China Prepares For An Ice-Free Arctic

8/9/2019 China Prepares For An Ice-Free Arctic

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CHINA PREPARES FOR

AN ICEFREE ARCTIC

ld jkobso*

SUMMARY

wThe prospect o the Arctic

being navigable during summer

months as a result o climate

change has impelled the

Chinese Government to

allocate more resources to

research in the High North.

Several Chinese academics have

encouraged their government

to be aware o the political,

economic and military

implications o shorter shipping

routes and untapped energyresources. However, Chinese

ocials advocate cautious

Arctic policies or ear o

causing alarm and provoking

countermeasures among the

Arctic states.

Chinas insistence on respect

or sovereignty as a guiding

principle o international

relations deters it rom

questioning the territorial

rights o Arctic states.Furthermore, China is aware

that its size and rise to major

power status evoke jitters, but

at the same time it is striving to

position itsel so that it will not

be excluded rom access to the

Arctic.

Smaller Arctic Council

members have an opportunity

to lay the oundation or a

unique relationship with China

by engaging Chinese ocialsand academics on Arctic

issuesranging rom climate

change and maritime rescue

operations to commercial

shipping routes and resource

exploration.

No. 2010/2 March 2010

SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security

I. Introduction

China i ain inain anin h nqn f h min fh i in h Ai Oan a a f ima han. Th f h

Ai in navia in mm mnh, ain h h hi-in an a na n , ha im h Chi-n Gvnmn aa m Ai ah. Chinia hav a a hin a wha in f ii w hChina n fm an i-f Ai nvinmn. China i a a iavan-a a i i nih an Ai ia ai ha n Ai a, an n vin ih nwa ninna hvn an AiCni mm a wih h ih aiia in h iin f Aiii. Di i min wa iin, China an x a in minin h iia famw an a fnain f f

Ai aivii.1

Th fm i-v Ai i nin an xaina an-fmain a a f h nn a wih whih h i i imin-ihin ( 1).2 Eima a whn h Ai Oan nin i-f in h mm an va a, fm 2013 2060.3 Th min f h Ai i nmi, miia an nvin-mna han h vnan f h in. In 2008 h v iaaCanaa, Dnma, Nwa, Ria an h Uni Sam-mi hmv h xiin a famw f h Ai an h mn f i vain aim.4 Di h a-

1See box 1 below for the current legal and political framework governing the Arctic.2According to one report, the annual average extent of Arctic Ocean ice has shrunk by 2.7% per

decade, with a decrease of 7.4% per decade during the summer months. Solomon, S. et al. (eds), Cli-mate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth

Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University

Press: Cambridge, 2007), p. 7.3For estimates of 2013, 2040 and 2060 see Grupta, A., Geopolitical implications of Arctic melt-

down,Strategic Analysis, vol. 33, no. 2 (Mar. 2009), p. 174; Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping

Assessment 2009 Report (Arctic Council: Apr. 2009), p. 30; and US National Snow and Ice Data

Center, Arctic Sea ice shrinks as temperatures rise, Press release, 3 Oct. 2006, .4Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat Declaration, Ilulissat, Greenland, 28 May 2008, . See also UN to rule on Arctic seabed

ownership,Daily Telegraph , 29 May 2008.

* The author is indebted to Jingchao Peng for his invaluable research assistance during

the process of writing this paper. She also thanks the Norwegian Ministry of ForeignAairs for providing support for her research on China and the Arctic.


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2 spr sgts o pece d securt y o. 2010/2

an, h vvin iain inh Ai nia a nw iia iinvvin a nn-ia a,ia ain i a f aa an -xain ih. Cnqn,ima n n in China

a Aia, E an Nh Amia a nin hi an-in h in in ahi anfmain an i -nmi, iia an iiaimiain.

T a China ha a awai-an- aah Aivmn, wa ha aivv w a aam inh ni Chinaiz an a a a iin aw.5 Chin ia ahf v ai whnfmain hi viw n Chi-na in in h Ai.6 Th ha China Ai ah

aivii main imai f n h imai an nvinmna n-qn f h i min in h Ai. Hwv, in n a Chinia an ah hav a a a h mmia, iiaan i imiain f China f a ana i-f Ai in.7

Thi a xamin hinin amn Chin ia an ha n hiia imnin f a hanin Ai. I vi an vviw f Chinaini, mmia an i in in h Ai (in IIan III), an hn in China aah h innaina ii fh Ai (in IV). Cnin a ivn in in V.

5Guo, P., Associate Professor of Ocean University of China, Interview with the author, Qingdao,

25 June 2009.6The author had o-the-record discussions with 13 Chinese ocials and researchers dealing

with Arctic issues in Beijing and Shanghai between 4 Apr. 2009 and 9 Feb. 2010.7 See e.g. Li, Z., [Analysis of Chinas strategy on the Arctic route],

Zhongguo Ruankexue, no. 1 (2009), pp. 17; Li, Z., [Obs-

tacles to Chinas participation in the international Arctic route mechanism and countermeasures],

Zhongguo Hanghai, vol. 32, no. 2 (June 2009), pp. 98102; Guo, P., [A big powers

strategy points at the Arctic],Liaowang, no. 27 (2009), p. 64; Ren, X. and Li, Y.,

[A tentative analysis on sovereignty dispute over the Arctic Ocean and Chinas inter-

national responsibility],Langang Shian Xueyuan Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban), vol. 24, no. 4 (Aug.

2008), pp. 6669; and Zhao, Y., [A brief analysis of

legal challenges in the Arctic region and its inuence on China],Haiyang Fazhan Yu Guanli, vol. 26,no. 3 (Mar. 2009), pp. 1721.

1982

Recorded and projected

minimum extent of ice:

201030

204060

207090

Figure 1. Projected decrease of Arctic sea ice

Source: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), GRID-Arendal, Maps and

Graphics Library, .


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c prepres or ce-ree rctc 3

II. Chinas expanding polar research capabilities

China ha n f h w n a ini ah aaiii.8Sin 1984 China ha aniz 26 xiin an aih 3 ahain in h Anai.9 Th Ai am a f fm 1995, whn a f Chin ini an nai av h Nh P nf an n ah n h Ai Oan i v, ima annvinmn. China Ai ah xiin a a in1999 an in hn i ha ai w m xiin, in 2003 an2008, wih a fh ann f h mm f 2010. China Aiah ain, Hanh (Yw Riv), wa fn a N-n inNwa Svaa ahia in J 2004.10

Sin 1994 China ha n a xain na h RahVXuelong(Snw Dan), whih wa ha fm Uain in 1993.Th 163-m-n v, wih a iamn f 21 000 nn, i hw a (nn-na) ia.11 Hwv, in O 2009 hSa Cni (h Chin Cain) i ha Xuelong an n nm h man f h n xanin a ah an nh an i.12 Af mnh f iain wn hain an-han fin v iin a Chin v, h vnmnav h iin f a nw hih-h a xiin ah i-

a.13 Pimina an a Chin-i ia a h f 2 iin an ($300 miin) ha n n wa wihin h Chin

Ai an Anai Aminiain (CAA) in a a a 2009. Thnw v, x aina in 2013, wi -in Chi-n an fin an an i in China.14 I wi ma han Xue-long, wih a iamn f n 8000 nn.15

Bi i wn ini xiin, China ha aa wih in-naina an mni h Ai nvinmna han. In 1997,China in h Innaina Ai Sin Cmmi (IASC), a nn-

8Zhu, Y., [We are already one of the strongest countries to con-

duct polar scientic expedition],Nanang Dushi Bao, 25 Oct. 2009; and Spears, K. J., China and the

Arctic: the awakening snow dragon, China Brie, vol. 9, no. 6 (18 Ma r. 2009).9 : [Deputy Administrator: Chinas polar expe-

dition has entered a new period of development], Xinhua, 20 Nov. 2009, .10 [Arctic region], Xinhua, 13 June 2006, ; and : [News background: the Chinese and the

Arctic], Xinhua, 11 July 2008, .

11Zhu (note 8); and Spears (note 8).12 2013 [China will build a new polar expedi-

tion icebreaker and plans to put it in use in 2013], Xinhua, 19 Nov. 2009, ; 25: [25th

anniversary of Chinas Antarctic expedition: peaceful utilization of the Antarctic will never be out

of date], Xinhua, 14 Oct. 2009, .13 25: (note 12). In addition, icebreaker supporting

facilities such as a wharf, storehouse and a training base will be built.14Xu, C., [China is planning to independently build a polar exped-

ition icebreaker with a capacity of 10 000 tonnes],Xin Jing Bao, 15 Jan. 2009, . At the time of writing the identity of the possible

foreign partners had not been made public.15 2013 (note 12).


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vnmna anizain ha aim faiia miiiina ahn h Ai in an i in h ah m. A h 2005 Ai Si-n Smmi h a Knmin, Ynnan Pvin, China wa invi inh N-n Sin Mana Cmmi, whih wa aih in1994 nhan ain amn h ah n a N-n. Fm han a a Chin ah an ia hav aiia ininnaina mina ain wih nvinmna, ini an imaii in h Ai. Fm Mah 2007 Mah 2009 a f China x w in h Innaina Pa Ya amm, an in-naina ini amm ha f n h Ai an Anai.

China ima Ai-f ah iniin a: (a ) h PaRah Ini f China (PRIC) in Shanhai, wih a a f 142 ,whih i in ha f a xiin nXuelongan n mhn-iv i f h a in; (b) h China Ini f Main Aai,h ah amn wihin h Sa Oani Aminiain (SOA) inBiin, whih main ah n innaina maiim aw anChina an vmn a; an (c) h Ini f Oan, amiiiina main in ah an vmn ini nh Chin Aam f Sin. In aiin, Ai-a ah in a h Oan Univi f China in Qina, Daian MaiimUnivi, Xiamn Univi, Tni Univi in Shanhai, h Chin

Figure 2. A Chinese view of Arctic sea routes

The captions label Shanghai, Rotterdam, New York, the North East Sea Route (red) and the North West Sea Route (blue).

Source: Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration, ; map drawn byHao Xiaoguang, .


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Anai Cn f Svin an Main a Whan Univi, an hRah Cn f Main Dvmn f China in Qina.16 Th aah n wa aih in 2006 an Wan Shan, fm haf h SOA, wa ain a i. Th n ima i niv, ai an mai ah nnin China mamaiim m an vi naiv vi f h SOA.17

Ahh h i n Chin iniin v ia ahn Ai ii, h a a hanf f inivia wh hav ihai an ha ha f n Ai ai an ii.Sin h mi-2000 Chin ah an ia havxan hi aiiain in innaina minafin n mmia, a an iia Aii. In a ma nhan China nanin fh iia, a an miia imnin f h Ai, inSm 2007 h Chin Gvnmn anh aah ni Ai I Rah invvinha an ia fm an China. Th 10 ah i a: h

Ai an hman i, Ai an hi xiain, Aiini ah, Ai anain, Ai aw, Ai ii anima, miia fa in h Ai, China Ai aivii, h

Ai ai iin, an China Ai i an mmnain.18Th ah , aniz h CAA, wa m 2009, h w n ma i.

III. Chinas commercial and strategic interests in the Arctic

Ba China nm i ian n fin a, h a aniammia imiain if hiin a hn in h mmmnh ah a. Na haf f China mi (GDP) ihh nn n hiin.19 Th i fm Shanhai Hamvia h Nhn Sa Rwhih n an h nh a f Ria fmh Bin Sai in h a Nvaa Zma in h wi 6400 i-m h han h via h Sai f Maaa an h Sz Cana( 2).20 Mv, ia, h f inan f hi av-in via h Gf f An wa h Sz Cana ina m han nf

wn Sm 2008 an Mah 2009.21

16The Research Centre for Marine Developments of China is managed by the Ministry of Edu-

cation and the SOA. Its oces are located at Ocean University of China.17Zhao, G., 40 [Research Center for Marine Devel-

opments of China will launch 40 research topics this year],Zhongguo Haiyang Bao, 26 June 2009,

(authors translation).18Wang, H. et al. (eds), 2008 [China ocean yearbook 2008] (Ocean Press: Beijing,

2008).19The precise share of Chinas GDP that depends on shipping is dicult to determine. It is stated

as 46% in e.g. Gao, W., Executive Vice President of COSCO Group, Development strateg y of Chinese

Shipping Company under the multilateral f ramework of WTO, Speech at the International Mari-

time Forum, 30 Oct . 2003, .20 International Northern Sea Route Programme, ; and Guo, P. et

al., [A study of the international issues of the Arctic route] (Ocean Press:

Beijing, Oct. 2009), pp. 32326. The Northern Sea Route is also known as the North East Route or

North East Passage.

21Gullestrup, P. and Stumbaum, M.-B., EU maritime interests and the piracy problem: a per-spective from the shipping industry, eds B. van Ginkel and F.-P. van der Putten, The International

Chinese research remains primarily

ocused on how the melting Arctic will

aect Chinas continental and oceanic

environment


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6 pgtopdutyo.2010/2

ChineseresearchremainsrimarilcsenhwhemelinArcic

willafecChinascninenalanceanicenvirnmenanhwinrn

schchanesclafecmesicariclralanecnmicevelmen.

Hwever,asmallnmberChineseresearchersarebliclencrain

hevernmenacivelrearerhecmmercialansraeicr-

niieshaamelinArcicresens.LiZhenDalianMariimeUni-

versihas,eherwihaeamsecialiss,assesseChinasavanaes

anisavanaeswhenheArcicsearesen(seere3).Wh-

everhascnrlverheArcicrewillcnrlhenewassaewrl

ecnmics an inernainal sraeies, wries Li, reerrin bh he

shreneshiinresbeweenEasAsiaanErerNrhAmerica

anheabnanil,as,mineralansherresrcesresmebein

heArcic.22CmmeninnhesccesslesvaesrmShKrea

Response to Somali Piracy: Challenges and Opportunities (Martinus Nijho: Leiden, forthcoming

2010).22 Li,Zhongguo Hanghai (note 7), (authors translation).

Figure 3. A Chinese specialist panels SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) assessment of use of

Arctic sea routes

Source: Li, Z., [Analysis of Chinas strategy on the Arctic route],Zhongguo Ruankexue, no. 1 (2009), pp. 17.

Chinas status as a major export country Elevation of Chinas global status

Enhancement of Chinas Arctic exploration and

research capacity

Strengthening of Chinese shipping companies

China doesnt have the absolute right to speak

in global aairs

Chinas cultural elements (most international

laws are based on Western culture) China is not an Arctic Ocean coastal state

Chinas vessel-building technology and logistic

planning techniques are not the most advanced

globally

The logistic costs of shipping companies will be

reduced

Asias high latitude ports will become new

centres for international shipping

Arctic shipping has high tourist value

Global trade and shipping patterns will change

in a way that favours China

Current international laws are not favourable to

Chinas interests in Arctic shipping

Scrambles among Arctic Ocean coastal states

such as Canada, Russia and the United States

Chinese shipping companies will face erce

competition

Negative eects on Chinas ports in lower

latitudes

Chinas successful response

to the Arctic shipping

routes problem

Strengths Weaknesses

OpportunitiesThreats


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h Nhan via h Nhn Sa R in h mm f 2009 wGman mmia v, Chn Xn f h China Ini f In-naina Si ai ha h nin f h Ai wi avan hvmn f China nh-a in an an aa aa . . . I i fiman Ea Aian ain a w.23 Chn a ai ha Chinah hav a n-m viin ain Ai hiin.

Li Zhnf ha iiiz h fa ha Chin ah n h Ai hi-in ha n n ann an n in a mhniv mann na China i in. Ain Li, China ahfai vi fnamna infmain an ini fn f China ma i Ai a an hf China w a i ih in h innaina ana i imi.24 Thi in f iiimf h vnmn aah Chin ha i a in

Ai-a iain. Li ai wa ih in anaina na amini h ii China

Aiain f Sin an Thn (CAST). Li in ha h Ai a ha inian miia va, a faniz h ni. In a a n- aia h Ai an f h P Liain Am, Sni CnHan Xn wan ha h iii f f f ann inh Ai mx vin i.25 Th inain miiaiman f an i-f Ai i in in iin inn a a v ia a nhn hi miia aaiiiin h Ai.26

Anh Chin ah n Ai ii, G Piqin f h OanUnivi f China, ha n win qi a iia a Li a vn-mn ii, in mia inviw h ha vi iava fChina minan naa in-in Ai ah an ai ii n in China in main na an a a f Ai aai.27G ha ai ha China, whih i aniinin fm a ina a aw, h m aiv in innaina Ai aai. H n haan n ha a mhniv ah n Pa ii wi x fm in a iiv w in h manamn f h Ai anhf f in a aiv iin.28

23 Zhou, Z., [The opening of Arctic shipping triggers an unclear battle

in the deep sea],Liaoning Ribao, 15 Oct. 2009.

24 Li,Zhongguo Hanghai (note 7), (authors translation). The journal, China navigation, is pub-lished by the China Institute of Navigation and administered by CAST, the largest quasi-govern-

mental supervisory body for science and technology research institutes in China.25 Han, X., [Closely watched dispute over Arctic sovereignty],Bingqi

Zhishi Fangwu Guancha Jia, vol. 253, no. 9B (Sep. 2008), pp. 1619.26 E.g. in Aug. 2007 Canada announced that it was setting up an Arctic military training centre in

Resolute Bay, on the Arctic; in Mar. 2009 Russia announced that it will establish a military force to

protect its Arctic interests; in July 2009 the Danish Parliament approved a plan to set up an Arctic

military command and task force by 2014; in Aug. 2009 Norway moved its centre of military oper-

ations from Jtt, in the south of the country, to Reitan, in the north; and in Nov. 2009 the US Navy

made public its rst Arctic road map to guide its policy, strategy and investments in the Arctic. See

e.g. Ebinger, C. K. and Za mbetakis, E., The geopolitics of Arctic melt,International Afairs, vol. 85,

no. 6 (2009); and US Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy Arctic roadmap, Oct. 2009.27 New cold wars over Arctic wealth, Global Times, 27 July 2009.

28 Interview with Guo, P., in Xie, K., [The future of the polar region iscrucial to China], Cankao Xiaoxi, 8 Nov. 2007 (authors translat ion).

The Arctic has signifcant military

value, a act recognized by other

countries


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Chin Ai iai anw h am naini a man fhi Wn na whn nmain hw aiv h Ai w ima in main h n hh hSz an Panama ana.29 Ahh aa an h Nhn Sa Rfm an China Wn E w ania hn h

n, hih inan mim, a f infa an hah n-iin ma ma h Ai mmia nvia, a a in hh m. Dif i wi nin a m f hi vn whn h

Ai aa a ia m i-f.30 Ba f h min fGnan i a, h nm f i i x ina, finhi a a w an ma . Fhm, h ha-w h f m f h aa an h hiin (in aiah Bin Sai) ma h Ai ni f i a hi.

Th nin f h Ai wi a vi a nw v f hn an h naa n whih China nmi whinain i. Th US Gia Sv ima ha h Ai n-ain 30 n f h w niv a an 13 n f hw niv i .31 Aiina, h in nain va

amn f a, ni, , nn, a, zin, ,iv, iamn, manan, hmim an ianim.32

Th hnia han aia wih xainn an mina i in h Ai hav n n

h Chin an Wn v.33 T a xih Ai , China n an wih fin

mani a, a n Chin ha n, h i a ah a awn Chin an avan fin -a i xain hn. 34

Ria, whih n man f h in Ai wa, a h hhn an h aia n xa hmnin h wa f i-aa in vn in Rian wa in Chin aia an Wn

29 See e.g. Yu, B. and Li, Y., [Comprehensive evaluation of the Northern

Sea Route],Dalian Haishi Daxue Xuebao, vol. 35 (June 2009), p. 228; Bai, C., Li, Z. and Yang, Z.,

[Research of Arctic sea routes],Hanghai Jishu, no. 5 (2009), pp. 79. ; and Zha ng, X. et a l.,

[Assessment of the economic poten-

tial of Arctic sea routes and its strategic signicance for the development of Chinas economy],

Zhongguo Ruankexue, Supplementary issue 2, 2009, pp. 8693. For articles by Western specialists

questioning the practicability of the Arctic shipping routes see e.g. Lasserre, F., High North ship-

ping: myths a nd realities, eds S. G. Holtsmark and B. A. Smith-Windsor,Security Prospects in the

High North: Geostrategic Thaw or Freeze?, NATO Defense College (NDC) Forum Paper no. 7 (NDC:Rome, May 2009), pp. 17999; and Christensen, S. A., Are the northern sea routes really the short-

est?, DIIS Brief, Mar. 2009, .30 Christensen (note 29), p. 3.31Gautier, D. et al., Assessment of undiscovered oil and gas in the Arctic,Science, 29 May 2009.32 ECON,Arctic Shipping 2030: From Russia with Oil, Stormy Passage, or Arctic Great Game?,

ECON Report 2007-070 (ECON: Oslo, 2007), p. 4.33 See e.g. Feng, D., Lu, C. and Zhou, S., [Petroleum exploitation in the

Arctic region: competition and obstacles],Jieneng Jishu, vol. 27, no. 4 (July 2009); and Hai, T.,

, [Vied for by oil companies, the Arcticthe next Middle East?],

Guoji Xianqu Daobao, 29 July 2008. For scepticism expressed by Western analysts on the question of

whether energy resources in the Arctic are a competitive alternative to other u ntapped resources

see e.g. Oerdal, K., High North energ y: myths a nd realities, eds Holtsmark and Smith-Windsor

(note 29), pp. 15178.

34 Li, Q., [The situation and challenges for deep water oil andgas exploration and exploitation in China],Zhongguo Haishang Youqi, vol. 18, no. 2 (Apr. 2006).

To be able to exploit the Arctics

resources, China needs to partner with

oreign companies


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Baziian hn.35 F xam, whn in a 2009Ria a-wni man Rnf annn an a f h ain in v 30 h i n Ria Ai ninna hf, inx i ha i w n a v h i n iwn.36 Maiv aia wi n in aiin nw f hihavan hn an iaiz manamn i. Anhnia miaa in vn in whih China aia inxhan f h ni ain h xin i in -waiin i h nin ain wn Sai, Ta anGazm v h ha f h Shman a in h BanSa. Thi i a n n a a h mmia ni a afmia hnia han.37

IV. China and Arctic politics

Ahh H Zhn, Chin aian mini f fin aai, haai China n hav an Ai a, h n aa hav a a ana ain h Ai.38 H ma hi amn whianin an Ai fm aniz h Nwian Gvnmn nSvaa in Jn 2009. Hi h a h fm, an wih hi mmn Chin nai af h fm, fm h m --a an m-hniv ia aiain f China hinin n h ii f h

Ai an in vin i.In in wih h n f-a vnin ini in innaina

aai, H mhaiz China wih i a vinv af hh ia. H x China f

Ai ni vin an iia ihf xam, in ain h ninna hfnw innaina aw inin h 1982Uni Nain Cnvnin n h Law f h Sa (UNCLOS; x 1). Ah am im, ain H, China hin h aw n nan v h iman ha a aiin fm h min fh i. I n h Ai Cni a h m innia ina vn-mna anizain. China ha aiia a an a h v in w

Ai Cni miniia min, in 2007 an 2009, an h ha iaiain an mann v a wi i a na i ( x 1). H h n f ain amn Aian nn-Ai a.

In hi h a Svaa, H anw ha h Ai i main aina i ai ha i i a an in-ina i imahan an innaina hiin. H i n mnin n an hnaa . Uniin, China w i h Ai a

35 E.g. Rosneft seeks licences for 30 oshore Arctic elds,FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, 21 Oct. 2009.

British Petroleum (BP), the Brazilian state-owned company PetroBras, Royal Dutch Shell a nd the

Norwegian company Statoil are currently the worlds leading deep sea energy drillers.36 Rosneft seeks licences for 30 oshore Arctic elds (note 35).37 Anker, M., The High North and Russo-Norwegian bilateral economic relations,Russia, Fin-

land and Norway: Economic Essays, BOFIT Online no. 15 (Bank of Finla nd: Helsinki, 15 Dec. 2009),

pp. 3639.38 Ning, X., [A microcosm of the worlds

futureAssistant Minister of Foreign Aairs talks about H igh North Study Tour],Shijie Bolan,vol. 349, no. 19 (2009), p. 58.


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niz h in f nn-Ai a. A H ai, Whn mininh imiain f ninna hv, h Ai a n nn han ainhi amn hmv, m a nih ainhi wn h ninna hf an h innainamain aa ha i h mmn hman hia, n a aan faa ni in an h mmn in f h innainammni.39 Pf G Piqin i m i: Cimanain hav nan ha Ai aai a n n ina i a innaina n.40 G ha ima ha a 88 n f ha f h Ai Oan w n h n f h Ai iaa if h Cmmiin n h Limi f h Cninna Shf w av a h xiin x aim h Ai Oan ninnahf.41 Hwv, whn niin h nn f China an h nn-

Ai a i i wh ain in min ha h va mai f nwn

39 [Chinas perspective on Arctic matters], Shijie Zhishi, vol. 55, no. 15

(2009), (authors translation).40 Guo, P., [The Arctic is not desolate],Huanqiu, no. 17 (Sep. 2008).

41 Guo, P., Associate Professor, Ocean University of China, Interview with the author, Qingdao,25 June 2009.

Box 1. The international legal and political framework for the Arctic

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

Opened or sig nature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982; entered into orce on 16 November 1994; 160 part ies

as o 1 January 2010; depositary UN Secretary-General

The convention aims to regulate all aspects of the resources of the sea and uses of the ocean. According to UNCLOS, coastal

(littoral) states have undisputed sovereign rights to their territorial sea and exclusive economic zone, which extend to a distance

of 200 nautical miles (370 kilometres) from their coastal baseline (articles 3 and 57). On ratication of UNCLOS, a country has

10 years to make claims to extend its 200-nautical-mile zone (Article 4).

In the case of the Arctic Ocean, the littoral states are Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States. Russia ratied

UNCLOS in 1997 and in December 2001 it submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) a

request that 120 million hectares of underwater terrain between the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges be conrmed as a

continuation of the Siberian shelf.a Norway ratied UNCLOS in 1996 and submitted its claim in November 2006.b Canada

(ratied in 2003) and Denmark (ratied in 2004) are in the process of preparing claims. The USA has not ratied UNCLOS.

Treaty text: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1833 (1994)

The Arctic CouncilEstablished by the Declaration on the Establishment o the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration), 19 September 1996;

inaugu rated 17 September 1998; 8 member states, 6 non-Arctic observer states and 3 ad hoc non-Arctic obser ver states

The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum for promoting cooperation among the Arctic states, in particular on issues of

sustainable development and environmental protection. The full member states are the eight circumpolar states: Canada,

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Russia and the United States. It is not an international organization with a rm

legal charter but rather an international forum designed to foster cooperation and collaboration on Arctic issues. Most member

states are opposed to broadening the Councils mandate to deal with legal issues, although they acknowledge that the changing

Arctic environment requires increased international cooperation on issues of trans-border interest.c

China, among others, has applied to become a permanent observer state. At the Arctic Councils April 2009 ministerial

meeting, no decision was taken on the applications. Currently, as an ad hoc observer China must apply to be admitted to each

Arctic Council meeting. dPermanent observer status does not dier from ad hoc observer status with regard to the inuence on

the decision-making process in ministerial meetings. Only Arctic Council member states have voting rights.e

Website:


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na n i in ni aa, ha i, wihin h ii-ma xiv nmi zn (EEZ) f h Ai ia a.42

Canaa an Nwa a h n ni hav h fa na wihChina in a fma iaa ia n Ai i. China an Nwa hava h a fw- ia in 2010. A h ChinaNwa ia- min in Jn 2009, ima han an a ah w ini- a h i f n mmn in, ahh h w i axhan viw n Ai ii, n i an a .43

I i na if an whn China wi i a m fma Ai a.Th i a f h 12h Fiv-Ya Pan (201115) f a xiinan a ah wi naiz af China m i 26h

Anai xiin in Mah 2010.44 In O 2009, n h v f hxiin, Chn Lianzn, D Di f h SOA, h m ih nh nx Fiv-Ya Pan na a. Th wi n China

42 See e.g. Oerdal (note 33); and Ebinger and Zambetakis (note 26).43 Gou, H., Chinese Ministr y of Foreign Aairs, Personal communication, 15 and 26 Jan. 2010;

and Svedahl, E., Minister Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy, Beijing, Personal communication,

13 Jan. 2010.44 : (note 9).

Box 1 continued

International Maritime Organization Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Icecovered Waters

Approved October and December 2002; issued 23 December 2002.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) Guidelines focus on the special climatic conditions of the Arctic and aim topromote the safety of navigation and to prevent pollution from ship operations in the Arctic. The Guidelines are not legally

binding: UNCLOS is the only existing law regulating maritime activities in the A rctic. Both Russia and Canada have adopted

strict legal regimes under UNCLOS for navigation in the Arctic within their respective area of jurisdiction.

Text: International Maritime Organization, MSC/Circ.1056 and MEPC/Circ.399, 23 Dec. 2002,

Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen (Svalbard Treaty)

Signed by the 9 original par ties at Paris, France, on 9 February 1920; entered into orce on 14 Augu st 1925; 40 parties as o

1 January 2010; depositary French Government

The treaty establishes Norways full sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago but stipulates that it must remain demilitarized.

Citizens from all states party enjoy the same right of access to and residence in Svalbard. Eleven institutions from 10 countries

have established research stations at Ny-lesund, Svalbard, three of which are permanently manned.Treaty text:League o Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2 (1920)

a United Nations, Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf receives its rst submission, Press Release SEA/1729, 21 Dec. 2001, ; and Baev, P.,Russias Race or the Arctic and the New Geopolitics o the North Pole, Occa-

sional paper (Jamestown Foundation: Washington, DC, Oct. 2007), p. 4.b United Nations, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the

baselines: submissions to the Commission: submission by the Kingdom of Norway, .c Ebinger, C. K. and Zambeta kis, E., The geopolitics of Arctic melt,International Afairs, vol. 85, no. 6 (2009), pp. 122730.d Bennet, M., Round-up from the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting (2/2), The Arctic, Foreign Policy Blogs, 1 May 2009, .e Cleveland, J. W., The next generation of international organizations: lessons f rom the Arctic Council in addressing regional climate change,

Appalachian Natural Resources Law Journal, vol. 1, no. 2 (spring 2008).Jensen, ., The IMO Guidelines or Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters: From Voluntary to Mandatory Tool or Navigation Saety and

Environmental Protection?, Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) Report 2/2007 (FNI: Lysaker, Mar. 2007); and Ebinger and Zambetakis (note c).


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nw f h ima f ima han n h w a in, xanChina ini xain aivii, an a an aiv a in aaai an aih China ai iin. T amih h a,h SOA inn i h f w an ha w.45

V. Conclusions

Sva Chin aami a nain hi vnmn a hihiia ni an niz h iia, nmi an miiava f h Ai an hn -vaa China ih in h Ai in

an a i ai an.46 Chin iin ma, nh h han, ava ai Ai ii f fa fain aam an vin nma amn h

Ai a. Pf G Piqin ha vn ai h aam-i iii f an aian f Ai a.47 China i awa

ha i iz an i ma w a v i a h am imi i ivin iin if ha i wi n x fm a h

Ai.China aa aia wa f Ria innin in h Ai.

Chin v hav ma n f Ria iin in A 2007 m n-ian m ih v h Ai an h anin f aRian a n h Ai a ha am mnh.48 G ha ai ha hi in h Ai a in fa Ria an m h a han h innaina an innaina aw af h n f h wa.49China an h f h w w a a iavana if Ria aimv h nwa ain wn h Lmnv an Mnv ia iimiz a, in ha a, Ria an w hav ih h in ha aa ( x 1). Evn if ha aim i nf, mChin Ai iai hav x nn ha h mmiaavana f h Ai w ania a if Ria w niaa ha xian vi f f hi ain hh i EEZwa.50

I i iman n, hwv, ha Ai i hav h fa naah in a ii f ain, wih anin i manaaf.51 Innaina ain in h Ai ha f h m a

n miaa.52 Mia f miin in an i-f Ai ha

45 25: (note 12), p. 2 (authors translation).46 Li, S. et al., : [Opportunities and challenges: the trend of

global warming in t he Arctic],Kexue, vol. 61, no. 4 (25 July 2009), p. 47 (authors translat ion).47 Xie (note 28).48 See e.g. Zhao, Q., Arctic scramble strains relations amid increasing militarization, Xinhua,

30 Mar. 2009, .49 Xie (note 28).50 This concern was expressed in the authors o-the-record discussions with A rctic experts in

Beijing and Shanghai. Also, in ar ticles published in China, reference is made to a Russian regu lation

dating back to 1991 that Russia will charge high passage and ser vice fees for ships traversing the

Northern Sea Route. Zhang, J., : [The Arctic: age of expedition to

age of scramble],Jingji Cankao Bao, 10 Apr. 2009; and Liu, J. and Guan, Q.,

[Disputes arise in the Arctics golden route],Huanqiu, no. 22 (2008).51Ebinger and Zambetakis (note 26), p. 1228.

52 See e.g. Heininen, L., Remarks at the seminar Arctic resources policies in Russia, FinnishInstitute of International Aairs, Helsinki, 3 Mar. 2009, .

Chinese decision makers advocate

cautious Arctic policies or ear o

causing alarm


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mhaiz nia i an a am f h Ai ivi nai f am ni ain in h in, ia ani invvin Ria. Hwv, h i n vin ha Ria i nain h ha i w n wan n miaa in i ain vin.53

Whi h min f h Ai i a nin in ChinaRiaain, h nw nii ha wi ai a a f an i-f

Ai n ain amn Ea Aian a. A nn-Aia, China, Jaan, Nh Ka an Sh Ka a a in h am a.Eah f hm an n nm fm h mmia hi-in an i a nw hin n an h naa. A ni Ai a w in hi ma in. Fin-in wa in an i-f Ai ha h nia a a ninwinwin iain f h China an Jaan, h w Ea Aian wwhih in man h aa n i i n mmn n.

Fm China viwin, an i-f Ai wi ina h va f ni an a ain wih h Ni ni ha hwi ni h iin a w ha i i ahan. China aa ha h a fin ma inRavi, in aniiain f Ian min a ma hi-in h.54 B aiv iin fh na Chinia an aami n Ai ianin fm i-ma han an a ah mmia hiin an maiim ainNi nian aa a ain h fnain f a ia Ai-ina ainhi wih China. Nwa, wih i -a iinxi, ha an avana if i wan f a niq Ai ainhiwih China. Finin wa f Chin an Nwian mani -a in Ai n xainin, f xam, h nin in h Shman 55w f a in Chin manian w n nhn ChinaNwa ain.

Th nin ha China ha ih in h Ai an x a in ai Chin aami an in mmn Chin -ia ni i aa in iv a an a a f aai. 56Hwv, n innaina aw, China ih in h Ai a imi.Mv, China inin ha f a vin a iinini f innaina ain ma i i f China qinh Ai a vin ih. Th i m in in h amn Chin ia ain n h Ai a ni h in f man-in ha a a an ha h Ai.57 Th amn aa na China n-anin ini f f vin anh inna aai f h a. Ba n ia amn h Chi-n Gvnmn an h n- ia win Chin Aiha, China an x nin in, qi anniv, h f h Ai in ii in ai a.

53 Heininen (note 52).54 Wade, R., A warmer Arctic needs shipping rules,Financial Times, 16 Jan. 2008.55 Anker (note 37).

56 E.g. Li et a l. (note 46); and Xie (note 28).57 E.g. (note 39).

While the melting o the Arctic ice could

create tension, the new opportunities

that will arise as a result o an ice-ree

Arctic could deepen cooperation


14/16


Abbreviations

CAA Chin Ai an Anai AminiainSOA Sa Oani AminiainUNCLOS Uni Nain Cnvnin n h Law f h SaEEZ Exiv nmi zn

OTHER SIPRI INSIGHTS ON PEACE AND SECURITY

Chinas engagement in nuclear arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation

SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2010/4

Bates Gill

Forthcoming, April 2010

Enduser certicates: improving standards to prevent diversion


Mark Bromley and Hugh Griths

Forthcoming, March 2010

Demilitarizing mining areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: the case

of northern Katanga Province


Ruben de Koning

SIPRI, January 2010

Prosecuting conictrelated sexual violence at the International Criminal Court


Ashley DallmanSIPRI, May 2009

Stemming destabilizing arms transfers: the impact of European Union air safety

bans


Hugh Griths and Mark Bromley

SIPRI, October 2008

Resourceconict links in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the

Congo


Ruben de Koning

SIPRI, October 2008

The private military services industry


Sam Perlo-Freeman and Elisabeth Skns

SIPRI, September 2008

OTHER RECENT SIPRI PUBLICATIONS

SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

Oxford University Press, 2009


15/16


Recent trends in the arms trade

Arms transfers to Central, North and West Africa/the Americas/the Middle East/

Asia and Oceania/East and Southern Africa/Europe and Central Asia

SIPRI Background Papers

The SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme

SIPRI, April 2009February 2010

Chronology of armaments, disarmament and international security 2009

SIPRI Fact Sheet

Nenne Bodell

SIPRI, January 2010

North Koreas nuclear test explosion, 2009

SIPRI Fact Sheet

Vitaly Fedchenko

SIPRI, December 2009

SIPRI Map of Multilateral Peace Operation Deployments

SIPRI, September 2009The EU nonproliferation clause: a preliminary assessment

SIPRI Background Paper

Lina Grip

SIPRI, November 2009

Chinas Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Implications

SIPRI Policy Paper no. 25

Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang

SIPRI, November 2009

Building air trafc capacity in Africa: options for improving security and

governance

SIPRI Policy Brief

Hugh Griths

SIPRI, October 2009

Multilateral peace operations: Africa/Asia/Europe/personnel, 2008

SIPRI Fact Sheets

Kirsten Soder

SIPRI, July 2009

Handbook of Applied Biosecurity for Life Science Laboratories

Peter Clevestig

SIPRI, June 2009

Air Transport and Destabilizing Commodity FlowsSIPRI Policy Paper no. 24

Hugh Griths and Mark Bromley

SIPRI, May 2009

Enforcing European Union Law on Exports of DualUse Goods

SIPRI Research Report no. 24

Anna Wetter

Oxford University Press, 2009

These publications can all be ordered or downloaded from


16/16

spr sgts o pece d secur ty o. 2010/2

CHINA PREPARES FORAN ICEFREE ARCTICld jkobso

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Linda Jakobson (Finland) is the Acting Programme Director and Beijing-based Senior

Researcher of the SIPRI China and Global Security Programme. She previously worked

for 10 years at the Finnish Institute of International Aairs (FIIA), most recently as

Director of its China Programme and Senior Researcher. She has lived and worked in

China for over 15 years and has published six books on Chinese politics, foreign policy

and East Asian society. Her current research focuses on Chinas foreign and security

policy as well as regional security issues in North East Asia.

Signalistgatan 9

SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden

Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00

Fax: +46 8 655 97 33

Email: [email protected]

Internet: www.sipri.org

SIPRI is an independent

international institute

dedicated to research intoconfict, armaments, arms

control and disarmament.

Established in 1966, SIPRI

provides data, analysis and

recommendations, based on

open sources, to policymakers,

researchers, media and the

interested public.

GOVERNING BOARD

Ambassador Rol Ekus,

Chairman (Sweden)

Dr Alexei G. Arbatov (Russia)

Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi

(Algeria)

Jayantha Dhanapala

(Sri Lanka)

Dr Nabil Elaraby (Egypt)

Ambassador Wolgang

Ischinger (Germany)

Proessor Mary Kaldor

(United Kingdom)

The Director

DIRECTOR

Dr Bates Gill (United States)

SIPRI 2010

CONTENTS

I. Introduction 1 II. Chinas expanding polar research capabilities 3

III. Chinas commercial and strategic interests in the Arctic 5

IV. China and Arctic politics 9

V. Conclusions 12

Box 1. The international legal and political framework for the Arctic 10

Figure 1. Projected decrease of Arctic sea ice 2

Figure 2. A Chinese view of Arctic sea routes 4

Figure 3. A Chinese specialist panels SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, 6

opportunitiesand threats) assessment of use of Arctic sea routes

Abbreviations 14

Documents

China Prepares For An Ice-Free Arctic