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DOI: 10.1177/07388942134913582013 30: 354 originally published online 9 July 2013Conflict Management and Peace Science

Molly M. Melin, Scott Sigmund Gartner and Jacob Bercovitchear of rejection: The puzzle of unaccepted mediation offers in international conflict

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Fear of rejection: The puzzle of

unaccepted mediation offers ininternational conflict

Molly M. MelinLoyola University, USA

Scott Sigmund Gartner

Pennsylvania State University, USA

Jacob Bercovitch

The University of Canterbury, UK

Abstract

How do factors that influence mediation offers affect belligerent behavior? The circumstances

that attract potential mediators are not the same as those that make mediation desirable tobelligerents. Third parties offer mediation when the conflict is intense, generation of an agreementis likely and they have ties to the conflict. However, mediation is less acceptable to belligerents in

these circumstances. This dynamic creates a dilemma; the characteristics that make third partiesmore forthcoming with mediation offers simultaneously make disputants more likely to rejectmediation proposals. A better understanding of this strategic process can help scholars and

policy-makers better determine how to supply mediation where it is needed most.

Keywords

Conflict resolution, expected utility, mediation

The rejection of offers to mediate international disputes presents a puzzle. Why would disputants

reject third-party offers when many of the costs of mediation are borne by the mediator? Despite

To our great sadness, Professor Jacob Bercovitch passed away during the preparation of this manuscript. We very much

miss his leadership on the study of international dispute mediation, his valuable contributions as a coauthor and his

wonderful friendship

Corresponding author:Molly M. Melin, Department of Political Science, 1032 W. Sheridan Road, Coffey Hall, 3rd Floor, Chicago, IL 60660, USA.

Email: [email protected]

CMP30410.1177/0738894213491358Conflict Management and PeaceScienceMelin et al.

Article


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Melin et al. 355

the high likelihood of failure, dispute mediators contribute time and resources, and risk their repu-

tation as peacemakers. Rejection of mediation offers can be costly to disputants in an international

environment that strongly disapproves of violent conflict. The reality is that the occurrence of

mediation may itself be an achievement, but the chances of further success are far from assured.

We examine why mediation occurs in some conflicts and not in others by asking how the factors

that influence mediation offers affect belligerent behavior. We argue that the circumstances that

make a conflict attractive to a potential mediator differ from those that make mediation attractive

to belligerents. Third parties offer mediation when the conflict is intense, when generation of an

agreement is likely and when they have ties to the conflict. Mediation is less acceptable, however,

for belligerents under these conditions. Both mediators and disputants act strategically, but this

strategic behavior leads them to react to similar factors differently. While existing research dis-

cusses mediation occurrence, we offer a more complete picture of those conflicts that go without

mediation. Exploring rejected mediation offers creates an understanding of variation in conflict

management behavior with important implications for how best to encourage mediation.

Understanding international mediation

Mediation is a method of international conflict management whereby a third party assists the dis-

puting parties in negotiating their conflict. Mediation differs from other forms of conflict manage-

ment in several important ways. First, unlike military intervention, which uses force to help one

side win (Melin and Koch, 2010), or economic sanctions, which encourage peace through limiting

financial interactions (Drury and Chan, 2000), mediation must be voluntarily acceptable to both

disputants (Beardsley, 2011). Second, unlike binding arbitration, mediation does not require an

advance commitment to accept an outcome (Gent and Shannon, 2010; Mitchell and Powell, 2011).

While we focus on the puzzle of mediation rejection, an informative body of research that

addresses mediation occurrence more generally has developed. This scholarship helps us under-

stand the types of conflicts that are likely to be mediated. For example, Greig (2005) examined the

incidence of mediation in enduring rivalries, finding that mediation is likely when the costs of

inaction are high and the likelihood of peace is low. Mediation is more likely in interstate, as com-

pared with civil, wars (Melin and Svensson, 2009). Third parties avoid mediating intractable con-

flicts and account for previous mediation efforts and their outcomes (Rost and Greig, 2011). More

generally, this literature finds that mediators act strategically and try to maximize the expected

benefits and minimize the anticipated costs of mediation (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006; Leng,

2000; Greig, 2005; Regan and Stam, 2000).

Some third parties are more likely to act as mediators. Biases and ties are likely to draw in third

parties, increasing the likelihood that actors will become involved since they have interests at stake

(Favretto, 2009; Maundi et al., 2006; Melin, 2011) and are seen as more committed to peacemak-

ing (Crescenzi et al., 2011; Kydd, 2003). Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) show that a third partys

reputation as an effective mediator plays an important role in the number of mandates they receive.

We build on this mediation incidence research theoretically, empirically and analytically.

Theoretically, we develop arguments for when disputants reject the presence of a mediator, provid-

ing an understanding of the circumstances when mediation does not occur. The underlying causal

mechanisms that lead to the rejection of mediation offers will differ from those that prompt media-

tion offers. Empirically, we examine the potential for state mediation in all violent disputes since

the Second World War, helping to identify the roles that state relationships, the mediation environ-

ment and conflict characteristics play in mediation offers and rejections. Finally, analytically, we


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356 Conflict Management and Peace Science30(4)

directly address the selection effects. Factors motivating third parties and disputants to partake in

mediation activities will affect the outcomes of their efforts, creating a selection bias (Gartner

and Bercovitch, 2006; Svensson, 2006). Selection bias is likely to be an important issue in the

study of international mediation because it is reasonable to expect that, rather than selecting cases

for mediation randomly, disputants and third-parties tie their decision to mediate to the chances forits success (Greig, 2005: 249). While scholars have studied the question of Who mediates?as

a precursor to mediation success and an element of the selection processthey have not explicitly

modeled the selection process they identified as critical. We offer that extension here.

For mediation to occur, three conditions must be met: (1) the disputants must agree to work with

a mediator; (2) the disputants must find a mutually acceptable third party; and (3) the third party

must be willing to become involved in the conflict (Beardsley, 2011: 18). Rarely are all of these

conditions met. As a result, the mediation process exhibits variation at all stages. While particular

actors may be more or less likely to offer mediation, the occurrence of mediation varies both abso-

lutely (the number of mediators or mediation efforts per year) and relatively (the ratio of mediation

or mediators to conflicts per year). Mediation is neither automatic (not every dispute is mediated),nor in constant supply (mediators are not always mediating). Mediation is the result of strategic

choices by disputants and third parties that cause the allocation of mediators to be asymmetrical.

Some conflicts attract more mediators than others (Svensson and Wallensteen, 2010), creating

under-provision of mediation even when the combatants desire it (Beardsley, 2011: 50).

We assume that third parties anticipate costs and benefits prior to offering mediation, as do

disputants when considering mediation offers (Mitchell, 1993). While we observe either

Mediation or No-Mediationempirically, there are three different possible No-Mediation out-

comes (see Figure 1). In Cell 1, there is neither mediation supply nor demand. Cell 2 represents

instances that lack mediator supply, wherein the disputants might have been amenable to work-

ing with a third-party mediator had one been available. Cell 3 represents instances lacking medi-ation demand as one or both disputants were unwilling to work with a third party. The literature

generally treats these different outcomes identically. While scholars have examined the request

for, offer of and occurrence of mediation (Greig, 2005), we have little theoretical or empirical

understanding of variation in disputants rejection of mediation offers. Ignoring the variation in

conflicts that go without mediation risks generating an incomplete understanding of mediation

decisions.

States, regional and international organizations, and individuals all mediate violent disputes

(Aall, 2007; Chigas, 2007; Touval, 2003). We expect that mediation works differently across medi-

ator types (Gartner, 2011). For example, belligerents are less likely to turn down mediation offers

from an organization to which they aspire to gain membership (Svensson and Wallensteen, 2010).The current literature includes many studies of international organization/UN mediation (Hansen

Figure 1. Disaggregating the occurrence and nonoccurrence of mediation.


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Melin et al. 357

et al., 2008; Shannon, 2009) and an increasing amount of research on regional governmental

organization mediation (Gartner, 2011; Olson and Pearson, 2002; Wehr and Lederach, 1991), but

few studies of state mediation (exceptions include Aydin, 2010; Melin, 2011; Rost and Greig,

2011). The comparative lack of analyses of state mediation is especially troubling because states

are the most common type of mediator.

State mediators differ from other types of mediators in both the reason for offering mediation

and the belligerents reason for acceptance or rejection. In contrast to states, international organiza-

tions are frequently tasked with peacemaking as a part of their charter (e.g. the African Union and

Organization of American States; Gartner, 2013). Despite this, international organizations must

overcome individualism and political struggles between members to build consensus before carry-

ing out a mission (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). In contrast, state mediators are less able to demon-

strate impartiality and more likely to have a stake in the conflicts outcome. National interests and

potential domestic ramifications of failed efforts mean states are more constrained than intergov-

ernmental organizations and must be more strategic in choosing to intervene (Aydin, 2010). States

may therefore have a lower baseline likelihood of acceptance as mediators than nonstate actors.

Additionally, states have more policy instruments at their disposal than international organizations.

This allows them to select one or more methods by which they can react to external conflict (includ-

ing support of one side, see Melin and Koch, 2010; Siverson and Starr, 1991; Werner and Lemke,

1997).

Empirically, the operationalization of interests, ties and probability of success for nonstate third

parties entails a vastly different set of variables than those of state actors. For example, the interests

of potential mediators are frequently analyzed using trade ties (Kathman, 2010). Capturing the

interests of international organizations using this metric without treating them simply as a sum of

their parts proves challenging.

Theory

How do the factors that influence mediation offers affect belligerents behavior? Third-party medi-

ators are dependent upon the belligerents acceptance of their offer to mediate. Sometimes third

parties wish to be involved but are not wanted by the disputants. Rejection is likely, however, in

any conflict environment where suspicion and mistrust abound (Svensson and Wallensteen, 2010).

For example, when the conflict between the USA and Iraq escalated in February 1998, several

states volunteered to act as mediators, but the disputants rejected these offers. At the last minute,

when a confrontation seemed inevitable, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan offered his services,

and his offer was accepted (Wedgwood, 1998: 725). The elective nature of mediation indicates that

the offer itself is only a part of the process.

Disputants consider the costs and benefits of mediation and will agree to mediation if they

expect it to generate a more favorable outcome for themselves compared with continued conflict

(Wilkenfeld et al., 2003; Zartman and Touval, 1992). Disputants consider the costs of a conflict

when deciding to work with a mediator (Greig and Regan, 2008; Melin, 2011). Mediation can be

used to gain time or to avoid the choice between escalation and making concessions (Kleiboer,

1996). This was probably the reason why Iran and Iraq agreed to mediation in 1975 (Lieb, 1985).

Mediation can also help policy-makers save face internationally and domestically when making

concessions, as was probably the motivation behind Irans acceptance of Algerian mediation dur-

ing the US hostage crisis (Sick, 1985). Agreeing to mediation can be costly for disputants in certain

circumstances, as openness to mediation can send a signal of low resolve to ones adversary. When

the costs of involving a mediator outweigh the benefits of doing so, third parties will reject


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mediation offers. Rejected offers may reflect either a rejection of mediation more generally or a

rejection of the specific mediator.

Mediationrejection occurs when one of the disputants deems mediation activities undesirable.

Belligerents preferences for continued fighting over mediation depends on conflict factors. The

intensity and potential for escalation that attract mediation offers have an inverse effect on accept-

ance offers. While the difficulty of resolving territorial disputes indicates these conflicts are the

ones that need mediation, they involve disputants that are the most likely to turn it down. This

rejection is due to the importance of signaling resolve and a willingness to continue fighting in

territorial disputes (Huth, 1998). Wiegand (2011: 110) writes that, because territorial disputes are

the most salient type of interstate disputes and the most likely to escalate to war, it is logical that

states involved in territorial disputes would be particularly concerned with signaling resolve to

adversaries. One way to signal resolve is to reject mediation.

These same high-stakes disputes are more likely to attract third-party mediation offers.

Reputation building requires that mediators take on disputes seen as both important and hard to

resolve. Bercovitch and Jackson (2001) find that mediation tends to occur in disputes that are com-

plex, intense and long. Third parties are more likely to mediate conflicts that are less likely to be

resolved bilaterally between the two disputing parties and will lead to deadly combat. Research

shows that territorial disputes are especially likely to escalate (Huth, 2000) and lead to costly fight-

ing (Wiegand, 2011). This potential for escalation and cost will probably increase both the visibil-

ity of the conflict and the probability that it attracts mediation offers (Allee and Huth, 2006;

Chiozza and Choi, 2003; Hensel et al., 2008; Huth, 1996; Huth and Allee, 2002).

Hypothesis 1.Territorial disputes are more likely to lead to mediation offers and rejection.

An ongoing war attracts mediation offers while also increasing the likelihood of their rejection.

States are most interested in mediating disputes that have escalated to violence and involve casual-ties since these conflicts are most likely to gain international attention. Research shows that high-

cost conflicts increase mediation occurrence (Beardsley, 2010). Positive reputation gains from

stopping a war exceed those of resolving a more peaceful conflict. However, wars are the result of

mutual optimism: the sides have conflicting estimates of their bargaining power and an inability to

agree on a peaceful reconciliation (Blainey, 1988; Slantchev and Tarar, 2010). Belligerents that

have decided to fight a war clearly demonstrate a lack of interest in pursuing peaceful means of

conflict resolution. Disputants are also unlikely to see the need for a mediator as long as conflict

costs and estimates of the likelihood of success remain unclear (Regan and Aydin, 2006). All of

these factors indicate that disputes that escalate to war involve a particular pair of disputants who

are unlikely to voluntarily accept a cooperative and peaceful process of reconciliation.

Hypothesis 2.Violent disputes are more likely to lead to mediation offers and rejection.

Mediatorrejection occurs when one of the disputants deems the mediator unacceptable. There are

instances where the states in a conflict may be open to third-party mediation but are not willing to

work with the actor that has offered mediation. Trust is necessary for third parties to be deemed

acceptable as mediators. Trust is a belief that the other side is trustworthy, that is, willing to recip-

rocate cooperation, and mistrust is a belief that the other side is untrustworthy, or prefers to exploit

ones cooperation (Kydd, 2005: 3). Disputants will only work with and share strategic informa-

tion with third parties they consider trustworthy. Dyadic relationships help to reassure disputantsthat a third party can be trusted.


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Melin et al. 359

Ties between the third party and disputants may also reflect the strategic interests of the third

party that may be at stake, thereby increasing the benefits of involvement. Actors are more likely

to offer to mediate when there are third-party interests (Greig and Regan, 2008) and an expectation

of future interactions with disputants (Rauchhaus, 2006). Ties play an important role in the occur-

rence of civil war mediation (Favretto, 2009) and international conflict management (Melin, 2011).

Hypothesis 3.Third partydisputant ties increase mediation offers and acceptances.

This hypothesis may seem counter-intuitive. Theoretically, network dynamics suggest that those

states with closer ties to disputants are more likely to support one or the other with arms, funding,

sanctuary and support. This bias would greatly limit their appeal to the disputant whose efforts they

oppose (Rauchhaus, 2006; Terris and Maoz, 2005), making them less likely to be seen as a media-

tor and more likely as an ally or enemy. Thus, ties cut both ways: connectivity simultaneously

increases the probability of a mediation offer (given the higher levels of strategic interests in the

dispute) and increases the probability of being seen as biased (increasing the chances of rejection

of the mediation offer). We explore these competing effects directly by examining the influence ofdifferent types of connections on mediation offers and rejections.

Belligerents, especially those involved in highly visible conflicts, often have multiple mediation

offers. It is therefore important to account for the conflict management options that disputants face

when deciding to accept a mediation offer. This is especially vital since disputants have been

shown to forum shop, looking for the most favorable method of peaceful resolution before agree-

ing (Wiegand and Powell, 2001). Conflicting actors want to obtain the best deal possible for them-

selves in mediation (Terris and Maoz, 2005). Disputes thus potentially create mediation markets

where disputants can choose among competing offers. Belligerents who prefer peacemaking to

conflict might reject one offer of mediation for another. We anticipate that evidence of other media-

tion options makes mediation offers more likely to be rejected.

Hypothesis 4.The presence of mediation alternatives increases the likelihood of mediation rejection.

Finally, third parties will take into account the likely outcome of their efforts before offering to

mediate. Research shows that mediators assess their ability to transform a conflict prior to becom-

ing involved and only make offers if they believe that their efforts will be effective (Touval and

Zartman, 1996). Mediators take the likelihood of success into account and avoid intractable con-

flicts that are likely to persist, as actors are more sensitive to risks in these cases (Bercovitch and

Gartner, 2006; Rost and Greig, 2011). Mediators anticipate that dyads previously engaged in dis-

putes are less likely to reach a settlement. Therefore, we expect these dyads to be less likely toreceive mediation offers.

Hypothesis 5.A history of conflict between the disputants decreases the likelihood of mediation offers.

When a third party perceives that they can help to generate an agreement, it is then that they are the

most likely to offer their services. This expectation seems to be in contradiction to findings that

mediated disputes are less likely to result in peace. However, this argument only claims that dispu-

tants will pay the costs of mediation for the more intractable disputes that are harder to resolve

(Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006; Gartner and Bercovitch, 2006). These studies only analyze the

observed strategic interaction of mediation once it is offered, accepted and acted upon. In contrast,


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our expectation speaks strictly to the likelihood that a mediator will offer their services, and that

this will happen only if a mediator perceives that an agreement is possible.

Rejecting offers to mediate is a way for disputants to signal their resolve to fight and optimism

about their chances for success. We therefore expect to observe rejected offers more often in

intensely violent and territorial-based disputes. Disputants in these conditions are less open to

third-party mediation, regardless of the offering party; they are rejecting mediation rather than the

mediator. In other circumstances, third parties may not appear trustworthy to the disputants owing

to their relationship to one of the disputants, or other offers may be more appealing, in which case

the disputants are rejecting the mediator rather than mediation. We therefore expect mediation

offers to be more likely to be rejected in violent conflicts over territory, when the disputants have

reason not to trust the offering state, and when other offers are present. However, we expect similar

circumstances to simultaneously increase the likelihood that states will offer to mediate. We test

our expectations in the following section.

Research designWe employed a dataset of post-Second World War third-party conflict mediation efforts that

includes allDyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes(Maoz, 2005). For every year in which a con-

flict is ongoing, we constructed an observation of each disputant and a potential mediator. We

defined a population of potential mediators based on theoretical arguments about likely mediators.

To be included, potential mediators must be at least one of the following (according to thePolitically

Relevant Dyadsdata; Maoz, 1996): (1) a major or regional power with both the resources and the

responsibility to manage conflicts; (2) a geographically contiguous state, regularly interacting with

the disputants and disproportionately affected by a neighboring conflict; or (3) a reputational

manager, having exhibited both the willingness and opportunity for mediation in previous dis-

putes. It is important to note that, since we used these variables in our data selection process, they

are not included in the analyses. Examination of all violent disputes since the Second World War

resulted in over 64,000 observations, allowing us to expand beyond the 35 enduring rivalries previ-

ously studied (Greig, 2005; Greig and Diehl, 2006). This empirical expansion also has theoretical

importance, as [e]nduring rivalries are unique phenomen[a] (Greig, 2005: 265), making it criti-

cal that we enlarge the empirical domain to capture other conflict dynamics.

Selection effects

States that offer to mediate and are accepted for mediation are not randomly selected. Selection

effects result when systematic factors reduce the population of potential observations. We identi-

fied and controlled for two types of selection. First, it is likely that third parties take into account

the probability that the disputants will accept mediation before offering their services (Greig and

Regan, 2008; Melin and Svensson, 2009). On the one hand, we know that this knowledge is not

perfect, as we observe disputants refusing mediation offers. On the other hand, we are unlikely to

identify the variables that completely reflect such knowledge. As a result of these Entry Effects,

only select mediation offers are observable.

Second, the cases requiring outside involvement are those that disputants are unable to resolve

on their own. Third parties therefore become involved in conflicts that are difficult to manage and

unlikely to lead to peace (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006; Greig, 2005). As a result of theseDispute

Effects, mediation is more likely to be observed among highly intractable conflicts.


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Melin et al. 361

We addressedEntryandDisputeselection effects in three ways: (1) theoretically, by specifying

factors that we think affect mediator offers; (2) empirically, by identifying a pool of available

mediators; and (3) methodologically, by employing a censored Probit estimation procedure that

takes into account dispute characteristics (an alternative method could involve matching; see

Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008). The censored Probit method allowed us to simultaneously model the

selection variables that explain mediation offers and acceptances (Nooruddin, 2002). Scholars

employ selection models to study conflict termination (Lemke and Regan, 2004), mediation (Greig

and Regan, 2008; Melin and Svensson, 2009) and peacekeeping (Greig and Diehl, 2005).

Specifically, the method has been used to address selection in the type of mediation study con-

ducted here (Gartner and Bercovitch, 2006; Savun, 2008).

Mediation offers

The unit of analysis is the disputantthird partyyear. This unit of analysis enabled us to explore

the factors that influence outside states to offer mediation and disputants to accept it. Annual exam-

ination of each potential mediator prevented us from excluding cases of multiple offers to mediate,

and allowed for annual variation in the explanatory variables. The first stage of the model predicts

whether or not the potential third party makes an offer to mediate (Offer=1, 0 otherwise). There

are 101 state mediation offers. The second stage predicts whether or not the disputants reject or

accept the offer (Reject=1, 0 otherwise; 34% are rejected). We cluster the models by dispute, since

not all cases are independent of one another. Information on mediation offers and acceptances is

from the Third Party Interventiondata (Frazier and Dixon, 2006) and the International Conflict

Managementdata (Bercovitch, 1999).

To measure third parties expectations that the benefits of their efforts will outweigh the costs of

involvement, we examine the role of the dispute environment and the ties between disputants and

potential mediators. Mediators account for the likelihood of success and want to avoid intractable

conflicts (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006; Rost and Greig, 2011). Mediators anticipate that dyads

previously engaged in disputes are less likely to reach a settlement. Therefore, we expect these

dyads to be less likely to receive mediation offers. We created the variablePrevious Dispute, and

it is coded 1 if the disputants have previously engaged in a militarized interstate dispute (83%), and

0 otherwise.

Given the costs of mediation, mediators want to work on salient disputes whose resolution is

meaningful. We captured important disputes by looking at conflicts involving current and future

potential loss of life. First, we employed the variable War(1 if currently coded as a war (6%), 0

otherwise). Second, using the Third Party Interventionand International Conflict Management

data we coded for the territorial nature of the issue (Territorial Conflictis 1 if applicable (9%), 0

otherwise), since territorial disputes have long been shown to be the most deadly (Huth, 1996).

We hypothesize that a third party is more likely to mediate if it has cooperative ties to the dis-

putants. To account for these relationships, we examined the presence of historic, alliance and

regime ties (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita, 1979). Colonial powers may be more likely to manage

conflicts in their former colonies (Bercovitch and Schneider, 2000), and such links increase the

probability of mediation offers in civil wars (Greig and Regan, 2008; Melin and Svensson, 2009).

The variableHistoric Tiesis coded 1 if at least one of the disputants was a former colony of the

potential intermediary (0.9%; 0 otherwise; The Correlates of War 2 Project, n.d.). Alliances increase

third-party efforts to resolve international conflicts (Melin, 2011). We measured the presence of a

defensiveAlliance Tiesbetween the third party and at least one disputant (Alliance Ties= 1 (5%);0 otherwise) using the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions data (Leeds et al., 2002).Regime


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Tiesshared by the third party and at least one disputant suggest ideological ties. Evidence shows

that a strong democratic community increases the probability of third-party mediation and its suc-

cess (Mitchell, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2008).Regime Tiesis coded 1 if the third party and one/both

disputant(s) are mature democracies, 0 otherwise; democracy requires a Polity IV score of 6

(Marshall and Jaggers, 2002).

Explanatory variables for mediation rejections

We expect that mediation behavior and the nature of the dispute influence the focus of our analysis:

mediation offer rejection. First, we examined Other Mediation. We anticipate that ongoing media-

tion identifies the availability of conflict management alternatives, and as a result, increases the

chances ofRejection. In the face of competing mediation offers, rejection is not necessarily a repu-

diation of peacemaking; rather, it may be an effort to attract more prominent mediators.

We used War, Power Differenceand Territorial Conflictto capture our hypothesized effects of

dispute characteristics and account for the presence of mutual optimism. We anticipate that those

disputants who are actively engaged in violent conflict are less likely to want to make peace. We

expect that fights over territory, seen by many as the most salient dispute issue, are less likely to

lead to voluntary peacemaking. Extensive research suggests that, the greater the power differences

between disputants, the higher the likelihood of mediation offer rejection (Bercovitch and Houston,

1993; Melin and Svensson, 2009). Large power asymmetries provide the strong state with confi-

dence in battlefield victory, making it less likely to seek compromise (Beardsley et al., 2006). Each

disputant state has a power capacity measured by its Composite Index of National Capability score

(Bennett and Stam, 2004), which creates an index of measures such as population, steel production

and military capability. We subtracted the Index scores of the two disputants to create the variable

Power Difference, which has a mean of 0.09, a standard deviation of 0.07 and ranges from near 0

to 0.36.

To test the role of ties between the third party and disputants, we examined the presence of

historic, alliance and regime ties (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita, 1979). The above variables are

summarized in Table 1. The results of our analysis are discussed below.

Results and discussion

We begin with a standard Probit analysis of actors rejecting mediation (results not shown). As we

expected, disputants are more likely to reject mediation when they anticipate success. Greater dif-

ferences in power increase the likelihood of mediation rejection. All measures of tiesalliance,

historic and regimehave no effect on the likelihood of the disputants rejecting a mediation offer,

suggesting that perhaps disputants are rejecting the involvement of any third party and not just the

offering third party. Jointly modeling mediation offers and rejections provides further support for

this theory, and combining these processes to capture the selection effects that mediation offers

have on rejections yields much stronger and more robust results.

Results from a censored Probit analysis, clustered by dispute, are shown in Table 2. As the table

shows, mediators are more likely to offer their services when a conflict is intense, but under these

conditions, disputants are also less willing to accept offers. War and Territorial Conflict both

increase the likelihood of mediation offers, but when accounting for selection effects, also increase

the probability disputants reject mediation. A dispute over salient objectives signals that disputants

are less likely to seek peace voluntarily.Previous disputes, which signal to third parties the diffi-

culty of resolving the conflict, decrease mediation offers. Overall, these conflict factors show that


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Melin et al. 363

third parties account for not only the visibility of the conflict but also the probability of resolving

it, and that disputants are unlikely to be open to mediation under these circumstances. This ten-

dency reveals a new pattern concerning disputant willingness to work with third parties. While

Greig (2005) shows that so-called triage factors increase bothmediation offers and occurrence,

we find that these factors also contain information about disputants openness to mediation.

Disputants are less willing to work with the international community while simultaneously absorb-

ing high costs and casualties, as mediation rejection signals an adversarys resolve and mutual

optimism.

As we hypothesized,Power Differenceincreases the likelihood of mediation rejection. At first,the positive relationship of power differences might seem counter-intuitive, as one might think that

large power differences should make it clear that the stronger state will win and the weaker one will

lose, making a peaceful alternative more desired. The problem with this line of thinking is that the

weaker state chose to fight recognizing the clear advantage of the stronger state (Sullivan, 2007).

As a result, when factors such as dispute characteristics and cooperative behavior are taken into

account, power no longer has a systematic influence, a result consistent with Sullivans findings

that major powers lose almost 40% of all wars with minor powers (Sullivan, 2007: 498).

Other Mediationis not correlated withRejection. This offers a first signal that disputants are not

shopping for the right mediator. That disputants are no more or less likely to agree to mediation

based upon the presence of other mediators offers evidence that disputants reject mediation basedon conflict characteristics and not mediation and relationship characteristics. Taking the mediation

environment and conflict intensity into account, relationships play a minor role in mediation deci-

sions. Cooperative relationships, such asHistoric Ties, Regime TiesandAlliance Ties, do not play

a part in third-party calculations. When tested as explanations for disputants rejections of media-

tion (results not shown), relationship ties were not significant predictors of disputant choices. The

lack of correlation offers further evidence that disputants reject mediation offers because they are

not open to mediation, rather than because they disapprove of the mediator. This result challenges

findings on the importance of trust in mediation occurrence (Kydd, 2003, 2005; Touval, 1975).

Overall, we find robust support for the inverse effects that conditions have on mediation offers

and their acceptance. Third parties appear to be more forthcoming with mediation offers when theconflict is intense; however, disputants are less willing to work with a third party when in a territo-

rial conflict or when the dispute has escalated to a war. Similarly, while third parties view the

Table 1.Summary statistics

Variable Mean standard deviation Minimum Maximum

Outcome variable

Rejection 0.3366337 0.4749153 0 1

Offer 0.0015689 0.0395784 0 1

Explanatory variable

Other Mediation 0.0129083 0.1128801 0 1

War 0.0552527 0.2284745 0 1

Territorial Conflict 0.0856206 0.2798052 0 1

Power Difference 0.0858299 0.0728291 0 0.3586476

Previous Dispute 0.8293335 0.3762202 0 1

Historic Ties 0.0089007 0.0939234 0 1

Regime Ties 0.0486509 0.2151388 0 1Alliance Ties 0.134924 0.341645 0 1


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presence of other mediators as an opportunity to burden-share or as a sign of compliant belliger-

ents, other mediators give the disputants alternatives and make rejection more likely.

In addition, we find substantial evidence that, when disputants reject mediation offers, they doso because they are not open to the mediation process at all and not because they do not approve of

the mediator. This finding supports the arguments of the ripeness literature, which argues media-

tion occurs when the disputants sense a conflict stalemate and see the improbability of winning

(Zartman, 2000). In such cases, mediation is acceptable since it offers a viable alternative to con-

tinued conflict. It seems that disputants are not as concerned with finding an acceptable and trust-

worthy mediator.

There is strong evidence that selection exerts powerful statistical effects (is significant, con-

firming the need for a censored approach), suggesting that unobserved factors, such as dispute

intensity, military stalemate and the inability of the belligerents to negotiate bilaterally, probably

affect both mediation offers and rejections. More importantly, controlling for selection reveals the

influence of key factors on mediation rejection, such as the presence of armed conflict, the nature

of the dispute and the presence of ongoing mediation. Neglecting to control for selection effects

leads to incorrect inferences about the mediation process. Modeling selection directly leads to

drastic variation between our findings and those presented by other scholars (e.g. Greig (2005),

who found that conditions jointly increase mediation offers and acceptance but did not employ a

selection approach).

Conclusion

Mediation is a voluntary process. As a result, the occurrence of mediation is a symbol of success.It signals openness to options beyond conflict. Indeed, often a back-and-forth takes place before

mediation can even begin. The act of accepting a mediator might be seen as a concession, requiring

Table 2. Censored Probit model of mediation offers and rejections 19461999

Rejection Offer

Mediation characteristics

Other Mediation 0.0247 (0.1581)

Conflict characteristicsTerritorial Conflict 0.6335*** (0.1470) 0.5210*** (0.1325)

War 0.5537*** (0.1723) 0.6404*** (0.1636)

Previous Dispute 0.3292*** (0.1032)

Power Difference 1.4870* (0.8848)

Relationship characteristics

Historic Ties 0.3555 (0.3268)

Regime Ties 0.1359 (0.1432)

Alliance Ties 0.1301 (0.1945)

Constant 3.4987*** (0.1417) 2.8717*** (0.0891)

2.2786** (0.9302)Total observations 64,377

Uncensored observations 101Log-likelihood 756.3251

Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.


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Melin et al. 365

discussion regarding what the mediator is allowed to do, what resources the mediator will have and

who will mediate. Disputants and mediators both deal with mediation strategically, but their stra-

tegic behavior pulls them in opposing directions. Although severe conflicts signal possible gains in

reputation for mediators, they also reflect that belligerents are less likely to work for peace. Thus,

the very characteristics that make third parties more forthcoming with offers of mediation are also

those that make disputants more likely to reject them.

Our research offers important insights into the complexities of the mediation environment.

While the empirical literature focuses on mediation offers and occurrence, our findings suggest

that this process is more dynamic. Observing the absence of dispute mediation suggests critical

implications. It might mean that no third party offered to mediate or that an offer was made and

rejected. Examination of these separate, but related, choices helps us to generate an improved

theoretical and practical understanding of mediation. The challenge for third parties, who undoubt-

edly would prefer to resolve conflicts before they become costly, is to convey to disputants the

potential for high costs should the conflict continue. By clarifying the likely costs of conflict, a

third party can help belligerents see the advantages of a mediator. Such information will probably

increase the acceptability of mediation. These implications will not only generate circumstances

under which disputants bring in a third-party mediator, but will probably also affect the outcomes

of such mediation efforts. Mediation represents a complex, strategic process that integrates the

preferences and interests of warring parties and potential peacemakers. This study contributes to

our understanding of how this complicated and important mechanism works.

AcknowledgementsA previous version of tis paper was presented to the Folke Bernadotte Academys Working Group on Conflict

Prevention Workshop at Emory University in Atlanta, GA, December 5th2008. The authors would like to

thank the members of the working group for their valuable feedback

Funding

This research was supported with funding from the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

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