[bold is anything from insight that needs verification]

Intelligence Services, Part 2: Iranian strategies of internal stability, external destabilization and deception

SummaryIn the ongoing covert[wc] war between Iran, the United States and Israel, the Iranian Minister of Intelligence Heidar Moslehi announced on Mar. 30 that his organization had carried out a ‘complicated operation’ in Pakistan [Link: http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20100330_brief_iranian_diplomat_rescued_pakistan]. The Iranians claimed that one of their attachés in Peshawar, Heshmatollah Attarzadeh, was captured by a group coordinated by the U.S. CIA and Israeli Mossad about a year before. Moslehi claimed that the operation to return Attarzadeh proved the Ministry of Intelligence’s “dominance over all other secret agencies active in the region.” These claims, however, were exaggerated [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20100330_brief_irans_exaggerated_rescue_operation]. Iran indeed has a strong and capable intelligence apparatus, but the announcemens of this operation, along with the capture of Abdolmalek Rigi [http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20100223_iraq_contingency_announcement_and_rigi_capture?fn=41rss74] may be a reflection of internal battles among Iran’s intelligence services.

AnalysisIran has two major and competing services on top of a larger intelligence community: the Ministry of Intelligence Security (MOIS) and the Intelligence Bureau[wc?] of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The bureaucratic battle between the two, as well as the many examples of working together, will explain the future of not just Iranian intelligence operations, but possibly the regime itself. They have developed so that no single organization could have a monopoly on intelligence but recently STRATFOR has seen Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, take greater control of both.

The operations of Iran’s intelligence and paramilitary services [I’m using ‘paramilitary’ for IRGC, but not sure if that’s the right word] are directed first and foremost at maintaining internal stability, moreso than other countries. Minimizing the threat posed by internal minorities [Link: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics_iran_holding_center_mountain_fortress] and their potential to be co-opted by external powers is the first imperative for Iranian intelligence. The second is awareness and distraction of foreign powers’ capabilities that threaten Iran. This involves traditional espionage but also disinformation operations and deployment of proxy groups to distract or destabilize foreign threats. Third is acquiring better capabilities for Iran’s defense. Currently, the major focus is on Iran’s nuclear program, but this also includes missile, navy, and insurgent capabilities.

Successful rulers of Iran throughout history have had strong internal security services, and the current trifecta of the MOIS), the IRGC and the Basij Militia (combined with ?6? other intelligence and security agencies) is no different. The next step for Iran’s leaders has been to create an ‘empire’ of influence, rather than one of control, which most recently has been done through proxies controlled by MOIS and the IRGC. Since the 1978/9 Iranian Revolution, Iran has expanded its influence into most notably Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan but also the whole Middle East through mostly Shia Islamist but also Sunni proxy forces.

Iran is most successful at operating behind a veil of secrecy. The leadership structure [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090610_iran_presidential_election_and_metamorphosis] is already confusing to outside observers. It is even moreso for military and intelligence services, with multiple overlapping lines of authority at the top, and unclear connections to proxies at the bottom. The prime example of this is the IRGC which is a complex combination of institutions: a military force, militia, internal police, intelligence service, covert action/special ops force, and business conglomerate, with proxies worldwide. More traditionally the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is the dual-functioning internal and external intelligence service. Both of these organizations overlap in responsibility, but one key point is that MOIS is controlled more by the President, and the IRGC by the Supreme Leader (but of course, this control overlaps as well). Both are guided by the Supreme National Security Council and the Supreme Leader’s Intelligence Unit (F/c name) parallel organization where overall intelligence authority lies (f/c).

Iran’s secretive nature blends into operations as well. One of the first and most famous attacks instigated by a MOIS/IRGC proxy was the 1983 U.S. embassy bombing- for which the identity of the bomber is still unknown (a notable exception to the culture of martyrdom within terrorist organizations). Iran has connections with Islamist, terrorist and militant groups worldwide, but especially extends its influence through those in the Middle East. The connections, however, have an extreme degree of plausible deniability that helps protect the Iranian state from blowback.

The most pressing issue for Iranian intelligence is a parallel structure where conventional intelligence, military and other civil institutions crossover in responsibility. This duplication of efforts, with different organizational and cultural backgrounds, can create major animosity and conflict between MOIS and the IRGC. It can also be used to guarantee that no single entity has a monopoly on intelligence and the political power that stems from it. In the last year, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has gone to great lengths to bring both organizations under his direct control. In the future, this could actually insulate the Leader with officials telling him what he wants to hear, rather than rigorous and honest intelligence reporting. Moreover, these agencies become extremely important for the covert war [link: http://www.stratfor.com/covert_war_and_elevated_risks] as it continues across the Middle East.

A Brief HistoryRecent Iranian campaigns of assassinations and covert action could be traced back to the 11th century Nizari sect of Ismaili Muslims who set up their first mountain fortress in the Alborz Mountains of what is now northern Iran. Their enemies called them the Hashshashin, which is the root word for ‘assassin.’ They carried out a campaign of assassination and religious conversion in their attempts to take control of strategic fortresses across the Middle East. While not directly linked, the Hashshashin campaign is remarkably similar to the activities of Iran’s intelligence apparatus today.

The Modern history of Iranian intelligence begins with the infamous security services of the Shah. In 1953 Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi was restored to the throne in Tehran, at the behest of an infamous CIA coup (Baer disputes CIA’s responsibility, will look into this more). The Shah’s power was based on the strength (or weakness) of the National Intelligence and Security Organization, better known as SAVAK, a Farsi acronym (Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar). It was formed in 1957 under guidance of the Israeli Mossad and the U.S. FBI. Like its descendent (MOIS), it served under the Prime Minister rather than the Shah, had close links to the military, and later became closer to the de facto ruler. [not sure if de facto is the right word]

Savak was able to create a police state to enforce the rule of the Shah through extremely large informant networks, surveillance operations, and censorship activities. This was the ?first? time that an Iranian ruler attempted total control of the country, rather than by associations with local leaders. Savak was instrumental in controlling dissent, but at the same time became completely corrupt which disaffected the Iranian populace. One observer claimed that one in every 450 males was a Savak informer. The Komiteh and Evin prisons (later used by the IRGC) are infamous for torture and indefinite detention of anyone deemed threatening to the Shah’s regime (including Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, LINK?).

The director of Savak was nominally under the authority of the prime minister, but he met with the Shah every morning. The Shah also created the Special Intelligence Bureau, which operated directly from his palace, to increase the ruler’s control over intelligence. Savak, while officially under a government minister, was brought more under control of the Shah by the end of his reign. The Shah also had his own Imperial Guard, a special security force, and the only one stationed in Tehran. Even with an extensive security apparatus, the Shah had alienated the Iranian population, and left Iran to the growing Revolution.

Prior to the Islamic Revolution, the security forces for a new regime were already taking shape. While Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was living in the Shi’a holy city of Najaf, Iraq during his exile from 1965 to 1978, Yasser Arafat visited multiple times to discuss Palestinian support for Iran’s own Islamic revolutionaries. Khomeini sent some of his loyalists the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for military training where they received instruction at Amal Militia and Fatah training camps. By 1977 over 700 Khomeini loyalists had graduated from these camps, and became the founding core of the IRGC and MOIS. Members of what was would later be called the IRGC effectively became the new Imperial Guards and intelligence service. The Shah’s forces were purged, and what was left was merged with the traditional army. Along with the forces that returned to support the Islamic Revolution, Arafat flew to Iran on Feb. 5 1979 with Force 17, Fatah’s best trained commandos, to enforce security. To replace the Palestinians and the informal revolutionary guard, the IRGC was formed on May 5, 1979 to protect the new regime from any possible counterrevolutionary activity and monitor what was left of the Shah’s military

In 1979 Savak Headquarters were overrun by the revolutionaries, and its member were one of the first targets of retribution. Internal security files were confiscated and high-ranking officers were apprehended. By 1981 61 senior intelligence officers were executed in the Islamists’ purge. Even though Savak was dismantled, its legacy remained in the form of SAVAMA (Sazman-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Melli-e Iran---National intelligence and Security….) ENGLISH? Tehran’s new intelligence and security service.

Savama was first ran by General Hossein Fardoust, who was actually a childhood friend of the Shah and former deputy director of SAVAK. He was later executed for spying for the Soviet Union, but serves as one of many examples, including a claim that SAVAMA kept the same nine bureaus that the ‘new’ intelligence services was a SAVAK carbon copy. In 1984 it became the current service, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, in a reorganization by the Army Military Revolutionary Tribunal.

From Exceptional Terrorists to Adept Agents of InfluenceOn July 4, 1982 young, disaffected Lebanese Shi’a met with an IRGC officer in Balabakk, a town in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. It was approximately a month after Israeli forces invaded his

homeland to quash the Palestinian resistance. The young Lebanese was an experienced guerrilla fighter who had already been a member of the PLO’s elite Force 17 and a bodyguard to Yasser Arafat. The meeting was highly secret. There was no report or record of it, even amongst the world’s premier intelligence agencies, for years to come.

The Lebanese man was Imad Mughniyah, one of the most infamous and effective terrorists of all time, and the IRGC officer is still unknown(???), but was likely Hussein Moslehi, IRGC’s liaison with Hezbollah and its affiliated organizations in the years afterwards. The new Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) would claim many terrorist attacks, all orchestrated by Mughniyah who unbeknownst to many had been given a secret officer commission within the IRGC in that first meeting. He was named the commander of a secret group, Amin Al-Haras, or Security of the Guards and was told to recruit family and friends from his time in Fatah to wage a new jihad as the IJO.

Around this time, Mughniyah also officially became the bodyguard of Sheikh Hussein Nasrallah, a religious leader in the newly formed Hezbollah. In March 1983, he represented Nasrallah at a meeting in Damascus with the Iranian Ambassador to Syria, Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi. They decided to begin one of the most effective terror campaigns of all time, and the first modern jihadist campaign to repel a ‘foreign occupier.’ Mughniyah orchestrated the attacks: a truck bomb on American Embassy in Beirut on April 18; and a dual-truck bomb attack on the U.S. Marine barracks and French Paratroopers on October 23. By March 31st of the next year, all the Multinational Forces in Lebanon had evacuated.

Mughniyah orchestrated many other bombings, kidnappings and plane hijackings that hid the hand of Iran, and even his own. When foreign governments wanted to negotiate the return of hostages held in Lebanon, however, they always went to Iran. The Iranians used their proxies’ captives as playing cards for political concessions and arms deals (like Iran-Contra). In 1988, however, Mughniyah orchestrated his last hijacking, Kuwait Airways flight 422, with the hope of freeing his brother-in-law from a Kuwaiti prison. It was executed perfectly, with eight hijackers using grenades to take control of the airplane mid-flight from Bangkok to Kuwait City. The hijackers managed the hostages with careful skill, spoke in classical Arabic to disguise their Lebanese accents, and traded clothes to confuse the hostages. But the hijacking was not sanctioned by the Iranian government, and was not allowed to land in Beirut by Hezbollah and Syrian forces, which controlled the airport.

Iran had realized it no longer gained from provocative international terrorist activities. So Iran turned Hezbollah into a guerrilla and political force to fight an unconventional war against Israel and other Lebanese forces. Guerrilla warfare replaced terrorism as the primary tactic for Iran’s proxies. Victories against Israel in 2000 and 2006 proved their effectiveness while Mugniyah was relegated to be a military commander rather than a terrorist coordinator.

Paradoxically, Ahmed Chalabi personified a shift from international terrorism towards more careful agents of influence. Chalabi was one of three executives, and the de facto leader, of the Iraqi National Congress(INC)- a supposedly broad-based Iraqi opposition group to Saddam Hussein’s regime. It will never be clear who Chalabi really worked for, other than himself, as he has played all sides, but Iran clearly had major involvement in his activities. STRATFOR laid out the case for Chalabi’s relationship with Iran [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ahmad_chalabi_and_his_iranian_connection] in 2004. We also noted that the false intelligence on Iraqi WMD provided by Iran through Chalabi did not make

the decision to go to war in Iraq[http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/overdoing_chalabi], it only provided the right impetus to convince the public. Chalabi was more instrumental in convincing the armchair intelligence officers in the Defense Department’s Office of Special Plans that the threat of Shi’a groups in southern Iraq was minimal. His influence enabled the U.S.’ tactical failures in Iraq [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/edge_razor] that allowed Iran’s unseen hand to gain power.

In May 2004 US officials revealed that Chalabi gave sensitive intelligence to an Iranian official. The information showed that the United States had broken the communications code used by MOIS. Again it is unclear if Chalabi was solely working fot the Iranians, but he served its purpose. These are the skills of Iranian intelligence operations abroad- the ability to use proxy groups for direct action and intelligence collection while keeping its involvement covert, or at least plausibly deniable, for years. While there is much circumstantial evidence that Chalabi or Mughniyah were Iranian agents, the lack of direct evidence clouds the issue and allows Iran to continue to operate clandestinely.

The Iranian services also know when to discard their assets. When the same Shi’a groups that Chalabi called weak began an insurgency as well as won Parliamentary elections after the U.S.-led invasion, the Iranians had already found their center of power. Chalabi, was no longer included in the Iraqi government by 2006, because Iran had found better proxies, in the same way that Mughniyah had been marginalized before his assassination [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090211_retribution_mughniyah_dish_served_cold].

The capability of Iran’s intelligence organizations to clandestinely attack and assassinate its opponents for Iranian security have transitioned to carefully developing agents of influence much like the Hashshashin took over strategic forts across the Middle East.

Organizations and Operations

Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)MOIS, also known by it’s Farsi acronym, VEVAK (Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar) is Iran’s premier civilian intelligence service by traditional standards. Constitutionally it is also the premier intelligence organization within Iran with around 15,000 employees as of 2006. But the Constitution is one of many veils that covers Iranian internal politics and MOIS is constantly vying with the IRGC for control of intelligence operations and influence with the Supreme leader.

MOIS’ internal organization is unclear, but its’ authority and operations are identifiable. MOIS is a ministry in the Iranian government, which means its director is a minister within the Iranian cabinet under the President [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090610_iran_presidential_election_and_metamorphosis]. This gives the popularly elected President (though nominated by the clerics), more say in MOIS intelligence activities. The Minister of Intelligence also serves within the Supreme National Security Council, where many intelligence-based decisions are made (F/C???).

Training for MOIS officers begins with recruitment in Iran. Only those with the right Twelver Shi’a Islamic background- those that believe Ali was the first of twelve correct descendants of the prophet, Muhammad [K-does this have something to do with Mahdi too? Please advise]- are allowed to serve in MOIS. Their loyalties to the Islamic Republic are tested

often as they are trained at sites in Northern Tehran and Qom, according to STRATFOR sources. Before training they also go through a careful clearance process, which STRATFOR assumes involves a lengthy background check by counterintelligence officers.

Intelligence officers are placed in many cover jobs. Official cover involves embassy positions within the Foreign Ministry, such as two officers caught surveilling targets in New York City [Link?]. Iranian embassies and missions, such as the one to the UN, have large intelligence stations for MOIS officers. They also use many non-official covers including as students, professors, journalists, and employees of state-owned or –connected companies. These include Iran Air and Iranian banks, such as Bank Melli (others?). According to STRATFOR sources, ex-patriot academics that often travel back to Iran from overseas positions due to family ties or emergencies may be MOIS employees.

Recruitment of foreign agents, some of whom are given an official position within MOIS or IRGC, happens mostly in overseas Muslim communities. Many are also recruited while studying Iran. The first major target was Lebanon, then spread to other Shi’a communities in the Middle East as well as those around the world. MOIS has individual departments for recruiting agents in the Persian Gulf, Yemen and Sudan [why this combo?], Lebanon and Palestine, Europe, South and East Asia, North America and South America. Their particular target in the latter is the tri-state border region of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil where a large Lebanese Shia population exists. Foreign agents are also non-Shia, whether sunni Muslims or of other backgrounds. Shi’a, however, tend to be the only agents that are trusted. MOIS agents are responsible for a wide range of tasks that fit into the intelligence collection and covert[wc?] operations explained below.

Unlike Some foreign intelligence agencies, MOIS’ domestic responsibility prioritized over its foreign one. In reality this has shifted over time, especially as IRGC has taken over domestic security, but MOIS still has important domestic priorities. First, MOIS is actively thwarting reformists, from demonstrations to organizing to secret meetings. Second, its officers surveil and infiltrate Iran’s ethnic minorities, especially the Baluchs Kurds and Arabs. Third, they control economic markets, both to guarantee that no economic elite can threaten the regime as well as control black markets for their own profits. Fourth they monitor the narcotics market. [any more on narco?]

MOIS foreign intelligence collection operations follow traditional methodology learned from the CIA and Mossad, but also disinformation campaigns learned from the KGB.

Foreign intelligence priorities focus on the region but MOIS has worldwide operations. Their first foreign priority is based on the domestic one- to monitor, infiltrate and control dissident groups operation overseas. Second, MOIS develops proxy and liaison networks for foreign influence and terrorist and military operations. Currently developing and preparing such groups are a priority to use in response to an attack on Iran’s nuclear program. Third, MOIS is constantly identifying any major foreign threats to the Islamic republic, currently focusing on Israel and the US. Fourth, is its interest in disinformation to protect Iran and further its interests. In recent years, the focus has been convincing the rest of the world that an attack on Iran would fail in stopping its nuclear program as well as have disastrous consequences. And its final major priority is acquiring technology for defensive capabilities, currently focusing on its nuclear program.

MOIS calls its disinformation operations nefaq. It learned these methods from the KGB where 80-90% of information released to foreign media or intelligence agencies are fact, while a small percentage is disinformation. This has most commonly been used to discredit reformist and opposition groups in foreign countries. It has also been used to distract foreign powers from its intelligence program as well as confuse them.

Throughout the 1980s and 90s, Iranian intelligence operatives carried out assassination of dissidents abroad. Within the first year of Islamic Revolution, a monarchist was already assassinated in Paris. In a Washington, DC suburb a former Iranian diplomat and then critic of the Islamic regime, Ali Akbar Tabatabai, was shot in his home. One of most high profile of these operations was the killing of the last Prime Minister under the Shah, Shapour Bakhtiar, in Paris in 1991 (after earlier failed attempts). It is believed at least 80 people were assassinated by Iranian intelligence during this time period across Europe, Turkey, Pakistan, and as far away as the Philippines. This was on top of a series of murders within Iran of internal dissidents and scholars between 1990 and 1998 (allegedly 15 orchestrated by MOIS).

Assassination campaigns have decreased as Iranian intelligence evolved. Instead, they have learned to carefully harass, intimidate, and de-legitimize dissidents worldwide. The fact that politically active Iranians abroad are not united, and involved in many different groups, leads them to report on each other to the local embassy or consulate. Such infighting allows Iranian intelligence to use emigrants to harass others or to provide intelligence for the intelligence officers’ own use. Representatives of Iranian missions have been known to monitor dissidents by infiltrating and observing their meetings or speeches. Often, MOIS officers want the dissident to know they are being watched in order to intimidate them. MOIS focuses many of its nefaq operations on disgracing dissidents for foreign audiences. MOIS operates websites, coopts dissidents and plants stories in foreign media to attack opposition organizations. Some of these groups are in fact terrorist groups, others royalist and others in support of democracy, but often their reputations is heavily influenced by MOIS operations. MOIS officers and agents work carefully to get them officially named as ‘terrorist organizations’ or otherwise discourage foreign governments from working with them.

MOIS has its own department, reportedly number 15, responsible for subversive activities abroad, or what it calls ‘exporting revolution.’ MOIS has liaisons with many types of resistance and terrorist groups throughout the world, not just Islamic ones. [example of least-related group here—I saw a report on IRA-hezbollah somewhere, but can’t find it now]. MOIS concentrates, however, on groups within and near its borders. Iran has long had a liaison relationship with al-Qaeda, though that is just as much an infiltration for intelligence purposes as an alliance. MOIS will never trust a Sunni group, but as long as they have similar goals, will work in concert with them. The primary importance of such relationships is to collect intelligence on competitors for leadership of Islamic revolution and possible threats to it. The secondary reason for this liaison is attacks against Iran’s adversaries. The ebb and flow of its relationship with al-Qaeda reflects this. Reports differ on how close MOIS or other Iranian operatives are with al-Qaeda but cooperation seems limited. It was likely better before 2001, after which Iran distanced itself. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, however, those links seem to have increased to get a handle on the insurgency there and in Afghanistan.

MOIS has numerous relationships with other Sunni groups across the world. Remember that the Iranian Revolution began with the support of Fatah, a secular Palestinian group. In Palestine, its most long-term and close relationship has been with Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) [Link?:

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/iran_boosts_palestinian_uprising]. But more notably Iran’s relationship with Hamas [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090210_iran_meddling_hamas_rivalry?fn=92rss23] has become closer as the jihadist organization has had internal difference on whom to choose as an ally. Iranian support was influential in the most recent conflict in Gaza, when Israel attempted to eliminate Hamas [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20081230_geopolitical_diary_israels_strategy_gaza]. The relationship began in December 1992 when Israel expelled Hamas and PIJ operatives to Lebanon, where MOIS developed contact through Hizbollah. After this period, these Sunni groups developed suicide terror tactics that had not been used before.

Iran has expanded its links to groups as far as Algeria and in the other direction to the Taliban in Afghanistan. These groups are ideologically separated from Iran, but have similar tactics and broad goals in fighting non-Islamic influence in their countries. MOIS is very successful at covering up or obfuscating information on these links, so little is known but much is suspected

MOIS develops and organizes these contacts, from liaison to proxy operations, in various ways. One common method is the use of embassy cover to meet and plan operations with its unofficial associates. For example many of the Lebanon operations by IJO and associated groups were planned from the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria. MOIS also works with IRGC to operate training camps, often on Iran’s borders, for visiting jihadists and proxy groups [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100203_iranian_proxies_intricate_and_active_web] in foreign but secure areas such as Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. Department 15 also operates under non-official cover, especially with funding through Iranian banks and charitable foundations.

Currently the Minister of Intelligence is Heidar Moslehi [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090818_iran_irgcs_place_new_cabinet], a former Revolutionary Guard officer appointed by President Ahmedinejad after the June, 2009 protests [LINK?]. Moslehi’s background working with the Basij and IRGC, and being a close ally of Ahmedinejad, furthers the IRGC’s current advantage over the intelligence bureaucracy. The IRGC, with the support of Khamenei, was able to accuse MOIS of not fulfilling its domestic responsibilities and letting the protests get out of hand.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Council (IRGC)- Intelligence unit, Quds Force and the Basij Militia

The IRGC, and its intelligence unit, is the significant other to MOIS. Its full name is Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami, literally the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. According to Stratfor sources, its intelligence units are on equal footing with MOIS, if they don’t already have the upper hand.

The IRGC founded by decree of Ayatollah Khomeini as the ideological guard for the new regime and is the main enforcer of the velayat-e-faqih, state rule by Islamic jurists [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/twisting_maze_iranian_politics] Article 150 of Iran’s Constitution gives it both the vague and expansive “role of guarding the Revolution and its achievements.” To enforce its commitment, the Supreme Leader has appointed political guides at every level of IRGC bureaucracy. It is as much a military force as an intelligence and security service, with an air force, navy and ground forces. With a large number of businesses and many former IRGC members becoming political leaders, the IRGC has grown into a social-political-military-

economic phenomenon that permeates through Iran [LINK?], and may even become the state itself. Its intelligence unit seems more active internally and the IRGC's key operational group abroad is the Quds force-- possibly the most effective direct action group[wc?] since what the KGB's First Chief Directorate and its predecessor organizations called “active measures.”

The IRGC is unique globally as a militant or terrorist organization with major intelligence capabilities that has essentially become the backbone of a state.

At first, the IRGC was one of many internal security forces for the revolution, including neighborhood komitehs (committees) that were freelance militias enforcing Islamic rule and revolutionary ideals. The IRGC became the primary security force for three reasons. First, it was successful in suppressing ethnic separatist groups, such as the Kurds and Balochis, as well as the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK) that had originally been an ally of the Ayatollah. But that did not make it unique, so the IRGC lays much of its legitimacy on its success in the “sacred defense” against Iraq (while this is debatable, it is a much publicized claim). In fact, many of the Guard were killed on the battlefield during the Iran-Iraq war, an effective purge that meant those who were both fundamentalist and smart remained to lead. Finally, and most notably, it established itself through successful covert action campaigns in Lebanon.

From the beginning of the revolution until MOIS was completely established in 1984, IRGC actually maintained the most active part of the domestic and foreign intelligence apparatus. After dismantling SAVAK, the Revolutionary Guard worked with the leftover intelligence officers to disrupt and destroy many domestic groups including the terrorist groups Forghan and Mujahideen-e-Khalq and the Communist Tudeh Party. The internal intelligence role was transferred to MOIS in 1984, but the IRGC still existed as a “shadow” or “parallel” intelligence organization. The IRGC’s security division, Sazman-e Harassat, functions more like a domestic intelligence apparatus. It monitors dissidents, arrests separatist and imprisons them in prisons controlled by the Guards.

As a major political-military-security-economic conglomerate, IRGC has many organizations and operations. Its primary intelligence operations are run through its own intelligence department, the Quds force, and the Basij militia.

IRGC IntelligenceThe Guard have their own intelligence office, the Ettelaat-e-Pasdaran, with a staff of 2,000 in 2006 (this has likely increased). It is difficult to separate its activities from the rest of the IRGC. It is under the command of Hassan Taeb, who was previously the Basij commander (see below). The July, 2009 reshuffling that brought Taeb to power also brought multiple agencies under its control. According to the National Council for Resistance in Iran (a dissident organization), seven agencies including the original intelligence unit, Basij intelligence, the Supreme Leader’s intelligence office or Section 101 (see below), parts of MOIS, the cyber defense unit, and the IRGC plainclothes and other police units were all brought under IRGC intelligence control. This report differs from other Stratfor sources (see Section 101 below), but it is likely that many of these groups are now under IRGC control.

The regime’s critics claims that IRGC intelligence is a “parallel intelligence and security organization” that includes the most conservative and violent elements of MOIS. When ‘reformist’ President Mohammad Khatami appointed Hojatislam Ali Younessi as Minister of Intelligence in 1997, conservative clerics were unhappy with the increased tolerance of political

openness. The Supreme Leader pushed the IRGC to restart an informal intelligence network that served conservative interests. When Ahmedinejad became president, this is believed to have reversed when the new Minister of Intelligence, Hojatolislam Gholamhussein Mohseni-Ejehi, began to establish his bona fides by cracking down on internal dissent. While the IRGC units are known to oppose each other bureaucratically, in the end they have the same goal of regime preservation. They are known to work together in many cases- especially through proxy forces- and thus reports of officers shifting between the two are not unlikely.

This unit is also responsible for security of the nuclear program. That means monitoring all scientists, securing installations, preventing sabotage, and counterintelligence against attempts to recruit Iran’s scientists.

Other activities of the IRGC’s intelligence office are unclear, but likely involve coordination of Basij intelligence for domestic security and work with the Quds force overseas.

Quds force The foreign covert action and intelligence group was known originally as “birun marzi”-outside the borders- or Department 9000. When it was officially established in 1990, IRGC leaders settled on the name Quds Force, of which al-Quds is the Arabic name for Jerusalem and implies that they will one day liberate the holy city. It is enabled by Article 154 in the Constitution which should be quoted verbatim, “Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the freedom fighters against the oppressors in every corner of the globe.”

While the Quds force officially began in 1990, the IRGC began establishing proxy groups years before. Since those groups are now under the command of Quds, we will address them here. The first operation began in Lebanon, where an unstable government, large Shi’a population, and partial occupation by Israel created the perfect opportunity for ‘exporting the revolution.’ In a reversal of the support Khomenei loyalists received a few years earlier, the IRGC sent two dozen trainers to southern Lebanon through Damascus in 1982. Probably among these were the clandestine founders of Hezbollah, the most infamous terrorist group of that decade.

The IRGC set up training camps in the Bekaa valley to train Islamic militia/terrorist groups. In September 1983, with the aid of the Amal militia, the IRGC took over the Sheikh Abdullah base from the Lebanese Army. It was renamed the Imam Ali training camp and became the IRGC base in Southern Lebanon. This base is now a training camp for the IRGC to teach local groups guerrilla and terrorist tactics.

The major Quds Force training centers are at Imam Ali University in the holy city of Qom, and the Shahid, Kazemi, Beheshti and Vali-e-Asr garrisons. Foreign Muslim students, who volunteer for such work, receive their training at secret camps in western Iran as well as the already mentioned centers. The Revolutionary Guard has also established overseas training camps, such as in Lebanon and the Sudan.

One main operational responsibility for the IRGC involves training the Hezbollah Special Security Apparatus which is the most elite force within Hezbollah and its associated groups. The Iranian military attaches in Damascus coordinates with the IRGC in the Bekaa valley for its work with Hezbollah and other groups in the area. There is also an IRGC headquarters in the Syrian

border village of Zebdani to coordinate operations there to coordinate transfer of weapons and funds.

The Quds General Staff for the Export of the Revolution direct operations. This political staff has a series of directorates for overseas operations: Iraq; Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan; Turkey; the Indian subcontinent including Afghanistan; Western countries; North Africa; the Arabian Peninsula; and the Former Soviet Union. The Quds force also has operations in Bosnia, Chechnya, North and South America, Europe, Northern Africa, including the Horn, the Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia [Pakistan?].

Quds operations have been most prevalent of late in Iraq and Afghanistan. Quds worked with multiple, often opposing, proxies throughout Iraq to destabilize the regime until a Farsi-friendly government was established. They operate out of a command center, the Fajr Base, in the city of Ahwaz on the Iraqi border with an operational base in the Iraqi city of Najaf. Quds operatives have worked with Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the former leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq [Link?: http://www.stratfor.com/attacks_jordan_al_qaeda_iraqs_questionable_capabilities]; Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army [Link?: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/iraq_mehdi_armys_existential_crisis]; the Badr Brigades, the military wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq [link?: http://www.stratfor.com/shiite_schisms]. [Ali Afoneh says also Mujahideen for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, (MIRI), and Thar Allah who are these dudes?][AEI’s Ali Afoneh claims Quds force has responsibility for AQ liaison, including ‘supervision’ of UBL’s relatives]

IRGC operations in Iraq were highlighted in Jan. 2007 when US forces raided an Iranian consulate in Arbil [Link: http://www.stratfor.com/iraq_u_s_move_check_iran]. One of those detained was the local Qods commander, Hassan Abasi, who was also a major strategic adviser to President Ahmedinejad.

Basij Militia [do they work for Sazman-e Harassat?]

Domestically the IRGC enforces security through the Basij militia who also aid intelligence collection. The Basij were founded in 1980 as the Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij which literally means Mobilization Resistance Force. At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (religious decree) that boys older than 12 could serve on the front line. Many of these youth were brought into the Basij to use for suicidal human wave attacks and as human mine detectors. As many as 3 million Basij member served during the Iran-Iraq war of the1980s, but the total forces at any one time was no more than 100,000 [F/c?] Many of them survived to become officers in the Revolutionary Guard. In fact, Iran’s current President, Mahmoud Ahmedinehad was a Basij member stationed in Kermanshah during the Iran-Iraq war and later became an IRGC officer.

The Basij only formally came under the IRGC command structure in 2007. But the Basij has long been affiliated with the IRGC and membership in the former often lead to a commission in the latter. The Basij were founded with similar principles as the IRGC- the need for a security forces to quickly replace those of the Shah and protect the Ayatollahs’ regime from any threats. While the IRGC is a paramilitary force, the Basij are a militia designed to include and train any and all volunteers. While the Basij were used in the Iran-Iraq war, they have become more of an

internal vigilante police force. In a speech by the Basij commander in 2006, Hussein Hamadani spoke proudly of their informant network which they call “the 36 million information network.” That number was picked because it’s exactly half the population of Iran. While such an overwhelming number of informants is unlikely, they are definitely pervasive.

Basij units are organized almost like a Communist Party in authoritarian states, existing throughout civil society. Each city is divided into ‘areas’ and ‘zones’ and villages have ‘cells.’ Units are organized at social, religious or government instutions, such as mosques and city offices. There are Basij units for students, workers, different tribes, etcetera. They have developed the Ashura Birgades for males and al-Zahra Brigades for females. Basij members are also arranged by their level of involvement with Regular, Active and Special rankings. Special Basij members have actually been on the IRGC’s payroll since 1991, before the Basij was put under IRGC authority. The Basij are recruited through local mosques with informal selection committees of local leaders, though mosque leaders are the most influential. With their large numbers the Basij claim to have been instrumental in preventing coups and other threats to the Islamic regime.

The Basij have been instrumental in stemming internal dissent and revolution. They claim to have stopped a Kurdish uprising in Paveh in July, 1979. In 1980, they claimed to have infiltrated what is known as the Nojeh coup, organized by different military and intelligence officers under the leadership of former prime minister Shahpour Bakhtiar. Allegedly the Basij had an informant who had infiltrated the conspirators and kept the regime informed of the plan. As fighter pilots were driving to an airbase in order to bomb the Shah’s residence and Tehran’s Mehrabad airport, they were intercepted and many of the coup plotters were arrested (and many eventually executed). In 1982, the Union of Iranian Communists, a Maoist political and militant group, instigated a failed uprising from the forest around Amol for which the Basij claim credit in stopping. All three of these were considered substantial threats to a young regime without institutionalized and entrenched security forces. They were also involved in policing the most recent election-related protests around Iran [LINKS].

The Basij may in fact be the major link in security for the Iranian regime in times of instability. The official police (explained below, LEF) have had a mixed record in the past and for that reason the Basij have been used. Most recently during the Ashura protests [Link] and post-election protests[Link?] the Basij were seen as most effective, while the civilian intelligence and security service were seen as failures by Khamenei. The most conservative political forces, with their Guard and Basij forces, have monopolized on this to take power from MOIS and LEF. The military itself is garrisoned away from population centers. Vigilante groups, which are more extreme and less organized than the Basij, are too undisciplined to enforce security. And while the IRGC officer corps is being used more for internal security, it is still a smaller force. Thus, Basij has become the nexus on which internal security relies, but the Iranian government is also responding to the risk of this reliance.

When the Basij was merged into the command structure of the IRGC in 2007, it was actually to turn the Guard inwards. As the new commander of the IRGC, Major Gen. Ali Jafari [Link: http://www.stratfor.com/iran_new_irgc_chief], said at the time “The main strategy of the IRGC has differed now. Confrontation with internal threats is the main mission of the IRGC at present.” This shift came about as Tehran saw a growing internal threat that it claimed was fueled by foreign governments.

The shift, and the results in crushing and preventing protests more recently, exemplifies the intential vagueness and flexibility of the IRGC’s mission. As Jafari said further, “"We should adapt our structure to the surrounding conditions or existing threats in a bid to enter the scene promptly and with sufficient flexibility.”

The Revolutionary Guard can serve all purposes at any time as is required to keep the Islamic regime in power. Since combating internal and external threats requires quality intelligence, and the IRGC serves the Supreme Leader directly, it serves a major, if undefined intelligence function.

J2 Intelligence and Security- Military intelligenceWithin the conventional military, the J2 unit handles traditional tactical intelligence. J2 membership is composed of officers from all of the armed forces, including the IRGC and some law enforcement. This organization is involved in combat planning and coordination of all the regular services, combat units of the IRGC and police units that are assigned to military duties. They are responsible for all intelligence operations, planning, counterintelligence and security within the armed forces as well as liaison with other services and

Ministry of Interior and Law Enforcement ForcesThe Ministry of Interior oversees Iran’s police, but has been pushed out of the security environment even moreso than MOIS. Specifically, the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), established in 1991 are legally responsible for internal security, and to that end, domestic intelligence. That year, the urban police, rural gendarmerie, revolutionary committees (komitehs) merged to form the LEF, which initially assisted the IRGC in domestic security. The police force is reported to number 40,000 and is responsible for internal and border security.

Overtime, the LEF became the day-to-day police and first line of defense, while the Basij provided backup and had ultimate responsibility for major protests and related dissent.

Anzar-e-Hezbollah? And vigilante groups….include?

Haydaryan –Sl security…..include?http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090817_iran_supreme_leaders_new_security_force

Oversight and ControlUnderstanding the internal networks of intelligence dissemination, as well as its command and control, is the most difficult subject of examination within Iranian intelligence and most interesting for Iran’s future. The government of Iran already has a convoluted political system, which Stratfor has explained [LINK to article with the charts], and its intelligence is even more so.

In the end, the Supreme Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the customer and commander of Iran’s intelligence operations. He has recently expanded a special unit within his office[LINK for Khamenei bringing power to his office? DATE?] to handle intelligence matters, as part of his effort to control Iran’s bureaucracy. Mohammad (Gholam Hossein) Mohammdi Golpayegani (sp?), essentially the chief-of-staff, runs Khamenei’s general office, which was established as the House of the Leader under Khomeini. Golpayegani was one of the founders of MOIS and previously served as a deputy minister of intelligence.

The Leader’s Intelligence and Security office is known as Section 101, according to Stratfor sources. Its purpose is to bring MOIS and IRGC under his central command. It reportedly includes about 10,000 people. This Section has the goal of controlling the ongoing bureaucratic conflict between IRGC and MOIS. It also is being used to clarify their responsibilities, such as directing foreign intelligence gathering through MOIS, and covert action through IRGC. These assignments fit more properly with the original responsibilities of each organization, as well as their cultures and specialties. It, however, could risk failure due the over centralization of the intelligence services.

Section 101, if that is it’s true name, is headed by Asghar Mir Hejazi (sp?), another Khamenei loyalist who served in MOIS. It is notable that both senior staffers in the House of the Leader have a MOIS, rather than IRGC background. This could mean the advancement of IRGC over MOIS, and thus its supremacy in the bureaucratic battle.

As Khamenei appoints loyalists within his own office to control intelligence flow, it reduces the prevalence of ‘speaking truth to power.’ Since intelligence organizations are not responsible for policy, they should have less interest and influence in it. Their primary interest is accurate and actionable intelligence. However, this division is never black and white, and since the IRGC is primarily a clandestine action organization it thus has incentives to evaluate those operations positively. Stratfor has not seen any direct evidence of this, however the organizational changes of the current regime are similar to those that occurred under the Shah. This is explained by the need for a centralized and robust intelligence apparatus in Iran, but it could also risk intelligence failure like under the Shah. That is not to say the Islamic Republic is at risk, in fact its intelligence has been extremely successful at controlling dissent, only that this will be an issue to watch in the future.

The balance between IRGC and MOIS and LEF depends on how the clerics feel about internal threats, and external powers supporting them. Iranian leaders and state-controlled press often proclaim the United States is waging a ‘soft war’ on Iran and encouraging domestic revolution.

The recent shifts (and those from the past) are explained by the ongoing conflict with Iran’s intelligence and security apparatus. No one organization is allowed a monopoly over intelligence, likely at the behest of the Supreme Leader. The balance of power between MOIS and IRGC intelligence is constantly shifting, though its currently in the direction of the latter. With the IRGC in control of military, business, intelligence and security organizations it is gradually becoming the state itself.

STRATFOR foresees two developments to watch: First, the centralization of intelligence under the Supreme Leader that could in fact undermine intelligence reporting. Second, the growing power of the Revolutionary Guard that could effectively take over the state itself. Both of these are responses to domestic instability, but could actually endanger the regimes power.

OLD STUFF and notes (IGNORE)?????Iran, and specifically its development of nuclear weapons, is the major issue in geopolitics at present, and as Stratfor has explained, intelligence capabilities [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090903_iran_u_s_intelligence_problem] are key to understanding the problem for outside powers. We have chronicled Iran’s intelligence activities

and the U.S. response [http://www.stratfor.com/united_states_and_iran_intelligence_wars]. This article is a further examination of Iran’s past, present and future intelligence capabilities- one major part in understanding the brewing crisis surrounding Iran.

As the US attempts to fight and negotiate its way out of Afghanistan, Iran has been in the news for arming and training Taliban elements. The Sunday Times reported on Mar. 21, that Taliban commanders from Afghanistan went across the border to Zahedan, Iran for training. In three-month courses through the winter, Taliban militants were given training in the use of small arms, improvised explosive devices, and raid tactics. U.S. Army Lt. Col. Edward Sholtis confirmed the report on Mar. 22, but caveated that he was not sure if the central government directed the training. An anonymous intelligence official confirmed in another report that Iran was supplying arms and providing some amount of training to Taliban forces. The training is likely government-directed through one of Iran’s intelligence and paramilitary services. It shows the general tactics used by a careful Iranian intelligence apparatus that are occurring the world, but especially near Iran’s borders. They are able to operate and clandestinely arm resistance groups while still maintaining plausible deniability with foreign governments.

Asghari goes missing, Feb, 07http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary_iranian_secrets_loose

Stratfor links:Monograph: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics_iran_holding_center_mountain_fortressintelligence problem (with MOIS): http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090903_iran_u_s_intelligence_problem

http://www.stratfor.com/united_states_and_iran_intelligence_warsnew cabinet: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090818_iran_irgcs_place_new_cabinet

http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20090726_geopolitical_diary_crisis_opportunity_irgcInternal politics/election: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090610_iran_presidential_election_and_metamorphosis

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090819_iran_fracturing_statehaydaryan security force- http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090817_iran_supreme_leaders_new_security_force

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090903_iran_supreme_leader_takes_controlhttp://www.stratfor.com/iran_new_irgc_chief

Hezbollah:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/irans_hezbollah_cardhttp://www.stratfor.com/special_report_hezbollahs_iranian_connectionhttp://www.stratfor.com/hezbollah_irans_ace_holenuke program: http://www.stratfor.com/value_nuclear_programhttp://www.stratfor.com/irans_redefined_strategyhttp://www.stratfor.com/tertiary_powers_and_nuclear_gambit

levinson abduction:http://www.stratfor.com/iran_apparent_abduction_ex_fbi_agent

http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SGE62U0JG.htm

Ali Hosseini-TashIRGC Brig. Gen. Ali Hosseini-Tash has been overseeing the nuclear weapons program of Iran. He was until 2005, the deputy Defense Minister and is now a member of the Supreme National Security Council.

Center for Readiness and New Advanced Defensive Technology in Lavisan-2 was exposed by the NCRI in 2004. This nuclear site, located at a military complex, replaced the Lavisan-Shian site. One of the most senior nuclear experts of the IRGC, named Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was in charge of operations there.

In 2004, the NCRI, once again revealed that Parchin military complex near Tehran, run by the Defense Ministry. A section of the site is used for laser enrichment under the supervision of an IRGC expert Mahammad Amin Bassam

Similarly, the Imam Hussein University is one of the most important universities run by the IRGC. At this university, now one of the most advanced nuclear R&D centers of Iran, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and Fereydoon Abbassi, both IRGC officers, have used the services of other universities to advance the IRGC nuclear weapons program.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,310979,00.html

Nuclear scientists and members of the IRGC, according to the NCRI, include: Mohsen Fakhri Zadeh (see separate entity record), in charge of nuclear activities for Iran's Ministry of Defense, Fereydoon Abbasi (see separate entity record) and Mansoor Asgari, both experts at the Modern Advanced Defensive Technology Center (see separate entity record); nuclear experts who work on the defense ministry's secret nuclear projects, according to the NCRI, include Dr. Muhammad Bagher Ghofrani, an enrichment expert and professor at Sharif University (see separate entity record), and Dr. Ali Abadi and Dr. Muhammad Hussein Ghezel Ayagh, both of Malek Ashtar University (see separate entity record).

http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/iran-revolutionary-guard-corps-%28irgc%29.html

Ahmad Vahidi the current Defense minister of Iran is in charge of the proliferation of arms to All terrorists groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, Al Qadea and he has close ties with the Al Qaeda leaders. He was the previous Quds force commander and is currently on the Interpol’s most wanted list for his involvement in the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center in

http://atimetobetray.com/blog/iranian-weapons-seized-in-afghanistan/

imams to MOIShttp://www.farshadebrahimi.com/2008/10/former-iranian-officer-explains-games.html

- Jafari set vital objectives for his forces: First, having up-to-date intelligence

about the perceived enemy‘s movements and activities, and second, increasing the regime‘s missile capabilities.- The most important IRGC posts have been filled with prominent hard-line figures such as Mohammad Hejazi, head of Saraallah – a powerful military unit in the IRGC; Jafar Assadi, commander of ground forces; and Hojjatoleslam Hussain Teab, chief of the Baji force.48