Civil Rights Action Outline

8/6/2019 Civil Rights Action Outline

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A. Introa. §1983:

i. ³Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance,regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District

of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of theUnited States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to thedeprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by theConstitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an actionat law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, exceptthat in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer¶s judicial capacity«´

ii. §1983 came after this initial wave of federal civil rights legislation,and was designed to open up the federal cts by giving litigants adirect federal cause of action against those who, acting ³under color of´ law, deprived them of their constitutional rights

iii. Unlike the statutes that preceded it, it gave private litigats a federal

court remedy of first resort, rather than a remedy that would beavailable only in default of or after state process

b. Before there can be an action for 1983, there needs to be UNDER COLOROF LAW--; any const violation---14tham, you nee STATE AXN; 31 supp

c. State of Mind and §1983;i. 1983 has no independent ³state of mind´ requirement of its own,

apart from the underlying constitutional (or statutory) duty that isbeing enforced

1. FOR EX: proving a violation of the equal protection clause of 14tham requires a showing of discriminatory intent

2. 4tam: reasonableness3. 8tham: deliberate indifference

B. ³Under Color of´ State Lawa. TYPICALLY, liability will attach if:

i. The defendant has acted ³under color of´ state law; andii. The defendant¶s action deprived the plt of some right, privilege, or

immunity secured by the Constiutionb. Monroe v. Pape p 32-42

i. Facts: 13 chicago police officers broke into petitioners home andamong other things, made them stand naked in living room whilethey ransacked every room«officers had no search warrant or arrest warrant

ii. Issues:1. Does §1983 provide a private right of action under federal

law? YES2. Does §1983 exclude acts of an official or police officer who

can show no authority under SL? NO3. Can police officers as individuals be liable under §1983? YES4. Municipalities? NO

iii. Holding: Congress in enacting §1983 meant to give a remedy toparties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunitiesby an official¶s abuse of his position



1. Monroe¶s §1983 remedy is ³supplemental´ to any remedy hemight have under SL

2. Police officer¶s axn was axn ³under color of´ law withinmeaning of §1983, even if what they did also violated SL

iv. Monroe means that state offiers act under color of law whenever they are carrying out tasks they ordinarily perform, as well as when

their actions are ³rendered possible or efficiently aided by the stateauthority´ lodged in them

v. The SC in Monroe concluded that a party injured by theunconstitutional action of police officers could sue the officers for damages in federal ct under §1983

c. Note p. 48-52d. Badge Effecte. Private Actors as Public Actors

i. One traditional way in which private actors can engage in stateaction is by acting in concert w/state or local officials

1. SC has held that a private physican who treated inmates in astate prison engaged in state action and action under color of

law when he acted w/deliberate indifference to the medicalneeds of inmates

ii. Symbiotic relationshipsiii. Public functions: has to be a function that the government

traditionally and exclusively presumes1. Best example is private prisons

iv. Conspiracy: if private individuals join w/officials, private indivds actunder color of state law²and no immunity for them

C. ³Rights«Secured by the Constitutioná. Search, Seizure and Excessive Force²4tham

i. 4tham STANDARD:1. Objective inquiry: whether the officer¶s action was

³reasonable´ when judged by an objective standard in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case andconfronted by the officer

2. Risk to the officer 3. What a reasonable officer would do4. You don¶t have to use most reasonable force, just force that

is reasonableii. Safford Unified Sch. Fist v. Redding, handout

1. Facts: Redding, an eighth grader, was strip-searched byschool officials on the basis of a tip by another student thatMs. Redding might have ibuprofen on her person in violationof school policy

2. Issue:a. Does the 4tham prohibit school officials from strip

searching students suspected of possessing drugs inviolation of school policy? Sometimes/fact dependent



b. Are school officials individually liable for damages in alawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C Section 1983? No

3. Holding: The Supreme Court held that Savanna's Fourth

Amendment rights were violated when school officials searchedher underwear for non-prescription painkillers. the Court reiterated

that, based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used byschool officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related

to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in lightof the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."

Here, school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrantextending the search of Savanna to her underwear. The Court also

held that the implicated school administrators were not

personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not

show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment." It

reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to

have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth

Amendment right. a. **BS²agree w/dissent²how could you not know??b. Yes²violation²BUT²have qualified immunity

iii. Graham v. Connor, handout1. Facts: Petitioner Graham, a diabetic, asked his friend, Berry, to

drive him to a convenience store to purchase orange juice tocounteract the onset of an insulin reaction. Upon entering thestore and seeing the number of people ahead of him, Grahamhurried out and asked Berry to drive him to a friend's houseinstead. Respondent Connor, a city police officer, becamesuspicious after seeing Graham hastily enter and leave the store,followed Berry's car, and made an investigative stop, ordering thepair to wait while he found out what had happened in the store.

2. Holding: The Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" inquiry iswhether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard totheir underlying intent or motivation. The "reasonableness" of aparticular use of force must be judged from the perspective of areasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody anallowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to makesplit-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in aparticular situation.

3. Eighth Amendment standard applies only after the State hascomplied with the constitutional guarantees traditionallyassociated with criminal prosecutions.

4. "All claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force -deadly or not - in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen are properly analyzed under the Fourth

Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard, rather than under asubstantive due process standard.

a. courts must identify the specific constitutional rightallegedly infringed by the challenged application of force and then judge the claim by reference to the



specific constitutional standard which governs thatright.

b. (b) Claims that law enforcement officials have usedexcessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatorystop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen are most properlycharacterized as invoking the protections of the Fourth

Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right 'to besecure in their... against unreasonable seizures,' and mustbe judged by reference to the Fourth Amendment's'reasonableness' standard.

c. (c) The Fourth Amendment 'reasonableness' inquiry iswhether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' inlight of the facts and circumstances confronting them,without regard to their underlying intent or motivation... Thetest applied by the courts below is incompatible with aproper Fourth Amendment analysis."

iv. Cook v. City of Bella Villa, handout1. Sexual assault case by officer

2. Ct held that he acted reasonably²v. NOTES:

1. A lot of the speeding and ³plt maneuver´ cases and personfor ex. Becomes a quadripalegic²ct says that this is NOTexcessive force

2. You don¶t have to use MOST reasonable application or use of force²just needs to be reasonable

b. Cruel and Unusual Punishment- 8thami. STANDRAD: cruel and unusual punishment²³deliberate

indifferenceíi. The 8tham has been held to impose affirmative duties on

government to protect incarcerated persons from the violence of other parties, not just state actors. It has also been read to imposean affirmative duty on the giovt to provide for the ³serious´ medicalneeds on inmates and other necessities

iii. The deliberate indifference standard in 8th am failure to protectcases is a subjective standard²even though the inquiry of whether the risk of harm was sufficiently serious is objective

a. Officer will not be liable for prisoner-prisoner violenceunless the officer disregarded a serious risk of whichhe was ACTUALLY aware²farmer case

b. Just to note: also requirement special/unique toprison cases that may affect the remedies of procedure in prisoners¶ litigation

2. Subjective (intent of officer/ ³meanness´/intent to causeharm)

3. Objective (punishment has to be serious)4. Needs to be an objective deprivation of human need²serious

need



a. Small bits of deprivation can add upb. One single human need include²food, warmth,

hygiene5. it has to be a risk that the officer actually knows about

iv. Wilson v. Sieter, handout1. Facts: While detained at the Hocking Correctional Facility in

Nelsonville, Ohio, Pearly Wilson claimed he experienced cruel andunusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and FourteenthAmendments. Wilson sought financial awards and an injunctionagainst the prison under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He filed suit in a federal

district court against two state prison officials, Richard P. Seiter and Carl Humphreys. The District Court ruled against Wilson, and

the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.It held that Wilson had to show that the prison officials had a

"culpable state of mind" when inflicting harm upon him. 2. Issue: Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

err by holding that prison officials must have a "culpable state of

mind" in order to establish cruel and unusual punishment of aninmate? Did the Court of Appeals err by overlooking an inmate'sclaim that prison officials showed "deliberate indifference" to his

conditions of confinement? 3. Holding: No and Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion

for a unanimous court. The Court referred to its earlier decisions in Francis v. Resweber and Estelle v. Gamble to establish that cruel

and unusual punishment required the "unnecessary and wantoninfliction of pain." For this to occur, the prison officials had to

exhibit intentional cruelty, which would result in a "culpable stateof mind." However, "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's

conditions also constituted abusive treatment according to thisstandard. Therefore the Court of Appeals should have considered

this aspect of Wilson's grievances. 4.

v. Farmer v. Brennan, handout1. Petitioner, a preoperative transsexual who projects feminine

characteristics, has been incarcerated with other males in thefederal prison system, sometimes in the general prison populationbut more often in segregation. Petitioner claims to have beenbeaten and raped by another inmate after being transferred byrespondent federal prison officials from a correctional institute to apenitentiary--typically a higher security facility with more

troublesome prisoners--and placed in its general population. Filingan action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, petitioner sought damages and an injunction barringfuture confinement in any penitentiary, and alleged thatrespondents had acted with "deliberate indifference" to petitioner'ssafety in violation of the Eighth Amendment because they knewthat the penitentiary had a violent environment and a history of



inmate assaults and that petitioner would be particularlyvulnerable to sexual attack.

2. H eld: A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with "deliberate indifference" to inmate health or safety only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk ofserious harm anddisregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.

a. (a) Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment toprovide humane conditions of confinement. They must ensurethat inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, andmedical care, and must protect prisoners from violence at thehands of other prisoners. However, a constitutional violationoccurs only where the deprivation alleged is, objectively,"sufficiently serious," Wilson v. Seiter , and the official has actedwith "deliberate indifference" to inmate health or safety.

b. (b) Deliberate indifference entials something more thannegligence, but is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or withknowledge that harm will result. Thus, it is the equivalent of acting recklessly. However, this does not establish the level of culpability deliberate indifference entails, for the termrecklessness is not self defining, and can take subjective or objective forms. Pp. 7 9.

c. (c) Subjective recklessness, as used in the criminal law, is theappropriate test for "deliberate indifference." Permitting a findingof recklessness only when a person has disregarded a risk of harm of which he was aware is a familiar and workable standardthat is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual PunishmentsClause as interpreted in this Court's cases. The Amendmentoutlaws cruel and unusual "punishments," not "conditions," andthe failure to alleviate a significant risk that an official shouldhave perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation,cannot be condemned as the infliction of punishment under theCourt's cases. Petitioner's invitation to adopt a purely objective

test for determining liability--whether the risk is known or shouldhave been known--is rejected. This Court's cases "mandateinquiry into a prison official's state of mind," id., at 299, andit is no accident that the Court has repeatedly said that theEighth Amendment has a "subjective component."

d. (d) The subjective test does not permit liability to be premised onobviousness or constructive notice. However, this does not meanthat prison officials will be free to ignore obvious dangers toinmates. Whether an official had the requisite knowledge is aquestion of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, anda factfinder may conclude that the official knew of a substantialrisk from the very fact that it was obvious. Nor may an officialescape liability by showing that he knew of the risk but did not

think that the complainant was especially likely to be assaultedby the prisoner who committed the act. It does not matter whether the risk camefrom a particular source or whether aprisoner faced the risk for reasons personal to him or because allprisoners in his situation faced the risk. But prison officialsmay not be held liable if they prove that they were unawareof even an obvious risk or if they responded reasonably to aknown risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.

e. (e) Use of subjective test will not foreclose prospective injunctiverelief, nor require a prisoner to suffer physical injury before



obtaining prospective relief. The subjective test adopted todayis consistent with the principle that "[o]ne does not have toawait the consummation of threatened injury to obtainpreventive relief.". In a suit for prospective relief, the subjectivefactor, deliberate indifference, "should be determined in light of the prison authorities' current attitudes and conduct," H elling v.McKinney , 509 U. S. ___, ___: their attitudes and conduct at thetime suit is brought and persisting thereafter. In making therequisite showing of subjective culpability, the prisoner may relyon developments that postdate the pleadings and pretrialmotions, as prison officials may rely on such developments toshow that the prisoner is not entitled to an injunction. A Courtthat finds the Eighth Amendment's objective and subjectiverequirements satisfied may grant appropriate injunctive relief,though it should approach issuance of injunctions with the usualcaution. A court need not ignore a prisoner's failure to takeadvantage of adequate prison procedures to resolve inmategrievances, and may compel a prisoner to pursue them.

3.

c. Equal Protection- 14thami. STANDRAD: discriminatory intent, not just effect

ii. Class of one²EP cases1. Soverign interest v. proprietary interest

a. Sovereign: does it eminate from legislature/laws; isperson asking permission to do something?

i. License, zoningii. Just bc there is revenue, does not mean its

proprietary²could be a fee

b. Proprietary: look at market participant; if acting as amarket participant, then no 14tham righti. if not a participant²more n more like soveren

stating the rulesii. difference between state being a participant and

controlling the marketiii. ex: employment, govt owner of something

2. Discretionary v. nondiscretionaryiii. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Corp. handout

1. Facts: The Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC)contracted with the Village of Arlington Heights ("Arlington") to

build racially integrated low- and moderate-income housing. When

MHDC applied for the necessary zoning permits, authorizing aswitch from a single- to a multiple-family classification,Arlington's planning commission denied the request. Acting on

behalf of itself and several minority members, MHDC challengedArlington's denial as racially discriminatory.

2. Issue: Was Arlington Height's denial of a zoning request,necessary for the creation of low- and moderate-income housing,



racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment'sEqual Protection Clause?

3. Holding: Perhaps. After finding that MHDC had proper federalstanding, since it acted on behalf of black plaintiffs who stood to

suffer direct and measurable injuries from Arlington's denial, the

Court held that it failed to establish Arlington's raciallydiscriminatory intent or purpose. While indicating that Arlington'szoning denial may result in a racially disproportionate impact, the

evidence did not show that this was Arlington's deliberateintention. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for

further considerationiv. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, handout

1. Facts: Grace Olech asked the Village of Willowbrook to connecther property to the municipal water supply. The Village

conditioned the connection on Olech's granting of a 33-footeasement. Olech refused, claiming that the Village only required a

15-foot easement from other property owners seeking access to thewater supply. Olech sued the Village claiming that the Village's

demand of an additional 18-foot easement violated the EqualProtection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District

Court dismissed the case for failure to state a cognizable claimunder the Equal Protection Clause. In reversing, the Court of

Appeals held that a plaintiff can allege an equal protectionviolation by asserting that state action was motivated solely by a

"spiteful effort to 'get' him for reasons wholly unrelated to anylegitimate state objective."

2. Issue: Does the Equal Protection Clause give rise to a cause of action on behalf of a "class of one" where the plaintiff did not

allege membership in a class or group3. Holding: Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Olech's

allegations were sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis. "Our cases have recognized

successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,'where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated

differently from others similarly situated and that there is norational basis for the difference in treatment,"

v.vi. Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, handout

1. Facts: Anup Engquist, a woman of Indian descent, brought this

action against the Oregon Department of Agriculture alleging thata co-worker at the Department harassed her and eventually

engineered her termination. Although Engquist asserted numerousclaims, a jury in the federal district court only found in her favor

on her equal protection, substantive due process, and intentionalinterference with employment claims.On appeal, the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck those jury verdicts. Althoughthe Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court had



previously dealt with such "class of one" equal protection claimseight years ago in a case, V illage of Willowbrook v. Olech,

involving a village resident suing the village for unjustified zoningdecisions, it refused to apply that short, two-page opinion to

Engquist's claim. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Olech

opinion may only apply when the government is in the role of regulator and did not clarify whether it would also apply in anemployment context such as this one. In seeking Court review,

Engquist noted the pervasive splits in the circuits regarding the proper allocation of the Court's decision in Olech, while Oregon

claimed that Olech should be construed narrowly so as to avoid adeluge of petty cases against the government. Oregon also pointed

out that even if the case were to be heard, Oregon would havequalified immunity and Engquist would necessarily lose.

2. Issue: Does the Court's ruling in V illage of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), allow so-called "class of one" equal

protection claims against government bodies in the context of employment discrimination?

Holding: No, it does not. The Court ruled 6-3 that the "class-of-one" theory of equal protection does not apply in the public

employment context. The government enjoys significantly greater leeway in dealing with employees than it does with the public at

large in its capacity as a regulator.vii.

d. Deprivations of Liberty or Property- 14thami. Life, Liberty and Property

1. Complaints alleging violations of the Bill of Rights and mostother non-due process provisions of the constitution areimmediately actionable under 1983 w/out regard to stateremedies

2. Problematic when the liberty or property interests protectedby the Due Process Clausae that plts seek to vindicate aren¶tfundamental rights

a. With respect to nonfundamnetal rights the ct hassuggested that it can only be protected by proceduraldue process clause

3. Incentive to make claim one based on a fundamental right or a substantive due process claim²b/c that way, you haveimmediate access to 1983

a. Make tort a substantive due process claim if its²outrageous or shocking!!!

4. Substantive: Loving, Roe v. Wade, Lawrence v. TX, Griswold a. Govt cannot take away a fundamental right w/out

compelling interest5. Procedural



a. what the state must do before taking something away b. notice and opportunity to be heard c. need to show a liberty or property interest in order for

procedural due process to be triggeredii. Paul v. Davis p259-73

1. Facts: A flyer identifying "active shoplifters" was distributed tomerchants in the Louisville, Kentucky area. The flyer included aphotograph of Edward C. Davis III, who had been arrested on ashoplifting charge. When the charge was dismissed, Davisbrought an action against Edgar Paul, the Louisville chief of police. Davis alleged that the distribution of the flyer hadstigmatized him and deprived him of his constitutional rights.

2. Issue: Did the distribution of the flyer violate Davis's right toprivacy and liberty under the Due Process Clause of theFourteenth Amendment?

3. Holding: the Court held that Davis had not been deprived of anyconstitutional rights under the Due Process Clause. The Courtalso emphasized that constitutional privacy interests did not cover

Davis's claims. The Court argued that the constitutional right toprivacy was limited to matters relating to "marriage, procreation,contraception, family relationships, and child rearing andeducation." The publication of records of official acts, such asarrests, did not fall under the rubric of privacy rights.

4. The central holding of Paul v. Davis is that Davis has nocognizable ³liberty interest´ in his reputation. The court¶smotivation for taking that position was clearly the desire toavoid making the 14tham a font for tort law

a. ³stigma plusí. stigma plus´ test requires that a plaintiff suing the

government for a due process violation arising outof injury to reputation show an ³additional injury´

such as loss of employment or the foreclosure of future employment opportunities.

iii. DeShaney v. Winnebago County p277-811. Facts: 4year old was beaten by his father and went into a

coma requiring brain surgery and he suffered brain damageso severe that he would be in an instiution forever. Socialservices had been contacted previously about the incidentand placed boy back with family²authorities refusedcoercive intervention. Mother brought a 1983 cliam. Thecomplaint alleged that the respondents deprived Joshua of

his liberty interest without due process of law, in violation of his rights under 14tham, by failing to intervene to protect himagainst a risk of violence at his father¶s hands which theyknew or should have known

2. Holding: this is a cliam invoking a substantive due processclaim; as a general matter, conclude that a state¶s failure toprotect an individual against private violence simply does notconstitute a violation of the Due Process Clause



a. A duty to protect may arise out of certain specialrelationships created or assumed by the statew/respect to particular individuals

3. After Deshaney, there remain two theories for holdinggovernments or public officials liable for not preventingtortuous acts by private parties:

a. Govt is responsible when the injury occurs while theplt is in state custody or when the govt has a specialrelationship with the plt p281

b. State is liable when the danger of an injury at privatehands is ³state created.´ P281

4. **Absent a state-imposed, or involuntary, custodial setting,the state is under no affirmative obligation to spend itsresources to protect indivs from harm

5. Limits on Deshaney: a. Special relationship b. State created harm

iv. Castle Rock v. Gonzales p281-5

1. In Deshaney, the court declined to consuder the question of whether Wisconsin¶s child protection statutes had created astate law entitelemnet to protective services, the denial of which would give rise to a PDP claim²cts decides issue inGonzales

2. Facts: woman had a restraining order for husband to stayaway from her and the kids. He took the kids and she calledpolice couple times asking for help. They refused²kidsfound dead²murdered by husband

3. Holding: the provisions of the law of the restraiing order don¶t make enforcement mandatory. A well establishedtradition of police discretion has long co-existed with

apparently mandatory arrest statutes«a. Even if statute made enforcement mandatory, it does

not mean that respondent had an entitlement to theenforcement. Making the actions of governmentemployees obligatory can serve various legitimateends other than the conferral of benefit on a specificclass of people

b. Court went on to say that even if there was some sortof entitlement, not sure that it arises to a propertyinterest for purposes of due process clause

v. Parratt v. Taylor p287-901. Facts: plt was a prison inmate who ordered $23.50 worth of

hobby materials. When they arrived, he was in segregationand was not permitted to recive them. The materials weretherefore signed by two employees of the prison hobbycenter. When Taylor was released and packages were nowhere to be found, he sued. He claimed that they negligentlydeprived him of property without due process of law

2. Issue: whether state post-deprivation process was sufficientto remedy the loss?



3. Holding: Prisoner who was seeking a post deprivationhearing could not go forward w/him 1983 claim but mustpursue his state remedies

a. Distinguished from Monroe b. Here²this is a PDP claim; it was impossible to predict

the ³random and unauthorized´ behavior of the

officials who had failed to follow established stateprocedures and who were responsible for the loss of the hobby kit. No pre-deprivation process would havebeen possible. But, post-deprivation proceduresadequate

c. Parrat involved a negligent deprivation²but same ruleapplies even for intentional deprivations

4. The SC backtracked from one of its subsidiary conclusions inParratt, when it later held that the Due Process Clause wasnot violated by the merely negligent behavior of governmental officials

5. **Parrat¶s rationale is limited to cases of random and

unauthorized actions. Distinguishing it from Monroe²thedeprivations at issue are different. Parrat¶s reasoning onlyapplies to non-fundamental rights only. The deprivation inMonroe was a 4tham fundamental right**

6 . By contrast, when an official¶s deprivation of such non- fundamental rights is not random and unauthorized, but

pursuant to some ³established state procedure´ or isotherwise systematic, then the Paratt requirement of resort to

post-deprivation state remedies is said to be inapplicableZinermon

7. When a deprivation is pursuant to established policy and isnot random and unauthorized, ³it is practical and feasible for

the state to provide pre-deprivation process for the aggrieved party´ Moore v. Board of educ. If however, the claim is thatconstitutionally required state deprivation was in place, butthat state officials merely failed somehow to follow it, thenthe deprivation becomes effectively random andunauthorized, and state court post-deprivation remedies areall that the constitution demands

8. In Hudson v. Palmer, during unannounced shakedown of prison and the intentional destruction of personal property, ct held that even intentional deprivation of property would not violate the DPC when the state provided a meaningful post- deprivation procedure to make good of loss

vi. Daniels v. Williams p290-11. Facts: prisoner in a city jail tripped over a pillow2. Holding: court overruled the part of Parratt that presupposed

that negligent actions could constitute official deprivationsand said that ³the Due Process Clause is simply notimplicated by a negligent act of an official causingunintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property

vii. Davidson v. Cannon p2911. Extended reasoning in Daniels to deprivations of liberty too



2. Facts: Davidson sued state prison officials for failure toprotect him from another inmate. Prior to assault, victim sentauthorities a note, but they failed to take action. Ct rejectedthis claim on the authority of Daniels

3. Dissent !*viii. County of Sacremento v. Lewis p293-4; SDP claim

1. Facts: 2 boys on a motorcycle speeding and police chasedthem²boy was killed. Parents filed 14tham substantive dueprocess claim for a deprivation of life

2. Holding: proper standard here was ³whether the deputy hadbeen guilty of an abuse of power which µshocks theconscience¶´ In the specific context of high speed chases, itrequired an intent to harm the suspects

ix. Zinermon v. Burch p295-3141. Darrell Burch (Respondent) brought this action under 42 U.S.C.

Section:1983 against 11 Florida State Hospital (FSH) physicians,administrators and staff (Petitioners), alleging they deprived him of his liberty without due process of law by admitting him as a

³voluntary´ mental patient when he was incompetent to giveinformed consent to his admission

2. HOLDING: Respondent¶s complaint was sufficient to state a claimunder Section:1983 for violation of his procedural due processrights. Parratt and Hudson come into play in special cases of thegeneral Mathews v. Eldridge analysis where postdeprivation areall the process that is due, simply because they are the onlyremedies the State could be expected to provide. This case wasnot controlled by Parratt and Hudson for three basic reasons.First, the deprivation of liberty was not unpredictable,because an error will occur, if at all, in the admissionprocess. Second, a predeprivation process was not

impossible here. The Florida statutes did not direct any facilitystaff to determine whether a person was competent to giveconsent. Because Petitioners had state authority to deprivepersons of liberty, the Constitution required them toconcomitant duty to see that no deprivation occurred withoutadequate procedural protections. Third, Petitioners¶ conductwas not ³unauthorized´ because the statute delegated broadauthority to them to effect the deprivation complained of here.

x. Pre-deprivation Procedural Due Process: pre-deprivaion process isappropriate only in ³extraordinary´ circumstances in which evenpostdepriation process will not adequately safeguard rights

1. According to Matthews v. Eldridge: predeprivation notice

and hearing available when the risk of an erroneousdeprivation, considered in light of the private interests thatcoyuld be affected, outweighs the govts interest in promotingthe axn

D. ³Rights«secured by the«laws´



a. A 1983 action will be unavailable to redress violations of federal statutesunless Congress has unambiguously created judicially enforceable rights.In addition, even if the underlying statute does create such rights, 1983 willbe unavailable to enforce it if the statute has its own enforcementmechanisms from which it can be inferred that Congress meant to displacethe 1983 remedy

i. 1.) statute creates enforceable rights in indivsii. 2.) Congress did not include its own remedies to sub for 1983

b. Maine v. Thiboutot p. 316-27i. Facts: man has 8 kids²gets benefits for children. Benefits

terminated for the 5 children that are not legally his, but whom he islegally obligated to support. Statute states that they are notqualifying expenses under the statute. Plt claimed he was deniedlaw secured by the state

ii. Issue: can you use §1983 to enforce a statute? YESiii. §1983 COA permission slip

c. Natl Sea Clammers p. 331-32i. Facts: an org of commercial fisherman sued various govt

authorities to stop the discharge of sewage and other pollutants intoNY Harbor and the Hudson River. Plts claimed that pollutionviolated federal statutes

ii. SC held that there are already available remedies, ³it is hard tobelieve that congress intended to preserve the §1983 right of actionwhen it created so many specific statutory remedies.´

iii. ³when the remedial devices provided in a particular act aresufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstratecongressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under 1983´

d. NOTE: i. Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment:

1. Facts: low income tenants overbilled for utilities

2. Issue: whether the federal rent ceilig could be enforced by1983

3. Holding: ³if there is a state deprivation of a µright¶ secured bya federal statute. 1983 provides a remedial cause of actionunless the state ctor demonstrates by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that congressintended to foreclose such private enforcement´

4. Ct held that ³the remedia; mechanisms provided are notsufficienly comprehensive and effective to raise a clear inference that congress intended to foreclose a 1983 COA«´

5. Nothing in the Housing Act or the Brooke Amendment evidences

that Congress intended to preclude petitioners' § 1983 claim

against respondent. Not only are the Brooke Amendment and itslegislative history devoid of any express indication that exclusiveenforcement authority was vested in HUD, but also both

congressional and agency actions have indicated that enforcementauthority is not centralized, and that private actions were

anticipated. Neither are the remedial mechanisms provided by thestatute sufficiently comprehensive and effective to raise a clear



inference that Congress intended to foreclose a § 1983 cause of action for the enforcement of tenants' rights secured by federal law.

e. Blessing v. Freestone p. 334-6i. Facts: an attempt by 5 mothers to enforce Social Security Act

provisions through §1983 pursuant to title IV-D. plts claimed thatthe state systematic failures violated their federal rights under §1983

ii. SC reversed Ct App stating that indivs didn¶t have rights in title IV-D²don¶t foreclose that some provisions of title IV-D give rise toindividual rights, just want dist ct to state which rights they areasserting²and complaint unclear

f. Alexander v. Sandoval p. 337-i. Facts: Because it is a recipient of federal financial assistance, the

Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department) is subject to Title VIof the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits

discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. Under section 602,the Department of Justice issued a regulation forbidding funding recipients

to utilize criteria or administrative methods having the effect of subjecting

individuals to discrimination based on the prohibited grounds. MarthaSandoval brought a class action suit to enjoin the Department fromadministering state driver's license examinations only in English. Sandoval

argued that the English-only policy violated the DOJ regulation because ithad the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based

on their national origin. Ordering the Department to accommodate non-English speakers, the District Court enjoined the policy. The Court of

Appeals affirmed. James Alexander, the Director of the Department,unsuccessfully argued before both courts that Title VI did not provide a

cause of action to enforce the regulation.ii. Issue: Does Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provide a cause of

action to enforce the Department of Justice's regulation forbidding federalfinancial assistance recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods

that have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based onrace, color, or national origin?

iii. Holding: No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, theCourt held that there is no private right of action to enforce disparate-

impact regulations promulgated under Title VI. "Title VI itself directlyreaches only instances of intentional discrimination," wrote Justice Scalia,

"[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI displayan intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce

regulations promulgated under [section 602]."

g. Gonzaga v. Doe p338-40i. In this case the SC sought to align the tests for determining whenthere is an implied right of action and when 1983 provides for anexpress remedy:

ii. Facts: case concerned the FERPA which prohibits the federalfunding of schools that permit the release of students¶ records w/outwritten consent

iii. Issue: May a student sue a private university for damages to enforceprovisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974?



iv. Holding:No. Court held that such an action is foreclosed because therelevant provisions of FERPA create no personal rights to enforce. TheCourt reasoned that the creation of individual rights required clear andunambiguous terms, which FERPA's confidentiality provisions did notcontain. "FERPA's nondisclosure provisions contain no rights-creatinglanguage, they have an aggregate, not individual, focus, and they serve

primarily to direct the Secretary of Education's distribution of public fundsto educational institutions´

1. In clearing things up the ct states:a. ³we now reject the notion that our case permit

anything short of an unambiguous conferred right tosupport a cause of action brought under 1983«accordingly, only ³rights,´ not ³benefits´ or ³interests´ may be enforced under that section.´

b. ** ³whether a statutory violation may be enforcedthrough 1983 is a different inquiry than that involved indetermining whether a private right of action can beimplied from a particular statute´

c. The question of whether Congress«intended to createa private right of action is definitely answered in thenegative where a statute by its terms grants no privateright to any identifiable class.

i. But even where a statute is phrased in suchexplicit rights-creating terms, a plt suing under an implied right of action still must show thatthe statute manifest an intent to create not justa private right but also a private remedy

d. Once the plt demonstrates that a statute confers anindividual right, the right is presumptively enforceableby 1983. But the initial inquiry²determining whether a

statute confers any right at all²is no different from theinitial inquiry in an implied right of action case, theexpress purpose of which is to determine whether or not a statute confers rights on a particular class of persons

h. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams p340i. Facts: Rancho Palos Verdes, a city in California, gave Mark Abrams a

permit to construct an antenna on his property for amateur use. But whenthe city learned Abrams used the antenna for commercial purposes, the

city forced Abrams to stop until he got a commercial use permit. Abramsapplied and the city refused to give him the permit. Abrams then sued in

federal district court, alleging the city violated his rights under theTelecommunications Act of 1996. Abrams sought damages under a federal

liability law that allowed people to sue for damages for federal rightsviolations.The district court agreed with Abrams and ordered the city to

give Abrams the permit. But the court refused Abrams' request for damages under the separate federal liability law. The court said Congress

intended for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act toinclude only remedies specifically found in that act. The Ninth Circuit



Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that because the act did not contain a"comprehensive remedial scheme," Abrams could seek damages under

other federal laws.ii. Issue: May people whose rights guaranteed by the Telecommunications

Act of 1996 are violated seek remedies other than those allowed by the

act?iii. Holding: No. the Court held that Abrams could not enforce the

limitations of the Telecommunications Act on local authorities

through federal liability law, because the act provides its own judicial

remedy. Congress could not have meant the judicial remedy expressly

authorized by the Telecommunications Act to co-exist with an

alternative remedy.

E. ³Shall be liableá. Soverign Immunity

i. Ex Parte Young p. 8-121. Facts: The state of Minnesota passed laws limiting what

railroads could charge in that state, and establishing severepenalties, including fines and jail for violators. Some railroadcompany shareholders filed a suit asserting that the lawswere unconstitutional as violating the DPC of the 14thAm aswell as the Dormant Commerce Clause. The shareholderssued the railroads to prevent them from complying with thelaw, and also sued Edward T. Young, then the AttorneyGeneral of Minnesota, to prevent him from enforcing the law.

Young argued that the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibitsstates from being sued by citizens, meant that the court didnot have jurisdiction to hear the case. The federal courtissued an injunction against Young enforcing the law. Thefollowing day, Young filed suit to force the railroads tocomply with the statute. The federal judge ordered Young toexplain his actions, and Young reiterated his 11thAmclaim--

judge held Young in contempt of court.2. Issues:

a. Is statute unconstitutional? YESb. tension between the Eleventh Amendment and the

Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment hadrecently been held in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1(1890), to prohibit federal courts from hearing suits by

citizens against their own states. Conversely, theFourteenth Amendment prohibits the states fromviolating the due process rights of their citizens. Coulda federal court entertain a lawsuit seeking to enjoin astate official from carrying out state laws that werepurportedly in violation of the FourteenthAmendment?



3. Holding: allows suits in federal courts against officials actingon behalf of states of the union to proceed despite the State'ssovereign immunity, when the State acted unconstitutionally.

a. The official is ³stripped¶ of any ³official or representative character´ if enforcement of SL violatesthe federal constitution, even though official¶s conduct

is still regarded as ³state action´ under the 14thamii. Edelman v. Jordan p12-20

1. Facts: class action to challenge the practices of certain Illinoisofficials in administering federal-state programs under the Aid tothe Aged, Blind, or Disabled Act. Wanted payment retroactivelyfrom date of initial eligibility bc claims that officials failed toprocess AABD apps in timely fashion

2. Issues: a. Since the 1890 decision in H ans v. Louisiana, the

Eleventh Amendment had been held to recognize thesovereign immunity of states from suits by their citizens.However, the 1908 case of Ex parte Young had allowed an

exception, that citizens could seek injunctive relief againststate officials to stop them from carrying outunconstitutional state policies.

b. In this case, the Supreme Court would have toexamine whether a federal court can require a state torestore money wrongfully withheld from citizens bythe state, if the order to restore the funds is in theform of an injunction requiring the state to stop itswrongful possession of those funds.

3. Holding: held that, because of the sovereign immunityrecognized in the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could notorder a State to pay back funds unconstitutionally withheld fromparties to whom they were due

iii. Abrogation of Immunity p 52-4iv. Hafer v. Melo p. 54-60

1. Facts: during campaign, US atty alleged to have secured jobsthrough payment. Won election and dismissed 18 EEs

2. Issue: whether state officers may be held personally liable for damages under 1983 based upon actions taken in their officialcapacities

3. Holding: state officials sued in their individual capacities are³persons´ within the meaning of 1983. The 11tham does notbar such suits

b. Official Immunity- Absolutei. Persons acting in a judicial capacity are accorded an absolute

immunity from 1983 suits for damages for all of their judicial acts²no matter how erroneous or objectively unreasonable²at least if they are acting within their jurisdiction



ii. Legislators and those who act in a lawmaking capacity are immunefrom damages and injuctive relief under 1983 for their legislativeacts

iii. Prosecutors have quasi-judicial immunity; when acting in an³investigatory capacity´ they may assert only qualified immunity

iv. Bogan v. Scott-Harris p. 74-82

1. Facts: Janet Scott-Harris filed suit under 1983 against the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, the city's mayor, Daniel Bogan, thevice president of the city counsel, Marilyn Roderick, and others,alleging that the elimination of the city department in which Scott-Harris was the sole employee was motivated by a desire toretaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights.The jury found the city, Bogan and Roderick liable on the First

Amendment claim. The First Circuit set aside the verdict againstthe city, but affirmed the judgments against Bogan and Roderick

2. Issue; Are actions by local officials introducing, voting for, andsigning an ordinance outside the scope of legislative activitiesbecause of the motives of the government actors?

3. Holding: No. Local legislators are entitled to the sameabsolute immunity from civil liability under Section 1983 for their legislative activities as are federal, state and regionallegislators. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of theact itself, rather than on the motive or intent of the officialperforming it. The acts at issue here were clearly legislative, andthe ordinance itself bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.

v. Stump v. Sparksman p. 82-961. Facts: A mother filed a petition in an Indiana Circuit Court, a

court of general jurisdiction under an Indiana statute, for authorityto have her "somewhat retarded" 15-year-old daughter (arespondent here) sterilized, and petitioner Circuit Judge approved

the petition the same day in an ex parte proceeding without ahearing and without notice to the daughter or appointment of aguardian ad litem. The operation was performed shortly thereafter,the daughter having been told that she was to have her appendixremoved. About two years later she was married, and her inabilityto become pregnant led her to discover that she had beensterilized. As a result she and her husband (also a respondenthere) filed suit in Federal District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.1983 against her mother, the mother's attorney, the Circuit Judge,the doctors who performed or assisted in the sterilization, and thehospital where it was performed, seeking damages for the allegedviolation of her constitutional rights.

2. Holding: The Indiana law vested in the Circuit Judge the power toentertain and act upon the petition for sterilization, and he is,therefore, immune from damages liability even if his approval of the petition was in error. Judges are absolutely immune.

vi. Imbler v. Pachtman 96-1001. Facts: Petitioner, convicted of murder, unsuccessfully petitioned

for state habeas corpus on the basis of respondent prosecutingattorney's revelation of newly discovered evidence, and chargedthat respondent had knowingly used false testimony and



suppressed material evidence at petitioner's trial. Petitioner thereafter filed a federal habeas corpus petition based on thesame allegations, and ultimately obtained his release. He thenbrought an action under § 1983, seeking damages for loss of liberty allegedly caused by unlawful prosecution, but the DistrictCourt held that respondent was immune from liability under §

1983, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 2. H eld: A state prosecuting attorney who, as here, acted within

the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminalprosecution and in presenting the State's case, is absolutelyimmune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983 for allegeddeprivations of the accused's constitutional rights.

vii. Pottawattamie County v. McGhee²handout1. Facts:In 1978, Curtis W. McGhee Jr. and Terry Harrington were

convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by anIowa state court. In 2002, Mr. McGhee's and Mr. Harrington's

convictions were reversed because the prosecutor at their trialimproperly withheld evidence of an alternative suspect.

Subsequently, Mr. McGhee and Mr. Harrington filed civil claimsin an Iowa federal court against Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and

the prosecutors and officers involved in their prosecution. Thedefendants moved for summary judgment arguing that they were

absolutely immune to civil prosecution. The district court foundsome defendants immune to certain claims, but denied immunity to

other defendants on the other claims. The U.S. Court of Appealsfor the Eighth Circuit granted interlocutory appeal on the question

of whether the prosecutors were absolutely immune to civil prosecution.The Eighth Circuit held that the prosecutors were not

immune from claims that they violated Mr. McGhee's and Mr.Harrington's due process rights. The court reasoned that allegations

that prosecutors obtained, manufactured, coerced, and fabricatedevidence did not fall within "a distinctly prosecutorial function"

and thus the prosecutors were not immune to the claims. 2. Issue: May a prosecutor be subject to civil prosecution when he

allegedly violated the criminal defendants' substantial due processrights by fabricating evidence and then introducing it at trial

against the defendants? viii. Briscoe v. LaHue p100-102

1. H eld: Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. V) does notauthorize a convicted state defendant to assert a claim for damages

against a police officer for giving perjured testimony at thedefendant's criminal trial.

2. The common law provided absolute immunity from subsequentdamages liability for all persons -- governmental or otherwise --

who were integral parts of the judicial process. Section 1983 doesnot authorize a damages claim against private witnesses. Similarly,

judges, P ierson v. Ray, and prosecutors, Imbler v. P achtman, maynot be held liable for damages under § 1983 for the performance of





2. Issue: whether good faith is subjective or objective3. Holding: both²in specific context of school discipline,

school board members are not immune from liability for damages under 1983 if he knew or reasonably should haveknown that he action he took would violate the const rights of a student²or if he took action w/malicious intent to deprive

of const rights vi. Harlow v. Fitzgerald p120-23

1. Facts: Fitzgerald was a notorious ³whistle-blower´ in theDept of Defense. He was terminated and brought a Bivensaction against a number of people

2. Holding: (1) presidential aides generally are entitled only to

qualified immunity; (2) aides failed to establish that their official

functions required absolute immunity; (3) presidential aides areentitled to application of qualified immunity standard that permitsdefeat of insubstantial claims without resort to trial; and (4)government officials performing discretionary functions generallyare shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conductdoes not violate clearly established statutory or constitutionalrights of which reasonable person would not have known.

a. ³Bare allegations of malice should not suffice tosubject govt officials either to the costs of trial or to tothe burdens of broad-reaching discovery. Wetherefore hold that govt officials performingdiscretionary functions generally are shielded fromliability for civil damages insofar as their conduct doesnot violate clearly established statutory or const rightsof which a reasonable person should have known´

vii. Wilson v. Layne p124-32:1. STANDARD FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY!!!!*2. Facts: police arrived where they believed to be the home of

someone they had an arrest warrant for. The home wasactually the parents of the guy. Police arrived with the mediaand allowed the media in the home to take pics. Claimed aviolation of the 4tham

3. Issue: whether the police had qualified immunitya. Whether there was a constitutional rightb. Whether the right was ³clearly established´

4. Holding: there was a violation of a constitutional right, butthe violation was not clearly established and the officerstherefore had qualified immunity

a. Was not clearly established that bringing in the mediawas a violation of the 4tham

5. Dissent: it was clearly establishedviii. Hope v. Pelzer p142-47

ix. Crawford-El v. Britton p152-66

d. ³Every Person´: Muncipailty Liability



i. Cities, counties, and other local governmental entities are suableunder §1983. As a matter of statutory interpretation, they areamong the class of suable ³persons´ to which 1983 refers

ii. Local governments are not liable in damages for the constitutionalharms inflicted by their officers on a vicarious liability or respondentsuperior basis

iii. Instead, damages action under §1983 for the unconstitutional acts of one of its officials only if the plaintiff can show that the official actedpursuant to some law, custom , or policy of the government entity

iv. The unauthorized, random unconstitutional acts of a local officialare therefore not ordinarily attributable to the entity for which theofficial works for purposes of liability under 1983, although theofficial herself may still be personally liable herself²subject toimmunities that may be raised

v. If city or county liable²cannot claim a defense of good faith²NOIMMUNITY!!

vi. Issues with these cases is usually: what constitutes governmental custom or policy?

1. SC has held that not just formal legislative enactments, butalso the individual decision of those who are final³policymakers´ can subject local governments to monetaryliability

2. Custom and Informal Policy:a. ³standing operating procedure´; ³persistent and

widespread´vii. Policymakers can subject local governments to monetary liability.

In addition, an entity¶s failure to train its officials can subject it toliability, and so can a failure to properly screen at the time of hire

1. SC has held that failure to train EEs can provide a basis for municipal liability ³only where the failure to train amounts to

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom theofficials come in contact´²objective standard

a. Usually claim is that with duties assigned to officers,the need for more training is obvious and theinadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the citydeliberately indifferent to the need

i. Ex: use of deadly force by police2. Fault in Hiring:

a. Plt has to show the EE¶s background made specificrisk a plainly obvious risk of being hired.

b. In the hiring context, a 1983 plt has to do more than

show a generalized risk, plt has to show that there is adirect causal link between the policy makers fault inhiring and the particular deprivation in constitutionalrights

viii. Monell v. NY City Dept p173-851. Holding: cities were among ³persons´ who could be sued

under 1983²in doing so, reversed a portion of Monroe v.Pape



2. Local government would be liable under 1983 only when its³custom´ or ³policy´ was the ³moving force´ behind theunconstitutional action of one of its officers

3. By making cities sueable persons, Monell was significant b/cit gave plts a real shot at significant monetary recovery whenmunicipal officials (who might be able to invoke personal

immunities for their good faith actions) have actedunconstutioally pursuant to local law, custom, or policy

ix. Will v. Michigan Dept p1861. Held that ³person´ in 1983 does not include state or state

official acting in their official capacities x. Owen v. City of Indep p. 188-208

1. Facts: city held liable when the city council voted to fire thecity¶s chief of police and in so doing, violated his proceduraldue process rights

2. Holding: municipalities have no immunity from damagesliability

xi. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati p 215-19; decisions of policy makers

1. Facts: claim arises from officers trying to serve a warrantand when they arrived they couldn¶t get in. They calledsupervisor, who told them to call county prosecutor, who toldthem to go in. Claim arises out of Stegald which held thatthis would be a violation of 4tham

2. Issue: whether the county is liable for the actions of policeofficers--yes

3. H eld: yes-- a. In ordering the deputy sheriff to enter the petitioners

clinic the county prosecutor was acting as the finaldecisionmaker for the county, and the county maytherefore be held liable under 1983

4. Significant about Pembar is the plurality¶s recognition thatpolicy making could take place outside of lawmaking bodiesand did not have to involve rules of general applicability.Rather, policy could be made by those individuals, as Monellstates, ³whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to representofficial policy´

xii. City of ST Louis v. Praprotnik p219-361. Facts: the employee-plaintiff brought 1983 action against the

individual who retaliated against him, and he also sued thecity for which it worked

2. Holding: those who retaliated against the plaintiff were notpolicy makers²they did not have the delegated power to

make employment policy so much as to implement it. Even if they implemented an unconstitutional policy,unconstitutionally, the city could not be held liable under Monell.

3. Significant about Praprotnik was the plurality¶s conclusionthat state law determined who was and who was not apolicymaker.

xiii. City of Canton v. Harris p237; failure to train



1. Facts: Harris was brought to police station in a patrol wagon.She was asked if she needed medical attention andresponded w/an incoherent remark«she received no medicalattn. She was diagnosed w/suffering from several emotionalailments. She makes state law and constitional claimsagainst the city and its officials. Among these claims was

one seeking to hold the city liable under 1983 for its violationof Harris¶ right under DPC of 14tham to receive medical attnwhile in police custody

2. Issue; whether municipality can ever be liable under 1983 for constitutional violations resulting from its failure to trainmunicipal employees²yes

3. Holding: Yes; Plt needs to prove that the failure to trainamounts to ³deliberate indifference´ and that the deficiencyin training actually caused the police officer¶s indifference toher medical needs

a. Ct remanded and let Ct App decide whether she couldget a new trial or find for city

4. Dissent: agrees w/everything²except, should just find for city

xiv. Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County p2461. Facts: she alleged that a county police officer used

excessive force in arresting her and that the county itself wasliable for her injuries based on sheriffs hiring and trainingdecisions.

e. Failure to train notes:i. for failure to train, focus is placed on the adequacy of the training program

in relation to the tasks particular officers must perform. However, it is notenough to merely show that a situation will arise and that an officer taking

the wrong course of action in that instance will result in injuries tocitizens. Even adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the

fact that they do says little about the training program or the legal basis for holding a city or county liable for that mistake. A city or county will not

be liable simply because it employed the officer whose actions resulted ina deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights. Rather, a plaintiff must

establish that government policy-makers either were or should have beenaware that a training program was inadequate and did little or nothing

about the problem. Which is to say, policy-makers were deliberatelyindifferent to the harm that would likely result from the failure to train

ii. "Deliberate indifference" is a standard of fault that requires a showing thatgovernment policy makers acted with conscious disregard for the obvious

consequences of their actions. (3) A pattern of constitutional violations byofficers may indicate that a lack of proper training, rather than a one-time

negligent administration of the training program or factors peculiar to theofficer involved in a single incident, is responsible for the plaintiff's

injury. (4) If a training program does not prevent constitutional violationsand a pattern of injuries develops, officials charged with the responsibility

of formulating policy for the agency may be put on notice that a new program is needed and a failure to address the problem may constitute



deliberate indifference. (5) In the absence of a pattern of violations,deliberate indifference may be inferred from the policy makers' continued

adherence to a training program that they knew or should have knownwould fail to prevent violations in usual or recurring situations. (6) In such

cases, the constitutional violation must be a highly predictable or plainly

obvious consequence of the failure to train.

F. §1983 and Criminal Proceeedingsa. Abstention

i. Handoutii. Handout

b. Habeas Corpusi. Heck v. Humphrey p. 491

1. Facts: While petitioner Heck's direct appeal from an Indianaconviction was pending, he filed this suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,

seeking damagesbut not injunctive relief or release from custody-on the claim that respondents, acting under color of state law, had

engaged in unlawful acts that had led to his arrest and conviction.

2. Holding: In order to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other

harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove

that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct

appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U. S. C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing thatrelationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. The foregoingconclusion follows upon recognition that the common law of torts

provides the appropriate starting point for the § 1983 inquiry, seeC arey v. P iphus, 435 U. S. 247,257-258; that the tort of malicious

prosecution, which provides the closest analogy to claims of thetype considered here, requires the allegation and proof of

termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of theaccused, and that this Court has long been concerned that

judgments be final and consistent and has been disinclined to

expand opportunities for collateral attack on criminal convictions,Although the issue in cases such as this is not, therefore, the

exhaustion of state remedies the dismissal of Heck's § 1983

action was correct because both courts below found that his

damages claims challenged the legality of his conviction ii. Edwards v. Balisok p508

1. SC reaffirmed, and perhaps extended Heck



2. Facts: prisoner claimed that unconstitutional proceedingswere used to take away his good time credits

3. Holding: the nature of the challenge to the procedures couldbe such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of thedisciplinary action taken against him

iii. Nelson v. Campbell p508

1. Facts: David Nelson was sentenced to death for murder andscheduled for execution in 1997. A series of appeals andhabeas petitions in federal court delayed the execution until2002, when an 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panelunanimously rejected a claim dealing with the allegedviolation of his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. After the final appeal was rejected, Nelson was rescheduled for execution on October 9, 2003.

2. Nelson filed petition in federal district court alleging that themethod of execution proposed by Alabama violated hisEighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusualpunishment. Alabama had notified Nelson that, because of

damage done to his veins by previous intravenous drugabuse, the execution procedure might require correctionsofficers to cut through muscles and fat in his arm to getaccess to a vein that could carry the toxins. He claimed thatthis was an inhumane method of execution and shouldtherefore be barred. Further, he argued that the petition wasnot an appeal of his conviction or sentence (appeals of bothwere prohibited by U.S. Code Title 28, Section 2254, a federallaw designed to limit the number of habeas corpus appealsby death row inmates) but rather a freestanding lawsuitchallenging the constitutionality of the proposed executionprocedure. Alabama countered that Nelson's appeal was

intended only to prolong his life through procedural delays,exactly what the federal law was designed to prevent, andshould therefore be thrown out.

3. The federal district court agreed with Alabama, holding thatNelson's appeal dealt not just with the procedure but with thesentence itself.

4. Issue: Is a prisoner's appeal of the proposed procedure for his

execution functionally equivalent to a habeas corpus petition andtherefore barred by Title 28, Section 2254 of U.S. Code?

5. Holding: No. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the

Court ruled unanimously that Nelson's suit dealt only with the

proposed method of execution, not with his conviction or

sentence, and was therefore different from a habeas corpus

appeal. Nelson had a right to challenge the necessity of the

procedure for his execution using the same legal approach he

would have used to challenge the conditions of his prison.However, the Court declined to rule on whether the execution

would be constitutional if the district court found that cutting



through was indeed necessary, leaving that question for a case inwhich necessity had already been determined.

iv. Hill v. McDonough:1. Facts: Case raised the Nelson issue in a different context. Hill¶s

challenge, filed four days before his scheduled execution for a1983 murder conviction, was to the particular three-drug sequence

used in FL¶s lethal injection protocol. Arg that the protocol waspainful«

2. Holding: this was controlled by Nelson and thereore appropriatefor §1983

a. ³the compaint does not challenge the lethal injunctionsentence as a general matter but seeks instead only toenjoin the respondents ³from executing Hill in the manner they currently intend´

c. Res Judicata i. 1983 lawsuits may be precluded as to some issues or claims b/c of

prior adjudication 1. There will be preclusion if the plt was previously a def in

criminal proceeding in issues that are now subject of 1983challenge²and issues decided against plt in criminalproceeding

2. Similarily, there will be claim preclusion if plt previouslybrought suit in state ct on state law grounds. Initial pursuit of state admin remedies may comprise a later filed 1983 claim

3. Full Faith and Credit Act: commands federal cts to give the³same´ preclusive effect to prior state ct judgments that the

judgment rendering ct would give them ii. Allen v. McCurry:

1. Facts: At a hearing before respondent's criminal trial, a Missouri court

denied, in part, respondent's motion to suppress, on Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment grounds, certain evidence that had been seized by the police.Respondent was subsequently convicted, and the conviction was affirmed onappeal. Because he did not assert that the state courts had denied him a "fulland fair opportunity" to litigate his search and seizure claim, respondent wasbarred by Stone v. Powell, from seeking a writ of habeas corpus in a federaldistrict court. Nevertheless, he sought federal court redress for the allegedconstitutional violation by bringing a suit for damages under § 1983 againstthe officers who had seized the evidence in question. District Court grantedsummary judgment for the defendants, holding that collateral estoppelprevented respondent from relitigating the search and seizure questionalready decided against him in the state courts. The Court of Appealsreversed and remanded, noting that Stone v. Powell, barred respondent fromhabeas corpus relief, and that the § 1983 suit was, therefore, respondent'sonly route to a federal forum for his constitutional claim, and directed the trial

court to allow him to proceed to trial unencumbered by collateral estoppel. 2. ROL:3. Holding: The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent's inability

to obtain federal habeas corpus relief upon his Fourth Amendment claimrenders the doctrine of collateral estoppel inapplicable to his § 1983 suit.Nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983 discloses anycongressional intent to deny binding effect to a state court judgment or decision when the state court, acting within its proper jurisdiction, has giventhe parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims, and therebyhas shown itself willing and able to protect federal rights. Nor does anything



in § 1983's legislative history reveal any purpose to afford less deference to judgments in state criminal proceedings than to those in state civilproceedings.

iii. Migra p.5271. Facts: Petitioner was employed by respondent Warren, Ohio,

Board of Education (Board) as a supervisor of elementary

education on an annual basis under written contracts²terminated.The complaint alleged two causes of action -- a breach of contractby the Board and wrongful interference by the individual memberswith petitioner's employment contract. She won in state ct.Thereafter, petitioner filed action under 1983 against the Board, itsmembers, and the Superintendent of Schools, alleging that,because of her activities involving a desegregation plan for theWarren elementary schools and a social studies curriculum thatshe had prepared, the Board members determined not to renewher contract, and that the Board's actions violated her rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. She requestedinjunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. The

District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants onthe basis of res judicata, inter alia, and dismissed the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals affirmed.

2. Holding: With respect to petitioner's § 1983 claim, which was notlitigated in state court, petitioner's state court judgment has thesame claim preclusive effect in federal court that the judgmentwould have in the Ohio state courts.

3. Section 1983 does not override state preclusion law andguarantee petitioner a right to proceed to judgment in statecourt on her state claims and then turn to federal court for adjudication of her federal claims²no claim splitting!!

iv. Haring v. Prosise:

1. Facts: after pleading guilty to a charge of manufacturing acontrolled substance, Prosise filled a §1983 action againstthe police officers who had searched his apartment. Thedistrict court held this claim barred, but the Supreme Courtdisagreed.

2. Holding: the issue under §1738 was whether state law wouldregard the conviction as preclusive. Here, it would not, bcthe fourth amendment claim was not litigated or resolved inthe stat ecriminal prosecution. The only issue determined bythe guilty plea was whether Prosise had manufactured acontrolled substance²which is irrelevant to 4tham issue

G. Civil Rights Actions Against Federal Officersa. Federal Officers are not ordinarily suable under 1983 but the Supreme Ct

has instead created an implied right of action for damages directly under the Constiution and the general federal question statute--1331

b. Bivens v. Six Unknown Officers p. 60-9i. Facts: Petitioner's complaint alleged that respondent agents of the

Federal Bureau of Narcotics, acting under color of federal authority, made



a warrantless entry of his apartment, searched the apartment, and arrestedhim on narcotics charges. All of the acts were alleged to have been done

without probable cause.ii. Issue: whether federal agents can be sued for constiutioal

violationsiii. Holding: Yes²Petitioner's complaint states a federal cause of

action under the Fourth Amendment for which damages arerecoverable upon proof of injuries resulting from the federal agents'violation of that Amendment

iv. For Bivens, the Court noted, the remedy was damages or nothing.There would not have been any vindication of rights through theexclusionary rule, a common remedy for 4th amendment violations,because no charges are pending against Bivens. The Court alsoobserved that no Congressional legislation curtailed moneydamages for violations of Constitutional rights, nor had it imposedany other remedy; Finally, it did not find any "special factorscounseling hesitation" in this case. For all of these reasons, Bivenswas allowed the right to recover from the Federal government, if he

proved his case.c. Davis v. Passman p69

i. Facts: administrative assistant to congressman alleged dismissalbecause of sex

ii. Relying on Bivens, the Court reversed the lower court'sconclusions. Both cases affirmed a citizen's right to bring suitagainst federal officers for constitutional violations. In this case,Passman violated Davis's rights through EPA of fifthamendment--sexual discrimination.

d. Carlson v. Green p. 69i. SC again upheld Bivens action permitting the plt to sue on behalf of

the estate of her deceased son for damages under the 8tham. She

alleged that federal prison officials caused the son¶s death by failingto provide adequate medical attention

ii. Ct noted that there were two instances when Bivens can beforeclosed:

1. ³special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress´; or

2. Where congress created an alternative remedial structuree. Bush v. Lucas p69-71

i. AN alternative remedial action foreclosed Bivens actionii. Facts: Bush, an aerospace engineer at the George C. Marshall Space Flight

Center (Center), a facility operated by the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA), made a series of public comments critical of theCenter. Lucas, the Center_s director, demoted Bush on the ground that the

comments were false and misleading. The Federal Employee AppealsAuthority upheld the demotion, but the Civil Service Commission_s

(CSC) Appeals Review Board later found that the demotion had violatedhis First Amendment rights. NASA accepted the Board_s recommendation

that Bush be restored to his former position retroactively, with back pay.While his administrated appeal was pending, Bush brought suit against



Lucas in Alabama state court, seeking to recover damages for violation of his First Amendment rights. Lucas removed the action to federal district

court, which granted summary judgment for Lucas. The Fifth Circuitaffirmed, holding that Bush had no cause of action for damages under the

First Amendment in view of the available remedies under the CSC

regulations.iii. Issue: Can a federal employee sue for damages for the violation of hisFirst Amendment rights by his superior where Congress has provided a

comprehensive remedial scheme, although one which does not fullycompensate the employee for the harm suffered?

iv. Holding: No; not under the CSC regulations. The federal judiciary, pursuant to its common law authority, has the power to recognize new

causes of action in absence of, or to supplement, statutory remedies unlessCongress has expressly indicated its relief is to be exclusive. In

determining whether judicial relief should be granted, federal courts are(1) to pay particular attention to special factors counseling hesitation in the

absence of affirmative action by Congress, and (2) to ascertain whether the purpose and comprehensive nature of the statutory scheme precludes

judicial remedies where statutory relief is available. The administrativescheme in this case reflected Congress_ attempt to balance the competing

interests of protecting the First Amendment rights of federal employeesand maintaining a disciplined and effective workforce. Congress, not the

judiciary, is in the best position to regulate the employee relations. Grantof supplementary judicial relief would disrupt this balance and is therefore

inappropriate.

v. NOTE: this case is similar to Sea Clammers case in 1983 action b/c

theres already a remedy in place²statute provides remedial scheme

vi. Where Congress has provided a remedy that will provide meanigful

relief, it is enough

vii. ***THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A BIVEN ACTION TO

ENFORCE A STATUTORY RIGHT!!**f. Correctional Svc Corp v. Malesko p71-73

i. Facts: prisoner in fed prison had heart condition and exempt fromtaking steps. One day he was forced to, and had a heart attack. Hefiled an 8tham violation

ii. Issue: Should the implied private action for damages against federal

officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights, firstrecognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.

388, be extended to allow recovery against a private corporation operating

a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons? iii. Holding: No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H.

Rehnquist, the Court held that Bivens' limited holding may not be

extended to confer a right of action for damages against private entitiesacting under color of federal law. The Court reasoned that the threat of suit

against an individual's employer was not the kind of deterrencecontemplated by the Bivens decision. The Court also noted that the

purpose of the Bivens decision was to deter individual federal officers



from committing constitutional violations. "In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice, to provide an

otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged tohave acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff

who lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual

officer's unconstitutional conduct. Where such circumstances are not present, we have consistently rejected invitations to extendg. Wilkie v. Robbins: handout

i. Facts: Harvey Robbins owned a private dude ranch which was

intermingled with federal lands. The previous owner had granted theBureau of Land Management (BLM) right-of-way across the private land,

but after Robbins bought the ranch he refused to re-grant it. Robbinsalleged that BLM officials harassed him with threats and meritless

criminal charges, with the aim of forcing him to grant the governmentright-of-way. Robbins sued the BLM officials for extortion in violation of

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). He also brought a Bivens action (an action seeking monetary damages from a

federal agent for a constitutional violation). Robbins argued that the FifthAmendment protects a "right to exclude" government officials from one's

property, and that the BLM agents had retaliated against him for hisexercise of this right.

ii. Issues: 1) Can government officials acting pursuant to their regulatoryauthority be guilty of extortion under the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for attempting to obtain property for the benefit of the government? 2) Is a Bivens claim based on Fifth

Amendment rights precluded by the availability of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act? 3) Does the Fifth Amendment protect

against retaliation for exercising a "right to exclude" the government fromone's property?

iii. Holding: No, unanswered, and no. The Court ruled 7-2 that "neither

Bivens nor RICO gives Robbins a cause of action," so he could not sue the

government for retaliation. In an opinion by Justice David Souter, theCourt declined to extend the availability of Bivens actions to cases of

retaliation for the exercise of the right to exclude the government fromone's property. The Court noted that Robbins had other administrative and

judicial remedies for the government's various violations, though itacknowledged that these amounted to a difficult-to-use "patchwork."

Because of the impossibly of devising a framework to separateconstitutional violations from government actions that are merely

borderline improper, the Court would not add a Bivens remedy tolandowners' toolkit. The government can be expected to engage in some

hardball tactics during land negotiations, the majority held, and inviting an"onslaught of Bivens actions" in an effort to counter the occasionaloverreach would be a "cure [...] worse than the disease." Robbins's RICO

claim failed as well, because extortion has not normally been understoodto encompass the actions of government officials seeking to obtain



property for the government rather than for themselves. The Court calledthe cases that Robbins cited in favor of his claim obscure and off-point.

h. Special Factors:i. It would cost a lot

ii. Against public policyiii. Would mess up the scheme of things

iv. Separation of powers issuesv. Military; Stanley²given LSD²ct said there were special factors herevi. FDIC v. Meyer²no such thing as entity liability bc it would be costly

i. 3 THINGS WOULD PRECLUDE BIVENS AXN:i. Comprehensive remedial scheme

ii. Special factorsiii. Suing entity

H. Remedies For Constiutional Wrongsa. In order to recover more that nominal damages from a 1983 def, the victim

of an unconstitutional injury must put on proof of actual injuryi. Punitive damages are available against individual officers, but not

local govts, and only when there has been ³reckless or callousindifference´ to constitutional rights, or when the def was motivatedby bad intent

ii. Compensatory damages:1. The basic purpose of 1983 is to compensate people for

injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rightsa. Need to show harm; Carey case²ct said damages

didn¶t exceed $1 (boy suspended for allegedlysmoking marijuana, and ct found PDP violation)

b. Put on proof of mental anguish, feelings of unjusttreatment, humiliation, personal indignity«

c. MUST PUT ON PROOF OF ACTUAL INJURYb. Injunctions

i. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons:1. Facts: In 1976, police officers of the City of Los Angeles

stopped Adolph Lyons for a traffic code violation. AlthoughLyons offered no resistance, the officers, withoutprovocation, seized Lyons and applied a chokehold. The holdrendered Lyons unconscious and damaged his larynx. Alongwith damages against the officers, Lyons sought aninjunction against the City barring the use of such controlholds.

2. Issue: Did Lyons's injunction against the use of policechokeholds meet the threshold requirements imposed byArticle III of the Constitution?

3. Holding: No. Court held that federal courts were without jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctive relief. Thefact that Lyons had been choked once did nothing toestablish "a real and immediate threat that he would again bestopped. . .by an officer who would illegally choke him into



unconsciousness." The Court held that in order to establishan actual controversy, Lyons would have to show either 1)that all Los Angeles police officers always choked citizenswith whom they had encounters, or 2) that the City ordered or authorized officers to act in such a manner. Lyons was thuslimited to suing the police and the city for individual

damages.4. Dissent: Whether Lyons can show that the City¶s

chokehold policy is unconstitutional? Lyons¶ claim for damages gives him standing to sue, success thereindepends on his proving whether the conduct wasunconstitutional. Standing under Article III isestablished by an allegation of threatened or actualinjury. Lyons suffered an actual past injury, as thefindings of the District Ct show.

5. **idk what the ct wanted him to show²another bs case!*ii. Missouri v. Jenkins p872-94

1. Facts of the Case: In order to combat segregation in publicschools in compliance with court directives, the Kansas City,Missouri School District (KCMSD) sought to enhance the quality of schools and to attract more white students from the suburbs. TheKCMSD's ability to raise taxes, however, was limited by state law.

After determining that the District did not have alternative meansof raising revenue for the program, federal district judge RussellG. Clark ordered an increase of local property taxes for the 1991-92 fiscal year. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuitaffirmed the decision, but ruled that the courts should enjoin statetax laws that prevented the District from raising the necessaryfunds and allow the state to set tax rates.

2. Question: Did the court order to increase property taxes violate Article III, the Tenth Amendment, or principles of federal/statecomity?

3. Conclusion: The Court held that the District Court "abused itsdiscretion" by imposing a specific tax increase. The Court alsoheld, however, that the modifications of the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals satisfied "equitable andconstitutional principles governing the District Court's power...."The majority found that court orders directing localgovernments to levy their own taxes were "plainly" judicialacts within the powers of federal courts. When aconstitutional justification existed, courts had the authority to

order tax increases despite statutory limitations. The Courtreasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise would fail to take accountof the obligations of local governments, under the SupremacyClause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitutionimposes on them."

c. Damagesi. Memphis Community School Dist v. Stachura p343

1. Facts: Respondent, a tenured teacher in the Memphis, Michigan, public schools, was suspended following parents' complaints about



his teaching methods in a seventh-grade life science course thatincluded the showing of allegedly sexually explicit pictures and

films. While respondent was later reinstated, he, before beingreinstated, brought suit in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against petitioner School District, Board of Education, Board

Members, school administrators, and parents, alleging that hissuspension deprived him of liberty and property without due process of law and violated his First Amendment right to academic

freedom. He sought both compensatory and punitive damages 2. Holding: Damages based on the abstract "value" or

"importance" of constitutional rights are not a permissibleelement of compensatory damages in § 1983 cases.

a. The basic purpose of § 1983 damages is "tocompensate persons for injuries that are caused bythe deprivation of constitutional rights." Carey v.Piphus, The instructions at issue cannot be squaredwith Carey, or with the principles of tort damages on

which Carey and § 1983 are grounded. Damagesmeasured by the jury's perception of the abstract"importance" of a constitutional right are notnecessary to vindicate the constitutional rights that §1983 protects, and moreover are an unwieldy tool for ensuring compliance with the Constitution.

3. (b) Since such damages are wholly divorced from anycompensatory purpose, they cannot be justified as presumeddamages, which are a substitute for ordinary compensatorydamages, not a supplement for an award that fullycompensates the alleged injury.

ii. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts p. 371-80

1. Facts: Respondents (an organization licensed by petitioner city topresent certain musical concerts, and a promoter of the concerts)brought suit in Federal District Court against the city and cityofficials. Alleging, inter alia, that the city's cancellation of thelicense amounted to a violation of their constitutional rights under color of.state law, respondents sought compensatory and punitivedamages under 42 U.S.C. § 183. Without objection, the courtgave an instruction authorizing the jury to award punitive damagesagainst each defendant, including the city. Verdicts were returnedfor respondents, which in addition to awarding compensatorydamages, also awarded punitive damages against both theindividual officials and the city. The city moved for a new trial,

arguing for the first time that punitive damages could not beawarded against a municipality under § 1983. Although noting thatthe challenge to the instruction was untimely under FRCP 51, theDistrict Court considered and rejected the city's substantive legalarguments on their merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, findingthat the city's failure to object to the charge at trial, as required byRule 51, could not be overlooked on the theory that the chargeitself was plain error. The court also expressed a belief that thechallenged instruction might not have been error at all, and



identified the "distinct possibility" that municipalities could be liablefor punitive damages under § 1983 in the proper circumstances.

2. ROL: Muncipalities are not subject to punitive damageawards, even when their officials act pursuant to officialpolicy, and even when that policy shows ³callous or recklessindifference´ to constiutional rights

3. Holding: The city's failure to object to the charge at trial does notforeclose this Court from reviewing the punitive damages issue.Because the District Court adjudicated the merits, and the Court of

Appeals did not disagree with that adjudication, no interests in fair and effective trial administration advanced by Rule 51 would beserved if this Court refused to reach the merits. Nor should reviewhere be limited to the restrictive "plain error" standard. Thecontours of municipal liability under § 1983 are currently in a stateof evolving definition and uncertainty, and the very novelty of thelegal issue at stake counsels unconstricted review. In addition tobeing novel, the punitive damages question is also important, andappears likely to recur in § 1983 litigation against municipalities.

Documents

Civil Rights Action Outline