GeopoliticalImplicationsoftheMeltingArcticIceCap:

AreStatesDoomedtoConflictorConvincedtoCooperate?

JaimieKent

IllinoisStateUniversity

FacultyMentor:

Dr.MichaeleneCox

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INTRODUCTION

While the impact of climate change is widespread, the Arctic region is particularly

vulnerableasitsaveragetemperaturehasrisenattwicetherateoftherestoftheworld(Hassol

2004). Currently,aglacial landmass intheArcticdividescircumpolarstates:TheU.S.,Russia,

Canada,NorwayandDenmark.Whatwasonceageographicrestraintontradeandseapassage

hasbecomeaspaceofterritorialdisputeamongcircumpolarnations.WiththemeltingofArctic

sea ice, navigation is becoming easier and resource exploitation is becoming all the more

possible.Infact,itisestimatedthattheArcticishometomorethantwenty-fivepercentofthe

world’soilandgasreserves(Isted2009).

AlthoughtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)warnsthattherearefew

adaptationoptions available tomitigate the alreadymeltingArctic ice shelf, states canwork

together to tackle theworsteffectsofclimatechange (MeyerandPachauri2014). Since the

1970s,glacierlossandthermalexpansionoftheoceanaccountforseventy-fivepercentofthe

globalsealevelrise(Stockeretal.2013,11).Thus,asthemeltingicecapopensuptheArctic

region for resource exploitation and competition, it also brings with it the devastating

environmental effects of sea level risewhich no circumpolar nation is immune to. Figure 1

(below)showsArcticseaicelossfromtheyears1900to2000(c)whilealsoindicatingarisein

sea level from 1900 to 2010 (d). Although climate change poses a credible threat to state

interests, it also provides a platform that creates a space for mutually held concern and

consequently,fornegotiationanddiplomacy.

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Figure1.ArcticIceLossandGlobalSeaLevelRise1

Examininghowclimatechangeaffectspolicyprovidesacrucialstepindeterminingnot

onlywhatisatstakeinregionsliketheArctic,buthowstatescanworktogethertocombatits

worst impacts. Ultimately, the more that is understood with regard to the geopolitical

environment in the Arctic, the more states can work together to address and mitigate

preventableconflict.Acomparativepolicyanalysisforallstateswithclaimsintheregionwillhelp

determinethegeopoliticaleffectsofthemeltingArcticicecap.Therefore,PartIofthispaper

analyzesArcticpolicy inallrelevantstates, lookingfirstatthehistoricalcontextofthestate’s

claimintheArcticandthenatitspoliciesfrom1970tothepresent.PartIIsynthesizesthepolicy

implicationsinthestatesunderstudy,providinganoverallassessmentofthecurrentgeopolitical

landscapeintheArcticaswellasimplicationsforfuturepolicy.Atheoreticalframeworkisapplied

to trends in Arctic policy showing a shift from the structural-realist perspective to liberal

institutionalismwithanincreasingpropensitytowardgreentheory.Beforedelvingintoindividual

policy,itisimportanttounderstandhowArcticterritoryiscurrentlydividedamongcircumpolar

1 DataSource:Meyer,L.A.andR.K.Pachauri.2014.“ClimateChange2014:SynthesisReport.ContributionofWorkingGroupsI,IIandIIItotheFifthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.”IPCC:Geneva,Switzerland.151.

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states. Figure 2 illustrates the territorial borders in and around the Arctic ice cap which is

necessary in determining land claims and sea routes in the region as defined by the UN

ConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS).2

Figure2.StateswithClaimsintheArctic3

PartI.ArcticPolicyinCircumpolarStates

UNITEDSTATES

SincethepurchaseoftheAlaskanTerritoryfromRussiain1867,U.S.policyintheArctic

hasbeenmixed. Whileeconomicandnationalsecurity interestsdominatedU.S.policy inthe

19thandmuchofthe20thcenturies,environmentalandtechnologicaladvancementscoupled

withgrowinginterdependencehavealteredpolicyobjectivesintherecentpast(U.S.Department

ofState2015).Further,coordinatingpolicyhasproventobeanissueovertheyearsbecauseno

2TheUNConventionontheLawoftheSeacameintoeffectonDecember10,1982.Russia,Canada,NorwayandDenmarkhaveall ratified the UNCLOS treaty. Although the United States is not a party to the treaty, it does recognize it as customaryinternationallaw.

3ImageSource:“FrozenConflict:DenmarkClaimstheNorthPole.”TheEconomist.December20,2014.Printedwithpermissionfrom:IBRU,DurhamUniversity:MinistryofForeignAffairsofDenmark.

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onegovernmentalagencyhasdirectaccesstoalloftherelevantinformationregardingU.S.Arctic

territory (Conley2013). In fact, theU.S.DepartmentsofDefense,Homeland Security, State,

InteriorCommerce,EnergyandTransportationallhavejurisdictionovervariousdealingsinthe

Arctic alongwith other agencies such asNASA and theNational Science Foundation (Conley

2013).

PresidentNixon’s1971NationalSecurityDecisionMemorandum(NSDM-144)onArctic

PolicywasthefirsttomentiontheU.S.responsibilitytowardminimizingadverseenvironmental

effects in the region. While only two pages long, environmental objectives were briefly

summarized and couched between national security concerns and the preservation of the

freedom of the sea. Similarly, President Reagan’s 1983 National Security Decision Directive

(NSDD-90) stated that the U.S. has “critical interests in the Arctic region relating directly to

national defense, resource and energy development, scientific inquiry and environmental

protection”(1).Itwasnotuntilthe1994PresidentialDecisionDirective(PDD/NSC-26)underthe

ClintonadministrationthatArcticPolicybegantotakeasharpturntowardcooperationamong

circumpolarcountries.ArcticpolicyunderClintonwasmarkedbytheendoftheColdWarwhich

welcomed a “new atmosphere of openness and cooperation with Russia” creating

“unprecedented opportunities for collaboration among all Arctic nations on environmental

protection, environmentally sustainable development, concerns of indigenous peoples and

scientific research” (2). Subsequently, GeorgeW. Bush’s 2009 National Security Presidential

Directive (NSPD-66) specificallymentioned climate change.While still reflecting security and

economic interests in the region, theNSPD-66maintained that it is necessary to strengthen

institutionsinordertoencouragecooperationamongArcticnations.Aparticularemphasison

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the“establishmentandongoingworkoftheArcticCouncil”andtotheInternationalMaritime

Organization(IMO)to“appropriatenewinternationalarrangementsorenhancementstoexisting

arrangements”reflectedthechangingdynamicintheArcticundertheBushadministration(3).

AlthoughPresidentBarackObamahasnotissuedpresidentialdirectivesonArcticpolicy

likehispredecessors,hehasimplementedastrategycognizantofthechangingArcticlandscape

(National Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013). The following excerpt from Obama’s Arctic

strategyreporthighlightstheneedtonotonlybalanceeconomicandenvironmentalinterests,

buttoworkmultilaterallyinsafeguardingpeaceandsecurityintheregion:

We will proactively coordinate regional development. Our economic development and

environmental stewardship must go hand-in-hand. The unique Arctic environment will

requireacommitmentby theUnitedStates tomake judicious, coordinated infrastructure

investment decisions, informed by science. To meet this challenge, we will need bold,

innovative thinking that embraces and generates new and creative public-private and

multinationalcooperativemodels(2013,11).

TheshiftinU.S.Arcticpolicytowardsworkinginconcertwithotherstakeholdersintheregion

servedasaprecursortotheU.S.chairmanshipoftheArcticCouncilfrom2015-2017.TheU.S.

mottoof“OneArctic:SharedOpportunities,ChallengesandResponsibilities”reflectsthetrend

inU.S. leadership towardengagementwithothernationswhile servingasactingchairof the

Arctic Council (U.S. Department of State 2015). Although the United States is beginning to

acknowledgeotherArcticactors, it is important tonote thatU.S.policyhasnotbeendeeply

rootedinahistoricalrelationshipwiththeregionasitiswithotherstates-particularly,Russia.

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RUSSIANFEDERATION

TheArcticregionhasbeenasymbolofbothheroismandprideinRussianculturesince

theearly18thcenturywhenRussialedthefirstscientificexpeditionintheregionandbecame

the first country to navigate the Northeast Passage (Breyfogle and Dunifon 2012). Arctic

explorationservedaspropagandafor thestatethroughoutthe19thand20thcenturythrough

“literature,Newspapers,journals,filmandculturalactivities”tocreate“acommonlanguageof

Arctic assimilation (Josephson 2014, 31). Under Soviet rule, policy in the Arctic focused on

industrialization efforts to “modernize [Arctic] inhabitants, control and reshape nature, and

extractnaturalandmineralresources(Josephson2014,2).TheColdWarsawSovietRussiamove

fromexplorationandscientificpracticeintheArctictolarge-scalemilitarybuild-upandstrategic

defense initiatives (Breyfogle and Dunifon 2012). Due to its deeply ingrained importance in

historyandculture,itisnosurprisethatRussiahasbeenthemostvocalandpredominantplayer

intheArctic.

Althoughtherewasabuild-upofRussianice-breakertechnologiesforoilexploitationin

the1990s,policy in the regiondidnotgainmomentumuntil 2001when theRussiancabinet

approvedadraftdocumenttitled,“FoundationsoftheStatePolicyoftheRussianFederationin

theArctic” (Heininen, Sergunin and Yarovoy 2014). This document outlined Russia’s national

interests in the region including natural resource extraction, transportation, preservation of

indigenousculture,theenvironment,industrialization,andmilitarystrategy(Heininen,Sergunin

andYarovoy2014).In2008,PresidentMedvedevexpandedonthe“FoundationsoftheState

Policyof theRussianFederation in theArctic” tooutlineRussian interestsuntil 2020. While

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Medvedev’supdatedstrategyincludedclimatechangeconcernsandacallforcooperationand

peaceintheregion,itsmilitaryundertonespaintedadifferentpicture:

[T]hesphereofnationalsecurityrequirestheprotectionanddefenseofthenationalboundary

oftheRussianFederation,includingthepreservationofabasicfightingcapabilityofgeneral

purposeunitsof theArmedForcesof theRussianFederation,aswell asother troopsand

militaryformationsinthatregion(3).

Naturally,Medvedev’s new strategy in the Arcticwas notwell received by the international

community.ItwasnotuntilPutinupdatedthedocumentin2013thatinternationalcooperation

andenvironmentalconcernsgainedmomentuminRussianpolicy.Althoughthenewdocument

underPutinstillstressedRussia’sneedformilitarystrategyanddefenseofArcticterritory,itdid

outlinean“impressivelistofpriorityareasforcooperationwithpotentialinternationalpartners”

(Heininen,SerguninandYarovoy2014,18).

Russia’s long history with the Arctic is evidenced in its traditional policies to uphold

territorial integrity in the region. Althoughalways active in the regionwhether for resource

exploitationorscientificpurposes,Russianpolicywasvirtuallynonexistentuntiltheturnofthe

21stcentury.WhileRussia’spolicystillreflectsamilitary-basedstrategy,thereisasignofmoving

towardmorepeacefulandcooperativeefforts. Whethertheseeffortsholdweightinpractice

remainstobeseen,butpolicyonpaperisundoubtedlyafirststepinfosteringacollaborative

andinclusivepoliticalenvironmentintheregion.Theneedforreconcilingactionwithpolitical

rhetoric is not unique to Russian policy. In fact, Canada faces many of the same issues as

explainedingreaterdetailbelow.

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CANADA

Canada’s claims in the Arctic stem from its 1870 purchase of Rupert’s Land and the

NorthwestTerritoriesfromtheHudsonBayCompanyfollowinganOrder-in-Councildeclaration

ofitsbordersin1880(GovernmentofCanada2013).BecauseofitsInuitpopulationintheNorth,

theArctichasremainedamainpolicyconcernofCanadathroughoutthepastcentury.Whilethe

20thcenturysawagreatnumberofCanadianexpeditionstotheArctic,the1970sbroughtashift

in Canadian policy to protect its sovereignty in the region. Since the 1970s, Canada has

maintaineda strongArcticmilitarypresence, symbolicof itsobjectives toprotect indigenous

populationsandsecurecontroloveritsterritorialresources(GovernmentofCanada2013).

DuringtheColdWarEra,CanadianArcticpolicywasmarkedbysecuritycooperationwith

theUnitedStateswhere“Canadiansovereigntyinterestswerede-prioritizedinfavorofissuesof

NorthAmericansecurity”(Dolata2009,2).TheendoftheColdWarbroughtnewconcernsto

Canada’s Arctic policy as Inuit populations became political stakeholders and environmental

concerns to preserve their land became priority. Thus, throughout the 1990s social and

environmentalconcernsledtotheinclusionofnon-stateandtransnationalactorsinArcticpolicy

formation(Dolata2009).

Yet,undertheleadershipofStephenHarper,Canadianforeignpolicytookavisibleturn

backtomilitarystrategyandsovereigntyissueswhichlessenedtheroleofoutsideactors.Inhis

“CanadaFirstDefenseStrategy”(CFDS)of2008,Harperoutlinedapathtowardtheconstruction

ofarmedice-breakersandthefundingofpatrolshipsandradar/satellitetechnologiesforArctic

securitypurposes.In2009Harperlaunched“Canada’sNorthernStrategy”(CNS)whichfocused

Arcticpolicyonexercisingsovereignty,promotingsocialandeconomicdevelopment,protecting

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environmentalheritageandimproving“devolvingNortherngovernance”(2).AlthoughtheCNS

hasandcurrentlyreflectsCanada’ssecurityconcernsintheArctic,itdoesacknowledgetheneed

formultilateralpolicyintheregion:

Cooperation,diplomacyandinternationallawhavealwaysbeenCanada’spreferredapproach

intheArctic.Asinternationalinterestintheregionincreases,effectiveCanadianstewardship

ofoursovereignterritoryandtheactivepromotionofCanadianinterestsinternationallyare

moreimportantthaneverbefore(33).

Onthewhole,CanadianpolicyintheArctichasbeenmixedsince1970.MovingonfromCold

WarErasecuritycompetition,theCanadiangovernmentturnedtowardenvironmentalandsocial

issuesonlytoreturntosovereignty,militaryandeconomicobjectivesintherecentpast.While

Harpercalledforcooperationintheregion,theallocationoffundsformilitarybuild-upinthe

Arcticcontradictedhiscallsforpeaceandstability.TherecentelectionofJustinTrudeaumay

changeCanada’sforeignpolicyobjectivesintheArcticashehasbeenknowntofavoradiplomatic

approachoverastrongmilitarypresenceintheregion(Wade2015). Fortunately,asCanada,

RussiaandtheU.S.continuetostrugglewithadiplomaticapproachtoArcticpolicy,Norwayand

DenmarkofferagreatdealofleadershipandoptimisminmovingtowardamoreinclusiveArctic

politics.

NORWAY

Withover half of its territory beingnorthof theArctic Circle, it is not surprising that

NorwayhasbeenactiveinArcticpolicyforsometime.NorwayhasalonghistoryintheArctic

mostlyinthewayofscientificresearch.Since1928,theNorwegiangovernmenthasdedicated

funding to theNorwegian Polar Institute (NPI) for research purposes (NPI 2014). Although it

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defined its Arctic borders along with the other Arctic nations during the 1970s with the

ratificationofUNCLOS,ithasfocusedmuchofitsArcticpolicyoncooperationwithothernations.

Itwasnotuntiltheearly2000sthatNorwaybegantolegallydefineitsintentionsintheArctic

withregardtoothercircumpolarstates.Since2006,NorwegianpolicyintheArctichasfocused

itsoverallgoaloncreating“sustainablegrowthanddevelopmentintheHighNorthaccordingto

threeoverarchingprinciples:presence,activityandknowledge”(HighNorthStrategy2006).

NorwegianpolicyintheArctichasbeensoft-powerbasedfromthestart.Thecooperative

natureandknowledge-sharingaspectof itspolicy isexplicitly stated theprioritiesof itsHigh

NorthStrategy(2006):

• ExerciseauthorityintheHighNorthinacredible,consistentandpredictableway

• Beattheforefrontofinternationaleffortstodevelopknowledgeinandabouttheregion

• BethebeststewardoftheenvironmentandnaturalresourcesintheHighNorth

• Provideasuitableframeworkforfurtherdevelopmentofpetroleumactivities

• Safeguard the livelihoods, traditions and cultures of indigenous peoples and develop

people-to-peoplecooperation

• StrengthencooperationwithRussia(1).

Further,theHighNorthStrategyismarkedbyitsemphasisondialogueandaninformation-based

approachtodevelopmentintheregion.Oftheseventy-four-pagedocument,onlyfivepagesare

dedicatedtopetroleumandmaritimeresourcesintheregionwhiletheothersixty-ninepages

range from the environment and indigenous populations to research and cooperation-based

strategieswithothernations.A2009extensionoftheHighNorthStrategydetailedevenfurther

stepstocounteracttheimpactsofclimatechangeinwhichtheNorwegiangovernmentstressed

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itscommitmentto“takeenvironmentalandclimateconsiderationsintoaccountineverything

[they]do”(HighNorthStrategy2009).Moreover,thelatestdevelopmentinNorway’sHighNorth

Strategycamein2014inanticipationoftheParisClimateConferenceof2015.Similartoprevious

policypriorities,thelatestdocumentoutlinedtheimportanceof“internationalcooperation,the

development of a knowledge-based business sector, knowledge development, infrastructure,

emergency preparedness and environmental protection” (NorwayArctic Policy 2014, 3). It is

evidentthatNorwayisontheprogressiveendofsustainabledevelopmentintheregionwiththe

environmenthavingbeenoneofitstopprioritiessince2006.TurningnowtoDenmark,itisclear

thatNorwayisnotaloneinitsprioritizationoftheclimateandcooperationinArcticpolicy.

DENMARK

Sincethe1300swhenDenmarkfirstsettledGreenland,theArctichasplayedanimportant

role inDenmark’spolicyagenda.Until theColdWar,Denmark’sclaimsandpolicytowardthe

ArcticcenteredonintegratingGreenlandintoitseconomyandculturethroughindustrialization

(Sørensen2007). During theColdWar,Greenland servedasa strategicbase, cuttingoff the

NorthwestPassagetoSovietshipsboundfortheAtlantic.Denmark’spolicyduringtheColdWar

ErawasthereforefocusedonmilitarystrategywiththeUnitedStatesincounteractingRussian

controloftheregion(Sørensen2007).The1980sand1990ssawclimateresearchinGreenland

emerge firstasa resultof “geopolitical, strategicandpatronage factors” followedbyamove

towardamorecooperativeandknowledge-sharingapproach(Martin2013,64).LikeNorway,

Denmark’spolicytowardtheArcticdidnotgainmomentumuntiltheearly2000sasaresultof

thechangingArcticlandscapeandenvironmentalconcerns.Onceasiteformilitaryandstrategic

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geopoliticalcontrol,theArctichasincreasinglybecomeanimportantfixtureinDenmark’sforeign

policy.

In 2008, Denmark’s foreign minister Per Stig Møller called all circumpolar states to

Ilulissate,Greenlandtocreateacohesiveenvironmentalplan for theArctic region (Hvidtand

Mouritzen2009).InwhatcametobeknownastheIlulissateDeclaration,Danishpolicyinthe

regionbecamemarkedbyitsabilitytobringotherstakeholderstothetableindiscussingmatters

ofmutualconcern.Denmark’sreleaseofitsStrategyfortheArctic2011-2020furtheroutlined

itsgoalofaninclusive-basedapproachtoArcticmanagement:

The rising strategic interest and activity in the Arctic region necessitates a continued

prioritisingofawell-functioninginternationallegalframeworkforpeacefulcooperation,a

specialneedforenhancedmaritimesafety,andpersistentfocusonmaintainingtheArcticas

aregioncharacterisedbypeaceandcooperation(13).

The 59-page document not only provided a detailed summary of bilateral and multilateral

relationswitheachcircumpolarnationbutsought to foster“newbilateral collaborationsand

dialoguesonopportunitiesandchallengesintheregion”(55).Althoughthedocumentexplained

thatitisinDenmark’sinteresttosafeguarditsterritoryandresources,themainemphasiswas

on managing climate change and protecting the environment through multilateral action.

Denmark’s policy approach to the Arctic is therefore the most progressive in terms of

environmentalmanagement, information-sharing and collaborationwhen compared to other

circumpolarstates. Thesharpturn inDenmark’spolicyfromthetimeoftheColdWartothe

present characterizes a shift in international cooperation in the region, where policy trends

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amongcircumpolarstatesshowaninclinationawayfrommilitarystrategyandrelative-gainsin

favorofinclusivityandsustainablegrowth.

PARTII.UnderstandingArcticPolicyTrends

TheaboveArcticpolicyassessmentsshowatrendtowardliberalinstitutionalismwitha

greentheoryorientationbycircumpolarstates.AstheArcticcommunitymovesonfromCold

War Era strategies, itmoves further away froma structural realist approach to international

relations.ThissectionwillfirstsynthesizeArcticpolicyduringtheColdWarandshowhowitfits

well with the tenants of structural realism. Next, analyzing post Cold War policy and the

development of institutions to manage Arctic relations will show the trend toward liberal

institutionalism. Finally, a lookatenvironmental concernsas theyhavemade theirway into

policywillhighlighttheincreasingroleofgreentheoryasitreflectstheimpactsofclimatechange

occurringintheregion.

COLDWARARCTICSTRATEGYANDSTRUCTURALREALISM

The actions of circumpolar states in the Cold War Era undoubtedly reflect John

Mearsheimer’saccountofoffensiverealism.Mearsheimer’s(2001)offensiverealismisfounded

on five key tenants including an anarchic world order, the possession of offensive military

capabilitiesbygreatpowers,unknownintentionsbyotherstates,survivalastheprimarygoal

andgreatpowers thatare rationalactors.All fiveof theabove tenantswere reflected in the

foreignpoliciesofcircumpolarstatesduringtheColdWar.Duringthistime,stateswerenotonly

concerned with maintaining their sovereignty in the region but with their relative gains for

economicexploitaswell.BeingthattheUnitedStatesandRussiaarebothcircumpolarnations,

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itisnotsurprisingthattheArcticregionreflectedthesecurityconcernsofthesetwogreatpowers

duringtheColdWar.

Asmentionedabove,ArcticpolicyundertheReaganadministrationwasfocusedprimarily

onnationalsecurityconcerns.Further,bothCanadaandDenmarkengagedinmilitaryoperations

with theUnited States in their relativeArctic territories. Russiawas alsoheavily engaged in

militarybuild-upintheregionwhichsymbolizedthebipolarityoftheworldorderatthetime.

MilitarybuildupintheArcticduringtheColdWarepitomizedMearsheimer’s(2001)pointthat

notonlydo“greatpowersfeareachother”buttheybehavesoastoensuretheirsecurityinorder

to achieve hegemony (33). Thus, the focus onmaintaining sovereignty in Arctic policy by all

circumpolarstatesreflectedthismovetowardhegemony. Althoughthebattle forhegemony

wasfoughtmainlybetweentheU.S.andRussiaitisimportanttopointoutthatNorway,Canada

andDenmarkallprioritizedsovereigntyconcernsintheirforeignpoliciesaswell.Yet,asCanada

andDenmarkwerepushingtheseconcerns intheirpolicies,theywerealso lettingtheUnited

Statesusetheirterritoriesforstrategicpurposes.ThisechoeswhatDavideFiammenghi(2011)

referstoas‘bandwagoning’where“neutralstatesbegintoreflectonthecostsoftheirneutrality,

especiallyifonesideshoulddefeattheotherleavingthemwithlittlechoicebutsubmission(133).

AlthoughtheColdWarErabroughtstructuralrealisttendenciestotheforefrontofinternational

relations,recentArcticpolicydoesnotreflectsuchastrongemphasisonrelative-gainsandpower

struggleintheregion.Infact,recentpolicysuggeststhatacooperative-basedstrategyisnow

preferredovereconomicandmilitarycompetitionintheregion.

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MOVINGTOWARDLIBERALINSTITUTIONALISM

Although the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) brought nations

togetherinsofarastheirterritorialboundarieswereconcerned,itwaslimitedinitsscopefortwo

majorreasons.First,theUnitedStatesneverratifiedthedocumentandsecond,itfellshortof

bringing Arctic nations together in generating a dialogue throughout the Cold War Era.

Fortunately,theArcticCouncilformedin1991andmanagedtobringeverycircumpolarnation

tothetableinopentalksonthefutureoftheregion.Coincidentally,itsformationcamethesame

year as the ColdWar ended, paving a newway forward for Arctic diplomacy and for liberal

institutionalismingeneral.

JenniferSterling-Folker(2013)assertsthatwhileliberal institutionalismviewsstatesas

rational actors, it ismore optimistic than structural realism in that it believes states choose

cooperation through institutions over conflict in their cost-benefit analyses. Moreover,

interdependenceby circumpolarnationshasmade themove to institutionalismall themore

attractive.AsFolker(2013)pointsout,notonlyarestateseconomicallyintertwined,they“have

acommoninterestinpreventingthedepletionofenvironmentalresources”(117).Whenthese

tenantsareappliedtotheforeignpoliciesofcircumpolarnations,Denmark,theU.S.andNorway

haveallshownsignsofmovingtowardmutuallybeneficialenvironmentalarrangements. The

openingofthispaperprovidedabriefsummaryoftheenvironmentalcostsofclimatechangein

the regionwhere Arctic ice loss has contributed to rising sea levels. Because sea ice loss is

threateningthesensitiveecosystemandindigenouspopulationsintheregion,itisclearthatnot

onlyhavecircumpolarstatesallcontributedtotheproblemofclimatechange,buttheyallhave

acommoninterestinmitigatingitsworseeffects.

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In fact,sea ice losspresentsatwo-fold issue. Ontheonehand,statesare inclinedto

cooperate due to mutually held environmental concerns. On the other hand, economic

interdependenceandopportunityareincreasinginimportance.AsseaicelossmakestheArctic

oceanmorenavigable,allstatescanpotentiallybenefitfromnewandshorterdistanceshipping

routesalongtheNortheastPassage.WhiletheU.S.,DenmarkandNorwayhaveallbeenona

promising path toward cooperation, Canada and Russia have only recently shown signs of

prioritizingcooperationintheirforeignpolicies.AxelrodandKeohane(1985)mightsuggestthat

the lackof cooperationon thepartofCanadaandRussia canbeattributed to theperceived

payoffstructureofnegotiationwhere“interestsarenotbasedsimplyuponobjectivefactorsbut

aregroundedupontheactor’sperceptionsoftheirowninterests”(229).Thisobservationalludes

tothepoweroftheleaderindeterminingforeignpolicy.AlthoughCanadatookatoughsecurity

stance in Arctic policy under Stephen Harper’s leadership, Justin Trudeau has an altogether

differentperceptionofCanada’sinterestsintheregion.Trudeau’sleadershipmightverywellbe

thepathtocooperationintheArcticthatliberalinstitutionalismsuggests.Moreover,although

RussianArcticpolicytookahardlinestanceunderMedvedev’sleadership,Putin’srecentforeign

policyarrangementssuggestthatRussiaismovingtowardamoreenvironmentalandcooperative

approachinitsengagementwithothercircumpolaractors.

Whilethecompleterealizationofliberalinstitutionalismhasnotyetbeenachievedinthe

region,itisclearthatstructuralrealismisnolongerthemainmotivatingprinciplebehindArctic

policy.Eventhoughforeignpolicyremainsmixed,thereisaclearcommitmenttomitigatingthe

effects of climate change in the region. TheArctic Council has been at the forefront of this

movementwhichspeaksnotonlytotheincreasingroleofinstitutionsininstillingcooperation,

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buttothe‘greening’ofArcticpolicymorebroadly.TheArcticCouncil’screationofthe2011Task

ForceonShortLivedClimateForcersnotonlyencouragesallcircumpolarnationstoactonbehalf

ofclimatechangebutalsooutlinesthemutuallybeneficialnatureoftheCouncilitself:

TheArcticCouncilcanencouragetheexchangeandsharingofknowledgeanddata;facilitate

collaboration and collective action where needed among Arctic nations; and incentivize

sustainedactionstoreduceemissionsofblackcarbonandmethane.TheArcticCouncilcan

alsofacilitatethepursuitofcommonobjectivesamongArcticnationstoreduceshort-lived

climateforcersincollaborationwithotherinternationalforumsandObservernations(1).

Thus, the Arctic Council’s role in facilitating cooperation among Arctic nations cannot be

overstated. Moreover, theobjectivesof theCouncilwith regard to climate change concerns

highlightthesalienceofenvironmentalissuesastheyareincreasinglyprioritizedintheforeign

policiesofcircumpolarstates.

PROPENSITYTOWARDGREENTHEORY

TheforeignpoliciesofNorwayandDenmarkinparticularmarkaturningpointinArctic

strategy as environmental protection gains momentum in the region. According to Robyn

Eckersley(2013),environmentaljusticeentailstherealizationofseveralfactorsincludingconcern

forfuturegenerationsandanimal/plantspecies,participationinthedecision-makingprocessby

allstakeholders,theminimizationandevendistributionofrisk,andredressforunfairlyaffected

populations.CurrentArcticpolicyreflectstheincorporationofalloftheabovefactorstovarying

degreesbycircumpolarstates.Forexample,allcircumpolarstateshavenotonlyacknowledged

environmental concerns in theirArcticpolicies,buthavealso recognized that climatechange

unequallyaffectsindigenouspopulationsintheregion.Norway,Denmark,Russia,theU.S.and

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Canadahaveallgonesofarasto includetheir indigenouspopulations inthedecision-making

process. In fact, indigenous groups in all circumpolar states have a permanentmembership

statusontheArcticCouncil.Further,theaboveexcerptfromtheArcticCouncilTaskForceon

Short-LivedClimateForcersspeakstobothtotheminimizationandevendistributionofriskwith

regardtomitigatingtheadverseaffectsofclimatechange.Asaforumforbothenvironmental

protectionandconcernsfromindigenousgroups,theArcticCouncilprovidesthefoundationfor

greentheorytoflourishinArcticpolicy.

WhilestateslikeDenmarkandNorwayarepavingthewayforenvironmentalconcerns

tobethemainpriority inArcticpolicy,otherstatessuchastheU.S.,CanadaandRussiahave

somecatchinguptodo.Itisimportanttopointoutthatdomesticandhistoricalcontextplaya

largeroleindeterminingthemovetowardgreenerpolicy.JustastheColdWarbroughtwithit

thestructural realist frameworkofArcticpolicy,sotoodocertaindomesticand international

factorscontributetothecurrentyetevolvingpoliciesseentoday.HunoldandDryzek’s(2002)

comparativeanalysisof state context is a solid framework for analyzing suchanevolution in

green policy. Future research might speculate on the domestic factors that are at play in

determiningwhyNorwayandDenmarkareleadersinthegreentheorymovementandwhystates

likeRussia,CanadaandtheU.S.arenotquitethereyet.

CONCLUSION

Theabovecomparativepolicyanalysisshowsthatnotonlyarecircumpolarstatesmore

inclinedtoturntoinstitutionsonArcticmatters,butthattheirArcticpoliciesare‘greener’than

everbefore.WhilethechangingArcticlandscapeopensupnewareasforeconomicexploitation,

it also brings with it an impending climate crisis which is increasingly acknowledged and

19

prioritized incircumpolarstatepolicy. There isnodoubtthatwhilerisingsea levelsthreaten

Arcticcommunities, themelting icecapprovides incentives tocooperateon issuesofmutual

concern.MovingonfromColdWarEramilitarystrategy,theArctichasbecomeanincreasingly

important area of concern that when managed correctly, provides the incentive for liberal

institutionalismandgreentheorytodevelop.Whilethereismuchworktobedoneintheway

ofcooperationandclimatechangemitigation intheregion,circumpolarstatesareshowinga

promising move toward addressing common concerns and working together to protect the

volatileecosystem. Itwillbe interesting to seehowthecontinuouslymelting icecapaffects

policyintheregion.Unfortunately,itisunclearwhethertheopeningofwaterwayswillfurther

encouragestatestocooperateorprovideaturningpointbacktoColdWarErastrategymarked

by military confrontation and security concerns. Perhaps most noteworthy is the drastic

transformationtakingplaceinthephysicalArcticlandscape.Itjustsohappensthatwhilethe

physicallandscapechanges,sotoodoesthepoliticallandscapecontinuetoevolve.Thequestion

hereiswhethercircumpolarstateswillmoveforwardaloneoract inconcertandcontinueto

progresstogether.

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"CanadaFirstDefenseStrategy-CanadianForcesContributiontoSovereigntyandSecurityintheNorth.”CanadianDepartmentofNationalDefense.May12,2008.

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SovereigntyandClimateChange.”FriedrichEbertStiftung.(2).Eckersley,Robyn. 2013. “GreenTheory.” In InternationalRelationsTheories, eds. TimDunne,

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NeorealistSynthesis.”InternationalSecurity.35(4):126-154.GovernmentofCanada.2013.Canada’sNorthernStrategy.http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/

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AvoidingaNewColdWar.”ValdaiDiscussionClubGranteesReport:Moscow.HighNorthStrategy.2006.NorwegianGovernment,MinistryofForeignAffairs.Hunold,Christianand JohnS.Dryzek.2002. “GreenPoliticalTheoryand theState:Context is

Everything.”GlobalEnvironmentalPolitics:2(3).17-39.Hvidt,NannaandHansMouritzen.2009.“DanishForeignPolicyYearbook2009.”DanishInstitute

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