CORSAIRS TO PANTHERS, U.S. Marine Aviation in · PDF fileAt Okinawa he commanded Marine Aircraft Group 14, ... Night Fighters Over Korea ... CORSAIRS TO PANTHERS

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series

CORSAIRS TOPANTHERS

U.S. Marine Aviation in Koreaby Major General John P. Condon

U.S. Marine Corps, RetiredSupplemented by

Commander Peter B. MerskyU.S. Navy Reserve, Retired

About the Authors

The main text of this pamphlet is derivedfrom Major General John P. Condon’s

original draft of a history of Marine Corps avi-ation, an edited version of which appeared asU.S. Marine Corps Aviation, the fifth pam-phlet of the series commemorating 75 yearsof Naval Aviation, published by the DeputyChief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) andCommander, Naval Air Systems Command in1987.

Major General John Pomery Condon,Naval Academy Class of 1934, earned hiswings as a naval aviator in 1937. On activeduty from May 1934 to October 1962, he heldcommand positions at the squadron, group,and wing levels. During World War II, heserved with the Fighter Command at Guadalcanal and in the Northern Solomonsand subsequently played a key role in training Marine Corps pilots for carrieroperations. At Okinawa he commanded Marine Aircraft Group 14, and in Korea,Marine Aircraft Groups 33 and 12, the first group to fly jet aircraft in combat andthe last to fly the Corsair against the enemy. As a general officer, he served withthe U.S. European Command and commanded both the 1st and 3d MarineAircraft Wings.

General Condon earned a Ph.D. at the University of California at Irvine andalso studied at the U.S. Air Force’s Air War College. He is the author of numer-ous essays and several works on Marine Corps aviation, the last, Corsairs andFlattops: Marine Carrier Air Warfare, 1944-1945, was published posthumouslyin 1998.

Commander Peter B. Mersky, USNR (Ret), provided supplemental materials.A graduate of the Rhode Island School of Design with a baccalaureate degreein illustration, Mersky was commissioned through the Navy’s Aviation OfficerCandidate School in 1968. Following active duty, he remained in the NavalReserve and served two tours as an air intelligence officer with LightPhotographic Squadron 306.

Before retiring from federal civil service, he was editor of Approach, theNavy’s aviation safety magazine, published by the Naval Safety Center inNorfolk, Virginia. Commander Mersky has written several books on Navy andMarine Corps aviation, including U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, 1912-Present (3dEdition, 1997). He also authored two publications for the History and MuseumsDivision: A History of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321 and Time of the Aces:Marine Pilots in the Solomons, 1942-1944, a pamphlet in the World War IICommemorative Series.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines inthe Korean War era, is published for the education and training ofMarines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S.Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department ofDefense observance of the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costshave been defrayed in part by contributions from members of the MarineCorps Heritage Foundation.

To plan and coordinate the Korean War commemorative events andactivities of the Sea Services, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guardhave formed the Sea Services Korean War Commemoration Committee,chaired by the Director, Navy Staff. For more information about the SeaServices’ commemorative effort, please contact the Navy-Marine CorpsKorean War Commemoration Coordinator at (202) 433-4223/3085, FAX433-7265 (DSN288-XXXX),E-Mail: [email protected],Website: www.history.usmc.mil.

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR,


Charles R. Smith

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Visual Information Specialist

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center1254 Charles Morris Street SE

Washington Navy Yard DC 20374-50402002

PCN 190 00319 800

SourcesThe five volume official Marine Corps

history of the Korean War provides the cen-terline for this account of Marine aviation inKorea: Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A.Canzona, USMC, U.S. Marine Operations inKorea, 1950-1953: The Pusan Perimeter(Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3Division, HQMC, 1954); Lynn Montross andCapt Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC, U.S.Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953:The Inchon-Seoul Operation (Washington,D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division,HQMC, 1955); Lynn Montross and CaptNicholas A. Canzona, USMC, U.S. MarineOperations in Korea, 1950-1953: TheChosin Reservoir Campaign (Washington,D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division,HQMC, 1957); Lynn Montross, Maj HubardD. Kuokka, USMC, and Maj Norman W.Hicks, USMC, U.S. Marine Operations inKorea, 1950-1953: The East-Central Front(Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3Division, HQMC, 1962); and LtCol Pat Meid,USMCR and Maj James M. Yingling, USMC,

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953: Operations in West Korea(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division,HQMC, 1972).

Other official accounts of use were RoyE. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North tothe Yalu (Washington, D.C.: Office of theChief of Military History, Department of theArmy, 1961), and Ernest H. Giusti andKenneth W. Condit, “Marine Air OverInchon-Seoul,” Marine Corps Gazette, June1952; Ernest H. Giusti and Kenneth W.Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,”Marine Corps Gazette, July 1952; and ErnestH. Giusti and Kenneth W. Condit, “MarineAir Covers the Breakout,” Marine CorpsGazette, August 1952.

Among useful secondary sources wereBGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret), TheUnited States Marines (Annapolis, MD:Naval Institute, 1999); Andrew Greer, TheNew Breed: The Story of the U.S. Marines inKorea (New York: Harper Brothers, 1952);Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War inKorea (Baltimore, MD: Nautical & AviationPublishing Co., 1986); G. G. O’Rourke with

E. T. Wooldridge, Night Fighters Over Korea(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 1998); andRobert F. Dorr, Jon Lake, and WarrenThompson, Korean War Aces (London:Osprey, 1995).

Sources of great use were the oral histo-ries, diaries, and memoirs of many of theparticipants. The most important of thesewere those of LtGen Robert P. Keller, LtColJohn Perrin, LtCol John E. Barnett, LtColEmmons S. Maloney, Col Edward S. John,LtCol William T. Witt, Jr., SgtMaj Floyd P.Stocks, LtGen Leslie E. Brown, MSgt JamesR. Todd, and MSgt Lowell T. Truex.

As is the tradition, members of theMarine Corps Historical Center’s staff, espe-cially Fred H. Allison, were fully supportivein the production of this pamphlet as wereothers: William T. Y’Blood and Sheldon A.Goldberg of the U.S. Air Force HistorySupport Office; Hill Goodspeed of the EmilBuehler Naval Aviation Library, NationalMuseum of Naval Aviation; and WarrenThompson, Joseph S. Rychetnik, Steven P.Albright, Steven D. Oltmann, NicholasWilliams, and James Winchester.

he first major sur-prise of the postWorld War II yearscame into play whenin late June 1950, the

United States found itself respond-ing in crisis fashion to the NorthKorean invasion of the new repub-lic of South Korea, just four yearsand nine months after VJ-Day. Thenation became involved in Korea asa result of the Cairo and Yalta con-ferences in which the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union agreedto the concept of a free and inde-pendent post-war Korea. Includedin the agreement was a joint occu-pation of the country by the twopowers, with the Soviets north ofthe 38th Parallel and the UnitedStates south. The concept of theoccupation had a general objectiveof settling down Korea for a periodso that it could learn to governitself as a nation after manydecades of Japanese rule. As theUnited States was painfully learning,however, it soon became apparentthat what the Soviets said was onething and what they intended wasquite another with respect to a

free, independent, and democraticKorea. When in 1948, they refusedto participate in elections, super-vised by the United Nations toform the first National Assembly,the hopes for a united Korea died.The Soviets formed a separateCommunist state in their sector,the People’s Democratic Republic ofKorea. With the elections complet-ed for the National Assembly inthe south, the Republic of Korea(ROK) was established and theUnited States trusteeship in thecountry came to an end.

On 25 June 1950, the NorthKoreans attacked with nine well-equipped infantry divisions, spear-headed by one armored divisionequipped with Soviet-built T-34tanks. The Republic of Korea’sarmy had been in existence forjust about a year and could onlyoppose the invasion with fourlightly equipped divisions and oneadditional regiment. Needless tosay, although there were somespirited but isolated small unitdefensive actions, the Republic’sforces were no match for theinvaders. The North Koreansreached out with rapidly advancingarmored columns, moving almost atwill during the first four days.Seoul fell on 28 June, and at thattime, the ROK army had 34,000troops missing, although many ofthem later returned to their units.With the capture of Seoul, theinvaders halted to regroup andthose ROK forces, which were stillintact, fell back through Suwon to

set up some form of new defensivepositions. The South Korean gov-ernment had displaced to Taejonwell to the south when the fall ofSeoul became imminent. This stateof near collapse was the basic sit-uation faced by the United Statesand the United Nations in theopening week of the war. It was the

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CORSAIRS TO PANTHERSU.S. Marine Aviation in Korea

by Major General John P. Condon, USMC (Ret)Supplemented by

Commander Peter B. Mersky, USNR (Ret)

ON THE COVER: After strafing enemytroops positions, a Vought F4U Corsairpilot hunts out a suitable target for hisremaining napalm bomb. Depart-ment of Defense Photo (USMC)A133540AT LEFT: A Grumman F9F Panther jetis directed into take off position for araid against enemy positions in NorthKorea. Department of Defense Photo(USMC) A43151

A graduate of the open cockpit andsilk scarf era of Marine Corps avia-tion, BGen Thomas J. Cushman sawservice in Nicaragua, Haiti, and theCentral Pacific before being namedAssistant Wing Commander, 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, in June 1950.He commanded the wing’s forwardechelon, which provided air supportfor the 1st Provisional Marine Brigadeat Pusan, and later served asCommanding General, Tactical AirGroup (X Corps) during Inchon andthe advance on Seoul.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2108

first time that a Soviet-supportedstate was permitted to go as far asopen warfare in their post-WorldWar II depredations, and it consti-tuted a definite showdownbetween the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

The United States responded tothe invasion of South Korea bothindependently, and through strongsupport and leadership in a United

Nations resolution condemningthe breaking of world peace bythe North Koreans. PresidentHarry S. Truman gave General ofthe Army Douglas MacArthur,Commander in Chief, Far East, thego-ahead to send Army units intoKorea from Japan and to takeother actions in support of theshocked and shattered ROKforces. It is important to note that of

the 56 respondents to the UnitedNations resolution, only threewere opposed: the Soviet Union,Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

The United Nations participat-ing pledges were substantial andincluded aircraft, naval vessels,medical supplies, field ambu-lances, foodstuffs, and strategicmaterials. In addition to the Armyforces authorized by PresidentTruman, a naval blockade of theentire Korean coast was ordered,and U.S. Air Force units based inJapan were authorized to bombspecific targets in North Korea. It isalso important to note that thesecritical actions met with thewholehearted approval of theAmerican people. Americans alsoapplauded the strong stance of theUnited Nations, and they repeat-edly expressed their thoroughgoingpride in the responses of theirnation to the seriously deterioratinginternational situation.

Marine Brigade

In response to urgent requests forAmerican reinforcements from theFar East Command, and as a resultof unit offerings and proposalsfrom the United States, the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade wasactivated on 7 July 1950. It was anair-ground team built around the5th Marine Regiment and MarineAircraft Group 33 (MAG-33), bothbased on the west coast at CampPendleton and Marine Corps AirStation, El Toro, respectively.Brigadier General Edward A.Craig, with Brigadier GeneralThomas J. Cushman, a renownedand experienced Marine aviator,assigned as his deputy comman-der, commanded the brigade.

The time and space factors inthe activation and deployment ofthe brigade were, to say the least,something extraordinary. Acti-vated on 7 July, the unit was given

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at the same time a sailing date fiveto seven days later. In lookingback at this first of the post-WorldWar II surprises, it is again impor-tant to fully understand what theradical demobilization steps hadaccomplished. It is impossible tolist them all in this short account,but it will suffice to point out thatrifle companies were at two pla-toons instead of three, infantrybattalions at two rifle companies

instead of three, and deep cuts innormal logistic back-ups of alltypes of “ready” supplies of every-thing from ammunition to fieldrations were common. It also mustbe emphasized that normally, afterthe cutbacks and reductions fol-lowing World War II, the division-wing teams on both coasts wouldhave been very hard-pressed todeploy one reinforced brigade ofregiment-group-sized in 30 days,

let alone the seven days granted inthis case. A super performance issimply a classic understatement forthe mount-out of the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade toKorea.

In late June 1950, MarineFighter Squadron 214 was the onlyCorsair squadron operating fromEl Toro. Marine Fighter Squadron323 was in the process of returningto the air station following several

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Forward Echelon, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (July–September 1950)

Marine Aircraft Group 33Headquarters Squadron 33Service Squadron 33Marine Fighter Squadron 214

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Fighter Squadron 323

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Night Fighter Squadron 513

(Grumman F7F Tigercat, Douglas F3D Skyknight)

Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2

1st Marine Aircraft Wing (September 1950 – July 1953)

Headquarters Squadron 1Marine Wing Service Squadron 1Marine Wing Service Group 17

Headquarters Squadron 17Marine Air Base Squadron 17Marine Aircraft Repair Squadron 17

Marine Aircraft Group 12Headquarters Squadron 12

(Vought F4U Corsair, General Motors TBM Avenger)

Service Squadron 12Marine Air Base Squadron 12Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 12

Marine Aircraft Group 33Headquarters Squadron 33

(Vought F4U Corsair, General Motors TBM Avenger)

Service Squadron 33Marine Air Base Squadron 33Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 33

Marine Fighter Squadron 115(Grumman F9F Panther)

Marine Attack Squadron 121(Douglas AD Skyraider)

Marine Fighter Squadron 212 (Redesignated Marine Attack Squadron 212 on 10 June 1952)

(Vought F4U Corsair, Vought AU-1 Corsair)Marine Fighter Squadron 214

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Fighter Squadron 311

(Grumman F9F Panther)Marine Fighter Squadron 312 (Redesignated Marine Attack Squadron 312 on 1 March 1952)

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (Redesignated Marine Attack Squadron 323 on 30 June 1952)

(Vought F4U Corsair, Vought AU-1 Corsair)Marine Attack Squadron 332

(Vought F4U Corsair)Marine Attack Squadron 251

(Douglas AD Skyraider)Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513

(Vought F4U Corsair, Grumman F7F Tigercat, Douglas F3D Skyknight)

Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 542(Grumman F7F Tigercat, Douglas F3D Skyknight)

Marine Transport Squadron 152(Douglas R4D Skytrain)

Marine Ground Control Squadron 1Marine Air Control Group 2Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3Marine Photographic Squadron 1

(McDonnell F2H-P Banshee)Marine Composite Squadron 1

(Douglas AD Skyraider)Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161

(Sikorsky HRS-1 Helicopter)Marine Observation Squadron 6

(Consolidated OY Sentinel, Sikorsky H03S Helicopter, Bell HTL Helicopter)

1st 90mm Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion

Marine Corps Air Units and Primary Aircraft

4

months of training at CampPendleton and on board theEssex-class carrier Philippine Sea(CV 47) off the California coast.Following its return, the aircraftand men of the squadron quicklyprepared to deploy. The BlackSheep of Marine Fighter Squadron214 likewise were in a high state ofreadiness, but had been “out ofpocket” when the war broke out.The squadron was enroute toHawaii on board the escort carrierBadoeng Strait (CVE 116), havingbeen awarded the privilege ofhosting the annual Naval Academymidshipman’s cruise, when itreceived word of the NorthKorean invasion of South Korea.It was not long before thesquadron’s commanding officer,Major Robert P. Keller, was sum-moned to Headquarters FleetMarine Force, Pacific, at CampSmith. After flying off the carrier,Keller met with Colonel Victor H.Krulak, Lieutenant General LemuelC. Shepherd, Jr.’s chief of staff.With a tone of dead seriousness

only Krulak could project, heasked Keller: “Major, are you readyto go to war?” Keller, reflecting onthe training and experience level ofthe squadron, assured him that theBlack Sheep were ready. With notime to enjoy Hawaii, the midship-men were offloaded and the carri-er made a beeline back toCalifornia in anticipation of mobi-lization orders.

As can be readily imagined,Camp Pendleton and El Toro weretwin scenes of mad confusion asMarines arrived hourly by train,bus, and plane, and “demoth-balled” equipment of all typesarrived for marking and packing,literally at a rate measured in tonsper hour. “Sleep on the boat” wasthe order of the day as the date ofembarkation at San Diego andLong Beach for the first elements,12 July, rapidly drew closer. By 14July, all units were on boardassigned shipping and underwaywestward.

At departure, the total strength ofthe brigade was 6,534. MAG-33totaled 192 officers and 1,358enlisted men, composed principal-ly of the two fighter squadrons,VMF-214 and VMF-323, a nightfighter squadron, VMF(N)-513, andan observation squadron, VMO-6.An important and historic compo-nent of VMO-6 was a detachment offour HO3S-1 Sikorsky helicopters,hurriedly assigned and moved to ElToro from the helicopter develop-ment squadron at Quantico, HMX-1. This was the first time that theUnited States Armed Services hadactually deployed helicopters in aunit mounting out for combat ser-vice overseas, although a few had


Marines of the wing’s forward echelon receive their inoculations in early July atMarine Corps Air Station, El Toro, before leaving for Korea on board the escortcarrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) and transport General A. E. Anderson (AP 111).

The Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) was the carrier home from which the “DeathRattlers” of Marine Fighter Squadron 323 launched their initial Korean combatmissions in August 1950.

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

been tried out in both theEuropean and Pacific theaters atthe end of World War II on anexperimental basis. Aircraftstrength at deployment added up to60 Vought F4U Corsairs, eightConsolidated OY “Sentinels,” andthe four Sikorsky HO3S-1s.

By 16 July, the brigade com-mander and a key advance partytook off by air for conferences andbriefings at Honolulu and at theFar East Command in Tokyo. Asthese meetings progressed and thepossibilities of immediate commit-ment on arrival of the main bodycame clearly into focus, an originalplan to hold the brigade in Japantemporarily was abandoned. Thiswas a result of the deterioratingposition of the United NationsCommand in Korea, which by thefourth week of the war had drawninto a perimeter-type defense ofthe port of Pusan at the southern tip

of the peninsula. On 2 August, thebrigade debarked at Pusan and on3 August at 0600, departed Pusanfor the front by rail and 50 bor-rowed Army trucks. MAG-33 ship-ping had been directed to Kobewhen the force reached far east-ern waters, and debarkation beganthere on 31 July. The fightersquadrons were flown off theBadoeng Strait to Itami nearOsaka, where they were checkedfor combat by the ground crewsand hastily transported overlandfrom Kobe. With just one refresherhop at Itami, VMF-214, now com-manded by Lieutenant ColonelWalter E. Lischeid, landed onboard the escort carrier Sicily (CVE118) for operations on 3 August,and on 5 August, Major Arnold A.Lund’s VMF-323 returned to theBadoeng Strait for the same pur-pose. VMF(N)-513, under the com-mand of Major Joseph H.

Reinburg, was assigned to the FifthAir Force for control and beganshore-based operations fromItazuke Airfield on the southernisland of Kyushu. Its mission was toprovide night “heckler” operationsover the brigade and the Koreancombat area generally, while thetwo carrier-based units would pro-vide close air support. To furnishthe essential communications andtactical links for close air supportand general direct support to thebrigade, on arrival at Kobe a tanklanding ship was waiting to reem-bark Marine Tactical Air ControlSquadron 2 (MTACS-2), led byMajor Christian C. Lee, and theground echelon of VMO-6, com-manded by Major Vincent J.Gottschalk, for transport to Pusan.The aircraft of VMO-6 were readiedat Kobe and Itami and ferried toPusan by air. Thus the air-groundintegrity of the brigade was held

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An F4U Corsair of Marine Fighter Squadron 214 launchesfrom the escort carrier Sicily (CVE 118). In its secondmajor war in five years, as the workhorse of Marine Corps avi-

ation, the “U-Bird” was still considered a first-rate close airsupport aircraft.

Courtesy of Cdr Peter B. Mersky, USNR (Ret)

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intact as it entered its first combatless than 30 days after activation, atruly remarkable achievement.

Pusan Perimeter Air Support

At the time of the commitment toaction of the brigade in earlyAugust 1950, the United Nationsdefense had contracted to aperimeter around the southern-most port of Pusan. It was vitalthat the perimeter contract nomore, since the port was the logis-tic link to a viable base position insupport of a United Nations recov-ery on the peninsula. In bringingthis desirable outcome to reality,the brigade became known vari-ously as the “Fire Brigade,” the“Marine Minutemen,” and otherinto the breach sobriquets. In theprocess of their month-in-the-perimeter employment, theMarines were accorded the honorof restoring the confidence ofUnited Nations troops throughdestruction of the myth that theNorth Koreans were somehow

invincible. Marine aviation carriedits portion of the brigade load inthis restoration of pride andstature, once again relying on itsability to operate afloat as well asashore. Like the deployments on

board the fast carriers in WorldWar II, the basing of VMFs -214and -323 on board the escort carri-ers Sicily and Badoeng Strait onceagain showed the lasting wisdom ofthe long-standing commonalitypolicies between naval and Marineaviation.

From Sicily, in the form of eightCorsairs, came the first Marineoffensive action of the war. Led byMajor Robert P. Keller, thesquadron’s executive officer, theeight VMF-214 Corsairs took off at1630 on 3 August in a strikeagainst Chinju and theCommunist-held village of Sinban-ni. Using incendiary bombs, rock-ets, and numerous strafing runs itwas a more than suitable andimpressive greeting for the previ-ously almost unopposed NorthKorean troops. On the followingday, 21 additional sorties wereflown to help relieve the pressureon the Eighth Army southernflank. These struck at bridges, rail-roads, and troop concentrations inthe Chinju and Sachon areas. With-214 continuing the march from

On the afternoon of 3 August, the “Black Sheep” of VMF-214 made their first airstrikes against North Korean positions from Chinju to Sachon. Earlier in the daythe squadron’s 24 planes landed on board the Sicily, then cruising in theTsushima Straits, following two days of field carrier landing practice and ashort flight from Itami Air Force Base, Japan.

Sicily Highlights from 1946 to 1951

Sicily Highlights from 1946 to 1951

The commanding officer of VMF-214, LtCol Walter E. Lischeid, center, and theSicily’s captain, Capt John S. “Jimmy” Thach, seated right, listen intently asreturning pilots report on the results of their mission.

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the deck of the Sicily, VMF-323joined the fray from BadoengStrait on 6 August with strikes westof Chinju along the Nam River, hit-ting large buildings and railroadlines with rockets and 500-poundbombs. Because the carriers were soclose to the frontlines of theperimeter, the strikes could reachtheir targets in a matter of minutesat almost any point where supportwas requested. That the NorthKoreans realized something newhad been added was apparentwhen on 11 August, -323 teamed upwith North American F-51Mustangs of the U.S. Air Force nearKosong in what became known asthe “Kosong Turkey Shoot.” In thisaction, the Corsairs hit a convoy ofmore than 100 vehicles of a NorthKorean motorized regiment, amixed bag of jeeps, motorcycles,and troop-carrying trucks, stop-ping the convoy at both ends on theroad. They got every one with thehelp of the F-51s. While hitting thejackpot in this manner was not an

every-day occurrence, the dailysorties from the two carriers soconveniently nearby, began toclimb in both number and effec-tiveness all along the length of theentire perimeter. MAG-33 aircraftwere constantly orbiting on stationover the frontline as the groundforces advanced, and communica-tions within the air-ground teamwas steady from the Tactical AirControl Parties (TACP) with thebattalions, all the way back to thebrigade headquarters. The air sup-port system, controlled by theactive presence of Marine TacticalAir Control Squadron 2 and VMO-6 at brigade headquarters from 6August on, worked to the won-drous amazement of the associatedU.S. Army and other UnitedNations units.

The Fifth Air Force exercisedoverall control of tactical air oper-ations in Korea, but Marine avia-tion units, as components of anintegrated Fleet Marine Force,operated in support of the brigade

as their highest priority, and insupport of other United Nationsunits as a lower priority. Thebrigade control organization con-sisted of three battalion Tactical AirControl Parties and one regimentalTACP, each consisting of one avia-tion officer, an experienced andfully qualified pilot, and six enlist-ed technicians. Each party wasequipped with a radio jeep,portable radios, and remotingcommunications gear. In addition,there were the facilities and per-sonnel of MTACS-2 at brigadeheadquarters, as well as thebrigade air section of the staff, oneofficer and one enlisted. The airsection was responsible for airplanning, tactical control, andcoordination of supporting aircraft.Lastly, but certainly of no lesserimportance, there was also thebrigade observation section con-sisting of the tactical air observer,three gunnery observers, and thelight observation and rotary-wingaircraft of VMO-6. When supportingother United Nations forces,Marine air units operated underthe Air Force-Army system for tac-tical air control.

The foregoing gives an abbrevi-ated description of the brigade airsupport system, which operatedvery effectively through some ofthe most rugged fighting of theKorean War. The operations in thePusan Perimeter basically weredivided during the six-week periodinto three major actions. The firstwas the counterattack in theextreme southwest which ranapproximately from 3 to 15August, and was known as theSachon offensive; the second wasthe First Naktong counteroffensive,from 16 to 19 August; and the thirdwas the Second Naktong from 3 to5 September. All three, rugged asthey were, resulted in thoroughdefeats for the Communist forcesbut were not without cost to the


Against a backdrop of rugged Korean terrain, an OY Sentinel light observationaircraft of Marine Observation Squadron 6, piloted by the squadron’s com-manding officer Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk, spots concentrations of NorthKoreans for Marine Corsairs to sear with napalm.

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brigade: 170 killed, 2 missing, and730 wounded. Estimates showedthat the brigade had inflictedalmost 10,000 casualties in killedand wounded on the enemy unitsfaced in the six weeks of its partic-ipation in the perimeter operation.

Throughout these three vitalactions the morale and confidenceof the United Nations forces facingthe North Koreans was restored.Marine air units of the brigade car-ried their part of the rebuildingprocess on a daily, and nightly,basis. In addition, Major Vincent J.Gottschalk’s VMO-6 established somany “firsts” with its helicoptersduring the period that it was obvi-ous that a major tactical innovationwas in the making. The new steedthat Brigadier General Craig, hischief of staff, Colonel Edward W.Snedeker, and G-3, LieutenantColonel Joseph L. Stewart, had dis-covered clearly indicated that thehelicopter was fully capable of

working a revolution in commandobservation, inspection, and staffprocedures.

Most importantly, it was apparentfrom action in the Pusan Perimeterthat the Marine Corps air-groundteam concept was a winner. Thetight knit integration of close airsupport into the ground scheme ofmaneuver proved to be devastat-ingly effective. From 3 August to14 September 1950, the twosquadrons of MAG-33 on board thecarriers (VMFs -214 and -323) andthe shore-based night fighters ofVMF(N)-513, flew 1,511 sorties, ofwhich 995 were close air supportmissions in response to requestsfrom engaged ground troops.

The strikes by Marine aircraftnot only decimated the enemy’sforces, but they rekindled the bondbetween air and ground that char-acterizes the Marine air-groundteam. Ground Marines gainedcourage from seeing their fellow

Marines in Corsairs swoop in todeliver ordnance oftentimes within100 yards of the frontlines. Thepilots became part of the fight onthe ground and as a result gained asense of pride and accomplish-ment in helping ground troopsaccomplish their mission. CaptainJohn E. Barnett, one of the Corsairpilots summed up how aviators feltabout their relationship withground Marines: “With consum-mate conceit we doubted not thatMarines were the best pilots sup-porting the best infantry, employingthe best tactics; a brotherhoodnon-parallel. Pilots were in awe ofthe infantry, lavish praise fromwhom (regarding close air sup-port) fed our ego.”

To sum up the air componentperformance in the perimeter, thewords of General Craig said it all:“The best close air support in thehistory of the Marine Corps. . . out-standing in its effectiveness.” Andfrom the envious viewpoint of anadjacent Army infantry regiment:

The Marines on our leftwere a sight to behold. Notonly was their equipmentsuperior or equal to ours, butthey had squadrons of air indirect support. They used itlike artillery. It was ‘Hey,Joe—This is Smitty—Knockthe left off that ridge in front ofItem Company.’ They had itday and night. It came offnearby carriers, and not fromJapan with only 15 minutes offuel to accomplish the mis-sion.

While there was literally no airopposition from the North KoreanAir Force because it had beenwiped out by the initial U.S. AirForce efforts at the beginning ofthe war, such accolades in additionto others were pleasant music toMarine aviation and to the brigade

For the first time in any war helicopters were used on the battlefront as liaisonaircraft and in evacuating the wounded. Although underpowered and hard-pressed to carry more than a pilot, crew chief, and one evacuee, the Sikorsky H03Swas relatively dependable.


as a whole. The performance ofthe brigade was a vital factor instopping the invasion in August.The punishment meted out to theNorth Korean units was so severethat it set them up for the crushingdefeat, which followed inSeptember.

Inchon Landing

The North Korean invasion ofSouth Korea occurred whileLieutenant General Lemuel C.Shepherd, Jr., was enroute toHawaii to take over asCommanding General, FleetMarine Force, Pacific. He cut shorthis trip on 25 June when hereceived word of the NorthKorean action and immediatelyproceeded to San Francisco andthen directly to Hawaii. Followinga rapid succession of conferencesand briefings, he was off to Japanfor meetings with the Far EastCommand. History was truly madein one of these meetings at FarEast Command in which GeneralMacArthur and General Shepherdwere the major participants. In asense, it was a reunion betweenthe two because a few yearsbefore on New Britain, GeneralShepherd had been the assistantdivision commander of the 1stMarine Division when it wasunder the operational control ofGeneral MacArthur. It had longbeen a plan of MacArthur’s thatshould a serious overrun of anypart of his forces occur, he wouldattempt to recoup through the useof appropriate delay followed by anamphibious landing in the enemyrear. This was the primary subjectto be discussed in the 10 Julymeeting.

The upshot of this historic con-ference was that followingGeneral Shepherd’s assurance thatthe 1st Marine Division could bemade available, MacArthur asked

the Joint Chiefs of Staff for it, withappropriate air in the form of the1st Marine Aircraft Wing. As it wasapproved, almost immediately, itwas “less the Brigade units” whichwould revert to the division andwing upon their arrival in the the-ater. General Shepherd knew fullwell that the under-strength divisioncould hardly deploy the reinforced5th Marines to the brigade, letalone field the balance of the divi-sion, but he had an abiding anddeep faith in the loyalty and per-formance potential of the MarineCorps Reserve. The Reserve,ground and air, came through likethe proverbial gang-busters, and inless than 60 days after receivingthe initial orders, both wing anddivision made the landing atInchon on 15 September, just 67days after the 10 July conference inTokyo.

The response of the MarineCorps Reserve was so much a key

to the success not only of Inchon,but also to the firm establishment ofthe United Nations effort in Korea.By about 20 July, the exchangesbetween Far East Command andWashington had settled out thatwhat would be deployed forInchon would be a war-strength1st Marine Division and 1st MarineAircraft Wing. With the strengthsof the two being only at 7,779 and3,733 respectively, there was noway the war-strength manning lev-els could be reached and main-tained without drawing heavily onboth the ground and aviationorganized Reserve contingents.Division war-strength ran about25,000 and the wing about 9,500.On 19 July, President Trumanauthorized the mobilization of theMarine Corps Reserve and thingsbegan to move at a record pace.Minimum time warnings went outto all Reserve District Directors,and alerts were given to CampPendleton, El Toro, Camp Lejeune,and Cherry Point to expect literal-ly thousands of reservists in a mat-ter of days. The first reservistsarrived at Camp Pendleton and ElToro on 31 July, and by utilizingsome units and personnel of the2d Marine Division and 2d MarineAircraft Wing on the east coast, the1st Marine Division and the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing were able torealistically consider their sched-uled mount-out dates of 10-15August. Because a very high per-centage of the reservists werecombat veterans of World War II,only about 10 percent requiredany form of basic indoctrinationand training. This was a key factor,particularly in aviation, since thetotal time required from com-mencement of pilot training tooperational status was a matter ofsome two years. To be called up sosoon after World War II, was thetheme of many a barracks-roomand ready-room ballad that sus-

9


So great was his confidence in theMarine Corps Reserve that LtGenLemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., took personalresponsibility for promising GenDouglas MacArthur that the 1stMarine Division with appropriateMarine air could be sent to Korea by 15September for the landing at Inchon.

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Major General Field Harris

Speaking before a crowded gathering of the WingsClub at the Ambassador Hotel in Washington, D.C.,in May of 1945, Major General Field Harris ended his

address on Marine aviation in the scheme of NationalDefense with the words: “We are not an air force. We area part of an air-ground team. I believe we will ever be anecessary part of our Nation’s air-ground-sea team. Asalways, we will aspire to be a useful and helpful arm ofthe United States Marines.” A little more than five yearslater, Harris’ remarks would ring true. As Major GeneralOliver P. Smith, Commanding General, 1st MarineDivision, wrote to Major General Harris, then com-manding the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea, follow-ing the successful breakout from the Chosin Reservoir:“Never in its history has Marine aviation given moreconvincing proof of its indispensable value to theground Marines. . . . A bond of understanding [betweenbrother Marines on the ground and in the air] has beenestablished that will never be broken.”

Born in 1895 in Versailles, Kentucky, he received hiswings at Pensacola in 1929. But before that he had 12years of seasoning in the Marine Corps that included seaduty on board the Nevada and Wyoming and toursashore with the 3d Provisional Brigade at Guantanamo,Cuba, and at Marine Barracks, Cavite, Philippines, and the Office of the Judge Advocate in Washington.

After obtaining his gold wings, Harris served with asquadron of the West Coast Expeditionary Force in SanDiego, followed by additional flight training and assign-ments at sea and on shore, including Egypt as assistantnaval attaché. During World War II he was sent to theSouth Pacific where he served successively as Chief ofStaff, Aircraft, Guadalcanal; Commander, Aircraft, NorthSolomons; and commander of air for the Green Islandoperation. Following the war, he became Director ofMarine Aviation and in 1948 was given command ofAircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, and a year later,Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and 1st MarineAircraft Wing at El Toro, California.

His Korean War service as Commanding General, 1stMarine Aircraft Wing was rewarded with both theArmy’s and Navy’s Distinguished Service Medal. Harrisreturned to the United States in the summer of the 1951and again became the commanding general of Aircraft,Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. Upon his retirement in 1954he was advanced to the rank of lieutenant general. Hedied in December 1967 at the age of 72.

Major General Christian F. SchiltMajor General Christian F. “Frank” Schilt, Major

General Field Harris’ replacement as CommandingGeneral, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, brought a vastamount of flying experience to his new post in Korea.

Born in Richland County, Illinois, in 1895, Schilt

1st Marine Aircraft Wing Leaders

Major General Field HarrisDepartment of Defense (USMC) A310952

Department of Defense (USMC) A30035Major General Christian F. Schilt

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entered the Marine Corps in June 1917 and served as anenlisted man in the Azores with the 1st MarineAeronautical Company, a seaplane squadron assigned toanti-submarine patrol. In June 1919, on completion offlight training at Marine Flying Field, Miami, Florida, hereceived his wings and was commissioned a Marine sec-ond lieutenant, beginning a near 40-year career inMarine Corps aviation.

His initial assignments were to aviation units in SantoDomingo and Haiti, and in 1927, he was assigned toNicaragua. As a first lieutenant in 1928, he received theMedal of Honor for his bravery and “almost superhumanskill” in flying out wounded Marines from Quilali.Schilt’s career pattern during the interwar years consist-ed of a mix or school and flight assignments.

Prior to the United States entry into World War II,Colonel Schilt was assigned to the American Embassy inLondon as assistant naval attaché for air, and as such, trav-eled extensively in the war zones observing British air tac-tics in North Africa and the Middle East. During the war,he served as the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing’s chief of staffat Guadalcanal, was later commanding officer of MarineAircraft Group 11, and participated in the consolidationof the Southern Solomons and air defense of Peleliu andOkinawa.

In April 1952, on his return from Korea, Schilt becameDeputy Commander, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and thenext year he was given control of aircraft in the Pacificcommand. His last assignment was as Director of

Aviation at Headquarters Marine Corps and upon hisretirement in April 1957, he was advanced to four-star rankbecause of his combat decorations. General Schilt diedin January 1987 at the age of 92.

Major General Clayton C. JeromeLike his predecessor, Major General Clayton C.

Jerome had a distinguished flying career.A native of Hutchinson, Kansas, born in 1901, he was

commissioned a second lieutenant in 1922 upon gradu-ation from the Naval Academy. After a year at MarineBarracks, Washington, D.C., he reported to Pensacola forflight training and received his naval aviator’s wings in1925. Foreign service in China, the Philippines, andGuam followed his first duty assignment at Naval AirStation, Marine Corps Base, San Diego.

In the mid-1930s, Jerome became naval attaché for airin Bogota, Columbia, and several other Latin and CentralAmerican republics. While serving as naval attaché heearned the Distinguished Flying Cross for his daring res-cue of the survivors of a Venezuelan plane crash. Usingan amphibious plane, he repeatedly flew over thetreacherous jungles of Cuyuni in search of the wreck. Afterfinding it he made two hazardous landings on the narrowCuyuni River to rescue four survivors.

During World War II, he took part in the consolidationof the Northern Solomons and the Treasury-Bougainvilleoperation as operations officer and later chief of staff toCommander, Aircraft, Northern Solomons. He was laterCommander, Aircraft and Island Commander, Emirau,before serving with the U.S. Army in the Philippines.During the Luzon campaign, he commanded MangaldenAirfield and Marine aircraft groups at Dagupan, directingMarine air support for the Army ground operations.

Postwar duty included command of Marine Corps AirStation, Quantico; duty as Chief of Staff, Marine CorpsSchools, Quantico; and simultaneous service as Directorof Public Information, Recruiting, and Marine CorpsHistory at Headquarters Marine Corps.

He was serving as Director of Aviation and AssistantCommandant for Air when reassigned as CommandingGeneral, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea in April 1952.

In January 1953, Major General Jerome reported toCherry Point, North Carolina, as Commanding General,2d Marine Aircraft Wing, and Commander, Aircraft, FleetMarine Force, Atlantic. Two years later he moved to ElToro, becoming the air commander for Fleet MarineForce, Pacific. Retiring in 1959 as a lieutenant general, hedied in 1978 at the age of 77.

Major General Vernon E. MegeeA Marine aviator for more than 20 years, Major

General Megee assumed command of the 1st MarineAircraft Wing on 9 January 1953.

Born in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in 1900, he enlisted in theMarine Corps in 1919 after attending Oklahoma A&MCollege. Commissioned in 1922, Megee served in

Major General Clayton C. JeromeMajGen Clayton C. Jerome, USMC

tained both ground and aviationtroops on the lighter side through-out the conflict. The “two-timelosers,” as they referred to them-selves, put a lot of morale-buildinghumor into Korea, but the factor ofoverriding importance was thatthey were well trained, experi-enced, and seasoned, ground andair.

Any discussion of Inchon mustbe considered incomplete if it failsto mention the difficult problemthe site itself presented to theamphibious planners. First, thetidal variation at Inchon is one ofthe greatest ranges of rise and fallon the entire Korean coastline,east or west. Secondly, theapproach channels to the landingsites essential to successful estab-

lishment of a major force ashore,were not only narrow and winding,but also were through extensivemud flats. The combination ofthese two factors alone meant thatmuch of the unloading of heavyequipment would be over mudflats at low tide with the amphibi-ous force ships on the bottom untilthe next tidal change. In order toaccommodate to this problemsomewhat and also meet the D-Day date of 15 September, andmanage to negotiate the very nar-row approach channels, it wasessential to make the approachduring daylight hours on the fallof the tide, thus deriving an assaultH-Hour of late afternoon.

While the complexities ofInchon as a site were much dis-

cussed, with sides taken both atFar East Command and all the wayback to Washington, GeneralMacArthur held firm in his confi-dence in the amphibious expertsof the Navy and Marine Corps. Hebelieved that any other site or datewould not yield the opportunity toquickly cut the North Korean sup-ply lines to their forces in thesouth. MacArthur was right, andInchon has achieved its place inhistory as the most audacious, dar-ing, difficult, risky—and success-ful—amphibious landing, perhapsof all time.

Air Support Plan

Major General Field Harris,commanding general of the 1st

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infantry, artillery, and expeditionary billets beforeundergoing pilot training in 1931. A year before, whilequartermaster with the Aircraft Squadrons, 2d MarineBrigade, in Nicaragua, he earned the Navy and Marine

Corps Medal for commendatory achievement while fly-ing as an observer and machine gunner in an attack ona large force of Sandinista rebels.

Receiving his naval aviator’s wings in 1932, Megeespent the pre-war decade as a flight instructor atQuantico; student at the Air Corps Tactical School,Maxwell Field, Alabama; and commander of a Marinefighter squadron. In 1940, Major Megee was assigned tothe U.S. Naval Aviation Mission to Peru and spent the nextthree years as a special advisor to that government’sMinister of Aviation.

During World War II, he was the first commander ofan Air Support Control Unit, which was created specifi-cally to provide close air support for ground troops. Incombat operations at Iwo Jima, Megee was said to havetold his pilots to “go in and scrape your bellies on thebeach” in support of Marines on the ground. Later, atOkinawa, he commanded all Marine Corps LandingForce Air Support Control Units.

After promotion to brigadier general in 1949, Megeewas named Chief of Staff, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, andafter receiving his second star in 1951, he served asCommanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, prior to his assignment in 1953 to command the1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea.

In 1956 he became the first Marine aviator to serve asAssistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief ofStaff. After having served as Commanding General, FleetMarine Force, Pacific, he retired in 1959. In retirement,General Megee earned a master’s degree from theUniversity of Texas, Austin, and served as superintendentof the Marine Military Academy in Harlingen. He died in1992 at the age of 91.

1st MAW Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr53

Major General Vernon E. Megee

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Marine Aircraft Wing, arrived inTokyo on 3 September, and imme-diately began to finalize the airsupport plans for the Inchon oper-ation with Far East Command, theNavy, the Air Force, and the Army.Underlying the air plan was thedecision that the sky over theobjective area was to be dividedbetween the air units of the Navy’sJoint Task Force 7, and those of XCorps. X Corps had been assignedits own organic air under corpscontrol in a manner reminiscent ofthe Tactical Air Force organizationaccorded X Army in the Okinawaoperation. The command of XCorps tactical air was given toGeneral Cushman who had beenthe brigade deputy commander toGeneral Craig in the PusanPerimeter. MAG-33, under ColonelFrank G. Dailey, was designatedby the wing as Tactical AirCommand X Corps, with principalunits being VMFs -212 and -312, inaddition to VMF(N)-542 and

VMF(N)-513. Joint Task Force 7counted on its fast carrier taskforce, Task Force 77, to gain airsuperiority in the area, as well as tofurnish deep support and interdic-tion strikes. Close support for thelanding was assigned to the taskgroup including the two small car-riers, Sicily and Badoeng Strait,still operating VMFs-214 and-323,which had supported the brigade sowell in the Pusan Perimeter.

The lst Marine Aircraft Wingdesignated MTACS-2, which hadcontrolled air support for thebrigade, to function in that capac-ity for the landing, and upon theestablishment of X Corps ashore, tothen continue to control forTactical Air Command, X Corps.

Assault Phase Air Support

A primary and crucial objectivein the Inchon landing was Wolmi-do Island, very close in to themain landing beaches of Inchon.Preparation of Wolmi-do began on10 September with attacks byVMFs -214 and -323 with bombs,rockets, and napalm. The islandwas only about 1,000 yards wideand about the same dimension onthe north-south axis, except that along causeway extending to thesouth added another 1,000 yardsto the length of the island. At theend of the causeway, a small cir-cular islet with a lighthousemarked the entrance to the harbor.The main part of the island wasdominated by a centrally situatedpiece of high ground known asRadio Hill. The Corsairs literallyblackened the entire island withnapalm to the extent that duringthe second day of attacks, thewhole island appeared to beablaze.

When the air strikes began, FirstLieutenant John S. Perrin, a pilotwith VMF-214, recalled that sever-al North Korean military vehicles

were flushed out. Evidently theenemy drivers believed that amoving target would be harder tohit. Perrin said that they got theirCorsairs as low and slow as theycould and literally chased thevehicles up and down streets andaround corners in the island’ssmall industrial sector. Eventuallyall the vehicles felt the wrath ofthe blue fighters.

While the two carriers werebusy with replenishment at Saseboon the third day of the pre-landingstrikes, Task Force 77 took overthe preparation effort with exten-sive bombing attacks, augmentedby the Shore Bombardment Groupof four cruisers and six destroyers,the latter closing to within 800yards of the island. In five days ofcontinuous pounding by this com-bined air and naval gunfire,Wolmi-do was one blasted pieceof real estate as the 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, prepared to land atGreen Beach on the morning of 15September. Testifying to the effec-tiveness of the pre-landing prepa-ration, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D.Taplett’s battalion had completedtheir mopping-up operations bynoon and its total casualties for theday were 17 wounded. In return,the battalion could count 136 pris-oners, 108 enemy dead, and frominterrogations of the prisoners, atleast 150 more entombed in cavesand emplacements throughout theisland. During the afternoon of 15September, from observation postsat the north tip of the island and atthe top of Radio Hill, targets werepicked out for special attentionduring the pre-H-Hour bombard-ment preparation for the landings atRed and Blue beaches at 1730.While the afternoon wore on,VMFs -214 and -323, in addition tothree squadrons of Navy ADSkyraiders, alternately blastedInchon, integrating their strikeswith naval gunfire from 1430 right


A Marine aviator since 1930 and aveteran of the Guadalcanal, IwoJima, and Okinawa campaigns duringWorld War II, Col Frank G. Dailey ledthe bomb- and napalm-ladenCorsairs of Marine Aircraft Group 33from the Pusan Perimeter to theChosin Reservoir.

up to H-Hour. In addition, TaskForce 77 kept a continuous strikegroup of another 12 planes overthe objective area to keep anymovement of defensive forcestoward the beaches at an absoluteminimum. With this type andintensity of air and naval gunfirepreparation, in addition to thesupport given the Red and Bluebeach landings from Wolmi-do,plus the strong element of surprisecarried by the Inchon assault, suc-cess of the operation was assured.In view of the very heavy elementof risk involved with the hydro-graphic characteristics of the harborand the many other departuresfrom normal planning patterns for

an amphibious assault of the mag-nitude of Inchon, a completelysuccessful outcome was indeedwelcome.

During the advance out of thebeachhead, which commenced theday following the landing, the airsupport control system functionedprecisely as previously described.On the first day of the advancetoward Seoul, the obviously con-fused North Koreans learned evenmore about close air support and itseffects than they had absorbed inthe Pusan Perimeter a few weeksbefore. While the attack on D+1had barely gotten underway, justfive miles away from the advancing5th and 1st Marines, six North

Korean T-34 tanks were spotted inbroad daylight rumbling along theSeoul-Inchon highway withoutescort of any kind, apparentlyordered out to bust up the landing.An eight plane strike of VMF-214 hitthe enemy armor near the village ofKansong-ni with napalm and rock-ets as 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,applauded from their positionsless than two miles away. TheCorsairs destroyed two of the T-34s and a third was damaged, butthe North Korean crews aban-doned some of the tanks and triedto take shelter in huts near the sideof the road, which were promptlynapalmed by the strike. This threwup large quantities of smoke and

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Marines charge ashore at Inchon on 15 September. After scal-ing the seawall, with the aid of ladders, they fan out rapid-

ly to secure the beachhead as Corsairs of the 1st MarineAircraft Wing blast enemy targets in support of the landing.

Sketch by Cpl Ralph H. Schofield, USMCR

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led the pilots to believe that all sixtanks had been destroyed, so theyswitched to other targets in thebeachhead area.

Destruction of the tanks came ata price. Captain William F.Simpson, Jr., a pilot with VMF-214was killed. Fellow pilot CaptainEmmons S. Maloney recalled thatSimpson “got so involved in it, hit-ting these tanks coming up, that, healmost flew straight into the tank.By the time he realized he was toolow, it was too late to pull out.”

Shortly after, 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, with a tank escort, cameinto Kansong-ni and as they werecoming into the position, surprisedthree of the remaining T-34s,which were promptly destroyedby the escorting M-26 Pershingtanks. The close contacts betweenair and ground, as typified by thisexample, permitted the continu-ous and synergistic employment ofthe capabilities of the air-groundteam during the advance to Seouland beyond.

To briefly summarize all aspectsof the Inchon landing, a quotefrom Rear Admiral James H.Doyle, the veteran amphibiousgroup commander, does the jobnicely:

The assault itself was suc-cessful only through theperfect teamwork that exist-ed between the participat-ing Naval and Marineelements. . . . Only the Unit-ed States Marines throughtheir many years of special-ized training in amphibiouswarfare, in conjunction withthe Navy, had the requisiteknow-how to formulate theplans within the limitedtime available and executethose plans flawlessly with-out additional training orrehearsal.

Kimpo Airfield

One of the key objectives of theassault phase and the advancetoward Seoul was the capture ofKimpo Airfield, the major airinstallation of the city, about sevenmiles west on the other side of theHan River from Seoul. While still inthe relatively confined operatingareas of the assault phase of theoperation, the forces assignedcould meet air support require-

Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC348504

A curious Marine passes three destroyed North Korean T-34 tanks five miles eastof Inchon. The rocket-laden Corsairs of VMF-214 knocked out the tanks, part ofa group of six ordered to break-up the landing.

In a destroyed hanger at Kimpo Airfield, Marines found one of several near-fly-able North Korean Soviet-built aircraft. Captured by 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,Marines engineers quickly made the airfield operational with temporary repairs,ready to receive elements of MAG-33.


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ments. As the objective areaswidened and expanded with theadvance, however, it was essentialto bring in more shore-based avia-tion to meet the demand quicklyand with optimized dispatch on aconstantly broadening front. Thefield was captured and declaredsecure in the mid-morning of 18September. It was in such goodshape after the assault that it waspossible to almost immediatelymove in the first operating units.The first aircraft to land officially atKimpo was an H03S helicopter ofVMO-6, piloted by Captain Victor A.Armstrong, which brought inGeneral Shepherd and his G-3,Colonel Victor H. Krulak, to conferwith General Craig, who had justarrived by jeep. Later in the after-noon, Generals Harris andCushman also arrived to makefinal plans for the deployment ofthe Marine squadrons from Japanand those that would fill out MAGs-33 and -12 for the follow-on oper-ations.

On 19 September, Tactical AirCommand X Corps, GeneralCushman, established his head-quarters at Kimpo, and was quick-ly followed by Marine GroundControl Intercept Squadron 1,MTACS-2, and VMO-6. The firstfighter squadron of MAG-33 tocheck in was Lieutenant ColonelMax J. Volcansek, Jr.’s VMF(N)-542with five Grumman F7F Tigercatslanding late in the afternoon of the19th. They also flew the first com-bat mission from the field early thenext morning when theydestroyed two locomotives nearSeoul. Corsairs of LieutenantColonel Richard W. Wyczawski’sVMF-212 and Lieutenant Colonel J.Frank Cole’s VMF-312 landedshortly after -542 and also got intoaction on the 20th.

During the transition of thesquadrons assigned to MAG-33

Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine Corps Research Center

Tactical Air Commander, X Corps, BGen Thomas J. Cushman, USMC, right, andhis chief of staff, Col Kenneth H. Weir, USMC, meet with the commanding gen-eral of the Fifth Air Force, MajGen Earle R. Partridge, USAF, left, at KimpoAirfield. While the wing headquarters remained in Japan, its task was to furnishadministrative and logistical support to Cushman’s command and MAG-33during the Kimpo air operations.

Returning to the Sicily after making the first landing at Kimpo Airfield, 1stLt JohnV. Haines points out the damaged section on his Corsair which caused theunscheduled landing to his squadron commander, LtCol Walter E. Lischeid.LtCol Lischeid would die six days later when his Corsair was shot down over thewestern suburbs of Seoul.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-420281

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from MAG-12 in Japan, the opera-tional burden of Marine air sup-port was handled entirely by thetwo carrier-based Corsairsquadrons, VMF-214 and VMF-323,now administratively assigned toMAG-12. Also supporting the dis-placement of the division-wingteam into the Korean peninsulawas Major Joseph H. Reinburg’sVMF(N)-513, still operating fromItazuke Air Force Base in Japan.

The flexibility of Marine avia-tion in supporting a forward dis-placement of such magnitude withhardly a break in the continuity ofoperations is well illustrated in therapid establishment of Tactical AirCommand X Corps at Kimpo.Once again, the value of common-ality between Marine and Navalaviation was effectively demon-strated in the coverage, without abreak, of air support requirementsof the 1st Marine Division, utilizingthe two carrier-based squadrons.Regarding the capture of Kimpo,Lieutenant General George E.Stratemeyer, Commander, Far EastAir Forces, had this to say to MajorGeneral Oliver P. Smith, the com-manding general of the 1st MarineDivision: “I want to take thisopportunity of expressing myadmiration and gratification for themanner in which elements of yourDivision recently captured Kimpo

Airfield and so secured it as tomake it available for use by FarEast Air Forces and Marine Corpsaircraft in shortest possible time.”

Control of air support passedfrom the Amphibious ForceCommander to MTACS-2 ashoreon D+2 when the landing forcecommander (Major General OliverP. Smith, Commanding General,1st Marine Division) declared hewas ready to assume control.Requests for close air supportincreased rapidly as the enemyrecovered from the initial shock ofthe assault. For example, on 18-19September, VMFs -323, -214, and-513 flew a total of 50 close supportsorties, delivering napalm, rockets,and 500-pound bombs againsttroop concentrations in front ofthe 1st Marines, who were findingthe going a bit tougher in thevicinity of Sosa on the Inchon-Seoul highway. In addition, -513flew a total of 15 daylight closesupport missions during the period17-19 September for Army unitsalong the Pusan Perimeter, wherethe accompanying breakout to thenorth and west was being initiated.

With Kimpo in hand, the nextmajor objective became the forcedcrossing of the Han River and thetaking of essential key terrain fromwhich to launch the assault onSeoul. MAG-33 and MAG-12 made

their principal contributions tothese major endeavors by steadilyand rapidly increasing theirstrengths and capabilities atKimpo, and through strikes againstredeployment and reinforcingmoves by the North Koreansattempting to improve the defens-es of the city. Logistically, therewas a vehicle shortage for themovement of aviation gasoline,ammunition, and oil from the portdumps at Inchon and Ascom City toKimpo, but a timely offer from theFar East Air Force’s Combat CargoCommand solved the problem.During the week of 18-24September, the Command hauled atotal of 1,545 tons of these vitalaviation supplies in from Japan.Once again the theorem that thefarther from Washington, thegreater the inter-Service cooperationwas proven, just as it was in theSouth Pacific a few years before. Inaddition to this air effort, about1,450 tons were trucked to Kimpofrom the port during the sameperiod. Also, Marine TransportSquadron 152 flew in spare partsand urgently needed groundequipment from Japan or wherev-er it could be made available,practically around-the-clock.

The crossing of the Han wasassigned to the 5th Marines in thevicinity of Haengju, and after an


The Corsairs from VMF-312 take off from Kimpo Airfield asfast as they could be refueled and rearmed in around-the-

clock attacks on retreating North Korean forces.

abortive attempt during the night of19 September; the 3d Battalionaccomplished it during daylighthours on the 20th. Four Corsairs ofVMF-214 provided supporting firesagainst a key hill from which theNorth Koreans were directingaccurate fire at the crossingtracked landing vehicles. As theassault on this hill continued, theCorsairs reported enemy in num-bers hastily evacuating with strafingMarine aircraft in full pursuit. Thethree primary objectives weresecured by mid-morning and theadvance down the north bank ofthe river toward Seoul beganimmediately. The general plan wasfor the 5th Marines to continue theadvance toward Seoul and to seizevantage points in support of the1st Marines crossing atYongdungpo. Yongdungpo, theindustrial area of the city, was sit-uated on the south bank of theHan on a large sandspit. The fight-ing on the north bank and in theattack on Yongdungpo bothserved notice to the division that itwas going to be a “to the last man”

defense of the city. By the 24th,after an extremely severe minute-to-minute three days of intensive bat-tling, night and day, the 1stMarines was able to make thecrossing and the battle for Seoulwas underway.

From the 19th on, both MAGs-12 and -33 flew maximum effortschedules in close support of boththe 1st and the 5th Marines in theirassaults toward the city. Typical ofthe squadron performances duringthis period was a flight of fiveCorsairs led by Lieutenant ColonelWalter Lischeid of VMF-214, whicheffectively broke up a threatenedcounterattack on Hill 105 South,held by the 1st Battalion, 5thMarines. It was one of six closesupport missions flown by -214 onthe 23d in the zone of the 5thMarines. As a counter to the airsupport rendered during the day-light hours, Marine artillery tookover the complete support jobafter dark when the “closest” closesupport possibilities becamesomewhat diminished. When theterrain cooperates, this one-twocounter to enemy counterattacksaround the clock was most effec-tive.

On the 24th, in front ofCompany F, 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, on the east slope of Hill56, VMF-323 dropped 500-pound

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Photo by Frank Noel, Associated Press

Marine amphibious tractors plow across the muddy Han River as the planes ofMarine Aircraft Groups 12 and 33 provide close support for the 1st and 5th Marinesin their assault toward the South Korean capital.

Marines of the Second Platoon, Company G, 5th Marines, clean snipers out of aresidential section of Seoul. Due to the confined nature of much of the fightingwithin the city, Marine close air support was used sparingly and at deeper dis-tances from the advancing troops.


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One area where the Marine Corps was probablyalone among the aviation Services was thedegree it used enlisted pilots, especially in com-

bat. Enlisted pilots were not new. France in World WarI and the Axis powers, Germany, Japan, and Italy, in WorldWar II made considerable use of their enlisted aviators.The Royal Air Force would have been in even worse straitsduring the Battle of Britain in 1940 had it not been for itssergeant-pilots. For the most part, however, the UnitedStates required its pilots to be commissioned officersand, with few exceptions, that is the way it continues tobe.

The Navy had instituted its Naval Aviation Pilot (NAP)designation in 1919 because of a pilot shortage. TheMarines, too, authorized selection of enlisted members tobecome pilots and First Sergeant Benjamin Belcher wasthe first Marine NAP in 1923.

With the country’s hurried and somewhat unexpectedentry into World War II, the need for pilots transcendedthe niceties of rank and tradition. Therefore all theServices, at one time or another during the war, made useof enlisted pilots, sometimes elevating them to commis-sioned rank later. Marine ace Lieutenant ColonelKenneth A. Walsh, who scored 21 kills and earned theMedal of Honor during the war, was an enlisted pilot untilhe was commissioned in 1942.

The Marine Corps probably had the largest number ofnoncommissioned aviators (131 in 1942), and not in sec-ond-line transport squadrons; many of these NAPs laterflew helicopters and jets in very heavy action in Korea.Flying sergeants flew Corsairs and Tigercats at Pusanand Chosin, Panthers in close air support against theChinese, and OYs on dangerous artillery-spotting missions.

Technical Sergeant Robert A. Hill accumulated 76combat missions as an OY pilot, earning the moniker“Bulletproof” after coming home in planes that weremore holes than aircraft. He received a DistinguishedFlying Cross for evacuating wounded Marines nearChosin under heavy enemy fire. Marine NAPs piloted sev-eral of the R4D transports that also evacuated woundedfrom Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri during the Chosin breakout.

But the jet pilots were the glamour boys and NAPswere among the first Marine jet pilots, taking their train-ing in Lockheed TO-1s along with their commissionedsquadron mates. The training met some resistance fromsenior squadron commanders, a few of whom did notwant enlisted pilots flying their new jets. NAPs were notallowed to train in jets until 1949. This provided a cadreof experienced and motivated personnel to draw uponduring the action in Korea.

This somewhat confusing situation had the addedfacet that several now-enlisted NAPs had been commis-sioned lieutenants in World War II. However, after mus-

tering out in 1945 and 1946, many of the former Corsairdrivers regretted their decision to leave the activeMarine Corps; several missed flying such powerful aircraftas the tough F4U. The Corps also found itself short ofqualified aviators to fly its new jets and to man itsremaining squadrons.

A program was developed whereby former Marine offi-cer aviators could return as master sergeants (E-7 was thehighest enlisted rating at the time), if they re-upped 90days or less after leaving active duty. After the 90-day limit,the former aviator could rejoin as a technical sergeant, agrade below that of master sergeant.

When VMF-311 brought its F9F Panthers to Korea,several of its pilots were enlisted aviators. MasterSergeant Avery C. Snow was the first NAP to complete 100combat missions in a jet. Snow had been a captain withMarine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 232 during WorldWar II.

Flying Sergeants: Enlisted Marine Aviators

National Archives Photo (USN) 80G-428028

The flying sergeants of VMF-212 on board the light car-rier Bataan (CVL 29). Standing from left to right are:TSgt Gail Lane, MSgt John J. McMasters, MSgt Clyde B.Casebeer, and seated from left to right, MSgt Billy R.Green, MSgt Donald A. Ives, and MSgt Norman E. Payne,Jr.

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One specialized squadron that made heavy use of itsNAPs was Marine Photographic Squadron 1 (VMJ-1),established on 25 February 1952, flying modifiedMcDonnell F2H-2P Banshees with a long nose toaccommodate several reconnaissance cameras. VMJ-1established an enviable record in Korea. Several of itspilots, who were specially trained volunteers, wereenlisted men who could double as lab technicians if thesituation warranted. Squadron crews flew 5,025 sorties,shooting 793,012 feet of film, one-third of all UnitedNations photo reconnaissance output, and at times, 50 per-cent of all Far East Air Force intelligence missions.However, even with this outstanding record, theBanshee drivers of VMJ-1 could not respond to allrequests, and as such, overall reconnaissance requirementssuffered throughout the war, primarily because of a lackof assets—mainly planes, pilots, and trained photo inter-preters. Real-time imagery for field commanders andtheir units was not available at times when it was mostneeded. This problem, although well known andaccepted, especially by the ground units, continuedthrough Vietnam, and even into the Gulf War.

Aerial photo reconnaissance is one of the most exact-ing and dangerous jobs in all military aviation. The“recce” pilot must be more than just a good pilot; that isjust a base from which to start. He must be a crackerjacknavigator and know his camera systems inside and out,their capabilities and their limitations. And he must beresourceful, as well as have an inexhaustible supply ofcourage. Sometimes these last qualities are all thatenable him to bring the film home and successfullycomplete his mission.

Most jet reconnaissance aircraft were unarmed, rely-ing upon their speed to get them home before being inter-cepted. During World War II, there were no specificallydedicated reconnaissance aircraft, merely modifiedfighters, which had cameras stuck in the most convenientspace, sometimes behind the pilot in the cockpit, orbelow him in the belly. The F6F Hellcat and P-51Mustang are examples of such modification. Usually,these aircraft retained most, if not all, their machine gunarmament and could therefore fight their way to and fromthe target. During Korea, however, the dedicatedphoto-Banshees of VMJ-1 were toothless and needed

Five master sergeant NAPs of VMJ-1 pose by one of theirBanshees. From left to right are: MSgt James R. Todd,MSgt Samuel W. Cooper, MSgt Lee R. Copland, MSgtMarvin D. Myers, and MSgt Lowell L. Truex. As a second

lieutenant with VMF-224 during World War II, Truexshot down a Japanese “George” fighter during anengagement off Okinawa.

Courtesy of MSgt Lowell L. Truex

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escorts. Sometimes another Banshee would go along,both as an escort and sometimes to ensure the coverageof the target with another camera. Air Force F-86s weresometimes called upon to shepherd the “recce” pilot. Andsometimes, the photo pilot found himself alone.

In 1952, Master Sergeant Lowell T. Truex had made hisphoto runs against installations near the Yalu River,thinking that his F-86 escort would look out for anyCommunist fighters, which might try to come after him.However, as he looked around he found that the Sabreswere nowhere to be seen, and he also spotted a gaggleof MiG-15s taking off across the river. Hurriedly, he fin-ished his photo runs and ran for home. He found later,that the F-86s had been watching from above, had theMiGs in sight, and were ready to jump the Chinese fight-ers if they come after Truex. Recalling his time with VMJ-1, Truex said:

My memories of the photo unit, which became asquadron during my tour, and all the plankowners,are good ones. We were completely self-containedand operated with field equipment from the well-point, water tank to the generators. The techni-cians were all superior guys, who worked withenergy and diligence.

While standing squadron watches, besides flying theirregular missions, the NAPs were also required to work asdivision officers in the squadron photo lab and on theflight line. There was also the need to brief escort pilots,who were often Air Force F-86 pilots. The Sabre pilots didnot always appreciate being briefed by an enlisted avia-tor, and occasionally made things difficult for theirMarine compatriot. In Master Sergeant Truex’s case, he hadto submit to annoying identification exercises before hewas allowed to conduct his brief. “I had to be verified,”he recalled, “and they wouldn’t let me into their briefingroom without identification. But, I briefed the Air Forcepilots precisely, even though some of them took a casu-al attitude about escorting a Marine reconnaissancepilot.”

The haughty Sabre pilots tended to look down on thebig, blue Banshee their Marine charges flew. How couldit compare with their shiny, silver F-86s? As MasterSergeant Truex again recalled:

They underestimated the Banshee’s speed andclimb, as well as the intensity our missionrequired. With our small J-34 engines and big tiptanks, our F2Hs had superior range. Although theirF-86s looked good, and the Air Force did take careof us—and we certainly appreciated their pres-ence—they usually bingoed before we were fin-ished. We usually flew back alone.

Master Sergeant James R. Todd was VMJ-1’s high-mis-

sion man, completing 101 photo missions before rotatinghome. Todd flew 51 reconnaissance missions inBanshees, 10 in F9F-2Ps, 23 in F7F-3Ps, 13 in F4U-5Ps, and4 escort missions in F4U-4Bs. As he recalled: “The F4U-4B was used for armed escort only. The rest of the time,we relied on a thirty-eight pistol, a can of film and a lotof speed.”

Like many of the enlisted aviators, Todd had been com-missioned a second lieutenant in World War II, althoughhe had just missed seeing combat service when the warended, having spent much of his post-wing time as aninstructor. He was mustered out in September 1946, butreturned in November. He resigned his first lieutenant’scommission, raised his hand as a private, then wasimmediately advanced to master sergeant and sent to ElToro and then to Pensacola. Arriving at the Florida air sta-tion, he joined other re-enlistees at the Naval School ofPhotography, where they learned the art of aerial recon-naissance. The training was to stand them in good steadin the coming years. By 1950, Todd and his friends hadgained a lot of experience in Corsairs and Tigercats.

In September 1951, they were sent to Korea to sup-plement the meager photographic assets at K-3(Pohang). At the time the Marines flew F7F-3Ps and F4U-5Ps. But Todd managed to check out in the F9F-2P, andthus, when VMJ-1 was commissioned the followingFebruary with brand-new McDonnell F2H-2P Banshees,he was a natural to slide into the new jet’s cockpit. Fora while, though, the squadron operated five differenttypes: F7F-3P, F4U-5P, F4U-4B (for escort), F9F-2P, andF2H-2P. The props and Panthers remained until April1952.

Several of VMJ-1’s enlisted aviators also worked in thesquadron’s photo section, interpreting mission film.Although the squadron was administratively underMAG-33 and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, it was the AirForce at K-14 (Kimpo) that tasked the targets, which wasin keeping with the agreement with the Fifth Air Force.Occasionally, the 1st Marine Division could call in arequirement, but for the most part, Fifth Air Force calledthe shots.

Two MiGs near Chosin set on one of Todd’s squadronmates, Master Sergeant Calvin R. Duke, who laid claim tobeing the oldest Marine NAP in Korea. In a dogfight thatwent from 10,000 feet to 30,000 feet, Duke outmaneuveredthe Communist fighters and ran for home at 600 miles perhour.

Enlisted aviators were an integral part of the MarineCorps’ capability. However, by Vietnam, there were onlya few NAPs on active duty, and fewer still actuallyinvolved in flying duties. Some of these pioneers servedwith distinction throughout Vietnam. But by 1973, onlyfour NAPs were still on active service with the Marines,and all four were simultaneously retired on 1 February1973, closing a colorful era in naval aviation and MarineCorps history.

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bombs only 100 yards from theattacking Marines, enabling themto seize the high ground. On thesame day, to further illustrate theintensity of the air support effort,VMF-212 set a squadron record forthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing forcombat operations by flying 12missions and a total of 46 single-plane sorties. When refueling,rearming, and mechanical checktimes are considered, this becamea rather remarkable achievementunder the more or less “primitive”conditions of the first five days atKimpo Airfield after moving infrom Japan.

During the difficult and veryheavy fighting in the city, therewere many occasions where closeair support could be called in witheffect. But because of the confinednature of much of the action, thepreponderance of air support wasrendered at deeper distances fromthe advancing troops. VMO-6 heli-copters and OYs rendered yeomanservice in evacuating wounded,flying constant observation mis-sions, and in providing helicoptercommunication, conference, andobservation flights for the troopcommanders.

By 28 September, the intensivefighting in the city was drawing toa close. The newly arrived 7thMarines joined the 1st and 5thMarines on the left after the assaulton the city began on the 24th, andthings began to move out with dis-patch. By the 28th, the 5thMarines, according to plan, hadbeen placed into division reserveand the 7th was preparing to pushoff in pursuit of the North Koreansfleeing the city toward Uijongbu, 10miles to the north. On the 29th,the 1st Marines were to establishblocking positions about threemiles east of the city and the 5thwas assigned a similar mission tothe northwest at Suyuhyon. Thesemissions were carried out with rel-

atively minor difficulty, as theNorth Korean resistance appearedto be collapsing.

The 7th Marines moved out forUijongbu early on 1 October andran into firm resistance about halfway to the objective. The develop-ing firefight exposed the enemypositions and enabled VMF-312Corsairs to work them over heavi-ly during the remainder of the day.The advance was renewed the sec-ond day and again -312 was busyaround-the-clock in support oftwo battalions forcing their waythrough a tough defile on the mainroad, essential for tank and heavyvehicle passage. In addition to theclose support missions, theCorsairs caught eight trucks inconvoy and destroyed seven inone attack. It was a heavy day allaround and two Corsairs were lostto North Korean antiaircraft fire,but one landed in friendly territoryand the pilot was recovered ingood shape. On the third day,with the progress that had beenmade to that point, one battalionwas assigned to each side of theroad to mop up while the thirdpassed through on the roadstraight for Uijongbu. It soonbecame apparent that the enemywas in full flight, but the 7thMarines was in Uijongbu by after-noon. Establishment of the blockingposition there marked the lastlarge-scale fight of the Inchon-Seoul operation. The supply lines ofthe North Korean invading forceshad been cut totally and theInchon landing had crushed theNorth Korean army.

With the end of this phase ofthe war, U.S. Army and Republic ofKorea Army units began to relievethe Marine forces of their arearesponsibilities. Division unitswere issued orders for movement tostaging areas in Inchon and allwere in place by 7 October tomount out for what looked like a

follow-on amphibious assault onthe east coast.

A few of the major highlightsdrawn from the operation will suf-fice to summarize the division-wing performance: (1) Expansionfrom a reduced peace strength to areinforced war strength, less oneregimental combat team, was com-pleted in 15 days; (2) Movementof more than 15,000 personnel,organic heavy equipment, andpartial resupply from San Diego tothe Far East Command began inless than three weeks after theexpansion order was issued; (3)Unloading, reembarkation, andcombat loading for the Inchonlanding was done at Kobe, Japan,in seven days, including two dayslost to a typhoon in the Kobe area;(4) The 1st Provisional MarineBrigade was disengaged fromactive combat in the PusanPerimeter at midnight on 5September, moved to Pusan, andoutloaded in combat shipping inless than seven days; (5) A suc-cessful assault landing was execut-ed at Inchon on 15 September,under some of the most adversehydrographic conditions in thehistory of amphibious operations;(6) The force beachhead line,approximately six miles from thelanding beaches, was seized with-in 24 hours of the main landings;(7) Kimpo Airfield, one of thefinest in the Far East, was captured50 hours and 35 minutes after H-Hour; (8) The Han River wascrossed, without major bridgingequipment, and Seoul was seized12 days after the Inchon landing;and (9) The effectiveness of theMarine air-ground team and closeair support doctrine was reaf-firmed with outstanding success.

Two more days of fightingremained for the squadrons ofMAGs -12 and -33 at Kimpo afterthe relief of the ground units.During the 33-day period from 7

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September to 9 October, the fivesquadrons flew a total of 2,774sorties, most of them being inclose support of infantry units. Theaccolades from all units supportedunder the Marine air support con-trol system were many, and wel-come, but one from the divisionartillery commander and fire sup-port coordinator of the Army’s 7thInfantry Division was particularlynoteworthy. As Brigadier GeneralHomer W. Kiefer said: “Allow me toreemphasize my appreciation forthe outstanding air supportreceived by this division. TheMarine system of control. . .approaches the ideal and I firmlybelieve that a similar systemshould be adopted as standard forArmy Divisions.”

During the period of theInchon-Seoul operation, 15 Sep-tember-7 October, the lst MarineDivision suffered losses of 415dead, of whom 366 were killed inaction and 49 died of wounds; sixwere declared missing in actionand 2,029 were wounded inaction, for a total of 2,450 battlecasualties. The division took 6,492North Koreans prisoner and theestimates of total casualties inflict-ed on the enemy added up to13,666, most of whom were count-ed dead on the battlefield. Thesefigures represent a ratio of betterthan 8 to 1, a thoroughly com-mendable performance consider-ing the speed with which theair-ground team was put togetherand deployed.

Chosin Reservoir

Before the end of the Inchon-Seoul operation, when it becameclear that the effect of the landingwas a total rout of the NorthKoreans, the Commander in Chief,Far East, was formulating plans forthe follow-up. With much pru-dence and caution emphasized

from both Washington and theUnited Nations regarding the pos-sible entry of either Soviet orChinese Communist forces intoKorea, it was decided that theUnited Nations Command couldconduct pursuit operationsbeyond the 38th Parallel intoNorth Korea. Concern over thepossible outbreak of a general warremained strong, however, and theauthority for General MacArthur toutilize his forces north of the 38thwas burdened with several limita-tions. Briefly, there could be noentry of other than Republic ofKorea forces if there was a clearindication of either Soviet orChinese entry. Also, there couldbe no attack of any type againstany portion of either Chinese orSoviet territory, including the use ofNaval or Air forces. Further, onlySouth Korean forces would be uti-lized in those provinces of NorthKorea bordering on the SovietUnion or Manchuria. It is interest-ing to note that in spite of thesequalifications, on 29 SeptemberSecretary of Defense George C.Marshall included the following ina message to MacArthur: “We wantyou to feel unhampered tacticallyand strategically to proceed north ofthe 38th parallel.” Coming so soonafter the world-shaking experi-ences of World War II, there wasjustifiable cause for concern, butlimitations and cautions over andabove normal prudence certainlyadded much to the difficulties of thedecisions faced by MacArthur asthe move into North Korea wasbeing executed.

Generally, the plan was forEighth Army, commanded byLieutenant General Walton H.Walker, USA, to advance along theKaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang axis;the II ROK Corps in the centeralong the Kumhwa-Yangdok-Sunchon axis; and the I ROKCorps up the east coast direct to

Wonsan. The 1st Marine Divisionwould make an assault landing atWonsan and the Army’s 7thInfantry Division would followashore in an administrative land-ing. After establishment ashore atWonsan, X Corps, under the com-mand of Major General Edward M.Almond, USA, would thenadvance west to Pyongyang, joiningup with Eighth Army. The entireforce would then advance north totwo phase lines, the second beingalong the general line Songjin in theeast, southwest to Chongju on thewest coast. Only South Koreanforces would advance beyond thesecond phase line, in keeping withMacArthur’s restrictions. EighthArmy would cross the 38th Parallelon 15 October and the Wonsanlanding was set for 20 October.

Wonsan Landing

As has been seen before in mil-itary operations, surprise comes inmany different packages, andWonsan indeed had its share.While the division was in thethroes of feverishly meeting itstight combat loading schedules atInchon, at 0815 on 10 October, theI ROK Corps in its rapid advance upthe east coast entered Wonsan. Bythe next day they had completedmopping up the town and wereguarding the airfield on KalmaPeninsula. MacArthur thenzigzagged back and forth with theidea of a new assault objective atHungnam, 50 miles north.However, by the time the harborcharacteristics and the availability ofboth landing craft and ships forunloading at two ports werereviewed, the original plan forWonsan was retained with D-Daystill set for 20 October.

The next surprise was a combi-nation of circumstances. First wasthe discovery that the harbor andapproaches to Wonsan were thor-

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oughly sown with rather sophisti-cated Soviet mines of all kinds,from drifting contact types to mag-netic ship-counting designs. It wasdetermined that no entry for land-ing could possibly be made untilthe harbor was safely swept andthe threat eliminated. The delaysentailed in the sweeping com-bined with the early taking ofWonsan by the I ROK Corps tobring about an unusual reversal ofthe normal order in amphibiousoperations. When the assault ele-ments of the division finally landedat Wonsan, they were welcomedashore by the already well-estab-lished Marine aviation units.

Planning for 1st Marine AircraftWing operations in the northeasthad kept up with the rapidlychanging strategic situation. On 13October, General Harris flew intoWonsan and on inspecting thecondition of the field, decided tobegin operations there immediate-ly. With that decision, VMF-312flew in from Kimpo on the 14thand wing transports flew in 210personnel of the headquarters andVMF(N)-513 the same day. Twotank landing ships sailed fromKobe with equipment and person-nel of MAG-12, and Far East AirForces’ Combat Cargo Command

began flying in aviation fuel. Somebombs and rockets to “get ‘emstarted” were flown in on theplanes of VMF(N)-513. On the16th, VMFs -214 and -323, still onthe Sicily and the Badoeng Strait,began operations at Wonsan, cov-ering the minesweeping activitiesuntil 27 October.

With the delay of almost 10days before the beach landings

could begin, the squadrons oper-ating from Wonsan had to relyalmost totally on air resupply for theperiod. The small amount of sup-plies that did arrive by ship arrivedonly by extreme effort andmakeshift means. Edward S. John,the only second lieutenant inMarine Aircraft Group 12 at thetime, was assigned the task of get-ting 55-gallon drums of aviation


Corsairs of VMF-312 at Wonsan Airfield are serviced for thecontinuing battle against Communist forces in northeastKorea. The squadron flew from Kimpo to Wonsan on 14

October, 12 days before landing craft brought elements of the1st Marine Division ashore.

One of the steady stream of Douglas R4D Skytrains that brought supplies toMarine fighter squadrons VMF-312 and VMF(N)-513 at Wonsan. The squadronswere totally dependent on airlift for all supplies during the 10 days it took to cleara lane through the Wonsan harbor minefields.


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fuel from a tank landing ship,floating clear of the minefield,ashore. In accomplishing the feat,the drums were manhandled intoWorld War II vintage landing craft,now under Japanese operation,using Korean laborers. Whenclose to the beach, the drums hadto be manually lifted over the side,as the ramp had been welded shut.Once in the surf the drums werewaded ashore through the icywater.

The squadrons also were facedwith added difficulties resultingfrom few bomb carts, trucks, andrefuelers. Consequently, the fueltrucks had to be loaded by handfrom 55-gallon drums which hadbeen rolled more than a mile fromthe dumps, also by hand. Thisslowed operations somewhat, butjudicious planning and steadyeffort maintained a useful sortierate. Armed reconnaissance flights

were flown regularly which result-ed in productive attacks on retreat-ing North Korean troops. On the24th, for example, a -312 flight sur-prised a column of about 800North Koreans near Kojo, 39 milessouth of Wonsan, and dispersed itwith heavy losses.

With the change from an assaultto an administrative landing atWonsan, the 1st Marine AircraftWing was placed under the con-trol of Far East Air Force, with del-egation of that control to Fifth AirForce, north of the 38th Parallel.This required the daily operationsschedule to be submitted to Fifth AirForce at Seoul by 1800 the previousday. Because of the distanceinvolved and the poor communi-cations that existed, it made itextremely difficult at best to getclearance back in time. This wasresolved between General Harrisand General Earl E. Partridge,

Commanding General, Fifth AirForce, with permission for the for-mer to plan and execute missionsfor X Corps in northeast Koreawithout waiting for Air Force clear-ance. Direction of support for XCorps was exercised for the wing byMAG-12 from 15 October to 9November. Night operations didnot begin until late in the monthbecause of delay in getting runwaylights at Wonsan, but -513 flew daymissions along with -312 from thebeginning. After the administrativelanding on the 27th, the two carri-er squadrons operated in similarfashion to the way they functionedat Inchon.

Generally, Marine aircraftreported to specified Tactical AirControl Parties at times given inthe Fifth Air Force daily order, inresponse to previous requests byground units for air support. Closeair support requests, which wereof a more urgent nature, were usu-ally handled by aircraft on runwayalert or by flights orbiting a specif-ic point on stand-by status.

As at Inchon, Major VincentGottschalk’s VMO-6 was under theoperational control of the 1stMarine Division. Two helicopterswere flown from Kimpo toWonsan on the 23d and the rest ofthe squadron came in by tanklanding ship on the 27th. A flightechelon of helicopters remained atKimpo until early November at therequest of Fifth Air Force, for evac-uation of casualties of the 187thAirborne Regimental Combat Teamin the Sukchon area.

After the landing of the initialelements of the division at Wonsanon the 26th, 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, was ordered to Kojo,southeast of Wonsan. The battalionoccupied positions in the vicinitywith the mission of protecting the IROK Corps supply dump there inpreparation for its displacement tothe north. It developed that a size-


Speed was of the essence for these Marine airmen in rearming their Corsair forrepeated strikes against Chinese and North Korean forces. Ground crewmen inthe foreground mix a batch of deadly napalm while other Marines hastilychange a tire.

able remnant of North Koreantroops was in the area and a seriesof significant actions took placetoward the end of the month. Itsoon became clear that the “rem-nant” was actually a seasoned unitof experienced troops, and thatpossibly a major counterattack wasin the offing in the Kojo area.However, as it evolved, most ofthese actions were confined tonight attacks by smaller units thanwere at first suspected. Aviationsupplied the need for emergencyevacuation of wounded by heli-copter, and although there was asignificant loss in killed andwounded, there was no need toreinforce the battalion fromWonsan. Ironically, the SouthKorean supply dump had beenessentially moved out before theattacks occurred and when theNorth Koreans were finally beatenoff and dispersed, the battalionwas ordered back to Wonsan. The

final loss count was 23 killed, 47wounded, and 4 missing. The bat-talion took 83 prisoners, withenemy casualties estimated at 250killed, in addition to an undeter-mined number of wounded and acount of 165 enemy dead on thebattlefield. The unit was back atWonsan by 4 November.

With the major changes in strat-egy that accompanied the collapseof the North Koreans, and therapid advances of Eighth Armyand the two Republic of KoreaArmy corps to the north,MacArthur issued new directions,which affected X Corps and theMarines. One was an order for the1st Marine Division to “advancerapidly in zone to the Koreannorthern border.” With the EighthArmy entering Pyongyang on 18October, X Corps on the east coastwas being left behind and the rightflank of Eighth Army was becomingexposed. Hence the corps was

under pressure to move north atthe earliest. With the exception ofa significant engagement of the 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, in theMajon-ni area near Wonsan, similarto the action of the 1st Battalion atKojo, most of the security require-ments laid on the 1st Marines inand around Wonsan had been metby early November.

At Majon-ni, the various actionswere supported by Marine aviationin the normal manner during day-light hours, but most of the attackson the perimeter defensesoccurred at night. Evacuations ofwounded were by helicopter pri-marily, and several airdrops ofsupplies were included in the gen-eral air support. Marine losses inthese actions included 20 killedand 45 wounded. Enemy casual-ties were estimated at 525 killedand 1,395 prisoners were taken.More than 4,000 Korean refugeeswere screened at the roadblocks

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Ordnance men operate a “belting”machine that inserted ammunitioninto a metal belt to be used in the20mm cannons of the Corsair. Themachine loaded the belts at a rate of6,000 rounds per hour in comparisonwith the hand operation of 500rounds per hour. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130762

1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov50

In 1st Marine Division operations around Wonsan, evacuation of the woundedwas accomplished by jeep ambulance, and in the case of more seriously wound-ed, by helicopter. The Sikorsky H03S and later Bell HTL helicopters attached toMarine Observation Squadron 6 were the cornerstones of the Korean War med-ical evacuation and rescue efforts.

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along the main supply route(MSR). The MSR itself was so pre-cipitous, narrow, and difficult, theMarines lost 9 killed and 81injured along one very toughstretch known as “ambush alley.”

While the 1st Marines werebusy at Kojo and Majon-ni, the 5thand 7th Marines had taken uptheir new assignments to thenorth. This meant that the divisionstretched a total of 130-road-milesfrom the 1st Marines in the south tothe 7th in the north. It would be agross understatement to only saythat this complicated the delivery ofthe usual air support by the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing to its brotherson the ground. With the arrival ofadditional Army elements of XCorps in the area, however, itbecame possible to shorten linessomewhat. The division’s com-mand post was moved toHungnam on 4 November, withthe 5th and 7th Marines operatingnorth. By 17 November, the 1stMarines were at Chigyong, 14miles south of Hungnam, thusclosing the stretch to less than 60miles. This was a definite improve-ment, but Wonsan from the view-point of Marine aviation, waslooking like a by-passed Japanesebase from World War II. The con-centration of the division north ofHungnam in its march to the YaluRiver made the airfield at Yonpoincreasingly attractive to the wingbecause it was in the center of theHungnam-Hamhung area. Thismeant that response times forclose air support would be consid-erably reduced for any actions thatoccurred to the north.Accordingly, on 6 November,MAG-33 was ordered to Yonpofrom Japan, and by 10 November,was in operation there in time toreceive VMF-212 from Wonsan.On the 15th, VMF-214 wasordered ashore from the Sicily andset up at Wonsan with MAG-12

supporting the squadron as best itcould, bearing in mind that manypieces of vehicular equipmentneeded ashore are not requirednor used on board carriers. Also,because of a shortage of shippingin the Far East, it took muchlonger to move essential shore-based equipment from where itwas stored in Japan, in the case ofboth -214 and -212, to where itwas needed in Korea. This meantthat for a considerable period,bombs often had to be loaded by“muscle power,” aircraft refueledby small hand “wobble” pumpsfrom 55-gallon drums, weighing450 pounds, and many other oper-ational and maintenance factorsthat revert to the hard way whenthe equipment just is not there. Itwas just another throwback to thesustaining principle of Marine avi-ation of doing the best with whatyou have got because the job mustget done—and in this case, again,it was done.

Ground Situation

At the time of the Wonsan land-ing, the Marines had been

informed that X Corps would be apart of the dash north to the Yaluunder the revised Far EastCommand/United Nations Com-mand plans, and Eighth Armywould be doing the same on thewestern side of the peninsula. Thejump-off dates were set for 24November for Eighth Army andthe 27th for X Corps. There hadbeen many sightings and identifi-cations of Communist ChineseForces (CCF) well below the Yalu asearly as late October and in thefirst few days of November. FarEast Command press releases,however, treated these sightings asbeing only “volunteers” to helpthe North Koreans resolve theirproblems. The usual sightingreports were invariably smallgroups in remote areas, but insome instances the sightings werecharacterized also by thousands offootprints and tracks in the snow.Furthermore, in a significant five-day battle from 4 to 9 November,the 7th Marines took 62 Chineseprisoners at Chinhung-ni, enroute totheir objective at Hagaru-ri. TheChinese were interrogated andprecisely identified as part of the

The outcome of the Chosin Reservoir campaign owed much to airdropped sup-plies by the wing’s twin-engine R4D transports. Assisting the Air Force’s CombatCargo Command, Marine transports carried more than five million pounds ofsupplies to the front.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4841

28

124th Division, 42d Army, 13thArmy Group, Fourth Field Army.Tokyo press releases dismissedthese and other CCF contacts withthe “volunteer” label and the planremained in effect.

By the 27th, the 1st MarineDivision was concentrated in thevicinity of the Chosin Reservoir,with the command post at Hagaru-ri, the 5th and 7th Marines atYudam-ni, and the 1st Marinesalong the MSR with a battalioneach at Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri, andHagaru-ri. Colonel Homer L.Litzenberg, Jr., commanding the7th Marines, while enroute fromHagaru-ri to Yudam-ni, haddropped off Company F atToktong Pass to hold that criticalpoint for any eventuality. On 25November, Generals Smith andAlmond conferred and the newswas not good from the EighthArmy sector. The II ROK Corpshad been overrun on EighthArmy’s right and the Army itselfwas falling back before a wholesaleCCF onslaught. In spite of theseresults, Almond ordered Smith toattack on the 27th as planned. Atthe time, 1st Marine Division intel-ligence had identified five moredivisions from prisoner interroga-tions, and line-crossing agents hadgiven firm indications of evenmore Chinese forces just to theimmediate north.

On the morning of the 27th, thedivision began its attack fromYudam-ni on schedule but thelead regiment had only advancedabout 2,000 yards when stiff resis-tance stopped it. On the night ofthe 27th, the CCF in great strengthattacked all Marine positions fromYudam-ni to Koto-ri, including adivision attack on Company F atToktong Pass, and a strong assaultof division-sized against the three-battalion task force of the 7thInfantry Division east of the reser-voir. As the intelligence reports

were gathered and analyzed, theresults showed clearly that oppos-ing the Marines and associatedtroops in the Chosin Reservoirarea was the 9th Army Group, 3dField Army. This comprised a totalof four corps-sized armies, a forcethat added to the five divisionsalready identified by the 1stMarine Division, totaled, by someestimates, almost 100,000 sea-soned Chinese infantry troops.With the disposition of the divi-sion north of Hungnam andHamhung, in addition to attachedunits of Royal Marines and assort-ed Army units totaling only 20,500in all, the balance of the twoforces favored the Chinese by bet-ter than 5 to 1. The fact that muchof this was known to Far EastCommand and X Corps on the25th, with Eighth Army estimating200,000 CCF in front of them, can-not go unmentioned in connectionwith General Almond’s order toGeneral Smith to attack as plannedtwo days later, the 27th.

The situation had changed soradically and so quickly that onthe 28th, General MacArthur calledGenerals Walker and Almond toTokyo for a lengthy conference.The result of these deliberationswas a change of strategy. The pre-vious plan for North Korea wasabandoned and both the EighthArmy and X Corps were to pullback to a more defensible line tothe south. General Smith hadalready decided to start movingwithout any further delay andordered the 5th and 7th Marines tomove back to Hagaru-ri fromYudam-ni, the first leg of whatwould be a 68-mile fight throughthousands of enemy troops.

Air Situation

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing’scommand post and attachedHeadquarters and Service units, inaddition to five fighter squadrons,had moved to Yonpo fromWonsan and Japan by late inNovember. The sixth squadron,VMF-323, was still launching itsmaximum efforts from theBadoeng Strait. Rounding out thewing’s combat lineup was VMO-6with its OYs and H03S helicopters,operating mainly from Yonpo, butalso from wherever else required.This was a crowd for Yonpo, espe-cially when it is remembered thatmuch of the ordnance and mainte-nance equipment of the squadronswas not available. Also included inthe serious shortage category wereboth transportation generally, andprovision of any form of heatedspace for bare-handed engine andaircraft engineering maintenance.

Cold weather maintenanceproved difficult. Touching themetal surface of an aircraft parkedon the flight line with bare skinwould cause the skin to stick to it.Aircraft engines had to be startedthroughout the night to keep them


Marines who used the “daisy-cutter” inthe South Pacific rig them again for useagainst the Chinese in Korea.Attaching the bombs to the racks ofthe Corsair required delicate adjust-ments, often difficult in the sub-zeroKorean winter weather.

29

from freezing. Tires on the planeswould be frozen on the bottom inthe morning and they wouldthump out for take off or slidealong the snow and ice. StaffSergeant Floyd P. Stocks, a planecaptain with VMF-214 recalled thedifficulties in accomplishing thesimplest maintenance tasks, suchas changing a spark plug in a F4U.“It isn’t too bad removing theplugs, that can be done wearinggloves. Installing them is a differentstory. You can’t start a plug wear-ing gloves, not enough clearancearound the plug port. To change asparkplug you have the old plugout and the new plug warm beforeyou start. Wrap a new warm plug ina rag and hurry to the man stand-ing by at the engine. That manpulls off his glove and gets theplug started. Once started he putson his glove and completes theinstallation using a plug wrench.”

Bombs, rockets, ammunition,and fuel were on hand at Yonpo,and with Marines to manhandle

them all, the air part of the air-ground team was ready to do itsjob. The task it had to do wasprobably the heaviest responsibili-ty ever placed on a supportingarm in relatively modern MarineCorps history. As LieutenantGeneral Leslie E. Brown, a Marineaviator who witnessed combat inthree wars, recalled: “The ChosinReservoir thing was the proudest Ihad ever been of Marine avia-tion...because those guys were justflying around the clock, every-thing that would start and move.And those ordnance kids out theredragging ass after loading 500-pound bombs for 20 hours. Andaviation’s mood and commitment tothat division, my God it was total.There was nothing that wouldhave kept them off those targets—nothing!”

From the time of the decision tofight their way south to the sea,Fifth Air Force had given the wingthe sole mission of supporting thedivision and the rest of X Corps.

Backup was provided by TaskForce 77 aircraft for additionalclose support as required, andboth the Navy and Fifth Air Forcetactical squadrons attacked troopconcentrations and interdictedapproach routes all along thewithdrawal fronts of Eighth Armyand X Corps. The Combat CargoCommand was in constant supportwith requested airdrops of foodand ammunition, and did a majorjob in aerial resupply of all typesfrom basic supplies to bridge sec-tions, as well as hazardous casual-ty evacuation from improvisedlanding strips at both Hagaru-riand Koto-ri.

When reviewing the fightingwithdrawal of the Marine air-ground team from the reservoiragainst these horrendous odds,and assessing the part Marine avi-ation played in the operation, it isimportant to remember theTactical Air Control Party structureof the Marine air control system.Every strike against enemy posi-


Marine Corsairs operating out of frozen Yonpo Airfieldexperienced a number of problems. The airstrip had to be con-tinually cleared and sanded, aircraft had to be run every two

hours during the night to keep the engine oil warm enoughfor morning takeoffs, and ordnance efficiency declined.

tions along the route wherever thecolumn was held up or pinneddown, was under the direct controlof an experienced Marine pilot onthe ground in the column, knownto the pilots in the air delivering theattack. Other methods had beentried repeatedly, but to put it col-loquially, “there ain’t no substitutefor the TACP.”

The Breakout

From the start of the 68-milebattle to the sea on 1 December toits completion at Hungnam on 12December, so much happened ona daily basis that only shelves of

books could tell the story in detail.It was one of the high watermarksfor the Marine Corps, ground andair, cementing permanently amutual understanding and appre-ciation between the two linebranches of the Corps that wouldnever be broken. It must be bornein mind that the same air supportprinciples in almost every detailwere followed in support of thedivision on its fight up to Hagaru-ri and Yudam-ni as were applied insupporting its fight back down tothe sea.

Underlying the air support planfor the operation was the idea ofhaving a flight over the key move-

ment of the day at first light. Thisinitial flight would be assigned tothe forward air controller (FAC) ofthe unit most likely to be shortly inneed of close air support. In turn,as soon as that flight had beencalled on to a target, another flightwould be assigned to relieve it onstation. This meant that responsetimes from request to delivery ontarget could be reduced to theminimum. Naturally, the weatherhad to cooperate and communica-tions had to stay on, but if minimumvisibility and ceiling held so thatpositive delivery of weapons waspossible, the targets were hit inminimum time. If the attack of the

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Sketch by Cpl Ralph H. Schofield, USMCR

Marine Corsairs hit enemy troop concentrations with rock-ets and napalm in support of Marines fighting around theChosin Reservoir. However, approximately half of the

Marine air missions were in support of South Korean andU.S. Army units.

aircraft on station was not suffi-cient to eliminate that target, addi-tional strength would be called in,either from Yonpo or from TaskForce 77, or from time to time, bysimply calling in any suitable aircraftin the area for a possible diversionfrom its assigned mission. The lastpossibility was usually handled bythe Tactical Air Direction Center(TADC) of the air support system, oroften by the tactical air coordinatorairborne on the scene.

After dark each night, the columnwould be defended through unitassignments to key perimeters ofdefense. This was when they weremost vulnerable to attacks by theChinese. During daylight whenCorsairs were on station, theChinese could not mass theirtroops to mount such attacksbecause when they tried theywould be immediately subjectedto devastating air strikes withnapalm, bombs, rockets, and over-whelming 20mm strafing. Not oneenemy mass attack was deliveredagainst the column during daylighthours. The night “heckler” mis-sions over the column were effec-tive in reducing enemy artillery,mortar, and heavy machine gunfires. But there was no way thatthey could do the things that weredone in daylight controlled close airsupport, although the night con-trolled strikes against enemy posi-tions revealed by their fires againstthe column were extremely effec-tive as well. The general feeling inthe column, however, was invari-ably one of relief with the arrival ofdaybreak.

The desire to have Marine aircraftoverhead during daylight hoursbears witness to the faith theMarines on the ground had in thepotency and accuracy of Marineclose air support. This was appar-ent to Captain William T. Witt, Jr.,who led a flight of eight VMF-214Corsairs that appeared over the

Marine column one cold day asmorning broke. As he checked inwith the forward air controller onthe ground he advised the con-troller that he had seen an enemyjeep heading north across thefrozen reservoir and asked “if theywanted it shot up.” The foot wearycontroller said: “Hell no, just shootthe driver.”

The first leg of the fight southwas from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri, amovement that would bring the5th and 7th Marines together withelements of the lst Marines, divisionheadquarters and command post. Itwas essential that Hagaru-ri beheld because it gave the division itsfirst chance to evacuate the seri-ously wounded by air. The evacu-ation was done from thehazardous but serviceable stripthat had been hacked out of thefrozen turf on a fairly level piece ofground near the town. CompanyD, 1st Engineer Battalion, accom-plished this extraordinary job.

Under fire much of the time, thework went on around-the-clock,under floodlights at night, andwith flights from the two Marinenight fighter squadrons orbitingoverhead whenever possible.During the period from the firstairstrip landing on 1 December to6 December, the Combat CargoCommand’s Douglas C-47 “Sky-trains,” augmented by everyMarine Douglas R4D in the area,flew out a total of 4,312 wounded,including 3,150 Marines, 1,137Army personnel, and 25 RoyalMarines. Until the Hagaru-ri stripbecame operational on 1December, evacuation of the seri-ously wounded was limited as theonly aircraft that could land atYudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, and Koto-riwere the OYs and helicopters ofVMO-6. For example, from 27November to 1 December, VMO-6evacuated a total of 152 casualties,including 109 from Yudam-ni, 36from Hagaru-ri, and 7 from Koto-ri.

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Casualties are helped on board a Marine R4D Skytrain at Hagaru-ri. Fromthere, and later at Koto-ri to the south, more than 4,000 wounded men weresnatched from death and flown to safety and hospitalization.

Department of Defense (USMC) A130281

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In the extreme cold and at the alti-tudes of the operation, these lightaircraft had much less power andconsiderably reduced lift from nor-mal conditions, but in spite ofthese handicaps, saved scores oflives.

The Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri legwas completed by the afternoon of4 December, with the first unitreaching Hagaru-ri in the earlyevening of the 3d. With most ofthe heavy action occurring on the1st and 2d, wing aircraft flew morethan 100 close support sorties bothdays, all in support of the divisionand the three Army battalions ofthe 7th Division, which were heav-ily hit east of the reservoir trying towithdraw to Hagaru-ri. The MarineFAC with the Army battalions,Captain Edward P. Stamford,directed saving strikes against theChinese on 1 December, but duringthe night, they were overwhelmedand he was captured. However,the next day he managed toescape and made his way into

Hagaru-ri. Of the three battalions,only a few hundred scatteredtroops survived to reach Hagaru-ri.On 4 and 5 December, wing aircraftcontinued the march with almost300 sorties against enemy posi-tions, vehicles, and troop concen-trations throughout the reservoirarea. But on 6 December, theyresumed their primary role overthe division as the second leg,Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri, began.

Air planning for the second legdrew heavily on the experiencegained during the move fromYudam-ni. The FACs were againspotted along the column and witheach flanking battalion, and wereaugmented with two airborne tac-tical air controllers who flew theirCorsairs ahead and to each side ofthe advancing column. The additionof a four-engine R5D (C-54) trans-port configured to carry a com-plete TADC controlled all supportaircraft as they reported on station,and assigned them to the variousFACs or TACs, as appropriate for the

missions requested. The systemworked smoothly and made it pos-sible for the column to keep mov-ing on the road most of the time;even while the support aircraftwere eliminating a hot spot. Byevening of the 7th, the divisionrear guard was inside the perimeterof the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, atKoto-ri. During the two days,Marine aircraft flew a total of 240sorties in support of X Corps’ with-drawal, with almost 60 percent ofthese being in support of the divi-sion, with the remainder being insupport of other units. In addition,245 sorties from Task Force 77 car-riers and 83 from Fifth Air Forcesupported X Corps. The Navy sor-ties were almost entirely closesupport while the Air Force weremostly supply drops. The Koto-ristrip, although widened andlengthened, was not even as oper-able as the more or less “hairy”one at Hagaru-ri, but an additional375 wounded were flown out.VMO-6, augmented by three TBMson 7 December, also evacuated163 more up to 10 December.

An enlisted squadron mechanicwith VMF-214 noted the unpleas-antness of unloading the TBMs inhis diary: “Not only are the peopleseriously wounded, they arefrozen too. This morning I helpedwith a Marine who never moved aswe handled his stretcher. Hishead, framed by his parka, lookedfrozen and discolored. His breathfogging as it escaped his purplelips was the only sign of life.Between fingers on his right handwas a cold cigarette that hadburned down between his fingersbefore going out. The flesh hadburned but he had not noticed.His fingers were swollen and atplaces had ruptured now lookinglike a wiener that splits from heat.”

With just one more leg to go,the epochal move was almostcompleted. But the third leg, Koto-


Elements of the 7th Marines pause at the roadblock on the way to Koto-ri as MarineCorsairs napalm an abandoned U.S. Army engineer tent camp. The position hadbecome a magnet for Chinese troops seeking food and shelter.

ri to Chinhung-ni, was tough tocontemplate because it includedan extremely hazardous passageof a precipitous defile calledFunchilin Pass, in addition to ablown bridge just three miles fromKoto-ri that had to be made pass-able. The latter was the occasion ofengineering conferences fromTokyo to Koto-ri, a test drop of abridge section at Yonpo as anexperiment, revision of parachutesand rigging, and finally the suc-cessful drops of the necessarymaterial at Koto-ri.

The air and ground plans for thedescent to Chinhung-ni amountedto essentially using the same cov-erage and column movementcoordination that had been so suc-cessful on the first two legs, onlythis time there was one very effec-tive addition. The 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, from its position inChinhung-ni, would attack up thegorge and seize a dominating hillmass overlooking the major por-

tion of the MSR. The battalion’sattack was set for dawn on 8December, simultaneous with thestart of the attack south from Koto-ri. The night of 7-8 December

brought a raging blizzard to thearea, reducing visibility almost tozero and denying any air opera-tions during most of the 8th. As aresult, although both attacksjumped off on schedule, littleprogress was made from Koto-riand the installation of the bridgesections was delayed. The onebright spot that day was the com-plete surprise achieved by the 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, in takingHill 1081. Using the blizzard ascover, Captain Robert H. Barrow’sCompany A employed total silenceand a double-envelopmentmaneuver by two of the compa-ny’s three platoons with the third infrontal assault, to take an enemystrongpoint and command post,wiping out the entire garrison.

The night of the 8th saw the endof the weather problem and theclear skies and good visibilitypromised a full day for the 9th.From the break of day completeair coverage was over the MSRunder the direction of the airborneTADC, the TACs, and the battalionFACs. The installation of thebridge was covered, and when it

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A General Motors TBM Avenger taxis out for takeoff. Largely flown by field-deskpilots on the wing and group staffs, the World War II torpedo bomber could flyout several litter patients and as many as nine ambulatory cases.



During the cold Korean winter it often took hours of scraping and chipping toclear several inches of ice and snow off the decks, catapults, arresting wires, andbarriers of the Badoeng Strait to permit flights operations. High winds, heavy seas,and freezing temperatures also hampered Marine carrier-based air missions.

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was in place, the column began itsmove down to Chinhung-ni on theplain below. It is interesting tonote that the bridge was installed atthe base of the penstocks of one ofthe several hydroelectric plants fedby the reservoir. (Eighteen monthslater in June 1952, two of theseplants were totally destroyed byMAGs -12 and -33 in one attack,Chosin 3 by MAG -12 and Chosin 4by MAG -33, the latter in one of thelargest mass jet attacks of the war.)

The good weather continued onthe 10th and the passage over thetortuous MSR was completed bynightfall. Early in the morning of the11th, the truck movement fromChinhung-ni to Hungnam began,and by early afternoon, the lastunit cleared the town. With thedivision loading out fromHungnam, the three shore-basedfighter squadrons moved to Japanon the 14th, and by the 18th the lastof the wing’s equipment wasflown out of Yonpo. Air coverage ofthe evacuation of Hungnambecame the responsibility of thelight carriers with the displace-ment of the wing. Under a gradualcontraction of the perimeter, withthe heavy support of the navalgunfire group, the movement andoutloading were completed by theafternoon of the 24th.

The statistics of the outloadingfrom Hungnam cannot go unmen-tioned. Included were 105,000 mil-itary personnel (Marine, Army,South Korean, and other UnitedNations units), 91,000 Koreanrefugees, 17,500 vehicles, and350,000 tons of cargo in 193shiploads by 109 ships. Thatwould have been a treasure trovefor the Chinese if it had not beenfor the leadership of GeneralSmith who said that the divisionwould bring its vehicles, equip-ment, and people out by the waythey got in, by “attacking in a dif-ferent direction.”

A few summary statistics serve togive an order of magnitude of thesupport 1st Marine Aircraft Wingrendered to the operation as awhole. From 26 October to 11December, the TACPs of Marine,Army, and South Korean unitscontrolled 3,703 sorties in 1,053missions. Close air support mis-sions accounted for 599 of thetotal (more than 50 percent), with468 of these going to the 1stMarine Division, 8 to the 3dInfantry Division, 56 to the 7thInfantry Division, and 67 to theSouth Koreans. The balance of 454missions were search and attack.On the logistics side, VMR-152, thewing’s transport squadron, aver-aged a commitment of five R5Ds aday to the Combat CargoCommand during the operation,serving all units across the UnitedNations front. With its aircraft notcommitted to the CargoCommand, from 1 November tothe completion of the Hungnamevacuation, -152 carried more than5,000,000 pounds of supplies to

the front and evacuated more than4,000 casualties.

One other statistic for Marineaviation was its first jet squadron tosee combat when VMF-311, underLieutenant Colonel Neil R.McIntyre, operated at Yonpo forthe last few days of the breakout. Itis of interest to note that the tacti-cal groups of 1st Marine AircraftWing, MAGs -12 and -33, were soconstituted that just a year laterMAG-33 was all jet and MAG-12was the last of the props, for abouta 50-50 split on the tacticalstrength of the wing.

On casualty statistics, the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing had eightpilots killed, four missing, andthree wounded, while the divisionhad 718 killed, 192 missing, and3,485 wounded. The division alsosuffered a total of 7,338 non-battlecasualties, most of which wereinduced by the severe cold insome form of frostbite or worse.The division estimated that aboutone third of these casualtiesreturned to duty without requiring

Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC355021

As the last of the division’s supplies and equipment were loaded on board U.S. Navylanding ships at Hungnam, the wing’s remaining land-based fighter squadronsat Yonpo ended their air strikes and departed for Japan.

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evacuation or additional hospital-ization. Against these figuresstands a post-action estimate ofenemy losses at 37,500, with15,000 killed and 7,500 wounded bythe division, in addition to 10,000killed and 5,000 wounded by thewing. In this case these estimatesare based on enemy testimonyregarding the heavy losses sus-tained by the Communists, andthere is some verification in thefact that there was no determinedattempt to interfere with theHungnam evacuation.

In a letter from General Smithto General Harris on 20 December,Smith stated the sincere feeling ofthe division when he wrote:

Without your support ourtask would have been infi-nitely more difficult and morecostly. During the long reach-es of the night and in thesnow storms many a Marineprayed for the coming of dayor clearing weather when heknew he would again hearthe welcome roar of yourplanes as they dealt outdestruction to the enemy.Even the presence of a nightheckler was reassuring.

Never in its history hasMarine aviation given moreconvincing proof of its indis-pensable value to the groundMarines. . . . A bond ofunderstanding has been es-tablished that will never bebroken.

In any historical treatment ofthis epic fighting withdrawal, it isimportant to emphasize that therewas total control of the air duringthe entire operation. Without that,not only would the action havebeen far more costly, but also itmay have been impossible. It iswell to keep firmly in mind thatnot one single enemy aircraft

appeared in any form to registerits objection.

Air Support: 1951-1953

After the breakout from theChosin Reservoir and the evacua-tion from Hungnam, the KoreanWar went into a lengthy phase ofextremely fierce fighting betweenthe ground forces as the EighthArmy checked its withdrawal,south of Seoul. The line surgedback and forth for months ofintensive combat, in many waysreminiscent of World War I inFrance, with breakthroughs beingfollowed by heavy counteroffen-sives, until it finally stabilized backat the same 38th Parallel where theconflict began in June 1950. In1951, there were many moves ofboth the 1st Marine Division andelements of the 1st Marine AircraftWing. The basic thrust of the wingwas to keep its units as close to thezone of action of the division aspossible in order to reduce to theminimum the response time torequests for close air support.Coming under Fifth Air Forcewithout any special agreements asto priority for X Corps, responsetimes from some points of viewoften became ridiculous, measuringfrom several hours all the way to noresponse at all. The JointOperations Center, manned byEighth Army and Fifth Air Force,processed all requests for air sup-port, promulgated a daily opera-tions order, approved allemergency requests for air sup-port, and generally controlled allair operations across the entirefront. With the front stretchingacross the Korean peninsula, witha communications net that tied inmany division and corps head-quarters in addition to subordinateunits, and many Air Force andother aviation commands, therewas much room for error and very

fertile ground for costly delays.Since such delays often couldmean losses to enemy action,which might have been avoided,had close support been responsiveand readily available, the JointOperations Center was not highlyregarded by Marines who hadbecome used to the responsive-ness of Marine air during theChosin breakout, Inchon-Seoulcampaign, and the Pusan Perim-eter. This was a difficult time for thewing because every time the FifthAir Force was approached with aproposal to improve wing supportof the division, the attempt ranhead-on into the statement thatthere were 10 or more divisions onthe main line of resistance andthere was no reason why oneshould have more air support thanthe others. There is without ques-tion something to be said for thatposition. But on the other hand, itcould never be sufficient to blockall efforts to improve close air sup-port response across the front byexamining in detail the elementsof different air control systemscontributing to fast responsive-ness.

Throughout the period from1951 to mid-1953, there were vari-ous agreements between the wingand Fifth Air Force relative to thewing’s support of 1st MarineDivision. These covered emer-gency situations in the divisionsector, daily allocations of trainingclose air support sorties, specialconcentrations for unusual efforts,and other special assignments ofMarine air for Marine ground.While these were indeed helpful,they never succeeded in answeringthe guts of the Marine Corps ques-tion, which essentially was: “Wedeveloped the finest system of airsupport known and equipped our-selves accordingly; we brought itout here intact; why can’t we useit?”

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If the Army-Air Force JointOperations Center system hadbeen compared in that combatenvironment to the Marine system,and statistically evaluated with theobjective of improved response tothe needs of the ground forces,something more meaningful mighthave been accomplished. Instead,what improvements were tried didnot seem to be tried all the way.What studies or assessments weremade of possibilities such asputting qualified Air Force pilotsinto TACPs with Army battalions,seemed to receive too quick a dis-missal. They were said to beimpractical, or would undercutother standard Air Force missionssuch as interdiction and isolationof the battlefield. Since the airsuperiority mission was confinedalmost entirely to the vicinity ofthe Yalu River in this war, a goodlaboratory-type chance to examinethe Joint Operations Center and

Marine systems under the samemicroscope was lost, probablyirretrievably. As if to prove the

loss, the same basic questionswere pondered, argued, and leftunanswered a decade or more

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing made a notable contribution in providing effectiveand speedy tactical air support. Simplified TACP control, request procedures, andfast radio system enabled wing pilots to reach the target area quickly and sup-port troops on the ground successfully.


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later in the puzzlement of theVietnam War.

By early 1952, the stabilization ofthe front had settled in to the pointwhere the fluctuations in the linewere relatively local. These surgeswere measured in hundreds orthousands of yards at most, ascompared to early 1951 where thebreakthroughs were listed in tens ofmiles. The Eighth Army hadbecome a field force of seasonedcombat-wise veterans, and withinlimitations, was supported by athoroughly professional Fifth AirForce. The wing, still tacticallycomposed of MAG-33 at K-3(Pohang) and K-8 (Kunsan) air-fields, and MAG-12, newly estab-lished at K-6 (Pyontaek), wasmore or less settled down to theroutines of stabilized warfare.Wing headquarters was at K-3, aswas the Marine Air Control Group,which handled the air defenseresponsibilities of the southernKorea sector for wing. Air defense

was not an over-exercised func-tion in southern Korea, but thecapability had to be in place, and itremained so throughout theremainder of the war. The controlgroup’s radars and communica-tions equipment got plenty ofexercise in the control and searchaspects of all air traffic in the sec-tor, and was a valuable asset of thewing, even though few if any“bogies” gave them air defenseexercise in fact. MAG-33 was com-posed of VMFs -311 and -115, bothwith Grumman F9F Panther jets,and the wing’s photographicsquadron, VMJ-l, equipped withMcDonnell F2H Banshee photojets, the very latest Navy-Marineaerial photographic camera andphoto processing equipment. Allwere at K-3 with accompanyingHeadquarters and ServiceSquadrons. At K-8, on the south-west side of the peninsula, MAG-33also had VMF(N)-513 withGrumman F7F-3N’s and Vought

F4U-5Ns. In mid-1952, -513 re-ceived Douglas F3D Skyknightsunder Colonel Peter D. Lambrecht,the first jet night fighter unit of thewing. Colonel Lambrecht hadtrained the squadron in the UnitedStates as -542, moving in the newunit as -513, making MAG-33entirely jet.

MAG-12 was the prop side ofthe house with VMAs -212, -323,and -312 equipped with the last ofthe Corsairs, and VMA-121 withDouglas AD Skyraiders. The ADwas a very popular aircraft withground Marines just like theCorsair, because of its great ord-nance carrying capability. VMA-312, under the administrativecontrol of MAG-12, and operatingfor short periods at K-6, main-tained the wing’s leg at sea andwas based on board the carrierBataan (CVL 29). The wing wassupported on the air transport sideby a detachment of VMR-152, inaddition to its own organic R4Ds,and by Far East Air Force’s CombatCargo Command when requiredfor major airlift. The rear echelon ofthe wing was at Itami, Japan,where it functioned as a supplybase, a receiving station for incom-ing replacements, a facility for spe-cial aircraft maintenance efforts,and a center for periodic rest andrecreation visits for combat per-sonnel.

Operationally, the 1st MarineAircraft Wing was in a uniqueposition with respect to the Fifth AirForce because the air commandtreated the two MAGs in the samemanner as they did their ownorganic wings. (Wing, in Air Forceparlance, is practically identical toMAG in Marine talk.) This left the1st Marine Aircraft Wing as kind ofan additional command echelonbetween Fifth Air Force and thetwo MAGs which was absent inthe line to all the other Air Forcetactical wings. On balance, the

Sketch by TSgt Tom Murray, USMC

Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 radio and radar van set-up atopChon-san—the imposing 3,000-foot peak near Pusan. During the early years ofthe war, the squadron was hard-pressed to identify and control the hundreds ofaircraft flying daily over Korea.

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Used as a night fighter during the early years of the war, thetwo-seat, twin-engine Grumman F7F Tigercat, with its dis-

tinctive nose-mounted radar and taller vertical tail, provedits capabilities time after time.

The Douglas AD Skyraider, one of the most versatile aircraftthen in existence, was used on electronic countermeasure,night fighter, and attack missions. It could carry more than

5,000 pounds of ordnance in addition to its two wing-mounted 20mm cannon.

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W.T. Larkins Collection, Naval Aviation History Office


The twin-engine Douglas F3D Skyknight jet night fightergained the respect of many “former” members of theChinese Air Force. With its state-of-the-art avionics, the big

jet was soon tasked with escorting Air Force B-29s, which hadbeen decimated by enemy MiGs.

The first Marine jet to see action in Korea, the Grumman F9FPanther compiled an enviable record in supporting United

Nations forces. It speed however was offset by its relativelyshort endurance and poor service reliability.

presence of the wing in the actwas a definite plus of the mostsupportive kind for the two MAGs.For instance, the daily operationorder for air operations came in tothe two MAGs during the nightand was popularly known as the“frag order,” or simply, “the frag.”The wing also received the frag atthe same time by teletype andcould check it over with MAGoperations or even intercede withthe Air Force if considered desir-able. Relations between Fifth AirForce and wing were consistentlygood and although communica-tions were somewhat hectic fromtime to time, the basic daily oper-ational plans got through so thatplanned schedules could be metmost of the time.

Maintenance of good commandrelations between the wing andthe Fifth Air Force in the some-times-difficult structure of the

Korean War was a direct function ofthe personalities involved. Marineaviation was fortunate in thisregard with a succession of wingcommanders who not only gainedthe respect of their Air Force coun-terparts, but also did not permitdoctrinal differences, which mightoccur from adversely affecting themutuality of that respect.Relationships were very muchaided also by the presence of aliaison colonel from the wing onduty at the Joint OperationsCenter, a post that smoothed manyan operational problem before itcould grow into something out ofproportion. The teams of leadersof the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing andthe Fifth Air Force were hard tomatch. Generals Field Harris–Earl E.Partridge, Christian F. Schilt–FrankE. Everest, Clayton C. Jerome–Glenn O. Barcus, and Vernon E.Megee–Glenn O. Barcus, constitut-

ed some of the most experiencedand talented airmen the countryhad produced up to that time.

Operations of both MAGs gen-erally ran to the same patternthroughout the war. Neither groupwas engaged in any except chanceencounters with respect to air-to-air,and some of these brought anoccasional startling result as whena Corsair shot down a Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15. However, sinceair combat was confined to theYalu River area, the chanceencounters were very infrequent.Considering the types of aircraftwith which both groups wereequipped, it is probably just aswell that the Communists workedtheir MiGs largely in that confinedsector. This left the usual fragorder assignments to Marine air-craft mostly in the interdiction andclose air support categories, with alesser number in night interdictionand photo reconnaissance.

Interdiction as a category took aheavy percentage of the dailyavailability of aircraft because ofthe determination of the Air Forceto show that by cutting theenemy’s supply lines his ability tofight effectively at the front could bedried up. No one can deny thewisdom of this as a tenet. But inKorea at various stages of the war,it was conclusively shown that theNorth Koreans and the Chinesehad an uncanny ability to fixroads, rails, and bridges in jury-rigged fashion with very littlebreak in the flow of supplies. Thiswas most evident at the main lineof resistance where no drying upwas noted. Because interdictionwas not proving effective, any dis-satisfaction stemmed from the lowallocation of aircraft to close airsupport where air support wasneeded almost daily. To many, itseemed that having tried theemphasis on interdiction at theexpense of close air support, pru-

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Cardinal Francis J. Spellman visits the Korean orphanage at Pohang supportedby the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. To the Cardinal’s left are: MajGen Christian F.Schilt, Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing; Bishop GermainMousset, head of the orphanage; and Col Carson A. Roberts, commanding offi-cer of Marine Aircraft Group 33.

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Major-League Reservists

The Marine Corps Air Reserve, like other Reservecomponents of the United States military, hadcontracted after World War II. Unlike today’s

active organization, many reservists simply went inactive,remaining on the roles for call-up, but not drilling.Former SBD pilot, Guadalcanal veteran, and a greatlyadmired officer, Colonel Richard C. Mangrum (later lieu-tenant general) helped to establish a Aviation Reserve pro-gram, resulting in the Marine Corps Air Reserve TrainingCommand that would be the nucleus of the “mobilizable”4th Marine Aircraft Wing in 1962. By July 1948, there were27 fighter-bomber squadrons, flying mostly F4UCorsairs, although VMF-321 at Naval Air StationAnacostia in Washington, D.C., flew Grumman F8Fs fora time, and eight ground control intercept squadrons.Major General Christian F. Schilt, who received theMedal of Honor for his service in Nicaragua, ran therevamped Air Reserves from his headquarters at Naval AirStation Glenview, Illinois.

When the North Koreans invaded South Korea, theRegular Marine forces were desperately below manninglevels required to participate in a full-scale war halfwayaround the world. The Commandant, General Clifton B.Cates, requested a Reserve call-up. At the time, there were30 Marine Corps Air Reserve squadrons and 12 MarineGround Control Intercept Squadrons. These squadronsincluded 1,588 officers and 4,753 enlisted members. Bylate July 1950, Marines from three fighter and six groundcontrol intercept squadrons had been mobilized—othersfollowed. These participated in such early actions as theInchon landing; 17 percent of the Marines involved werereservists.

The success of the United Nations operations in con-taining and ultimately pushing back the North Koreanadvance, prompted the Communist Chinese to enter thewar in November and December 1950, creating anentirely new, and dangerous, situation. The well-docu-mented Chosin breakout also resulted in a surge ofapplications to the Marine Corps Reserves from 877 inDecember 1950 to 3,477 in January 1951.

In January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized theMarine Corps to increase the number of its fightersquadrons from 18 to 21. Eight days later, nine fightersquadrons were ordered to report to duty. Six of thesewere mobilized as personnel, while three—VMFs -131,-251, and -451—were recalled as squadrons, thus pre-serving their squadron designations. Many of therecalled aviators and crewmen had seen sustained servicein World War II. Their recall resulted from the smallnumber of Marine aviators, Regular and Reserve, comingout of flight training between World War II and the firstsix months of the Korean War. Interestingly, few of thecall-ups had experience in the new jet aircraft, a lack ofknowledge that would not sit well with many Regular

members of the squadrons that received the eager, butmeagerly trained Reserve second lieutenants. As onereservist observed, without rancor: “The regulars had allthe rank.”

Major (later Lieutenant General) Thomas H. Miller, Jr.,who served as operations officer and then executiveofficer of VMA-323, appreciated the recalled reservists.Remembering that the executive officer of the squadron,Major Max H. Harper, who was killed in action, was areservist, Miller observed that although the Reserve avi-ators had to be brought up to speed on current tactics,they never complained and were always ready to dotheir part.

Miller was the eighth Marine to transition to jets andwas looking forward to joining VMF-311 to fly Panthers.However, because he had flown Corsairs in World War IIand was a senior squadron aviator, he was assigned toVMA-323 as a measure of support to the incomingReserve aviators, most of who were assigned to theCorsair-equipped units in Korea. It was important, heobserved, to show the Reserves that Regular Marinesflew the old, but still-effective fighters, too.

The call-up affected people from all stations, fromshopkeepers to accountants to baseball players. Twobig-league players, Captain Gerald F. “Jerry” Coleman ofthe New York Yankees and Captain Theodore S. “Ted”Williams of the Boston Red Sox, were recalled at the sametime, and even took their physicals at Jacksonville on thesame day in May 1952. Another member of the 1952Yankees, third baseman Robert W. “Bobby” Brown, wasactually a physician, and upon his recall, served with anArmy ground unit in Korea as battalion surgeon.

Capt Gerald F. “Jerry” Coleman poses in an F4U Corsairof VMA-323. Playing second base for the New YorkYankees, the former World War II SBD dive-bomber pilotwas recalled to duty for Korea.

Courtesy of Gerald F. Coleman

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At 34, Williams was not a young man by either base-ball or military standards when he was recalled to activeduty in Korea in 1952. Of course, he was not alone inbeing recalled, but his visibility as a public figure madehis case special. The star hitter took the event stoically.In an article, which appeared the August 1953 issue of TheAmerican Weekly, he said: “The recall wasn’t exactlyjoyous news, but I tried to be philosophical about it. Itwas happening to a lot of fellows, I thought. I was no bet-ter than the rest.”

Many in the press could not understand the need torecall “second hand warriors,” as one reporter wrotesomewhat unkindly. Most sports writers bemoaned thefact that Williams was really kind of old for a ball play-er as well as for a combat jet pilot.

However, the Boston outfielder reported for duty on2 May 1952, received a checkout in Panthers withVMF-223 at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NorthCarolina, and was assigned to VMF-311 in Korea. Hissquadron mates got used to having a celebrity in theirmidst. Future astronaut and United States Senator John H.Glenn, then a major, was his flight leader for nearly halfhis missions.

On 16 February 1953, Williams was part of a 35-planestrike against Highway 1, south of Pyongyang, NorthKorea. As the aircraft from VMF-115 and VMF-311 doveon the target, Williams felt his plane shudder as hereached 5,000 feet. “Until that day I had never put ascratch on a plane in almost four years of military flying.But I really did it up good. I got hit just as I dropped mybombs on the target—a big Communist tank andinfantry training school near Pyongyang. The hitknocked out my hydraulic and electrical systems and start-ed a slow burn.”

Unable to locate his flight leader for instructions andhelp, Williams was relieved to see another pilot,Lieutenant Lawrence R. Hawkins, slide into view.Hawkins gave his plane a once-over and told Williams thatthe F9F was leaking fluid (it turned out later to behydraulic fluid). Joining up on the damaged Panther,Hawkins led Williams back to K-3 (Pohang), calling onthe radio for a clear runway and crash crews. The base-ball player was going to try to bring his plane back,instead of bailing out.

With most of his flight instruments gone, Williamswas flying on instinct and the feel of the plane as he cir-cled wide of the field, setting himself up for theapproach.

It took a few, long minutes for the battered Panther tocome down the final approach, but perhaps his athlete’sinstincts and control enabled Williams to do the job. TheF9F finally crossed over the end of the runway, and slidalong on its belly, as Williams flicked switches to preventa fire. As the plane swerved to a stop, the shaken pilotblew off the canopy and jumped from his aircraft, a lit-tle worse for wear, but alive.

Later that month, after returning to El Toro, he wrote

a friend in Philadelphia describing the mission:

No doubt you read about my very hairy experience.I am being called lucky by all the boys and withgood cause. Some lucky bastard hit me with smallarms and. . . started a fire. I had no radio, fuel pres-sure, no air speed, and I couldn’t cut it off and slideon my belly. . . . Why the thing didn’t really blowI don’t know. My wingman was screaming for meto bail out, but of course, with the electrical equip-ment out, I didn’t hear anything.

Williams received the Air Medal for bringing theplane back. He flew 38 missions before an old ear infec-tion acted up, and he was eventually brought back to theStates in June. After convalescing, Williams returned tothe Boston Red Sox for the 1954 season, eventually retir-ing in 1960. Although obviously glad to come back to histeam, his closing comment in the letter to his friend inPhiladelphia indicates concern about the squadronmates he left behind: “We had quite a few boys hit late-ly. Some seem to think the bastards have a new computerto get the range. Hope Not.”


Capt Theodore S. Williams prepares for a mission in hisVMF-311 Panther jet. Although in his mid-30s, Williamssaw a lot of action, often as the wingman of anotherfamous Marines aviator, Maj John H. Glenn.

dence and logic would haveswitched the preponderance ofeffort the other way, particularlywhere casualties were being takenwhich close air support missionsmight have helped reduce.

Other than in this doctrinal area,interdiction missions targeted sup-ply dumps, troop concentrations,and vehicle convoys, as in the ear-lier days of the war. Day roadreconnaissance missions became

less productive as the monthsrolled by, and the Communistsbecame very adept at the use ofvehicle camouflage as they parkedoff the routes waiting nightfall.Flak became increasingly intensealso and was invariably in placeand active wherever a road or railcut looked to the target analysts asif it might create a choke pointleading to a supply break. Thefact, however, that nothing moved

except at night generally stated theeffectiveness of day interdiction.But it was impossible to isolate thebattlefield if the tactical air wasonly effective half of each day.

VMF(N)-513 carried the load forthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing withrespect to night road reconnais-sance, or “road recces” as theywere known, using both F7F-3Nsand F4U-5Ns. Usually, they wereassigned a specific section of road

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Unlike Williams, who had spent his World War II dutyas an instructor, Yankees second-baseman Coleman hadseen his share of combat in the Philippines in 1945 as anSBD pilot with Marine Scout Bomber Squadron 341, the“Torrid Turtles,” flying 57 missions in General DouglasMacArthur’s campaign to wrest the archipelago from theJapanese.

Coleman had wanted gold wings right out of highschool in 1942, when two young naval aviators strode intoa class assembly to entice the male graduates with theirsnappy uniforms and flashy wings. He had signed up andeventually received his wings of gold. When Marine aceCaptain Joseph J. “Joe” Foss appeared at his base, how-ever, Coleman decided he would join the Marines. Andhe soon found himself dive-bombing the Japanese onLuzon.

Returning home, he went inactive and pursued acareer in professional baseball. Before the war, Colemanhad been a member of a semi-pro team in the SanFrancisco area, and he returned to it as a part of theYankees farm system.

He joined the Yankees as a shortstop in 1948, but wasmoved to second base. Coleman exhibited gymnasticagility at the pivotal position, frequently taking to the airas he twisted to make a play at first base or third. His col-orful manager, Casey Stengel, remarked: “Best man Iever saw on a double play. Once, I saw him make a throwwhile standin’ on his head. He just goes ‘whisht!’ and he’sgot the feller at first.” By 1950, the young starter hadestablished himself as a dependable member of one ofthe game’s most colorful teams. He had not flown since1945.

As the situation in Korea deteriorated for the allies, theresulting call-up of Marine Reserve aviators finallyreached Coleman. The 28-year-old second baseman,however, accepted the recall with patriotic understand-ing: “If my country needed me, I was ready. Besides, thehighlight of my life had always been—even includingbaseball—flying for the Marines.” After a refresher flightcourse, Coleman was assigned to the Death Rattlers ofVMF-323, equipped with F4U-4 and AU-1 Corsairs.

Younger than Williams, whom he never encounteredoverseas, the second baseman had one or two close

calls in Korea. He narrowly averted a collision with an AirForce F-86, which had been cleared from the opposite endof the same runway for a landing. Later, he experiencedan engine failure while carrying a full bomb load. Withno place to go, he continued his forward direction to acrash landing. Miraculously, the bombs did not deto-nate, but his Corsair flipped over, and the force jerked thestraps of Coleman’s flight helmet so tight that he nearlychoked to death. Fortunately, a quick-thinking Navycorpsman reached him in time.

Coleman flew 63 missions from January to May 1953,adding another Distinguished Flying Cross and sevenAir Medals to his World War II tally. With 120 total com-bat missions in two wars, he served out the remainder ofhis Korea tour as a forward air controller.

When the armistice was signed in July 1953, he got acall from the Yankees home office, asking if he could getan early release to hurry home for the rest of the season.At first the Marine Corps balked at expediting the captain’strip home. But when the Commandant intervened, itwas amazing how quickly Coleman found himself on aFlying Tigers transport leaving Iwakuni bound forCalifornia.

Coleman had to settle for rejoining his team for the1954 season, but he felt he never regained his gameafter returning from Korea. Retiring in 1959, he becamea manager in the front office, indulged in several com-mercial ventures, and finally began announcing for theexpansion team San Diego Padres in 1971, where he canstill be found today.

The press occasionally quipped that the military wastrying to form its own baseball club in Korea. However,the players never touched a bat or ball in theirsquadrons. In the privacy of the examination room, Dr.Robert “Bobby” Brown did try to show an injured soldierhow to better his slide technique—all in the interests ofmorale.

According to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Airat the time, John F. Floberg, every third airplane that flewon a combat mission in Korea was flown by a Navy orMarine reservist. Of the total combat sorties conductedby the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Air Reservesflew 48 percent.

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and a time on station, coordinatedwith a flare plane which wouldsometimes be a wing R4D, at oth-ers another Tigercat or Corsair, or atstill others an Air Force aircraft. Amission plan would be set up andbriefed for all participants, and allintelligence available would becovered. At the agreed upon time,the flare plane would illuminateand the pilot of the attack planewould be in such a position that hecould hopefully make maximumuse of the light in delivering hisordnance, usually fragmentationbombs, napalm, and strafing.Here, as elsewhere, as the stabi-

lized phase of the war continued,the Communists improved theiruse of organized light flak. Manyplanes were holed with hand-heldweapons, indicating a policy ofmassed fires of all weapons whenunder air attack. In addition, asteadily increasing number ofmobile twin 40mm mountsappeared on the roads, whichadded weight to the flak problem.The gradual improvement waseffective to the point that in 1952,the F7F was taken off road reccesbecause its twin-engine configura-tion was correlated with excessivelosses without the protection of

one big engine directly forward ofthe cockpit. The Corsair continuedto fly road recces, but the Tigercatwas used primarily for air-to-airintercepts at night from mid-1952.The F3D Skyknight, when itarrived in -513, was used for deepair-to-air patrolling and for nightescort of B-29s, with the F7F forcloser range patrols.

Close air support missions wereof two types. The first, used themost, appeared in the frag as anassignment of a certain number ofaircraft to report to a specific con-trol point at a specific time, for useby that unit as required or specified.

During a series of strike missions in June 1953, more than68 Panther jets from VMFs –115 and –311 destroyed or

damaged more than 230 enemy buildings using napalm andincendiary munitions.


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Night MiG Killers

AMarine squadron that had both an unusual com-plement of aircraft and mission assignments wasVMF(N)-513, the “Flying Nightmares.” The

squadron was on its way to the Pacific war zone whenthe Japanese surrendered, but it was an early arrival inKorea, operating Grumman’s graceful twin-engine F7FTigercat. Too late to see action in the Pacific, the F7F hadlanguished, and it was not until the war in Korea that itwas able to prove its worth.

Actually, a sister squadron, VMF(N)-542 had taken thefirst Tigercats over—by ship—and flew some of the firstland-based Marine missions of the war, relinquishing theGrummans to -513 when it relieved -542.

The Flying Nightmares soon found their specialty innight interdiction, flying against Communist road supplytraffic, much as their successors would do more than 10years later and farther to the south in Vietnam, this timeflying F-4 Phantoms.

Operating from several Air Force “K” fields, -513quickly gained two other aircraft types—the F4U Corsairand the twin-jet F3D Skyknight. Thus, the squadron flewthree frontline warplanes for the three years of its rotat-ing assignment to the war zone.

The squadron accounted for hundreds of enemyvehicles and rolling stock during dangerous, sometimesfatal, interdiction strikes. Four Nightmare aviators wereshot down and interned as prisoners of war.

Occasionally, Air Force C-47 flareships would illumi-nate strips of road for the low-flying Corsair pilots, a trickybusiness, but the high-intensity flares allowed theMarines to get down to within 200 to 500 feet of their tar-gets.

Nightmare aviator First Lieutenant Harold E. Rolandrecounted how he prepared for a night interdiction flightin his Corsair:

As soon as I was strapped in, I liked to put on mymask, select 100 percent oxygen and take a fewdeep breaths. It seemed to clear the vision. At theend of 4 1/2 hours at low altitude, 100 percentoxygen could suck the juices from your body, butthe improved night vision was well worth it.We always took off away from the low mountainsto the north. Turning slowly back over them, myF4U-5N labored under the napalm, belly tank, and

eight loaded wing stations. I usually leveled off at6,000 feet or 7,000 feet, using 1,650 rpm, trying toconserve fuel, cruising slowly at about 160 indicat-ed.

The F4U pilots were expected to remain on station,within a quick call to attack another column of enemytrucks. Individual pilots would relieve another squadronmate as he exhausted his ordnance and ammunition.

VMF(N)-513 was also unique in that it scored aerial killswith all three types of the aircraft it operated. TheCorsairs shot down one Yakovlev Yak-9 and onePolikarpov PO-2, while the F7Fs accounted for two PO-2s. The jet-powered F3Ds, black and sinister, with redmarkings, destroyed four MiG-15s, two PO-2s, and oneother Communist jet fighter identified as a Yak-15, butsometimes as a later Yak-17.

Today, the squadron flies the AV-8B Harrier II, andalthough based at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma,Arizona, it is usually forward deployed in Japan. Adetachment of VMA-513 Harriers flew combat opera-tions during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Returning on the night he shot down a MiG-15,squadron commander LtCol Robert F. Conley greets SSgtWalter R. Connor. There was a second MiG, which was list-ed as a probable, hence SSgt Connor’s two-fingered ges-ture.


Applicable intelligence and coordi-nating information would beincluded most of the time, andordnance would either be speci-fied or assigned as a standard load.Depending on the target, if onewas specified in the frag, flights of

this type were usually of four aircraftbut could often be as many aseight or twelve. The second type ofclose air support mission wasknown as strip alert. This conceptwas adapted usually to those fight-er fields which were reasonably

close to the main line of resistance,making it possible for the slowerprop aircraft so assigned to reachany sector of the front from whicha close support request wasreceived, in minimum time. It wasalso used from fields farther back,

primarily with jet aircraft, in orderto conserve their fuel so that theycould remain on station longer,time to reach any sector of thefront not being as much of a factoras with prop aircraft. Ordnanceloads for strip alert close air supportcould be specified or standard.

Intelligence matters and coordinat-ing data would usually be givenwhile the aircraft were enroute.Strip alert aircraft were withoutexception under the “scramble”control of Joint Operations Center.

The same increasing antiaircraftcapabilities of the Communists

were found along the main line ofresistance as elsewhere. In fact,stabilized warfare brought someweird and different tactics intoplay, which were somewhat remi-niscent of the “Pistol Pete” days atGuadalcanal. Heavy antiaircraftartillery guns were sited close to

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Corsairs of Marine Fighter Squadron 312, based on thelight carrier Bataan (CVL 29), carry out a raid against sev-

eral small North Korean boats suspected of being used to laymines along the Korean coastline.


47

the main line of resistance just outof friendly artillery range, and 37and 40mm twins were a common-ly encountered near the frontlines.Once the close air support flightchecked in with the Tactical AirControl Party, the usual responsewas for the controller to bring theflight leader “on target” by havinghim make coached dummy runs.

When he had the target clearlyspotted, he would mark it with arocket or other weapon on anoth-er run, having alerted the orbitingflight to watch his mark. The flightwould then make individual runs, incolumn and well spaced, invari-ably down the same flight path.While this was essential for accuratetarget identification, the wholeprocess gradually told the enemyexactly who or what the targetwas, so that by the second or thirdrun down the same slot, everyenemy weapon not in the actualtarget was zeroed in on the nextdive. The heavy antiaircraftartillery and automatic antiaircraftfire complicated the processbecause the flight, orbiting at10,000 feet or so, now had other

things to consider while watchingthe flight leader’s dummy run andmark. In close air support, there isusually no way to change thedirection of the actual attack run

without subjecting friendly troops toinordinate danger of “shorts” or“overs.”

The net effect stimulated moretime on target coordinating tacticswith the artillery, and also putmore emphasis on the detailedbriefing given by the forward aircontroller by radio to the flight.This measure served to reduce thenumber of dummy runs and mark-ing runs required, while coordina-tion with the artillery put airburstsinto the area at precisely the righttime to cut down on the massing ofenemy weapons on each succeed-ing dive. These measures wereeffective counters to the increasedantiaircraft capability of theenemy, without the sacrifice of anyeffectiveness in close air supportdelivery.

To attempt to fill the lack ofTactical Air Control Parties in theArmy and other United Nationsdivisions, the Fifth Air Force usedthe North American T-6 training


An entrenched Marine peers out over the lip of his bunker to observe an air strikeagainst equally entrenched Communist soldiers on the western front in Korea.

A bird’s-eye-view of Battery B, 1st 90mm Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion’sheavily sandbagged position north of Pusan. While the battalion’s two 90mm bat-teries were centered on Pusan, its .50-caliber automatic weapons battery was sta-tioned at K-3 (Pohang), the home base of MAG-33.

1st MAW Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jul53

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aircraft which flew low over thefrontlines and controlled air strikesin close support, in somewhat thesame manner as was done by aforward air controller in theTactical Air Control Party. Many ofthese controllers, known as“Mosquitos,” were very capable intransmitting target information tostrike aircraft and in identifyingand marking targets. The Mosquitowas an effective gap-filler, butwith increased enemy antiaircraftfire, the effectiveness of the expe-dient fell off markedly.

In addition to interdiction andclose air support missions, fromtime to time Fifth Air Force wouldlay on a maximum effort acrossthe board when intelligence devel-oped a new or important target.These missions would involve allAir Force wings, in addition to thetwo MAGs, and a heavy force fromTask Force 77 carriers. Preliminarycoordination and planning would

Department of Defense Photo (USN) 443503

Among the targets hit by Marine aircraft were the generating stations of hydro-electric plants along the Yalu River, which provided power to Communist-con-trolled manufacturing centers. The resultant blackout of the surrounding areashalted production of supplies needed by enemy forces.

A Sikorsky HRS-1 helicopter picks up several Marines froma precarious frontline position. The helicopters of MarineHelicopter Transport Squadron 161 revolutionized frontline

operations, bringing men and equipment into the battlezone and evacuating the wounded in minutes.


usually be the subject of confer-ences at Joint Operations Center, towhich the wing commanders(including the commanding offi-cers of the Marine aircraft groups)would be summoned. When anon-scheduled wing commandersconference was called, it was asignal that a big one was in theoffing. Examples of this type oftargeting included the hydroelec-tric plant complex, long restrictedand finally released in June 1952;intelligence indications of a high-level Communist conference inPyongyang; or an important instal-lation on the Yalu, just across fromthe MiG fields in Manchuria. Thesemissions broke the routine of sta-bilized warfare and gave all units achance to see what massing theiraircraft could achieve—it was agood break from the usual flight-of-four routine.

While VMO-6 continued its sup-port of the division through 1951-1953 with its OYs, OEs, and

HO3Ss, the big news in heli-copters was the arrival of MarineTransport Helicopter Squadron161 on 31 August 1951.Commanded by LieutenantColonel George W. Herring, thefirst transport helicopter squadronwas attached to the division andadministratively supported by thewing in the pattern of VMO-6. Justtwo weeks later, the squadronexecuted the first resupply andcasualty evacuation lift in just 2.5hours, moving 19,000 pounds ofcargo seven miles to the engaged2d Battalion, 1st Marines, andevacuating 74 casualties. CalledOperation Windmill, it was thefirst in a long and growing list ofMarine Corps combat lifts. HMR-161 set standards on helicopteroperations with troops, which arestill in active use. The squadronwas a leader in night and margin-al weather operations, and pio-neered many different movementsof field equipment in combat for

the division, quick tactical dis-placements which were previouslyimpossible. A typical example wasthe pre-planned emplacement ofrocket launchers, which after aripple discharge attracted immedi-ate counterbattery fire. Lifting thelaunchers in by “chopper,” andthen immediately lifting them toanother planned site after firingavoided an enemy response.

Another piece of Marine avia-tion equipment that was movedinto the 1st Marine Division areaearly in 1951 was a radar bombingsystem that could direct aircraft totheir proper release points at nightor in bad weather. It was scaleddown from an Air Force versionmounted in large vans that wasunsuitable for forward battlefieldterrain, to a mobile configurationthat could be used close to thefrontlines. Designated the MPQ-14, the objective of the design wasto provide close air supportaround-the-clock, regardless ofthe weather. While this ambitiousgoal was not attained, neverthe-less the use of the MPQ-14 radar inKorea was an unqualified successin that it kept an “almost close”capability over the frontlinesunder conditions that previouslyhad closed the door to air support.MPQ-14 air support was never asclose and as positive as the close airsupport, but it was useful andcontinued to fill that type of needmany years after Korea.

In practice, the MPQ controllerwould vector the aircraft to therelease point and at the properspot, would direct release byradio, and in later refinements,automatically. The aircraft wouldbe in horizontal flight, and ineffect it turned day fighters andday attack aircraft into all-weatherhorizontal bombers, without anymajor modification to the aircraft,ordnance, and communicationssystems. The work that was done

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Developed between 1946 and 1950, the MPQ-14 radar-controlled bombingequipment was employed by Marine Air Support Radar Team 1 to control nightfighter sorties flown by day attack aircraft, achieving Marine aviation’s prima-ry goal of providing real 24-hour close air support, regardless of weather conditions.

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VMJ-1 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Oct52

Crewmen load reconnaissance cameras on board one ofMarine Photographic Squadron 1’s MacDonnell F2H-2PBanshees. The squadron’s wartime output of more than

793,000 feet of processed prints was equal to a continuousphotographic strip six-and-one-half times around the earthat the equator.

VMJ-1 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Oct52

Maj Marion B. Bowers, VMJ-1’s executive officer, prepares to“light-off” his 550-mph F2H-2P twin-jet Banshee for anoth-er unarmed but escorted mission deep into North Korea to

photograph enemy positions, airfields, powers plants, andother potential targets.

with the MPQ-14 in Korea estab-lished confidence in its use andset procedures in its employment,which are still standard practice.

In the spring of 1952, MAG-33acquired a new and specialsquadron, VMJ-1. A photo recon-naissance unit, the squadron wasequipped with 10 McDonnell F2H-2P Banshees and the latest Navy-Marine camera configuration thatmade the aircraft by far the most

efficient photo reconnaissancesystem in the Fifth Air Force. Notonly were the side-looking andvertical cameras superior to any-thing else around, but also thesquadron was equipped with itsown organic field film processingequipment. The design of theBanshee photo equipment wasthe work of the photographicdevelopment section of theBureau of Aeronautics of the

Navy, the McDonnell AircraftCorporation, and the Navy andMarine pilots assigned to the asso-ciate activities. Where the percent-age of film exposed that afterprocessing was readable had beenno more than 30 percent, the com-parable figure in VMJ-1 was morethan 90 percent. This factor, alongwith other automated advances inthe system, literally made the 10Banshees, which comprised no

51

Who Were the Guys in the MiGs?

For decades, the public perception was the men inthe cockpits on the other side were North Koreanand Communist Chinese. While there were cer-

tainly pilots from these countries flying against alliedaircraft, recent disclosures after the collapse of theSoviet Union in 1991 and subsequent release of previouslyclassified files, point to a complete wing of MiG-15sflown exclusively by “volunteered” Soviet aviators,many of whom had considerable combat experience inWorld War II. Several had sizeable kill scores against theGermans. Indeed, the leader of the wing, although heapparently did not actually fly MiGs in Korean combat,was Colonel, later Air Marshall, Ivan N. Kozhedub, with62 kills on the Eastern Front, the top-scoring Allied aceof World War II.

The Soviets went to great lengths to disguise the trueidentities of their MiG drivers. They dressed the much larg-er Soviet aviators in Chinese flight suits, complete withred-topped boots, and tried (somewhat unsuccessfully)to teach them flying phrases in Chinese to use on theradio. But they could not hide the rapid-fire RussianAmerican monitors and pilots heard once a majorengagement had begun. The American Sabre andPanther pilots always suspected that the “honchos,” theleaders of the so-called “bandit trains” that launchedfrom the other side of the Yalu River, were actuallySoviets.

While the MiG-15 was a match for the American F-86Sabre jets, which several Marine Corps aviators flew dur-ing exchange tours with the Air Force, its pilots laterdescribed their cockpits as rather cramped with much lessvisibility compared to the Sabre. They flew without G-suitsor hard helmets unlike their opposite numbers in the F-86s. MiG-15 pilots used the more traditional leather hel-mets and goggles—a kit used through the 1970s byNorth Vietnamese MiG-17 pilots.

The MiG’s ejection seat required activating only onehandle, whereas the Sabre pilot had to raise both armsof his seat to eject. While the Soviet arrangement might

be advantageous if the pilot was hurt in one arm, itcould also place him badly out of proper position whenejecting, and could result in major back injuries.

Korean service was hard, and decidedly inglorious forthe Soviet crews, who remained largely anonymous formore than 40 years. Yet, it would seem that the top-scor-ing jet-mounted ace in the world is a Russian, ColonelYevgeni Pepelyaev with 23 kills over United States AirForce F-86s and F-84 Thunderjets in Korea. He is close-ly followed by Captain Nikolai Sutyagin with 21 scores.The only other jet aces who approached these scores aretwo Israelis, with 17 and 15 kills, and American AirForce Captain Joseph “Mac” McConnell with 16 kills in F-86s. When McConnell was ordered home in May 1953,Marine Corps ace Major John F. Bolt, Jr., succeeded himas commander of Dog Flight, 39th Squadron, 51stFighter Interceptor Wing.

Yefim Gordon Archives

Soviet volunteer pilots inspect one of their MiG-15s inKorea. The MiG’s small size shows up well, as does thebifurcated nose intake.

more than 20 percent of the photoreconnaissance force available,carry upwards of 30 to 40 percentof the daily Air Force photo missionload.

The employment of the recon-naissance aircraft was interesting.Totally unarmed, almost all of itsmissions were flown unescorted athigh altitude, except that often thepilot in the event of cloud obstruc-tion would descend below a clouddeck to acquire his target if thearea was not too hot. For thetougher targets, like Sinanju and

Suiho on the Yalu, which werewell within MiG range from acrossthe Yalu, the Banshee was escort-ed by an ample flight of NorthAmerican F-86 Sabre jets. Therewas an advantage, strange as itmay seem, to the unescorted mis-sion. A single Banshee at high alti-tude presented a very low profile toenemy antiaircraft radar and radarfighter direction equipment, com-pared to that of one photo planewith four or more fighter escorts incompany. The unescorted mis-sions penetrated all the way up

the east coast to the Soviet borderand at the extreme northeast end ofthe run, Vladivostok was clearlyvisible. Other missions would takethe aircraft the length of theManchurian border down the Yaluto the point where the range ofthe MiG dictated escort. If jumpedwhen unescorted, the bestdefense against the MiG was asteep and very tight spiral to thedeck or to the nearest heavycloudbank.

The last highlight to mentionwas the system arranged betweenFifth Air Force and 1st MarineAircraft Wing which provided afew Marines, after they had fin-ished their tours in MAG-33 jets, theexperience of a few weeks tempo-rary duty with the F-86 squadrons.Being very experienced jet pilots,they checked out quickly andwere taken into the regular flightsof the Air Force squadrons, somefor as many as 50 or more mis-sions against the MiG. FromNovember 1951 to July 1953, thesevisitors shot down a total of 21MiG-15s. At any given time, therewas usually only one Marine onduty with each of the two F-86wings. The high score and onlyMarine jet ace of the group wasMajor John F. Bolt with six,although Major John H. Glenn,getting three in July 1953, wasclosing in fast when the ceasefirewas announced. It was a valuableprogram for Marine aviation,which was indebted to the AirForce for the experience; air-to-airexperience being essentiallydenied because the straight-wingF9F was no match for the swept-wing MiG-15. With the Corsair,Tigercat, and Skyknight tollsadded in, Marines shot downmore than 37 Communist aircraft ofall types during the Korean War.

The character of the KoreanWar for Marine aviation was lighton air-to-air, heavy on air-to-

52

1stMAW Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jul53

Maj John F. Bolt, Jr., while flying a North American F-86 Sabre jet with the AirForce’s 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing shot down his sixth MiG-15 on 12 July 1953,becoming the Marine Corps’ first jet ace. Bolt also achieved ace-status during WorldWar II by downing six Japanese aircraft while flying with the Black Sheep of VMF-214.

53

Marine Pilots and Enemy Aircraft DownedDate: Pilot Squadron Aircraft Flown Aircraft Downed

21 Apr 51: 1stLt Harold D. Daigh VMF-312 F4U-4 2 Yak-9

21 Apr 51: Capt Phillip C. DeLong VMF-312 F4U-4 2 Yak-9

30 Jun 51: Capt Edwin B. Long/

WO Robert C. Buckingham VMF(N)-513 F7F-3N 1 PO-2

12 Jul 51: Capt Donald L. Fenton VMF(N)-513 F4U-5NL 1 PO-2

23 Sep 51: Maj Eugene A. Van Gundy/

MSgt Thomas H. Ullom VMF(N)-513 F7F-3N 1 PO-2

4 Nov 51: Capt William F Guss 336 FIS (USAF) F-86A 1 MiG-15

5 Mar 52: Capt Vincent J. Marzelo 16 FIS (USAF)* F-86A 1 MiG-15

16 Mar 52: LtCol John S. Payne 336 FIS (USAF) F-86A 1 MiG-15

7 Jun 52: 1stLt John W. Andre VMF(N)-513 F4U-4NL 1 Yak-9

10 Sep 52: Capt Jesse G. Folmar VMF-312 F4U-4 1 MiG-15

15 Sep 52: Maj Alexander J. Gillis 335 FIS (USAF) F-86E 1 MiG-15

28 Sep 52: Maj Alexander J. Gillis 335 FIS (USAF) F-86E2 2 MiG-15

3 Nov 52: Maj William T. Stratton, Jr./

MSgt Hans C. Hoglind VMF(N)-513 F3D-2 1 Yak-15(17?)

8 Nov 52: Capt Oliver R. Davis

WO Dramus F. Fessler VMF(N)-513 F3D-2 1 MiG-15

10 Dec 52: 1stLt Joseph A. Corvi/

MSgt Dan R. George VMF(N)-513 F3D-2 1 PO-2

12 Jan 53: Maj Elswin P. Dunn/

MSgt Lawrence J. Fortin VMF(N)-513 F3D-2 1 MiG-15

20 Jan 53: Capt Robert Wade 16 FIS (USAF) F-86E 1 MiG-15

28 Jan 53: Capt James R. Weaver/

MSgt Robert P. Becker VMF(N)-513 F3D-2 1 MiG-15

31 Jan 53: LtCol Robert F. Conley/

MSgt James N. Scott VMF(N)-513 F3D-2 1 MiG-15

7 Apr 53: Maj Robert Reed 39 FIS (USAF) F-86F 1 MiG-15

12 Apr 53: Maj Robert Reed 39 FIS (USAF) F-86F 1 MiG-15

16 May 53: Maj John F. Bolt 39 FIS (USAF) F-86F 1 MiG-15

17 May 53: Capt Dewey F. Durnford 335 FIS (USAF) F-86F 1/2 MiG-15

18 May 53: Capt Harvey L. Jensen 25 FIS (USAF) F-86F 1 MiG-15

15 Jun 53: Maj George H. Linnemeier VMC-1 AD-4 1 PO-2

22 Jun 53: Maj John F. Bolt 39 FIS (USAF) F-86F 1 MiG-15



11 Jul 53: Maj John F. Bolt 39 FIS (USAF) F-86F 2 MiG-15

12 Jul 53: Maj John H. Glenn 25 FIS (USAF) F-86F 1 MiG-15


20 Jul 53: Maj Thomas M. Sellers 336 FIS (USAF) F-86F 2 MiG-15


* FIS (Fighter Interceptor Squadron)

ground, and often primitive withrespect to operating airfields. Thepart played by the enemy whichdirectly affected Marine aviation,was the gradual and continuousbuild-up of his antiaircraft capabil-ity. The employment of heavyantiaircraft artillery in proximity tothe front, the increased use ofmobile automatic antiaircraftweapons of higher caliber, both atthe front and on access routes,forced tactical changes but did notlessen the effectiveness of eitherclose air support or interdictionmissions. In addition, the timespent in advancing up the learningcurve as changes occurred, arereflected in a summary of the avi-ation statistics for the war. Theseshow that Marine aviation lost 258killed (including 65 missing andpresumed dead) and 174 wounded.A total of 436 aircraft were alsolost in combat and in operationalaccidents. Of the 221 Marines cap-tured during the three-year con-flict, 31 were aviators.

Armistice and Aftermath

The possibility of a ceasefireand general armistice was a con-stant element in the Korean Warfrom mid-1951. The peace talksgained more attention in early1952 after a formal site was estab-lished at Panmunjom, withassigned United Nations, NorthKorean, and Communist Chinesenegotiators in attendance at sched-uled sessions. Marine aviationprovided support for this aspect ofthe Korean War, and its aftermath.Aviation furnished several generalofficers, as did the ground MarineCorps, for the negotiating team, ashared assignment between all theUnited States Armed Services.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wingpost-armistice plan, a part of theFifth Air Force strategy, was effec-tive on 27 July 1953. Its basicobjective was twofold: first, tocarry out Fifth Air Force responsi-bilities as assigned; and second tomaintain a high level of combat

readiness in all units. Thearmistice delineated a “no-fly” bar-rier along a line just south of theUnited Nations southern boundaryof the Demilitarized Zone, and dayand night patrols of that barrierwere missions assigned to thewing. The day missions wereshared by the MAGs at K-3 and K-6, while the night patrols wereflown by the F3Ds of VMF(N)-513and the radar-configured ADs ofMarine Composite Squadron l.

The armistice agreement createda set of administrative bottlenecks,with the limitation on airports ofentry and departure to a total of sixfor South Korea. This meant thatevery aircraft entering, regardless ofits ultimate destination, had toundergo a detailed inspectionupon landing. Numerous formswere required to be filled out anduntold reports rendered for eachaircraft arriving in country ordeparting. When the personneland unit reports were added to thelist, it all became a formidablebureaucratic check on cheatingwith respect to the armisticeagreement.

Because of the indeterminatenature and duration of thearmistice, it was necessary todeploy additional Fleet MarineForces to the Far East in order tomaintain a posture of amphibiousreadiness in the area. Late in thesummer of 1953, the 3d MarineDivision arrived in Japan accom-panied by MAGs -11 and -16, thelatter a helicopter transport groupequipped with Sikorsky HRS-2s.MAG-11, comprised of three F9Fsquadrons, was based at Atsugi,Japan, as was VMR-253, an addi-tional transport squadron assignedto wing and flying the F4QFairchild Packet. MAG-16 wasbased at Hanshin Air Force Basewith its two squadrons and serviceunits.

Both in Korea and Japan, the

54


Future astronaut and United States Senator, Maj John H. Glenn smiles from thecockpit of his F-86 Sabre jet on his return from a flight over North Korea duringwhich he shot down the first of three MiG-15s he would be credited with duringthe war.

55

Aviator Prisoners of War

The long months of incarceration, torture, depriva-tion, and uncertainty made the prisoner of warexperience a terrible ordeal. It was a harbinger of

what the next generation of American prisoners of warwould face barely a decade later in another Asian coun-try.

While American treatment toward its prisoners of warin World War II was much more benevolent, it might besaid that the stories told by returning prisoners fromWorld War II Japanese and Korean War prison campschanged how we as a country looked at ourselves as war-riors, and how we conducted ourselves regardingenemy soldiers we captured in future wars.

Certainly, the greatest change that resulted from theKorean War prisoners’ collective experience was theinstitution of the Code of Conduct, which specifically out-lined what an American serviceman would give his cap-tors by way of information and how he would conducthimself.

The Code was at times quite nebulous and in its firsttest, in Vietnam, each American had to determine his ownlevel of faith and endurance. The boundaries weredefined in the Code, but as the years wore on, cut off fromany contact with his government, and with only occasionalmeetings with his compatriots in the camps, each had todetermine for himself how he could meet the require-ments of his country. It was a trial of strength andcourage far more terrible than the short-burst stress of aer-ial combat. Those who survived their internment inSoutheast Asia could—in some measure—perhaps thanktheir predecessors in the cold mountain camps of Koreafor bringing back information that helped them live. Ofthe 221 Marines captured during the Korean War, 31were flight crewmen. Three died in captivity; one is pre-sumed dead.

The first Marine aviator prisoner of war in Korea wasCaptain Jesse V. Booker of Headquarters Squadron 1. Hewas shot down on 7 August 1950 while flying a recon-naissance mission from carrier Valley Forge (CV 45).Captain Booker, who had shot down three Japanese air-craft in World War II, received several briefings onescape and evasion. He could be considered as wellprepared as could be at this early stage of the war. Aftercapture, he was beaten and tortured by his NorthKorean guards and was the only Marine pilot in enemyhands until April 1951.

Captain Paul L. Martelli was shot down on 3 April 1951while flying Corsairs with VMF-323. As he attackedground targets, his fighter’s oil cooler was hit by smallarms fire, and he soon had to bail out. His wingman ini-tially reported that Captain Martelli had fallen from hisF4U, and he was carried as killed in action.

Martelli was captured by Chinese troops, who took himto an interrogation center near Pyongyang. He endured

several painful sessions with a Major Pak, considered bymany of the prisoners to be among the enemy’s mostsadistic “interviewers.”

Captain Mercer R. Smith launched for an armedreconnaissance mission from K-3 (Pohang) on 1 May1951. Flying F9F-2B Panthers with VMF-311, he and hiswingman were at 6,000 feet when Captain Smith report-ed a fire in the cockpit. He climbed to 16,000 feet andejected. At first, his wingman and the pilot of a rescue heli-copter that arrived shortly afterward reported enemytroops standing over the body of the downed pilot,thereby giving rise to the belief that Captain Smith wasdead. He initially was carried as killed in action, but wasreported on the Communist 18 December 1951 list of pris-oners of war.

The following day, Captain Byron H. Beswick, anF4U pilot with VMF-323, was part of a four-plane, closeair support mission. It was his third mission of the dayand the 135th of his tour. Small arms fire caught him dur-ing a strafing run, hitting a napalm tank, which did notignite. However, his aircraft was hit soon afterward,catching fire, and forcing Captain Beswick to bail out. Hesuffered painful burns on his face, arms, hands, andright leg.

Communist troops captured him, placing him with abattalion of British prisoners of war, which fortunatelyincluded two doctors. Enduring long marches, CaptainBeswick and his compatriots tried to escape, but wererecaptured.

On 27 May 1951 while on an armed reconnaissancewith two other aircraft, Captain Arthur Wagner, the pilotof an F4U-5N with VMF(N)-513 also was interned.

Captain Jack E. Perry of VMF-311 was the squadron-

Department of Defense (USN) 628393

Maj Francis Bernardini, USMC, chats with returningprisoners of war Capt Jesse V. Booker, center, and 1stLtRichard Bell, right, at Freedom Village, Panmunjom,Korea. Booker and Bell were returned on 27 August1953, the first Marine aviators to be sent back.

period was one of intensive train-ing, including landing exercises,joint exercises with the U.S. Armyand the U.S. Air Force, and aheavy concentration on bombingand gunnery. The principal bomb-ing target for Korean-basedsquadrons was on the Naktong,where Marine pilots had doneconsiderable bombing during thedefense of the Pusan Perimeter. In

addition an exchange programbetween Japan-based and Korean-based squadrons was establishedwithin the wing. The objective ofthe program was to familiarizenew pilots to the area with flightconditions in Korea, just in casethe ceasefire did not work out.There were many programs andcompetitions in athletics with one ofthe highlights being the winning

of the Fifth Air Force and Far EastAir Force softball championshipsby MAG-12 of K-6.

In June 1956, the wing moved itsheadquarters to Naval Air Station,Iwakuni, Japan, and control of thewing passed from Fifth Air Force toCommander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,in Hawaii, thus ending MarineCorps aviation’s participation inthe Korean War.

56

briefing officer and had to scrounge flights. By mid-June1951 he had 80 missions. He knew about the danger ofenemy flak sites in the Singosan Valley and scheduled him-self for a mission against the traps on 18 June. However,the guns quickly found the range and hit his Panther’s fueltank. Captain Perry ejected and was captured byChinese troops, who showed him bomb craters andtheir wounded soldiers as a result of American strikes.

Several other Marine aviators were shot down in sub-sequent months, mainly by antiaircraft guns. But VMF-311lost a Panther to MiGs on 21 July 1951. First LieutenantRichard Bell was part of a 16-plane strike in MiG Alley,the notorious area along the Yalu River in northwesternKorea. His division of three aircraft—a fourth F9F pilothad aborted the mission when his cockpit pressurizationfailed—flew their mission and were returning to basewhen no less than 15 MiG-15s appeared. The enemy fight-ers attacked the small American formation, whose pilotsturned into the oncoming MiGs.

Unknown to his two other squadron mates,Lieutenant Bell, low on fuel, engaged the first MiGs, giv-ing his fellow Marines the chance to escape. When his fuelwas gone, Bell ejected from his powerless jet and was cap-tured.

Other Marines were interned after leaving their crip-pled aircraft. On 30 July, Lieutenant Colonel Harry W.Reed, the commanding officer of VMF-312, was hit byanother Corsair during an attack and bailed out. Theother pilot, First Lieutenant Harold Hintz, was thought tohave been killed when he apparently spun in. But sub-sequent prisoner of war debriefings revealed Hintz haddied in captivity. Lieutenant Colonel Reed was capturedand apparently hanged by the North Koreans because hehad shot and killed four enemy soldiers during his cap-ture.

Marine crews from nearly every squadron flyingoffensive missions in Korea were captured. VMF(N)-513’s executive officer, Major Judson C. Richardson, Jr.,was captured when his F4U-5N was shot down on a nightarmed-reconnaissance mission on 14 December 1951.

Lieutenant Colonel William G. Thrash was flying aTBM-3R as part of a strike with VMA-121. The oldGrumman torpedo bombers, normally assigned to 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, flew as hacks—mainly short-range

“taxis” and currency trainers, and occasionally carriedobservers. With two ground officers as passengers,Lieutenant Colonel Thrash accompanied the strikewhen his aircraft was hit by enemy flak. Thrash and thejunior officer behind him were able to get out of the crip-pled Avenger, but the ground colonel could not open hiscanopy and died in the plane crash.

Four Marine aviators were shot down in May 1952:Major Walter R. Harris (VMF-323); First Lieutenant MiltonH. Baugh (VMF-311); Captain John P. Flynn, Jr. (VMF[N]-513); and First Lieutenant Duke Williams, Jr. (VMF[N]-513).

Most prisoners of war of all Services and nationalitieswere subjected to periods of torture, starvation, andpolitical indoctrination. The Chinese, in particular, werefurious at the effort by the United Nations and took outtheir anger and frustration on many prisoners. Thedegree of interrogation and deprivation varied consider-ably, depending on requirements and how much inter-camp movement occurred in any particular period.Other prisoners were occasionally put in camps withnewly captured forces.

Lieutenant Colonel Thrash became the senior officerin one camp, establishing rules of behavior that listed whattasks prisoners would do and not do. Thrash’s policieseventually brought the wrath of the camp commanderdown on him, resulting in his removal and eight monthsof solitary confinement with constant interrogation andharassment.

The final Marine prisoner of war was actually capturedafter the armistice. Lieutenant Colonel (later Colonel)Herbert A. Peters was an experienced aviator with heavycombat experience in the Pacific, where he shot downfour Japanese aircraft during service at Guadalcanal. On5 February 1954, he took off in an OY light aircraft andbecame lost in a snowstorm among the mountains.

Circling, he saw a small landing strip through theclouds. He landed, but was immediately surrounded byNorth Korean soldiers, who held onto his small plane’swings so he could not take off. He languished in captivityat the airfield until August. No word of his internment hadbeen sent, and his family and the Marine Corps hadthought him missing, if not dead. His family was surprisedand gratified to be notified of Peters’ return in October1954.

About the Authors

The main text of this pamphlet is derivedfrom Major General John P. Condon’s

original draft of a history of Marine Corps avi-ation, an edited version of which appeared asU.S. Marine Corps Aviation, the fifth pam-phlet of the series commemorating 75 yearsof Naval Aviation, published by the DeputyChief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) andCommander, Naval Air Systems Command in1987.

Major General John Pomery Condon,Naval Academy Class of 1934, earned hiswings as a naval aviator in 1937. On activeduty from May 1934 to October 1962, he heldcommand positions at the squadron, group,and wing levels. During World War II, heserved with the Fighter Command at Guadalcanal and in the Northern Solomonsand subsequently played a key role in training Marine Corps pilots for carrieroperations. At Okinawa he commanded Marine Aircraft Group 14, and in Korea,Marine Aircraft Groups 33 and 12, the first group to fly jet aircraft in combat andthe last to fly the Corsair against the enemy. As a general officer, he served withthe U.S. European Command and commanded both the 1st and 3d MarineAircraft Wings.

General Condon earned a Ph.D. at the University of California at Irvine andalso studied at the U.S. Air Force’s Air War College. He is the author of numer-ous essays and several works on Marine Corps aviation, the last, Corsairs andFlattops: Marine Carrier Air Warfare, 1944-1945, was published posthumouslyin 1998.

Commander Peter B. Mersky, USNR (Ret), provided supplemental materials.A graduate of the Rhode Island School of Design with a baccalaureate degreein illustration, Mersky was commissioned through the Navy’s Aviation OfficerCandidate School in 1968. Following active duty, he remained in the NavalReserve and served two tours as an air intelligence officer with LightPhotographic Squadron 306.

Before retiring from federal civil service, he was editor of Approach, theNavy’s aviation safety magazine, published by the Naval Safety Center inNorfolk, Virginia. Commander Mersky has written several books on Navy andMarine Corps aviation, including U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, 1912-Present (3dEdition, 1997). He also authored two publications for the History and MuseumsDivision: A History of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321 and Time of the Aces:Marine Pilots in the Solomons, 1942-1944, a pamphlet in the World War IICommemorative Series.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines inthe Korean War era, is published for the education and training ofMarines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S.Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department ofDefense observance of the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costshave been defrayed in part by contributions from members of the MarineCorps Heritage Foundation.

To plan and coordinate the Korean War commemorative events andactivities of the Sea Services, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guardhave formed the Sea Services Korean War Commemoration Committee,chaired by the Director, Navy Staff. For more information about the SeaServices’ commemorative effort, please contact the Navy-Marine CorpsKorean War Commemoration Coordinator at (202) 433-4223/3085, FAX433-7265 (DSN288-XXXX),E-Mail: [email protected],Website: www.history.usmc.mil.


DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR,


Charles R. Smith

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Visual Information Specialist

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center1254 Charles Morris Street SE

Washington Navy Yard DC 20374-50402002

PCN 190 00319 800

SourcesThe five volume official Marine Corps

history of the Korean War provides the cen-terline for this account of Marine aviation inKorea: Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A.Canzona, USMC, U.S. Marine Operations inKorea, 1950-1953: The Pusan Perimeter(Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3Division, HQMC, 1954); Lynn Montross andCapt Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC, U.S.Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953:The Inchon-Seoul Operation (Washington,D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division,HQMC, 1955); Lynn Montross and CaptNicholas A. Canzona, USMC, U.S. MarineOperations in Korea, 1950-1953: TheChosin Reservoir Campaign (Washington,D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division,HQMC, 1957); Lynn Montross, Maj HubardD. Kuokka, USMC, and Maj Norman W.Hicks, USMC, U.S. Marine Operations inKorea, 1950-1953: The East-Central Front(Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3Division, HQMC, 1962); and LtCol Pat Meid,USMCR and Maj James M. Yingling, USMC,

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953: Operations in West Korea(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division,HQMC, 1972).

Other official accounts of use were RoyE. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North tothe Yalu (Washington, D.C.: Office of theChief of Military History, Department of theArmy, 1961), and Ernest H. Giusti andKenneth W. Condit, “Marine Air OverInchon-Seoul,” Marine Corps Gazette, June1952; Ernest H. Giusti and Kenneth W.Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,”Marine Corps Gazette, July 1952; and ErnestH. Giusti and Kenneth W. Condit, “MarineAir Covers the Breakout,” Marine CorpsGazette, August 1952.

Among useful secondary sources wereBGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret), TheUnited States Marines (Annapolis, MD:Naval Institute, 1999); Andrew Greer, TheNew Breed: The Story of the U.S. Marines inKorea (New York: Harper Brothers, 1952);Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War inKorea (Baltimore, MD: Nautical & AviationPublishing Co., 1986); G. G. O’Rourke with

E. T. Wooldridge, Night Fighters Over Korea(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 1998); andRobert F. Dorr, Jon Lake, and WarrenThompson, Korean War Aces (London:Osprey, 1995).

Sources of great use were the oral histo-ries, diaries, and memoirs of many of theparticipants. The most important of thesewere those of LtGen Robert P. Keller, LtColJohn Perrin, LtCol John E. Barnett, LtColEmmons S. Maloney, Col Edward S. John,LtCol William T. Witt, Jr., SgtMaj Floyd P.Stocks, LtGen Leslie E. Brown, MSgt JamesR. Todd, and MSgt Lowell T. Truex.

As is the tradition, members of theMarine Corps Historical Center’s staff, espe-cially Fred H. Allison, were fully supportivein the production of this pamphlet as wereothers: William T. Y’Blood and Sheldon A.Goldberg of the U.S. Air Force HistorySupport Office; Hill Goodspeed of the EmilBuehler Naval Aviation Library, NationalMuseum of Naval Aviation; and WarrenThompson, Joseph S. Rychetnik, Steven P.Albright, Steven D. Oltmann, NicholasWilliams, and James Winchester.

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series

CORSAIRS TOPANTHERS

U.S. Marine Aviation in Koreaby Major General John P. Condon

U.S. Marine Corps, RetiredSupplemented by

Commander Peter B. MerskyU.S. Navy Reserve, Retired

Documents

CORSAIRS TO PANTHERS, U.S. Marine Aviation in · PDF fileAt Okinawa he commanded Marine Aircraft Group 14, ... Night Fighters Over Korea ... CORSAIRS TO PANTHERS