CHAPTER II

STRATEGIC ENVIRONHENT : A HISTORICAL SURVEY

CHAPTER II

STRATEGIC ENVIRONrVIENT A HISTORICAL SURVEY

The strategic situation in the Indian Ocean has

significant implications for the security of India as

the coun~ry has a central position in the Indian Ocean,

athwart the principal sea-lanes between the east and the

west. India's long coastline and the fact that it is cut

off from the Asian continent by mountains, gives the Indian

Ocean an important role in India's maritime strategy. Its

immense potential prompted Alvin ~ottrell to remark that

the Indian Ocean had become •ocean of the future•. 1 For

a long time, the Atlantic enjoyed a preponderant. place in

world hi story due to the location of developed nations

around it; the Indian Ocean was neglected by scholars till

very recently. However, even Arnold Toynbee agreed that

modern history is closely connected with the Indian

Ocean through da Gama' s expedition, and tne contemporary

history began with the opening of the Suez Canal in

1869. 2

1 Alvin J. Cottrell, 11 The Indian Ocean of 'l'omorrow", Navy : The Ma~azine of Se~ P~v1er ·l Washington, D. c.), vol. 14, no. , March 197•, p. 1o.·

2 Auguste Toussaint, History of the Indian Ocean (London, 1966), p. 2.

41

42

The geography of this ocean made it convenient

for a power to control all maritime activities in this

area. The ocean is walled off on three sides: Asia forms

the roof over it, and the whole stretch between the Cape

of Good Hope to Cape Leeuwin (South- West tip of Australia)

for.ms the vast expanse of this ocean. The land mass of

the northern portion is accessible fran both east and west

only through narrow straits - in the west there are the

Ked Sea and the Persian Gulf, and the east is separated

by the Indonesian island chains (narrow passages in­

betvleen) and the Australian continent. Apart fran

straits and islands, the tropical character of the ocean

makes it free frClrl oceanic obstructions. The geographical

situation modifies the rigours of climate, making the

ocean well-navigable and ideal for maritime trade. 3 The

importance of the Indian Ocean thus lies not only in its

strategic location and vital sealanes but also in the

possibility it affords for the control of the landmasses

rich in material resources throu~ its ingresses and

egresses.

Historians have divided the strategic history of

the Indian Ocean into pre-Gaman and the post-Gaman period.

3 K.IVI. Panikkar, Geo~Yhical i''actors in the Indian , History \Bombay, 1 5 , pp. 55:61; Ference A. Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Re~ion : 'Ihe Balances of Po\ver (New York, 1976), pp. 4=26.

43

The 450 years fran the time of Gama' s arrival 1 constitute

a clearly marked epoch of history•. 4 The early trading

empires based themselves on its western approach via the

Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, or strong maritime states

stationed themselves on Sunatra or Java. But a total

perception of the Indian Ocean as a single unit was lacking

in the pre-Ga~an period in spite of fairly developed

regional trade and limited expansion of scme kingdoms.

This was the reason why no single power was able to ru.le

the Ocean and, thus, the area of dominance was fragmented.

It was Portugal which united the eastern and western half

of the Indian Ocean due to its oceanic outlook, technical

advantage, better ships, weapons and navigational skill.

This led to reorientation of trade and commerce in the

Indian Ocean area with the help of systematic colonisation.

This system was adopted by Britain and other colonisers

in order to facilitate their economic, political and

strategic domination geared to the same end ••

In the pre-Gama era the Indian Ocean was frequented

not only by the shore countries but also by the Phoenicians,

the Greeks and the ttomans in the west, and by the Chinese

in the east. Scholars have traced the flourishing maritime

4 K.fvl. Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance (London, 1959), p. 13.

44

trade between India and Babylon as far bac~s seventh to

sixth century B. c. It is well kno .... vn that Indian traders

were settled in Arabia, and Babylon and on the coasts of

East Africa and China. 5 In the earliest reports of

navigation, the Egyptian expedition around 1500 B.C. reached

the land of Punt, most probably Somal~land; Phoenician

shippers brought goods from Ophir; and the traders and

colonists from pre-Islamic Arabia, India, Malaya and China

sailed along the northern coast of Indian Ocean, exchanging

their goods and spreading civilisation. 6 The maritime

expeditions of Alexander were of modest nature, but the

Homan conquest of Egypt gave stimulus to a direct maritime

trade with India. The Homan gold coin, aureus, poured

all over India in exchange for silk, spices, gems,

perfumes, muslin, tortoise shell; ivory, pearls, dye

stuff etc. 'I

In the ancient period, India served as the main

entrepot, as also the trader of many important items.

It is normally believed that all the sailors at that time

confo.nned to the pattern of peaceful trade and commerce,

5 R.K. Mookerji, Indian Shippine (Allahabad, 1962), p. 62.

6 Vali, n. 3, p. 3; K.s. Sidhu, The Role of NayY in India's Defence (New Delhi, 1933), pp. 3=16.

. . 7 Toussaint, n. 2, p~ 32; Mookerji, n. 5, p. 7.

45

anddid not aspire to colonise or subjugate the neighbouring

countries. Paniklcar argues that the Arabian Sea was used

mainly for trade purposes, whereas colonisation of islands

'"as done east of the Bay of· Bengal by the Kalingas, the

Cholas and ti1e Pandyas.8 But in the Arabian Sea also the

rivalry for trade existed among Persians, Arabs and

Auxmite Kingdan (Ethiopia). The Persians normally

controlled the Persian Gulf routes, whereas the Arabs

and the Auxmi tes dcminated the Red Sea area. The daninant

power would hold sway and attract the Greek, Romans or

Indian traders to its respective bases at the head of

the Persian Gulf, Aden or I1assav~. 9 The rise of Islam

changed the power relations in this area, and Egypt and

Iran made the Red Sea an Islamic lake. In the east,

the Chinese expeditions under the Sung dynasty and

Kublai Khan showed some a~ount of Chinese aspirations

to daninate the trade in the Indian Ocean area. Later,

seven expeditions (1405-1431) by Cheng Ho, under the Ming

dynasty, as far as the l·festern gates of Honnuz, Aden and

East Africa, proved this point even more emphatically,

thoue,h they did not have the concept of stationing and

1 . t 10 regu ;:tr sea ma1.n enance.

8 K.i··1. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean (Banbay, 1971), pp. 28-:5 ~

9 A. P. s. Bindra, 11India1 s Navy ·- Raison d' Etre", Navy International (Surrey), vol. 85, no. 12, December 193o, p. 723.

10 Ibid.

46

Professor Radha Kumud Mookerji collected a great

amount of evidence to prove that Indian rulers were keenly

interested in a maritime future. He divided the early

maritime history of India into seven epochs, from pre­

Mauryan times to the Moghul period, and cited sources

including the Rig Veda, the Bible, Tamil and Pali works

as well as Greek and Roman authors, and the Ai~i-Akbari 11

of Abul Fazal. From these sources, we learn about the

existence of Boards of Admiralty during the reigns of

Chandragupta Jl1aurya and Akbar, and also about peaceful

trade, shipping stations, and ship-building activities etc.

However, this evidence seems hardly convincing to Western

scholars, 12 who attribute the systematic development of

maritime power to tne European culture.

'lhe North Indian rulers, w1 th tlmeir Central

Asian outlook, did not have sustained interest in maritime

activities whereas the Kalingas, the Cholas, the Pandyas

etc. created the main centre of Indim1 expansion in the

Tamil or Dravidian region, and conducted 'peaceful

econanic and cultural penetration beyond the Indian borders

\·;i th the full consent of those colonised. 13 After the

11 Mookerji, n. 5, pp. 6-10.

12 Toussaint, n. 2, p. Eo.

13 Ibid., pp. 61-64.

47

Hauryas, the Andhras were the lords of the eastern seas.

Then the su~remacy passed on to the Pallavas, which is

brought out by the fact that the inscription as well as

architecture in Cambodia and Java, between the seve.nth

and the ninth centuries, are Pallava in character. From

the fifth to the tenth century, the canmand of the

Malacca Straits and the South China Sea was in the hands

of Sri Vijaya Eln[Jire which maintained a powerful navy

and ke[Jt the sea free of pirates and corsairs. Only the

founding of the Dutch empire, about a thousand years

later, could equal this kind of control. The Chela

King Rajendra challenged the might of Sri Vijaya in the

eleventh century with tile help of a powerful navy. The

Cholas captured Kedah and established their· power over

l'·1alayan [Jeninsula. They also annexed the Nicobar islands,

parts of l\1alaya and Sumatra, and proceeded to lord the

sea tradinc routes to the Indian Ocean. But the hundred

years' 'W8.r took toll of the Ct1ola power, and they withdrew

by the end of eleventh century from this profitless

overseas venture. r1oreover, they could not maintain their

fleet 1500 miles from home, whereas the Sailendra bases

were close at hand. This lesson regarding bases was not

1 t +'>t •t• 14 os on .ul ure mar~ l.me powers.

14 Ponikkar, n. 8, pp. 32-34; Bi~dra, n. ~' p. 723.

The hundred years' war weakened the Sri Vijaya

power also, and opened the way for the Arab supremacy.

There were Huslim settlements on the fvlalabar coast, Malay

area, l\1alacca and further beyond. This Muslim sway

succeeded the Gama-epoch in same areas in Indonesia, Java

( 1500 A.D.) and Sunda Islands (16oO A.D.) etc~ 15 But the

Sri Vijaya empire held sway up to the thirteenth century,

and there were two invasions of Ceylon by Chandrabhanu in

1236 and 1256. After the decline of this empire, the Hindu

period of Greater India came to an end, and the oceanic

trade passed on to the Arabs who were intermediaries

bet\'leen Europe and India. They never attempted to exercise

naval control, as their policy was shaped by merchant

adventurers.

It is true that there were naval warfares and

bids were made to wrest the control of the oceanic trade

in the ancient and medieval period too. A systematic

thalassocracy, however, conceiving the Indian Ocean as a

unit, developed only with the arrival of the Europeans

who could control the ocean by barring entry and exit

from all the choke-points. Due to the commercial

appetite of the Europeans, peaceful trade gave way to

military force and colonisation

15 Vali, n. 3, p. 6.

49

The arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean

marked the beginning of the European era. K.M. Panikkar

has rightly called it the Vasco da Gama epoch of Asian

History. This epoch was markedly different from the earlier

maritime history of Asia. The first major difference \1as

in tern1s of the imposition of commercial economy on a

scale Which was never witnessed before in this area. The

original desire for the monopoly of the spice trade was

changed, in a hundred years, into a voracious appetite

for textiles, tea and other goods. This again changed,

after the Industrial Revolution, into the need to find

markets for European manufactured goods, and finally for

. t ~ ·t l 16 E li 1 1 l ~nvestmen o~ cap~ a s. ·vange ca zea was a so a

motivating factor. It has, therefore, been ri§htly

stated that search for profits and souls were the main

objectives in the earlier phase of this era. During the

great counter-reformation in the Catholic world, the spirit

of evangelism to ole Asia into its sphere, and St. Francis

Xavier w~s the embodiment of that spirit. After the arrival

of the Dutch and the British there was a lull for over a

century. Dut the protestant sect's missionary activities

by the end of eizhteenth century were connected and

synchronised with ':!estern political supremacy in

Asia. 17

16 Panikkar, n. 4, p~ 13.

17 Ibid., p. 15.

50

There were major innovations in the reaJm o:f naval

strategy. Ships armed with cannon, brought by the Portuguese,

transfonned the character of naval warfare. The piracy 1n

the gulf of Kutch or Sunda straits, and the battles of

Chola and Sri Vijaya navies 'were all sham compared to

raging battles followed by Portuguese expedition' • 18 Another

revolution in maritime strategy, and a more important one,

was the control of all the key points to the approach of

the Indian Ocean in order to dominate all maritime

activities in and out of this area. The Portuguese

Governor-General wrote in the early sixteenth century

about the importance of the three gates to the Indian

Ocean, r1al::1cca, Aden and Honnuz, which \vould make the

kins of Portugal the lord of all the world. 19 Along with

better wearons, ships, navigational skill and technical

advantage, the grand maritime vision of the Europeans

heralded a nev.,r era that changed the h1story of the Indian

Ocean area, subsequently havin~:; great impact on the course

of Indian history too.

The original impulse for the great maritime

voy.1ges wo.:::; the crusade against Islam and the strategic

outflankin0 of the Ottoman ~pire. After the fall of the

Rom:::m Empire, the Sassanids of Iran were in control of the

18 Toussaint, n. 2, pp. 101-2.

19 Bindra, n. 9, p.· 724.

51

land and sea routes to the east. After that, Islam occupied

Egypt, and thus deprived Byzantines of the Red Sea route.

On the other hand, Venice had dcminated the Adriatic since

the tenth cen"b..lry, and had captured the trade in the

Levant. It had no 'scruples' about trade with the Muslims,

despite Papal interdictions. In order to check the trade

monopoly of Venice, Byzantine emperors gave trade

privileges to Pi sa and Genoa, \ilich started the rivalry

between the Venetian and the Genoese schools. Tne Venetian > r!J.arco Polo was imprisoned by the Genoese and that was ,)hen

he wrote his travel account. No Genoese merchant left

accoun~s comparable to those of Marco Polo or Nicolo

Conti, but their expeditions were much more important

which opened a new phase in world history.

'l"nere were only two vtays to cut down the Ottoman

colossus and the Venetian domination of the European trade.

The first one was to attack them in the 'Erythrean Sea',

\..hich was tried but in vain. The second one was to take

it from the rear by going around Africa. 20 Earlier, a

Genoese sailor, Christopher Columbus, had taken the west­

ward route to reach America. This chapter was later

opened by Gama whose discovery of India was overtaken by

the historical result~> o.fter severul wars. 21 Gama• s

expedition and successes were the result of 200 years•

20 on ' t ? . 94 _ J.oussa1.n , n. '--' p. • ,_... ___ .! '-1---- 0

52

old dream and 75 years of sustained efforts by the mercantile

people of the Mediterranean, except Venic~. 22 After a long

crusade with canbined Christendom, the Muslims remained in

control of Egypt and the coast~ine. The Venetians had

influence at Cairo \-.hich made then the monopolist agents

of the I11uslim trade. So outflanking the Muslims and

beating the Venetians for spice trade became imperative

for the Europeans. The yearning for glory, power and

wealth, mixed with religious dedication, inspired the

Portuguese Royal House to discover the route to India • . 1·rince Henry the Nnvigator sent expeditions along the

coast of Africa, pushing deep into the gulf of Guinea and

South Atlantic. He dreamed of a direct route to India but

his navigations were confined to the coasts of Africa.

King Joao II commissioned Bartholomeu Diaz in 1487, who

made an epoch-makinz; voyage up to the Cape of the Tempest,

better l;;:novm as the Cape o.C Good Hope, making possible a

direct route to India. Vasco da Gama was sent by King

Tianoel I in 149'/ on an 8lmost charted route, and he was

a..Lso 8.\-Jare of the monsoon patterns and problems of

navieation in those waters. In July 1497, he reached the

Arab trade centre of fvioz2111bique, "-'here he got the services

22 Vali, n. 3, pp. ~21.

53

of a Gujarati pilot and reached Calicut in May 1498.

The arrival of Gama on the Indian coast was

significant not so much for the discovery of the route, as

it v1as for the introduction of a different policy of sub­

jugation by the Europeans. The opening up of the trade

route to the Indian Ocean resulted in a 'reoriented 23 commerce in Europe'. The flanlcs of the Islamic c.·rorld

were turned and the traditional flow of spices was diverted.

This deprived the I1uslims the revenues of passage. Thus

the Portuguese upset the market system by seeking the

spices directly at the source and abolished the inter-

mediaries. Venice had rroposed the reopening of the

Suez Can.::tl in 150L~, sanded up since 767 A.D., to the

Sultan of Cairo; it later sought spices on the market at 24 Lisbon, like the rest of the Europeans.

The Portuguese penetration into the Indian Ocean

met minimal opposition because of the disorganised and

relatively defenceless Arab seafarine monopoly. 25 Initially,

the Portuguese had requested the Zamorin.·:, the Kine of

23

24

25

Donald F. Lach, Asia in the f'Iakin>r of Europe : The Century of Discovery (Chicago, 1971), vol. 1, p. 92.

Toussaint, n. 2, pp. 93-94.

Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea (London, 1976), p. 128.

54

Calicut, to permit trade. Later, Gama' s refusal to pay the

port-custom was an indication of the policy subsequently

followed by the Portur,uese. The second expedition of

.. ~milc.ar Cabral destroyed Arab shipping at Calicut and

enforced the Portuguese doctrine of the monopoly of the

Sea. He recognised the common right of all to navigate,

but not beyond Europe; and, thus, justified his right to

confiscate the goods of all those v1ho navigated ,.Ji thout

his permission. But the dete~1ined opposition of the

Zamorin made him abandon the port. Even the next expedition

of Gama was attacked by the Zamorin' s fleet, under Kassim.

It had more speed, but the Portuguese had greater firepower.

The Zamorin's fleet consisted of fast and small vessels.

Therefore Kassirn could not force a decision. 1he Portuguese

took o.dvantage of this weakness in later engagements. The

Zamorin invoked the aid of the Sultan of Egypt in 1507 to

fight .'\.lrneida' s fleet. But the treachery of f'-1alik ,\.iyaz,

tl1e King o.r Gujarat who joined the Portuguese, helped -A lmeida to cut the Egyptian supply due to which Mir

Hussain s:tiled away after a short and inconclusive

battle. 26

Tr1us the supremacy of the sea passed on to the

Portuguese ,,.ri thout a decisive bs.ttle. \'li thin a few months

26 Panikkar, n. 8, p. 43.

55

of Mir Hussain' s departure, Affonso Albuquerque became the

Governor and laid the foundation of the Portuguese Empire.

He wanted an impregnable base at the r·1alabar by the reduction

of the Zamorin, but failed. Later he selected Goa, as it

had an excellent harbour, a suitable hinterland and was far

away from the aufuori ty of any ruler. Overcaning the

Indian counterattack he took Goa in 1510, and made it the

capital of the Portuguese in Asia. Z7 His aim was to capillre

the strategic approaches, to seal them off to foreign

shipping and to set up territorial bases around the shores

of the ocean. He quickly perceived the three strategic

water ways, Bab el f1Iandeb, Onnuz and r-1alacca. By gaining

control of the first tv.JO he eliminated the Arab canpeti tion;

and by holding the third, he enforced the same result over

Indonesian and Halayan traders. 28

The vJhole European phase was marked by the

daninance of the maritime power over the land masSE!S of

Asia. 'Ihe ~loghul tllipire v.ras essentially a land power, and

the clear division of l3.nd and seapower prevented any

major cl3.sh between the Portuguese and the rulers of

Delhi, thou£P. I1lalabar Huslims put up a gallant figtlt for

more than ninety years. Albuquerque' s imperial maritime

27 Reynolds, n. 25, p. 130.

28 Ibid., p. 128.

56

policy succeeded in protecting the Portuguese commercial

policy and by 1514, the Venetians themselves started

buying pepper frcm Lisbon. 29

Events in the Atlantic in tiLe sixteenth and the

seventeenth century changed the structure of maritime

power in the Indian Ocean too, and this led to the

decline of the Portuguese structure of power. The

organised piracy led by Drake and the dispersal of the

Spanish Annada made it possible for ~Le other nations to

sail into the Indian Ocean too.

The first to benefit from tiLe changed position

were the Dutch. 30 Antwerp was the centre of Portuguese

trade where money vms raised to buy pepper, and the

Portuguese factory there v1as tied by Hanoel into the system

of control he \18.S evolving. But later, the Portuguese

closed the factory to make up for the heavy losses and,

after 154<3, spices were sold at Lisbon directly fran East

India. 31 This led to a substantial increase in the prices

1·.rhid1 the Dutch no longer 'danted to pay. They systematized

the concept of mercantili~n, embracing political coals,

economic gain, maritime lav.;, strategy, naval architecture,

29 Lach, n. 23, p. 121.

30 For details see Panikkar, n. 4; pp. 46-49; Toussaint, n. ?, pp. 118-?0; Vali, n. 3, PI!· 9-10.

31 Lach, n. 23, p. 126.

57

cartography, logistics and tactics. 32 After the finances

and business of the Netherlands were constituted at

funsterdam, and Philip II' s Portuguese troops occupied

-'~ntwerp in 15<35, the le·Jdinc; Dutch merchants decided to

establish a canpo.ny to deal directly with India trade.

Cornelius de Houtman \'las sent to Lisbon to collect

information; Jan Huygen Linschoten, the secretary to the

Archbishop of Goa, provided a guide to navigation and

geograrhy in his book Itinerario. The reports of Hou-tman

and Linschoten facilitated the first voyage of Houtman to

Indonesia. 1:.Ji th the Dutch occupation of Jakarta ( 1619),

!,ialacca ( 1641), Ceylon ( 1654) and Cochin ( 1663), the

defence structure of Albuquerque v~s upset. The lucrative

spice trade [>assed fran Lisbon to Amsteroam \'lith the centre

of activity at Java. Batavia was the capital of the Dutch

East Indian Empire.

The Dutch could succeed in .scxne degree to the

heritar,e of Albuquerque, but they could not shape the

policy in the Indian ocean as England and France did later.

The English had approached the Spice Island as junior

partner of the Dutch, and signed a treaty vri th the latter

against the Portuguese in 1619. But v.hen the Dutch decided

to increase the price of pepper from three to ei~t

shillings per pound in 1549, the English decided to enter

32 Reynolds, n. 25,. pp. 146-7.-

58

the eastern trade directly. 33 They went to the side of

Portugal, and the Dutch became their enemy number one. The

English East India Company received Queen Elizabeth's

cl1arter gi vin& it monopoly of trade in India. The first

vessels under Captain Lancaster came to Sumatra in 16o1

and returned with more than a million pounds of pepper,

but they had nothirl.['; to give in exchange. As there v.ra.s

fresh denand for Indian textiles at Dantom and Halaccas,

the English established a trading centre at Surat in 1612.

Their main centre of commercial interest became India as

they were forced out of Indonesia in 1615. They established

the f'lasaulipatc'"UTI trading post and the Fort at I"ladras in

1641, and made 23 trading rosts by 1643. The acquisition

of Banbay in 1665 maae then shift the headquarters of

company affairs fran Surat to Bombay. In spite of

resistance fran i\ur::mgzeb, Shivaji, Hyder Ali, Kanhoji

etc., the English were v1eH: settled in Bombay, Hadras and

Calcutta by the end of the seventeenth century. Earlier

they had defeated the Portuguese at Surat in 1615,

ousted them fran Ormuz in 1628 also v,ri th the help of the

King of Persia, in order to gain control of the North­

Western gateway.

The French also entered the Indian Ocean in the

beginninc of tile 17th century \'/hen Henry IV established the

33 Toussaint, n. 2,,pp. 118-26.

59

French East India Company to keep up with the European

powers. They had a number of expeditions in the region,

but were checked by the Dutch in Java in 1616. They tried to

take Jv1auri tius in 1638 but had to remain content with

Bourbon (Reunion); took Madagascar in 1642; and went for

Trincanalee in 1672 but were repulsed by the Dutch.

Aurangzeb conceded Pondichery to them in 1688. Their

preoccupation v1i th European developments prevented

sustained efforts on ti1eir part, as Louis XIV viewed France

as a continental pov1er, the fleet supporting the army. 34

But the phenomenal naval building programme of Colbert,

who increased the French navy from 20 to 270 warships

between 1661 to 1677, had great impact. 35 Tne French

East India Company \vas incorporated in 1664. Intenni ttent

efforts of La Bourdonnais in the Bay of Bengal, and

Dupleix's desire to control South India (against Clive)

v1i thout a foundation of naval support were sane instances

of the French challenc;e to the English naval mastery, but

not of much conseciuence. Later Suffren fought against

Ed\·Jard Hughe~ in the B3y of Bengal, and had some successes

even \vi thou t b:J.ses. I!e co.ptured Trairicomalee with Hyder

Ali's support. But all that could not provide much gaj.ns,

and the Peace Treaty of 1783 was signed in favour of

London.

34 i{eynolds, n. 25, p. 19).

35 Ibid.

60

The Napoleonic wars wiu1essed the ccm~letion of

the structure of i±1e British naval empire. Due to the

chaneed political situation in the Atlantic, Portugal and

Holland were pushed to the back seat, though the latter had

a virtual mono[_)oly in Indonesia. All the competitors,

including France, were eliminated by the British who

were able to put into effect Albuquerque' s tneory of

strategic points. 'll1is \vork was also facilitated by

Napoleon's annexation of Holland. The British captured

the Cape rrovince (1806), Dutch settlements in Ceylon

( 1796), Hauri tius from the French ( 1810) , Aden ( 1839),

f.Ialacca ( 1759), Singapore ( 1824), and Seychelles etc.

Some posts were returned to the French and the Dutch after

the Treaty of Paris (1814-15), but Britain took all

strategic points. The British had established

thalassocracy in the Indian Ocean vJhid1 continued U..'1til

\·Jorld \var II. After the Dattle of Trafalgar and the

Treaty of Vienna, Britain became the only power in the

Indian Ocean. 36 The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869

shortened the route to the Indian ocean. The British

acquired a preronderant influence in Egypt in order to

embark the 'lifeline' called Indian empire. Their control

36 August Toussaint, "Shifting Power l3a.lance in the Indian Ocean", in A.J. Cottrell and J.M. Burrels, eds., TI1e Indian Ocean: Its·Political, Economic and f;1ili tary Importance (New ?orf, 1972), p. 9; see also Gerald· Stanford Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean (Oxford, 1967), pp. 17, 24=57.

61

over Cyprus, Gibraltar, Hal ta, Aden and Port Said made

their masterly complete.

British naval su~)renacy, hO\'!ever, did not go

unchallenged. The alignment of all the maritime powers,

as enemies or a11ned neutrals, acso.inst Great Britain had

led to the destruction of Britain1 s economic self-

sufficiency. They o.dvanced the co.use of Nare Liberum, and

had left the balo.nce of power in Europe and the world

still unsettled. France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark and even

.\ustria followed the British example, and vn th Russia took

to the sea to threaten the peace of 1783. 37 In the Indian

Ocean area there were other European powers for territorial

gains in the decades preceding the World \1ar I. France

established itself in Affars and the Issas tSomalian

Djibouti) in 1888, overlooking the British stronghold of

Aden. It also occupied l'·'ladagascar in 1895 and Diego

Suarez ( overlookin~ the f1ozambique channel), and once again

bGcame a potential Indian Ocean power. Gennany1 s occupation

o:t'.-.-'ilnGanyilca gave her o. coastline and also an extensive

terri tory in East Africa. WilheJm II' s rroposed Berlin­

Baghdad railway, to be extended up to the Persian Gulf,

was an attenpt to strategically outflank fue British

predcninance of the Atlantic ·o.nd the Red Sea route.

37 Reynolds, n. 25, p. 276.

62

Thou@h a potential threat to Britain v~s envisaged from

the side of Russia, througj:l the Hindu Kush and the

Pamirs, the greatest danger seemed to cane fran Germany

after the Anglo-Russian Convention of 19)7. Italy v~s

ti1e successor of the Venetian tradition ~ose monopoly

was destroyed by the Portuguese of the Genoese tradition.

Now with a large enpire in Abyssinia, Italy tried to enter

the Indian Ocean by joining it \'lith I tal ian Somaliland.

It developed the colony of Eritrea, planned a naval base

at l'1assawa and tried to acquire a political role in the

Yemen in order to secure a strong presence in the Red

Sea.

Events in the Pacific in the last decade of the

nineteenth century had ominous implications for fue later

course of events in the Indian Ocean. The defeat of

China at the hands of a resurgent Japan started a chain

of events in East Asia whose impact could not possibly

have been foreseen by the most far-s igjl ted in the

nineteenth century. The Japanese annexation of Taivmn

and the consequent extension o.f Jar;>anese naval power

were the irrunedL:.te result::> of the Sino-Japanese war.

The American-Spanish v.ar led to the American occupation

of the Philippines. Thus two new naval powers emerged in

63

East Asia, Japan and the United States. 'lhis development

in the Pacific Ocean v!3.s bound to affect the balance of

naval power in the Indian Ocean.

Durinr; the First World Vlar, Britain could check-

mate the German threat in time. A Gennan cruiser, Emden,

shelled l-Ic.dras; but Britain could destroy the privateering

vessels wi"lh the help of their convoy systen. Tais v.J8.r

eliminated Gennan nav8l presence fran the Indian_Ocean.

The ';!ashington Naval Conference of 1921-22, by restricting

fresh nav3l constructions, put temporary restrictions on

Japo.nese no.val capo.bilities too. Turkish rresence was

also reduced due to the defeat of the Ottanan Elnpire, an

o.lly of Germany in the proposed Berlin.-Ba§.1dad

'1 38 ro.~ ':ray.

During the inter-war period, France developed

Diego .Surez into a povverful base at an enonnous cost.

1·1ussolini developed I'•Iassawa into a bir; naval base, and the

annexation of Abyssinia was part of his great schene. But

',,'orld \'Jar II started before the conversion of Abyssinia

and Eritrea into a creat lo.nd empire \'las conplete.

I'-Jussolini' s land empire WCJ.s far fran Italy, without

mastery of the seas and bases, as were the French colonies

38 Panikkar, n. 8, pp. 72-81; Vali, .n. 3, pp. 12-21.

64

in the Napoleonic \'mrs, Spanish islands in 1893 war and

Gerrnan colonies in 1:lorld \'far I.

Britain could cope with its European ccmpeti tors

but the growing challenge from the Japanese and American

naval presence in the Pacific changed the situation in the

Indian Ocean. 39 The Japanese offensive in the Second

\·/orld War succeeded in its original strategic objective

of conquering South-East Asia and establishing a defensive

perimeter across the Central Pacific. In 1942, Japanese

fleets under Admiral· Chuichi Nagumo and Vice Admiral

Jisaburo Oza'\'1'8. entered the Indian Ocean and attacked the

Bay of Bengal. They captured Singapore after sinking

the British battleships the Prince of Wales and the

Repulse and tool<: the control of the I!J:alacca Straits due to

which Captain Somerville had to leave Ceylon apd retire

to I'lcmbasa. 40 But the timely appearance of the American

fleet in the Coral Sea, and their victories of Guadal canal

and ;Udway islands forced Japan to withdraw from the

Indian Ocean. 41 The Japanese naval onslaught in the

39 I'-'lanoranjan Bezboruah, US Strate~ in the Indian Ocean : The International Response (New ork, 1977), pp. 4:7; Bindra, n. 9, p. 724.

40

41 Reynolds, n. 25, pp. 515-18.

65

early stages of the Second World \var triggered off the

process of the gradual decline of British naval power in

the Indian Ocean.

The American predominance in the Pacific, the

emergence of independent littoral states and the declining

military and economic power of Britain, called for a

total reappraisal of British position east of Suez.

British naval structure in the Indian Ocean and the

adjoining seas was centred on the maintenance of its

Indicm Empire. Hiththe disappearance of the Raj, the

rationale of this structure was no more. Then came tile

tremendous psychological and economic setback of the Suez

crisis of 195b. The ignominious British failure in its

Suez adventure brou[jlt home to the people of Britain the

realization that Britain had been relegated to the position

of a :Jecond-rate power. But even after such a setback,

Britain vJ8.s still a world power: the Royal Navy effectively

stalled any Iraqi advance to cJ.airn Kuv1ai t in 1961 because

Britain secured almost half of its oil from Kuwait; then

th. ere v1as quicl{ intervention in Brunei . vklen troops fran

Singapore were sent to safeguard a J.ocal rebellion. 42

Britain's overseas commitments lingered on for

s cne more tLrne after the war, but it vias gradually realised

/

42 Bezboruah, n. 39~ p. 16.

66

that they v1ere proving to be costly. Moreover, the econan1c

resources of BritaL~ could not sustain it as a leading

actor on the world stage. 'lllere were t'wo devaluations of

the pound, from $4.03 to $2 .so in 1949 and further down

to $2.40 in 1967, leading to a~nost an end in the 1970s

to itG role as btmker and financier of the sterling

bl · 4 3 . p B · ta. b d f . . . th oc;:. ,1 ore over, r~ ~n \l/8.s arre rom JO~n~ng e

European Common 1'-'larket by a French veto. There vJas a

gradual realization that the returns on invesunent in

the Indian Ocean area \·/ere no more commensurate with the

total cost of British presence east of Suez. When tile

Labour Party ca:ne to pov1er in October 1964, it realized

that the strain on expenditure ancl ma<1pov1er \'/as immense,

and this realization gradually s"Vrelled tb.e ranks of the

opposition against the British presence east of Suez. 44

After the closure of ti~e Suez Canal in 1967, the estimated

profits fror!l the oil industry declined sharply and the

net return of its local taxes vrere less than half the cost

of maintaining forces there due to hi~er shipping costs

for exports and imports. 'Ihe expanded programmes of the

43 'l'hanas c. Bird, 11Dri tish East of Suez Policy : A Victim of Economic Necessi ty 11 , Naval War College Review (New Port, R.I.), vol. 22, no. 8, April 197o, p. 55.

44 Ibid., Bezboruah, n. 39, p. 20. /

67

Welfare State also necessitated curtailment of expenditure

abroad. 45

The economic burden and the Suez Crisis exposed

deficiencies in the areas of basic tr0nsQort equipment and

strategic mobility \vhich ultimately led to the reduction in

defence expenditure and gradual v1i thdrm·Tal of the British 46 forces. Tne joint Ane;lo-American staging post and the

British Indian Ocean Territory were created to retrieve the

situation. But the dcmestic opposition continued, and the

Defence Review of 1966 proposed withdrawal fran the Aden

base as soon as South Arabia became independent. The

Defence Review of 1967 proposed to bring defence expenditure

into balance with t!1e country' s resources. 47 'lhe measures

proposed included the reduction of overseas land forces and

bases, establishment of an amphibious force backed by

necessary air support and coverage fran island staging

posts and new conm;md ships v1i th V/STOL in place of aircraft

45 Bird, n. 43, p. 56; ',/i tildra\·.Cl from the (Port Leavenworth), pp. 14-21.

Alvin J. Cottrell, "British Persian Gulf", Hilitar~ Review vol. 50, no. 6, June 1~6,

46 f·lichael Howard, 11 Bri tain' s Strategic Problems : East of Suez", International Affairs t London), vol. 42, no. 2, April 1966, pp. 179-83. This issue of the journal is devoted to various aspects of the same then e.

47 ':!alter Goldstein, The Dilemma of British· Defence : 'Ihe Ir:lb.'1lance betWeen Commi tnient "liid Resources t Columbus, 1966), pp. 4~-43.

68

carriers. 48 But the financial crisis and the devaluation

of the pound in the same year forced the Labour Government

to reduce the national budget estimates, and finally to

announce the f3 teful decision of its vri thdra\val from east

of Suez.

July 16, 1968 is considered to be the last

milestone in Britain's descent from empire when Harold

~·lilson announced a phased ,.,i thdrawal of all British forces

fran east of suez, v1i th the exception of security units in

a few lingering colonies. 'Ihis controversial move v.J8.S

opposed not only by the Conservative Party, but also by

the Foreign Uffice and the Ministry of Defence, leading to

the resignation of George BrO\'II1 frcm the Cabinet.· 'lhe

Economist and the Daily Telegraph also criticized the

move, and the latter called it an open invitation to China

to t:J.ke wer by 1975. 49 Britain's allies in the region

,.,ere equally disturbed by the decision, and the Governments

of I-Ialaysia, Singa~Jore, Indonesia and Australia expressed

their unhappiness over the decision, and pressed the need

for bases. Japan was concerned about the area's security

becc.use of its oil imports through the Straits of f'lalacca.

The United States' preoccupation ·vii fu Vietnam made it

48 Bezboruah, n. 39,. pp. 24-25. /

49 Bird, n. 43, p. 65.

69

take a dim viev1 of the British move in the li@l t of the

immtnent Soviet efforts to enter the Indian Ocean area.

It is siQlificant to note that the US decision to create

the Indio.n Ocean command v.;as made in 1963, when there vvere

virtually no Soviet naval vessels in the region. 50 The

Pentagon had foreseen the imminent British '.-r.i thdrawal

from the Indian Ocean, as the latter 1-Iithdrew fran the

l'1edi terranean. Upon its persuasion, the British Governnent

announced an independent British Indian Ocean Territory

(BIOT) in 1965, yeo.rs before its decision to withdraw

frcm east of Suez. Thus, vb.ile the American goven~!lTlent

publicly expressed reluctance to shoulder additional

burdens, its forces in the Pacific and the Atlantic were

being readied to fill the •vacuum• in the Indian Ocean.

Exit Britain, enter the United States, the Soviet Union

and other medium po\'Jers, coupled \'lith local annament race,

and thus began the contemporary history of the Indian

Ocean area.

50 K.R. Sin@:l, Politics of the Indian Ocean (Delhi, 1974), p. 61.