.

Thefocusonthethoughtsandideasofpeoplewhohaveyettocommitacriminalact,butwhoitisthoughtmaypotentiallydoso(ratherthanbeingjudgedonbehaviour)hasbeenwidelycriticisedasthestateoversteppingitsremitintermsofanOrwelliansurveillanceofcitizenspriortothemcommittinganyactualoffence.

Guidelineshavebeencritiquedas‘unscientific’,basedonprejudiceandassumptions,andencouragingfront-linestaffto‘seerisk’wheretheremaybenone.

ABehaviouralInsightsTeamreport(2018)foundthatmorethan95%of33

25

weremale.

Purposeandapproach:

• Identifyindividuals‘atrisk’;

• Assessthenatureandextentofthe‘risk’;

• Developanappropriateindividualsupportplan.

‘de-radicalisation’schemesassociatedwithPREVENTasacounter-terrorstrategywereineffectiveorfailing.Onlytwoprogrammeswerefoundtobeeffective.

AashaGangMediationProject:AprojectcoordinatedbyOsmaniTrustinTowerHamlets(UK)between2003–2016.

Projectaimedtosupportlocalyoungpeople‘vulnerable’tojoiningagang.

TowerHamletshasbeenafocalpointofthePreventingViolentExtremism(PVE)fundofPREVENT.OnlyBradfordandBirminghamreceivedmore‘anti-terror’and‘de-radicalisation’funding.

FocusonPREVENTION

Community-led

Whoisengaged?

Focusonchangingtheideasofyoungpeopleto(hopefully)alterlaterbehaviour.

Purposeandapproach

Peer-to-peerengagementmodeltoreduceterritoriallyassociatedviolenceandcriminality:

• Accreditedtraining;

• Diversion:Excursionstohighlightalternativeactivitiesto‘gang’culture;

• One-to-onementoringandpersonaldevelopment;

• Streetoutreach;

In2015/16Aasha:

• Reachedoutto270localyoungpeopleinavarietyofactivities(109ofwhomwereunder19yearsofage);

• 88youngpeoplewererecruitedaspeer-to-peermentors;

• 25youngpeoplewereinnationally-recognisedaccreditedtraining;

• 21workshopson‘gangs’,drugsandanti-socialbehaviourweredelivered;

• Twocommunityeventschallenging‘gang-culture’wereheld(attendedby340peoplefromthelocalcommunity);

• Aashastaffmediatedin12

Arelativelysmall(24)internalevaluationbasedonself-reportedchangeidentifiedprogressinanumberofareas(2016).

Anexternalevaluation(2011)foundthattheOsmaniTrusthadbuiltuprelationshipswithyoungpeoplewithinthecommunityoveryearsbeforetryingtodeliverwhatwasperceivedbysomeasacontroversialprogramme(PREVENT)directedtowardstheircommunity(Muslims).

Evenwithpriorwork,astronglocalbase,and‘culturalcompetence’todealwithidentity,faithandviolence,ittooktimetobuildrelationshipstodealwithsensitiveissuesassociatedwiththecounter-terrorismstrategy.

Theexternalevaluationfoundthattheprojecthadmoreimpactonyoung

26

• Gangmediationintimesofcrisisorviolence.

De-glamorisationusingpositiverolemodelsfromthelocalcommunity,andinparticular,youngpeoplewhowereformer‘gang’membersbutwhohadultimatelychangedtheirlifestyleforthebetter.

gang-relatedincidents.

peoplebyfocusinguponissuessuchaseducation,promotingvolunteeringandcivicengagementthantheinitialnarrowerremitfocusedonchallengingfaith-basedextremism.Theevaluationconcludedthatthiswasdrivenbylocalpriorities,whichfoundthatIslamicradicalisationwasalessimportantasariskfactorforyoungpeoplethanothervulnerabilitiesandconcluded:‘Comparedtothatofthefunder,thismayrepresentaslightlydifferentmodelofwhat‘violentextremism’isandhowitshouldbeaddressed.’

EXITSweden:

Establishedin1998inStockholmtoworkwithpeople(predominantlyyoungmen)seekingtoleavetheneo-Naziandfar-rightsubculture.

Basedonthepremisethatyoungpeoplejoinwhitesupremacistmovementsfrompersonalandsocialcircumstances–

FocusonDESISTENCE

Voluntary-led/policecooperation

EXITSwedenispartofFryshuset(YMCAnetwork),fundedprimarilybygrantsfromtheSwedishgovernment.

Whoisengaged?

People(mostlyyoungmen)seekingtoleavetheneo-Naziandfar-rightsubculture.

Referralsaretakenpurelyonavoluntary,self-referralbasis.Trustiscrucial.Moststaffareformermembersoffar-rightgroups,andhavebeenthroughasimilarprocess.Engagement

Assessmentismadeona‘violentextremism’spectrumrangingfrom-10(mostextreme)to+10(mostpositive).Staffapplythescalebasedonmanyfactors–socialconnectedness,levelsoftolerance,(power)relationswithothers,willingnesstouseviolence,socialskills,etc.Thisnumericalspectrumisusedtotailorinterventions.Todealwithsomeoneatthe-10endwillrequireastaffmemberwhohasalsobeenatthatlevelofextremism.Differentstaffareusedatdifferingtimesintheinterventionandmentoringprocess,dependingonwheretheyoungpersonis,atthat

Since1998,EXITSwedenhasworkedwith800individuals,helpingthemleavefar-rightgroups.ThereisnopubliclyavailabledataonrecidivismlevelsforparticipantsinEXITSweden,butsincetheyear2000,recidivismlevelsofparticipantsintheEXITGermanyprogrammeareestimatedtobeaslowas3%.

27

feelingexcludedfromsocietyordisconnectedtoothers–ratherthaninherentbeliefinideology.

Joiningfar-rightgroupsisassociatedwithasearchforidentity,statusandpower.

withclientscanlastfromseveralmonthstoseveralyears.

Purposeandapproach:

EXITSwedensupportsclientstobuildanewsocialidentityforthemselves,inwhichtheirformerworldview/ideologywillnolonger‘makesense’.

Crucialtotheengagementinbothprojectshavebeenqualifiedstaffwhothemselveshavepersonalexperienceoftheissueswithwhichtheyareworking.

Themainmethodistotrainparticipantstomeetnewpeopleandhandlenewrelationshipsandsituationsthataredifferenttowhentheywereinthewhitepowermovement,whichinturnmakesthemlessdependentontheirformerneedforpowerandcontrol.Gradually,anextremistworldviewstopsmakingsense.

EXITSwedenusestherapeuticdialogue,mentoringschemesandotheractivitiestosupportclientstodevelopalternativeworldviews,self-understandingandinternallycritiquetheidentitytheyhaveascribedtothemselves.

particulartime.

Theprogrammeincludes:

• Personalmeetingsandacontactperson(initiallyavailableatalltimes,ifneeded);

• Assistancetoliaisewithgovernmentagencies(housing,socialservices,probation,police,etc.);

• Supportforfamilyandfriends;

• Counselling,managingconflictsessionsandpsychotherapytoclientsaswellasparents,siblings,partnersandothers;

• Socialactivities(sports,music,etc.)andtrainingtoencourageparticipantstocarveoutanewsocialidentityforthemselvesawayfromnegativepeergroup;

• Helpwitheducational/vocationaltrainingandfindingajob;

• Practicalassistancewiththeremovaloffar-righttattoosandemblems.

28

‘Mechelenmodel’:foundedontheprinciplesandvaluesofinclusion.

MechelenisacityinBelgium(Flanders).AlargeproportionofMechelen’simmigrantpopulationwereborninBelgiumofMoroccandescentandoftenexperiencedastruggletobalancethedifferingculturesandexperiences.

Thesedifficultieswereexacerbatedbypopulist(andattimesxenophobic)reactiontoimmigrantcommunitiesfollowingthe‘terrorist’attacksinParisandBrussels.

FocusonPREVENTION

Localauthority-led

Whoisengaged?

Integrationofwholecity

Purposeandapproach:

Theproblemof‘radicalisation’wasre-conceptualisedasmarginalisation.Mechelenacknowledgedthatsocio-economicconditionsofdeprivation,socialexclusionandalackofopportunitieswerecultivatingconditionsthatenabledgroupssuchasSharia4Belgiumto‘radicalise’andexploityoungpeople:

‘Wedon’tneedmorepoliceorspeciallaws.Thefirstthingtodoishaveaninclusivepolicyatthelocallevel,youneedtocreatesecurityinyourcity,don’tallowneighbourhoodstobewithoutservices,withcriminalsasrolemodels.Inmanycitiespeopledon’tlivewitheachotherbutnexttoeachother,inarchipelagosofmonoculturalsocieties.’

• Safety–applicationofthelawiscriticaltopreventthecreationofavacuum.Responsibilitydoesnot,however,falljusttolawenforcementagenciesorthecriminaljusticesystem.InMechelen,an‘OlderBrothersProgramme’operatesduringsummermonthsandholidayperiods,withyounginternsbeingappointedtoworkintheircommunitiestotellotheryoungpeopletoobservesocialandcivicresponsibility.Thiscreatesleadershipandmentoringskillsininternsandmaymakethemmoreactivelythinkaboutsocietalnormsandbehaviour;

• Developanewnarrativeofdiversitythatallcitizenscaninputintoorconnectwith.

• Avoidgroup-thinkthatresultsinfurtherdemarcationinsocietalgroupsratherthanpromotingengagementandinclusion;

• Counteractsegregationinsociety,e.g.inschools;

• Appreciatetheever-changing

WhencomparedwiththeneighbouringtownofVilvoorde,theimpactofthe‘Mechelenmodel’isstark.VilvoordeishalfthesizeofMechelenbuthasbeenasourceof28jihadisconnectedwiththeoutlawedIslamistgroupSharia4Belgium.TheMayorofMechelenestimatedthatbutfortheimplementationofthe‘Mechelenmodel’,25residentswouldhavelefttojoinjihadinSyriaorIraqbasedontheregionalaverage.

29

dynamicsoftownsandcities;

• Discusscommonvaluesthatunderpinsocietyasabridgingtoolbetweenindividuals;

• CombatWahabistpropaganda.

CommunityInitiativetoReduceViolence(CIRV):wasestablishedinGlasgowin2008bytheViolenceReductionUnit,managedandledbytheStrathclydePolice.

TheaimsofthementoringaspectoftheCIRVprojectwereto:

• Reduceoffending(includinganti-socialbehaviour)rates;

• Encourageparticipantstoconsider

FocusonDESISTENCE

Police-led

Whoisengaged?129street‘gang’memberswereinvitedtoapublicmeeting(heldatGlasgowSheriffCourt)–andtoldthat‘Theviolencemuststop’.Voluntaryfollow-upmeetingswereheldwithnon-policestafffromtheprogramme(usually‘onthestreet’).Participantswereaskedtosignawrittenpledgethattheywoulddesistfrom‘gang’activity.Withintheparametersoflaw,collectiveresponsibilitywasexpectedfrom‘gangs’–ifone‘gang’memberbrokethenon-violenceagreement,theentire‘gang’wasinviolation.

Purposeandapproach:

‘Focuseddeterrencestrategy’promotedbytheBostonCeasefireprojectandtheCincinnatiInitiativetoReduceViolence.

Adopteda‘publichealthapproach’(like

ThreecorecomponentstoCIRV:

• Themoralvoiceofthecommunity.

• Enforcement–disruptingtheactivitiesofgangsviaintelligencegathering;‘gang’violenceanalysis;andgrouptargetedenforcement.

• Servicesandprogrammes:

Coursesandtrainingofferedtoyoung(predominantlymale)‘gang’membersincluding:

• Personaldevelopment;

• Employability;

• Mentoring;

• Intensivesupport;

• Diversionaryactivities(includingsport).

Afull-timefour-weekcourse(TacklingGangViolenceProgramme)for‘gang’

Interimtwo-yearevaluationfoundthattheCIRVmodelhadcontributedto:

• A46%reductioninviolentoffendingbyparticipating‘gang’members;

• A34%reductioninallothertypesofcrimesandoffencesbyparticipating‘gang’members;

• ‘Gang’fightingwasreducedbyapproximately73%andweaponpossessionreducedby85%;

• Violentoffendingforthemost‘atrisk’membersreducedby56%(andoffendingamongstthiscohortforotheroffencesreducedby34%);

• Participantswhoengagedwithintensivementoringreducedtheirviolentactivityby73%andtheircriminalbehaviourby62%;

• CIRVclientsonaveragereduced

30

victimissues;

• Reducenegativepeerassociation;

• Improveself-esteem;

• Helpsupportparentsandcarers;

• Supportaccesstoeducation;

• Reducealcoholanddruguse.

illness,violenceis‘preventable’)tocoordinateexistingwork,whichhadtendedtoworkindependently–inthebeliefthatuncoordinatedresponsesfocusedonenforcementhadpreviously‘failed’.

Takesapartnershipapproachincludingthepolice,socialservices,education,housingandcommunitysafety,alongsidethelocalcommunity.

membersinvolvedinhighlevelsofviolence.Thecoursedeliberatelyincludesmembersfromdiffering‘gangs’,‘forcing’themtomeetandengageindialogue.Usingsports(includingmartialarts)fromtrainedinstructors(someofwhomareformer‘gang’members),coursecontentincludedsessionsonterritorialismandtheimpactof‘gang’violenceonthelocalcommunity,anti-knifecrimeawareness,drugandalcoholawareness,motivationalworkshops,employmentregistrationanda‘careeressentials’programme,workshopsonvisualisation,affirmationandemotionalintelligenceandconflictresolutionworkshopsandteam-buildingactivities.

Followinggraduation–andiftheyhadnotreoffendedduringtheperiod–youngparticipantsproceededtoafour-week‘Employabilityprogramme’.

Amentoringservice,providedbytheIncludemcharitywasacorecomponentofthewrap-aroundservicesprovided.Thisone-to-onementoringsupport(byreferral)tookplacewiththose‘gang’membersdeemedtobethe‘highestrisk’andthosewhohavetendednottoengagewithotherservicesprovided

theirviolencelevelsbyapproximately22%morethanthose‘gang’memberswhodidnotparticipate.

Theresultsofthefinalevaluation(Williamsetal.,2014),usingbeforeandafteranalysisalongsideanon-participatingcomparisongroup,foundthatforthe167youngmen(aged16–29)whoengagedintheresearchforbetweenoneanduptotwoyearsfollowingtheirparticipationinCIRV:

• Violentoffendingreducedby52%forCIRVparticipantscomparedto29%fornon-participating‘gang’members;

• TherateofphysicalviolencewasnotovertlydifferentbetweenCIRVandnon-CIRV‘gang’membersevenafterparticipation;

• Buttherateofweaponscarryingreducedby84%forCIRVparticipantscomparedto40%fornon-participants.

31

withintheCIRVpartnership.

A‘TrainingofTrainers’componentwasdeliveredtoover80staffofpartnerorganisations(aswellasex-‘gang’members),toenablethemtoworkwithyoung‘gang’membersinthefutureandensuresustainability.

OtheraspectsoftheprogrammeincludedtheCIRVEastEndFootballLeague,andanImpactYouthprogrammeforunder16stoimprovehealth,lifestylechoicesandreduceanti-socialbehaviour.

FightforPeace:FoundedbyLukeDowdneyinRiodeJaneiroin2000andopenedanotherbaseinNewham,EastLondonin2007.

Utilisesboxingandmartialarts,alongsideeducationandpersonaldevelopment.Theprogrammespecificallyaimstoworkindisadvantagedareas,

FocusonBOTHPREVENTIONANDDESISTENCE

Voluntaryorganisation

Personalapproach

Whoisengaged?Youngpeoplefromdisadvantagedbackgroundsto‘realisetheirfullpotential’.

Purposeandapproach:

FightforPeacedrawsona‘publichealth’modeltoviolencepreventionandfocusesonthreecoreareas:

• Promotingthesocio-economicinclusionofthoseaffectedby

Fivepillars:

• Boxingandmartialarts:A‘hook’toencourageyoungpeopletojointheprogramme.Thesportsarealsousedtoencouragediscipline,self-controlandpromotemorepositivelevelsofself-esteem;

• Education:Educationalopportunitiesforyoungpeoplemarginalisedor‘failing’inmainstreameducationorwhoarenotattendingschool;

• Employability:Trainingandvocationalcoursesand

In2018,1,256youngpeopletookpartintheevaluationinRioand727tookpartinLondon(seeFightforPeace,2018):

DataforLondon(%):

Lesslikelytocarryaweapon

80

Lesslikelytocommitacrime

87

Lesslikelytobepartofagang

80

32

whicharedisproportionatelyimpactedbycrimeandviolence.

The‘TheoryofChange’oftheprogrammeisbasedontheassumptionthat‘ayoungperson’sbehaviour,situationandthechoicestheymake,aredependentonthewaytheyseethemselves,howtheyrelatetoothers,andhowtheyseetheirfuture’.

crimeandviolence;

• Supportingthoseyoungpeopleidentifiedasbeing‘atrisk’ofengagingincrimeandviolence;

• Supportingyoungpeopletodisengagefromcrimeandviolenceandhelptheireffortsnottoreoffend.

opportunitiestoengagewithpotentialemployers(particularlyintheprivatesector);

• Supportservices:Includesmentoring,medicalandlegalreferrals,homevisitsandcommunityoutreach;

• Youthleadership:Youngparticipantsareencouragedintoleadershiprolestopromote‘activecitizenship’bybecomingmembersoftheYouthCouncil,whichliaisesontheorganisation’sbehalfwithexternalorganisations.

InRioin2018,410youngpeoplegainedjobinterviewsthroughemploymentsupportand42youngpeoplegainedemployment.

DataistakenfromFightforPeaceandisnotindependent.Anexternalevaluation(peer-reviewedaspartofProjectOracle2013)oftheRioandLondonprojectsfoundthattheprogrammewas‘highlysuccessful’.Thisexternalevaluationalsofoundthattheorganisationencouragedreflectionandadaptivepracticeamongstbothyoungpeopleandstaff.

FightforPeaceAlliancehastrainedmorethan160organisationsacross25countries.

StGilesTrust:WorkstoresettleandreintegrateoffendersonreleasefromprisoninCamberwell,London.

Theprojectoperatesonapeer-to-peerbasistotrainandassistnewlyreleasedoffenders,workingwith3,000offenders

DESISTENCE(SoS)andPREVENTION(SoS+)

Voluntaryorganisation

Whoisengaged?

SOSoffersintensivehelptoyoungpeopleexposedtoorattheriskofbeingavictimofviolence,‘vulnerability’orexploitation.

TheSOS+programmefocusesonpreventingyoungpeoplefrombecoming

SOS+

Thecourseisdeliveredbytrainedprofessionalswithdirect,personal,livedexperienceoftheissuestheyarespeakingabout.Theprojectaimsto:

• Debunkmythsandstereotypesaroundthe‘glamorous’lifestyleassociatedwith‘gangs’,crime,weaponsandtochallengesocialmediabyexposingtherealitiesofnegativelifestylechoices;

In2017/18:517peopleweretrainedasPeerAdvisors;4,793werehelpedtofindapermanenthome;795clientswerehelpedtofindpaidwork;aneconomicanalysisfoundan£8.34savingforevery£1investedinpeer-ledservicesthroughtheStGilesTrust.

TheSocialInnovationPartnership(TSIP)evaluationintotheSOSprojectin2012/13found:

• 87%ofclientintervieweessaid

33

inthelasttenyears.Theprojectmakescontactwithprisonleaversfourweekspriortotheirrelease.PeerAdvisorsassesseachclient,identifytheirneeds,drawupanagreedactionplanofsupportandliaisewithagenciesbothwithintheprisonandinthecommunity.

Withspecificreferencetoyoungpeopleand‘gang’involvement,StGilesTrustoperatestwoprogrammes:SOSandSOS+.

involvedin‘gangs’throughaseriesofinteractivesessionsinschools,pupilreferralunitsandcollegesthatprovidepracticaltoolsonhowtostayclearof‘gangs’,violenceandcrime.

Purposeandapproach:

SOS

Selected,trainedindividualsofcomparablebackgroundstotheyoungpeopleutilisetheirpersonalandprofessionalexperiencetorelateto,supportandmentor‘at-risk’youngpeople.‘CountyLines’,whichoffersflexiblesupportforyoungpeopledrawnintosupplyinganddealingdrugsthroughoronbehalfof‘gangs’.Thefocusistosupporttheyoungpersontoreconnectwithfamilyandpositivesupportnetworksawayfromdrugs,crime,‘gang’involvementandexploitation.

• Imparttoolsandstrategiestoyoungpeoplesothattheycanresistnegativepeerpressureand‘grooming’from‘gangs’;

• Encourageyoungpeopletostayineducationandpositiveactivities.

Eachcourseistailoredtotheindividualneedsofeachgroup,andmodulesincludetopicssuchas:knifecrime;therealitiesofprison;sexualexploitation;andtheimpactonvictims.

thatengagingwiththeSOSprojectchangedtheirattitudetooffending;

• 73%saiditwasimportantthatcaseworkerswereex-offenders;

• 100%agreedorstronglyagreedthattheSOSprojecthelpsclientstostoporreducereoffending.

CountyLinesDemonstrationProject

IndependentresearchbyJHConsulting(2019)found:

• 38childrenandtheirfamilieswereprovidedwithone-to-onesupport,with35remainingengagedwiththeprojectattheendofSept2018.Ofthose,11(31%)childrensuccessfullyexitedCountyLinesactivity;19(54%)childrenweredeemedtobeatdecreasedrisk;

• KentPolicereportedthat50%ofchildrenexperiencedareductioninreportedcrime(eitherasvictimorsuspect)andmissingepisodesacrossthecohorthavehalved.

34

J-ARC:beganinNovember2014inDublin

StartedwithajointprotocolbetweenAnGardaSíochána,theIrishPrisonServiceandtheProbationServiceandaimsto:

• Developandfurtherstrengthenamulti-agencyapproachtothemanagementofcrime;

• Prioritiseoffenderstodevelopinitiativestoaddresstheiroffendingbehaviour;

• Reducecrimeandincreasepublicsafetyinlocalcommunities.

FocusonDESISTENCE

Statutory-led

Whoisengaged?

ACER3:Workingwith20people(involvedinburglary)aroundTallaghtandKevinStreetStations(May2015–December2016).

ChangeWorks:Engagedwith50‘priority’individualsinthefirstquarterof2015andafurther50inthesecondquarter.

STRIVE:Workedwith18‘prolific’offendersaroundEastBallymun(January2015–December2015,andJuly2016–December2016).

Unlike the CIRV model, participants didnothavetoconsent toparticipationbutwere selected after proposal by theGardai (ACER3) or Probation Board(Change Works) or all three partneragencies (STRIVE) and encouraged to‘buyin’toeachpilotprogramme.WithintheSTRIVEpilotinparticular,communityagencies played an important rolealongside statutory agencies in termsofsupportforprojectparticipants.

Whatistheapproach?

Acorecomponentbehindallthreepilotprogrammesisforpersonalplansforaccesstosupport–participantsareexpectedtoadheretoplans(e.g.attendingtheJobCentre).Iftheydonotfollowactionplans,thenthereistheprospectofreturntocustody.

• ACER3:Threeofthe20(15%)offendersdidnotreoffendduringtheobservationperiod,whileninehadpartiallydesisted(45%).Therewasalsoareductionby37%inburglariesbyparticipants.Burglaryoffencesinandaroundthetwotrainstationsreducedby40%duringtheinterventionperiod.However,tenparticipantswerereturnedtoprison;

• ChangeWorks:37%ofparticipants(19of51)didnotreoffend.31%(16)ofparticipantswhoreoffendedwerereturnedtoprison.18(35%)participantsweredeemedtohavecompletedallaspectsoftheirpersonalactionplanandcompletedtheprogramme;

• STRIVE:28%(fiveof18participants)didnotreoffend.Therewasareductionby43%(35fewer)inoffencesbyparticipants.Therewasa57%reductioninarsonoffencesinthegeographicalareaduring

35

Threetwo-yearpilotprogrammesinDublin:

• ACER3:Localdrugtreatmentservicesaswellasemploymentorganisationswerealsoinvolved;

• ChangeWorks:Focuswasonthoseengagedinviolentandharmfulbehaviour.TheBridgeProjectwasinvolvedalongsideJ-ARCpartners;

• STRIVE:TheBallymunSocialRegenerationSub-Committee,theJobCentre,DSP,DCCandLocalDrugsTaskforcealsoinvolvedwithJ-ARCpartneragencies.

thistime,whiledrugoffencesreducedbyapproximately30%(seeJARC,2018).

As the general recidivism rate in theRepublic of Ireland in 2018 wasestimatedat58%(JARC,2018:29),thereview of the external evaluationssuggestedthattheearlyfindingsoftheprogramme were ‘promising’.However,theevaluatorsacknowledgedchallengeswiththeevaluation:

• Nobaselinedata;

• No randomised control groupusedforcomparativepurposes;

• Difficulties in comparing acrossthethreepilots;

• Smallsamplesizes(onlyaround90 individuals were involvedwith the three J-ARC pilots atanyonetime).

ROCA:InterventionistyouthworkmodelinMassachusettssince1988andlaterinBaltimore.

FOCUSONBOTHPREVENTIONANDDESISTENCE

Community-led

Whoisengaged?

Targetsyoungmenwho:

• Areaged17–24yearsold;

Four-stageapproach:

1. A‘relentless’outreachapproachthatinvolvesmembersofROCAconfrontingyoungpeoplewithintheircommunity,withwhomotheryouthprogrammeshavebeenunabletowork,by

ROCAusesa‘SocialSolutions,Outcomes’datacollectionmethodandtrackingonaweekly,monthly,quarterlyandannualbasistochartparticipantprogressandstaffperformance.Thedatacollectedincludescapturingeveryeffortmadetocontactayoungpersonaswellastime

36

• Havebeenpreviouslyarrested;

• Havepriorincarceration;

• Are‘gang-’or‘street-involved’;

• Useordeal‘drugs’;

• Haveapriorjuvenileprobationand/oraprioradultprobation;

• Havedroppedoutofschool.

Purposeandapproach:

ThemottoofROCAis‘lessjail:morefuture’.

ROCA’svisionistodisrupttheexpectedcycleofincarcerationandpovertybyhelpingyoungpeopletransformtheirlives.Theirworkisunderpinnedbyanorganisationaltheorythatwhenyoungpeopleareengagedbypositiveandintensiverelationships,theycanchangetheirbehavioursandtheirlives.

knockingondoors,meetingthematschooland‘persistingwiththem’untiltheyagreetoparticipateintheprogramme.

2. Atransformationalrelationshipapproachtendingtowardsarestorativeapproachinwhichobligationsandresponsibilitiesareattached,notonlytotheyoungperson,butalsotheROCAyouthworker,ona24/7contactbasis.

3. Afocusonthreecoreareas:education;lifeskills;andemployment.

4. Engagementwithexternalorganisationsthatimpactonthelivesofhigh-riskyoungpeople.ROCAadoptsa‘relentlessoutreach’approachindemandingthatexternalorganisationsengagewiththemselvesandtheyoungpeopleinvolvedwiththeprogramme.

loggedbyayoungpersonengagedinprogramming,arisk/needsassessment,theprogressofthetransformationalrelationshipbetweeneachyouthworkerandayoungperson,andoverallprogrammeandstaffevaluation.

In2018,ROCAengagedwith942‘high-risk’youngmen.Ofthese:

• 88%werenotarrestedagainafterengagementinROCA;

• 298(32%)wereintransitionalemployment;

• 267(28%)wereplacedinajob;

• 78%stayedwithROCA;

• 66%heldjobsforoversixmonths.

37

GREAT(GangResistance,EducationandTraining):anevidence-based‘gang’andviolencepreventionprogrammebuiltaroundschool-basedlawenforcementcurricula,whichbeganin1991inPhoenix,Arizona(USA).Thepolicedepartmentwastaskedtodevelopa‘gang’preventionpilotinschools.

FocusonPREVENTION

Police/school-led

Whoisengaged?

Targetedprimarilyatchildrenandyoungpeopleagedjustbelowwhatisconsideredtobetheprimeagesforinductioninto‘gangs’.

Purposeandapproach:

Theprogrammewasdesignedtoreduce‘gang’activitybyeducatingyoungpeopleonhowtoresistpressuretojoin‘gangs’byhavingtrained,uniformedpoliceofficersteachlifeskillstostudents.Atypicalprogrammeincludes13‘middle-school’lessons,asix-lessonelementary-schoolcurriculum,asummercomponentandafamilycomponent.

• Elementaryschoolcomponent:Designedforstudentsaged8–10yearsoldwithafocusonintroducingstudentstoGREATskillsandconcepts.Theprogrammeisdeliveredbyspeciallytrainedanduniformedpoliceofficers.Theprogrammeisstructuredsothatthe30–45-minutelessonsrunconsecutivelywithnomorethantwo-weekgaps.Attheendofeachlesson,aletterdetailingwhatthepurposeofthelessonwas,issenthometoparents.Themesincludeviolenceprevention,stayingsafe,effectivecommunication,angermanagement,respectandcitizenship.

• Middleschoolcomponent:Targetedatyoungpeopleattending‘middle-school’(aged11–16).Trainingisdeliveredbyuniformedpoliceofficers.Themesincludetherelationshipbetweencrime,violence,drugabuseand‘gangs’,beliefsabout‘gangs’andviolence,rolesandresponsibilitiesintheirfamily,

SinceGREATwasestablished,morethan13,000policeofficershavebeentrainedtoteachthecurriculatooversixmillionchildrenandyoungpeople.Havingtrained1,859lawenforcementofficersanddeliveredcurriculatomorethan500,000middleschoolstudents,aUniversityofNebraskaOmahaevaluationoftheprogrammein1995foundthatitwasnotclearlydemonstratingthatitwasmeetingitsgoalsforreducing‘gang’activityandmembership.

AsecondevaluationbytheNationalInstituteforJustice(reviewperiod2006–2012)focusedonstudentswhohadreceivedthemodifiedcurriculum,inordertoassesswhethertheredesignedprogrammewouldensuretheprojectaimswerebeingmet.Theevaluationconcluded:

‘OurmulticomponentevaluationfoundthattheG.R.E.A.T.program[sic]isimplementedasitisintendedandhastheintendedprogrameffectsonyouthgangmembershipandonanumberofriskfactorsandsocialskillsthoughttobeassociatedwithgangmembership.Resultsone-year

38

schoolandcommunities,personalgoals,decision-makingskills,effectivecommunicationskills,active-listeningskills,effectiverefusalskills,anger-managementskills,conflictandviolenceprevention,andconflict-resolutiontechniques.

• Familiescomponent:Asix-sessionfamilystrengtheningprogrammeinwhichparentsandtheirchildrenareengagedingroupactivitiesandfacilitatedgroupdiscussions.Thecurriculumincludesanexplorationofviolence,familyrolesinsafeandhealthycommunities,improvingfamilyrelationships,communicationskills,clear,consistentrules,limitsandtheroleofeffectivedisciplineandmonitoring,addressingbullyingandinternetsafetyforfamilies.

• Summercomponent:Thesummercomponentcomplementsschool-basedcomponents.Theaimsareto:

• Buildonschool-based

post-programshoweda39%reductioninoddsofgangjoiningamongstudentswhoreceivedtheprogramcomparedtothosewhodidnotandanaverageof24%reductioninoddsofgangjoiningacrossthefouryearspost-program.’

Fromaschoolperspective,surveysofteachersandschooladministratorsfoundthat:

• 91%ofteachersandadministratorssupporthavinglawenforcementinschools;

• 94%ofadministratorsand87%ofteacherssupporthavingGREATintheirschools;

• 100%ofadministratorsand83%ofteacherssaythatGREATaddressesproblemsfacingtheirstudents;

• 88%ofadministratorsand80%ofteachersagreethatGREATteachesstudentstheskillsneededtoavoid‘gangs’andviolence.

Incontrasttothosewhodidnottakepartintheprogramme,theevaluation

39

curriculaandreinforcegoalsbyofferingyoungpeopleanopportunitytoenhancetheirskills;

• Strengthenlawenforcement’srelationshipwiththecommunity;

• Providepositivealternativesto‘gang’involvement;

• Improvepublic/communityrelations;

• Providestructuredactivitieswhenstudentsarenotinschool.

revealedthatGREATstudentsdemonstrated:

• More-positiveattitudestowardpolice;

• Less-positiveattitudesabout‘gangs’;

• Moreuseofrefusalskills(saying‘No’);

• Highercollectiveefficacy(andresearchcorrelateshighercollectiveefficacywithlowercrimeratesinneighbourhoods);

• Lessuseofhittingneutralisations;

• Lessanger;

• Lowerratesof‘gang’membership;

• Higherlevelsofaltruism;

• Lessrisk-seeking.

BUILD(BroaderUrbanInvolvementandLeadershipDevelopment):BUILDhasbeenoperatinginChicagosince1969,withtheexplicitfocus

FOCUSONBOTHPREVENTIONANDDESISTENCE

Community-led

BUILDprovidescounselling,mentoring,communityeducationandwork-readinesstraining.

• PreventionProgramme–aten-weekin-schoolcourseaimedatpreventingyoungpeoplefromengagingindruguseand‘gang’life;

• InterventionProgramme–

BUILD’sannualreportstates:

• 3,765youngpeopleweredirectlyservedbyBUILDprogrammes;

• 87%ofyouthreducednegativeorriskybehaviour;

40

‘toengageat-riskyouthinschoolsandonthestreetstohelpthemrealizetheirpotentialandcontributetoourcommunities’.

ViolenceInterventionCurriculumisdesignedtohelpyoungpeopleindetentioncentresovercomechallenges,issuesandproblemsthattheymayfaceintheircommunities,specificallyrelatingto‘gangs’,crimeandviolence.

Note

$2,000annualcostperyouthforBUILDintensivementoringcomparedwith$187,765annualcostperyouthforincarcerationinIllinois.

solicits‘gang’membersfromthestreettoparticipateinrecreationalactivitiesandoffersdrugabuseeducation,referralstomedicalspecialists,andcounselling.BUILD’s‘PeaceLeagues’bringtogetherex-’gang’members,policeandyoungpeopletodeveloppositivealternativesto‘gang’life.Intensivementoringprovidesat-riskyoungpeoplewiththesupportandopportunitiestomoveawayfrom‘gang’involvement;

• CommunityResourceDevelopmentProgramme–involvesadultswhovolunteertodevelopmentoringrelationshipswith‘gang’membersandtocreatestrongcommunitybondsanddisrupt‘gang’development;

• RehabilitationProgramme–interveneswithadjudicatedyouthintheCookCountyJuvenileTemporaryDetentionCentretoreducerecidivism.

• 85%ofyouthimprovedconflictresolutionskills;

• 98%ofBUILD’syouthwerepromotedtothenextgrade;

• 96%ofBUILD’shigh-schoolseniorsappliedforpost-secondaryeducation;

• 93%ofeligibleBUILDyouthreceivedajoborinternship;

• 96%ofBUILD’shigh-schoolseniorsearnedadiploma;

• 72%ofjustice-involvedyouthdonotreoffend–thestate-wideaveragebeing40%.

41

HomeboyIndustries:EstablishedinEastLAin1988totryandimprovethelivesofformer‘gang’members.Itisthelargest‘gang’intervention,rehabandre-entryprogrammeintheworld.

FocusonDESISTENCE

Community-led

Whoisengaged?

Formerlygang-involvedandpreviouslyincarceratedmenandwomen.Eachyearover10,000former‘gang’membersfromacrossLosAngelescometoHomeboyIndustries.

Purposeandapproach:

ThefiveprincipalobjectivesofHomeboyIndustriesareto:

• Reducerecidivism;

• Reducesubstanceabuse;

• Improvesocialconnectedness;

• Improvehousingsafetyandstability;

• Reunifyfamilies.

• Tattooremoval

• Workforcedevelopment:Employmentspecialistsassistclientsindiscoveringskills,gainingnewskills/qualifications,interviewpreparationandidentifyingjobopportunities.

• Solarpaneltraining:Developingmarketableskills.

• Educationalservices:Over40classeseachweekincluding:lifeskills;substanceabuserecovery;workreadiness;artsandwellness;academic.

• Mentalhealthservices:Professionaltherapistsforone-to-onecounselling.Additionalsupportgroupsarealsoavailableandopentothepublic.

• Domesticviolence:A52-weekinterventionprogramme.

• Legalservices:Legalprofessionalsassistclientswithanylegalissuesthatmayinhibittransitionfrom‘gang’involvement.

The2018AnnualReportforHomeboyIndustriesstates:

• 7,712receivedprogrammeandservicesupport;

• 65%ofTraineesreportedarrestsinthethreemonthspriortojoiningHomeboyIndustries–afterjoiningHomeboyIndustries,only1%ofTraineesreportedarrests.

• 24%ofTraineesreportedusingharddrugsinthe30dayspriortojoiningHomeboyIndustries–2%ofTraineesreportedrarelyorneverusing‘harddrugs’afterjoiningHomeboyIndustries.

• 95%ofTraineesreportedatleastweeklycontactwithsupportivepeoplesincejoiningHomeboyIndustries.

• 80%ofTraineesreportedhavingreunifiedwiththeirchildrensincejoiningHomeboyIndustries.

• $19,258infinesandfees

42

• Casemanagement:ClientsengagedonHomeboyIndustries’18-monthjobtrainingprogrammeworkwithcasemanagerstodevelopbespokeserviceplans.

• Substanceabuse:Supportforclientswhomayusedrugsandothersubstances.

• Socialenterprise:Currentsocialenterprisesinclude:

• HomeboySilkscreenandEmbroidery;

• HomeboyNationwide:Brandedandlicenseditemsforsaleatgrocerystoresnationwide;

• HomegirlCaféandHomegirlCatering;

• HomeboyElectronicsRecycling;

• HomeboyBakery,HomeboyFoods.comandHomeboyFarmers’Market:

• HomeboyDineratCityHall.

removedforclients.

• 11,240tattooremovals.

• 26,398classeswereattended.

• 32studentswereenrolledincollegeforthefirsttime.

• 85participantsbecamecollegestudents.

• 34traineesgainedadriver’slicence.

• 8traineesobtainedcustodyoftheirchildren;

• 23traineesweredischargedfromprobation/parole.

43

2.4Summarisingtheapproachesandmethods

A summary of the approaches andmethods adopted by the projects (see Table 1 below) shows that no single or consistent approach to

interventionhasyetemergedinrelationtoyoungpeopleandinvolvementingroup-basedviolence.However,fromthetable,itispossibleto

identifyanumberofpatternsofpriority.

• Fiveoftheprojectsinthissurveyweredirectlyledbythestateorgovernmentagencies.InthecaseofCHANNEL,thepolicyhadahigh

profileandwassupportedbyallagenciesofthestate,fromthepolicetoschoolstolocalgovernment.Others,suchasCIRV,werepolice

coordinated and led. The majority of programmes were delivered by voluntary agencies, some in conjunction with broader state

policiesandothersasindependentprojects.

• Projectswithyoungpeopleweredirectedatbothpreventingyoungpeoplejoiningviolentgroupsandathelpingpeopleleave.

• Theoverarchingquestionofyoungpeopleandgroupviolenceisdividedbetweenthosewithaclearideologicalpurpose(Islamistorfar

right),thosedirectedatterritorialgangsandthosedirectedatpeoplecomingoutofprisonandbecominginvolvedingangs.Someof

the projects were designed to address how people think, whereas others were entirely directed at preventing or stopping violent

behaviour.

• Almostalloftheprojectsthattargetedindividualpeopleusedpersonalmentors.

• Formalteachingwasoneelementofalltheprojects,andthefocusoftheBUILDandGREATprojects.

• Connectiontoemploymentwascentraltothemajorityofprojects.

• Sportwasavehicleforengagementintwooftheprojects.

• Counsellingandsupportforwell-beingandpersonalhealthwasathemeinthemajorityofprojects.

• Changingthesocialenvironmentwasaconsciouspartofanumberofprogrammes.

44

• Sixofthe13projectsworkeddirectlyonmattersoffaithandideology.

• Removingsymbolssuchastattooswasanexplicitgoaloftwoprojects.

• Oneprojectwasaimedataddressingprimary-agedchildrenandworkedwithinschools.

• Oneprojectworkedonthebasisofanamnesty,whereyoungpeoplewerepresentedwithchoicesinrelationtothestyleofpolicingto

beadopted(CIRV).

• Other themes includeddirectpersonaldevelopmentplanning, inter-agencycoordinationandcooperation,mediationwithgangsand

groups,communitiesofsupportforyoungpeople,developinganewnarrativeatlocallevelforinclusion,programmesforthetrainingof

trainers,drugtreatment,legalservicesandsupportincasesofdomesticviolence.

• Theslogan‘relentlessoutreach’wasuseddirectlybyoneproject(ROCA).However,itcharacterisedanumberofotherprojects.

45

Table1:Summarytableofapproachesandinterventionmethodsadoptedbyallprojects

Group State/NGO

PD

Target VoluntaryParticipation

PersonalMentors

FormalTeaching

Workissues

Sport Counselling/MentalH

Diversion/Social

Faith/Ideology

Tattoos OtherMethods

STREET Islamistyouth

Personaldevelopment

CHANNEL Radical-isation

Referrals

Statutoryobligationoncouncils

AASHA Islamistyouth

Gangmediation

Positiverolemodels

Communityevents

EXIT Far-rightextremism

Supportforfriendsandfamilies

MECHELEN Segregation Newnarrativeforthecity

CIRV Knifecrime Enforcement

Trainingoftrainers

FFP PD Youthatriskofcrime

Youthleadership

46

developmentSTGILES PD Young

peopleandgangs

Countylinesproject

J-ARC Youngviolentoffenders

Drugtreatment

ROCA PD Lessjail,morefuture

Relentlessoutreach

GREAT Youngpeopleandgangs

Curricular-basedapproach

BUILD PD At-riskyouth

PeaceLeague

HOMEBOY Peopleingangs

Substanceabuse

Domesticviolence

Legalservices

47

2.5The‘fit’ofinternationalmodelstoNorthernIreland?

Havingcompletedadesk-basedanalysisofmodelsofgoodpracticeforinterventionwithyoungpeople(eitheratriskoforactuallyengaging

withviolenceelsewhereintheUK,Ireland,continentalEuropeandtheUS)someimportantsimilaritiesanddifferenceswereimmediately

apparent.

Althoughthereisaclearcommonthreadrunningthroughalloftheinternationalmodelsofpracticerelatingtotheconnectionbetweenyoung

peopleandgroup-basedviolence,itisalsoapparentthattheproblemthateachprojectisdesignedtoaddressvariessignificantlyineachcase.

No single project directly meets the challenges associated with paramilitarism, and translating the learning in external projects into the

NorthernIrishcontextmustbedonecarefully.

OutsideNorthernIreland,‘Gang’violence,evenwhereaganghaslocalterritorialdominance,isnormallybetreatedascriminalwithoutfearof

creatingwiderpoliticalsympathy.Ontheotherhand,neitherIslamistgroupsnotviolentfar-rightgroupshaveachievedterritorialdominance

orhegemonyinanyterritoryorneighbourhoodintheWest.ArmedstruggleinNorthernIreland,ontheotherhand,emergesfromadeeply

embedded andwidely accepted ethnic and political narrative of hostility and aspiration,where armed violence has at various times been

regardedasalegitimatetooloristoleratedasafactoflifebyahighproportionofthesurroundingcommunityinsomeareas.Thelongevityof

conflictinNorthernIrelandsince1970meantthatarmedandparamilitarygroupsbecameanintegralpartofthefabricoflifeofmanylocalities

for decades. Over time, paramilitary organisations and paramilitaries were a critical part of the internal community structure and the

organisation of community life, embedded in families, cultural tradition, social control, the local economy and community development.

Although the political conditions have altered substantially since 1998, paramilitary and armed groups claim symbolic continuitywith this

legacyofcommunity-politicallegitimacy.

48

InsomepartsofNorthernIreland,widespreadsympathyfor‘armedstruggle’onbehalfofacommunityagainstitsexternalenemiesremains

integral to community and spatial identity, reflected in public visual culture, annual celebration and historical remembering of events. In

Belfast, tourism now celebrates the activity of paramilitary and armed organisations continue to be presented as historic indigenous

instrumentsofdefenceorattackforthecommunityagainstacommonfoe,partof‘us’against‘them’.

Thiscreatesanalmostinevitableambiguitybetweenaninformalandembeddednarrativeof(good)internaldefendersagainst(bad)external

attackersandaformalbutessentiallynovelnarrativepitting(good)stateactorsainoppositionto(bad)internalcriminals. Whilethereisa

longhistoryinNorthernIrelandofsecurityinitiativesandeffortstodeterparamilitarismthroughpoliticsandcommunityinitiatives,ithasnot

yetbeenpossible toassumewhatCIRV calls the ‘moral voiceof the community’with full effect, especially at local level. Is actionagainst

paramilitaryandarmedgroupsbythestatein2020tobeunderstoodasanessentialandpositiveactiontoupholdtheruleoflaworaheavy-

handedexternalattackoncommunitiesbytheirfoes.Intheeventofconfrontation,whowillbeconsidered‘us’andwhois‘them’?Tackling

paramilitarismuntil nowhasbeen seenas theprovinceof theexternal impositionof law. Changing theemphasis to reducingcommunity

toleranceforandcopoperationwithparamilitarismthereforeinvolvesalongandcomplexprocessofresolvingembeddedcontradictionsand

transformingtheeveryday‘normal’patternsofcommunitylifeinsomeplaces.Itwillnotbeeliminatedbytakingenforcementactionagainst

‘abnormal’behaviourwithoutdevelopingnewpatternsofcommunitynormality.

Uncertainty about political, administrative or community support in ‘tackling paramilitarism’ continues to mean that actively pursuing

paramilitaries and paramilitarism is treated as an unacceptable personal or organisational risk by many state and voluntary agencies,and

avoided. As a result, practice in relation to paramilitarism and armed groups in Northern Ireland remains informal and dependent on

individualsmorethanfiftyyearsaftertheyreappearedinthepost-CivilRightsera.

The surveyof internationalprojects suggests that thecommon thread isnot found in thedirect comparabilityofarmedgroups,but in the

principlesofyouthworkandtheir relationshiptoyoungpeople. Thecommonprofessional task is the intentionalextensionofyouthwork

49

practicetoincludetheprotectionofyoungpeopleincommunitiesfromengagementin,orbecomingthevictimsof,armedgroupsbecauseitis

achallengetovaluesandprinciples,ratherthanbeingresponsibleforapolicytaskof‘tacklingparamilitarism’.However,inNorthernIreland

thisdoesentailacceptancethatparamilitarismhasanegativeimpactonyoungpeople,andthatyouthworkersmustbepracticalandproactive

inresponse.

Takingthisasastartingpoint,theinternationalprojectsofferedanumberofimportantinsightsintogoodpractice:

• Althoughthereligious/theologicalaspectofSTREETisnotequivalenttotheNorthernIrishcontext,thefactthatSTREETstaffwerelocal

and had ‘street cred’ amongst their young people was an important element in working with young people. The rigorous risk-

assessmentprocessundertakenbySTREETstaff,takingintoaccountbothriskandprotectivefactors,anddesigningaperson-centred

approachwasalsoevidenceofimportantyouthworkvalues.

• Aasha’sfocusonapreventativeapproachtostoppingyoungpeopleillustratestheneedtoseteffortstotackleviolentextremismwithin

awidercommitmenttothewell-beingofyoungpeople.ThefactthattheAashaprojectworkedmosteffectivelywhenit focusedon

those issues impactingdirectlyonyoungpeopleonthe fringesof ‘gang’culture, including improvingschoolattendance,educational

attainment,raisingtheirhopesandaspirationsandencouragingthemtoconsidertheiremploymentoptionsmovingforwards,suggests

thatasimilargroundinginthelivedexperiencesofyoungpeopleinNorthernIrelandwillbeacriticalelementofsuccessfulyouthwork.

• ThelearningoutcomesofEPICSweden,capturedinWilchen’s(2015)doctoralthesis,suggestanumberofkeyactions:

o Usingtheexperienceofstaffofsimilarbackgroundstothosewithwhomtheywork;

o Thevalueofself-referrals,andpersonalmotivationtochange;

o Thefocusontheemotionalandsocialunderpinningsofextremismratherthanideology;

o Theimportanceof(re)establishingasupportnetworkaroundthe(vulnerable)youngperson;

50

o Accessingwideryouthandsocialsupportservicesforyoungpeopletoensurethattheprojectisnotisolatedandtakesplacewithina

wideryouth-worksetting.

• Creatingaconnectiontoemploymentandwrap-aroundserviceswasanimportantelementoftheGlasgowanti-knifecrimeexperiment

(CIRV), confirming a continuing connection between the attraction of armed groups and the provision ofmeaningful pathways for

youngpeopletoamoresecurefuture.ThisisdespitethefactthatCIRVmaynottranslatedirectlyintoNorthernIrelandwherepolice

leadershipremainsasensitiveissue,especiallywherethepoliceareofferingachoicebetweenparticipationandaharshclampdown,

andwherehandingoverweaponsisahighlypoliticalissue,regulatedbytreaty.

• TheprincipleofreconnectingyoungpeopletotheircommunitiesisreproducedintheFightforPeaceprojectthroughits‘fivepillars’:

sport,education,employability,supportservicesandyouthleadership.Theuseofsportastheinitialhooktoencourageengagement

withyoungpeopleemphasisesthevalueofestablishingconfidenceinrelationships,asapre-cursortoanywiderexplorationofideology

orbeliefs.

• TheROCAmodelbuildsonabeliefinthepotentialoftransformationalpro-socialrelationshipstodisruptcyclesofpoverty,violenceand

criminality among young people (TEO, 2018a) by targetting a core demographic of young people (aged 17–24) at particular risk of

becominginvolvedin‘gangs’and,incarcerationandexpectedlivesofcriminality.

• ThefocusontransformationalrelationshipsisalsosharedwithinHomeboyIndustries.Here,theemphasisisontheimportanceofre-

establishingsocialconnectednessandreducingsocial isolationasawaytoprovideasenseofpurposeoridentity(McAraandMcVie,

2010), and to nurture an environment within which people can address all sorts of negative behaviours. These include substance

misuse,barrierstoemploymentandeducation,andtheremovalofsymbolsof‘gang’identity.

51

• Twooftheprojectshaveaspecificfocusonworkingwithyoungpeopleleavingprisonasanatriskgroup.Havingacriminalrecordcan

be a factor for young people either coming to the attention of the paramilitaries or joining a ‘gang’ or armed group for their own

protection(Densley,2013;Fraser,2017).InNorthernIreland,40outof41youngpeoplereleasedfromcustodyin2015/16reoffended

withinoneyear(DOJ,2018).TheStGilesTrust’s‘ThroughtheGates’programmeprovidessupportforpeoplebefore,duringandafter

theirreleasefromprisontoenasblere-entrybackintoacommunity.TheresultsoftheJ-ARCprogrammeforyoungoffendersmayalso

provideaninterventionmodeltoreducerecidivismforyoungoffendersinNorthernIreland.

• Researchhasshownthatsomeyoungpeoplehaveaglamorisedviewof‘theTroubles’,prisonlifeandtheroleofparamilitariesintheir

community(TEO,2018a;2018b).TheSOSprogramme/modelmightbeadaptedtochallengetheperceptionsandstereotypesthatmay

resultinyoungpeoplejoining‘gangs’orparamilitariesinsearchofwhattheybelieverepresentsaglamorouslifestyle.

• TheemphasiswithintheGREATprogrammeonbuildingthesocialskillsandcapacityforyoungpeopletoresistandrefuseparamilitary

coercioncouldbehelpful inacontextofwidercommunitysupport.The focuswithinBUILDonwhathappensoutsideofschoolalso

offerspotentialareasofexploration,requiringcloseinter-agencycollaborationandcommunityendorsementofthecurriculum.

Paradoxically,giventhatTacklingParamilitarismisagovernment-ledprogramme,themostdistinctivedifferencestoNorthernIrelandpractice

were in the two models led directly by public policy rather than youth workers. The ‘Mechelen model’ consciously reconceptualises the

‘radicalisation’ debate in terms of marginalisation and social exclusion and seeks to address the conditions that create a vacuum within

communitiesthatcanbeexploitedbyviolentextremistgroups.Thereisnodoubtthatthesocio-economic,culturalandhealthconditionsthat

impactyoungpeopleincommunitiesinBelgiumhavesignificantparallelsinNorthernIreland.Importantly,the‘Mechelenmodel’suggeststhat

youth-workinterventionmustbeinacontextofwiderculturechange.Responsibilityisspreadacrossallsectionsofsocietyinrecognisingthat

long-termobjectivesofsocialinclusioncanonlybeachievedthroughco-ordinatedinvestmentandcooperation.

52

PerhapsthemostchallengingmodelforyouthworkersinNorthernIrelandisCHANNEL.Since2015,therehasbeenastatutorydutyonlocal

authorities in England andWaleswith provision for teachers, doctors and youthworkers to be trained to spot the signs of ‘radicalisation’

amongstyoungpeoplewithwhomtheywork.TwoaspectsarestrikingfromaNorthernIrelandperspective:ontheonehand,theabilityofthe

statetoactthroughavarietyofmeansagainstidentifiedradicalgroupswithoutfearofcommunityoppositionisnotdirectlytransferrable.In

NorthernIreland,elementsofthestate,especiallypolicing,wereunabletorelyonbroadco-operationineverycommunity.Wherethestate

didcontinuetooperateincludinginsocialservices,health,educationandyouthwork,eachservicerestricteditsresponsibiliitytoupholding

lawwithinitsdirectareaofservice,ratherthanovertlysupportingwiderpolicing.Evensince1998,thepolicecannotfullyrelyon‘presumed

consent’inallplacesatalltimesineitherrepublicanandloyalistdominatedareas.Teachers,youthworkersandprofessionalsinmanyareas

maynotyetfeelconfidentthattheycouldextedinformation-sharingbeyondexistingboundarieswithoutriskingcommunityconfidenceand

theirabilitytodelivercoreservices.Somewouldfeelthatitputthelivesofstaffintopersonaldanger.Furthermore,manywouldfeelthatany

efforttochangethedutyonprofessionalstoreport,wouldnotendradicalisationbutdriveitdeeperintothecommunityandresultingrowing

communityresentmentagainstallauthorities.Inotherwords,adoptingaCHANNELapproachinNorthernIrelandwouldprovokeratherthan

preventradicalisation.

2.6:Emergentthemesfromtheinternationalfield

1. Engagementmustbespecifictocontext:Whileallofthecasestudyexamplesarearesponsetocriminalinfluenceonyoungpeople,

context matters to each of them. That context includes location, the social status of the individuals, the people engaged both as

practitionersandyoungpeopleandthepoliticalenvironment.Similarchallengesandbehaviourswithinadifferentsocialandpolitical

environment inevitably alters practice. Thus none of the examples can be treated as ‘best practice’ and transferred without

qualificationintotheNorthernIrelandcontext.

53

2. Youthworkmustbeperson-centred:Allofthemodelsinthisstudyweretargetedataddressingindividualneedsratherthanmeeting

securitytargets.Changeinyouthworkisnot‘forced’,but‘chosen’asyoungpeopleareencouragedtotakepartinnewsocialactivities

anddevelopnew(andmorepositive)socialnetworks,inwhichtheyareexposedtoalternativeworldviews.Theprojectsthemselves

areadirectresponsetoadesiretochangenegativeinfluencesonyoungpeople,‘vulnerable’torecruitmentorvictimhood.Allofthe

intervention and prevention approacheswere consciously targeted at the needs of the individuals at risk of ‘gang’ involvement or

‘radicalisation’.

3. Youthwork is relationship-based,and loses its capacity to influenceyoungpeoplewithout trust: Acommoncritical theme in the

international projects dealing with desistance and ‘radicalisation’ is the reliance of youth work on building and fostering strong,

sustainablerelationshipsoftrustwithyoungpeople.Organisationsdirectlyinvolvedinpreventing(orcountering)the‘radicalisation’of

youngpeople,suchastheAashaGangMediationProjectandEXITSweden,emphasisedtheimportanceofestablishingrelationships

withtheyoungpeoplebeforeaspaceiscreatedforideologiesthatneedtobechallenged.Indeed,thevalueofyouthworkinrelation

toengagementwithyoungpeopleatriskoforengagedinviolentorextremebehaviourdependsalmostentirelyontheextenttowhich

youthworkersareconsideredtrustworthybyyoungpeople.Forthattrusttobepossible,youthworkersmustalsocommandthetrust

of the sponsorand thehost community. There is an inherentdifficultywith top-down, state-drivenapproaches tograding ‘risk’, in

whichthestatedefinestheriskandappliesittotheyoungpersonordefines‘need’inrelationtostatecriteria.Inthisstudy,thiswas

particularlyevident inthecriticismofCHANNEL (O’Donnell,2016;Hill,2019). InTacklingParamilitarism,thesponsor isthestate. By

engaging youth work, the state also engages the primacy of trust-building within youth work, and accepts clear distinctions with

policingandsecurity.Byengagingwiththestate,youthworkersalsoacceptparameters,includingcommitmentstosafeguardingand

theruleoflaw.InthecontextoftheambiguityaroundparamilitarismandtheroleofthestateinNorthernIreland,however,realtrust

can only be developed through open public discussion about how trust is to be nurtured and grown. Compromising these values

54

preventsyouthworkersfromdoingtheirjobwithyoungpeople,byturningthemintodirectagentsofsecuritypolicy.Aboveall,thereis

aneedtoestablishwhatelementofpracticeiscentrallydetermined,andwhataspectsrelylargelyonprofessionaljudgement.

4. Successfulyouthworkisahubforre-connection,coordinationandcooperationfortheyoungperson:Youthworkinterventionisnot

astand-aloneactivity.FromtheSTREETcommunity-led‘counter-radicalisation’programmeinBrixton,SouthLondontotheHomeboy

Industries project in LosAngeles, the youthwork is predicatedupon re-establishing connectivity, coordinationand cooperation for

marginalisedyoungpeoplewhomayhavebecomeisolatedfrommainstreamsociety:

• InHomeboyIndustries,thisisachievedbyreunifyingfamiliesandimprovingsocialconnectedness.

• TheBUILDandROCAprojects(andalsotheStGilesSOSproject)engagecommunitymemberstoestablishmentoringandsupport

relationshipsbetweenthecommunityandtheyoungperson.

• CIRV,inGlasgow,encouragespartnershipworkingandgreatercoordinationbetweenstatutoryagenciesandthelocalcommunity,

toprovidewrap-aroundsupportservicesfor‘vulnerable’young‘gang’members.

• TheProjectOracleSynthesisStudy(McMahon,2013:4)concludedthatsuchtargeted,comprehensive,multi-agencyprogrammes

gave‘thestrongestindicationofaneffectonyoungpeople’sparticipationingangactivityandviolenceinLondon’.21

This also includes signposting young people into professional support. Most of the projects surveyed (including the two statutory

examples ofCHANNEL and J-ARC) actively reconnect young peoplewithprofessional support services, in a process of coordinated

engagementtoaddressunderlyingneedssuchasdrugsandalcoholabuse,socialisolationormentalhealthissues,andwhichmayhave

contributedtocriminogenicbehaviour.

5. Changerequirescriticalself-reflectionbyyoungpeople,andintense,focusedandacutework.Aconsistentthemeintheinternational

examples is that change is possiblewhen a previousworldview no longermakes sense under changed life conditions.Most of the21ProjectOracleisaLondon-centricprojectaimingtogenerateanevidencebaseofevaluatedyouthservices.TheProjectOracleEvidenceHubemergedasapartnershipbetweentheSocialInnovationPartnershipandLondonMetropolitanUniversity.In2018,itjoinedwiththeCentreforYouthImpact.

55

projectsbelievethattargeted,continuousandsustainedsupportandengagementonthetermsoftheyoungpersonofferstheonly

prospectofsuccess.Youngpeoplewillnotnecessarilybereadytoengageorprogressatthespeedthatthecommunityortheprojects

themselvesmayseekto.Evenwhereayoungpersondisengagesorfallsaway,theyshouldnotbeabandoned.

• TheCIRVproject inGlasgow, itselfborne fromthe ‘focuseddeterrencestrategy’of theBostonCeasefireproject,exemplifies the

intense nature of approaches that balance harsh punishments with support for individuals seeking to move beyond ‘gang’

involvement.

• ROCAbalances intenseand‘relentless’directengagementwithyoungpeoplewithfollow-upsupportiveelementsdesignedtobe

transformationalinbuildingthecapacityfortheyoungpersontotransitionfromviolenceandcriminalbehaviour.

6. Addressingunderlying social issues is vital:Almost all of theprojects are aimedat themost at-risk,marginalised and ‘vulnerable’

youngpeopleinat-riskandmarginalisedcommunities.Manyofthecasestudiesdrawdirectlyontheoriesthatsuggestthatchangecan

onlyoccurifitdisruptscyclesofpoverty,hopelessness,crimeandincarceration.Educationoremploymentareoftenseenascrucialin

sustainingthetransitionofayoungpersonawayfromnegativeinfluences.Notonlydoesthisapproachformthebackboneofanumber

of projects such as Fight for Peace, but it is an incentive to participate. Young ‘gang’ members participating in CIRV in Glasgow

suggestedthatthemainreasontheychosetoparticipateintheprogrammewasthehopeofsecuringajob.

7. Communityengagementishugelyvaluable:Thevalueofcommunitymembersalongsideprofessionalsinmentoringyoungpeoplewas

anothercommonthemeofmostofthecasestudies.Bybeingabletospeakwithfirst-handknowledgeofhavinggonethroughsimilar

situationswithregardto‘gang’cultureandexpectationsplaceduponthem,mentorsareabletonotonlyrelatetoyoungpeoplebut

alsotoofferhopeandinspirationthatmovingbeyond‘gang’lifeispossible.Thisalsoopenedupapathwaytowardsreconnectionwith

thewidercommunity:

56

• TheSTREET,AashaandBUILDprogrammeshighlightedtheroleofformer‘gang’membersascriticalinbuildingrelationshipswith

youngpeople.

• ManyEXITSwedenstaffarethemselvesformermembersoffar-rightgroups.

Insummary,theinternationalprojectssuggestthatgoodyouthworktoaddressviolencemust:

• belocallyrelevant;

• beperson-centred;

• buildtrustthroughrelationships;

• reconnectyoungpeopletothecommunity,servicesandhealthynetworks;

• betargeted,continuousandsustained;

• addressrealeducationalandemploymentdeficits;

• workwithcommunitysupport.

57

3.TacklingparamilitarisminNorthernIreland

InternationalpracticehasresultedinnumerousexamplesofgoodyouthworkpracticewithclearlessonsforNorthernIreland.LikeCHANNEL,

the Tackling Paramilitarism programme has its roots in public policy. However, unlike CHANNEL, and as outlined above, the state has a

differenthistoricalrelationshipwithcommunities,organisationsandpeopleinNorthernIreland,shapedinparticularbythepoliticalandpeace

processof the1990s. Inbroadtermsanti-radicalisationprogrammespresumethat theradicalelement (whether Islamistor far right) isan

abnormalandidentifiableviolentpresencewhichdoesnotrepresentthewidercommunity,andcanultimatelybeisolatedfromit.InNorthern

Ireland, armed groups are woven into the community infrastructure in a way which cannot be eradicated by external pressure without

communityconsenttochange.OtherworkoutsideNorthernIrelandespeciallywithmembersofgangshasofteninvolvedvoluntaryinitiatives

committedtoofferinganalternativetocriminaljusticeforyoungpeople.Theyarenotnecessarilyintergratedintoanywiderframeofpublic

policy.Voluntaryleadershipofthisnaturetendstoproduceexemplaryprojectswithoutnecessarilyengageingsystemicchange.

Thissectionofthereportsummarizestheoutcomesofaseriesofinterviews(17)andfocusgroups(2)withyouthworkersandothersinvolved

incommunityyouthwork inNorthern Ireland,duringwhichweexploredtheirdirectexperienceandpracticeaswellas theirapproachand

attitudetotheworkestablishedwithintheTacklingParamilitarismprogramme.

3.1DefiningparamilitarisminNorthernIreland

BuildingonthecommitmentsoftheGoodFridayAgreementof1998,itcanbeinferredthattheintendedpurposeoftheFreshStartis:

• toreinforcethecommitmentintheAgreementtoremovinglegitimacyfromallunlawfulviolenceforanypurpose-actual,intendedor

tolerated-andfromanygroupsthatuseit

• togiveoperationalmeaningtothatcommitmentthroughanactivepolicyofstoppingandpreventingongoingparamilitaryactivity;

58

• totreatanyresidualviolence,andthegroupsperpetratingit,asentirelycriminal

• tonurtureandsupporttheemergenceofculturewhichhasnoongoingarmedactivity,organisationsorcultures.

InrealitytheserelativelysimplepolicygoalsarebeingimplementedinacontextwheretheterminologythathasemergedinNorthernIreland

aroundparamilitarism is no longer precise, andmay even add to confusion.While ‘paramilitarism’ and ‘paramilitaries’ are still referred to

without qualification on a daily basis in politics, community and the media, closer scrutiny shows that the terms appear to be used

interchangeablyforwhathavebecomeavarietyofdistinctconcepts,interalia;

• illegalterroristsingeneral,

• ‘armedgroups’engagedinalegitimateconflictbefore1998,

• communityleadersofstandingandpopularauthorityinsomeareas,consultedonmajorpoliticalchanges,

• local‘gangs’,

• organisedcrimeoperations,

• para-stateoperativescarryingoutclandestineactionsonbehalfofthestate,oreven

• a specifically loyalist termwhose nearest equivalent is either the provisional IRA,which formally disbanded in 2007 butwhowere

accusedofthekillingofKevinMcGuiganin2015,and/oranti-peaceprocessrepublicandissidents.

Itwasclearinourinterviews,thatthenature,purposeandgeographicalscopeofarmedactivityevenbetweentheareasdesignatedunderthe

programmerangedfromthenormalised‘extracurricular’activitiesofnamedindividualsandspecificactivitiestoaninformalbutever-present

59

andsinistercoerciveinfluenceoncommunitylife,experiencedasrealoranticipatedintimidation,decisive‘political’controlandswayshaping

powerrelationsandfreespeechincommunities.Thiswasreflectedbymanyofourrespondents:

‘Paramilitariesareeitheragangorinvolvedincommunitydevelopment,andthereisconflictbetweenthetwo.’

‘In this area, people connected toparamilitarismaremore forward thinkingand trying todo things the rightway. It comes

downtopersonalities.Iwouldhazardaguessin[otherareas]thattheyhavethissiegementality.Theyareusingloyalismasa

flagofconvenienceforcriminality.Theyhappentobeprotestantslivinginaprotestantareaandusethattopoisonthekids.’

‘Wefoundtheterm‘paramilitary’isadifficulttermtogetyourheadaround–becausetherearesomanydifferentlayers.We

wouldalwayssaywewouldworkwithanyoneandwithanyonewhohaslearnedandturnedthecornerandisworkingforthe

commongood.Butthereareotherswhoarenotworkingforthecommongood.’

‘Thenthere is theword ‘paramilitary’,which issometimesan issueofcriminality.Someof themoneywhichgoes in tothese

groupsisusedtokeepthemquiet.Butitgivesthemlegitimacy–ashardtoreach[people]whoneedtobebroughttothetable.

Butoncetheycometothetable,itisimpossibleforanyoneelsetocometothetable.Decentpeoplehaveleft.Itisokaytowork

withthem…ifitistheoneswhohaveturnedthecorner.’

‘PeopleheredonotmakeaconnectionbetweenthedeathofLyraMcKeeandgettingalocal‘guy’togiveabeatingtothekid

thatbrokeintoyourhouse.’

60

‘Whatyoualsohave,especiallyintheloyalistside,arethesegroups…thatclaimtobethepeacefulelementofparamilitarism,

but they all have an agenda about trying to legitimate the narrative around loyalist paramilitaries and be the good side of

them.’

‘So,onebodyisbroughtintodoworkinplaceA.ButtheyarethesameorganisationinplaceB.Theyareallbranchesofthe

sameorganisationdoingworkoneachother’spatchesbyagreement–theyjustlookdifferently.’

‘Inreality,it’sallveryblurredandcomplicated–youhavethosealignedwiththegroupsthatareinvolvedincrimeanddrugs

andotherswhoaremoreconcernedabouttheirlegacy…So,youngpeoplearegrowingupinthisconflict;itseverywheretothe

pointthatitisnormaltohavetheseillegalinstitutionsresponsibleforgovernanceincommunities,andthisisanotherlayerof

complexitiesthatyoungpeoplehavetonavigate.’

Aspolicyresponsestoeachofthesephenomenaarenecessarilydifferent,‘tacklingparamilitarism’mayhavebecomeanunhelpfulandeven

inaccurate tool for defining policy or action. In the interim, public debate about tackling paramilitarism too often consists of generalised

soundbites,andappearstoproceedsfromthepresumptionofsharedmeaning,withoutdueregardforthecomplexityofthelegacyofconflict

intheshapeofparamilitarismincommunitiesinNorthernIreland.

‘Wearedeliveringinanecosystem–quickanswershaven’tworkedandwon’twork.’

‘Wearechangingthetrajectoryofcommunitiesandpeople:thatisusuallynotashort-termexperience.’

61

3.2.ThecontextofchangeIn thisextremelycomplicated landscape forpolicy,politicsandpractitioners, rhetoricaloversimplificationof tacklingparamilitarism

carriessignificantrisks.Someofthecomplexcontextualissuesevidentfromthisresearchinclude:

• Thelanguageand‘mentalmap’ofloyalistandrepublicanrespondentswereclearlydifferent.Whereasthoseinloyalistareasidentified

‘paramilitarism’ within their communities, they also pointed out that the experience of what this meant at local level varied

enormously, even where the same organisation was involved. Loyalists largely equated their role as community activists with

mainstreamSinnFein-supportingrepublicans,andindirectlywiththeprovisionalIRAandnotwithdissidents.Mostrepublicans,onthe

otherhand,didnotassociateparamilitarismwithSinnFein-linkedactivity. Theclosest internalanalogyof ‘paramilitarism’ for those

workinginrepublicandominatedareaswaswithviolent‘dissident’republicans.Evenherethetermparamilitarywasseldomdeployed:

‘Theterm‘dissidentrepublican’coversamultitudeofgroupsandpeople,andtheblankettermdoesnothelpwiththosethatare

tryingtodissuadepeoplefrombeingassociatedwiththesegroups.’

‘The issuesare similar in republican communitieswith thebiggest issue thedissidentsand themultiple splinterswithin that

community. They – the dissident republicans – are always trying to circumvent the law-and-order argument. Also, the

geography–thelackofspace–meansitiseasiertorecruit.Youcancontroltheenvironment.’

Anumberofrespondentsindicatedthatbyusingthelanguageofparamilitarism,theprogrammeisperceivedbyloyalistsastargeting

loyalist communities and exempting mainstream republicanism from change. Some loyalists express concern that community

62

organisation, which they perceive as coercive ‘political’ control of republican areas by mainstream republicans, is excluded from

scrutiny.Intheirowndefence,theypointtotheoriginsoftheFreshStartprogrammesintheactivityofapartofthe‘mainstream’IRA,

whichnonethelessexemptsitselffromconsiderationas‘paramilitary’.Thisapparentlysemanticissuehasimportantconsequencesifit

shapesnotonlyexpectationsaboutwhothetargetsforchangewithintheprogrammeare?,butwhatcountsassuccess?,howitistobe

measured?andwhoisconsideredapotentialfuturepartner?

• InsomeplacesinNorthernIreland,theinterpenetrationof‘armedgroupsandtheirculture’withlocalcommunitydevelopment,local

politicsandpoliticalorganisation, traditional culturaldisplayandevenwithaspectsofcriminal justiceappears tobealmostorganic,

meaningthatitmaynotbefinallypossibletodistinguishbetweenwhat‘is’and‘isnot’paramilitary:

‘Everybodyfromthelocalcommunityknowswhoisconnectedwithindissidentrepublicangroups–butnothingchanges.What

doesthattellyou?’

Thisisalsolocallyvariable:indeedinmanyotherplacesinNorthernIrelandarmedgroupshavenomeaningfulpresence.Wherearmed

groups are embedded, some community, political, cultural and criminal justice interestsmay be, at best, ambivalent about actively

upsetting this symbiosis,or at least thoseaspectswhich they seeaspositive,where theyareassociatedwith identityorwhere the

changeprocesswoulddisruptthepatternofcommunitylife.

• Theexperienceandperceptionofarmedgroupsisalsostronglyaffectedbyanumberofdifferences,includingpoliticalallegiance,age

and geography. Attitudes to paramilitarism shaped by very different local experience and by different generational experiences

63

inevitably shape attitudes to policy and to priorities for intervention. These differences impact directly on the language, content,

methods and measurement of the programme. A single approach to intervention inevitably hits against this reality that the

circumstancesofcommunitiesdiffer:

‘Whenyouthinkofit,alotoftheworkovertheyearshasbeenconsistentbutcontradictory.Whatworksherewillnotworkin

otherplaces.Theprinciplesarethesame.’

‘Obviously,inthisparticulararea…youstillhavethescaffoldingoftheconflict,whichstillwrapsaroundcommunitiestoday,

evidencedbythecontinuingexistenceoftheUDA,UVF,RHC–andontherepublicansideyouseethesplinteredandfractured

dissidentgroups.’

• Theresponseofgovernment,politicsandthepublicsectortoparamilitarismiswidelybelievedtobe‘two-faced’:rhetoricinfavourof

tackling paramilitarism is seldom matched by action on the ground. Over a long period of time, the press has regularly carried

allegations that former paramilitaries and alleged current paramilitaries hold visible positions of formal and informal authority and

influence.Wheretheseallegationsarebothdeniedandrepeatedbutnotinvestigated,manyinthewidercommunityareleftunsettled

andambivalent.

Thiswasreflectedbysomerespondentswhomaintainedthatthepolicehaveattimesdevelopedpragmaticbutconsistentchannelsof

engagementwithsomeparamilitary-linkedindividualsandgroupsandatacitacceptanceofsomeaspectsofparamilitarystructuresat

local level, regardingthemasconstructiveandsupportiveorderingelementsactingtomaintainconfidenceandorder. Atthesame

64

time,fewstatutoryorganisationsoutsidethepoliceadmittoengagingdirectlywithparamilitarismatall,althoughwefoundthatthisis

widely disputed in the community. Where the links between paramilitary organisations and community development, political

leadership and cultural organisations or on justice issues are hard to distinguish at local level, agencies are inevitably facedwith a

dilemma. Thus numerous Interviewees commented on the ambiguous attitude to paramilitarism, armed groups and political

connection by statutory agencies and funding agencies supporting community development, often for pragmatic asmuch as policy

reasons:

‘Therewasamajorissueatlocallevelandanefforttoengageallparties.Butthateffortmeansthatcontrolofthepolicymoves

tothegroupswhichhavecausedthetrouble.Whenalocalresidentcomplainedabouttheimplicationsofthiscontroltoalocal

electedrep,theelectedrepwenttothegroupandtoldthem.’

‘Inthisarea,thereisone‘clientofchoice’whoarebroughtintodealwithissuesofviolence.Itissanctionedbythepowersthat

be.Buttheyarepartoftheorganisation–theboundaryisentirelyfluid.Yougetthemoneybecauseofthetrouble.Butifyou

stopthemoney,thentheygobacktothetrouble.’

‘Andthenthereispeopleinthestatutorieswhoappeartobesupportingthem.’

‘TheXPeaceImpactprogrammeisgearedtothedifficultorganisations,nottothemiddleoftheroad.Weweretakenoutofthe

programme.’

65

• Without exception, group domination of these areas is strongly associated with multiple deprivation and strict housing

segregationbyclass,politicsandreligion.We foundaconsensus that ‘tacklingparamilitarism’ is inextricably linked towider

efforts to end poverty and underlying political/ethnic/religious division, although therewere a number of views about the

relationshipofcauseandeffect:

‘Housingareasdictatethestretchofparamilitaries–theyhavelittleswayinprivatelyownedareas,eveniftheyareinthesame

postcode.’

‘This [is]alwaysalsoaboutsocialchangeandaboutthereduction inalienationandviolence insocial relationships.Business

andpeopleneedtobepartofthepathways.Currently,thisisanicheissue–forpeoplealreadyinmultipledeprivation.’

Thepracticalpoliticalconsequenceofspecificgeographicalconcentration,however, is that tacklingparamilitarism is treated

acrossNorthernIrelandasaspecificissueofcriminalityforthoseinthepoorestdistrictsandnotinthecontextofthepoliticsof

thewidersociety,playedoutwherelawandorderstrugglestoprotect,andtheadvantagesofgangbehaviourincreased.

• TheareasidentifiedascoreltotheTacklingParamilitarismProgrammeareallmarkedbymultipleissuesofdeprivation.Manystatutory

agenciesarethereforeinevitablyandproperlyengagedindirectcollaborationwithlocalpartnersasacriticalelementtoprovidepublic

services.Intheabsenceofanywaytoguaranteetheboundarywithparamilitarypresence,however,thiscreatessignificantdilemmas

forallpublicservicesinpractice-includingtheyouthservice.Formally,allagenciesmaintainthattheyhavenodirectconnectionswith

anyparamilitarygroup.Inpractice,ithasprovedverydifficult,ifnotimpossible,toensurethatthereisnostatutoryengagementwith

66

paramilitarismwhenitisimpossibletomarktheboundary,leadingtoallegationsofstatutoryhypocrisyanddouble-standards.Despite

thefactthatarmedgroupsre-emergedincommunitiesinNorthernIrelandfiftyyearsago,fewstatutoryagencies,withtheexceptionof

policing,haveformally identified ‘tackling’paramilitarismasanamedpriority instrategicoroperationalplanning, (ie intentionaland

accountableprogrammeswhosesuccessismeasuredontheeliminationofparamilitaryorganisationsandactivity).Asaconsequence,

theTacklingParamilitarismprogrammeisnotdrawingon50yearsofestablishedpractice,buton50yearsof‘creativeadaptation’to

circumstances combinedwith relianceon individual initiatives and relationships. Formany respondents, formal ‘condemnation’ of

paramilitarieswaspersistentlyunderminedbythecontinuedinteractionofpublicagencieswiththosebeingcondemned:

‘Youthclubscondemnrepublicanviolenceagainstyoungpeople.Noneofthoseyouthworkersarelistenedto.Theycannotgivesupport.

Weareaskingcommunitiestoturntheirbacksonparamilitariesandyetthesamepeopleareinvitedtothemeetings.Itishypocrisy.’

• During research for this project, many interviewees commented that the political environment had become more polarised, and

communities were less willing to criticise paramilitaries than previously, attributing this to the collapse of the Northern Ireland

Assemblyin2017,tensionsoverculturaldisplaysandconflictlegacyissuesandtheincreasinglyfebriledebatesovertheimplicationsof

UKwithdrawalfromtheEUforNorthernIreland:

‘Sixmonthsago,peopleweresupportive.Butpeoplesay,“EverytimeIlook,peoplearestickinguptwofingerstous”.’

‘Attitudestobehaviourdepend.Manyofthoseactive inpoliticsandsupportiveofthepeaceprocessfindtheirviewpointand

toleranceisbeingtested.Itisalsoaculture.Alotofthingsthatpeopleexperiencedinthepastiscomingupagain.Maybeyou

areright–thingshaven’tchanged.’

67

‘Whathaschanged?Iwouldsay lookatthecity,the infrastructure,the investment.Peopleseecertainbitsofthat.Butwhat

they see that is blatant and in-your-face is people are saying, “No”. Young people are in an arenawhere they can feel the

tension,theycanpickitup.Allofsuddentheyareasking,“Aretheseorganisationsgoingtomakemesafe,standupforus?’’’

‘Theyarecriminalsinsearchofmeaning.Theyclingtothemeaningforaslongastheycan.Brexithasrecreatedthenotionthat

paramilitariesareforsomething.’

Progressinthisuncertainenvironmentisclearlyatriskunlessboththe‘ecological’natureofparamilitarisminNorthernIreland(thisisnotonly

a lawandorder issue) and the local variations are taken into account. Only flexible engagement and active learningbyworkers, funders,

communities,politicalleadersandagencypartnerscannegotiatethesecomplexdilemmas

3.3AttitudestoviolenceandarmedgroupsincommunitiesinNorthernIreland

Underlyingtheinconsistentterminologyandexperience,however,respondentsinthisresearchwereunanimousinconfirmingthecontinuing,

pervasivenatureandrelativetoleranceof‘paramilitary(armedgroup)activity’inthe‘FreshStart’areas.Consistentlyandimportantly,armed

group activity beyond legal limitation was so common as to be treated as part of the fabric of ‘normal’ community life rather than an

‘abnormal’shorttermexception,integratedintothecommunity’sdailyexperience:

‘Theabnormalisnormal–peoplebecomeconditionedtotheplaceandstopquestioningwhatisabnormalbehaviour.’

68

‘Maybepeopledon’t see itasaspecialandspecific issuebecauseparamilitarism is ingrainedwithin thesecommunities; it is

entwinedinallaspectsoflife.’

‘Thereachishuge.Weseeitinallplaces.’

‘InNorthernIreland,wetakeitforgranted–theviolenceandtheexistenceofarmedgroups–becauseourbenchmarkisthe

past,evenifit’snothinglikethepast.’

‘Thevacuuminlawandordercreatesaplatformwhichtheyfill–that’stheproblem.’

Inthoseareaswherearmedgroupviolencehasbeenalongtermreality,relationshipsbetweenmembersofthecommunityandthosedirectly

involvedinparamilitaryorganisationsandactivitiesarethereforeshapedwithinapatternofcomplexity,continuityandambivalence:

‘Thevillagesareallfamilyconnections.Theywillsupporttheirown.Therearerelationsbetweenthegroupsandthepoliceat

personallevel.Theyarereleasedrightandquickly.Iftheyarearrestedandreleased,thatisanotherstripeontheirarm.’

Perhapsunsurprisingly,communityattitudesappearattimestobecomplex,contradictoryandunstable. Thisreflectsavarietyofdifferent,

andsometimescompeting,experiences,including:

69

• Personal relationships with individuals who are also known for their contribution to family and community outside paramilitarism,

includingleadershipandorganisationalskills;

• Disdainanddisapprovalofillegalparamilitary/armedgroupactivityrelatedtodrugsandothercriminalactivity;

• Admirationforanidentificationwiththepoliticalcausesforwhichparamilitary/armedorganisationsstoodinthepast;

• Fearofparamilitary/armedgroupattentionorreprisal,whichactstosuppressopendebateorcriticism;

• Latenttoleranceforparamilitary/armedactivityactingagainstanti-socialbehaviour;

• Resentmentatallegedcontrolofcommunitydevelopmentandcommunityresources,andtheperceptionthatstateagenciescollude

withthisdevelopment;

• Toleranceofpublicdisplaysofparamilitary-relatedorerectedemblems,history,symbolsandflags.

This pattern of ambivalence and ambiguity was reflected throughout our interviews. On the one hand, interviewees emphasised that

community support for illegality was strictly limited, and silence largely amatter of fear. Paramilitaries in this viewwere a sinister and

coerciveforceinthecommunity:

‘Whyis itthatparamilitarismisthoughtofasauthenticworkingclassandanyonewhoobjects iscalledmiddleclass?Middle

classmeans[a]do-gooderwhodoesn’tunderstand.Butitisnottrue.Igrewupinacouncilestate.Addressingparamilitarismis

seenasanti-workingclass.Butitisn’t.Therearepeopletryingtokeeptheirchildrenoutofit,buttheycan’tspeak.’

‘Hasitchanged?Idon’tthinktherealityhaschanged.Therearesomechanges–moreintegratedrelationships,andthatcomes

fromthecross-communityclubs.Butthepeopleintherelationshipsstillcan’tlivewheretheywant.Italwayswasbrutalising,

70

controllingandcoerciveinfluenceonwhatyoucanandcan’tdo.Thereisacodeofconductoutthereandifyoustepoutofline

youwillhaveheatcomingtoyourdoor.Itisthere.Youdon’tneedtowriteitdown.’

‘Ifwewere to condemn them, theywould stop talking to us.When Iworked on the X interface,we couldn’t say anything

against loyalist paramilitaries. They ensured their members were always in attendance. When young people live in these

communities,theyareforcedtojoin.’

‘Electionpostershadtobe‘approved’tohangincertainvillages.AndIhadtohaveconnectionstofindthatout.’

Yet, on the other hand, the tradition of heroic local armed resistance is still celebrated and nurtured in the cultural messages

transmittedtoyoungpeople.Thenamesoforganisationsandlocalheroesofwararewidelydisplayedinmurals,symbolsandstreet

markinginalloftheareasoftheTacklingParamilitarismprogramme:

‘Ifyoucanbrandyouractivityasparamilitary,thestatecan’ttouchyoubecauseyouhavelegitimacy.’

‘The legacyofconflict incommunities isdeep–yousaw it in the localbonfires.Yousawtheestablishment–yougetall the

grants,yougettherulesandthenyougettheconstraintsonthepolice.Thatisthelegacyofconflict.Itissociallyacceptable.

Theyarepoisoningthewell.’

‘Thereisnodoubtthatparamilitariesputpressureonpeoplenottoengagewiththepolice.’

71

‘Thiscommunityislikealivingmuseum–inessence,youarenotallowedtoforget.’

‘Asyouthworkers,wewereouttryingtosortoutthebonfire[inourarea].AndwhenIwasthere,Saoradhcameoutandsaid,“If

thepolicecomeinhere,wewilldefendthiscommunity”.Andtheyhadatraction.’

‘Communities are still defined by crime. Community identity is tied up with heroic resistance, and the paramilitaries are

associatedwiththis.Alternativeidentityformation.Paramilitariesstandupformeasalostperson.’

Even apparently straightforward descriptions of paramilitaries as criminals anddrug dealerswere qualified by some interviewees. In some

areas,paramilitariesseemtoseetheirroleasprotectingthecommunityfromdrugsandmaintainingorderagainstthepotentialforcriminal

organised crime. However, it was acknowledged that this type of action also inevitably sustained the brand of paramilitarism within the

community,whichcouldlaterbeabused:

‘Drugsisabigproblem…Wehavelostthedrugswar.Youalwayshearabouttheparamilitariesinvolvedindrugs.Andthereis

some–andIwouldacknowledgethat.ButnotALLofthemaredrugdealers.Butthereareothersdealingdrugstoo.Drugdeals

andparamilitariesarenotonething.ButChineseandEasternEuropeansaresupplyingdrugstoo.Thereisa lotof laziness in

sayingparamilitariesareinvolvedinracketeeringandgangsterism.Therearesome,butitismuchbiggerthanthat.’

72

‘Inthisarea,ifdrugsarepickedup,theparamilitariesandloyalistgroupsareoutsupportingthepolice.Thedifficultyisthatthe

paramilitaries are still perpetuating the messenger. We needed a suitability panel [that existed in restorative justice] or

somethinglikeit.Thethingaboutex-prisonersisthatyoucan’tgettaxilicencesbutyoucanrunthecountry.’

The‘legitimacy’orparamilitarismisthusahighlyvolatilesocialvariableandmaychangequicklydependingonthespecificissueindispute,the

immediate political environment and local perceptions of the alternatives. This volatility makes it hard for youth workers to develop a

consistent approach to intervention. For example, some youth workers reported that community support for violent attacks on local

‘hoodlums’involvedinchronicanti-socialbehaviourwashighandembedded:

• ‘Weranfiveseminarsoverthelasttwoyearstryingtogetthecommunitytogetpeopletounderstand.Thathasn’tworkedin

thisareayet.Wewillhavetocontinue.’

• ‘Wegetaccusationsofrewardingbadbehaviour–goodiesforbaddies.’

Overall,theresearchconfirmedthatparamilitarismisnotaphenomenonwithclearandunambiguousboundaries incommunities,but isan

aspectofcommunitylifethathasbecomeorganicallyembeddedthroughitscomplex,locallyspecificandimpreciseboundarieswithfamilies,

political ideology and identity, community organisation, informal community power structures including the local formal and informal

economy, criminal justice andwelfare issues. At this stage of development, external partners relate on a daily basis to ‘paramilitaries’ or

membersofarmedgroups ina varietyof contexts that, superficiallyat least, areonly tangentially linked toparamilitarism,orengagewith

paramilitariesascommunityspokespeopleonissuesasdifferentaseducationalneeds,housingandchildren’sservices.

Thismaynotalwaysbeapparenttoobserversoutsidecommunities,whoseeonlytheillegalandpoliticalconsequencesofarmedgroups.Butit

doessuggestthatchangeinthiswillrequirebothasensitivitytolocaldifference,andthereforerelianceonlocalknowledgeANDtheabilityto

73

confrontpowerstructuresthatrelyoncoercionandrepressionfortheirlocalpower,whichcanonlycomefromoutside.Italsosuggeststhat

publicdiscoursewillhavetobecomemorehonestaboutthedilemmasandambiguities facing local,politicalandstatutoryactors (including

councils,thepolice,youthservicesandhousingauthorities),which‘tacklingparamilitarism’meansinpracticeatcommunitylevel.

‘Weneedanewconfidentsocialnarrativeaboutcommunities.’

3.4ThepressuresonyoungpeopleincommunitiesinNorthernIrelandwithaparamilitarypresence

Therewasconsensusamongallintervieweesthatyoungpeoplewereatthefrontlineoftheexperienceofparamilitarismincommunitiesas

bothparticipantsinandvictimsofactivity,ideologyandculture.

‘Youngpeople in this areausually have threeoptions: one, theygo to school, get a jobandhavenoassociationwith these

groupsorcriminalactivity;two,thosethataremanipulatedintojoiningbecauseofadebtorriskofbeating;three,thosethat

choosethislifestyle.Thatthirdgrouprequiresaspecificskillsettoworkwith–[a]speciallanguageandrelationshipstyle–to

confronttheirchoices.’

‘Thepeoplethatarebeingarrestedareyoung.Andthatiswhyitimportanttogetthemearly.Thepsychologyofthisisgetthem

early,whentheirlifejourneyisshaped.So,alotofourworknowis[in]primaryschool.Ourchallengeisnottheyoungpeople;it

isbuildingresilienceinyoungpeople.’

The interviewees identified both ‘push’ factors, which encouraged or drove young people to either become or remain involved in

paramilitarism,and‘pull’factors,whichattractedyoungpeople.Thesefactorsincluded:

• familyties,whichencouragedasenseofidentityandbelonginginextendednetworks;

74

• personalsecurityinahostileenvironmentthroughmembershipofagroup;

• pathwaystoidentityandpoweratlocallevel;

• excitementandperceivedglamour;

• opportunitiesforfinancialgain;

• debtanddependencyissues,includingdrugs;

• badexperiencesofpolicingorwiderauthority.

Intervieweesacknowledgedthatparamilitarismwasnotanewphenomenonbutwasestablishedasanelementofcommunityandsometimes

familyidentity:

‘Forsomeofthem,itiswhattheyareusedto.’

Thiswas combinedwith the attraction of belonging to a ‘gang’ identified in the previous section onmodels of practice outside Northern

Ireland:

‘Thegroupinthisareaareyoungpeoplesearchingforasenseofidentity/security/belongingtofeelsafe.Theyidentifywitha

group to have protection. The other element is the rush, the adrenaline. The youngmendon’t understand the fear and the

consequences. For a lot of them, it is a bit of craic, a bit of banter, and they don’t see the short-term or long-term

consequences.’

Associationwithaparamilitarygrouporactivitycanthereforebetheresultofavarietyofpushandpullfactors,someofwhicharevoluntary,

somecoercive,anditmayormaynotbeconsciouslytodowithideologyorcriminality.Critically,theintergationofparamilitarismispervasive,

75

such that even where young people consciously separate from paramilitaries, they end up participating within the sphere of action of

paramilitarygroups:

‘Young people initiate their own gangs distinct from the paramilitaries but are involved in drugs and crime so really they are being

controlledbutdon’toftenrecogniseit.Theydon’tnecessarilyholdallegiancestoparamilitariestheydon’trecognisetheircause/ideology

orwhytheyexistbeyondacontrolfunction.Theironyistheywanttoengageinthebehavioursassociatedwithparamilitaries–drugs

andcrime.’

Atthesametime,manyyoungpeopleseearmedgroupsasanotherformofsocialcontrol.Accordingtoyouthworkers,someactthisoutby

escalatingviolenceandanti-socialbehaviourinthecommunityasareactiveanddistortedmeansofresistanceandidentityexpression:

‘Therearealsoyoungpeoplethatrebelagainstallformsofauthority–illegalandlegal.’

‘Somehavewhatwecall‘‘Fuck‘emsyndrome”andtheysay,“IfIamgoingtojail,Imayaswellgoforsomethingbig”.’

Manyintervieweesidentifiedtheabsenceofmeaningfulrelationshipsbetweenyoungpeopleandpolicingasacommonthemeinbothloyalist

and republican areas andwere critical of the approach of policing at-risk young people,which they feltwas often counterproductive, and

createdimpedimentstotheirownabilitytoworkwithpolice:

‘Currently,thepracticeispersonality-basedandthereisnorealinstitutionalcontract.Also,therelationshipiswithconstables

andonceyougoupthepipethepolice loseknowledgeandbecomeunclearaboutwhat ishappening.Basically, Idon’tthink

theyinternallyshareinformation.’

76

Manyyoungpeoplestillsharethebasicassumptionthattheprimaryaimofpoliceofficersistogatherwiderintelligence,potentiallyturning

theyoungpeopleinto‘touts’andsocialpariahsamongtheirpeers:

‘There is a fear factor there still when you explain to the young people the nature of your role with the police. From the police

perspective,theyneedtogetbetteratsharinginformationandnotseeitallasintelligence.’

Insomeplaces,thishascreatedavacuuminsocialcontrolthattheparamilitariesfirstfilledandnowprotectagainsttheencroachmentofthe

police,usinganideologicaljustification:

‘Thevacuuminlawandordercreatesaplatformwhichthey[theparamilitary/armedgroups]fill–that’stheproblem.’

In this context, young people are largely the targets of brutal paramilitary action, where members of armed groups are able to portray

themselvesasactingonbehalfofthecommunityintheabsenceofpolicing.

3.5Istacklingparamilitarismaroleforyouthwork?

Armedactivityincludingrecruitmentbyarmedorganisationsengaginglocalyoungpeoplehasbeenacontinuousrealityinsomecommunities

inNorthernIrelandsince1969.However,thisresearchdidnotidentifyanycurrentprojectorcommunity-basedyouthworkprogrammewith

the explicit or primary aim of preventing young people from joining local armed groups or paramilitary organisations, or with an explicit

mission to support youngpeople if they seek to leave.There isnodevelopedor formalbodyofpracticewith thisaimandonlyoccasional

community-ledcommentonitsabsence,andusuallyfromexternalcommentators.ThiscontrastssharplywithPREVENTandCHANNELinGreat

Britain,andwithinternationalprojectsthatexplicitlyseektotackleradicalisation,whetheramongyoungMuslimsorinthecontextofextreme

right-wingorganisationsortosupportexit.Moreover,wedidnotfindyouthworkprojectsthatequatemembershipofaparamilitaryorarmed

77

groupwiththeinternationalconceptof‘gangs’andtherehasnotyetbeenanydirectefforttoendparamilitarymembershipalongthelines

attemptedinGlasgowintheCIRVprojectinrelationtoknifecrime.

Inasense, itappearsthat ‘paramilitaries’andorganisationswhichpromotearmedactionwithinapolitical ideologyhavebeenuntouchable

withincertaincommunities,anchoredinataken-for-grantedunderstandingthatanyefforttoaddressthiswouldputbothlivesandservicesat

risk.Implicitly,therefore,armedgroupscontinuetodeterminewhatcanandcannothappeninthelivesofcommunitiesandyoungpeoplein

alloftheFreshStartcommunitiesintransition.

In general, therefore, the phenomenon of ‘paramilitarism’ has been seen as a political phenomenon or series of connected political

phenomenainNorthernIrelandrequiringapoliticalsolution,ratherthanaproblemofviolence,safeguardingorcriminality.Strikingly,despite

theGoodFridayAgreement,newelectedframeworksandformalsocialconsensusthatchangeshouldonlybeachievedby‘exclusivelypeaceful

anddemocraticmeans’,armedgroupactivitydrawingonhistoricalcausesandsymbolismhasnotyetbeenbroughttoahalt.Forsomepeople,

thisisaglaringgapforsocietyasawhole:

‘Youcan’ttacklethisissueheadon.Wearetoldthereisnosuchthingasparamilitariesinthisareabecauseitdoesn’texist.This

dogissoviciousyoucan’tkickit.’

‘Forme,thisisacrisisofvision,understanding[analysis],trust,authority,concept,leadership,management.Andallwillneedto

change.’

78

‘Noorganisationhastacklingparamilitarismasaremit.Butweseeourselvesasprovidinganalternative.’

‘On the issueof direct naming, there is a general feelingwe should be takingpeople out of paramilitarism, butweare still

clingingontoit.[T]heonlytacticthatwehaveisnotnamingdirectly.Theotherdirectapproachwouldgetitsheadblownoff.So

youhavetoworkoutwhatyouareupagainst.Therearestillthosetherewhoseetheseinitiativesasthreat.’

Thisclearlyhasimplicationsforthesafetyofbothyoungpeopleandpeopleworkingwiththem.Throughtheresearch,weexploredwhether

preventingyoungpeoplefrombecomingmembersofarmedgroupsorsupportingthemto leavewasayouthworkresponsibilitywithinthe

termsof theconceptofsafeguarding.Respondentshadavarietyofviews. Overwhelmingly, respondentsbelievedthat thecommitmentof

youthworkerstoyoungpeopleimpliedarelentlessengagementontheirbehalfagainstallthreats,includingparamilitarism,ratherthaneither

focusingonorignoringparamilitarismasatopic:

‘Weprobablyoperatefromayouthengagement[and]personaldevelopmentangle.Buttheissueofparamilitarismisthere.You

arenotdoingitspecifically,workingwithyoungpeopleattachedtoayouthclub,buttheyaresusceptibletoallinfluences.We

providediversionaryactivitiesandthatiswhatitis.’

‘Whatwewere trying to stop [was]peoplebeingbrutalised…Ourprimarypurpose thenwasde-escalating situational crisis,

supporting young people in opportunities to engage in something while they weren’t working. It was also workforce

developmentforourselves.’

79

‘Buttheothersideisthatpersonaljourney.Whenyougowiththemthroughthecourt,theyrealiseyouareinterestedinthem:

“Iusedtothinkyouwereawanker,butyouarealright”.’

‘Therearethosethatstayawayfromthatstuff,andotherswhogoatitstraighton.Wearetryingourbesttoengageonrisks.

Weareprovidingadifferentopportunityforyoungpeople.WewouldmeetonaFridayeveningwhentheywouldbeoutrunning

thestreets.Itisalmosta‘midnightclub’.ButitgivesthemsomewhereonaFridaynight.Theymaynotstay.’

The majority of rinterviewees in this research acknowledged that paramilitarism and its implications for young people in some

communitiescouldnotbeignoredbyeitherworkersoryoungpeople.Atthesame,time,mostfeltthattheonlywaytoaddressthe

issueofarmedgroupsandyoungpeoplewasobliqueandopportunisticratherthandirectandconfrontational:

‘Inthisarea,youhavetobeconstantlymindfuloftheissueandtheimpactithasonthecommunityandrelationships,butwe

trynottoletitdominateourwork.Possiblythemainareawhereitcouldimpactisinrelationtodetachedyouthwork,because

oftheissueofterritory.’

‘Yesitisanissue…butitisnotsomethingthatIconsciouslythinkabout.’

‘Thereusedtobeanissuethatparamilitariesdidn’tgoforyouthworkers.Butwhentheywentforoneofours…Ihadtotell

people,“Tellmewhatyoucan’tordon’twanttodo”.Whenwesaid,“WearegoingtomeetSaoradh”,wedidittoprotectthe

youngpeople.Ifweseetheyareindanger,wewillchallenge.’

80

‘Howdoyoubuildresilienceinwhichthetrenchesarepartofthearchitecture?Wegivepeopledifferent,emotionallypowerful

experiencesofeachother.’

‘Whatdoesittaketorunacommunity?Lawandaccountabilityforactionsarepartofit.Becauseoftheirlackofpolitical

leadership,wearestartingtocreateasocietyoflawlessness.Andsomeoftheyoungpeople’sattitudesare“Sowhat?”Howdo

wegetbackto“No,youcan’tdowhatyouwant”?’

‘Wenowhaveagirlwhowastrailedthrough[amajorcommunityconfrontation]in2001.Shewasaprimetargetforgetting

involved.Wewentinandshemetthepeoplein[theprimaryschoolsinthesamearea]anddecidednottogothere.Now,sheis

runningagameofthreehalvesin[front-linedistricts].Sheconsciouslysays,“Icouldhavebeenpartofthat”.Thatjourneyup

thereisaprettysignificantone.’

‘Youdon’tknowhowmanypeoplewouldbeinvolvedifwehadn’tbeenthere.Wouldtheynotbetheboysorthepeopleifthere

hadnotbeenanalternative?Wedon’tname itup front,butwedotry tobuildaresilience.Wedotalkabout it.Theyknow

somebodyfromtheotherside.Contactisnotenough.Conversationhastobepartofit.Arelationshipfacilitatesaconversation

andaconversationcreatesarethinkpossibility.’

Forothers,however,worktoendparamilitarismwasanautomaticextensionofyouthworkvaluesinaNorthernIrelandcontext:

81

‘Inacommunitywereyoungpeoplecanberecruitednow,oneofourjobsistokeepthemoutofthehandsofparamilitaries.Our

jobistoreducetheirhatredofothers.Thisisourtask.Theproblemis,wearefartoofocusedongeneralism.Theproblemis,itis

seenassomethingonlyforspecialistsineightareas.Itisakeypartofourjob.’

‘Itisjustpartofthejob,anacceptedresponsibility.Attheendoftheday,youaretherefortheyoungpersonregardlessofthe

issues–that’swhywegot intothisprofession–and if theydoendupwithinaparamilitarygroup it isnotthefailureofthe

youthworker.Therearesomanyvariables that lead to that scenario.Youcanneverwrite someoneoffbut, instead,always

leavethedooropen.’

Theseworkerswerelargelyoftheviewthatavalues-ledapproachhadalwaysbeencentraltothetaskofyouthworkincommunities:

‘We were always dealing with these issues then Fresh Start came along and everyone thought it was something new and

unique.Youthworkersdon’tnecessarilyseethisasdifferentwork,especiallyifthisisalltheyhavedoneandconfronted–this

hasbeentheirenvironment.’

Thisincludeddirectnegotiationonbehalfofyoungpeoplewithorganisationsinthecommunity:

‘Iseeitasan‘ofcourse’issue.Allofmyfriendswereprominentparamilitaries.Someofmykidsinthisareaarethedissidents.

So,Ihavetonegotiate.’

Ingeneral,theywerecriticaloftheabsenceofformaltraining,organisationalguidanceorofficialsupportforworkersoryoungpeople.Asone

workercommented:

82

‘Theyarenot training it inhere [UlsterUniversity]. Iamfighting tohave ‘circleofcourage’and ‘goodrelations’backon the

degree.Thereisnotrauma-informedpracticeonthecourse.’

This view cannot, however, be regarded as an established consensuswithin youthwork. For some, the political nature of armed struggle

remains an ‘option’ that a young person can legitimately explore, even if youthwork is obliged to offer and suggest alternatives. Tackling

paramilitarismwastheresponsibilityofthepoliticalclassandthepolice,whocouldalsonotbefullyendorsedbyyouthwork.Youthwork’s

taskistoofferafreespaceforopenexplorationwithinthatpoliticalframe:

‘Itisnotayouthworker’sjobtotackleparamilitarism.Itisthejoboftheyouthsectortoengagewithparamilitarismasitaffects

youngerpeople.Itisourresponsibilitytomitigatetheeffectsonyoungpeople.Itisuptogovernmentstotackleparamilitarism

–itiswaybeyondourbrief.’

‘Peopleclaimingthattheyaredoingthisworkandareclearlynot.Forty-oddyearsago,inworkingclassareas,workerswerenot

aboutgettingpeopletostopsupportingtheUDAortheIRA.Manyyouthworkerswouldhavesupportedtheexistenceofthese

organisations.Manypeoplewouldnothaveseentheirjobasgettingyoungpeopletostoppeoplejoining.Butwhentheyoung

peopleweengagewithsay“Werecognisetherightofrepublicanstoengageinarmedstruggle”,weneedtoseeifitiseffective

andwesaywhynot.’

‘Ourpassionistocreateoptions–tohelppeoplepushbackagainstthesysteminadifferentway.Weidentifiedanissuewitha

realdeficitinyoungpeoplewithleadershipcapacityfromloyalistcommunities–toempoweryoungpeopletopushback.Our

83

roleistoestablisharelationshipwithyoungpeopletogivethemvoice.[Andona]policylevel,tospeaktopoliticians–tocreate

aninfluencingrole.’

Inthisview,anobligationonyouthworkerstotackleparamilitarismwouldalsoputbothworkersandyoungpeopleatunacceptablerisk:

‘Copsnegotiatedthedealsdirectly[aroundthebonfires]–sotheyseewherepowerlies.Itisnotmyrole.Itputsmystaffand

youngpeopleIworkwithatrisk.Thecommunityknowsthatthestatecannotgetridofthegroups.Sowhyshouldwe?Despite

recentdeaths,thereisstillcontinuingrecruitment.’

‘Therealityofthesituationisthatmembersofourstaffhavetheircarsattacked.Ihavewokenupwithacaroutsidethedoors.

Weworkwithanyone.Itisveryrisky.Wehavestaffworkingincommunitieswherepeopleareactive.Peopleareasking,“Where

doesthemoneycomefrom?”’

Whilelargercohortofyouthworkersinthisresearchtooktheviewthattacklingparamilitarismwasaresponsibilityofyouthwork,themajority

alsofeltthatitcouldonlybeundertakenonthebasisofstrictadherencetothegoals,valuesandpurposesofyouthwork,andlargelywithout

directreferencetotheissueof‘tacklingparamilitarism’.Inpractice,youthworkersoftenprovidethelastavailableresponsibleadultformany

youngpeople:

‘Also,ifitisoutofsightthenitisoutofmind–so,statutorybodiesdropinandoutandtheydon’thavetoconfrontthereality

everyday, so it’seasier to ignore it.However,ayouthworker in theareacan’t ignore itas it transcendsallaspectsof their

work.’

84

In thisview, theover-ridingdutyofayouthworker is to focusonthefutureofeachyoungperson,placingtheemphasisofyouthworkon

youngpeopleandtheirneeds,includingbutnotdefinedbyarmedviolence.:

‘Wewillalwayschallenge,becausetheultimatethingisprotectingyoungpeople.’

‘The role of youth work is in the transition from childhood to adulthood. Relationships are key to successful work, not

programmeperse.Investinlocaladultswithmentoring–notparent-child,butparent-youngadult.Aspecialadultiscriticalto

youngadultsasbothawitnessandameasure.’

‘Ourroleistobuildthecapacityofyoungpeopletouseothermechanismstoachievetheirends.Tothinkaboutdifferentways

ofaffectingsocialchange.Moreimportantis:areweencouragingthemtobecriticalthinkersandpushback?Themeslikesocial

justiceandsocialchange,andwhatdoesyouth-ledjusticemean?’

‘We are trying to empower young people to support the view that violence is not the only possibility. We focus on the

individual.’

Inallcases,however,respondentsagreedthatyouthworkcouldonlymakeausefulcontributionwithinacollaborativeenvironmentandwere

keenthatthispointthatshouldbeemphasisedbytheEducationalAuthority:

‘EAcannotcreateastrategicengagement.Collaborationiscritical.’

85

‘Collaborativepartnershipandlearningiscrucial.’

‘Investingincommunitiesisimportant.Youthworkhasarolebutitisnotallyouthwork.’

3.6Youthworkwhereparamilitarismisacontinuingrealityincommunities

Asidefromthecentraltasksofprovidingprotectedspaceawayfromtraumaticsocialinfluences,directpersonaldevelopmentinterventionand

personalemotionalsupport,youthworkactivitytopreventdamagetoyoungpeopleinrelationtoparamilitarismoftenfell intothreebroad

categories:mediation,diversionandadvocacy.

Asmediators,youthworkersdescribedfindingthemselvesatthecentreofnegotiationswithyoungpeople(bothindividuallyandingroups),

armedorganisations,politicalparties,localresidents,statutoryagencies(includingthepoliceandlocalcouncils)andthemediaasoneofthe

fewpeopleoftrustcapableoffindingsolutions.Forexample:

‘Wehadconversationswith localcommunity, independentcouncillorsandSinnFéinabout thebonfire.Oncewegot themto

agreethattyresarenotgoodforourcommunity,theyoungboystookthemout.Wehavebeenbuildingrelationshipswiththese

youngpeopleformonths.Theyhavenoaspirations,nohopeornothing.’

‘Therealityisthatparamilitarygrowthrequirescommunitysupport,sotheyhavetobecarefulnottoalienatethecommunity.

So, the relationshipsbetweenyouthworkersandyoungpeople is important,becauseweareengagingandmanaging issues

associatedwithoftenverymarginalisedyoungpeople.’

86

For some critics, thismay fall short of tackling paramilitarism, but itwas also acknowledged that diversion often creates opportunities for

changeorpreventsescalationallowingyouthworkerstoprotectyoungpeoplefromharmandfurtherinvolvementbytakingyoungpeopleinto

unknownyettrustedcircumstances.Thiswasconsciouslypartofthestrategyofprojectsthatusedsportorexcursionsasavehicletoengageor

protectalienatedyoungpeople.

‘Sportdoesnothavetobeaboutfriendshipsbutithastobeaboutthepossibilityofafriendship.Therelationshipwhichateam

createsallowspeopletotalkdifferently.Youhavetotaketheopportunityofthatnewrelationship.Youhavetosustainit–a

teamsportcreatesthis.Italsocreatesasharedmissionandvision.Anditcreatesashareddependency.’

‘Wheresomethinghappensinthecity,thereisnowasystem.TwelfthJuly,policerangme–Irang[anotheryouthclub],“Can

youput[on]someactivities?”Theysaidyes,weputstreetworkerson,and[theotherclub]took60kidstothebowlingalley.’

‘Interventionsshouldnotalwaysmeanpeoplehavetoleavetheircommunity.AtthetimeofLyraMcKee,weweregoingtotake

peopleoutofourcommunity.Itchangedourmindset.WeputmoneyfromtheAgileFund.Wedroppedthe‘takingpeopleout’

process.Instead,weorganisedafamily-orientatedday[here]toshowthetruespirit–music,watersports,staffminglingwith

community:1,542peopleparticipated–butthemediarefusedtoreportit.’

Beyond short-termdiversion, anumberof youthworkerspointed topersistentpresentationofalternatives suchasemployment, asa vital

elementinanyprocessofchange:

‘This year, therewasnopolitical involvement in thebonfire. Thatwasabighelp. The youthemployment schemeunder the

EducationAuthoritywasalsoagreathelp.Wehaveagroupof12youngpeopleallpreviouslyinvolvedatdifferentlevelsinriots

87

andbonfiresandsoon.Iaskedtheyoungpeoplewhytheywantedthejobandtheysaid,“Idon’twanttobepartofwhatIwas

part of last year”. Not one of them has been arrested this year.We got the right people in – they had to go through an

applicationprocesstoreinforceachievement.Theyhadaninductionandtraining–induction,childprotection,CRED.Thisyear,

nobodywillbeoutonbonfirenight.’

Youthworkersoften also find themselves as the advocates for youngpeople at risk fromparamilitaries, exploitationbyother elementsor

caughtupinanti-socialbehaviour:

‘Youhavetoproveyouhavethekid’sback.Youhavetovisittheminjail.Youhavetohelpthemwhentheyareofftheirfaces.’

‘Youneedtotalktotheparamilitaries?Wewilldothatforyou.Doyouneedcounselling?Wewillgetthat.Howdowekeepyousafe?Do

youneedtimeout?Thequestionis,“Howdowefixit?”’

Theresearchconfirmedthatthereiscurrentlynofixedviewamongpractitionersabouttheappropriateapproachtobetakenbyyouthworkers

towardsaddressingparamilitarism.However,itispossibletoidentifyanumberofissuesthatmaybeimportanttodebateatprofessionallevel:

• Youth workers in local communities rely on community confidence and consent to do their work. The key to effective work is an

effectivetrustbetweenthecommunityandtheprogramme,thecommunityandtheworker(s),theworker(s)andtheyoungperson.In

theabsenceofaconsistentpositionontacklingparamilitarismamongpoliticalandcommunityleaders,especiallyatlocallevel,youth

workerscannotactwithoutcaution.

• Tackling paramilitarism directly in communities in Northern Ireland could put young people and youth workers at personal risk or

preventthemfromdoingtheirjob.Alltheevidenceisthatthemoresuccessfulitisinaddressinginterestsincommunity,themorework

needstobesupported.However,itisnotalwaysclearwhoworkersandyoungpeoplecanrelyonforprotection.

88

• YouthworkerssharetheambivalenceinNorthernIrelandasawholeaboutpolicingandthehistoryofarmedstruggle.

• There are tensions within value-based approaches to youth work between an emphasis on non-violence and an emphasis on

participationandfreedomofexpression.

• Thefocusofyouthworkisthedevelopmentandqualityoflifeofyoungpeople.Tacklingparamilitarismisasecondaryaimwithinthis

primarypriority.

3.7Evolvingyouthworkpracticetoaddressparamilitarismincommunities

Theresearchidentifiedanumberofcommonthemesinrelationtogoodpracticeforyouthworkwithyoungpeople‘atrisk’ofengagementin

criminalbehaviourthrough‘gangs’orarmedgroups.

Everyyouthworkerinthisresearchprojectagreedthatchangeinbehaviouronlyhappenedinandthroughrelationships.Asseveralpeoplesaid

independently, ‘Relationships are the heart of thework’. This is entirely consistentwith all of themost successful internationalmodels of

violencereductionsurveyedinthefirstpartofourresearch.Formanyworkers, itwasalsopartoftheirownexperienceasyoungpeoplein

relationtootherissues:

‘Churchandyouthworksavedme.Ifyougetpeoplewhoarepreparedtogivepeopletime.Peoplethinkitismoneybutitisnot

–itistime.Persistent,professional,well-boundaried.Accountabilitycomesfromthat.Kidswillrollwiththeflow.’

It therefore seems likely that the specific contributionof youthwork toanyprogramme related toarmedgroupsmay lie in its capacity to

engage in face-to-face relationships with young people at risk, rather than simply ‘tackle paramilitarism’ as a specific political or social

phenomenon.Atthesametime,asdescribedbyanumberofrespondents,thisworkrequiresprofessionalandboundariedworkentailinga

89

degreeofhonestyanddirectnessthathassometimesbeencharacterisedas‘toughlove’,combiningfocusedattentionwithaninsistenceon

responsibility-taking:

‘These kids get all their love, care and attention from negative behaviour. They get negative skills; they get attention from

deviancy.So,wesitthemdownandwetalktothem.Wehaveaposterineveryroom.Andwesay“Whatdidyoudo?Whatare

youresponsiblefor?Whataretheconsequences,andhowwouldyouresolvetheissue?”’

‘Wekeeptellingthem,“Stoptellingmeaboutwhathedone.Whatdidyoudo?”Wehavetogetthembackto“Whatdidyou

do?”’

The qualities of a good worker were, perhaps unsurprisingly, consistent with core qualities of good youth work in the work identified at

internationallevelandincluded:

• Persistence

• Consistency

• ‘Onthestreet’

• Value-driven

• Prioritisingpastoralcare

• Clearaboutboundaries

• Pro-socialmodelling

• Adegreeofstreetcred.

90

Itwasacknowledgedthatmanyworkersalreadyhadthesequalities,butthattherehadbeenlittlestrategicsupport,eitherinrelationtofocus

onthequestionoftacklingparamilitarismand itsconsequencesforyoungpeople incommunitiesorforworkersworking inthefieldwhere

paramilitarismwasareality:

‘Thereisagapintermsofourpracticearoundengagingwithgangsandtheoryofgangculture–thatisabigandgrowingissue

inthesecommunities,anditdoesn’tnecessarilystartoutasparamilitary-controlled.’

‘Wedohavedefinedpractice.Butitisstillnotstrategic.’

‘Thisisaprocessofchangingwhatyouthworkersdoandhowyouthworkersunderstandwhatyouthworkistodo.Forfartoo

longwehavebeentooairy-fairy.’

Thethemesofpersistenceandconsistencywerealsocommonamongall theprofessionals interviewed. In relation toyoungpeopleat risk,

workersacceptedthat inconsistencyandunreliabilitywereexpectedbehavioursandthatthe jobofyouthworkerswastoofferapro-social

model that could challenge this for young people. It also echoed the themes of ‘relentless follow-up’ evident in someof the ‘gang’-based

projectsintheUS,surveyedearlier:

‘The Education Authority were sending different people and opening on different days. What we did was keep turning up. That

consistencywasreallyimportant.’

‘Itisaquestionofnotsucceedingforawhile–andyetstickingwithit.’

91

‘Youneedtocommitandfollowthrough.Consistentandpersistent.Thelandscapeisbetter.Before,youhadtorappeople’sdoorsand

youbuiltrelationswiththeirdasandmasandcousins.’

‘Myroleisnotfournightsinayouthclub.Igoouttothefamily.Wehavethiscircleofcourage,whichwedoasone-to-one,andwecan

knowtheyoungperson.Throughourlifemapsystemweknowtheperson.Wecanidentifywhattheissueis.Wecan’tbeallthingstoall

people–andwecantransferbetweenpeople.’

Buildingonthesethemes,therewasadegreeofconsensusabouttheprioritiesofanyyouth-basedprogrammetoreduceengagementwith

armedorgroupviolence:

• De-glamorisation–de-glamoriseviolencewithrestorativeprinciples

• Streetbystreet

• Keepgoing–persistence

• Localpeoplearecritical(bothinsupportandinchange)

• Downanddirty–realissues(nocheapanswers)

• Peerapproachtochange(learningisfromamodel,notfromaninstructor)

• Reformulatingtheissue(notagainstparamilitarism–FORameaningfulidentity)

• Hotspotwhereitmatters–butbeflexiblewithboundaries(respondwithintelligence)

• Agileandflexiblefunding(think,act,account)

• Givecreditforgoodwork–donotkeeppeopleinthebox(allowpeopletochange)

92

According to one interviewee, the outstanding challenge in Northern Ireland remains the continuing lack of urgency in relation to the

developmentofgoodpracticeandoftestingandapplyingitappropriately:

‘Idevelopedthegear-stickmodelofyouthwork–fifthgearisallaboutthegangculture.’

Nonetheless,ininterviews,anumberofissuesemergedasconsistentpriorities,inanychangedapproach,toimproveyouthworkpracticein

thisarea:

1. A revision of the understanding of ‘risk’ in youthwork to ensure that the concept of ‘at risk’ is focused away from generic socio-

economic indicators, to enable youthworkers to identify and focus effort on those young people identified as at risk from serious

involvementwithcriminalityandviolence:

‘Wehavetakenaserviceandpushedthemandtrainedtheminunderstandingwhat‘youngpeopleatrisk’(YPAR)isandhowwe

transitionpeoplebackfromthedarksideofsocialcapitaltothe lightside.The languagedoesn’thelp.Becauserisk isaterm

whichcanmeananything.Wedealwithitintermsofnormalrisks–drugsandthelike.Butwewanttoworkatthereallyhard

end–thoseatriskofgettinginvolvedinphysicalattacksandviolence,ofharmingthemselvesandharmingothers.’

‘Thesekidshateeverybodyandeverybodyhatesthem.Thisisatwo-waysystem.Thecommunityhatesthem,persecutesthem.

Weareonlytalkingseventotenkids [inmyarea].Buttheyarethemost fragile,brokenkidsyouhaveevermet inyour life.

Nobodywantstohelpthem,butnobodywantstowalkwiththem.’

2. A formal professional recognition of the damage that violence does to young people, both through trauma as victims and in

traumatisingothers.Thiswould, in turn,enable significant commitment todifficult youngpeoplewhohavesuffered inand through

93

violence,requiringawillingnessbyprofessionalstobehonestaboutunacceptablebehaviourswithyoungpeople,whileworkingmore

closelywiththem.Foroneworkerinthisresearch,thisentailedaformalshiftintheemphasisofyouthworktowardstrauma-informed

practiceandsupportingyouthworkersinlearninghowtorespondappropriately:

‘Wearenowoutinthefield,trainingyouthworkersandteachersinwhatthemeaningofATRISKisandknowinghowto

tackleit,allinastrength-basedperspective–youdon’tjudgetheperson,butyoujudgethebehaviourandgetthemto

takeresponsibility.Yougetthemtoprogressthebehaviourwhileunderstandingthemasavaluablehumanbeing.’

3. Focused work that may reduce the total number of young people being worked with at any one time but that also involves a

commitmenttoendexclusionsfordifficultyoungpeople,acultureofreflectivepracticeforworkersandincreasedattentiontoaction

research.Thisalignedcloselywiththeconceptof‘relentlessoutreach’adoptedinROCA.

‘Itusedtobeaboutnumbers–45anight,atleast.Ioncedid90.Itwasmental.Iwenttothemandsaid,“Fortyisour

maximum,withthebehaviourswearedealingwith”.Now,Itakefourstaffwith12people.’

‘We need one-on-one work, bespoke programmes, sufficient time resources – which means enough people and the

capacitytoadaptspendingtoneedsandchangingevents.’

‘Timeisamassiveissue–youjustdon’thavethetimeorspace.Wevalueit,buttimeisthebarrier.Thereissuchahigh

burnoutinthiswork–peoplecangetverynegativetoo.’

94

‘Weneedreflectivepracticewhichencouragesreflectioninyoungpeople.’

‘Wearenotdoingenoughresearch.Weneedmore.’

‘We need new techniques, new knowledge, new research.More expert advice.More accountability. I have external

evaluatorsandtheyadvise.Theygivemeresources.Wehaveneverhadthatinthepast.’

Thecontributionofthiskindoffocusedcommitmenttoyouthatriskasawaytolimittheimpactofviolenceisclearlydistinctivefromother

approachestotacklingparamilitarism,includinglawandorder.Atthesametime,itmaygosomewaytosquaringthecircleofaroleforyouth

workinpreventingviolenceandtheimpactofviolence,andthedirectlypoliticaltaskoftacklingparamilitarismbyensuringthatyouthwork

retainsitsfocusontheyoungpersonwhileaddressingparamilitarismasatraumaticexperienceofviolence.

Inthemostextremecasesofdamage,however,youthworkersinthisresearchalsoacknowledgedthatyouthworkinterventionalonewillnot

resolveissuesofgangviolenceandrequiresinteragencycooperation:

‘Wegradedouryoungpeopleasgreens,ambersandreds–greensandamberswehavebeensuccessfulwith,redsnotsomuch.

Ournewmethodis‘anti-group’work.Ourjobwastobuilddowntheirgroupidentityandrebuildit.Wewantedthembackfrom

thedark sideof social capital.Theambers takemorework than thegreens.For the reds,wecan’tdo thatwithyouthwork

alone.Weneedamulti-disciplinaryapproach.Theyouthworker is theirpersonof trust.We take themtoappointments;we

meettheminprison.Buttheyneedmorethanthat.’

Thenotionof ‘anti-group’workhasechoesoftheworkofEXITSweden,whichsees itstaskascreatingpositivepeergroupassociationasa

criticalsupportivefactorforpeopleleavingviolentgroupideology.

95

3.8Collaborativecommunityyouthworkfortacklingparamilitarism

OneofthemoststrikingthemestoemergefromtheresearchwastheinitiallyparadoxicalsuggestionthatanysuccesswoulddependonBOTH

localcredibilityANDtheengagementoftrustedoutsiders.

Inthefirstinstance,localcredibilitywasaconstantthemeofintervieweesinrelationtotheabilityofanyprofessional,includingyouthworkers,

toengagewithparamilitarismandarmedgroupviolenceinNorthernIreland.Indeed,allrespondentswereoftheviewthatunlesstherewas

sufficienttrustwiththelocalcommunity,noworkcouldbesuccessful:

‘Youhavetoalsorememberthattheoverwhelmingmajorityofyouthworkersintheselocationsareallfromthearea.Theyhave

always lived here or have family. That means they know the history and identity of the place, they know who are the

partnershipsthatyouneedtomake,whatthepoliticsofthelocalcommunityarelike,whatconstitutesgoodandbadbehaviour

–andtheyalsohavecredibility.Thisiscrucialforthistypeofwork,andalotofitcannotbetrainedorreadinabook.’

‘Ifyouwantsomebodytodoit,youneedtothinkaboutthat.It’slikeallthings–anideayouprove.Itissimple:youknowyour

areaandyouknowwhereyoucango.Whenyougetlocalpeoplecommittedtotryingtodothingsrightintheircommunities

youcanchangeit.Outsidersgoinginwillneverchangeit.’

‘Youhavetogetthesupportinthecommunity.Butiftheyseelocalpeopledoingit,theyhaveavestedinterest.Andeveninthe

East,thereispeopletotalkto.Eventhen,wedidstreetbystreet.Mothersandgranniesoutonthestreetstellingtheirkidswhat

todo.’

96

‘Workingclasscommunitieswhoaretryingtodothingsneedsupported…Thosewhoweredoingitputthebootsontheground.

Weweredoingitfor‘us’.Itwasourchildren,itwasourcommunitiesgettingcaughtupinit.’

‘Youngadultstuff.Ithinkthisissueistotallydifferentindifferentplaces.Ifyoulookatyoungpeoplealone,ontheirown,itdoes

notwork.Youhavetolookatthewholecommunitytounderstandwheretheiryoungpeoplefit.’

‘Youhavetogetoutandaboutonthestreets.EAneedtodothat.Youhavetoknowthekids.Youhavetogetdownanddirty.’

Tosomeextent,thisisalogicalconclusionfromthedemonstrablerealitythateachcontextissubtlydifferent,madeworseinNorthernIreland

bytheinsularityandinwardfocusofmanyoftheseparatedareasinthisprogramme.

‘Ineachcommunity,theFreshStartworkerisdifferent.Evenhere,itisdifferent.’

Yet,somerespondentswerealsoawarethattheneedforlocalcredibilitysometimescameatthecostofindependenceofaction,creativityand

innovation,especiallyinachallengingareaofworkwheretherearepowerful,localvestedinterestswillingtouseintimidationtoachievetheir

ends,orwherethecommunitysidesdecisivelyagainsttheinterestsofayoungperson(forexample,incasesofanti-socialbehaviour):

‘Local knowledge and reputation is key in this field of work – it gives credibility. But the risk then is that it does not create an

environmentwherenewthinkingcanbeintroduced.’

97

‘Weareoftenslowtorecognisewhatisnormalandwhatisabnormalbehaviour.Webecomeconditionedtothelocalissuesandthink

that is simply the way things are – you see everything as normative – so reflective practice is crucial. But… you also need a good

challengewhendoingreflectivework–needtobequestionedaboutwhywedothethingswedo.’

Therewas, therefore, a broad agreement that the generation of trust towards the goal of tackling paramilitarism in youthwork required

attention toactive relationship-buildingbetweenanumberofkeystakeholdersandpartners. Ineverycase, these includedmaintaining the

confidence of young people, local workers and theirmanagers, the local community, externalmentors, and partner agencies (sometimes

includingthepolice).Theintervieweesmostcommontermsusedtodescribethiswere‘mentoring’,‘activelearning’and‘co-delivery’,including

co-design:

‘Mentoringiscritical.’

‘TheEducationAuthorityworkdoesn’tworkdirectlyhere.Co-deliveryisveryimportant–vital.’

‘Havingtransitionalfiguresofauthorityandidentityisveryimportanttoayoungperson.ThefourPs:[a]parental,persistent,

protectivepersonality.Amentorissometimesonegoodadult.’

‘Wemustco-designandcreateinterventionstogether.Itisgettingmuchbetter.Butitneverhappenedbefore.’

‘Partnershipallowsustosharerisks...Risk-sharingiscritical,becausewesharethesamevalues.’

98

‘The key to effective work is an effective trust between the community and the programme, the community and the

worker/workers,theworker(s)andtheyoungperson.’

Oneintervieweesuggestedthatthisapproach,togetherwithacommitmenttoreflectivepracticeandflexibilityinresponsetolearning,should

behard-wiredintoanyprogrammeonthethemeoftacklingviolenceincommunities,establishing:

• Abespokeprogrammeofworkinvolvingteams;

• Ensuring that people are paired – a young person just out of university with all the knowledge of best practice and a clear

understandingofcurrentapproachesandtheoriesalongsideamoreexperiencedperson,say50+yearsofage;

• Thiswouldensurethattheprogrammeofworkhadlocalcredibilityandthattheteamwouldhavetheknowledgeofcommunitypolitics

andlocalhistorytoguidetheinteractions–alocalpersoncancommandrespect;anoutsiderwouldstruggleforlegitimacy;

• Thisworkischallenginganditiscrucialthatpeoplehaveopportunitiesfordebriefingandreflectivepractice.

This kind of co-delivery approachmight allow for both established and new knowledge to be engaged, for learning involving a number of

sourcesandfor localcapacitytobeengagedfruitfullyandproducingnewoutcomes.Oneworkerdescribedchangingunderstanding intheir

ownproject:

‘Wedon’tsign[youngpeople]uptobasketballanymore.Weareacommunityrelationsandpeacebuildingorganisationthat

usessport.Basketballisparticularlyusefulherebecauseitdoesn’tbelongtoanygroup.Butyouhavetoleverthesport.They

joinanintegratedteamandtheyknowthat.Ideally,thekidsgethooked.Maybethebasketballisthehook.IfIhadgoneto[a

stateschool]andsaid,“Let’splayGaelic[football]”,itwouldnothaveworked.Basketballallowedsomeoftheparentstostep

up…Iaminterestedinthetool.Theoriginalmotivationwaswewanttodosomethingwiththesport.Indesperation,theyused

moneyasahook.Theschoolssawthedollars.ButnowtheyseeitasawaytodotheirPDMU.Now,wesaytheteachersneedto

99

change, and the teachers need to change. There is a transfer from our work to “Today, we talked about diversity in the

classroom”.’

3.9Challengesforyouthworkinaddressingissuesarisingfromparamilitarism

Inthecourseoftheresearch,workersidentifiedtenspecificchallengestothesuccessfuldeliveryofasystematicprogrammetotackling

paramilitarismthatshouldbeaddressed:

1. Tacklingparamilitaryactivityandthecultureofparamilitarismincommunitiesiscurrentlynotsystematicbutreliesonindividual

workersandtheirrelationshipsincommunitiesandwithotheragencies.

‘Detachedyouthworkisstillthebestwayofrespondingtotheseissues–one-to-onemethodologies,withgoodstrong

links to statutory partners. However, a lot of this work is still personality-driven – so we know people in the NIHE

[NorthernIrelandHousingExecutive]orPSNIandwecangetthingsdone.Butthereisnocorporateknowledgeofhowto

dojoined-up,consistentwork.’

‘OutsideBelfast,theprofessionalstructuredoesnotexist.’

2. Traininginthisareaofyouthworkremainspoorlydevelopedandcannotbereliedoninthefield.Respondentsfeltthatmentoring

and reflective practice for workers were more appropriate for a developing field with huge risks and the potential for worker

isolation.

100

3. Dealing with difficult young people at risk from involvement as either perpetrator or victim is complex work, requiring both

attentiontorecruitmentandconstantattentionandreflectiononthepartoftheworker:

‘Muchofthisworkhastohappenonthestreet,butitisdifficult.Becauseyouonlyhaveyourownboundaries.Youarein

their classroom. If you have them in a room, you can reinforce a healthy learning environment. You can use peer

influencetode-escalatethesituation.Itisavaluabletool,butyouneedtherightpeople;otherwise,theriskssupersede

thelikelihoodofsuccess.Eithertheytakeunnecessaryrisksortheyendupavoidingtheriskandwalkingarounddoing

nothing.’

4. There are real fears about the intimidation and safety of workers in communities, especially if workers are seen to work in

cooperationwiththepolice.Theexpectationsonworkersneedtobeappropriatelymanaged.

‘Ifweweretosaythatwewereworkingonparamilitarism,howlongwouldtheprojectlast?Howlongwouldwelast?’

5. Work to address the consequences of paramilitarism for young people in communities needs to be imaginative and flexible,

requiringactiveandintelligentworkers,andwillrequirethatresourcescanbemadeavailableinatimelyway.Thiswillrequirenew

approachestoaccountabilitythatfocusonoutcomesaswellasprocedures.

‘Therearecertainsituationswheretherulesdon’tfit.STARTprogrammeworkswith12kids.Youwouldneverhavegot

thatinthepast.xhastakenarisk.Xisseeingthatthequalityandtheinterventionisthere.’

‘Rulesareguidelines,notlaws–youneedtheabilitytotakedecisions.’

101

‘Agilefundingisvitalifyouaretotakeopportunities.’

‘[Here]fourofusaretheoverseersofthemoney.Wedecide.Thiswholeethoscameaboutbecauseofthelocaltension

about [the]outcomeof theBloody Sunday Inquiryand thedecision toprosecuteoneperson.Weknewwe shouldbe

flexible.Wearefocusedonyoungpeople,wherebeforehandwewouldhavefocusedontheclub.Isaid[ourclub]would

dotheriskassessmentforeveryone[inourcity],andwewereabletotake310peopletoactivities.’

‘Theamountofmoneythatispumpedintoareasisnotreviewed.Itismoneytomanage.’

6. Re-orientating youthwork provision to tackling paramilitarismmeans prioritising thosemost at risk. This is a culture change for

muchyouthwork.

‘Weareseeingchanges.Wearenotageneralservice;weareafocusedservice.’

7. Tacklingparamilitarismsuccessfullythroughyouthworkwillrequirepersistenceandconsistencyfromfundersaswellasprojects.

‘Ifpeoplehavepavedtheway,don’ttryandinventthewheel.Noveltygetsprioritised,noteffectiveness.’

8. Thereisnosimplecauseandeffectthatyouthworkcandeliverintacklingparamilitarism.Successforyouthworkmaynotlooklike

statisticalchange,butrather,smallchangesthatenablelargersocialchanges.Governmentagenciesneedtosupportworkersasthey

102

engagewiththistopicandchangetheirownexpectationsofsuccess.Additionally,theyshouldbewillingtoadaptchangeslearned

throughtheprogrammeintotheirmainstreamactivities.

‘Wearepunchingholesinsomeofthewalls.Creatingcomplexityistheissue.Weworkwith2,500peopleand250stick

anddotheschoolprogramme.Parentsmakethatdecision,notschools.Andthekidsmakethedecision.Andofthe250,

we have the 50 people who become coaches and facilitators – they are trained to be community relations workers

throughsport.Andtheythenusethesports.Youhaveempoweredandskilleduppeople,buttheyhiteverybarrier.What

canwedotostartpunchingholesinthewalls?Themachineswallowsyouup.’

9. Honestyaboutdifficultiesandchallengesisdifficultinanenvironmentthatisdrivenbycorporatesuccessandamediaculturethat

moneyspentontacklingdifficultissuesismoneymisdirected.

‘Howdopeoplebecomehonestabouttheuncertaintyofthework?Weneedamorehonestenvironment…Xissaying,“I

amokaywithpeoplemessingup,aslongasyoulearn”.’

10. Accountability needs to be related to outcomes. Outcomes need to be assessed honestly,with the chance to evolve and adjust

practiceifthingsdonotworkonthefirstattempt.Reflectivelearningshouldbecoordinatedacentrallevel.

‘Howdowebuildthesafeguardsintothesystem[accountability]?’

103

3.10Measuringsuccess?

Inthisresearch,manyoftherespondentswerekeentopointoutthattheTacklingParamilitarismprogramme,moregenerally,shoulddevelop

ameaningfulunderstandingofchangeandthepaceatwhichitcanbedelivered,aswellastherolethatyouthworkcanplay insupporting

youngpeopleinchange.Foryouthworkers,paramilitarismisthecontext,nottheproblem:theprofessionalchallengeisfindingeffectiveways

tosupportculturechangeagainstviolenceforyoungpeopleincommunitieswheregroup-basedviolenceandself-protectiveorganisationhave

remainedingrained.

In general, youthworkers in this research agreed that the onlymeaningful level ofmeasurementwas in changed life prospects for young

peopleandcommunities. The contributionof youthwork in thisenvironment isnever the single-handederadicationofparamilitarism,but

seekingtoendtheviolationofyoungpeople.Inevitably,thatisamulti-agencytask,withthecommunityalsoatitsheart:

‘Outcomeaccountabilityisultimatelytheonlytest.’

Therewasasensethatameaningfulprogrammewouldhavetoacceptthatchangeforyoungpeopleismeasuredinchangesovertime,rather

thaninimmediateresponses.

‘Wetouchlotsofpeople,whodon’tdeliverfortenyears.Itismuchmoreorganicsthancauseandeffect.Aseedproduces–butonlyifit

getssupport.Youhavetokeepsowing.Verydifficulttotrack.Therearetriggersandthekeyisresiliencewhenithappens.’

‘Weare equippingour children todo it differently tohowwedo it now.Wearenotasking the kids todo it for us.Weareputting

somethingnewin,notdoingthesamething–thedefinitionofmadness.’

104

Within this broad framework, youthworkers accepted that indicative changeswere also important asmilestones in the shorter term. This

required a degree of qualitative assessment, including stories of potential, which could act as exemplars for future work, especially in a

developingnewareaofwork.Anumberofexampleswereoffered:

‘Recruitment isnotat the level itoncewas. Iknowthatwhenyouare lookingaround,sayatRemembranceDay, therearevery few

youngones.Noteenagerscomingthrough.Dotheywanttobeinvolved?Somedo.Thereisnoparamilitarismintheoldsense,butthose

fromthatkindofbackgroundwhowanttodothingsinapositivewaydon’tgetachance.’

‘In2002,wecouldnothavegoneinto[someschools].Butin2010wecould.Gettingthemfromtwobusesintoonebuswasnewaswell.

Thengoingtoeachother’sschools.Butthatwasaten-yearjourney.Thekidsbecamethechampionsfortheparents.Butthatisallabout

theresiliencething.’

‘Success looks like the kids that are coming throughandarenowgivingback.Of course,wedo surveysandattitudinal surveysand

numbersandallthat.Butwearetryingtostartsomething.Wegivethemthetoolsandthecontextwherethatmightbepossible.You

givethemthelanguageandtheknowledge.Wewouldtestsomeofthekids.Thekeyis[that]ithastogetundertheirskin.Thereisa

hugeissueingettingthatintoorganisations.Youhavetopunchholesintheorganisationstoo.’

Importantly,respondentsfeltthatthisaspectoftheworkshouldbeintegratedintoawiderreflectivelearningframework, inwhichhonesty

aboutbothsuccessesandfailurescouldalsocontributeactivelyaspartofwiderprofessionallearningandaccountability.

3.10Summaryobservationsandrecommendations

105

a. Paramilitarism remains a contested concept in Northern Ireland. Both loyalist and republican communities have been shaped by

embeddednarrativesofarmedstruggleand/ordefenceofthecommunitybyarmedgroupsformanygenerations.Boththepresenceof

armedgroupsandyoungpeoplejoiningthemhasadegreeof‘historictradition’,even‘normality’, infamiliesandcommunities. This

givesgroupsoutsidethelawanunusualdepthandcontinuityaswellasatradition,howevertenuously,ofclaimingpoliticalpurpose.

TacklingarmedviolenceinNorthernIrelandthereforemeanstacklingsomethingthatistreatedasintegrated,traditionaland‘normal’,

andpartofthecommunityfabricandinfrastructure,notsomethingthatisdistinct,separateandexceptional.Whileotherpartsofthe

UKandIrelandhaveknownaspectsofthis,andmanyhavehadyouthgangsorlocal‘ethnic’groups,noneofthemlivedthroughthis

phenomenonforso long,andnowherehas it impactedoneverydaycommunity lifeandpolitics foroveracentury.Anyoneworking

withparamilitarismisthereforeworkinginanunusualpoliticalcontext,inwhichpersonalhistoryandlocal‘tradition’havecombinedto

createadegreeof‘normality’-evenacceptability-aroundthepresenceanduseofviolenceforpoliticalends.

In1998,however,allofthemainpoliticalparties,includingthoseassociatedwitharmedgroups,acceptedthatviolencehasnoplacein

solvingpolitical disputes, that the ruleof law should apply everywhere and that paramilitary groups shoulddisband. In theory, this

represents a watershed political consensus that any armed activity is no longer ‘political’ but is instead ‘violence’ and therefore

criminal.Twentyyearslater,however,armedactivityincommunitiescontinues-albeitatareducedlevel-usuallyassociatingitselfwith

thepoliticaltraditionsofthepast.Youngpeopleindeprivedcommunitiesareinthefrontlineofthisactivity,bothasperpetratorsand

victims.

Modelsofpracticetoaddressviolencedevelopedelsewherecannotthereforesimplybe‘lifted’andappliedwithoutreferencetothis

historicalandsocialcontext.

106

b. Thisstudyconfirmsthattherearenumerousexamplesofeffortstopreventarmed-groupviolence indemocraticsocietiesacrossthe

world,arededicatedtopreventinggangviolenceand/orenablingmemberstoleaveandintegrateintomainstreamsociety.Youthwork

approaches, specifically of relationship building, providing alternative services, counselling, support for employment and education,

mediationandpersistenttargetingofthosemostatrisk-havebeenanessentialelementintheseefforts.Themostsuccessfularethose

whichofferagenuinealternativepathandsupporttoreachit.

Consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2250, the contribution of youth work is a commitment to young people and their

participationandarefusaltoengagein‘moralpanic’,whileatthesametimerecognisingthatviolenceandconflictshapesanddistorts

young lives disproportionately to the lives of the wider community. The evidence from this study shows a surprising degree of

consensusabouttheprioritiesofyouthworktoaddressviolencebygroupsincommunities:

• De-glamorisationviolencewithrestorativeprinciples;

• Thereisnosingleformula:workhastobestreetbystreetandperson-

• centred;

• Mentor-andPeer-approachestochangearecritical.Relationshipsarethecoreofthework;

• Success requires persistence and commitment to the young person, especially those most at risk because of trauma and

marginalisation;

• Localpeoplearecritical(bothinsupportandinchange);

• Authenticandhonestengagementwithdilemmas(reflectivepractice);

107

• Youthworkexiststosupportyoungpeopleandtheirwell-beingnotpoliceproblems;

• Goodyouthworkrequiresanabilitytofocusresourcesonthosemostindifficulties;

• The systems supporting youth work with young people at risk have to be agile and flexible and not pre-determined or

bureaucratic;

• Wherepeoplechange,thishastobeacknowledgedandpermittednotresented.

c. The formal commitment to tackling paramilitarism in Northern Ireland is qualified by the experience that society is much more

ambivalentabouttakingactioninpractice.Theabilityofyouthwork,oranysingleprofession,todeliverchangeinisolationinrelation

toarmedgroupsinNorthernIrelandislimitedby:

• Perceivedcontinuingambivalenceinpoliticalleadershipandcommunitiesabouttacklingparamilitarismthatcreatesuncertainty

andriskforthoseworkingwithyoungpeople;

• Organisationssuchascouncils,police,housingorcommunitydevelopmentseldomnametacklingparamilitarismasacorporate

goal,andmuchoftheworkstilldependsonindividualswillingtotakerisks.

• Ataprofessionallevelthespecificcontributionandresponsibilityofyouthworktowardsyoungpeopleandtheirrelationshipto

armedgroupsisnotclear.Therearecurrentlyinadequatesystemsofprofessionalsupport,insufficienttraining,andinflexible

sources of protection and finance. Anyone charged professionally with tackling paramilitarism at local level without

unambiguoussupportisperceivedtobeimmediatelyatrisk.Thishasnotsubstantiallychangedsince1998;

• There is inconsistency in the wider community about the role of law and order (retributive) and personal and community

(restorative)approachesindealingwithviolenceleadingtoalackofconsistentnarrative;

108

• Funders appear to treat tackling paramilitarism as a short-term delivery target rather than a major culture-change project

requiringthedevelopmentofculturesoftrust,collaboration,co-designandco-delivery.There isaneedtomoveawayfrom

short-term ‘delivery’models, toonewhichmeasures long-termand sustainable changes in culture, reflected in the livesof

youngpeople;

• There are few opportunities for honest dialogue about challenges, opportunities and risks on these themes between young

people, local communities, youthworkers and political leaders or public agencieswith responsibilities. Aworking culture,

whichpenalisesmistakesratherthanlearnsfrommistakesiscounter-productiveinacontextofrisk.Thereisarequirementfor

opportunitiesforreflectivelearningandsupportforatransformativepracticeforyouthworkers.

d. Changewill depend on addressing the identified challenges and embedding the values and practice of supporting young people to

escape violence in thepractice of youthworkers, requiring a transformation in training, community expectations and attitudes and

professionalsupport.

3.11Recommendations

1. TheTacklingParamilitarismprogrammeshouldleadawidersocialandpoliticalconversationtoseekgreaterclarityaboutterminology

withintheprogramme,includingadiscussionofthecomplexityoftacklingparamilitarismandthevarietyofdifferentphenomenawhich

arecurrentlyencapsulatedinasingleterm.Thisshouldinformthedevelopmentofappropriateinterventionsandoutcomes,aswellas

expectationsandmeasurementsofchange.

109

2. Thevalueofyouthworkinterventioninrelationtoarmedgroupscanonlybefullyrealisedifthereareclearpathwaysforcollaborative

workingwithotheragencies.TheYouthServiceshouldconsiderhostingaquarterlymeetingofotherstakeholdersandpolicy-holders

focussingon ‘TacklingParamilitarismforYouth’asavehicle forenhancing learningacrosssectors,sharingresourcesand identifying

commonpriorities.Atminimumtheseforumsshouldincludecouncils,education,policeandcommunityhealthagencies.Aspartofa

PolicingwiththeCommunityapproachtoTacklingParamilitarism,thePSNIandyouthserviceshoulddevelopclearprotocolsforyouth

workersandpoliceofficersonformalcollaboration,toenableclearpathwaystosupportsafeguarding. Thiscouldalsocouldexplore

opportunities for a triage system,perhaps including communitymentalhealth services, toenableappropriate response to issuesof

youngpeople and violence in the community. The central importance of pastoral care andmental health supportwas a consistent

themeofthisresearch.TheSTARTprogrammeshouldbedirectlyconnectedtomentalhealthservices,toenablefastaccesstomental

healthacuteservicesatthepointofvulnerability.

3. AddressingParamilitarismand its impactonyoungpeople remainsanundevelopedareaofyouthworkpractice. TheYouthService

couldestablishclearopportunities for reflective learningandcritical reflectivepractice tounderpin thedevelopmentofprofessional

standards.Suchaprocessmightconsiderwhethertacklingparamilitarismandrelatedissuesofarmedgroupviolencerequiresspecialist

skillsorbecomespartofgenericyouthworkinNorthernIreland.

4. Youthwork practice, professional standards and training should be developed to ensure that tackling paramilitarism and all other

programmesaregovernedbyinternationalstandardsofworkingwithyoungpeople(asarticulatedin‘TheMissingPiece’(2018));This

includesaformalcommitmentto:

• mentoring and positive relationships , including one-to one mentoring for those most at risk. This could include the

establishmentofformaltrainingforMediation,DiversionandAdvocacy

• recreatingandmaintaining‘socialbridges’betweenyoungpeopleandtheircommunities,workingalongsideothers.

110

• Designingandmakingavailableavarietyoftoolsforyouthworkersengagingthosemostatrisk,includingthepotentialofgroup

work,diversionaryactivitiesandtheroleofsport,entertainmentandthearts.

• Anidentifiedroleforyouthworkersinidentifyingissuesofpersonalwell-beingandpathwaysforsignpostingyoungpeopleto

appropriatewellbeingandmentalhealthsupport.

• Explorationofgenderandtheappropriateinterventionsrelatingtothisparticularissue.

• Educationoremploymentarewidelyseenascrucialelementsinsustainingthetransitionofayoungpersonawayfromharmful

behaviour and influences. The Tackling Paramilitarism programme should ensure that these pathways are available and

integratedwithbroaderyouthworkapproaches.

5. Youthworkprogrammesarecommittedtoworkingtowardsreducingexposuretotrauma,andriskofanyfurtherharmtoparticipants

within traumatised communities. Youth work agencies should continue to explore the potential of Restorative Practices, Trauma-

informedapproaches topractice, and thepotential forpublichealth approaches to violence reduction toenhance youthwork, and

integratelearningintoprofessionaltraininganddevelopment.

6. One of the most important concepts emerging from this research was ‘relentless outreach’ to young people at risk. There was

widespreadsupportamongworkersfordivertingresourcestothosemostatrisk.Whilethisconceptwasseenasvitalinestablishing

commitment to some of the most marginalised, it was also recognised that successful outreach was emotionally and physically

challengingforworkers. Toenablethis, theYouthserviceshouldestablishclearmechanismstosupportworkers inthisdifficultand

pioneering area, where workers may feel isolated or under stress. Youth workers should have clear support within their line-

managementstructurewithinwhichsometimesdifficultjudgementscanbeconsideredandsupportedandhavethecapacitytodraw

onexternalsupportandplannedrespiteifrequired.

111

7. Likeallstatutoryandcommunityservices,youthworkdependsontheruleoflaw.Theroleofyouthworkinaddressingparamilitarism

arisesfromaparticularapplicationofthedutytosafeguardyoungpeoplefromriskswhichhaveamoreuniversalapplicationincluding

violence,seriouscriminalityandcoercivecontrol.Whilethenatureoftheriskinarmedgroupsisspecific,itisultimatelyadevelopment

ofanexistingrole.ConsiderationshouldbegiventothearticulationofaProfessionalDutywhichappliestoallyouthworkandisnot

simplythedomainoftheSTARTworkers.

8. Ameaningfulyouthworkcontributiontotacklingparamilitarismincommunitieswillnotbeachievedunlessyouthworkisresourcedto

sustaintheworkoverameaningfulperiodoftime.Relationship-basedworkrequiressustainedengagement. Longtermsuccesswill

requireresourceplanningfora5-10yearprogramme.

9. Approachestotacklingparamilitarismrootedinvoluntaryengagement,alternativepathwaysandsupportingtransition,suchasyouth,

social development and trauma-informedapproaches arenecessarily distinct fromenforcement-basedapproaches, throughpolicing

andcriminaljusticeontheother.Youthworkprogrammescanonlycontributetotheoverallprogrammeifyouthparticipationremains

voluntary rather thanmandatory. Theways inwhicheach canand should contribute to theoutcomeof theTacklingParamilitarism

programmeisdistinctive,anditwoldbehelpfuliftheexpectationsofhoweachmethodisappliedandcomplementseachothercould

beclarifiedby theProgrammeBoard,andused todevelopclearermeasuresand indicatorsof successandhoweachcontributes to

outcomes.

10. Atthesametime,thespecificfocusonsupportingyoungpeople‘atrisk’orinvolvedinarmedgroupsinthisprogrammecaneasilybe

lostin‘generalprinciplesofgoodyouthwork’unlessthereisclearunderstandingofpurposeandmeasurementandstrongprofessional

supportandguidanceforworkers.Youthworkshoulddevelopnewmethodstogatherinformationonchangeanddevelopment.This

includesqualitativemeasureswhichindicatehowapparentmicro-developmentsaresometimesmajorachievementsforyoungpeople.

Clarifying expectations at programme and professional level, and developing a clearer understanding of the range of possible

112

interventionsandmeasuresofsuccesswouldbeanimportantcontributiontoprofessionaldevelopmentinthisarea.Theseshouldbe

presentedinsuchawayastocontributetooutcomes-basedaccountability.

11. Therelationofyouthworkerstothepolicewithin‘PolicingwiththeCommunity’shouldbeclarified.ThePSNIandyouthserviceshould

developclearprotocolsforyouthworkersandpoliceofficersoncollaboration,makingclearboththedistinctandseparaterolesofthe

two services while enabling collaboration to support safeguarding. Thismight explore explore opportunities for a triage system to

enableappropriateresponsetoissuesofyoungpeopleandviolenceinthecommunity.

113

References

Ali,A.K.,andMiah,R.(2002)YouthGangPhenomenoninTowerHamlets.London:OsmaniCentre.

Aly,A.,Taylor,E.,andKarnovsky,S. (2014) ‘MoralDisengagementandBuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism:AnEducation Intervention,’

StudiesinConflictandTerrorism,Vol.37(4),pp.369–385.

Bannerjee P. (2017) ‘Mechelen: How a Flemish City Fought off ISIS Recruiters’, The Smart Citizen. Available at:

https://thesmartcitizen.org/citizen-engagement/mechelen-counter-radicalisation/(accessed4thJuly2019).

Barclay,J.(2011)StrategytoReach,EmpowerandEducateTeenagers(STREET):ACaseStudyinGovernment-CommunityPartnershipandDirect

Intervention to Counter Violent Extremism. Policy Brief, December 2011. Centre on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation. Available at:

https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/332/strategy-to-reach-empower-and-educate-teenagers-street-a-case-study-in-

government-community-partnership-and-direct-intervention-to-counter-violent-extremism(accessedJuly3rd2019).

Bartlett, J., and Miller, C. (2012) ‘The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization,’

TerrorismandPoliticalViolence,Vol.24(1),pp.1–21.

Bennett,T.,andHolloway,K.(2004)‘Gangmembership,drugsandcrimeintheUK,’BritishJournalofCriminology,Vol.44(3),pp.305–323.

Bjerregaard,B. (2003) ‘Antigang legislationand itspotential impact: Thepromiseand thepitfalls,’Criminal JusticePolicyReview,Vol.14(2),

pp.171–192.

Bjørgo,T.,andHorgan,J.(2009)LeavingTerrorismBehind:DisengagementfromPoliticalViolence.NewYork,NY:Routledge.

114

Braddock,K.,andHorgan,J.(2016)‘TowardsaGuideforConstructingandDisseminatingCounternarrativestoReduceSupportforTerrorism,’

StudiesinConflict&Terrorism,Vol.39(5),pp.381–404.

Burke J. (2016) ‘Why did the bombers target Belgium?’, The Guardian (22nd March 2016). Available at:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/22/why-was-belgium-targeted-by-bombers(accessed4thJuly2019).

CentreforSocialJustice(2018)Itcanbestopped:AprovenblueprinttostopviolenceandtacklegangandrelatedinoffendinginLondonand

beyond.London:CSJ.

Choudhury,T.(2017)‘Theradicalisationofcitizenshipdeprivation,’CriticalSocialPolicy,Vol.37(2),pp.225–244.

Cohen,A.(1955)DelinquentBoys:TheCultureoftheGang.NewYork,NY:TheFreePress.

Cohen,S.(1972)FolkDevilsandMoralPanics:TheCreationoftheModsandRockers.3rded.,2002.LondonandNewYork,NY:Routledge.

Coolsaet, R. (2019) ‘Radicalization: The origins and limits of a contested concept,’ in Fadil, N., de Koning, M., and Ragazzi, F. (eds.),

RadicalizationinBelgiumandtheNetherlands:CriticalPerspectivesonViolenceandSecurity.LondonandNewYork,NY:I.B.Taurus.

Coppock,V. (2014) ‘‘CanyouSpotaTerrorist inYourClassroom?’Problematising theRecruitmentof Schools to the ‘WaronTerror’ in the

UnitedKingdom,’GlobalStudiesofChildhood,Vol.4(2),pp.115–125.

Coppock,V.,andMcGovern,M.(2014)‘‘DangerousMinds’?DeconstructingCounter-TerrorismDiscourse,Radicalisationandthe‘Psychological

Vulnerability’ofMuslimChildrenandYoungPeopleinBritain’,ChildrenandSociety,Vol.28,pp.242–256.

Cottrell-Boyce,J.(2013)‘Endinggangandyouthviolence:Acritique,’YouthJustice,Vol.13,pp.193–206.

deGoede,M.,andSimon,S.(2013)‘GoverningFutureRadicalsinEurope,’Antipode,Vol.45(2),pp.315–335.

115

Densley,J.A.(2013)Howgangswork:AnEthnographyofYouthViolence.LondonandNewYork,NY:PalgraveMacMillan.

Departmentof Justice (DOJ) (2018) ‘Adult andYouthReoffending inNorthern Ireland–2015/16Cohort’.Availableat:https://www.justice-

ni.gov.uk/news/adult-and-youth-reoffending-ni-statistics-published-today(accessed1stJuly2019).

Dowdney, L. (2007)NeitherWar nor Peace: International Comparisons of Children and Armed Youth in Organised Armed Violence. Rio de

Janeiro:COAV/UN.

Downes,D.(1966)TheDelinquentSolution:AStudyinSubculturalTheory.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul.

Dudenhoefer,A.L.(2018)‘ResistingRadicalisation:ACriticalAnalysisoftheUKPreventDuty,’JournalforDeradicalization,Vol.14,pp.153–191.

Egley,A.,Howell,J.C.,andHarris,M.(2014)Highlightsofthe2012NationalYouthGangSurvey.OJJDPJuvenileJusticeFactsheet.Washington,

DC:USDepartmentofJustice.

Elshimi,M. (2015) ‘De-radicalisation interventionsas technologiesof theself:aFoucauldiananalysis,’CriticalStudiesonTerrorism,Vol.8(1),

pp.110–129.

Engel,R.S.,Tillyer,M.S.,andCorsaro,N.(2013)‘Reducinggangviolenceusingfocuseddeterrence:EvaluatingtheCincinnatiInitiativetoReduce

Violence(CIRV),’JusticeQuarterly,Vol.30(3),pp.403–439.

Esbensen,F.A.,Peterson,D.,Taylor,T.J.,andOsgood,D.W. (2012) ‘IsG.R.E.A.T.Effective?Does theProgramPreventGang Joining?Results

fromtheNationalEvaluationofG.R.E.A.T.’St.Louis,MO:UniversityofMissouri-St.Louis.

FightforPeace(2018)2018AnnualReport.London:FightforPeace.

Fink,N.,andHearne,E. (2008)BeyondTerrorism:DeradicalizationandDisengagement fromViolentExtremism.NewYork,NY: International

PeaceInstitute.

116

Fraser,A.(2017)GangsandCrime:CriticalAlternatives.LondonandNewburyPark,CA:SAGE.

Garland,D.(2001)TheCultureofControl:CrimeandSocialOrderinContemporarySociety.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Githens-Mazer, J., and Lambert, R. (2010) ‘Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalisation Fails: The Persistence of a Failed Discourse,’

InternationalAffairs,Vol.86(4),pp.889–901.

Heath-Kelly, C. (2017) ‘The geography of pre-criminal space: epidemiological imaginations of radicalisation risk in theUK Prevent Strategy,

2007–2017,’CriticalStudiesonTerrorism,Vol.10(2),pp.297–319.

Herrington, V., and Roberts, K. (2012) ‘Risk assessment in counterterrorism,’ in Kumar, U., andMandal,M.K. (eds.),Countering terrorism:

Psychosocialstrategies,pp.282–305.London:Sage.

Hickman,M.,Thomas,L.,Nickels,H.,andSilvestriS. (2012) ‘Socialcohesionandthenotionofcommunities:astudyoftheexperiencesand

impactofbeingsuspectforIrishcommunitiesandMuslimcommunitiesinBritain,’CriticalStudiesonTerrorism,Vol.5,pp.89–106.

Hill,R. (2019) ‘CounterExtremisminBritishSchools:EnsuringRespectforParents’RightsOverTheirChildren’sReligiousUpbringing,’British

JournalofEducationalStudies,Vol.67(1),pp.115–129.

Hillyard,P.(1993)SuspectCommunity:People’sExperiencesofthePreventionofTerrorismActsinBritain.London:PlutoPress.

Hirschfield,A.,Christmann,K.,Wilcox,A.,Rogerson,M.,Sharratt,K.,Thomas,P.,andGill,S. (2012)ProcessEvaluationofPreventingViolent

ExtremismProgrammesforYoungPeople.London:YouthJusticeBoardforEnglandandWales.

HomeboyIndustries(2019)‘2018AnnualReport’.Availableat:https://homeboyindustries.org/our-story/our-results/(accessed1stJuly2019).

Home Office (2018) Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2017 toMarch 2018: Statistical Bulletin.

London:HomeOffice.

117

Hörnqvist, M., and Flyghed, J. (2012) ‘Exclusion or culture? The rise and the ambiguity of the radicalisation debate,’ Critical Studies on

Terrorism,Vol.5(3),pp.319–334.

HouseofCommons(2015)HomeAffairsCommittee:GangsandYouthCrime.ThirteenthReportofSession2-14-15.HC199.London:Houseof

Commons.

HMGovernment(2008)YouthCrimeActionPlan.London:HMGovernment.

HMGovernment(2011a)EndingGangsandYouthViolence.London:HMGovernment.

HMGovernment(2011b)CONTEST:TheUnitedKingdom’sStrategyforCounteringTerrorism.London:HMSO.

HMGovernment(2017)CONTEST:TheUnitedKingdom’sStrategyforCounteringTerrorism.London:HMSO.

Horgan, J. (2008) ‘DeradicalizationorDisengagement?AProcess inNeedofClarityandaCounterterrorism Initiative inNeedofEvaluation,’

PerspectivesonTerrorism,Vol.2(4),pp.3–8.

Horgan,J.(2009)WalkingAwayfromTerrorism:AccountsofDisengagementfromRadicalandExtremistMovements.London:Routledge.

Horgan, J. (2012) ‘Discussion point: The end of radicalization?’ Available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/news/discussion-point-end-

radicalization(accessedJuly1st2019).

Horgan, J., and Braddock, K. (2010) ‘Rehabilitating the terrorists? Challenges in assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs,’

TerrorismandPoliticalViolence,Vol.22,pp.267–291.

Iacopini,G.,Stock,L.,andJunge,K.(2011)EvaluationofTowerHamletsPreventProjects.London:TavistockInstitute.

JARC(2018)CriticalReviewofInitialEvaluationsontheThreeJ-ARCPilotProjects.Dublin:J-ARCFrameworkWorkingGroup.

118

Jerome,L.,andElwick,A.(2019)‘IdentifyinganEducationalResponsetothePreventPolicy:StudentPerspectivesonLearningaboutTerrorism,

ExtremismandRadicalisation,’BritishJournalofEducationalStudies,Vol.67(1),pp.97–114.

JH Consulting (2019) ‘Evaluation of the County Lines Pilot Project’. Available at: https://stgilestrust.org.uk/general-attachments/view?id=18

(accessed1stJuly2019).

Katz,H.A.(2003)‘Issuesintheproductionanddisseminationofgangstatistics:AnethnographicstudyofalargeMidwesternpolicegangunit,’

CrimeandDelinquency,Vol.49(3),pp.485–516.

Klausen,J.,Campion,S.,Needle,N.,Nguyen,G.,andLibretti,R.(2016)‘TowardaBehavioralModelof‘Homegrown’RadicalizationTrajectories,’

StudiesinConflict&Terrorism,Vol.39(1),pp.67–83.

Kundnani,A.(2012)‘‘Radicalisation’:TheJourneyofaConcept,’Race&Class,Vol.54(2),pp.3–25.

Maher,S.,andFrampton,M.(2009)ChoosingOurFriendsWisely:CriteriaforEngagementwithMuslimGroups.London:PolicyExchange.

McAra, L., andMcVie, S. (2010) ‘Beyond themetaphor: Political Violence, human rights and ‘new’ peace-making criminology,’ Theoretical

Criminology,Vol.7(3),pp.319–346.

McCauley,C.andMoskalenko,S.(2011)Friction:Howradicalizationhappenstothemandus.NewYork,NY:OxfordUniversityPress.

McCauley, C., and Moskalenko, S. (2017) ‘Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two Pyramids Model,’ American Psychological

Association,Vol.72(3),pp.205–216.

McMahonS.,(2013)‘ProjectOracleChildren&YouthEvidenceHub:Gangs,ViolenceandCrime’,ProjectOracleSynthesisStudy03/13.

Medina,J.,Aldridge,J.,andRalphs,R.(2013)‘Gangtransformation,changesordemise:EvidencefromanEnglishCity,’inMasson,C.L.,EgleyJr,

A.,Miller,J.,andKlein,M.W.(eds.),TheModernGangReader.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.197-209.

119

Messerschmidt,J.(1997)CrimeasStructuredAction:Gender,Race,ClassandCrimeintheMaking.ThousandOaks,CA:Sage.

Miller,W.(1975)ViolencebyYouthGangsandYouthGangsasaCrimeProbleminMajorAmericanCities.Washington,DC:USDepartmentof

Justice.

Mirahmadi,H.(2016)‘BuildingResilienceagainstViolentExtremism:ACommunity-BasedApproach,’ANNALS,AAPSS,668,pp.129–145.

O’Donnell,A.(2016)‘Securitisation,CounterterrorismandtheSilencingofDissent:TheEducationalImplicationsofPrevent,’BritishJournalof

EducationalStudies,Vol.64(1),pp.53–76.

OsmaniTrust(2016)AnnualReport2015/16.London:OsmaniTrust.

RadicalisationAwarenessNetwork(RAN)(2018a)InventoryoftheBestPracticesonDe-RadicalisationfromtheDifferentMemberStatesofthe

EU.AmsterdamandMadrid:RAN.

RadicalisationAwarenessNetwork (RAN) (2018b)PreventingRadicalisation toTerrorismandViolentExtremism:Exit strategies.Amsterdam:

RAN.

Ragazzi,F.(2017)‘Counteringterrorismandradicalisation:Securitisingsocialpolicy?’CriticalSocialPolicy,Vol.37(2),pp.163–179.

Ralphs,R.,andSmithson,H.(2015)Europeanresponsestogangs,in,Decker,S.,andPyrooz,D.(eds.),TheHandbookofGangs.Chichester:John

Wiley.

Rennison,C.M., andMelde,C. (2009) ‘Exploring theuseof victim surveys to studygang crime:Prospectsandpossibilities,’Criminal Justice

Review,Vol.34(3),pp.489–514.

Sampson,M.,andVilena,M.R.(2013)FightforPeaceAcademiesinRioandLondon–AssessingTheirProgressandImpact.London:Centrefor

SocialJusticeandChange,UniversityofEastLondon.

120

Sarma, K.M. (2017) ‘Risk Assessment and the Prevention of Radicalization from Nonviolence into Terrorism,’ American Psychological

Association,Vol.72(3),pp.278–288.

Schmid,A.P. (2014) ‘ViolentandNon-ViolentExtremism:TwoSidesof theSameCoin,’ResearchPaper.TheHague: InternationalCenter for

Counterterrorism(ICCT).

Sedgwick,M.(2010)‘TheConceptofRadicalizationasaSourceofConfusion,’TerrorismandPoliticalViolence,Vol.22(4),pp.479–494.

Schuurman, B., and Bakker, E. (2016) ‘Reintegrating jihadist extremists: Evaluating a Dutch initiative, 2013–2014,’ Behavioral Sciences of

TerrorismandPoliticalAggression,Vol.8(1,)pp.66–85.

Scott,P.(1956)‘GangsanddelinquentgroupsinLondon,’BritishJournalofDelinquency,Vol.7,pp.4–26.

Sewell,A.,andHulusi,H.(2016)‘PreventingRadicalisationtoExtremePositionsinChildrenandYoungPeople:Whatdoestheliteraturetellus

andshouldEducationalPsychologyRespond?,’EducationalPsychologyinPractice,Vol.32(4),pp.343–354.

Shaw,C.,andMcKay,H.D.(1942)JuvenileDelinquencyandUrbanAreas.Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress.

Shute,J.,andMedina,J.(2014)‘HuntingGruffalo:‘Gangs’,unreasonandthebigbadcoalition,’CriminalJusticeMatters,Vol.96(1),pp.26–27.

Skarbek,D.(2014)TheSocialOrderoftheUnderworld:HowPrisonGangsGoverntheAmericanPenalSystem.NewYork,NY:OxfordUniversity

Press.

SomersB.,(2017a)‘LocalExamplesandBestPractices:TheMechelenModel–AnInclusiveCity’,CIDOBColecciónMonografías.

SomersB.,(2017b)‘Howtopreventradicalisationofyoungpeople?,’EuropeanYouthPortal:InformationandOpportunitiesforyoungpeople

acrossEurope.Availableat:https://europa.eu/youth/eu/article/39/45159_en(accessed4thJuly2019).

121

Spalek,B.,andDavies,L.(2012)‘MentoringinRelationtoViolentExtremism:AStudyofRole,Purpose,andOutcomes,’StudiesinConflict&

Terrorism,Vol.35(5),pp.354–368.

Stanley,T.,andGuru,S.(2015)‘ChildhoodRadicalisationRisk:AnEmergingPracticeIssue,’Practice,Vol.27(5),pp.353–366.

Sukarieh,M.,andTannock,S. (2015) ‘Thede-radicalisationofeducation: terror,youthandtheassaulton learning’,Race&Class,Vol.57(4),

pp.22–38.

The Executive Office (TEO) (2018a) ‘Building Capacity to Support Transition in Carrickfergus and Larne: Fieldwork Report from Phase 1 –

BuildingCapacityinCommunitiesinTransition’.Availableat:https://www.cooperationireland.org/cit-reports(accessed1stJuly2019).

TheExecutiveOffice(TEO)(2018b)‘BuildingCapacitytoSupportTransitioninLurgan(KilwilkieandDrumgask):FieldworkReportfromPhase1

–BuildingCapacityinCommunitiesinTransition’.Availableat:https://www.cooperationireland.org/cit-reports(accessed1stJuly2019).

The Social Innovation Partnership (TSIP) (December 2013) ‘An Evaluation of St Giles Trust’s SOS Project’. Available at:

https://www.stgilestrust.org.uk/reports-and-evaluations(accessed1stJuly2019).

Thomas, P. (2016) ‘Youth, Terrorism and Education: Britain’s Prevent programme,’ International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol.35(2),

pp.171–187.

Thornberry T., Krohn,M., Lizotte, A., and Smith, C. (2003)Gangs andDelinquency in a Developmental Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge

UniversityPress.

Thrasher,F.(1927)TheGang:AStudyof1,313GangsinChicago.Seconded.,1963.Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress.

UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly SecurityCouncil (2018)TheMissingPeace: Independentprogress studyonyouthandpeaceand security,

A/72/761-S/2018/86.

122

vanGemert,F.(2005)YouthgroupsandgangsinAmsterdam:ApretestoftheEurogangExpertSurvey,’inDecker,S.,andWeerman,F.(eds.),

EuropeanStreetGangsandTroublesomeYouthGroups.Oxford:AltaMiraPress.

Vermeulen,F.(2014)‘SuspectCommunities–TargetingViolentExtremismattheLocalLevel:PoliciesofEngagementinAmsterdam,Berlin,and

London,’TerrorismandPoliticalViolence,Vol.26(2),pp.286–306.

ViolenceReductionUnit(2010)Glasgow’sCommunityInitiativetoReduceViolence:SecondYearReport.Glasgow:VRU.

Wacquant,L.(2007)TerritorialstigmatizationintheAgeofAdvancedMarginality.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Weaver,B.(2015)OffendingandDesistance:TheImportanceofSocialRelations.London:Routledge.

Weine, S. (2012) ‘Building resilience to violent extremism inMuslim diaspora communities in the United States,’Dynamics of Asymmetric

Conflict,Vol.5(1),pp.60–73.

Weine, S., Horgan, J., Robertson, C., Loue, S., Mohamed, A., and Noor, S. (2009) ‘Community and family approaches to combating the

radicalization and recruitment of Somali-American youth and young adults: A psychosocial perspective’,Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict,

Vol.2(3),pp.181–200.

Weine, S., Eisenman,D.P., Kinsler, J., GlikD.C., and Polutnik, C. (2016) ‘Addressing violent extremismas public health policy andpractice’,

BehavioralSciencesofTerrorismandPoliticalAggression,Vol.9(3),pp.208–221.

Wilchen, T. (2015)AQuestion of Participation –Disengagement from the Extremist Right: A Case Study from Sweden. RoskildeUniversity,

Unpublished PhD Thesis. Available at: https://www.humanculture.dk/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2018/04/Phd-Thesis-A-question-of-

participation-TWC.pdf(accessedJuly2nd2019).

123

Williams,D.J.,Currie,D.,Linden,W.,andDonnelly,P.D.(2014)‘AddressinggangrelatedviolenceinGlasgow:Apreliminarypragmaticquasi-

experimentalevaluationoftheCommunityInitiativetoReduceViolence,’AggressionandViolentBehavior,Vol.19,pp.686–691.

Williams,P.(2015)‘Criminalisingtheother:Challengingtherace-crimenexus,’RaceandClass,Vol.56(3),pp.18–35.

Williams,P.,andClarke,B.(2016)DangerousAssociations:JointEnterprise,GangsandRacism.London:CentreforCrimeandJusticeStudies.

Yablonsky,L.(1962)TheViolentGang.London:Collier-MacMillan.

Countering Paramilitary & Organised Criminal Influence on Youth: A Review

Full Report

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThank you for taking the time to read this research. We would like to thank all of those who gave up their time to be interviewed or to assist with the study.

AUTHORSDuncan Morrow & Jonny Byrne

DESIGN StudioStereo PUBLISHED BYThe Corrymeela Press, BelfastMarch 2020