CORSAIRS TO PANTHERS

U.S. Marine Aviation in Koreaby Major General John P. Condon, USMC (Ret)

Supplemented byCommander Peter B. Mersky, USNR (Ret)

he first major sur-prise of the postWorld War II yearscame into play whenin late June 1950, the

United States found itself respond-ing in crisis fashion to the NorthKorean invasion of the new repub-lic of South Korea, just four yearsand nine months after VJ-Day. Thenation l)ecame involved in Koreaas a result of the Cairo and Yaltaconferences in which the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union agreedto the concept of a free and inde-pendent post-war Korea. Includedin the agreement was a joint occu-pation of the country by the twopowers, with the Soviets north ofthe 38th Parallel and the UnitedStates south. The concept of theoccupation had a general objectiveof settling down Korea for a periodso that it could learn to governitself as a nation after manydecades of Japanese rule. As theUnited States was painfully learn-ing, however, it soon becameapparent that what the Soviets saidwas one thing and what theyintended was quite another with

AT LEvr: After strafing enemytroops positions, a Vought F4UCorsair pilot hunts out a suit-able target for his remainingnapalm bomb. Department ofDefense Photo (USMC) A133540

respect to a free, independent, anddemocratic Korea. When in 1948,they refused to participate in elec-tions, supervised by the UnitedNations to form the first NationalAssembly, the hopes for a unitedKorea died. The Soviets formed aseparate Communist state in theirsector, the People's DemocraticRepublic of Korea. With the elec-tions completed for the NationalAssembly in the south, the Republicof Korea (ROK) was establishedand the United States trusteeship inthe country came to an end.

On 25 June 1950, the NorthKoreans attacked with nine well-equipped infantry divisions, spear-headed by one armored divisionequipped with Soviet-built T-34tanks. The Republic of Korea'sarmy had been in existence for justabout a year and could onlyoppose the invasion with four light-ly equipped divisions and oneadditional regiment. Needless tosay, although there were some spir-ited but isolated small unit defen-sive actions, the Republic's forceswere no match for the invaders.The North Koreans reached outwith rapidly advancing armoredcolumns, moving almost at willduring the first four days. Seoul fellon 28 June, and at that time, theROK army had 34,000 troops miss-ing, although many of them laterreturned to their units. With thecapture of Seoul, the invaders halt-ed to regroup and those ROKforces, which were still intact, fellback through Suwon to set up

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some form of new defensive posi-tions. The South Korean govern-ment had displaced to Taejon wellto the south when the fall of Seoulbecame imminent. This state ofnear collapse was the basic situa-tion faced by the United States andthe United Nations in the openingweek of the war. It was the first

A graduate of the open cockpit andsilk scarf era of Marine Corps avia-tion, BGen Thomas J. Cushman sawservice in Nicaragua, Haiti, and theCentral Pacfic before being namedAssistant Wing Commander, 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, in June 1950.He commanded the wing's forwardechelon, which provided air supportfor the 1st Provisional Marine Brigadeat Pusan, and later served asCommanding General, Tactical AirGroup (X Corps) during Inchon andthe advance on Seoul.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2108

the United Nations resolution, onlythree were opposed: the SovietUnion, Poland, and Czechoslo-vakia.

The United Nations participatingpledges were substantial andincluded aircraft, naval vessels,medical supplies, field ambu-lances, foodstuffs, and strategicmaterials. In addition to the Armyforces authorized by PresidentTruman, a naval blockade of theentire Korean coast was ordered,and U.S. Air Force units based inJapan were authorized to bombspecific targets in North Korea. It isalso important to note that thesecritical actions met with the whole-hearted approval of the Americanpeople. Americans also applaudedthe strong stance of the UnitedNations, and they repeatedlyexpressed their thoroughgoingpride in the responses of theirnation to the seriously deteriorat-ing international situation.

Marine Brigade

time that a Soviet-supported statewas permitted to go as far as openwarfare in their post-World War IIdepredations, and it constituted adefinite showdown between theCommunist and non-Communistworlds.

The United States responded tothe invasion of South Korea bothindependently, and through strongsupport and leadership in a United

Nations resolution condemning thebreaking of world peace by theNorth Koreans. President Harry S.Truman gave General of the ArmyDouglas MacArthur, Commander inChief, Far East, the go-ahead tosend Army units into Korea fromJapan and to take other actions insupport of the shocked and shat-tered ROK forces. It is important tonote that of the 56 respondents to

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In response to urgent requestsfor American reinforcements fromthe Far East Command, and as aresult of unit offerings and propos-als from the United States, the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade wasactivated on 7 July 1950. It was anair-ground team built around the5th Marine Regiment and MarineAircraft Group 33 (MAG-33), bothbased on the west coast at CampPendleton and Marine Corps AirStation, El Toro, respectively.Brigadier General Edward A. Craig,with Brigadier General Thomas J.Cushman, a renowned and experi-enced Marine aviator, assigned ashis deputy commander, command-ed the brigade.

The time and space factors inthe activation and deployment ofthe brigade were, to say the least,something extraordinary. Acti-vated on 7 July, the unit was given

to seven days later. In lookingback at this first of the post-WorldWar II surprises, it is again impor-tant to fully understand what theradical demobilization steps hadaccomplished. It is impossible tolist them all in this short account,hut it will suffice to point out thatrifle companies were at two pla-toons instead of three, infantry bat-talions at two rifle companies

normal logistic back-ups of alltypes of "ready" supplies of every-thing from ammunition to fieldrations were common. It also mustbe emphasized that normally, afterthe cutbacks and reductions fol-lowing World War II, the division-wing teams on both coasts wouldhave been very hard-pressed todeploy one reinforced brigade ofregiment-group-sized in 30 days,

this case. A super performance issimply a classic understatement forthe mount-out of the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade toKorea.

In late June 1950, Marine FighterSquadron 214 was the only Corsairsquadron operating from El Toro.Marine Fighter Squadron 323 wasin the process of returning to theair station following several

Marine Corps Air Units and Primary AircraftForward Echelon, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (July—September 1950)

Marine Aircraft Group 33Headquarters Squadron 33Service Squadron 33Marine Fighter Squadron 214

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Fighter Squadron 323

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Night Fighter Squadron 513

(Grumman F7F Tigercat, Douglas F3DSkyknight

Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2

1st Marine Aircraft Wing (September 1950 — July 1953)

Headquarters Squadron 1Marine Wing Service Squadron 1Marine Wing Service Group 17

Headquarters Squadron 17Marine Air Base Squadron 17Marine .Aircraft Repair Squadron 17

Marine Aircraft Group 12Headquarters Squadron 12

(Vought F4U Corsair, General Motors TBMAvenger)

Service Squadron 12Marine Air Base Squadron 12Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 12

Marine Aircraft Group 33Headquarters Squadron 33

(Vought F4U Corsair, General Motors TBMAvenger)

Service Squadron 33Marine Air Base Squadron 33Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 33

Marine Fighter Squadron 115(Grumman F9F Panther)

Marine Attack Squadron 121(I)ouglas AD Skyraider)

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Marine Fighter Squadron 212 (Redesignated MarineAttack Squadron 212 on 10 June 1952)

(Vought F4U Corsair, Vought AU-i Corsair)Marine Fighter Squadron 214

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Fighter Squadron 311

(Grumman F9F Panther)Marine Fighter Squadron 312 (Redesignated MarineAttack Squadron 312 on 1 March 1952)

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (Redesignated MarineAttack Squadron 323 on 30 June 1952)

(Vought F4U Corsair, Vought AU-i Corsair)Marine Attack Squadron 332

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Attack Squadron 251

(Douglas AD Skyraider)Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513

(Vought F4U Corsair, Grumman F7F Tigercat,Douglas F3D Skyknight)

Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 542(Grumman F7F Tigercat, Douglas F3D Skyknight)

Marine Transport Squadron 152(Douglas R4D Skytrain)

Marine Ground Control Squadron 1Marine Air Control Group 2Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3Marine Photographic Squadron 1

(McDonnell F2H-P Banshee)Marine Composite Squadron 1

(Douglas AD Skyraider)Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161

(Sikorsky HRS-1 Helicopter)Marine Observation Squadron 6

(Consolidated OY Sentinel, Sikorsky HO3SHelicopter, Bell HTL Helicopter)

1st 90mm Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion

at the same time a sailing date five instead of three, and deep cuts in let alone the seven days granted in

months of training at CampPendleton and on board the Essex-class carrier Philippine Sea (Cv 47)off the California coast. Followingits return, the aircraft and men ofthe squadron quickly prepared todeploy. The Black Sheep of MarineFighter Squadron 214 likewisewere in a high state of readiness,but had been 'out of pocket" whenthe war broke out. The squadronwas enroute to Hawaii on boardthe escort carrier Badoeng Strait(CvE 116), having been awardedthe privilege of hosting the annualNaval Academy midshipman'scruise, when it received word ofthe North Korean invasion ofSouth Korea. It was not longbefore the squadron's command-ing officer, Major Robert P. Keller,was summoned to HeadquartersFleet Marine Force, Pacific, atCamp Smith. After flying off thecarrier, Keller met with Colonelvictor H. Krulak, LieutenantGeneral Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.'schief of staff. With a tone of deadseriousness only Krulak could pro-

ject, he asked Keller: "Major, areyou ready to go to war?" Keller,reflecting on the training and expe-rience level of the squadron,assured him that the Black Sheepwere ready. With no time to enjoyHawaii, the midshipmen wereoffloaded and the carrier made abeeline back to California in antic-ipation of mobilization orders.

As can be readily imagined,

Camp Pendleton and El Toro weretwin scenes of mad confusion asMarines arrived hourly by train,bus, and plane, and "demoth-balled" equipment of all typesarrived for marking and packing,literally at a rate measured in tonsper hour. "Sleep on the boat" wasthe order of the day as the date ofembarkation at San I)iego andLong Beach for the first elements,12 July, rapidly drew closer. By 14July, all units were on boardassigned shipping and underwaywestward.

At departure, the total strengthof the brigade was 6,534. MAG-33totaled 192 officers and 1,358enlisted men, composed principal-ly of the two fighter squadrons,vMF-214 and vMF-323, a nightfighter squadron, vMF(N)-513, andan observation squadron, VMO-6.An important and historic compo-nent of vMo-6 was a detachmentof four HO3S-1 Sikorsky heli-copters, hurriedly assigned andmoved to El Toro from the heli-copter development squadron atQuantico, HMX-1. This was thefirst time that the United StatesArmed Services had actuallydeployed helicopters in a unitmounting out for combat serviceoverseas, although a few had been

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130091

Marines of the wing's forward echelon receive their inoculations in early July atMarine Corps Air Station, El Toro, before leaving for Korea on board the escortcarrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) and transport General A. E. Anderson (AP 111).

The Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) was the carrier home from which the "DeathRattlers" of Marine Fighter Squadron 323 launched their initial Korean combatmissions in August 1950.

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

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tried out in both the European andPacific theaters at the end of WorldWar II on an experimental basis.Aircraft strength at deploymentadded up to 60 Vought F4UCorsairs, eight Consolidated OY"Sentinels," and the four SikorskyHO3S-ls.

By 16 July, the brigade com-mander and a key advance partytook off by air for conferences andbriefings at Honolulu and at theFar East Command in Tokyo. Asthese meetings progressed and thepossibilities of immediate commit-ment on arrival of the main bodycame clearly into focus, an originalplan to hold the brigade in Japantemporarily was abandoned. Thiswas a result of the deterioratingposition of the United NationsCommand in Korea, which by thefourth week of the war had drawninto a perimeter-type defense ofthe port of Pusan at the southern

tip of the peninsula. On 2 August,the brigade debarked at Pusan andon 3 August at 0600, departedPusan for the front by rail and 50borrowed Army trucks. MAG-33shipping had been directed toKobe when the force reached fareastern waters, and debarkationbegan there on 31 July. The fightersquadrons were flown off theBadoeng Strait to Itami nearOsaka, where they were checkedfor combat by the ground crewsand hastily transported overlandfrom Kobe. With just one refresherhop at Itami, VMF-214, now com-manded by Lieutenant ColonelWalter E. Lischeid, landed onhoard the escort carrier Sicily (CVE118) for operations on 3 August,and on 5 August, Major Arnold A.Lund's VMF-323 returned to theI3adoeng Strait for the same pur-pose. VMF(N)-513, under the com-mand of Major Joseph H.

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Reinburg, was assigned to the FifthAir Force for control and beganshore-based operations fromItazuke Airfield on the southernisland of Kyushu. Its mission wasto provide night "heckler" opera-tions over the brigade and theKorean combat area generally,while the two carrier-based unitswould provide close air support.To furnish the essential communi-cations and tactical links for closeair support and general direct sup-port to the brigade, on arrival atKobe a tank landing ship was wait-ing to reembark Marine Tactical AirControl Squadron 2 (MTACS-2), ledby Major Christian C. Lee, and theground echelon of VMO-6, com-manded by Major Vincent J.Gottschalk, for transport to Pusan.The aircraft of VMO-6 were read-ied at Kobe and Itami and ferriedto Pusan by air. Thus the air-ground integrity of the brigade was

cowlesy of Cdr Peter B. Mcrsky, USNR (Ret)

An F4U Corsair of Marine Fighter Squadron 214 launches the "U-Bird" was still considered afirst-rate close air supportfrom the escort carrier Sicily (CVE 118). In its second major aircraft.war in five years, as the workhorse of Ma rine ops aviation,

held intact as it entered its firstcombat less than 30 days after acti-vation, a truly remarkable achieve-ment.

Pusan Perimeter Air Support

At the time of the commitment

somehow invincible. Marine avia-tion carried its portion of thebrigade load in this restoration ofpride and stature, once again rely-ing on its ability to operate afloatas well as ashore. Like the deploy-

ments on board the fast carriers inWorld War II, the basing of VMFs -214 and -323 on board the escortcarriers Sicily and Badoeng Straitonce again showed the lasting wis-dom of the long-standing com-monality policies between navaland Marine aviation.

From Sicily, in the form of eightCorsairs, came the first Marineoffensive action of the war. Led byMajor Robert P. Keller, thesquadron's executive officer, theeight VMF-214 Corsairs took off at1630 on 3 August in a strikeagainst Chinju and theCommunist-held village of Sinhan-ni. Using incendiary bombs, rock-ets, and numerous strafing runs itwas a more than suitable andimpressive greeting for the previ-ously almost unopposed NorthKorean troops. On the followingday, 21 additional sorties wereflown to help relieve the pressureon the Eighth Army southernflank. These struck at bridges, rail-roads, and troop concentrations inthe Chinju and Sachon areas. With-214 continuing the march from

Sicily Hi,qhlights from 1946 to 1951

The commanding officer of VMF-214 LtCol Walter E. Lischeid, centet and theSicily's captain, Capt John S. "Jimmy" Thach, seated right listen intently asreturning pilots report on the results of their mission.

to action of the brigade in earlyAugust 1950, the United Nationsdefense had contracted to aperimeter around the southern-most port of Pusan. It was vital thatthe perimeter contract no more,since the port was the logistic linkto a viable base position in supportof a United Nations recovery onthe peninsula. In bringing thisdesirable outcome to reality, thebrigade became known variouslyas the "Fire Brigade," the "MarineMinutemen," and other into thebreach sobriquets. In the processof their month-in-the-perimeteremployment, the Marines wereaccorded the honor of restoringthe confidence of United Nationstroops through destruction of themyth that the North Koreans were

On the afternoon of 3 August, the "Black Sheep" of VMF-214 made their first airstrikes against North Korean positions from Chinju to Sachon. Earlier in the daythe squadron's 24 planes landed on board the Sicily, then cruising in theTsushima Straits, following two days offield carrier landing pra ctice and a shortflight from Itami Air Force Base, Japan.

Sicily Highlights from 194610 1951

612

the deck of the Sicily, VMF-323joined the fray from Badoeng Straiton 6 August with strikes west ofChinju along the Nam River, hittinglarge buildings and railroad lineswith rockets and 500-poundbombs. Because the carriers wereso close to the frontlines of theperimeter, the strikes could reachtheir targets in a matter of minutesat almost any point where supportwas requested. That the NorthKoreans realized something newhad been added was apparentwhen Ofl 11 August, -323 teamedup with North American F-SiMustangs of the U.S. Air Force nearKosong in what became known asthe 'Kosong Turkey Shoot." In thisaction, the Corsairs hit a convoy ofmore than iOO vehicles of a NorthKorean motorized regiment, amixed hag of jeeps, motorcycles,and troop-carrying trucks, stoppingthe convoy at both ends on theroad. They got every one with thehelp of the F-51s. While hitting thejackpot in this manner was not an

every-day occurrence, the dailysorties from the two carriers soconveniently nearby, began toclimb in both number and effec-tiveness all along the length of theentire perimeter. MAG-33 aircraftwere constantly orbiting on stationover the frontline as the groundforces advanced, and communica-tions within the air-ground teamwas steady from the Tactical AirControl Parties (TACP) with thebattalions, all the way back to thebrigade headquarters. The air sup-port system, controlled by theactive presence of Marine TacticalAir Control Squadron 2 and VMO-6 at brigade headquarters from 6August on, worked to the won-drous amazement of the associatedU.S. Army and other UnitedNations units.

The Fifth Air Force exercisedoverall control of tactical air opera-tions in Korea, but Marine aviationunits, as components of an inte-grated Fleet Marine Force, operat-ed in support of the brigade as

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their highest priority, and in sup-port of other United Nations unitsas a lower priority. The brigadecontrol organization consisted ofthree battalion Tactical Air ControlParties and one regimental TACP,each consisting of one aviationofficer, an experienced and fullyqualified pilot, and six enlistedtechnicians. Each party wasequipped with a radio jeep,portable radios, and remoting com-munications gear. In addition,there were the facilities and per-sonnel of MTACS-2 at brigadeheadquarters, as well as thebrigade air section of the staff, oneofficer and one enlisted. The airsection was responsible for airplanning, tactical control, andcoordination of supporting aircraft.Lastly, but certainly of no lesserimportance, there was also thebrigade observation section con-sisting of the tactical air observer,three gunnery observers, and thelight observation and rotary-wingaircraft of VMO-6. When support-ing other United Nations forces,Marine air units operated under theAir Force-Army system for tacticalair control.

The foregoing gives an abbrevi-ated description of the brigade airsupport system, which operatedvery effectively through some ofthe most rugged fighting of theKorean War. The operations in thePusan Perimeter basically weredivided during the six-week periodinto three major actions. The firstwas the counterattack in theextreme southwest which ranapproximately from 3 to 15 August,and was known as the Sachonoffensive; the second was the FirstNaktong counteroffensive, from 16to 19 August; and the third was theSecond Naktong from 3 to 5

September. All three, rugged asthey were, resulted in thoroughdefeats for the Communist forcesbut were not without cost to the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130914

Against a backdrop of rugged Korean terrain, an OY Sentinel light observationaircraft of Marine Observation Squadron 6 piloted by the squadron's coin-nzanding officer Mel Vincentj Gottschalk, spots concentrations of North Koreansfor Marine Corsairs to sear with napalm.

brigade: 170 killed, 2 missing, and730 wounded. Estimates showedthat the brigade had inflictedalmost 10,000 casualties in killedand wounded on the enemy unitsfaced in the six weeks of its partic-ipation in the perimeter operation.

Throughout these three vitalactions the morale and confidenceof the United Nations forces facingthe North Koreans was restored.Marine air units of the brigade car-ried their part of the rebuildingprocess on a daily, and nightly,basis. In addition, Major Vincent J.Gottschalk's VMO-6 established somany "firsts" with its helicoptersduring the period that it was obvi-ous that a major tactical innovationwas in the making. The new steedthat Brigadier General Craig, hischief of staff, Colonel Edward W.Snedeker, and G-3, LieutenantColonel Joseph L. Stewart, had dis-covered clearly indicated that thehelicopter was fully capable of

working a revolution in commandobservation, inspection, and staffprocedures.

Most importantly, it was appar-ent from action in the PusanPerimeter that the Marine Corps air-ground team concept was a win-ner. The tight knit integration ofclose air support into the groundscheme of maneuver proved to bedevastatingly effective. From 3August to 14 September 1950, thetwo squadrons of MAG-33 onboard the carriers (VMFs -214 and-323) and the shore-based nightfighters of VMF(N)-513, flew 1,511sorties, of which 995 were close airsupport missions in response torequests from engaged groundtroops.

The strikes by Marine aircraft notonly decimated the enemy's forces,but they rekindled the bondbetween air and ground that char-acterizes the Marine air-groundteam. Ground Marines gained

courage from seeing their fellowMarines in Corsairs swoop in todeliver ordnance oftentimes within100 yards of the frontlines. Thepilots became part of the fight onthe ground and as a result gained asense of pride and accomplishmentin helping ground troops accom-plish their mission. Captain John E.Barnett, one of the Corsair pilotssummed up how aviators felt abouttheir relationship with groundMarines: "With consummate con-ceit we doubted not that Marineswere the best pilots supporting thebest infantry, employing the besttactics; a brotherhood non-parallel.Pilots were in awe of the infantry,lavish praise from whom (regard-ing close air support) fed our ego."

To sum up the air componentperformance in the perimeter, thewords of General Craig said it all:"The best close air support in thehistory of the Marine Corps... out-standing in its effectiveness." Andfrom the envious viewpoint of anadjacent Army infantry regiment:

The Marines on our leftwere a sight to behold. Notonly was their equipmentsuperior or equal to ours, butthey had squadrons of air indirect support. They used itlike artillery. It was 'Hey,Joe—This is Smitty—Knockthe left off that ridge in frontof Item Company.' They had itday and night. It came offnearby carriers, and not fromJapan with only 15 minutes offuel to accomplish the mis-

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While there was literally no airopposition from the North KoreanAir Force because it had beenwiped out by the initial U.S. AirForce efforts at the beginning ofthe war, such accolades in additionto others were pleasant music toMarine aviation and to the brigade

For the first time in any war helicopters were used on the battlefront as liaisonaircraft and in evacuating the wounded. Although underpowered and hard-pressed to carry more than a pilot, crew chief and one evacuee the SikorskyHO3S was relatively dependable.

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

sion.

as a whole. The performance ofthe brigade was a vital factor instopping the invasion in August.The punishment meted out to theNorth Korean units was so severethat it set them up for the crushingdefeat, which followed inSeptember.

Inchon Landing

The North Korean invasion ofSouth Korea occurred whileLieutenant General Lemuel C.

Shepherd, Jr., was enroute toHawaii to take over asCommanding General, FleetMarine Force, Pacific. He cut shorthis trip on 25 June when hereceived word of the North Koreanaction and immediately proceededto San Francisco and then directlyto Hawaii. Following a rapid suc-cession of conferences and briefin-gs, he was off to Japan for meet-ings with the Far East Command.History was truly made in one ofthese meetings at Far EastCommand in which GeneralMacArthur and General Shepherdwere the major participants. In asense, it was a reunion betweenthe two because a few years beforeon New Britain, General Shepherdhad been the assistant divisioncommander of the 1st MarineDivision when it was under theoperational control of GeneralMacArthur. It had long been a planof MacArthur's that should a seri-ous overrun of any part of hisforces occur, he would attempt torecoup through the use of appro-priate delay followed by anamphibious landing in the enemyrear. This was the primary subjectto be discussed in the 10 July meet-ing.

The upshot of this historic con-ference was that following GeneralShepherd's assurance that the 1stMarine Division could be madeavailable, MacArthur asked the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A1466

So great was his confidence in theMarine Corps Reserve that LtGenLemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., took personalresponsibility for promising GenDouglas MacArthur that the 1stMarine Division with appropriateMarine air could be sent to Korea by15 September Jbr the landing atInch on.

Joint Chiefs of Staff for it, withappropriate air in the form of the1st Marine Aircraft Wing. As it wasapproved, almost immediately, itwas "less the Brigade units" whichwould revert to the division andwing upon their arrival in the the-ater. General Shepherd knew fullwell that the under-strength divi-sion could hardly deploy the rein-forced 5th Marines to the brigade,let alone field the balance of thedivision, but he had an abiding anddeep faith in the loyalty and per-formance potential of the MarineCorps Reserve. The Reserve,ground and air, came through likethe proverbial gang-busters, and inless than 60 days after receiving theinitial orders, both wing and divi-sion made the landing at Inchonon 15 September, just 67 days afterthe 10 July conference in Tokyo.

The response of the MarineCorps Reserve was so much a key

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to the success not only of Inchon,but also to the firm establishmentof the United Nations effort inKorea. By about 20 July, theexchanges between Far EastCommand and Washington hadsettled out that what would bedeployed for Inchon would be awar-strength 1st Marine Divisionand 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Withthe strengths of the two being onlyat 7,779 and 3,733 respectively,there was no way the war-strengthmanning levels could be reachedand maintained without drawingheavily on both the ground andaviation organized Reserve contin-gents. Division war-strength ranabout 25,000 and the wing about9,500. On 19 July, PresidentTruman authorized the mobiliza-tion of the Marine Corps Reserveand things began to move at arecord pace. Minimum time warn-ings went out to all Reserve DistrictDirectors, and alerts were given toCamp Pendleton, El Toro, CampLejeune, and Cherry Point toexpect literally thousands ofreservists in a matter of days. Thefirst reservists arrived at CampPendleton and El Toro on 31 July,and by utilizing some units andpersonnel of the 2d MarineDivision and 2d Marine AircraftWing on the east coast, the 1stMarine Division and the 1st MarineAircraft Wing were able to realisti-cally consider their scheduledmount-out dates of 10-15 August.Because a very high percentage ofthe reservists were combat veteransof World War II, only about 10 per-cent required any form of basicindoctrination and training. Thiswas a key factor, particularly in avi-ation, since the total time requiredfrom commencement of pilot train-ing to operational status was a mat-ter of some two years. To he calledup so soon after World War II, wasthe theme of many a barracks-room and ready-room ballad that

1 St Marine Aircraft Wing LeadersMajor General Field Harris

Speaking before a crowded gathering of the WingsClub at the Ambassador Hotel in Washington, D.C.,in May of 1945, Major General Field Harris ended

his address on Marine aviation in the scheme of NationalDefense with the words: "We are not an air force. We area part of an air-ground team. I believe we will ever be anecessary part of our Nation's air-ground-sea team. Asalways, we will aspire to be a useful and helpful arm ofthe United States Marines." A little more than five yearslater, Harris' remarks would ring true. As Major GeneralOliver P. Smith, Commanding General, 1st MarineDivision, wrote to Major General Harris, then command-ing the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea, following thesuccessful breakout from the Chosin Reservoir: "Never inits history has Marine aviation given more convincingproof of its indispensable value to the ground Marines.• . A bond of understanding [between brother Marines onthe ground and in the air] has been established that willnever be broken."

Born in 1895 in Versailles, Kentucky, he received hiswings at Pensacola in 1929. But before that he had 12years of seasoning in the Marine Corps that included seaduty on board the Nevada and Wyoming and toursashore with the 3d Provisional Brigade at Guantanamo,Cuba, and at Marine Barracks, Cavite, Philippines, and

Major General Field HarrisDepartment of Defense (USMC) A310952

Department of Defense (USMC) A30035Major General Christian F Schilt

the Office of the Judge Advocate in Washington.After obtaining his gold wings, Harris served with a

squadron of the West Coast Expeditionaiy Force in SanDiego, followed by additional flight training and assign-ments at sea and on shore, including Egypt as assistantnaval attaché. During World War II he was sent to theSouth Pacific where he served successively as Chief ofStaff, Aircraft, Guadalcanal; Commander, Aircraft, NorthSolomons; and commander of air for the Green Islandoperation. Following the war, he became Director ofMarine Aviation and in 1948 was given command ofAircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, andl a year later,Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and 1st MarineAircraft Wing at El Toro, California.

His Korean War service as Commanding General, 1stMarine Aircraft Wing was rewarded with both the Army'sand Navy's Distinguished Service Medal. Harris returnedto the United States in the summer of the 1951 and againbecame the commanding general of Aircraft, FleetMarine Force, Atlantic. Upon his retirement in 1954 hewas advanced to the rank of lieutenant general. He diedin December 1967 at the age of 72.

Major General Christian F SchiltGeneral Christian F. "Frank" Schilt, MajorField Harris' replacement as Commanding1st Marine Aircraft Wing, brought a vast amountexperience to his new post in Korea.in Richland County, Illinois, in 1895, Schilt

MajorGeneralGeneral,of flying

Born

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entered the Marine Corps in June 1917 and served as an Aviation at Headquarters Marine Corps and upon hisenlisted man in the Azores with the 1st MarineAeronautical Company, a seaplane squadron assigned toanti-submarine patrol. In June 1919, on completion offlight training at Marine Flying Field, Miami, Florida, hereceived his wings and was commissioned a Marine sec-ond lieutenant, beginning a near 40-year career inMarine Corps aviation.

His initial assignments were to aviation units in SantoDomingo and Haiti, and in 1927, he was assigned toNicaragua. As a first lieutenant in 1928, he received theMedal of Honor for his bravery and "almost superhumanskill" in flying out wounded Marines from Quilali. Schilt'scareer pattern during the interwar years consisted of amix or school and flight assignments.

Prior to the United States entry into World War II,Colonel Schilt was assigned to the American Embassy inLondon as assistant naval attaché for air, and as such,traveled extensively in the war zones observing Britishair tactics in North Africa and the Middle East. During thewar, he served as the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing's chief ofstaff at Guadalcanal, was later commanding officer ofMarine Aircraft Group 11, and participated in the con-solidation of the Southern Solomons and air defense ofPeleliu and Okinawa.

In April 1952, on his return from Korea, Schilt becameDeputy Commander, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and thenext year he was given control of aircraft in the Pacificcommand. His last assignment was as Director of

Major General Clayton C. JeromeMajGen clayton c. Jerome, USM

retirement in April 1957, he was advanced to four-starrank because of his combat decorations. General Schiltdied in January 1987 at the age of 92.

Major General Clayton C. JeromeLike his predecessor, Major General Clayton C. Jerome

had a distinguished flying career.A native of Hutchinson, Kansas, born in 1901, he was

commissioned a second lieutenant in 1922 upon gradua-tion from the Naval Academy. After a year at MarineBarracks, Washington, D.C., he reported to Pensacola forflight training and received his naval aviator's wings in1925. Foreign service in China, the Philippines, andGuam followed his first duty assignment at Naval AirStation, Marine Corps Base, San Diego.

In the mid-1930s, Jerome became naval attaché for airin Bogota, Columbia, and several other Latin and CentralAmerican republics. While serving as naval attaché heearned the Distinguished Flying Cross for his daring res-cue of the survivors of a Venezuelan plane crash. Usingan amphibious plane, he repeatedly flew over the treach-erous jungles of Cuyuni in search of the wreck. Afterfinding it he made two hazardous landings on the nar-row Cuyuni River to rescue four survivors.

During World War II, he took part in the consolidationof the Northern Solomons and the Treasuiy-Bougainvilleoperation as operations officer and later chief of staff toCommander, Aircraft, Northern Solomons. He was laterCommander, Aircraft and Island Commander, Emirau,before serving with the U.S. Army in the Philippines.During the Luzon campaign, he commanded MangaldenAirfield and Marine aircraft groups at Dagupan, directingMarine air support for the Army ground operations.

Postwar duty included command of Marine Corps AirStation, Quantico; duty as Chief of Staff, Marine CorpsSchools, Quantico; and simultaneous service as Directorof Public Information, Recruiting, and Marine CorpsHistory at Headquarters Marine Corps.

He was serving as Director of Aviation and AssistantCommandant for Air when reassigned as CommandingGeneral, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea in April 1952.

In January 1953, Major General Jerome reported toCherry Point, North Carolina, as Commanding General,2d Marine Aircraft Wing, and Commander, Aircraft, FleetMarine Force, Atlantic. Two years later he moved to ElToro, becoming the air commander for Fleet MarineForce, Pacific. Retiring in 1959 as a lieutenant general, hedied in 1978 at the age of 77.

Major General Vernon E. MegeeA Marine aviator for more than 20 years, Major

General Megee assumed command of the 1st MarineAircraft Wing on 9 January 1953.

Born in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in 1900, he enlisted in theMarine Corps in 1919 after attending Oklahoma A&MCollege. Commissioned in 1922, Megee served in

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1st MAW Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr53

Major General Vernon E. Mcgee

infantry, artillery, and expeditionary billets before under-going pilot training in 1931. A year before, while quar-termaster with the Aircraft Squadrons, 2d MarineBrigade, in Nicaragua, he earned the Navy and Marine

Corps Medal for commendatory achievement while fly-ing as an observer and machine gunner in an attack ona large force of Sandinista rebels.

Receiving his naval aviator's wings in 1932, Megeespent the pre-war decade as a flight instructor atQuantico; student at the Air Corps Tactical School,Maxwell Field, Alabama; and commander of a Marinefighter squadron. In 1940, Major Megee was assigned tothe U.S. Naval Aviation Mission to Peru and spent thenext three years as a special advisor to that government'sMinister of Aviation.

During World War II, he was the first commander ofan Air Support Control Unit, which was created specifi-cally to provide close air support for ground troops. Incombat operations at Iwo Jima, Megee was said to havetold his pilots to "go in and scrape your bellies on thebeach" in support of Marines on the ground. Later, atOkinawa, he commanded all Marine Corps LandingForce Air Support Control Units.

After promotion to brigadier general in 1949, Megeewas named Chief of Staff, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic,and after receiving his second star in 1951, he served asCommanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, prior to his assignment in 1953 to command tile1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea.

In 1956 he became the first Marine aviator to serve asAssistant Commandant of the Marine Corps 'and Chief ofStaff. After having served as Commanding General, FleetMarine Force, Pacific, he retired in 1959. In retirement,General Megee earned a master's degree from theUniversity of Texas, Austin, and served as superinten-dent of the Marine Military Academy in Harlingen. Hedied in 1992 at tile age of 91.

sustained both ground and avia-tion troops on the lighter sidethroughout the conflict. The "two-time losers," as they referred tothemselves, put a lot of morale-building humor into Korea, but thefactor of overriding importancewas that they were well trained,experienced, and seasoned,ground and air.

Any discussion of Inchon mustbe considered incomplete if it failsto mention the difficult problemthe site itself presented to theamphibious planners. First, thetidal variation at Inchon is one ofthe greatest ranges of rise and fallon the entire Korean coastline,east or west. Secondly, theapproach channels to the landingsites essential to successful estab-

lishment of a major force ashore,were not only narrow and wind-ing, hut also were through exten-sive mud flats. The combination ofthese two factors alone meant thatmuch of the unloading of heavyequipment would be over mudflats at low tide with the amphibi-ous force ships on the bottom untilthe next tidal change. In order toaccommodate to this problemsomewhat and also meet the D-Day date of 15 September, andmanage to negotiate the very nar-row approach channels, it wasessential to make the approachduring daylight hours on the fall ofthe tide, thus deriving an assaultH-Hour of late afternoon.

While the complexities ofInchon as a site were much dis-

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cussed, with sides taken both atFar East Command and all the wayback to Washington, GeneralMacArthur held firm in his confi-dence in the amphibious expertsof the Navy and Marine Corps. Hebelieved that any other site or datewould not yield the opportunity toquickly cut the North Korean sup-ply lines to their forces in thesouth. MacArthur was right, andInchon has achieved its place inhistory as the most audacious, dar-ing, difficult, risky—and success-ful—amphibious landing, perhapsof all time.

Air Support Plan

Major General Field Harris,commanding general of the 1st

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A29033

A' Marine aviator since 1930 and aveteran of the Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima,and Okinawa campaigns duringWorld War II, Col Frank G. Dailey ledthe bomb- and napalm-laden Corsairsof Marine Aircrcitè Group 33 from thePusan Perimeter to the GhosinReservoir.

Marine Aircraft Wing, arrived inTokyo on 3 September, and imme-diately began to finalize the airsupport plans for the Inchon oper-ation with Far East Command, theNavy, the Air Force, and the Army.Underlying the air plan was thedecision that the sky over theobjective area was to be dividedbetween the air units of the Navy'sJoint Task Force 7, and those of XCorps. X Corps had been assignedits own organic air under corpscontrol in a manner reminiscent ofthe Tactical Air Force organizationaccorded X Army in the Okinawaoperation. The command of XCorps tactical air was given toGeneral Cushman who had beenthe brigade deputy commander toGeneral Craig in the PusanPerimeter. MAG--33, under ColonelFrank G. Dailey, was designatedby the wing as Tactical AirCommand X Corps, with principalunits being VMFs -212 and -312, inaddition to VMF(N)-542 and

VMF(N)-513. Joint Task Force 7counted on its fast carrier taskforce, Task Force 77, to gain airsuperiority in the area, as well asto furnish deep support and inter-diction strikes. Close support forthe landing was assigned to thetask group including the two smallcarriers, Sicily and Badoeng Strait,still operating VMFs-214 and-323,which had supported the brigadeso well in the Pusan Perimeter.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wingdesignated MTACS-2, which hadcontrolled air support for thebrigade, to function in that capaci-ty for the landing, and upon theestablishment of X Corps ashore,to then continue to control forTactical Air Command, X Corps.

Assault Phase Air Support

A primary and crucial objectivein the Inchon landing was Wolmi-do Island, very close in to the mainlanding beaches of Inchon.Preparation of Wolmi-do began on10 September with attacks byVMFs -214 and -323 with bombs,rockets, and napalm. The islandwas only about 1,000 yards wideand about the same dimension onthe north-south axis, except that along causeway extending to thesouth added another 1,000 yardsto the length of the island. At theend of the causeway, a small cir-cular islet with a lighthousemarked the entrance to the harbor.The main part of the island wasdominated by a centrally situatedpiece of high ground known asRadio Hill. The Corsairs literallyblackened the entire island withnapalm to the extent that duringthe second day of attacks, thewhole island appeared to beablaze.

When the air strikes began, FirstLieutenant John S. Perrin, a pilotwith VMF-214, recalled that sever-al North Korean military vehicles

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were flushed out. Evidently theenemy drivers believed that amoving target would he harder tohit. Perrin said that they got theirCorsairs as low and slow as theycould and literally chased the vehi-cles up and down streets andaround corners in the island'ssmall industrial sector. Eventuallyall the vehicles felt the wrath of theblue fighters.

While the two carriers werebusy with replenishment at Saseboon the third day of the pre-landingstrikes, Task Force 77 took overthe preparation effort with exten-sive bombing attacks, augmentedby the Shore Bombardment Groupof four cruisers and six destroyers,the latter closing to within 800yards of the island. In five days ofcontinuous pounding by this com-bined air and naval gunfire,Wolmi-do was one blasted piece ofreal estate as the 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, prepared to land at GreenBeach on the morning of 15September. Testifying to the effec-tiveness of the pre-landing prepa-ration, Lieutenant Colonel RobertD. Taplett's battalion had complet-ed their mopping-up operations bynoon and its total casualties for theday were 17 wounded. In return,the battalion could count 136 pris-oners, 108 enemy dead, and frominterrogations of the prisoners, atleast 150 more entombed in cavesand emplacements throughout theisland. During the afternoon of 15September, from observation postsat the north tip of the island and atthe top of Radio Hill, targets werepicked out for special attentionduring the pre-H-Hour bombard-ment preparation for the landingsat Red and Blue beaches at 1730.While the afternoon wore on,VMFs -214 and -323, in addition tothree squadrons of Navy ADSkyraiders, alternately blastedInchon, integrating their strikeswith naval gunfire from 1430 right

up to H-Hour. In addition, TaskForce 77 kept a continuous strikegroup of another 12 planes overthe objective area to keep anymovement of defensive forcestoward the beaches at an absoluteminimum. With this type and inten-sity of air and naval gunfire prepa-ration, in addition to the supportgiven the Red and Blue beachlandings from Wolmi-do, plus thestrong element of surprise carriedby the Inchon assault, success ofthe operation was assured. In viewof the very heavy element of riskinvolved with the hydrographiccharacteristics of the harbor andthe many other departures fromnormal planning patterns for an

amphibious assault of the magni-tude of Inchon, a completely suc-cessful outcome was indeed wel-come.

During the advance out of thebeachhead, which commenced theday following the landing, the airsupport control system functionedprecisely as previously described.On the first day of the advancetoward Seoul, the obviously con-fused North Koreans learned evenmore about close air support andits effects than they had absorbedin the Pusan Perimeter a fewweeks before. While the attack onD+1 had barely gotten underway,just five miles away from theadvancing 5th and 1st Marines, six

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North Korean T-34 tanks werespotted in broad daylight rumblingalong the Seoul-Inchon highwaywithout escort of any kind, appar-ently ordered out to bust up thelanding. An eight plane strike ofVMF-214 hit the enemy armor nearthe village of Kansong-ni withnapalm and rockets as 2d Battalion,1st Marines, applauded from theirpositions less than two miles away.The Corsairs destroyed two of theT-34s and a third was damaged, butthe North Korean crews aban-doned some of the tanks and triedto take shelter in huts near the sideof the road, which were promptlynapalmed by the strike. This threwup large quantities of smoke and

Sketch by cpl Ralph H. Schofield, USMCR

Marines charge ashore at Inchon on 15 September. After rapidly to secure the beachhead as Corsairs of the 1st Marinescaling the seawall with the aid of ladders, they fan out Aircraft Wing blast enemy targets in support of the landing.

The assault itself was suc-cessful only through the per-fect teamwork that existedbetween the participatingNaval and Marine elements.

Only the Unit-ed StatesMarines through their manyyears of specialized trainingin amphibious warfare, inconjunction with the Navy,had the requisite know-howto formulate the plans withinthe limited time available andexecute those plans flawlesslywithout additional training orrehearsal.

Kimpo Airfield

Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC348504

A curious Marine passes three destroyed North Korean T-34 tanks five miles eastof inchon. The rocket-laden Corsairs of VMF-214 knocked out the tanks part ofa group of six ordered to break-up the landing.

beachhead area.Destruction of the tanks came at

a price. Captain William F.

Simpson, Jr., a pilot with VMF-214was killed. Fellow pilot CaptainEmmons S. Maloney recalled thatSimpson "got so involved in it, hit-ting these tanks coming up, that,he almost flew straight into thetank. By the time he realized hewas too low, it was too late to pullout."

Shortly after, 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, with a tank escort, cameinto Kansong-ni and as they werecoming into the position, surprisedthree of the remaining T-34s,which were promptly destroyedby the escorting M-26 Pershingtanks. The close contacts betweenair and ground, as typified by thisexample, permitted the continu-ous and synergistic employment ofthe capabilities of the air-groundteam during the advance to Seouland beyond.

To briefly summarize all aspectsof the Inchon landing, a quotefrom Rear Admiral James H.

One of the key objectives of theassault phase and the advancetoward Seoul was the capture ofKimpo Airfield, the major air instal-lation of the city, about sevenmiles west on the other side of theHan River from Seoul. While still inthe relatively confined operatingareas of the assault phase of theoperation, the forces assignedcould meet air support require-

led the pilots to believe that all sixtanks had been destroyed, so theyswitched to other targets in the

Doyle, the veteran amphibiousgroup commander, does the jobnicely:

In a destroyed hanger at Kimpo Airfield, Marines found one of several near-fly-able North Korean Soviet-built aircraft. Captured by 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,Marines engineers quickly made the airfield operational with temporary repairs,ready to receive elements of MAG-33.

Department of Defense Photo (USMG) A3226

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ments. As the objective areaswidened and expanded with theadvance, however, it was essentialto bring in more shore-based avia-tion to meet the demand quicklyand with optimized dispatch on aconstantly broadening front. Thefield was captured and declaredsecure in the mid-morning of 18September. It was in such goodshape after the assault that it waspossible to almost immediatelymove in the first operating units.The first aircraft to land officially atKimpo was an HO3S helicopter ofVMO-6, piloted by Captain VictorA. Armstrong, which brought inGeneral Shepherd and his G-3,Colonel Victor H. Krulak, to conferwith General Craig, who had justarrived by jeep. Later in the after-noon, Generals Harris andCushman also arrived to makefinal plans for the deployment ofthe Marine squadrons from Japanand those that would fill out MAGs-33 and -12 for the follow-on oper-ations.

On 19 September, Tactical AirCommand X Corps, GeneralCushman, established his head-quarters at Kimpo, and was quick-ly followed by Marine GroundControl Intercept Squadron 1,

MTACS-2, and VMO-6. The firstfighter squadron of MAG-33 tocheck in was Lieutenant ColonelMax J. Volcansek, Jr.'s VMF(N)-542with five Grumman F7F Tigercatslanding late in the afternoon of the19th. They also flew the first com-bat mission from the field early thenext morning when they destroyedtwo locomotives near Seoul.Corsairs of Lieutenant ColonelRichard W. Wyczawski's VMF-212and Lieutenant Colonel J. FrankCole's VMF-312 landed shortlyafter -542 and also got into actionon the 20th.

During the transition of thesquadrons assigned to MAG-33

Gen Oliver P. Smith collection, Marine corps Research center

Tactical Air Commandei X Cos, BGen ThomasJ. Cushman, USMC, righl andhis chief of staff ('ol Kenneth H. Weii USM meet with the commanding gener-al of the Ffih Air Force MajGen Earle R. Partridge, USA] left, at Kimpo Airfield.While the wing headquarters remained in Japan, its task was to fttrnish admin-istrative and logistical support to Cushman 's command and MAG-33 during theKimpo air operations.

Returning to the Sicily after making the first landing at Kimpo Aiifield, istit ohnV Haines points out the damaged section on his Corsair which caused theunscheduled landing to his squadron commande LtCol Walter E. Lischeid.LtC'ol Lischeid would die six days later when his Corsair was shot down over thewestern suburbs of Seoul.

National Archives l'hoto (IJSN) 80-G-420281

622

from MAG-12 in Japan, the opera-tional burden of Marine air supportwas handled entirely by the twocarrier-based Corsair squadrons,VMF-214 and VMF-323, nowadministratively assigned to MAG-12. Also supporting the displace-ment of the division-wing teaminto the Korean peninsula wasMajor Joseph H. Reinburg'sVMF(N)-513, still operating fromItazuke Air Force Base in Japan.

The flexibility of Marine aviationin supporting a forward displace-ment of such magnitude with hard-ly a break in the continuity ofoperations is well illustrated in therapid establishment of Tactical AirCommand X Corps at Kimpo.Once again, the value of common-ality between Marine and Navalaviation was effectively demon-strated in the coverage, without abreak, of air support requirementsof the 1st Marine Division, utilizingthe two carrier-based squadrons.Regarding the capture of Kimpo,Lieutenant General George E.

Stratemeyer, Commander, Far EastAir Forces, had this to say to MajorGeneral Oliver P. Smith, the com-manding generai of the 1st MarineDivision: "I want to take thisopportunity of expressing myadmiration and gratification for themanner in which elements of yourDivision recently captured Kimpo

Airfield and so secured it as tomake it available for use by FarEast Air Forces and Marine Corpsaircraft in shortest possible time."

Control of air support passedfrom the Amphibious ForceCommander to MTACS-2 ashore onD+2 when the landing force com-mander (Major General Oliver P.Smith, Commanding General, 1stMarine Division) declared he wasready to assume control. Requestsfor close air support increasedrapidly as the enemy recoveredfrom the initial shock of theassault. For example, on 18-19September, VMFs -323, -214, and-513 flew a total of 50 close sup-port sorties, delivering napalm,rockets, and 500-pound bombsagainst troop concentrations infront of the 1st Marines, who werefinding the going a bit tougher inthe vicinity of Sosa on the Inchon-Seoul highway. In addition, -513flew a total of 15 daylight closesupport missions during the period17-19 September for Army unitsalong the Pusan Perimeter, wherethe accompanying breakout to thenorth and west was being initiated.

With Kimpo in hand, the nextmajor objective became the forcedcrossing of the Han River and thetaking of essential key terrain fromwhich to launch the assault onSeoul. MAG-33 and MAG-12 made

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their principal contributions tothese major endeavors by steadilyand rapidly increasing theirstrengths and capabilities atKimpo, and through strikes againstredeployment and reinforcingmoves by the North Koreansattempting to improve the defens-es of the city. Logistically, therewas a vehicle shortage for themovement of aviation gasoline,ammunition, and oil from the portdumps at Inchon and Ascom Cityto Kimpo, but a timely offer fromthe Far East Air Force's CombatCargo Command solved the prob-lem. During the week of 18-24September, the Command hauled atotal of 1,545 tons of these vitalaviation supplies in from Japan.Once again the theorem that thefarther from Washington, thegreater the inter-Service coopera-tion was proven, just as it was inthe South Pacific a few yearsbefore. In addition to this air effort,about 1,450 tons were trucked toKimpo from the port during thesame period. Also, MarineTransport Squadron 152 flew inspare parts and urgently neededground equipment from Japan orwherever it could be made avail-able, practically around-the-clock.

The crossing of the Han wasassigned to the 5th Marines in thevicinity of Haengju, and after an

1)epaicrnent of Defense Photo (USMC) A130104

The Corsairs from VMF-312 take off from Kimpo Airfield as clock attacks on retreating North Korean forces.,frist as they could be refueled and rearmed in around-the-

abortive attempt during the nightof 19 September; the 3d Battalionaccomplished it during daylighthours on the 20th. Four Corsairs ofVMF-214 provided supporting firesagainst a key hill from which theNorth Koreans were directingaccurate fire at the crossingtracked landing vehicles. As theassault on this hill continued, theCorsairs reported enemy in num-bers hastily evacuating with straf-ing Marine aircraft in full pursuit.The three primary objectives weresecured by mid-morning and theadvance down the north bank ofthe river toward Seoul beganimmediately. The general plan wasfor the 5th Marines to continue theadvance toward Seoul and to seizevantage points in support of the1st Marines crossing atYongdungpo. Yongdungpo, theindustrial area of the city, was sit-uated on the south bank of theHan on a large sandspit. The fight-ing on the north bank and in theattack on Yongdungpo bothserved notice to the division that itwas going to be a "to the last man"

defense of the city. By the 24th,after an extremely severe minute-to-minute three days of intensivebattling, night and day, the 1stMarines was able to make thecrossing and the battle for Seoulwas underway.

From the 19th on, both MAGs -

12 and -33 flew maximum effortschedules in close support of boththe 1st and the 5th Marines in theirassaults toward the city. Typical ofthe squadron performances duringthis period was a flight of fiveCorsairs led by Lieutenant ColonelWalter Lischeid of VMF-214, whicheffectively broke up a threatenedcounterattack on Hill 105 South,held by the 1st Battalion, 5thMarines. It was one of six closesupport missions flown by -214 onthe 23d in the zone of the 5thMarines. As a counter to the airsupport rendered during the day-light hours, Marine artillery tookover the complete support jobafter dark when the "closest" closesupport possibilities becamesomewhat diminished. When theterrain cooperates, this one-twocounter to enemy counterattacksaround the clock was most effec-tive.

On the 24th, in front ofCompany F, 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, on the east slope of Hill56, VMF-323 dropped 500-pound

Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

Marine amphibious tractors plow across the muddy Han River as the planes qfMarine Aircraft Groups 12 and 33 provide close support for the 1st and 5thMarines in their assault toward the South Korean capital.

Marines of the Second Platoon, Company G, 5th Marines clean snipers out qf aresidential section of Seoul. Due to the confined nature of much of the fightingwithin the city, Marine close air support was used sparingly and at deeper dis-tances from the advancing troops.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A3365

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Flying Sergeants: Enlisted Marine Aviators

Q ne area where the Marine Corps was probablyalone among the aviation Services was thedegree it used enlisted pilots, especially in com-

bat. Enlisted pilots were not new. France in World War Iand the Axis powers, Germany, Japan, and Italy, in WorldWar II made considerable use of their enlisted aviators.The Royal Air Force would have been in even worsestraits during the Battle of Britain in 1940 had it not beenfor its sergeant-pilots. For the most part, however, theUnited States required its pilots to be commissioned offi-cers and, with few exceptions, that is the way it contin-ues to be.

The Navy had instituted its Naval Aviation Pilot (NAP)designation in 1919 because of a pilot shortage. TheMarines, too, authorized selection of enlisted members tobecome pilots and First Sergeant Benjamin Beicher wasthe first Marine NAP in 1923.

With the country's hurried and somewhat unexpectedentry into World War II, the need for pilots transcendedthe niceties of rank and tradition. Therefore all theServices, at one time or another during the war, made useof enlisted pilots, sometimes elevating them to conimis-sioned rank later. Marine ace Lieutenant Colonel KennethA. Walsh, who scored 21 kills and earned the Medal ofHonor during the war, was an enlisted pilot until he wascommissioned in 1942.

The Marine Corps probably had the largest number ofnoncommissioned aviators (131 in 1942), and not in sec-ond-line transport squadrons; many of these NAPs laterflew helicopters and jets in very heavy action in Korea.Flying sergeants flew Corsairs and Tigercats at Pusan andChosin, Panthers in close air support against the Chinese,and OYs on dangerous artillery-spotting missions.

Technical Sergeant Robert A. Hill accumulated 76 com-bat missions as an OY pilot, earning the moniker"Bulletproof" after coming home in planes that weremore holes than aircraft. He received a DistinguishedFlying Cross for evacuating wounded Marines nearChosin under heavy enemy fire. Marine NAPs piloted sev-eral of the R4D transports that also evacuated woundedfrom Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri during the Chosin breakout.

But the jet pilots were the glamour boys and NAPswere among the first Marine jet pilots, taking their train-ing in Lockheed TO-is along with their commissionedsquadron mates. The training met some resistance fromsenior squadron commanders, a few of whom did notwant enlisted pilots flying their new jets. NAPs were notallowed to train in jets until 1949. This provided a cadreof experienced and motivated personnel to draw uponduring the action in Korea.

This somewhat, confusing situation had the addedfacet that several now-enlisted NAPs had been commis-sioned lieutenants in World War II. However, after mus-

National Archives Photo (USN) 80G-428028

The flying sergeants of VMF-212 on board the light Gam-er Bataan (CVL 29). Standing from left to right are. TSgtGail Lane, MSgt John J. McMasters, MSgt Clyde B.Casebeer, and seated from left to right, MSgt Billy R.Green, MSgt Donald A. Ives, and MSgt Norman E. Payne,Jr.

tering out in 1945 and 1946, many of the former Corsairdrivers regretted their decision to leave the active MarineCorps; several missed flying such powerful aircraft as thetough F4U. The Corps also found itself short of qualifiedaviators to fly its new jets and to man its remainingsquadrons.

A program was developed whereby former Marineofficer aviators could return as master sergeants (E-7 wasthe highest enlisted rating at the time), if they re-upped90 days or less after leaving active duty. After the 90-daylimit, the former aviator could rejoin as a technicalsergeant, a grade below that of master sergeant.

When VMF-3i i brought its F9F Panthers to Korea, sev-eral of its pilots were enlisted aviators. Master SergeantAvery C. Snow was the first NAP to complete 100 combatmissions in a jet. Snow had been a captain with MarineTorpedo Bomber Squadron 232 during World War II.

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One specialized squadron that made heavy use of itsNAPs was Marine Photographic Squadron 1 (VMJ-1),established on 25 February 1952, flying modifiedMcDonnell F2H-2P Banshees with a long nose to accom-modate several reconnaissance cameras. VMJ-1 estab-lishecl an enviable record in Korea. Several of its pilots,who were specially trained volunteers, were enlistedmen who could double as lab technicians if the situationwarranted. Squadron crews flew 5,025 sorties, shooting793,012 feet of film, one-third of all United Nationsphoto reconnaissance output, and at times, 50 percent ofall Far East Air Force intelligence missions. However,even with this outstanding record, the Banshee drivers ofVMJ-1 could not respond to all requests, and as such,overall reconnaissance requirements suffered throughoutthe war, primarily because of a lack of assets—mainlyplanes, pilots, and trained photo interpreters. Real-timeimagery for field commanders and their units was notavailable at times when it was most needed. This prob-1cm, although well known and accepted, especially bythe ground units, continued through Vietnam, and eveninto the Gulf War.

Five master sergeant NAPs of VMJ-1 pose by one of theirBanshees. From left to right are: MSgt James R. Todd,MSgt Samuel W Coopei MSgt Lee R. Copland, MSgtMarvin D. Myers, and MSgt Lowell L. Truex. As a second

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Aerial photo reconnaissance is one of the most exact-ing and dangerous jobs in all militaty aviation. The"recce" pilot must be more than just a good pilot; that isjust a base from which to start. He must he a crackerjacknavigator and know his camera systems inside and out,their capabilities and their limitations. And he must beresourceful, as well as have an inexhaustible supply ofcourage. Sometimes these last qualities are all thatenable him to bring the film home and successfully com-plete his mission.

Most jet reconnaissance aircraft were unarmed, rely-ing upon their speed to get them home before beingintercepted. During World War II, there were flC) specifi-cally dedicated reconnaissance aircraft, merely modifiedfighters, which had cameras stuck in the most conve-nient space, sometimes behind the pilot in the cockpit,or below him in the belly. The F6F Hellcat and P-SiMustang are examples of such modification. Usually,these aircraft retained most, if not all, their machine gunarmament and could therefore fight their way to andfrom the target. During Korea, however, the dedicatedphoto-Banshees of VMJ-1 were toothless and needed

lieutenant with VMF-224 during World War II, Truexshot down a Japanese "George" fighter during an engage-ment off Okinawa.

coirtesy of MSgt Lowell L. Tiucx

escorts. Sometimes another Banshee would go along,both as an escort and sometimes to ensure the coverageof the target with another camera. Air Force F-86s weresometimes called upon to shepherd the "recce" pilot.And sometimes, the photo pilot found himself alone.

In 1952, Master Sergeant Lowell T. Truex had made hisphoto runs against installations near the Yalu River,thinking that his F-86 escort would look Out for anyCommunist fighters, which might try to come after him.However, as he looked around he found that the Sabreswere nowhere to be seen, and he also spotted a gaggleof MiG-15s taking off across the river. Hurriedly, he fin-ished his photo runs and ran for home. He found later,that the F-86s had been watching from above, had theMiGs in sight, and were ready to jump the Chinese fight-ers if they come after Tniex. Recalling his time with VMJ-1, Truex said:

My memories of the photo unit, which became asquadron during my tour, and all the plankowners,are good ones. We were completely self-containedand operated with field equipment from the well-point, water tank to the generators. The technicianswere all superior guys, who worked with energyand diligence.

While standing squadron watches, besides flying theirregular missions, the NAPs were also required to work asdivision officers in the squadron photo lab and on theflight line. There was also the need to brief escort pilots,who were often Air Force F-86 pilots. The Sabre pilotsdid not always appreciate being briefed by an enlistedaviator, and occasionally made things difficult for theirMarine compatriot. In Master Sergeant Truex's case, hehad to submit to annoying identification exercises beforehe was allowed to conduct his brief. "I had to be veri-fied," he recalled, "and they wouldn't let me into theirbriefing room without identification. But, I briefed the AirForce pilots precisely, even though some of them took acasual attitude about escorting a Marine reconnaissancepilot."

The haughty Sabre pilots tended to look down on thebig, blue Banshee their Marine charges flew. How couldit compare with their shiny, silver F-86s? As MasterSergeant Truex again recalled:

They underestimated the Banshee's speed andclimb, as well as the intensity our mission required.With our small J-34 engines and big tip tanks, ourF2Hs had superior range. Although their F-86slooked good, and the Air Force did take care ofus—and we certainly appreciated their presence—they usually bingoed before we were finished. Weusually flew back alone.

Master Sergeant James R. Todd was VMJ-1 's high-mis-

sion man, completing 101 photo missions before rotatinghome. Todd flew 51 reconnaissance missions inBanshees, 10 in F9F-2Ps, 23 in F7F-3Ps, 13 in F4U-5Ps,and 4 escort missions in F4U-4Bs. As he recalled: "TheF4U-4B was used for armed escort only. The rest of thetime, we relied on a thirty-eight pistol, a can of film anda lot of speed."

Like many of the enlisted aviators, Todd had beencommissioned a second lieutenant in World War II,although he had just missed seeing combat service whenthe war ended, having spent much of his post-wing timeas an instructor. He was mustered out in September 1946,but returned in November. He resigned his first lieu-tenant's commission, raised his hand as a private, thenwas immediately advanced to master sergeant and sent toEl Toro and then to Pensacola. Arriving at the Florida airstation, he joined other re-enlistees at the Naval Schoolof Photography, where they learned the art of aerialreconnaissance. The training was to stand them in goodstead in the coming years. By 1950, Todd and his friendshad gained a lot of experience in Corsairs and Tigercats.

In September 1951, they were sent to Korea to sup-plement the meager photographic assets at K-3 (Pohang).At the time the Marines flew F7F-3Ps and F4U-5Ps. ButTodd managed to check out in the F9F-2P, and thus,when VMJ-1 was commissioned the following Februarywith brand-new McDonnell F2H-2P Banshees, he was anatural to slide into the new jet's cockpit. For a while,though, the squadron operated five different types: F7F-3P, F4U-5P, F4U-4B (for escort), F9F-2P, and F2H-2P. Theprops and Panthers remained until April 1952.

Several of VMJ-l's enlisted aviators also worked in thesquadron's photo section, interpreting mission film.Although the squadron was administratively under MAG-33 and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, it was the Air Force atK-14 (Kimpo) that tasked the targets, which was in keep-ing with the agreement with the Fifth Air Force.Occasionally, the 1st Marine Division could call in arequirement, but for the most part, Fifth Air Force calledthe shots.

Two MiGs near Chosin set on one of Todd's squadronmates, Master Sergeant Calvin R. Duke, who laid claim tobeing the oldest Marine NAP in Korea. In a dogfight thatwent from 10,000 feet to 30,000 feet, Duke outmaneu-vered the Communist fighters and ran for home at 600miles per hour.

Enlisted aviators were an integral part of the MarineCorps' capability. However, by Vietnam, there were onlya few NAPs on active duty, and fewer still actuallyinvolved in flying duties. Some of these pioneers servedwith distinction throughout Vietnam. But by 1973, onlyfour NAPs were still on active service with the Marines,and all four were simultaneously retired on 1 February1973, closing a colorful era in naval aviation and MarineCorps history.

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bombs only 100 yards from theattacking Marines, enabling themto seize the high ground. On thesame day, to further illustrate theintensity of the air support effort,VMF-212 set a squadron record forthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing forcombat operations by flying 12

missions and a total of 46 single-plane sorties. When refueling,rearming, and mechanical checktimes are considered, this becamea rather remarkable achievementunder the more or less "primitive"conditions of the first five days atKimpo Airfield after moving infrom Japan.

During the difficult and veryheavy fighting in the city, therewere many occasions where closeair support could be called in witheffect. But because of the confinednature of much of the action, thepreponderance of air support wasrendered at deeper distances fromthe advancing troops. VMO-6 heli-copters and OYs rendered yeomanservice in evacuating wounded,flying constant observation mis-sions, and in providing helicoptercommunication, conference, andobservation flights for the troopcommanders.

By 28 September, the intensivefighting in the city was drawing toa close. The newly arrived 7thMarines joined the 1st and 5thMarines on the left after the assaulton the city began on the 24th, andthings began to move Out with dis-patch. By the 28th, the 5thMarines, according to plan, hadbeen placed into division reserveand the 7th was preparing to pushoff in pursuit of the North Koreansfleeing the city toward Uijongbu,10 miles to the north. On the 29th,the 1st Marines were to establishblocking positions about threemiles east of the city and the 5thwas assigned a similar mission tothe northwest at Suyuhyon. Thesemissions were carried out with rel-

atively minor difficulty, as theNorth Korean resistance appearedto be collapsing.

The 7th Marines moved out forUijongbu early on 1 October andran into firm resistance about halfway to the objective. The develop-ing firefight exposed the enemypositions and enabled VMF-312Corsairs to work them over heavi-ly during the remainder of the day.The advance was renewed the sec-ond day and again -312 was busyaround-the-clock in support of twobattalions forcing their waythrough a tough defile on the mainroad, essential for tank and heavyvehicle passage. In addition to theclose support missions, theCorsairs caught eight trucks in con-voy and destroyed seven in oneattack. It was a heavy day allaround and two Corsairs were lostto North Korean antiaircraft fire,but one landed in friendly territoryand the pilot was recovered ingood shape. On the third day, withthe progress that had been madeto that point, one battalion wasassigned to each side of the roadto mop up while the third passedthrough on the road straight forUijongbu. It soon became apparentthat the enemy was in full flight,but the 7th Marines was inUijongbu by afternoon.Establishment of the blocking posi-tion there marked the last large-scale fight of the Inchon-Seouloperation. The supply lines of theNorth Korean invading forces hadbeen cut totally and the Inchonlanding had crushed the NorthKorean army.

With the end of this phase of thewar, U.S. Army and Republic ofKorea Army units began to relievethe Marine forces of their arearesponsibilities. Division unitswere issued orders for movementto staging areas in Inchon and allwere in place by 7 October tomount out for what looked like a

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follow-on amphibious assault onthe east coast.

A few of the major highlightsdrawn from the operation will suf-fice to summarize the division-wing performance: (1) Expansionfrom a reduced peace strength to areinforced war strength, less oneregimental combat team, was com-pleted in 15 days; (2) Movement ofmore than 15,000 personnel,organic heavy equipment, and par-tial resupply from San Diego to theFar East Command began in lessthan three weeks after the expan-sion order was issued; (3)Unloading, reembarkation, andcombat loading for the Inchonlanding was done at Kohe, Japan,in seven days, including two dayslost to a typhoon in the Kobe area;(4) The 1st Provisional MarineBrigade was disengaged fromactive combat in the PusanPerimeter at midnight on 5

September, moved to Pusan, andoutloaded in combat shipping inless than seven days; (5) A suc-cessful assault landing was execut-ed at Inchon on 15 September,under some of the most adversehydrographic conditions in the his-tory of amphibious operations; (6)The force beachhead line, approx-imately six miles from the landingbeaches, was seized within 24hours of the main landings; (7)Kimpo Airfield, one of the finest inthe Far East, was captured 50hours and 35 minutes after H-Hour; (8) The Han River wascrossed, without major bridgingequipment, and Seoul was seized12 days after the Inchon landing;and (9) The effectiveness of theMarine air-ground team and closeair support doctrine was reaffirmedwith outstanding success.

Two more days of fightingremained for the squadrons ofMAGs -12 and -33 at Kimpo afterthe relief of the ground units.During the 33-day period from 7

September to 9 October, the fivesquadrons flew a total of 2,774 sor-ties, most of them being in closesupport of infantry units. The acco-lades from all units supportedunder the Marine air support con-trol system were many, and wel-come, but one from the divisionartillery commander and fire sup-port coordinator of the Army's 7thInfantry Division was particularlynoteworthy. As Brigadier GeneralHomer W. Kiefer said: "Allow meto reemphasize my appreciationfor the outstanding air supportreceived by this division. TheMarine system of control.approaches the ideal and I firmlybelieve that a similar systemshould be adopted as standard forArmy Divisions."

During the period of theInchon-Seoul operation, 15 Sep-tember-7 October, the 1st MarineDivision suffered losses of 415dead, of whom 366 were killed inaction and 49 died of wounds; sixwere declared missing in actionand 2,029 were wounded inaction, for a total of 2,450 battlecasualties. The division took 6,492North Koreans prisoner and theestimates of total casualties inflict-ed on the enemy added up to13,666, most of whom were count-ed dead on the battlefield. Thesefigures represent a ratio of betterthan 8 to 1, a thoroughly com-mendable performance consider-ing the speed with which the air-ground team was put together anddeployed.

Chosin Reservoir

Before the end of the Inchon-Seoul operation, when it becameclear that the effect of the landingwas a total rout of the NorthKoreans, the Commander in Chief,Far East, was formulating plans forthe follow-up. With much pru-dence and caution emphasized

from both Washington and theUnited Nations regarding the pos-sible entry of either Soviet orChinese Communist forces intoKorea, it was decided that theUnited Nations Command couldconduct pursuit operations beyondthe 38th Parallel into North Korea.Concern over the possible out-break of a general war remainedstrong, however, and the authorityfor General MacArthur to utilize hisforces north of the 38th was bur-dened with several limitations.Briefly, there could be no entry ofother than Republic of Koreaforces if there was a clear indica-tion of either Soviet or Chineseentry. Also, there could be noattack of any type against any por-tion of either Chinese or Soviet ter-ritory, including the use of Navalor Air forces. Further, only SouthKorean forces would be utilized inthose provinces of North Koreabordering on the Soviet Union orManchuria. It is interesting to notethat in spite of these qualifications,on 29 September Secretary ofDefense George C. Marshallincluded the following in a mes-sage to MacArthur: "We want youto feel unhampered tactically andstrategically to proceed north ofthe 38th parallel." Coming so soonafter the world-shaking experi-ences of World War II, there wasjustifiable cause for concern, butlimitations and cautions over andabove normal prudence certainlyadded much to the difficulties ofthe decisions faced by MacArthuras the move into North Korea wasbeing executed.

Generally, the plan was forEighth Army, commanded byLieutenant General Walton H.Walker, USA, to advance along theKaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang axis;the II ROK Corps in the centeralong the Kumhwa-Yangdok-Sunchon axis; and the I ROK Corpsup the east coast direct to Wonsan.

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The 1st Marine Division wouldmake an assault landing at Wonsanand the Army's 7th InfantryDivision would follow ashore in anadministrative landing. After estab-lishment ashore at Wonsan, XCorps, under the command ofMajor General Edward M. Almond,USA, would then advance west toPyongyang, joining up with EighthArmy. The entire force would thenadvance north to two phase lines,the second being along the gener-al line Songjin in the east, south-west to Chongju on the west coast.Only South Korean forces wouldadvance beyond the second phaseline, in keeping with MacArthur'srestrictions. Eighth Army wouldcross the 38th Parallel on 15October and the Wonsan landingwas set for 20 October.

Wonsan Landing

As has been seen before in mil-itary operations, surprise comes inmany different packages, andWonsan indeed had its share.While the division was in thethroes of feverishly meeting itstight combat loading schedules atInchon, at 0815 on 10 October, theI ROK Corps in its rapid advanceup the east coast entered Wonsan.By the next day they had complet-ed mopping up the town and wereguarding the airfield on KalmaPeninsula. MacArthur thenzigzagged back and forth with theidea of a new assault objective atHungnam, 50 miles north.However, by the time the harborcharacteristics and the availabilityof both landing craft and ships forunloading at two ports werereviewed, the original plan forWonsan was retained with D-Daystill set for 20 October.

The next surprise was a combi-nation of circumstances. First wasthe discovery that the harbor andapproaches to Wonsan were thor-

oughly sown with rather sophisti-cated Soviet mines of all kinds,from drifting contact types to mag-netic ship-counting designs. It wasdetermined that no entry for land-ing could possibly be made untilthe harbor was safely swept andthe threat eliminated. The delaysentailed in the sweeping com-bined with the early taking ofWonsan by the I ROK Corps tobring about an unusual reversal ofthe normal order in amphibiousoperations. When the assault ele-ments of the division finally land-ed at Wonsan, they were we!-comed ashore by the already well-established Marine aviation units.

Planning for 1st Marine AircraftWing operations in the northeasthad kept up with the rapidlychanging strategic situation. On 13October, General Harris flew intoWonsan and on inspecting thecondition of the field, decided tobegin operations there immediate-ly. With that decision, VMF-312flew in from Kimpo on the 14thand wing transports flew in 210personnel of the headquarters andVMF(N)-513 the same day. Twotank landing ships sailed fromKobe with equipment and person-nel of MAG-12, and Far East AirForces' Combat Cargo Command

began flying in aviation fuel. Somebombs and rockets to "get 'emstarted" were flown in on theplanes of VMF(N)-513. On the16th, VMFs -214 and -323, still onthe Sicily and the Badoeng Strait,began operations at Wonsan, cov-ering the minesweeping activitiesuntil 27 October.

With the delay of almost 10days before the beach landings

could begin, the squadrons opel'-ating from Wonsan had to relyalmost totally on air resupply forthe period. The small amount ofsupplies that did arrive by shiparrived only by extreme effort andmakeshift means. Edward S. John,the only second lieutenant inMarine Aircraft Group 12 at thetime, was assigned the task of get-ting 55-gallon drums of aviation

Department of Defense l'hoto (USMC) A4452

Corsairs of VMF-312 at Wonsan Airfield are serviced for the Octobe 12 days beJbre landing craft brought elements o/continuing battle against Communist forces in northeast the 1st Marine Division ashore.Korea. The squadron flew from Kimpo to Wonsan on 14

One of the steady stream of Douglas R4D Skytrains that brought supplies toMa rifle fighter squadrons VMF-312 and VMF(N)-513 at Wonsan. The squadronswere totally dependent on airlift for all supplies during the 10 days it took to cleara lane through the Wonsan harbor minefields.

Department of Defense Photo (LJSMG) A130144

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a tire.

fuel from a tank landing ship, float-ing clear of the minefield, ashore.In accomplishing the feat, thedrums were manhandled intoWorld War II vintage landing craft,now under Japanese operation,using Korean laborers. Whenclose to the beach, the drums hadto he manually lifted over the side,as the ramp had been welded shut.Once in the surf the drums werewaded ashore through the icywater.

The squadrons also were facedwith added difficulties resultingfrom few bomb carts, trucks, andrefuelers. Consequently, the fueltrucks had to be loaded by handfrom 55-gallon drums which hadbeen rolled more than a mile fromthe dumps, also by hand. Thisslowed operations somewhat, butjudicious planning and steadyeffort maintained a useful sortierate. Armed reconnaissance flights

were flown regularly which result-ed in productive attacks on retreat-ing North Korean troops. On the24th, for example, a -312 flight sur-prised a column of about 800North Koreans near Kojo, 39 milessouth of Wonsan, and dispersed itwith heavy losses.

With the change from an assaultto an administrative landing atWonsan, the 1st Marine AircraftWing was placed under the controlof Far East Air Force, with delega-tion of that control to Fifth AirForce, north of the 38th Parallel.This required the daily operationsschedule to be submitted to FifthAir Force at Seoul by 1800 the pre-vious day. Because of the distanceinvolved and the poor communica-tions that existed, it made itextremely difficult at best to getclearance back in time. This wasresolved between General Harrisand General Earl E. Partridge,

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Commanding General, Fifth AirForce, with permission for the for-mer to plan and execute missionsfor X Corps in northeast Koreawithout waiting for Air Force clear-ance. Direction of support for XCorps was exercised for the wingby MAG-12 from 15 October to 9November. Night operations didnot begin until late in the monthbecause of delay in getting runwaylights at Wonsan, but -513 flew daymissions along with -312 from thebeginning. After the administrativelanding on the 27th, the two carri-er squadrons operated in similarfashion to the way they functionedat Inchon.

Generally, Marine aircraft report-ed to specified Tactical Air ControlParties at times given in the FifthAir Force daily order, in responseto previous requests by groundunits for air support. Close air sup-port requests, which were of amore urgent nature, were usuallyhandled by aircraft on runway alertor by flights orbiting a specificpoint on stand-by status.

As at Inchon, Major VincentGottschalk's VMO-6 was under theoperational control of the 1stMarine Division. Two helicopterswere flown from Kimpo to Wonsanon the 23d and the rest of thesquadron came in by tank landingship on the 27th. A flight echelonof helicopters remained at Kimpountil early November at the requestof Fifth Air Force, for evacuation ofcasualties of the 187th AirborneRegimental Combat Team in theSukchon area.

After the landing of the initialelements of the division at Wonsanon the 26th, 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, was ordered to Kojo,southeast of Wonsan. The battalionoccupied positions in the vicinitywith the mission of protecting the IROK Corps supply dump there inpreparation for its displacement tothe north. It developed that a size-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130420

Speed was of the essence for these Marine airmen in rearming their Corsair forrepeated strikes against Chinese and North Korean forces. Ground crewmen inthe foreground mix a batch of deadly napalm while other Marines hastily change

able remnant of North Koreantroops was in the area and a seriesof significant actions took placetoward the end of the month. Itsoon became clear that the "rem-nant" was actually a seasoned unitof experienced troops, and thatpossibly a major counterattack wasin the offing in the Kojo area.However, as it evolved, most ofthese actions were confined tonight attacks by smaller units thanwere at first suspected. Aviationsupplied the need for emergencyevacuation of wounded by heli-copter, and although there was asignificant loss in killed andwounded, there was no need toreinforce the battalion fromWonsan. Ironically, the SouthKorean supply dump had beenessentially moved out before theattacks occurred and when theNorth Koreans were finally beatenoff and dispersed, the battalionwas ordered back to Wonsan. The

Ordnance men operate a "belting"machine that inserted ammunitioninto a metal belt to be used in the20mm cannons of the Corsair. Themachine loaded the belts at a rate of6; 000 rounds per hour in comparisonwith the hand operation of 500rounds per hour.Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130762

ical evacuation and rescue efforts.

final loss count was 23 killed, 47wounded, and 4 missing. The bat-talion took 83 prisoners, withenemy casualties estimated at 250killed, in addition to an undeter-mined number of wounded and acount of 165 enemy dead on thebattlefield. The unit was back atWonsan by 4 November.

With the major changes in strat-egy that accompanied the collapseof the North Koreans, and therapid advances of Eighth Army andthe two Republic of Korea Armycorps to the north, MacArthurissued new directions, whichaffected X Corps and the Marines.One was an order for the 1stMarine Division to "advance rapid-ly in zone to the Korean northernborder." With the Eighth Armyentering Pyongyang on 18October, X Corps on the east coastwas being left behind and the rightflank of Eighth Army was becom-ing exposed. Hence the corps was

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under pressure to move north atthe earliest. With the exception ofa significant engagement of the 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, in theMajon-ni area near Wonsan, similarto the action of the 1st Battalion atKojo, most of the security require-ments laid on the 1st Marines inand around Wonsan had been metby early November.

At Majon-ni, the various actionswere supported by Marine aviationin the normal manner during day-light hours, but most of the attackson the perimeter defensesoccurred at night. Evacuations ofwounded were by helicopter pri-marily, and several airdrops ofsupplies were included in the gen-eral air support. Marine losses inthese actions included 20 killedand 45 wounded. Enemy casualtieswere estimated at 525 killed and1,395 prisoners were taken. Morethan 4,000 Korean refugees werescreened at the roadblocks along

lstMarDiv Historical Diaiy Photo Supplement, Nov50

In 1st Marine Division operations around Wonsan, evacuation of the woundedwas accomplished by jeep ambulance, and in the case of more seriously wound-ed, by helicopter. The Sikorsky H035 and later Bell HTL helicopters attached toMarine Observation Squadron 6 were the cornerstones of the Korean War mcd-

the main supply route (MSR). TheMSR itself was so precipitous, nar-row, and difficult, the Marines lost9 killed and 81 injured along onevery tough stretch known as"ambush alley."

While the 1st Marines were busyat Kojo and Majon-ni, the 5th and7th Marines had taken up theirnew assignments to the north. Thismeant that the division stretched atotal of 130-road-miles from the 1stMarines in the south to the 7th inthe north. It would be a grossunderstatement to only say thatthis complicated the delivery ofthe usual air support by the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing to its broth-ers on the ground. With the arrivalof additional Army elements of XCorps in the area, however, itbecame possible to shorten linessomewhat. The division's com-mand post was moved toHungnam on 4 November, withthe 5th and 7th Marines operatingnorth. By 17 November, the 1stMarines were at Chigyong, 14miles south of Hungnam, thusclosing the stretch to less than 60miles. This was a definite improve-ment, hut Wonsan from the view-point of Marine aviation, was look-ing like a by-passed Japanese basefrom World War II. The concentra-tion of the division north ofHungnam in its march to the YaluRiver made the airfield at Yonpoincreasingly attractive to the wingbecause it was in the center of theHungnam-Hamhung area. Thismeant that response times forclose air support would be consid-erably reduced for any actions thatoccurred to the north.Accordingly, on 6 November,MAG-33 was ordered to Yonpofrom Japan, and by 10 November,was in operation there in time toreceive VMF-212 from Wonsan. Onthe 15th, VMF-214 was orderedashore from the Sicily and set upat Wonsan with MAG-12 support-

ing the squadron as best it could,bearing in mind that many piecesof vehicular equipment neededashore are not required nor usedon board carriers. Also, because ofa shortage of shipping in the FarEast, it took much longer to moveessential shore-based equipmentfrom where it was stored in Japan,in the case of both -214 and -212,to where it was needed in Korea.This meant that for a considerableperiod, bombs often had to beloaded by "muscle power," aircraftrefueled by small hand "wobble"pumps from 55-gallon drums,weighing 450 pounds, and manyother operational and mainte-nance factors that revert to thehard way when the equipment justis not there. It was just anotherthrowback to the sustaining princi-ple of Marine aviation of doing thebest with what you have gotbecause the job must get done—and in this case, again, it wasdone.

Ground Situation

At the time of the Wonsan land-ing, the Marines had been

informed that X Corps would be apart of the dash north to the Yaluunder the revised Far EastCommand/United Nations Com-mand plans, and Eighth Armywould be doing the same on thewestern side of the peninsula. Thejump-off dates were set for 24November for Eighth Army andthe 27th for X Corps. There hadbeen many sightings and identifi-cations of Communist ChineseForces (CCF) well below the Yaluas early as late October and in thefirst few days of November. FarEast Command press releases,however, treated these sightings asbeing only "volunteers" to help theNorth Koreans resolve their prob-lems. The usual sighting reportswere invariably small groups inremote areas, but in someinstances the sightings were char-acterized also by thousands offootprints and tracks in the snow.Furthermore, in a significant five-day battle from 4 to 9 November,the 7th Marines took 62 Chineseprisoners at Chinhung-ni, enrouteto their objective at Hagaru-ri. TheChinese were interrogated andprecisely identified as part of the

The outcome of the Chosin Reservoir campaign owed much to airdropped sup-plies by the wing's twin-engine R4D transports. Assisting the Air Force's CombatCargo Command, Marine transports carried more than five million pounds ofsupplies to the front.

National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A4841

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124th Division, 42d Army, 13thArmy Group, Fourth Field Army.Tokyo press releases dismissedthese and other CCF contacts withthe "volunteer" label and the planremained in effect.

By the 27th, the 1st MarineDivision was concentrated in thevicinity of the Chosin Reservoir,with the command post at Hagaru-ri, the 5th and 7th Marines atYudam-ni, and the 1st Marinesalong the MSR with a battalioneach at Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri, andHagaru-ri. Colonel Homer L.

Litzenberg, Jr., commanding the7th Marines, while enroute fromHagaru-ri to Yudam-ni, haddropped off Company F atToktong Pass to hold that criticalpoint for any eventuality. On 25November, Generals Smith andAlmond conferred and the newswas not good from the EighthArmy sector. The II ROK Corpshad been overrun on EighthArmy's right and the Army itselfwas falling back before a whole-sale CCF onslaught. In spite ofthese results, Almond orderedSmith to attack on the 27th asplanned. At the time, 1st MarineDivision intelligence had identifiedfive more divisions from prisonerinterrogations, and line-crossingagents had given firm indicationsof even more Chinese forces justto the immediate north.

On the morning of the 27th, thedivision began its attack fromYudam-ni on schedule but the leadregiment had only advanced about2,000 yards when stiff resistancestopped it. On the night of the27th, the CCF in great strengthattacked all Marine positions fromYudam-ni to Koto-ri, including adivision attack on Company F atToktong Pass, and a strong assaultof division-sized against the three-battalion task force of the 7thInfantry Division east of the reser-voir. As the intelligence reports

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130488

Marines who used the "daisy-cutterin the South Pacific rig them againfor use against the Chinese in Korea.Attaching the bombs to the racks ofthe Corsair required delicate adjust-ments, often difficult in the sub-zeroKorean winter weather.

were gathered and analyzed, theresults showed clearly that oppos-ing the Marines and associatedtroops in the Chosin Reservoir areawas the 9th Army Group, 3d FieldArmy. This comprised a total offour corps-sized armies, a forcethat added to the five divisionsalready identified by the 1stMarine Division, totaled, by someestimates, almost 100,000 sea-soned Chinese infantry troops.With the disposition of the divisionnorth of Hungnam and Harnhung,in addition to attached units ofRoyal Marines and assorted Armyunits totaling only 20,500 in all, thebalance of the two forces favoredthe Chinese by better than 5 to 1.The fact that much of this wasknown to Far East Command andX Corps on the 25th, with EighthArmy estimating 200,000 CCF infront of them, cannot go unmen-tioned in connection with GeneralAlmond's order to General Smithto attack as planned two days later,the 27th.

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The situation had changed soradically and so quickly that on the28th, General MacArthur calledGenerals Walker and Almond toTokyo for a lengthy conference.The result of these deliberationswas a change of strategy. The pre-vious plan for North Korea wasabandoned and both the EighthArmy and X Corps were to pullback to a more defensible line tothe south. General Smith hadalready decided to start movingwithout any further delay andordered the 5th and 7th Marines tomove back to Hagaru-ri fromYudam-ni, the first leg of whatwould he a 68-mile fight throughthousands of enemy troops.

Air Situation

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing'scommand post and attachedHeadquarters and Service units, inaddition to five fighter squadrons,had moved to Yonpo from Wonsanand Japan by late in November.The sixth squadron, VMF-323, wasstill launching its maximum effortsfrom the Badoeng Strait. RoundingOut the wing's combat lineup wasVMO-6 with its OYs and HO3Shelicopters, operating mainly fromYonpo, but also from whereverelse required. This was a crowdfor Yonpo, especially when it is

remembered that much of the ord-nance and maintenance equip-ment of the squadrons was notavailable. Also included in the seri-ous shortage category were bothtransportation generally, and pro-vision of any form of heated spacefor bare-handed engine and air-craft engineering maintenance.

Cold weather maintenanceproved difficult. Touching themetal surface of an aircraft parkedon the flight line with bare skinwould cause the skin to stick to it.Aircraft engines had to be startedthroughout the night to keep them

from freezing. Tires on the planeswould he frozen on the bottom inthe morning and they wouldthump out for take off or slidealong the snow and ice. StaffSergeant Floyd P. Stocks, a planecaptain with VMF-214 recalled thedifficulties in accomplishing thesimplest maintenance tasks, suchas changing a spark plug in a F4U."It isn't too bad removing theplugs, that can be done wearinggloves. Installing them is a differentstory. You can't start a plug wear-ing gloves, not enough clearancearound the plug port. To change asparkplug you have the old plugout and the new plug warm beforeyou start. Wrap a new warm plugin a rag and hurry to the manstanding by at the engine. Thatman pulls off his glove and gets theplug started. Once started he putson his glove and completes theinstallation using a plug wrench."

Bombs, rockets, ammunition,and fuel were on hand at Yonpo,and with Marines to manhandle

them all, the air part of the air-ground team was ready to do itsjob. The task it had to do wasprobably the heaviest responsibilityever placed on a supporting arm inrelatively modern Marine Corpshistory. As Lieutenant GeneralLeslie E. Brown, a Marine aviatorwho witnessed combat in threewars, recalled: "The ChosinReservoir thing was the proudest Ihad ever been of Marine avia-tion.. .because those guys were justflying around the clock, everythingthat would start and move. Andthose ordnance kids out theredragging ass after loading 500-pound bombs for 20 hours. Andaviation's mood and commitmentto that division, my God it wastotal. There was nothing thatwould have kept them off thosetargets—nothing!"

From the time of the decision tofight their way south to the sea,Fifth Air Force had given the wingthe sole mission of supporting thedivision and the rest of X Corps.

Backup was provided by TaskForce 77 aircraft for additionalclose support as required, and boththe Navy and Fifth Air Force tacti-cal squadrons attacked troop con-centrations and interdictedapproach routes all along the with-drawal fronts of Eighth Army and XCorps. The Combat CargoCommand was in constant supportwith requested airdrops of foodand ammunition, and did a majorjob in aerial resupply of all typesfrom basic supplies to bridge sec-tions, as well as hazardous casual-ty evacuation from improvisedlanding strips at both Hagaru-ri andKoto-ri.

When reviewing the fightingwithdrawal of the Marine air-ground team from the reservoiragainst these horrendous odds, andassessing the part Marine aviationplayed in the operation, it is impor-tant to remember the Tactical AirControl Party structure of theMarine air control system. Everystrike against enemy positions

every two hours during the night to keep the engine oilwarm enough for morning takeoffs, and ordnance efficien-cy declined.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130423

Marine Corsairs operating out of frozen Yonpo Airfieldexperienced a number of problems. The airstrip had to becontinually cleared and sanded, aircrqft had to be run

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Sketch by Cpl Ralph H, Schofield, USMCR

Marine Corsairs hit enemy troop concentrations with rock- Marine air missions were in support of South Korean andets and napalm in support of Marines fighting around the US. Army units.Chosin Reservoir. However, approximately half of the

along the route wherever the col-umn was held up or pinned down,was under the direct control of anexperienced Marine pilot on theground in the column, known tothe pilots in the air delivering theattack. Other methods had beentried repeatedly, but to put it col-loquially, "there ain't no substitutefor the TACP."

The Breakout

From the start of the 68-mile bat-tle to the sea on 1 December to itscompletion at Hungnam on 12December, so much happened ona daily basis that only shelves of

books could tell the story in detail.It was one of the high watermarksfor the Marine Corps, ground andair, cementing permanently amutual understanding and appreci-ation between the two line branch-es of the Corps that would neverbe broken. It must be borne inmind that the same air supportprinciples in almost every detailwere followed in support of thedivision on its fight up to Hagaru-ri and Yudam-ni as were applied insupporting its fight back down tothe sea.

Underlying the air support planfor the operation was the idea ofhaving a flight over the key move-

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ment of the day at first light. Thisinitial flight would he assigned tothe forward air controller (FAC) ofthe unit most likely to be shortly inneed of close air support. In turn,as soon as that flight had beencalled on to a target, another flightwould be assigned to relieve it onstation. This meant that responsetimes from request to delivery ontarget could be reduced to theminimum. Naturally, the weatherhad to cooperate and communica-tions had to stay on, but if mini-mum visibility and ceiling held sothat positive delivery of weaponswas possible, the targets were hitin minimum time. If the attack of

the aircraft on station was not suf-ficient to eliminate that target, addi-tional strength would be called in,either from Yonpo or from TaskForce 77, or from time to time, bysimply calling in any suitable air-craft in the area for a possiblediversion from its assigned mis-sion. The last possibility was usual-ly handled by the Tactical AirDirection Center (TADC) of the airsupport system, or often by the tac-tical air coordinator airborne onthe scene.

After dark each night, the col-umn would be defended throughunit assignments to key perimetersof defense. This was when theywere most vulnerable to attacks bythe Chinese. During daylight whenCorsairs were on station, theChinese could not mass theirtroops to mount such attacksbecause when they tried theywould be immediately subjected todevastating air strikes with napalm,bombs, rockets, and overwhelming20mm strafing. Not one enemymass attack was delivered againstthe column during daylight hours.The night "heckler" missions overthe column were effective inreducing enemy artillery, mortar,and heavy machine gun fires. Butthere was no way that they coulddo the things that were done indaylight controlled close air sup-port, although the night controlledstrikes against enemy positionsrevealed by their fires against thecolumn were extremely effective aswell. The general feeling in the col-umn, however, was invariably oneof relief with the arrival of day-break.

The desire to have Marine air-craft overhead during daylighthours bears witness to the faith theMarines on the ground had in thepotency and accuracy of Marineclose air support. This was appar-ent to Captain William T. Witt, Jr.,who led a flight of eight VMF-214

Corsairs that appeared over theMarine column one cold day asmorning broke. As he checked inwith the forward air controller onthe ground he advised the con-troller that he had seen an enemyjeep heading north across thefrozen reservoir and asked "if theywanted it shot up." The foot wearycontroller said: "Hell no, just shootthe driver."

The first leg of the fight southwas from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri, amovement that would bring the 5thand 7th Marines together with ele-ments of the 1st Marines, divisionheadquarters and command post.It was essential that Hagaru-ri beheld because it gave the division itsfirst chance to evacuate the seri-ously wounded by air. The evacu-ation was done from the hazardousbut serviceable strip that had beenhacked out of the frozen turf on afairly level piece of ground nearthe town. Company D, 1stEngineer Battalion, accomplished

this extraordinary job. Under firemuch of the time, the work wenton around-the-clock, under flood-lights at night, and with flights fromthe two Marine night fightersquadrons orbiting overheadwhenever possible. During theperiod from the first airstrip land-ing on 1 December to 6 December,the Combat Cargo Command'sDouglas C-47 "Sky-trains," aug-mented by every Marine DouglasR4D in the area, flew out a total of4,312 wounded, including 3,150Marines, 1,137 Army personnel,and 25 Royal Marines. Until theHagaru-ri strip became operationalon 1 December, evacuation of theseriously wounded was limited asthe only aircraft that could land atYudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, and Koto-riwere the OYs and helicopters ofVMO-6. For example, from 27November to 1 December, VMO-6evacuated a total of 152 casualties,including 109 from Yudam-ni, 36from Hagaru-ri, and 7 from Koto-ri.

Casualties are helped on board a Marine R4D Skytrain at Hagaru-ri. From there,and later at Koto-ri to the south, more than 4,000 wounded men were snatchedfrom death and flown to safety and hospitalization.

Department of Defense (USMC) A130281

637

In the extreme cold and at the alti-tudes of the operation, these lightaircraft had much less power andconsiderably reduced lift from nor-mal conditions, but in spite ofthese handicaps, saved scores oflives.

The Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri legwas completed by the afternoon of4 December, with the first unitreaching Hagaru-ri in the earlyevening of the 3d. With most of theheavy action occurring on the 1stand 2d, wing aircraft flew morethan 100 close support sorties bothdays, all in support of the divisionand the three Army battalions ofthe 7th Division, which were heav-ily hit east of the reservoir trying towithdraw to Hagaru-ri. The MarineFAG with the Army battalions,Captain Edward P. Stamford, direct-ed saving strikes against theChinese on 1 December, but dur-ing the night, they were over-whelmed and he was captured.However, the next day he man-aged to escape and made his way

into Hagaru-ri. Of the three battal-ions, only a few hundred scatteredtroops survived to reach Hagaru-ri.On 4 and 5 December, wing air-craft continued the march withalmost 300 sorties against enemypositions, vehicles, and troop con-centrations throughout the reser-voir area. But on 6 December, theyresumed their primary role overthe division as the second leg,Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri, began.

Air planning for the second legdrew heavily on the experiencegained during the move fromYudam-ni. The FAGs were againspotted along the column and witheach flanking battalion, and wereaugmented with two airborne tacti-cal air controllers who flew theirGorsairs ahead and to each side ofthe advancing column. The addi-tion of a four-engine R5D (G-54)transport configured to carry acomplete TADG controlled all sup-port aircraft as they reported onstation, and assigned them to thevarious FAGs or TAGs, as appropri-

638

ate for the missions requested.The system worked smoothly andmade it possible for the column tokeep moving on the road most ofthe time; even while the supportaircraft were eliminating a hot spot.By evening of the 7th, the divisionrear guard was inside the perimeterof the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, atKoto-ri. During the two days,Marine aircraft flew a total of 240sorties in support of X Corps' with-drawal, with almost 60 percent ofthese being in support of the divi-sion, with the remainder being insupport of other units. In addition,245 sorties from Task Force 77 car-riers and 83 from Fifth Air Forcesupported X Corps. The Navy sor-ties were almost entirely close sup-port while the Air Force weremostly supply drops. The Koto-ristrip, although widened andlengthened, was not even as oper-able as the more or less "hairy" oneat Hagaru-ri, but an additional 375wounded were flown out. VMO-6,augmented by three TBMs on 7December, also evacuated 163more up to 10 December.

An enlisted squadron mechanicwith VMF-214 noted the unpleas-antness of unloading the TBMs inhis diary: "Not only are the peopleseriously wounded, they are frozentoo. This morning I helped witl1 aMarine who never moved as wehandled his stretcher. His head,framed by his parka, looked frozenand discolored. His breath foggingas it escaped his purple lips wasthe only sign of life. Between fin-gers on his right hand was a coldcigarette that had burned downbetween his fingers before goingout. The flesh had burned but hehad not noticed. His fingers wereswollen and at places had rupturednow looking like a wiener thatsplits from heat."

With just one more leg to go, theepochal move was almost complet-ed. But the third leg, Koto-ri to

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5439Elements of the 7th Marines pause at the roadblock on the way to Koto-ri asMarine Corsairs napalm an abandoned US. Army engineer tent camp. The posi-tion had become a magnet for Chinese troops seeking food and shelter.

Chinhung-ni, was tough to con-template because it included anextremely hazardous passage of aprecipitous defile called FunchilinPass, in addition to a blown bridgejust three miles from Koto-ri thathad to be made passable. The lat-ter was the occasion of engineer-ing conferences from Tokyo toKoto-ri, a test drop of a bridge sec-tion at Yonpo as an experiment,revision of parachutes and rigging,and finally the successful drops ofthe necessary material at Koto-ri.

The air and ground plans forthe descent to Chinhung-niamounted to essentially using thesame coverage and column move-ment coordination that had beenso successful on the first two legs,only this time there was one veryeffective addition. The 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, from itsposition in Chinhung-ni, wouldattack up the gorge and seize adominating hill mass overlookingthe major portion of the MSR. The

battalion's attack was set for dawnon 8 December, simultaneous withthe start of the attack south fromKoto-ri. The night of 7-8December brought a raging bliz-

zard to the area, reducing visibili-ty almost to zero and denying anyair operations during most of the8th. As a result, although bothattacks jumped off on schedule,little progress was made fromKoto-ri and the installation of thebridge sections was delayed. Theone bright spot that day was thecomplete surprise achieved by the1st Battalion, 1st Marines, in takingHill 1081. Using the blizzard ascover, Captain Robert H. Barrow'sCompany A employed totalsilence and a double-envelopmentmaneuver by two of the compa-ny's three platoons with the thirdin frontal assault, to take anenemy strongpoint and commandpost, wiping out the entire garri-son.

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The night of the 8th saw theend of the weather problem andthe clear skies and good visibilitypromised a full day for the 9th.From the break of day completeair coverage was over the MSRunder the direction of the airborneTADC, the TACs, and the battalionFACs. The installation of thebridge was covered, and when it

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-425817

During the cold Korean winter it often took hours of scraping and chipping toclear several inches of ice and snow off the decks, catapults, arresting wires andbarriers of the Badoeng Strait to permit flights operations. High winds, heavyseas, and freezing temperatures also hampered Marine carrier-based air mis-

A General Motors TBM Avenger taxis out for takeoff Largely flown by field-deskpilots on the wing and group staffs, the World War II torpedo bomber could flyout several litter patients and as many as nine ambulatory cases.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A131268

was in place, the column began itsmove down to Chinhung-ni on theplain below. It is interesting tonote that the bridge was installedat the base of the penstocks of oneof the several hydroelectric plantsfed by the reservoir. (Eighteenmonths later in June 1952, two ofthese plants were totally destroyedby MAGs -12 and -33 in one attack,Chosin 3 by MAG -12 and Chosin 4by MAG -33, the latter in one ofthe largest mass jet attacks of thewar.)

The good weather continued onthe 10th and the passage over thetortuous MSR was completed bynightfall. Early in the morning ofthe 11th, the truck movement fromChinhung-ni to Hungnam began,and by early afternoon, the lastunit cleared the town. With thedivision loading out fromHungnam, the three shore-basedfighter squadrons moved to Japanon the 14th, and by the 18th thelast of the wing's equipment wasflown Out of Yonpo. Air coverageof the evacuation of Hungnambecame the responsibility of thelight carriers with the displacementof the wing. Under a gradual con-traction of the perimeter, with theheavy support of the naval gunfiregroup, the movement and outload-ing were completed by the after-noon of the 24th.

The statistics of the outloadingfrom Hungnam cannot go unmen-tioned. Included were 105,000 mil-itary personnel (Marine, Army,South Korean, and other UnitedNations units), 91,000 Koreanrefugees, 17,500 vehicles, and350,000 tons of cargo in 193shiploads by 109 ships. That wouldhave been a treasure trove for theChinese if it had not been for theleadership of General Smith whosaid that the division would bringits vehicles, equipment, and peo-ple out by the way they got in, by"attacking in a different direction."

A few summary statistics serveto give an order of magnitude ofthe support 1st Marine AircraftWing rendered to the operation asa whole. From 26 October to 11December, the TACPs of Marine,Army, and South Korean units con-trolled 3,703 sorties in 1,053 mis-sions. Close air support missionsaccounted for 599 of the total(more than 50 percent), with 468of these going to the 1st MarineDivision, 8 to the 3d InfantryDivision, 56 to the 7th InfantryDivision, and 67 to the SouthKoreans. The balance of 454 mis-sions were search and attack. Onthe logistics side, VMR-152, thewing's transport squadron, aver-aged a commitment of five R5Ds aday to the Combat CargoCommand during the operation,serving all units across the UnitedNations front. With its aircraft notcommitted to the Cargo Command,from 1 November to the comple-tion of the Hungnam evacuation, -152 carried more than 5,000,000pounds of supplies to the front and

640

evacuated more than 4,000 casual-ties.

One other statistic for Marineaviation was its first jet squadron tosee combat when VMF-311, underLieutenant Colonel Neil R.

McIntyre, operated at Yonpo forthe last few days of the breakout.It is of interest to note that the tac-tical groups of 1st Marine AircraftWing, MAGs -12 and -33, were soconstituted that just a year laterMAG-33 was all jet and MAG-12was the last of the props, for abouta 50-50 split on the tactical strengthof the wing.

On casualty statistics, the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing had eightpilots killed, four missing, andthree wounded, while the divisionhad 718 killed, 192 missing, and3,485 wounded. The division alsosuffered a total of 7,338 non-battlecasualties, most of which wereinduced by the severe cold insome form of frostbite or worse.The division estimated that aboutone third of these casualtiesreturned to duty without requiring

Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC355021

As the last of the division's supplies and equpment were loaded on board U.S.Navy landing ships at Hungnam, the wing's remaining land-based fightersquadrons at Yonpo ended their air strikes and departed for Japan.

evacuation or additional hospital-ization. Against these figuresstands a post-action estimate ofenemy losses at 37,500, with15,000 killed and 7,500 woundedby the division, in addition to10,000 killed and 5,000 woundedby the wing. In this case theseestimates are based on enemy tes-timony regarding the heavy lossessustained by the Communists, andthere is some verification in thefact that there was no determinedattempt to interfere with theHungnam evacuation.

In a letter from General Smith toGeneral Harris on 20 December,Smith stated the sincere feeling ofthe division when he wrote:

Without your support ourtask would have been infi-nitely more difficult andmore costly. During the longreaches of the night and inthe snow storms many aMarine prayed for the comingof day or clearing weatherwhen he knew he wouldagain hear the welcome roarof your planes as they dealtout destruction to the enemy.Even the presence of a nightheckler was reassuring.

Never in its history hasMarine aviation given moreconvincing proof of its indis-pensable value to the groundMarines. . . . A bond ofunderstanding has been es-tablished that will never bebroken.

In any historical treatment ofthis epic fighting withdrawal, it isimportant to emphasize that therewas total control of the air duringthe entire operation. Without that,not only would the action havebeen far more costly, but also itmay have been impossible. It iswell to keep firmly in mind thatnot one single enemy aircraft

appeared in any form to registerits objection.

Air Support: 1951-1953

After the breakout from theChosin Reservoir and the evacua-tion from Hungnam, the KoreanWar went into a lengthy phase ofextremely fierce fighting betweenthe ground forces as the EighthArmy checked its withdrawal,south of Seoul. The line surgedback and forth for months ofintensive combat, in many waysreminiscent of World War I inFrance, with breakthroughs beingfollowed by heavy counteroffen-sives, until it finally stabilized backat the same 38th Parallel wherethe conflict began in June 1950. In1951, there were many moves ofboth the 1st Marine Division andelements of the 1st Marine AircraftWing. The basic thrust of the wingwas to keep its units as close tothe zone of action of the divisionas possible in order to reduce tothe minimum the response time torequests for close air support.Coming under Fifth Air Forcewithout any special agreements asto priority for X Corps, responsetimes from some points of viewoften became ridiculous, measur-ing from several hours all the wayto no response at all. The JointOperations Center, manned byEighth Army and Fifth Air Force,processed all requests for air sup-port, promulgated a daily opera-tions order, approved all emer-gency requests for air support,and generally controlled all airoperations across the entire front.With the front stretching acrossthe Korean peninsula, with a com-munications net that tied in manydivision and corps headquarters inaddition to subordinate units, andmany Air Force and other aviationcommands, there was much roomfor error and very fertile ground

641

for costly delays. Since suchdelays often could mean losses toenemy action, which might havebeen avoided, had close supportbeen responsive and readily avail-able, the Joint Operations Centerwas not highly regarded byMarines who had become used tothe responsiveness of Marine airduring the Chosin breakout,Inchon-Seoul campaign, and thePusan Perim-eter. This was a diffi-cult time for the wing becauseevery time the Fifth Air Force wasapproached with a proposal toimprove wing support of the divi-sion, the attempt ran head-on intothe statement that there were 10or more divisions on the main lineof resistance and there was noreason why one should have moreair support than the others. Thereis without question something tobe said for that position. But onthe other hand, it could never besufficient to block all efforts toimprove close air supportresponse across the front byexamining in detail the elementsof different air control systemscontributing to fast responsive-ness.

Throughout the period from1951 to mid-1953, there were var-ious agreements between thewing and Fifth Air Force relative tothe wing's support of 1st MarineDivision. These covered emer-gency situations in the divisionsector, daily allocations of trainingclose air support sorties, specialconcentrations for unusual efforts,and other special assignments ofMarine air for Marine ground.While these were indeed helpful,they never succeeded in answer-ing the guts of the Marine Corpsquestion, which essentially was:"We developed the finest systemof air support known andequipped ourselves accordingly;we brought it out here intact; whycan't we use it?"

If the Army-Air Force JointOperations Center system hadbeen compared in that combatenvironment to the Marine system,and statistically evaluated with theobjective of improved response tothe needs of the ground forces,something more meaningful mighthave been accomplished. Instead,what improvements were tried didnot seem to be tried all the way.What studies or assessments weremade of possibilities such asputting qualified Air Force pilotsinto TACPs with Army battalions,seemed to receive too quick a dis-missal. They were said to beimpractical, or would undercutother standard Air Force missionssuch as interdiction and isolationof the battlefield. Since the airsuperiority mission was confinedalmost entirely to the vicinity of theYalu River in this war, a good lab-oratory-type chance to examinethe Joint Operations Center and

Marine systems under the same the same basic questions weremicroscope was lost, probably irre- pondered, argued, and left unan-trievably. As if to prove the loss, swered a decade or more later in

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing made a notable contribution in providing effectiveand speedy tactical air support. Simplified TACP control, request procedures,and fast radio system enabled wing pilots to reach the target area quickly andsupport troops on the ground successfully

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National Archives Photo (I.JSN) 80-G-429965

F4U-5Ns. In mid-1952, -513 re-ceived Douglas F3D Skyknightsunder Colonel Peter D. Lambrecht,the first jet night fighter unit of thewing. Colonel Lambrecht hadtrained the squadron in the UnitedStates as -542, moving in the newunit as -513, making MAG-33entirely jet.

aircrqft flying daily over Korea.

the puzzlement of the VietnamWar.

By early 1952, the stabilizationof the front had settled in to thepoint where the fluctuations in theline were relatively local. Thesesurges were measured in hundredsor thousands of yards at most, ascompared to early 1951 where thebreakthroughs were listed in tensof miles. The Eighth Army hadbecome a field force of seasonedcombat-wise veterans, and withinlimitations, was supported by athoroughly professional Fifth AirForce. The wing, still tacticallycomposed of MAG-33 at K-3(Pohang) and K-8 (Kunsan) air-fields, and MAG-12, newly estab-lished at K-6 (Pyontaek), wasmore or less settled down to theroutines of stabilized warfare.Wing headquarters was at K-3, aswas the Marine Air Control Group,which handled the air defenseresponsibilities of the southernKorea sector for wing. Air defense

was not an over-exercised functionin southern Korea, but the capabil-ity had to be in place, and it

remained so throughout theremainder of the war. The controlgroup's radars and communica-tions equipment got plenty ofexercise in the control and searchaspects of all air traffic in the sec-tor, and was a valuable asset of thewing, even though few if any"bogies" gave them air defenseexercise in fact. MAG-33 was com-posed of VMFs -311 and -115, bothwith Grumman F9F Panther jets,and the wing's photographicsquadron, VMJ-l, equipped withMcDonnell F2H Banshee photojets, the very latest Navy-Marineaerial photographic camera andphoto processing equipment. Allwere at K-3 with accompanyingHeadquarters and ServiceSquadrons. At K-8, on the south-west side of the peninsula, MAG-33 also had VMF(N)-513 withGrumman F7F-3N's and Vought

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MAG-12 was the prop side ofthe house with VMAs -212, -323,and -312 equipped with the last ofthe Corsairs, and VMA-121 withDouglas AD Skyraiders. The ADwas a very popular aircraft withground Marines just like theCorsair, because of its great ord-nance carrying capability. VMA-312, under the administrative con-trol of MAG-12, and operating forshort periods at K-6, maintainedthe wing's leg at sea and wasbased on board the carrier Bataan(CVL 29). The wing was supportedon the air transport side by adetachment of VMR-152, in addi-tion to its own organic R4Ds, andby Far East Air Force's CombatCargo Command when requiredfor major airlift. The rear echelonof the wing was at Itami, Japan,where it functioned as a supplybase, a receiving station for incom-ing replacements, a facility for spe-cial aircraft maintenance efforts,and a center for periodic rest andrecreation visits for combat per-sonnel.

Operationally, the 1st MarineAircraft Wing was in a uniqueposition with respect to the FifthAir Force because the air com-mand treated the two MAGs in thesame manner as they did theirown organic wings. (Wing, in AirForce parlance, is practically iden-tical to MAG in Marine talk.) Thisleft the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing askind of an additional commandechelon between Fifth Air Forceand the two MAGs which wasabsent in the line to all the otherAir Force tactical wings. On bal-

Sketch by TS8t Torn Murray, USMC

Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 radio and radar van set-up atopChon-san—the imposing 3,000-foot peak near Pusan. During the early years ofthe war, the squadron was hard-pressed to identify and control the hundreds of

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

Used as a night fighter during the early years of the wai the tinctive nose-mounted radar and taller vertical tail, provedtwo-seal twin-engine Grumman F7F Tigercat, with its dis- its capabilities time after time.

The Douglas AD Skyraidei one of the most versatile aircraft 5,000 pounds of ordnance in addition to its two wing-then in existence, was used on electronic countermeasure, mounted 20mm cannon.night fighter, and attack missions. It could carry more than

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) Al 33S36

644

W.T. Larkins Collection, Naval Aviation History Office

The twin-engine Douglas F3D Skyknight jet night fighter soon tasked with escorting Air Force B-2s which had beengained the respect of many jormer" members of the Chinese decimated by enemy MiGs.Air Force. With its state-of-the-art avionics, the big jet was

The first Marine jet to see action in Korea, the Grumman United Nations jbrces. It speed however was offset by its rel-F.9F Panther compiled an enviable record in supporting atively short endurance and poor service reliability.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A132958

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ance, the presence of the wing inthe act was a definite plus of themost supportive kind for the twoMAGs. For instance, the daily oper-ation order for air operations camein to the two MAGs during thenight and was popularly known asthe "frag order," or simply, "thefrag." The wing also received thefrag at the same time by teletypeand could check it over with MAGoperations or even intercede withthe Air Force if considered desir-able. Relations between Fifth AirForce and wing were consistentlygood and although communica-tions were somewhat hectic fromtime to time, the basic daily opera-tional plans got through so thatplanned schedules could he metmost of the time.

Maintenance of good commandrelations between the wing and theFifth Air Force in the sometimes-difficult structure of the Korean

War was a direct function of thepersonalities involved. Marine avia-tion was fortunate in this regardwith a succession of wing com-manders who not only gained therespect of their Air Force counter-parts, but also did not permit doc-trinal differences, which mightoccur from adversely affecting themutuality of that respect.Relationships were very muchaided also by the presence of a liai-son colonel from the wing on dutyat the Joint Operations Center, apost that smoothed many an oper-ational problem before it couldgrow into something Out of pro-portion. The teams of leaders ofthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing andthe Fifth Air Force were hard tomatch. Generals Field Harris—EarlE. Partridge, Christian F.

Schilt—Frank E. Everest, Clayton C.Jerome— Glenn 0. Barcus, andVernon E. Megee—Glenn 0. Barcus,

646

constituted some of the most expe-rienced and talented airmen thecountry had produced up to thattime.

Operations of both MAGs gener-ally ran to the same patternthroughout the war. Neither groupwas engaged in any except chanceencounters with respect to air-to-air, and some of these brought anoccasional startling result as whena Corsair shot down a Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15. However, sinceair combat was confined to theYalu River area, the chanceencounters were very infrequent.Considering the types of aircraftwith which both groups wereequipped, it is probably just as wellthat the Communists worked theirMiGs largely in that confined sec-tor. This left the usual frag orderassignments to Marine aircraftmostly in the interdiction and closeair support categories, with a less-er number in night interdiction andphoto reconnaissance.

Interdiction as a category took aheavy percentage of the daily avail-ability of aircraft because of thedetermination of the Air Force toshow that by cutting the enemy'ssupply lines his ability to fighteffectively at the front could l)edried up. No one can deny the wis-dom of this as a tenet. But in Koreaat various stages of the war, it wasconclusively shown that the NorthKoreans and the Chinese had anuncanny ability to fix roads, rails,and bridges in jury-rigged fashionwith very little break in the flow ofsupplies. This was most evident atthe main line of resistance whereno drying up was noted. Becauseinterdiction was not proving effec-tive, any dissatisfaction stemmedfrom the low allocation of aircraftto close air support where air sup-port was needed almost daily. Tomany, it seemed that having triedthe emphasis on interdiction at theexpense of close air support, pru-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A132423

Cardinal Francisf Spellman visits the Korean orphanage at Pohang supportedby the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. To the Cardinal's left are: Ma/Gen Christian FSchilt Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing; Bishop GermainMousset head of the orphanage; and Col Carson A. Roberts, commanding offi-cer of Marine Aircraft Group 33.

Major-League Reservists

The Marine Corps Air Reserve, like other Reservecomponents of the United States military, had con-tracted after World War II. Unlike today's active

organization, many reservists simply went inactive,remaining on the roles for call-up, but not drilling.Former SBD pilot, Guadalcanal veteran, and a greatlyadmired officer, Colonel Richard C. Mangrum (later lieu-tenant general) helped to establish a Aviation Reserveprogram, resulting in the Marine Corps Air ReserveTraining Command that would he the nucleus of the"mobilizable" 4th Marine Aircraft Wing in 1962. By July1948, there were 27 fighter-bomber squadrons, flyingmostly F4U Corsairs, although VMF-321 at Naval AirStation Anacostia in Washington, D.C., flew GrummanF8Fs for a time, and eight ground control interceptsquadrons. Major General Christian F. Schilt, whoreceived the Medal of Honor for his service in Nicaragua,rap the revamped Air Reserves from his headquarters atNaval Air Station Glenview, Illinois.

When the North Koreans invaded South Korea, theRegular Marine forces were desperately below manninglevels required to participate in a full-scale war halfwayaround the world. The Commandant, General Clifton B.Cates, requested a Reserve call-up. At the time, therewere 30 Marine Corps Air Reserve squadrons and 12Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadrons. Thesesquadrons included 1,588 officers and 4,753 enlistedmembers. By late July 1950, Marines from three fighterand six ground control intercept squadrons had beenmobilized—others followed. These participated in suchearly actions as the Inchon landing; 17 percent of theMarines involved were reservists.

The success of the United Nations operations in con-taining and ultimately pushing back the North Koreanadvance, prompted the Communist Chinese to enter thewar in November and December 1950, creating anentirely new, and dangerous, situation. The well-docu-mented Chosin breakout also resulted in a surge of appli-cations to the Marine Corps Reserves from 877 inDecember 1950 to 3,477 in January 1951.

In January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorizedthe Marine Corps to increase the number of its fightersquadrons from 18 to 21. Eight days later, nine fightersquadrons were ordered to report to duty. Six of thesewere mobilized as personnel, while three—VMFs -131,-251, and -451—were recalled as squadrons, thus pre-serving their squadron designations. Many of the recalledaviators and crewmen had seen sustained service inWorld War II. Their recall resulted from the small num-ber of Marine aviators, Regular and Reserve, coming outof flight training between World War II and the first sixmonths of the Korean War. Interestingly, few of the call-ups had experience in the new jet aircraft, a lack ofknowledge that would not sit well with many Regular

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members of the squadrons that received the eager, butmeagerly trained Reserve second lieutenants. As onereservist observed, without rancor: "The regulars had allthe rank."

Major (later Lieutenant General) Thomas H. Miller, Jr.,who served as operations officer and then executive offi-cer of VMA-323, appreciated the recalled reservists.Remembering that the executive officer of the squadron,Major Max H. Harper, who was killed in action, was areservist, Miller observed that although the Reserve avia-tors had to be brought up to speed on current tactics,they never complained and were always ready to dotheir part.

Miller was the eighth Marine to transition to jets andwas looking forward to joining VMF-311 to fly Panthers.However, because he had flown Corsairs in World War IIand was a senior squadron aviator, he was assigned toVMA-323 as a measure of support to the incomingReserve aviators, most of who were assigned to theCorsair-equipped units in Korea. It was important, heobserved, to show the Reserves that Regular Marinesflew the old, but still-effective fighters, too.

The call-up affected people from all stations, fromshopkeepers to accountants to baseball players. Twobig-league players, Captain Gerald F. "Jerry" Coleman ofthe New York Yankees and Captain Theodore S. "Ted"Williams of the Boston Red Sox, were recalled at thesame time, and even took their physicals at Jacksonvilleon the same day in May 1952. Another member of the1952 Yankees, third baseman Robert W. "Bobby" Brown,was actually a physician, and upon his recall, servedwith an Army ground unit in Korea as battalion surgeon.

Capt Gerald F 'Jerry" Coleman poses in an F4U Corsairof VMA-323. Playing second base for the New YorkYankees, the former World War II SBD dive-bomber pilotwas recalled to duty for Korea.

Courtesy of Gerald F. Coleman

At 34, Williams was not a young man by either base-ball or military standards when he was recalled to activeduty in Korea in 1952. Of course, he was not alone inbeing recalled, but his visibility as a public figure madehis case special. The star hitter took the event stoically.In an article, which appeared the August 1953 issue ofThe American Weekly, he said: "The recall wasn't exact-ly joyous news, but I tried to be philosophical about it.It was happening to a lot of fellows, I thought. I was nobetter than the rest."

Many in the press could not understand the need torecall "second hand warriors," as one reporter wrotesomewhat unkindly. Most sports writers bemoaned thefact that Williams was really kind of old for a ball play-er as well as for a combat jet pilot.

However, the Boston outfielder reported for duty on2 May 1952, received a checkout in Panthers withVMF-223 at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NorthCarolina, and was assigned to VMF-311 in Korea. Hissquadron mates got used to having a celebrity in theirmidst. Future astronaut and United States Senator JohnH. Glenn, then a major, was his flight leader for nearlyhalf his missions.

On 16 February 1953, Williams was part of a 35-planestrike against Highway 1, south of Pyongyang, NorthKorea. As the aircraft from VMF-115 and VMF-311 doveon the target, Williams felt his plane shudder as hereached 5,000 feet. "Until that day I had never put ascratch on a plane in almost four years of military flying.But I really did it up good. I got hit just as I dropped mybombs on the target—a big Communist tank and infantrytraining school near Pyongyang. The hit knocked out myhydraulic and electrical systems and started a slowburn."

Unable to locate his flight leader for instructions andhelp, Williams was relieved to see another pilot,Lieutenant Lawrence R. Hawkins, slide into view.Hawkins gave his plane a once-over and told Williamsthat the F9F was leaking fluid (it turned out later to behydraulic fluid). Joining up on the damaged Panther,Hawkins led Williams back to K-3 (Pohang), calling onthe radio for a clear runway and crash crews. The base-ball player was going to try to bring his plane back,instead of bailing out.

With most of his flight instruments gone, Williamswas flying on instinct and the feel of the plane as he cir-cled wide of the field, setting himself up for theapproach.

It took a few, long minutes for the battered Pantherto come down the final approach, but perhaps his ath-lete's instincts and control enabled Williams to do thejob. The F9F finally crossed over the end of the runway,and slid along on its belly, as Williams flicked switchesto prevent a fire. As the plane swerved to a stop, theshaken pilot blew off the canopy and jumped from hisaircraft, a little worse for wear, but alive.

Later that month, after returning to El Toro, he wrote

Courtesy of Ccli Peter B. Mersky, USNR (Ret)

Capt Theodore S. Williams prepares for a mission in hisVMF-311 Panther jet. Although in his mid-30s, Williamssaw a lot of action, often as the wingman of anotherfamous Marines aviator, Maj John H. Glenn.

a friend in Philadelphia describing the mission:

No doubt you read about my very hairy experi-ence. I am being called lucky by all the boys andwith good cause. Some lucky bastard hit me withsmall arms and. . . started a fire. I had no radio,fuel pressure, no air speed, and I couldn't cut it offand slide on my belly. . . . Why the thing didn'treally blow I don't know. My wingman wasscreaming for me to bail out, but of course, withthe electrical equipment out, I didn't hear anything.

Williams received the Air Medal for bringing the planeback. He flew 38 missions before an old ear infectionacted up, and he was eventually brought back to theStates in June. After convalescing, Williams returned tothe Boston Red Sox for the 1954 season, eventually retir-ing in 1960. Although obviously glad to come back to histeam, his closing comment in the letter to his friend inPhiladelphia indicates concern about the squadronmates he left behind: "We had quite a few boys hit late-ly. Some seem to think the bastards have a new com-puter to get the range. Hope Not."

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Unlike Williams, who had spent his World War II dutyas an instructor, Yankees second-baseman Coleman hadseen his share of combat in the Philippines in 1945 as anSBD pilot with Marine Scout Bomber Squadron 341, the"Torrid Turtles," flying 57 missions in General DouglasMacArthur's campaign to wrest the archipelago from theJapanese.

Coleman had wanted gold wings right out of highschool in 1942, when two young naval aviators strodeinto a class assembly to entice the male graduates withtheir snappy uniforms and flashy wings. He had signedup and eventually received his wings of gold. WhenMarine ace Captain Joseph J. "Joe" Foss appeared at hisbase, however, Coleman decided he would join theMarines. And he soon found himself dive-bombing theJapanese on Luzon.

Returning home, he went inactive and pursued acareer in professional baseball. Before the war, Colemanhad been a member of a semi-pro team in the SanFrancisco area, and he returned to it as a part of theYankees farm system.

He joined the Yankees as a shortstop in 1948, but wasmoved to second base. Coleman exhibited gymnasticagility at the pivotal position, frequently taking to the airas he twisted to make a play at first base or third. Hiscolorful manager, Casey Stengel, remarked: "Best man Iever saw on a double play. Once, I saw him make athrow while standin' on his head. He just goes 'whisht!'and he's got the feller at first." By 1950, the young starterhad established himself as a dependable member of oneof the game's most colorful teams. He had not flownsince 1945.

As the situation in Korea deteriorated for the allies,the resulting call-up of Marine Reserve aviators finallyreached Coleman. The 28-year-old second baseman,however, accepted the recall with patriotic understand-ing: "If my country needed me, I was ready. Besides, thehighlight of my life had always been—even includingbaseball—flying for the Marines." After a refresher flightcourse, Coleman was assigned to the Death Rattlers ofVMF-323, equipped with F4U-4 and AU-i Corsairs.

Younger than Williams, whom he never encounteredoverseas, the second baseman had one or two close calls

in Korea. He narrowly averted a collision with an AirForce F-86, which had been cleared from the oppositeend of the same runway for a landing. Later, he experi-enced an engine failure while carrying a full bomb load.With no place to go, he continued his forward directionto a crash landing. Miraculously, the bombs did not det-onate, but his Corsair flipped over, and the force jerkedthe straps of Coleman's flight helmet so tight that henearly choked to death. Fortunately, a quick-thinkingNavy corpsman reached him in time.

Coleman flew 63 missions from January to May 1953,adding another Distinguished Flying Cross and seven AirMedals to his World War II tally. With 120 total combatmissions in two wars, he served out the remainder of hisKorea tour as a forward air controller.

When the armistice was signed in July 1953, he got acall from the Yankees home office, asking if he could getan early release to hurry home for the rest of the season.At first the Marine Corps balked at expediting the cap-tain's trip home. But when the Commandant intervened,it was amazing how quickly Coleman found himself ona Flying Tigers transport leaving Iwakuni bound forCalifornia.

Coleman had to settle for rejoining his team for the1954 season, but he felt he never regained his game afterreturning from Korea. Retiring in 1959, he became amanager in the front office, indulged in several commer-cial ventures, and finally began announcing for theexpansion team San Diego Padres in 1971, where he canstill be found today.

The press occasionally quipped that the military wastrying to form its own baseball club in Korea. However,the players never touched a bat or ball in theirsquadrons. In the privacy of the examination room, Dr.Robert "Bobby" Brown did try to show an injured soldierhow to better his slide technique—all in the interests ofmorale.

According to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy forAir at the time, John F. Floberg, every third airplane thatflew on a combat mission in Korea was flown by a Navyor Marine reservist. Of the total combat sorties conduct-ed by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Air Reservesflew 48 percent.

dence and logic would haveswitched the preponderance ofeffort the other way, particularlywhere casualties were being takenwhich close air support missionsmight have helped reduce.

Other than in this doctrinal area,interdiction missions targeted sup-ply dumps, troop concentrations,and vehicle convoys, as in the ear-lier days of the war. Day roadreconnaissance missions became

as the monthsthe Communists

became very adept at the use ofvehicle camouflage as they parkedoff the routes waiting nightfall.Flak became increasingly intensealso and was invariably in placeand active wherever a road or railcut looked to the target analysts asif it might create a choke pointleading to a supply break. The fact,however, that nothing moved

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except at night generally stated theeffectiveness of day interdiction.But it was impossible to isolate thebattlefield if the tactical air wasonly effective half of each day.

VMF(N)-513 carried the load forthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing withrespect to night road reconnais-sance, or "road recces" as theywere known, using both F7F-3Nsand F4U-5Ns. Usually, they wereassigned a specific section of road

less productiverolled by, and