Action (Outline, Casedigest, Fulltextcases)

8/9/2019 Action (Outline, Casedigest, Fulltextcases)

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Outline - ACTION CIVIL PROCEDU

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CIVIL PROCEDURE

Lesson for July 26, 2014, Saturday

Action (or suit) - a formal demand of ones legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the la

- Section 3, Rule 1

Special proceeding - a remedy by which a party seeks to establish status, a right, or a particular fact

- Section 3(c), Rule 1; Rules 72-109 (Settlement of estate of deceased persons; Escheat; Guardianship and custof children; Trustees; Adoption; Rescission and revocation of adoption; Hospitalization of insane persons; Hab

corpus; Change of name; Voluntary dissolution of corporations; Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of mi

natural children; Constitution of family home; Declaration of absence and death; Cancellation or correction of ent

in the civil registry)

- Lopez v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, G.R. No. L-19613, April 30, 1966

- Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951

Kinds of Actions:

A. Criminal actions - Section 3(b), Rule 1

B. Civil actions

1. Ordinary civil actions - Section 3(a), Rule 12. Special civil actions - Section 3(a), Rule 1; Rules 62-71 (Interpleader; Declaratory Relief; Review

Judgments, etc. of Comelec & COA; Certiorari, Prohibition & Mandamus; Quo Warranto; Expropriat

Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage; Partition; Forcible Entry & Unlawful Detainer; Contempt)

Civil actions versus special proceedings:

- Hagans v. Wizlizemus, G.R. No. 16680, September 13, 1920

Real and Personal actions:

Real action - Section 1, Rule 4

Personal action - Section 2, Rule 4

- Hernandez v. DBP, G.R. No. L-31095, June 18, 1976

- Claridades v. Mercader, G.R. No. L-20341, May 14, 1966

Local and transitory actions:

Local action - Section 1, Rule 4

Transitory action - Section 2, Rule 4

- De la Cruz v. El Seminario de la Archidiocesis de Manila, G.R. No. L-5402, January 28, 1911

Actions in rem, in personam and quasi in rem:

Action in rem-

Action in personam-

Action quasi in rem-

- Paderanga v. Hon. Buissan, G.R. No. L-49475, September 28, 1993- Lopez v. The Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-22136, December 17, 1924

- Domagas v. Jensen, G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005

- Midgely v. Hon. Ferandos, G.R. No. L-34314, May 13, 1975

- Rayray v. Chae Kyung Lee, G.R. No. L-18176, October 26, 1966

Independent Civil Action - an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of

criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence

- Articles 32, 33, 34 & 2176, New Civil Code of the Philippines; Section 3, Rule 111, Rules of Criminal Procedure

- Lim v. De Leon, G.R. No. L-22554, August 29, 1975

- Carandang v. Hon. Santiago, G.R. No. L-8238, May 25, 1955


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CASE DIGEST: ACTION CIVIL PROCEDU

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LOPEZ vs FILIPINAS COMPAIA DE SEGUROS

G.R. No. L-19613, 30 April 1966

Facts:

The plaintiff-appellant applied with the defendant-

appellee company for the insurance of his property consisting of a

Biederman truck tractor and a Winter Weils trailer from loss or

damage.

In connection with the above application, the defendantcompany inquired the plaintiff if the plaintiff-appellant has any

company in respect of the insurance of any car or vehicle (a)

declined, cancelled or refused to renew plaintiff-appellants

insurance? and (b) increased plaintiff-appellants premium on

renewal?

To both questions, the plaintiff answered: "none," though

the truth was at that time, the American International Underwriters

of the Philippines (AIU) had already declined a similar application for

insurance by the plaintiff in respect of the above-described vehicles.

Defendant issued to the plaintiff two Commercial Vehicle

Comprehensive Policies.

While the said policies were in force, the aforementionedvehicles figured in an accident.

Plaintiff made demand from defendant payment of the

total amount of damages.

On April 28, 1960, defendant rejected the claim because of

claimant's alleged "concealment of a material fact the insured

property previously been declined insurance by another company.

The plaintiff-appellant filed on May 27, 1960 with the

Office of the Insurance Commissioner a complaint against the said

company.

Plaintiff-appellant informed by letter the Office of the

Insurance Commissioner that he was willing to submit his claim to

arbitration and suggested that the Assistant InsuranceCommissioner be designated as the sole arbitrator of the same. The

Insurance Commissioner informed the plaintiff-appellant of his

willingness to act as the single arbitrator, provided that both parties

to the dispute manifest in writing their conformity thereto and to

abide by the arbitrator's award. The defendant-appellee informed

the Insurance Commissioner that it could not consent to the above

proposal since "the claim of the plaintiff cannot be resolved by

arbitration, as recourse to arbitration referred to in the policy

contract, envisioned only differences or disputes, 'with respect to

the amount of the company's liability,' and not to cases where the

company does not admit its liability to the insured." With this

rejection, the plaintiff-appellant filed his complaint with the Court of

First Instance of Manila on September 19, 1961.

Defendant-appellee filed a motion to dismiss on the

ground of prescription. The latter argued that the plaintiff's claim

had already prescribed since it was not filed within twelve months

from its rejection by the insurance company as stipulated under

paragraph 9 of the General Conditions of Commercial Vehicle

Comprehensive Policy.

The Court of First Instance granted defendants motion

and dismissed the complaint. Thus, the instant appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint filed by the plai

appellant with the Office of the Insurance Commissioner on May

1960 a commencement of an "action or suit". No! It should

September 19, 1961, when the plaintiff-appellant filed

complaint with the Court of First Instance.

Held:

Supreme Court found for the appellee.

Action is the act by which one sues another in a coujustice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or

prevention or redress of a wrong. Special proceeding is the ac

which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party,

particular fact. Hence, an action is distinguished from sp

proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by

against another, while the latter is but a petition or a declaratio

a status, right or fact.

Rule 2, Section 1 of the Rules of Court: Section 1. Ac

defined.Action means an ordinary suit in a Court of Justic

which one party prosecutes another for the enforcemen

protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

Suit is the prosecution or pursuit of some claim or demin a court of justice or any proceeding in a court of justice in wh

plaintiff pursues his remedy to recover a right or claim.

The terms "action" and "suit" are synonymous. It is c

that the determinative or operative fact which converts a claim

an "action or suit" is the filing of the same with a "court or just

Filed elsewhere, as with some other body or office not a cou

justice, the claim may not properly be categorized under e

term.

Appellant's recourse to the Office of the Insur

Commissioner could not have been an "action or suit" which c

have halted the running of the prescriptive period stipulated in

insurance policies involved. An "action or suit" is essentially "forenforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redre

a wrong." (Rule 2, Sec. 1, Rules of Court). There is nothing in

Insurance Law, Act No. 2427, as amended, nor in any of its a

Legislations, which empowers the Insurance Commissione

adjudicate on disputes relating to an insurance company's liabilit

an insured under a policy issued by the former to the latter.

TOLENTINO vs THE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY

G.R. No. L-3062, 28 September 1951

Facts:

This is an action for declaratory relief filed by plainti

the Court of First Instance of Manila for the purpose of testing

constitutionality of section 16-A of Commonwealth Act No. 3

otherwise known as the Philippine Accountancy Law, as amende

Commonwealth Act No. 342. The ground advanced for the claim

unconstitutionality is that "it is a class legislation since by its term

excludes persons engaged in other callings or professions f


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adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection with the

practice of such callings or professions."

The action is addressed against the Board of Accountancy,

Robert Orr Ferguson, and Hans Hausamann and notice thereof has

been served on the Solicitor General.

Plaintiff is a Filipino citizen and a certified public

accountant duly admitted to the practice of accountancy. The Board

of Accountancy is an administrative body created by law and vested

with the power and authority to regulate and supervise the practiceof the profession of accountancy in the Philippines. Defendants

Robert Orr Ferguson (British) and Hans Hausamann (Swiss) are

foreigners admitted to the practice of accountancy in the Philippines

Complaint alleged that the two defendants have been and

are practicing their profession as certified public accountants under

the trade name "Fleming and Williamson"; and that Section 16-A of

Act No. 3105 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342,

authorizing accountants to practice their profession under a trade

name, is unconstitutional on the ground that it excludes persons

engaged in other callings and professions from adopting or acquiring

or using a trade name.

In their answer, the defendant Robert Orr Ferguson andHans Hausamann admitted the allegations of the complaint. Said

defendants allege that Commonwealth Act No. 342 amending Act

No. 3105, authorizing the use of a trade name in the practice of the

profession of accountancy is not a class legislation, nor does it

violate the provision of the Constitution with respect to equal

protection of the laws; that the plaintiff has no right or interest

adversely affected by said law and that he is entitled to the benefits

thereof and may use a trade or name firm name in the practice of

his profession as accountant.

The parties are agreed as to the material facts alleged in

the pleadings. They are also agreed that the firm name "Fleming and

WIlliamson" is an old trade name of accountants which was usedoriginally in 1952 by Messrs. D.M. Flemung and J. Williamson. The

right to use this firm name was sold to various parties until the end

it was acquired at the defendants in 1946. On June 10, 1946,

defendants Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans Hausamann formed a co-

partnership styled "Ferguson and Hausamann" doing business under

the trade name "Fleming and Williamson". The articles of co-

partnership were presented for registration in the Securities and

Exchange Commission. "Fleming and Williamson" was registered in

the Bureau of Commerce as the firm name of the partnership

"Ferguson and Hausamann," under which the said defendants would

practice their profession as certified public accountants in the

Philippines.

The partnership of "Ferguson and Hausamann" applied for

the renewal of the registration of "Fleming and Williamson" as their

trade name and was so registered.

The defendant Board of Accountancy did not appear or

answer notwithstanding service of summons upon it and upon the

Solicitor General. By agreement of the parties, the case was

submitted for decision upon the pleadings presented and the

memoranda filed by the parties.

The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint.

Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the plaintiff has sufficient cause of ac

to question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 342.

Held:

The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action

declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on

following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there must be a justici

controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons winterests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief m

have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue invo

must be ripe for judicial determination. These requisite facts

wanting and, therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of suffic

cause of action.

Justiciability; its requisites. Except that accomplished phy

wrong need not be alleged in a petition for declaratory relief, a

of such nature must exhibit all the usual conditions of an ordi

action. There must be (1) real parties in interest (2) asse

adverse claims and (3) presenting a ripe issue. The Supreme Cou

Pennsylvania summarized its exhaustive opinion on the requisit

justiciability of an action for declaratory relief by saying thatcourt must be "satisfied that an actual controversy, or the ripe

seeds of one, exists between parties, all of whom are sui juris

before the court, and that the declaration sought will be a prac

help in ending the controversy." Justice Brandeis thought that

fact that the plaintiff's desires are thwarted by its own doubts, o

the fears of others does not confer a cause of action." But the d

becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a c

of right which is actually contested.

Granting for the sake of argument that plaintiff has establis

the requisite facts to entitle him to claim for declaratory relief

are, however, of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 342 d

not offend against the equal protection clause of our Constitutiothe ground of class legislation, for the reason that said Act ap

alike to all persons pursuing the same calling or profession unde

same conditions or requirements.

Civil actions versus special proceedings:

HAGANS vs WISLIZENUS

G.R. No. 16680, 13 September 1920

Facts:

This is an original petition, presented in the Supr

Court, for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in the petition

admitted by a demurrer.

The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, ar

that the provision of Act No. 190 permit him to appoint assesso

"special proceedings," The petitioner contends that no authori

law exists for the appointment of assessors in such proceedings.

The only provisions of law which authorize

appointment of assessors are the following; (a) Section 57-62 o

No. 190; (b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190; (c) section 44 (a) o


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No. 267; (d) section 2477 of Act No. 2711; and (e) section 2 of Act

No. 2369.

Said section 44 (a) of Act No. 267 and section 2477 of Act

No. 2711 apply to the city of Manila only. Act No. 2369 provides for

the appointment of assessors in criminal cases only. Sections 57-62

of Act No. 190 provide for the appointment of assessors in the court

of justice of the peace. Therefore, the only provisions of law which

could, by any possibility, permit the appointment of assessors in

"special proceedings" are sections 153-161 of Act No. 190.Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may

apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the

filing of such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be

provided, . . . ."

Issue:

Whether or not a judge of the Court of First Instance, in

special proceedings, is authorized under the law to appoint

assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an

administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care,

management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.

No!Whether a special proceeding, like in the present case,

an action.

Held:

Section 1 of Act No. 190 gives us an interpretation of the

words used in said Act, that a distinction is made between an

"action" and a "special proceeding." Said section 1 provides that an

"action" means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, while "every

other remedy furnished by law is a 'special proceeding."

There is a distinction between an "action" and a "special

proceeding," and that when the Legislature used the word "action"

it did not mean "special proceeding."An action is a formal demand of one's legal rights in a

court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law.

It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite

established rules. (People vs.County Judge, 13 How. Pr. [N. Y.], 398.)

The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or

proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular

fact. (Porter vs.Purdy, 29 N. Y., 106, 110; Chapin vs.Thompson, 20

Cal., 681.) Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are

required, unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in

special proceedings is generally granted upon an application or

motion. Illustrations of special proceedings, in contradistinction to

actions, may be given: Proceedings for the appointment of an

administrator, guardians, tutors; contest of wills; to perpetuate

testimony; to change the name of persons; application for admission

to the bar, etc., etc. (Bliss on Code Pleading, 3d ed., sec. 1.)

The judge of the Court of First Instance is without

authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the demurrer is hereby

overruled and the prayer of the petition is hereby granted, and it is

hereby ordered and decreed that the order of the respondent judge

appointing the assessors described in the petition be and the same

is hereby annulled and set aside; and, without any finding as to

costs, it is so ordered.

Real and Personal actions:

HERNANDEZ vs DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-31095, 18 June 1976

Facts:

This is a case which involves the question of proper ve

in a real action.

Petitioner Jose M. Hernandez was an employee of pri

respondent Development Bank of the Philippines in its LDepartment for twenty-one (21) years until his retirement du

illness. In due recognition of his unqualified service as Assis

Attorney in its Legal Department, the private respondent awa

to the petitioner a lot in the private respondent's Housing Proje

No. 1 West Avenue, Quezon City. After the petitioner received f

the private respondent's Housing Project Committee a stateme

account of the purchase price of the said lot and house. He sen

the said Committee a Cashier's Check issued by the Philip

Banking Corporation in the name of his wife to cover the cash

full payment of the purchase price of the lot and house awarde

him. However, more than a week thereafter, the Chief Accoun

and Comptroller of the private respondent returned to petitioner the aforementioned check, informing him that the pri

respondent, through its Committee on Organization, Personnel

Facilities, had cancelled the award of the lot and house previo

awarded to him on the following grounds: (1) that he has alr

retired; (2) that he has only an option to purchase said house

lot; (3) that there are a big number of employees who have

houses or lots; (4) that he has been given his retirement grat

and (5) that the awarding of the aforementioned house and lot t

employee of the private respondent would better subserve

objective of its Housing Project. Petitioner protested against

cancellation of the award and demanded from private respon

the restoration of all his rights to said award. Private responrefused.

Petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instanc

Batangas against the private respondent seeking the annulmen

the cancellation of the award of the lot and house in his favor

the restoration of all his rights thereto. He contends that

cancellation of said award was unwarranted and illegal for he

already become the owner of said house and lot by virtue of

award and has acquired a vested right thereto, which canno

unilaterally cancelled without his consent; that he had requested

private respondent to restore to him all his rights to said award

the latter refused and failed and still refuses and fails to comply

said request.

Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the comp

on the ground of improper venue, contending that since

petitioner's action affects the title to a house and lot situate

Quezon City, the same should have been commenced in the Cou

First Instance of Quezon City where the real property is located

not in the Court of First Instance of Batangas where petiti

resides. Respondent Court sustained the motion to dismiss file

private respondent on the ground of improper venue.

Hence, the instant petition to review the orde

respondent Court.


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Issue:

Whether the action of the petitioner was properly filed in

the Court of First Instance of Batangas. No! It is not a real action but

a personal action which may be properly brought by petitioner in

his residence.

Held:

It is a well settled rule that venue of actions or, moreappropriately, the county where the action is triable depends to a

great extent on the nature of the action to be filed, whether it is real

or personal. A real action is one brought for the specific recovery of

land, tenements, or hereditaments. A personal action is one brought

for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some

contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of

damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property.

Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, "actions affecting title

to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition, or condemnation

of, or foreclosure of mortgage in real property, shall be commenced

and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or

may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides,at the election of the plaintiff".

A close scrutiny of the essence of the petitioner's

complaint in the court a quowould readily show that he seeks the

annulmentof the cancellation of the award of the Quezon City lot

and house in his favor originally given him by respondent DBP in

recognition of his twenty-one years of service in its Legal

Department, in pursuance of his contention that he had acquired a

vested right to the award which cannot be unilaterally cancelled by

respondent without his consent.

The Court agrees that petitioner's action is not a real but a

personal action. As correctly insisted by petitioner, his action is one

to declare null and void the cancellation of the lot and house in hisfavor which does not involve title and ownership over said

properties but seeks to compel respondent to recognize that the

award is a valid and subsisting one which it cannot arbitrarily and

unilaterally cancel and accordingly to accept the proffered payment

in full which it had rejected and returned to petitioner.

Such an action is a personal action which may be properly

brought by petitioner in his residence.

Real and Personal actions

CLARIDADES vs MERCADER

G.R. No. L-20341, 14 May 1966

Facts:

Appeal from an order of dismissal of the Court of First

Instance of Bulacan based upon the ground that venue had been

improperly laid.

Petitioner, Dr. Simeon S. Claridades brought this action

against Vicente C. Mercader and Perfecto Fernandez for the

dissolution of a partnership allegedly existing between them and an

accounting of the operation of the partnership, particular

fishpond located in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, which was the main a

of the partnership.

In their answer the defendants admitted the existenc

the partnership and alleged that its operation had been so

unproductive. By way of special defense, they alleged, also,

there is an impending auction sale of said fishpond due

delinquency in the payment of taxes owing to lack of funds

plaintiff's failure to contribute what is due from him. Defendalikewise, set up a counter-claim for damages.

Guillermo Reyes was allowed to intervene for the purp

of recovering a sum of money allegedly due him for serv

rendered as foreman of said fishpond, plus damages. Later,

Armando Asuncion succeeded in intervening as the alleged assig

of the interest of defendant. Mercader in said partnership

fishpond. Thereafter, on plaintiff's motion, the lower c

appointed a receiver of the fishpond. Upon the other hand, Alf

Zulueta and his wife Yap Leding sought permission to intervene,

later, alleging that they are the owners of said fishpond, ha

bought one-half () of it from Benito Regencia, who, in turn,

acquired it from Asuncion, who had purchased the fishpond fdefendant Mercader, and the other half having been assigne

him directly by Asuncion.

Permission was granted which gave the Zuluetas ten

days within which to file such pleading as they may deem neces

for the protection of their rights. The Zuluetas filed a motio

dismiss upon the ground that the complaint states no caus

action; that venue has been improperly laid; and that plai

complaint is moot and academic. The lower court granted the s

upon the ground of improper venue. A reconsideration of this o

having been denied, plaintiff and intervenor Reyes have interpo

the present appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not this action should have been institu

not in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, but in tha

Marinduque, where the aforementioned fishpond is located. N

is a personal action which may be brought in the place of reside

of either the plaintiff or the defendants.

Held:

Plaintiff's complaint merely seeks the liquidation o

partnership with defendants Fernandez and Mercader. Th

obviously a personal action, which may be brought in the plac

residence of either the plaintiff or the defendants. Since plaintiff

resident of Bulacan, he had the right to bring the action in the c

of first instance of that province.What is more, although defend

Fernandez and Mercader reside in Marinduque, they did not ob

to the venue. In other words, they waived whatever rights they

if any, to question it.

The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the assets o

partnership, including the fishpond in question, did not change

nature or character of action, such sale being merely a neces

incident of the liquidation of the partnership, which should prec

and/or is part of its process of dissolution. Neither plain

complaint nor the answer filed by defendants Fernandez


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Mercader questioned the title to said property or the possession

thereof.

Again, the situation was not changed materially by the

Intervention either of Asuncion or of the Zuluetas, for, as alleged

successors to the interest Mercader in the fishpond, they, at best,

stepped into his shoes. Again, the nature of an action is determined

by the allegations of the complaint.At any rate, since the venue was

properly laid when the complaint was filed, said venue cannot,

subsequently, become improper in consequence of issues laterraised by any of the intervenors. The court having legally acquired

authority to hear and decide the case, it can not be divested of that

authority by said intervenors. "An intervention cannot alter the

nature of the action and the issues joined by the original parties

thereto."

Local and transitory actions:Local action - Section 1, Rule 4

Transitory action - Section 2, Rule 4

DE LA CRUZ vs EL SEMINARIO DE LA ARCHIDIOCESIS DE MANILA

G.R. No. L-5402, January 28, 1911

Facts:

The appellee, Cayetano de la Cruz, was a member and the

president of a Methodist Episcopal religious association at

Dinalupijan, Province of Bataan. Cayetano de la Cruz, as such

member and president, was then authorized by the association to

lease a certain building site and to use the funds contributed for thepurpose of constructing a chapel.

He leased from one J. C. Miller, the agent of the appellant,

for a period of two years, a certain lot or parcel of land, being a part

of that hacienda and which is fully described in the written contract

of lease, agreeing to pay as rental P2 per year, the first year's rent to

be paid in advance.

On the execution of this lease Cayetano de la Cruz, as

member and president of the Methodist Episcopal association, was

placed in possession of this lot or building site and proceeded to

construct thereon a chapel for the use of the said religious

association.

About the time this chapel was completed an action of

forcible entry and detainer was commenced by one Raymundo

Sinsuangco in the justice of the peace court of Dinalupijan, in which

Cayetano de la Cruz, as lessee of the lot upon which the chapel was

constructed, and J. C. Miller, as agent and representative of the

appellants, who, in such capacity executed said lease, as lessor, were

made defendants.

Judgment was rendered against the defendants in the

action. The appellants in the case at bar were duly notified of the

judgment of the justice of the peace and were requested to appeal

to the Court of First Instance.

No appeal was taken and the judgment becoming final

executed in such a manner that the above-mentioned chapel

completely destroyed.

Cayetano de la Cruz commenced this action in the Cou

First Instance of the city of Manila against the appellants to rec

the sum of P2,000 as damages for a breach of the rental contract

To this complaint the appellants, through their attorn

presented a demurrer, based upon the following grounds: (1)

the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila was withjurisdiction to try and determine this action for the reason

damages for injuries caused to real property situated in the Prov

of Bataan is sought to be recovered; and (2) the complaint fai

allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This demu

was overruled, the appellants duly noting their exception.

The court rendered judgment in favor of the appellees

against the appellants. The appellants after noting their exceptio

the judgment and making a motion for a new trial, which mo

was overruled and exception thereto noted, appealed to this cou

Issue:

Whether or not action is one for damages to real essituated in the Province of Bataan, under the provisions of sec

377 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court of First Instance of

city of Manila had no jurisdiction.

Held:

No. The demurrer was properly overruled. This is no

action to recover damages to real estate; it is an action for breac

covenant in a lease. The fact that the damages to real estate

involved, as an incident to the breach of the contract, does

change the character of the action. Such an action is personal

transistory.

The rule is well stated in the case of Neil vs. Owen (3 145), wherein the court said (p. 146): If the action is founded

privity of contract between the parties, then the action whe

debt or covenant, is transitory. But if there is no privity of cont

and the action is founded on privity of estate only, such a cove

that runs with the land in the hands of the remote grantees,

the action is local and must be brought in the country wherein

land lies.

In an action on a covenant contained in a lease, whe

begun by the lessor against the lessee, or by the lessee against

lessor, the action is transitory because it is founded on a m

privity of contract. (Thursby vs. Plant, cited in vol. 5, Ency. Plea

Prac., p. 362.)

In general, also, actions which are founded upon contr

are transitory. In an action upon a lease for nonpayment of ren

other breach of covenants, when the action is founded on the pr

of contract it is transitory and the venue may laid in any county

Ency. Plead. & Prac., pp. 782-783.)

Therefore, section 377 of the Code of Civil Proced

which provides, among other things, that actions to rec

damages for injuries to real estate shall be brought in the prov

where the land, or a part thereof, is situated, is not applica

(Molina vs. De la Riva, 6 Phil. Rep., 12.) The amended comp


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clearly states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Sec. 90,

Code of Civil Procedure.)


Action in rem-Action in personam-

Action quasi in rem

PADERANGA vs HON. BUISSAN

G.R. No. L-49475, September 28, 1993

Facts:

Petitioner PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA

entered into an oral contract of lease for an indefinite period

(P150.00 per month) of a commercial space in Ozamiz City.

P subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by

constructing a partition wall in between. He then took possession ofthe other half, allegedly with Jose Elumbras consent.

CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City. R

instituted an action for damages and prayed for the fixing of the

period of lease at five (5) years. P moved for its dismissal, action was

a real action, jurisdiction is with the Court of First Instance of

Misamis Occidental stationed in Ozamiz City where the property in

question was situated.

Motion to Dismiss DENIED (case merely involved the

enforcement of the contract of lease, and while affecting a portion

of real property, there was no question of ownership raised hence,

venue was properly laid.

P filed MOR but was also Denied. SC - P filed petition forprohibition. PADERANGA - inasmuch as ELUMBA seeks to recover

possession of the portion surrendered to P, being a real action,

venue is laid in the court having jurisdiction over the territory in

which the property lies. ELUMBA - present action is chiefly for

damages arising from an alleged breach in the lease contract; hence,

the issue of recovery of possession is merely incidental.

Issue:

Whether or not CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in

Dipolog City has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

No. While it may be that the instant complaint does not

explicitly pray for recovery of possession, such is the necessary

consequence thereof. The instant action therefore does not operate

to efface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the

case which is to recover the one-half portion repossessed by the

lessor, herein petitioner. Indeed, where the ultimate purpose of an

action involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition or

condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, such

an action must be deemed a real action and must perforce be

commenced and tried in the province where the property or any

part thereof lies (Ozamiz City). Petition for Prohibition is GRANTED.


Action in rem-

Action in personam-

Action quasi in rem

LOPEZ vs THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS

G.R. No. L-22136, December 17, 1924

Facts:

One of two parcels of land belonging to Rufo de Jesus

sold by the city assessor and collector at public auction for

payment of taxes due thereon to the petitioner Ramon Lopez, as

highest bidder. Rufo de Jesus, having failed to redeem said

parcel of land within one year from the date of the sale, the

became absolute and the city assessor and executed in favo

Ramon Lopez, as purchaser of said one lot, a deed conveying tothe title thereto, free from all liens of any kind whatsoever

requested for the issuance of a new title but was denied, beca

the petitioner did not present the duplicate certificate of said

No. 2458; second, because on said title there appeared a notatio

a mortgage executed by said Rufo de Jesus in favor of

Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Direct

Lands, to secure a debt of P1,190, which still remained unp

and, third, because in the absence of an order of the Court of

Instance to that effect, he could not issue a new certificate of

for said lot, free from the encumbrance of said mortgage.

It is contended by the petitioner that in accordance

the provisions of section 2500 of the Administrative Code, he entitled to a new certificate of title covering said parcel of land

for taxes, and that said new certificate should be issued free from

incumbrances whatsoever; that the Government of the Philip

Islands or its representative, the Director of Lands, could not c

any lien over said parcel of land so sold for taxes under

provisions of section 2497 of the Administrative Code.

This action was commenced in the Court of First Insta

of the City of Manila. Upon the issue thus presented, the co

quoon the 18th day of January, 1924, issued an order directing

Director of Lands to deliver to the registrar of deeds of the Cit

Manila within five days the duplicate certificate of title No. 2

and ordered the said registrar of deeds to cancel the same an

issue a new certificate of title to said parcel of land in favo

Ramon Lopez, without nothing thereon the existence of

mortgage in favor of the Director of Lands, and to issue a

certificate to the other parcel of land to Rufo de Jesus and to

on said new certificate the existence of said mortgage.

Attorney-General appeared on behalf of the Directo

Lands and prayed for a reconsideration of the decision. Said mo

was based upon the ground that the petitioner, Ramon Lopez,

not entitled to have a new certificate of title issued to him, free f

all liens whatsoever upon said second parcel of land mortgage

Rufo de Jesus to the Director of Lands, for the reason that he


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acquired said property at public sale and that he could by no means

have a better title than the owner of the land at the time of said

sale.

After a consideration of the motion of the Attorney-

General and the opposition thereto, the Honorable C.A. Imperial

denied the same. The Attorney-General, after duly excepting to the

judgment and order denying the motion for rehearing, appealed and

made several assignments of error. The Attorney-General, in his first

assignment of error, contends that "the lower court erred in notholding that the tax proceeding under which Ramon Lopez claims an

indefeasible title is a proceeding in personamand not in rem."

Issue:

Whether or not the proceeding for the collection of taxes

upon real estate is an action in personam.

Held:

Yes. The court ruled that the proceedings here were in

personamand not in rem.

An action in remmay be defined as an action or

proceeding instituted against a thing and not against a particularperson. (In reStorey's Will, 20 III. App., 183, 190.)

Chief Justice Marshall, in discussing an action in rem, said:

"I have always understood that where a process is to be served on

the thing itself, by the service of a process and making proclamation,

the court is authorized to decide upon it (the thing) without notice

to any individual defendant, to which all the world are parties. The

claimant is a party, whether he speaks or is silent, whether he

asserts his claim or abandons it." Decisions in such cases are binding

and conclusive, not only on the parties litigating, but on all others.

Every one who can possibly be affected by the decision has a right to

appear and assert his own rights by becoming an actual party to the

proceeding. (Cunningham vs. Shanklin, 60 Cal., 118, 125.)A proceeding in rem, in a strict sense, is one taken strictly

against property, and has for its object the disposition of the

property, without reference to the title of individual claimants. But

in a larger and more general sense the phrase "proceeding in rem" is

applied to actions between parties, where the direct object is to

reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest

therein. (Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316.)

A proceeding brought to determine the status of a

particular thing itself and which is confined to the subject-matter in

specie, is in rem, the judgment being intended to determine the

state or condition, and,pro facto, to render the thing what the

judgment declares it to be. Process may be served on the thing itself

and by such service and making proclamation, the court is

authorized to decide upon it without notice to persons, all the world

being parties. (Cross vs. Armstrong, 44 Ohio St., 613; Woodruff vs.

Taylor, 20 Vt., 63, 73.)

A "judgment in rem" is an adjudication pronounced upon

the state of some particular subject-matter by a court having

competent authority for that purpose; while a "judgment in

personam" is, in form as well as in substance, between persons

claiming a particular right, and that it is so inter parties, appears by

the record itself. A "judgmentin rem" differs from a "judgment in

personam" in this, that the latter is, in form as well as substance,

between the parties claiming the right, and that it is so inter par

appears by the record, and it is binding only upon the pa

appearing to be such by the record, and those claiming by them.

a "judgment in rem" is founded upon a proceeding instituted

against the person as such but against or upon a particular thin

subject-matter, whose state or condition is to be determined, a

judgment is a solemn declaration upon the status of the thing

it ipso factorenders it what it declares it to be. (Woodru

Taylor, supra.)In a "judgment in personam" when property is

thereunder at public auction, the rights of the owner only are

while in a "judgment in rem" the res itself is sold.

An examination of the remedies for the collectio

unpaid municipal taxes shows that different states have ado

different methods. The methods may be summarized as: First

action to recover personal judgment; second, an action to enfor

lien on land; third, a summary sale of the property on which

taxes are in lien; and, fourth, by distraint. In the Philippine Isla

the Legislature has adopted practically the third method, b

summary sale of the property on which the taxes have becom

lien by advertising and a sale at public auction. Under that systhe City of Manila may sell either personal property or the land u

which the tax exists. The City of Manila may use its discretion e

by proceeding against the personal property of the taxpaye

against the land upon which the tax has been levied. The fact

the City of Manila has the option of proceeding against the rea

personal property, evidently is the fact which induced this cou

the two decisions cited above (Government of the Philip

Islands vs. Adriano, supra; Valencia vs. Jimenez, and Fuster, su

to decide that in this jurisdiction the action to collect delinq

taxes upon real property is an action in personamand not in rem

In jurisdictions where the action to recover delinq

taxes upon land is an action in personam, the tax title isthereunder is purely a derivative title and such a deed conveys

such title as was vested in the delinquent taxpayer. Governme

the Philippine Islands vs. Adriano, supra; McDonald vs. Hanna

Fed. Rep., 73.)


Action in rem-

Action in personam-

Action quasi in rem

DOMAGAS vs JENSEN

G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005

Facts:

MTC: Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for for

entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC.

summons and the complaint were NOT served on the respon

because the latter was apparently out of the country. This


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relayed to the Sheriff by her (the respondents) brother, Oscar

Layno, who was then in the respondents house at No. 572 Barangay

Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The Sheriff left the summons and

complaint with Oscar Layno, who received the same. TC rendered

judgment in favor of DOMAGAS. The respondent failed to appeal the

decision and a writ of execution was issued.

RTC: JENSEN filed annulment of decision of MTC against

the petitioner on the ground that due to the Sheriffs failure to serve

the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo,Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her

person. Respondents allegations: the service of the complaint

and summons through substituted service on her brother, Oscar

Layno, was improper because of the following: (a) when the

complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed, she was not a resident of

Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, but of Oslo, Norway, and

although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the

summons and the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo

Gonzales; (b) she was in Oslo, Norway, at the time the summons and

the complaint were served; (c) her brother, Oscar Layno, was merely

visiting her house in Barangay Buenlag and was not a resident nor an

occupant thereof when he received the complaint and summons;and (d) Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the summons

and the complaint for and in her behalf.

In her answer the petitioner alleged that the respondent

was a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was

the owner of the subject premises where Oscar Layno was when the

Sheriff served the summons and complaint; that the service of the

complaint and summons by substituted service on the respondent,

the defendant in Civil Case No. 879, was proper since her brother

Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay. Buenlag,

Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for and

in her behalf.

TC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent.CA : affirmed the decision with modification . The

petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. The CA ruled that the

complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was one for ejectment, which is an

action quasi in rem. Since the defendant therein was temporarily out

of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been

served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to

Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires

prior leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of

court and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of

Court was followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that there

was really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the

respondent, the defendant in Civil case.

SC: The petitioner assails the decision of the CA, alleging

that the appellate court erred in holding that the respondents

complaint for ejectment is an action quasi in rem. The petitioner

insists that the complaint for forcible entry is an action in personam;

therefore, substituted service of the summons and complaint on the

respondent, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of

Court, is valid. The petitioner, likewise, asserts that Oscar Layno is a

resident and a registered voter of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,

Pangasinan; hence, the service of the complaint and summons on

the respondent through him is valid.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding

the respondents complaint for ejectment is an action quasi in

Yes

Whether or not there was a valid service of the summ

and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on the respondent herein

was the defendant in the said case. No

Held:Yes. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a

action and one in personam.

No. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the pe

of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and de

the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant

does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by pers

service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of

Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summ

within a reasonable time, substituted service may be mad

accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out o

country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted

(a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal seroutside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publica

also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court

deem sufficient. Thus, any judgment of the court which ha

jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an ac

determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem,

personam, or quasi in remfor that matter, is determined b

nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding inpersona

a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations bro

against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the per

although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership

specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose ofaccordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose o

proceeding in personamis to impose, through the judgment

court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of

defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendan

specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecun

liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which

for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished fro

judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has b

held that an action in personamis a proceeding to enforce pers

rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person

far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled th

is an injunctive act in personam.In Combs v. Combs, the appe

court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights

obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjus

the rights and obligations between the affected partie

inpersonam. Actions for recovery of real property are in persona

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in remis

brought against persons seeking to subject the property of

persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action qua

rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of

proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligatio

loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in remdeal with

status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which


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intended to operate on these questions only as between the

particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off

the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments

therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real

action and in personambecause the plaintiff seeks to enforce a

personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of

the New Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of

the action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, andpay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use

or occupation of the property.

In the present case, the records show that the respondent,

before and after his marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987,

remained a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. This

can be gleaned from the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26,

1992 in which she declared that she was a resident of said barangay.

Moreover, in the Real Estate Mortgage Contract dated February 9,

1999, ten days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed,

the petitioner categorically stated that she was a Filipino and a

resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering

that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippineson February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No.

879 may only be validly served on her through substituted service

under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the

defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in

the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies

of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of

suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving

the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with

some competent person in charge thereof.

Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in

order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of thedefendant.The statutory requirement of substituted service must be

followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted service other

than that authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective.

The Return of Service filed by Sheriff Eduardo J. Abulencia

on the service of summons do not show that as of April 5, 1999, the

house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latters

residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any

showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of

the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the

occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that

Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from

him. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he

was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or

place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily

stays and to which he intends to return.

Therefore, the respondent was not validly served with

summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999,

by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire

jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; the decision of the

MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.


Action in rem-

Action in personam-

Action quasi in rem

MIDGELY vs HON. FERANDOS

G.R. No. L-34314, May 13, 1975

Facts:

Petitioner Midgely and Pastor Jr. are children of Pasto

and Sofia Bossio, who died in Oct. 1966. They both lived in Sp

while the private respondent Quemada claims to Pastor

illegitimate child.

When Pastor Sr. died in June 1966, his suppo

holographic will dated July 31, 1961, devised 30% of his 42% sha

certain mining claims and real properties. In 1970, the said will

presented for probate in special proceedings in CFI Cebu. Therea

Quemada was appointed special administrator of the decede

estate, which Midgely and Pastor Jr. opposed. They prayed fordismissal of the proceeding. (The holographic will was probate

the lower court's order of December 5, 1972 which was appeale

the Court of Appeals by Mrs. Midgely and Alvaro Pastor, Jr., CA-

No. 52961-R).

As such administrator and as heir of Alvaro Pastor,

Quemada filed in the CFI a complaintagainst the spouses Pasto

Midgely, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corpora

and Caltex (Philippines), Inc. to settle the question of owner

over certain real properties and the rights in some mining cla

to obtain an accounting and payment of the royalties and inc

thereof and for the payment of damages.Quemada's theory is

those properties and income belong to the estate of Alvaro PaSr.

Allegedly without complying with the requirements of

14 of the Rules of Court, Quemada caused extraterritorial servic

summons to be made in that case through the DFA and

Philippine Embassy in Madrid, Spain, which effected the servic

the summons by registered mail upon Mrs. Midgely and the Pa

Jr. spouses at their respective address in Alicante and Barce

Spain.

Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Mrs. Midgely, in their respec

letters to the Philippine Embassy dated February 11 and 12, 1

acknowledged the service of summons but reserved the righ

contest the courts jurisdiction over their persons. The Mini

Counselor of the Embassy forwarded those letters to the Cler

Court and apprised him of the manner the summons was served

Through counsel, Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses enter

special appearance and filed a motion to dismiss on the groun

lack of jurisdiction. They contended that as nonresidents, they c

be summoned only with leave of court and that the requirem

laid down in section 17 of Rule 14 should have been obser

Quemada opposed the motion to dismiss.

The CFI Judge denied the motion. He ruled that

Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses had been properly summo

He gave Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses 70 days f


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February 12, 1971 within which to file their answer, deducting from

that period the time from March 10 to May 8, 1971 when their

motion to dismiss was pending.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, he

ruled that the action filed by Quemada was for the recovery of real

properties and real rights. He gave Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr.

spouses 60 days from notice within which to answer the complaint

and directed that a copy of his order be sent to them through the

Philippine Embassy in Madrid.Hence, the petition for certiorari herein filed on November

3, 1971.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court has acquired jurisdiction

over the person of the petitioner.

Held:

Yes. We are of the opinion that the lower court has

acquired jurisdiction over the person of Mrs. Midgely by reason of

her voluntary appearance. The reservation in her motion to dismiss

that she was making a special appearance to contest the court'sjurisdiction over her person may be disregarded.

It may be disregarded because it was nullified by the fact

that in her motion to dismiss she relied not only on the ground of

lack of jurisdiction over the person but also on the ground that there

was no showing that earnest efforts were exerted to compromise

the case and because she prayed "for such other relief as" may be

deemed "appropriate and proper".

"When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of

objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be

for the sole and separatepurpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of

the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the

jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himselfto the jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion

made for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court

over the person will be held to be a general appearance, if the party

in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of the action

upon the further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the

subject matter." (Syllabus, Flores vs. Zurbito, supra, at page 751.

That rule was followed in Ocampo vs. Mina and Arejola, 41 Phil.

308).

Having shown that Mrs. Midgely had voluntarily submitted

to the lower court's jurisdiction when she filed her motion to dismiss

(see sec. 23, Rule 14, Rules of Court), the inevitable conclusion is

that it did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying her

motion to dismiss.

The case may be viewed from another angle.

Supposing arguendo that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction

over the person of Mrs. Midgely, still her motion to dismiss was

properly denied because Quemada's action against her may be

regarded as a quasi in rem actionwhere jurisdiction over the

person of the nonresident defendant is not necessary and where

service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying

with the requirement of due process.

An action quasi in remis an action between parties w

the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by th

or of some interest. Quemada's action falls within that category.

With respect to the extraterritorial service of summons t

nonresident defendant like Mrs. Midgely, Rule 14 of the Rule

Court provides: SEC. 17. Extraterritorial service. When

defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines

the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to

the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in whichdefendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, o

which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in exclu

the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of

defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may

leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal ser

as under section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of gen

circulation in such places and for such time as the court may o

in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court sha

sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defend

or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any o

granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall

be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defenmust answer.

Under section 17, extraterritorial service of summo

proper (1) when the action affects the personal status of

plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of whic

property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or cl

a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief deman

in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding

defendant from any interest in property located in the Philipp

and (4) when defendant nonresident's property has been attac

within the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court).

In any of such four cases, the service of summons

with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in three w(1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of gen

circulation in such places and for such time as the court may o

in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court sh

be sent by registered mail to the last known address of

defendant, and (3) service of summons may be effected in any o

manner which the court may deem sufficient. That third mod

extraterritorial service of summons was substantially complied

in this case.

It should be noted that Civil Case No. 274-T is relate

the testamentary proceeding (which is a proceeding in rem

excellance) because the former case was filed by Quemada for

purpose of recovering the properties which, according to

understanding, belong to the estate of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and w

are held by Mrs. Midgely and the spouses Alvaro Pastor, Jr.

Maria Elena Achaval. Disposition: Petition is dismissed.


Action in rem-


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Action in personam-

Action quasi in rem-

RAYRAY vs CHAE KYUNG LEE

G.R. No. L-18176, October 26, 1966

Facts:

Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his

marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter'swhereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a resident of Pusan,

Korea, summons was served by publication, as provided in the Rules

of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in

default, she not having filed an answer, and that a date be set for

the reception of his evidence. Before acting on this motion, the

lower court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to

Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for the

purpose of determining whether or not a collusion between the

parties exists. Said officer having found no such collusion, the case

was heard on the merits. In due course, thereafter, decision was

rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint, without costs, upon the

ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a marriage contractedabroad; and (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the relief

prayed for. A reconsideration of this decision having been denied,

plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case

to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court being in

issue in the appeal.

In relation thereto, the court a quo found that it had no

jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage to the

defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea. Said

conclusion is erroneous. In order that a given case could be validly

decided by a court of justice, it must have jurisdiction over (1) the

subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the parties therein;

and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court has acquired jurisdiction

over the annulment case contracted in Korea.

Held:

Yes. The subject-matter of the present case is the

annulment of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, which is within

the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance, and, in Manila, of its

Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.

The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his

submission thereto in consequence of the filing of the complaint

herein. Defendant was placed under the jurisdiction of said court,

upon the service of summons by publication.

This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the

parties herein, and status affects or binds the whole world.

The res in the present case is the relation between said parties, or

their marriage tie. Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the

nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of

marriage, or the locus celebrationis. Plaintiff here is a citizen of the

Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our

jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and under

plaintiff's theory still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does

not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon

validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.

Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double statu

that the status therein involves and affects two persons. On

married, never in abstract or a vacuum, but, always to someb

else. Hence, a judicial decree on the marriage status of a pe

necessarily reflects upon the status of another and the rela

between them. The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court

jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of marriprovided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a natio

of, the forum. Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in

Philippines, it follows that the lower court had jurisdiction

the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and

parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of

marriage between the parties herein.

Disposition: Decision appealed from is affirmed. N

The marriage of the parties was not annulled due to insufficienc

evidence to establish that defendant was married to another pe

prior to their marriage.

Independent Civil Action - an entirely separate and distinct

action for damages, which shall proceed independently of

criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderanc

evidence

- Articles 32, 33, 34 & 2176, New Civil Code of the Philippi

Section 3, Rule 111, Rules of Criminal Procedure

LIM vs DE LEON

G.R. No. L-22554, August 29, 1975

Background of the case:

On April 1961, petitioner Taha sold to Timbangcay

motor launch. On April 1962, Timbangcaya filed a complaint with

Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that Taha for

took away the motor launch from him. After conducting prelimi

investigation, Fiscal de Leon filed with the CFI-Palawan

Information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Per

against Taha.

Facts:

On June 1962, upon being informed that the motor lau

was in Balabac, Palawan, he wrote the Provincial Commande

Balabac to impound the motor launch. He reiterated on a follo

request that the subsequent sale of the motor launch to Lim ca

prevent the court from taking custody of the same. On July 6, 1

Maddela, upon the order of the Provincial Commander, seized

motor launch from Lim and impounded it. Lim and Taha plea

with Fiscal de Leon to return the motor launch but he refu

insisting that the same was the subject of a criminal offense.

Lim and Taha filed with CFI, a complaint for dam

against Fiscal de Leon and Maddela alleging that Maddela ent

the premises of Lim without a search warrant and there took a


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the hull of the motor launch without his consent; and that he

effected the seizure upon the order of Fiscal de Leon who was not

vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property; for

the payment of damages for the alleged violation of their

constitutional rights.

Private respondents denied the material allegations and as

affirmative defenses, alleged that Fiscal de Leon, as Acting Provincial

Fiscal of Palawan, he ordered the seizure of the motor launch for

being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Maddela merelyobeyed his superior officer to impound said launch.

The trial court rendered its decision, upholding the

validity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that "the

authority to impound evidences or exhibits or corpus delicti in a

case pending investigation is inherent in the Provincial Fiscal who

controls the prosecution and who introduces those exhibits in the

court." Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint of

plaintiffs-appellants and ordered them to pay jointly and severally

each of the defendants-appellees the amount of P500.00 by way of

actual damages, another amount of P500.00 for attorney's fees and

P1,000.00 as exemplary damages. Hence, this appeal on a question

of law.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents are civilly liable to

plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them

granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.

Held:

Yes. Article 32 and 2219 of the Civil Code, provides: ART.

32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who

directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner

impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of

another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.xxx xxx xxx

(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

xxx xxx xxx

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages

may also be adjudicated."

"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the

following and analogous cases:

xxx xxx xxx

"(6) Illegal search;

xxx xxx xxx

"(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,

34 and 35."

Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose

constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to

actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee

responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be

awarded.

However, with respect to plaintiff Jikil Taha, he is not

entitled to recover any damage which he alleged he had suffered

from the unlawful seizure of the motor launch inasmuch as he had

already transferred the ownership and possession of the motor

launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was seized and therefore, he has

no legal standing to question the validity of the seizure. Well set

is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested onl

the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that

objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal

cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, one who is

the owner, lessee, or lawful occupant of the premises searc

cannot raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.

Taha is not without recourse though. He can still collect from hi

plaintiff, Delfin Lim the unpaid balance of P1,000.00.Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon wanted to w

his hands of the incident by claiming that "he was in good f

without malice and without the slightest intention of inflicting in

to plaintiff-appellant, Jikil Taha"when he ordered the seizure of

motor launch. We are not prepared to sustain his defense of g

faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is eno

that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plain

and it is not required that defendants should have acted with m

or bad faith.

But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be

accountable because he impounded the motor launch uponorder of his superior officer, the Provincial Commander.

Disposition: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the dec

appealed from is hereby reversed and another one ent

declaring the seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee F

Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim

sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages, plus P1,000.00 moral dama

and, in addition, P750.00 for attorney's fees. With costs ag

defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon.

Independent Civil Action - an entirely separate and distinct

action for damages, which shall proceed independently of

criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderanc

evidence

- Articles 32, 33, 34 & 2176, New Civil Code of the Philippi

Section 3, Rule 111, Rules of Criminal Procedure

CARANDANG vs HON. SANTIAGO

G.R. No. L-8238, May 25, 1955

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vic

Santiago, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to annu

order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled Cesar M. Carandang vs. To

Valenton, Sr. et al., suspending the trial of said civil case to await

result of the criminal Case No. 534, Court of First Instanc

Batangas. In this criminal case, Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found g

of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against the perso

Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appe

the decision to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pend


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The decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in

the criminal case was rendered on September 1,1953 and petitioner

herein filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila to

recover from the defendant Tomas Valenton, Jr. and his parents,

damages, both actual and moral, for the bodily injuries received by

him on occasion of the commission of the crime of frustrated

homicide by said accused Tomas Valenton, Jr.After the defendants

submitted their answer, they presented a motion to suspend the

trial of the civil case, pending the termination of the criminal caseagainst Tomas Valenton, Jr. in the Court of Appeals. The judge

ruled that the trial of the civil action must await the result of the

criminal case on appeal. A motion for reconsideration was

submitted, but the court denied the same; hence this petition for

certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint for damages may proceed

independently pending resolution of the criminal case before the

Court of Appeals.

Held:Yes. Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code,

which is as follows: "In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical

injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct

from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such

civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,

and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

The Code Commission itself states that the civil action

allowed (under Article 33) is similar to the action in tort for libel or

slander and assault and battery under American law (Report of the

Code Commission, pp 46-47). But respondents argue that the term

"physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in the

Revised Penal Code, and therefore said term should be understoodin its peculiar and technical sense, in accordance with the rules

statutory construction.

In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and

convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it was

found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the

defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang,

which wound is a bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical

injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction

of the wound is attended by the intent to kill. So the question

arises whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means

physical injuries in the Revised Penal Code only, or any physical

injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted with intent to kill or not.

The Article in question uses the words "defamation",

"fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in

their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the

Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined

therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have

been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws

of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent

circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries"

could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in

the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code

Commission would have used terms in the same articlesome in

their general and another in its technical sense. In other words

term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bo

injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms u

with the latter, are general terms. In any case the C

Commission recommended that the civil action for physical inju

be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in Amer

Law, and this recommendation must have been accepted by

Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommende

the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily hreceived by the complainant similar to the civil action for ass

and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action sh

lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injurie

frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.

A parallel case arose in that of Bixby vs. Sioux City, 16

W. 641, 643. In that case, the appellant sought to take his case f

the scope of the statute by pointing out that inasmuch as noti

required where the cause of action is founded on injury to

person, it has no application when the damages sought arefo

death of the person. The court ruled that a claim to recover

death resulting from personal injury is as certainly "founded

injury to the person" as would be a claim to recover damages fnon-fatal injury resulting in a crippled body.

For the foregoing considerations, we find that

respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial o

civil case, and his order to that effect is hereby revoked, and

hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of said civil case wit

awaiting the result of the pending criminal case. With costs ag

the defendant-appellees.


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FULL TEXT CASES - ACTION CIVIL PROCEDU

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G.R. No. L-19613 April 30, 1966

ALFONSO G. LOPEZ,plaintiff-appellant,vs.

FILIPINAS COMPAIA DE SEGUROS,defendant-appellee.

Antonio M. Mendoza for plaintiff-appellant.

Josue H. Gustilo and Associates for defendant-appellee.

REGALA,J.:

This is an appeal by the plaintiff-appellant, Alfonso G. Lopez, from an

order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated January 25,

1962, dismissing his complaint against the defendant-appellee,

Filipinas Compaia de Seguros.

Prior to April 22, 1959, the plaintiff applied with the defendant

company for the insurance of his property consisting of a Biederman

truck tractor and a Winter Weils trailer from loss or damage in the

amount of P26,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively. In connection

with the above application, the defendant company inquired of the

plaintiff the following:

5. Has any company in respect of the insurance of any car

or vehicle (a) declined, cancelled or refused to renew your

insurance?

(b) increased your premium on renewal?

To both questions, the plaintiff answered: "none," though the truth

was at that time, the American International Underwriters of the

Philippines (AIU) had already declined a similar application for

insurance by the plaintiff in respect of the above-described vehicles.

On April 22, 1959, the defendant-appellee issued to the plaintiff-

appellant two Commercial Vehicle Comprehensive Policies covering

the above properties. On August 30, 1959, while the said policies

were in force, the aforementioned vehicles figured in an accident at

Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, resulting in the total loss of the tractor and

partial damage to the trailer. Accordingly, the plaintiff gave notice of

the same to the defendant company and made demand upon the

latter for the payment to him of P27,962.00, the total amount of

damages resulting from the accident.

On April 28, 1960, the defendant-appellant rejected the above claim

by reason of, among others, the claimant's alleged "concealment of

a material fact," namely: that the insured property previously been

declined insurance by another company.

In view of the rejection of his claim by the defendant company, the

plaintiff-appellant filed on May 27, 1960 with the Office of the

Insurance Commissioner a complaint against the said company. On

June 7, 1960, the Assistant Insurance Commissioner requested the

defendant company to give its side of the above complaint and,

thereafter, or on August 1, 1960, the said official "transmitted to the

plaintiff, thru his counsel, the 'self-explanatory letters' dated June

12, 1960 of the American International Underwriters of the

Philippines, Inc., and June 21, 1960 of the defendant, which the said

office had received from said parties in connection with plaintiff's

complaint, with the suggestion that in view of the reluctant attitude

of plaintiff 'towards the company's proposal for the matter to be

settled thru arbitration, and considering the informative f

disclosed, in the letter of the AIUPI, plaintiff should pursue his

to the Court which has proper competence to resolve said matte

On August 16, 1961, the plaintiff-appellant informed by letter

Office of the Insurance Commissioner that he was willing to sub

his claim to arbitration and, in the premises, suggested that

Assistant Insurance Commissioner be designated as the

arbitrator of the same. On September 1, 1960, the Insur

Commissioner informed the plaintiff-appellant of his willingnesact as the single arbitrator, provided that both parties to the dis

manifest in writing their conformity thereto and to abide by

arbitrator's award. The defendant-appellee, on the other h

informed the Insurance Commissioner on September 22, 1960 th

could not consent to the above proposal since "the clai

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