Chapter 1. Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities in

Table 1 A New Dataset on Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities

Figure 1 The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies

Figure 2a The reversal of educational divides in English-speaking and Northern European countries

Figure 2b The reversal of educational divides in Continental and Southern European countries

Figure 3a The stability/decline of income divides in English-speaking and Northern European countries

Figure 3b The stability/decline of income divides in Continental and Southern European countries

Figure 4 The transformation of Western party systems, 1945-2020

Figure 5 The fragmentation of Western cleavage structures

Figure 6 The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies

Figure 7 Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies

Figure 8a Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: English-speaking and Northern-European countries

Figure 8b Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: Continental and Southern European countries

Figure 9 Religious-secular cleavages in Latin America

Figure 10 Religious-secular cleavages in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia

Figure 11 The native-immigrant cleavage in Western democracies

Figure 12 The Muslim vote in Western democracies

Figure 13 Sociocultural cleavages and disadvantaged minorities in comparative perspective

Figure 14 The strength and persistence of sociocultural cleavages in comparative perspective

Figure 15 Rural-urban cleavage in Western democracies

Figure 16 Rural-urban cleavages in comparative perspective

Figure 17 Rural-urban cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant parties by geographical location

Figure 18 Regional cleavages in comparative perspective

Figure 19 Regional cleavages in historical perspective

Figure 20Class and regionalism: Vote for independentist parties in Belgium, Spain, Canada, and the United Kingdom by

income group

Figure 21 Generational cleavages and party system fragmentation in Western democracies

Figure 22 The reversal of the educational cleavage in Western democracies by generation

Chapter 1. "Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities in 50 democracies, 1948-2020"

Amory Gethin, Clara Martínez-Toledano, Thomas Piketty

Tables and Figures

Main figures and tables

Figure 23 Generational cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant party by age group

Figure 24 Generational cleavages, political integration, and foreign policy: Vote for selected parties by age group

Figure 25 The reversal of gender cleavages in Western democracies

Figure A1 The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies, small panel

Figure A2 The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies, unbalanced panel

Figure A3 The reversal of educational divides, all Western democracies

Figure A4 The reversal of educational divides, all Western democracies, after controls

Figure A5 The decline/stability of income divides, all Western democracies

Figure A6 The decline/stability of income divides, all Western democracies, after controls

Figure A7 The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies (quadrant representation), all countries

Figure A8 Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1950s







Figure A15 Decomposing multi-elite party systems: Detailed party families

Figure A16 Decomposing multi-elite party systems: Green vs. Anti-immigration parties

Figure A17 Decomposing multi-elite party systems: Social-Democrats / Socialists vs. Conservatives / Christians

Figure A18 Vote for Green parties by education group

Figure A19 Vote for Green parties by income group

Figure A20 Vote for Green parties by self-perceived class

Figure A21 Vote for anti-immigration parties by education group

Figure A22 Vote for anti-immigration parties by income group

Figure A23 Vote for anti-immigration parties by self-perceived class

Figure A24 Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies

Figure A25 Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies (after controls)

Figure A26 Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies

Figure A27 Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies (after controls)

Figure A28 The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies (before controls)

Figure A29 The strength of income divides in non-Western democracies

Figure A30 The strength of educational divides in non-Western democracies

Figure A31 Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies (after controls for income/education)

Appendix A - Income, Education, and Class

Figure A32 Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies (after all controls)

Figure B1 Vote for left-wing parties by religion in Western democracies, 1970s

Figure B2 Vote for left-wing parties by religion in Western democracies, 2010s

Figure B3 Vote for left-wing parties among voters with no religion in Western democracies

Figure B4 Vote for left-wing / secular parties by religion in Latin America, last election

Figure B5 Vote for left-wing parties by country of birth in Western democracies, 2010s

Figure B6 The strength of sociocultural cleavages in comparative perspective

Figure B7 The strength of sociocultural inequalities in comparative perspective

Figure C1 The strength of rural-urban cleavages in comparative perspective (after controls)

Figure C2 The strength of rural-urban inequalities in comparative perspective

Figure C3 Vote for Green parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies

Figure C4 Vote for anti-immigration parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies

Figure C5 Vote for left-wing parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies

Figure C6 Vote for Green parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies

Figure C7 Vote for anti-immigration parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies

Figure C8 Vote for anti-immigration parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies (after controls)

Figure C9 Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in selected Western democracies

Figure C10 Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in selected Western democracies, after controls

Figure C11 The strength of regional inequalities in comparative perspective

Figure C12 Vote for nationalist parties among top-income voters in Catalonia, Flanders, Québec, and Scotland

Figure D1 Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies

Figure D2 Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies

Figure D3 Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies (after controls)

Figure D4 Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies (after controls)

Figure D5 Vote for Green parties by age group in Western democracies

Figure D6 Vote for anti-immigration parties by age group in Western democracies

Figure D7 The strength of generational cleavages in comparative perspective

Figure E1 Vote for left-wing parties among women in Western democracies (after controlling for religion)

Figure E2 Gender cleavages and sectoral specialization in Western democracies

Figure E3 Vote for Green parties by gender in Western democracies

Figure E4 Vote for anti-immigration parties by gender in Western democracies

Appendix B - Religious, Sociocultural, and Ethnic Cleavages

Appendix C - Regional and Rural-Urban Cleavages

Appendix D - Generational Cleavages

Appendix E - Gender Cleavages

Figure E5 The strength of the gender cleavage in comparative perspective

Table A1 A New Dataset on Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities (all countries)

Appendix Tables

Time period ElectionsData

quality

Avg.

sample sizeLow-income party / coalition / candidates

Western Europe

Austria 1971-2017 10 Medium 3831 Social Democratic Party, KPÖ, Greens, NEOS, Other left

Belgium 1971-2014 14 High 4817 Socialist Party, Socialist Party Differently, Ecolo, Agalev, PTB

Denmark 1960-2015 21 High 2819 Social Democrats, SF, Social Liberal Party, Red-Green Alliance

Finland 1972-2015 11 High 2452 Social Democratic Party, Green League, Left Alliance, Other left

France 1956-2017 17 High 3208 Socialist Party, Communist Party, Other left

Germany 1949-2017 19 High 2782 Social Democratic Party, Alliance 90/The Greens, Die Linke

Iceland 1978-2017 12 High 1488 Left-Green Movement, Social Democratic Alliance, People's Party

Ireland 1973-2020 13 Medium 7115 Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin, Other left

Italy 1953-2018 14 High 2147 Democratic Party, Free and Equal

Luxembourg 1974-2018 9 Low 3890 Socialist Workers' Party, Greens, Other left

Netherlands 1967-2017 15 High 2068 Labour Party, Socialist Party, D66, Greens, Other left

Norway 1957-2017 15 High 1964 Labour Party, Green Party, Socialist Left Party

Portugal 1983-2019 10 High 1822 Socialist Party, Left Bloc, Unitary Democratic Coalition

Spain 1979-2019 14 High 8996 Socialist Workers' Party, Podemos, United Left, Other left

Sweden 1956-2014 19 High 3088 Social Democratic Party, Left Party, Green Party

Switzerland 1967-2019 14 High 3328 Social Democrats, Party of Labour, Green Party, Green Liberal Party

United Kingdom 1955-2017 16 High 5262 Labour Party

Post-communist

Eastern Europe

Czech Republic 1990-2017 7 High 1565 Social Democratic Party, Communist Party, Greens, Pirate Party

Hungary 1998-2018 6 High 1679 Fidesz, Jobbik

Poland 1991-2015 8 High 2555 Law and Justice

North America /

Oceania

Australia 1963-2019 18 High 2382 Labor Party, Greens

Canada 1963-2019 17 High 3302 Liberal Party, Green Party, New Democratic Party

New Zealand 1972-2017 16 High 2555 Labour Party, Greens, Other left

Table 1.1 - A New Dataset on Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities

United States 1948-2020 18 High 2179 Democratic Party

Asia

Hong Kong 1998-2016 5 Low 864 Pro-Beijing camp

India 1962-2014 10 High 13412 Indian National Congress, left-wing parties, other center / left

Indonesia 1999-2014 4 High 1850 Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, NasDem, Golkar

Japan 1953-2017 14 Medium 1909 Constitutional Democratic Party, Communist Party, Soc. Dem. Party

Malaysia 2004-2013 3 Low 1213 Barisan Nasional

Pakistan 1970-2018 8 High 3682 Pakistan Peoples Party

Philippines 1998-2016 4 Medium 1200 Grace Poe, Jejomar Binay

South Korea 2000-2016 5 Medium 1160 Liberty Korea Party

Taiwan 1996-2016 6 Medium 1744 Democratic Progressive Party

Thailand 2001-2011 3 Low 1431 Pheu Thai

Latin America

Argentina 1995-2019 6 Medium 2056 Peronist parties

Brazil 1989-2018 8 High 10225 Workers' Party

Chile 1989-2017 7 Medium 1135 Broad Front, Progressive Party, País

Colombia 2002-2018 5 Medium 3340 Democratic Center, Mejor Vargas Lleras

Costa Rica 1974-2018 12 Medium 1083 National Liberation Party

Mexico 1952-2018 9 Medium 1339 Institutional Revolutionary Party

Peru 1995-2016 5 Medium 1592 Popular Force

Africa and Middle East

Algeria 2002-2017 3 Low 1226 National Liberation Front, Democratic National Rally

Botswana 1999-2019 5 Low 1680 Botswana Democratic Party

Ghana 2000-2016 4 Low 2600 National Democratic Congress

Iraq 2005-2018 5 Low 1984 Shia lists

Israel 1969-2019 15 High 1381 Likud, Other conservative / ultra-orthodox

Nigeria 1999-2019 6 Low 2853 All Progressives Congress

Senegal 2000-2019 4 Low 1800 Alliance for the Republic

South Africa 1994-2019 6 High 3514 African National Congress

Turkey 1991-2018 7 Medium 1564 Justice and Development Party (AKP)

Source: authors' elaboration using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).

Note: the table presents, for each country, the time coverage of the dataset, the number of elections covered, the quality of electoral surveys, the

average sample size of these surveys, and the main significant party or group of parties whose support is concentrated among the bottom 50% of

income earners in the last election available (see corresponding case studies).

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-14 2015-20

Figure 1.1 - The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies

Difference between (% of top 10% educated voting left) and(% of bottom 90% educated voting left)

Difference between (% of top 10% earners voting left) and(% of bottom 90% earners voting left)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (democratic / labor / social-democratic / socialist / green) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote hasgradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multi-elite party system". Figures correspond to five-yearaverages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and theUS. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employmentstatus, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Higher-educated voters voting for left-wing parties (democratic, labor, social-democratic, socialist, green, etc.)

Top-income voters voting for right-wingparties (other parties)

-40

-35

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies. Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries

Australia Britain Canada

Denmark Finland Iceland

Ireland New Zealand Norway

Sweden United States Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) votersvoting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. Innearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have graduallybecome more likely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban,region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Ireland

United States

Canada

-40

-35

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies. Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries

Austria Belgium France

Germany Italy Luxembourg

Netherlands Portugal Spain

Switzerland Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) votersvoting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In nearly allcountries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have gradually become morelikely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region,race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Switzerland

Portugal

Spain

France

Netherlands

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies. Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries

Australia Britain Canada Denmark

Finland Iceland Ireland New Zealand

Norway Sweden United States Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting fordemocratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. In all countries,top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control foreducation, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (incountry-years for which these variables are available).

UnitedStates

SwedenAustralia

United States

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies. Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries

Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg

Netherlands Portugal Spain Switzerland Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting fordemocratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education,age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years forwhich these variables are available).

Germany

Italy

Germany

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1945-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.4 - The transformation of Western party systems, 1945-2020

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the average share of votes received by selected families of political parties in Western democraciesbetween the 1940s and the 2010s. Communist parties saw their average scores collapse from 7% to less than 0.5%, while green andanti-immigration parties have risen until reaching average vote shares of 8% and 11% respectively. Decennial averages over allWestern democracies except Spain and Portugal (no democratic elections before 1970s) and the United States and the UnitedKingdom (two-party systems).

Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left

Conservatives / Christian Democrats

Communists

Liberals / Social-liberals

Greens

Anti-immigration

Other

8%

11%

7%

10%

34%

30%

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

Rela

tive s

upport

am

ong t

op-incom

e v

ote

rs

Relative support among higher-educated voters

Figure 1.5 - The fragmentation of Western cleavagestructures. Panel A. 1960-1980

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting forselected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom90%) voters on the x-axis. In the 1960s-1980s, socialist and social democratic parties were supported by both low-income and lower-educated voters, while conservative, Christian, and liberal parties were supported by both high-income and higher-educated voters.Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban,region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

ConservativesChristian DemocratsLiberals / Social-liberals

High incomeLow education

Low incomeLow education

High incomeHigh education

Low incomeHigh education

Social DemocratsSocialistsOther left

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

Rela

tive s

upport

am

ong t

op

-incom

e v

ote

rs


Figure 1.5 - The fragmentation of Western cleavagestructures. Panel B. 2000-2020

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting forselected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom90%) voters on the x-axis. Education most clearly distinguishes anti-immigration from green parties, while income most clearlydistinguishes conservative and Christian parties from socialist and social-democratic parties. Averages over all Western democracies.Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status,and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Social Dem.SocialistsOther left


GreensAnti-immigration

ConservativesChristian DemocratsLiberals / Social-lib.Anti-immigration

Social Dem.SocialistsGreens

Other left





-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.6 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies

Australia

Britain

Denmark

France

Luxembourg

Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Portugal

Spain

Sweden

United States

Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters self-identifying as belonging to the "working class" or the "lowerclass" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class", the "upper class" or "no class" voting for democratic / labor / socialdemocratic / socialist / green parties. Self-perceived class cleavages have declined significantly over the past decades. Estimatescontrol for income, education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, andmarital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Sweden

Norway

Denmark

Britain

Argentina

Brazil

Botswana

Chile

ColombiaCosta Rica

Czech RepublicAlgeria

Ghana

Hong Kong

Hungary

Indonesia Israel

India Iraq

Japan

South Korea

Mexico

MalaysiaNigeria

Peru

Philippines

Pakistan

PolandSenegal

Thailand

Turkey

Taiwan

South Africa

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-10

0

10

20

30

40

-5 0 5 10 15 20 25

Str

ength

of

educational div

ides

Strength of income divides

Figure 1.7 - Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and high-income (top 50%) voters voting forselected "pro-poor parties" (see table 1.1) on the x-axis, and the same difference between lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters on the y-axis in non-Western democracies. South Africa and Botswana display particularly strong incomeand educational divides, while education and income only play a minor role in determining electoral behaviors in Japan, the Philippines,and Indonesia. Income and education are shown as identical for Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal given lack of data on income.

High income dividesHigh educational divides

Low income dividesLow educational divides

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-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.8 (panel a) - Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: English-speaking and Northern-European countries

Australia Britain Canada New Zealand


Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of Protestants declaring going to church at least once a year and the share ofother voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, Protestants have remainedsignificantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

United States

New Zealand

AustraliaBritain

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.8 (panel b) - Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: Continental and Southern European countries

Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg


Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of Catholics (or Catholics and Protestants in mixed countries) declaring goingto church at least once a year and the share of other voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. Inall countries, religious voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

Italy

Spain

Switzerland

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Argentina Chile Brazil Peru Mexico Colombia Costa Rica

Figure 1.9 - Religious-secular cleavages in Latin America

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters declaring belonging to no religion and the share of other votersvoting for left-wing / secular parties (Peronist parties in Argentina) in the last election available (Argentina 2015, Brazil 2018, Chile 2017,Colombia 2018, Costa Rica 2018, Mexico 2018, Peru 2016). Non-religious voters are more likely to vote for left-wing / secular parties inall countries, but this gap is large in Costa Rica and almost insignificant in Argentina. See case studies for more details on classificationof parties.

Costa Rica, 2018: non-religious votersmore likely to vote for left-wing / secularparties by 35 percentage points

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.10 - Religious-secular cleavages in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia

Israel - Difference between (% non-religious)and (% religious) voting center / left

Turkey - Difference between (% non-religious) and (% religious) voting left

India - Difference between (% Muslims) and(% non-Muslims) voting INC / left

Indonesia - Difference between (% non-Muslims) and (% Muslims) voting PDI-P

Malaysia - Difference between (% non-Muslims) and (% Muslims) voting DAP / PKR

Pakistan - Difference between (% Shia /non-Muslims) and (% Sunni) voting PPP

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the evolution of the vote of religious minorities or non-religious voters in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia,Pakistan, and Malaysia. In the past decades, religious cleavages have risen in India, Pakistan, and Malaysia, while they have remainedstable at high levels in Indonesia, Turkey, and Israel. INC: Indian National Congress; PDI-P: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle;DAP: Democratic Action Party; PKR: People's Justice Party; PPP: Pakistan Peoples Party.

Israel: non-religious voters more likely tovote for center / left by 43 percentage points

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Figure 1.11 - The native-immigrant cleavage in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and the European SocialSurvey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters born in non-Western countries (all countries excluding Europe,Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States) and the share of natives (voters born in the country considered) voting fordemocratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In nearly all Western countries, immigrantsare much more likely to vote for these parties than natives. US and Iceland figures include voters born in Western countries given lackof data on exact country of origin. Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Denmark: immigrants more likely to vote forsocial democratic / socialist / green partiesby 39 percentage points

Iceland, Finland, Portugal, Australia:immigrants not voting for differentparties than natives

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Figure 1.12 - The Muslim vote in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and the European SocialSurvey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of Muslim voters and the share of non-Muslims voting for democratic /labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In all Western countries, Muslims are substantially morelikely to vote for these parties than non-Muslims. This cleavage is stronger in countries with strong far-right parties (e.g. Sweden,Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, France). Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Muslim voters more likely to vote for social democratic /socialist / green parties by over 40 percentage points

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

Turkey Algeria Mexico Peru Colombia CostaRica

Botswana Senegal Brazil NewZealand

India West.dem.

UnitedStates

Figure 1.13 - Sociocultural cleavages and disadvantaged minorities in comparative perspective

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of specific sociocultural minorities and the share of other voters voting forselected "pro-poor" parties in the last election available. The Turkish AKP corresponds to a "social-exclusive party": it is supported bylow-income voters of the majority but not by the disadvantaged Kurdish minority. The Democratic Party in the United States is a "social-inclusive party", supported by both low-income voters and disadvantaged Black voters. Ethnic minorities correspond to non-Tswanagroups in Botswana and speakers of Fulani / Serer / Mande languages in Senegal.

"Social-exclusive parties"Pro-poor, anti-minorities

"Social-inclusive parties"Pro-poor, pro-minorities

Turkey, 2018: Kurdish votersless likely to vote AKP by 32percentage points

US, 2016: Black voters morelikely to vote Democratic by47 percentage points

Berber

Indigenous

Indigenous Afro-Colombians

Afro-Costa Ricans

Ethnic minorities

Ethnic minorities

Afro-Brazilians

Māori

Muslims

Muslims

AKP FLN/RND PRI FP Uribists PLN BDP APR PT Left-wing parties

Congressand left

Left-wing parties

Democraticparty

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1945-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.14 - The strength and persistence of sociocultural cleavages in comparative perspective

South Africa - Black vote for ANC

US - Black vote for Democrats

Pakistan - Sindhi vote for PPP

Taiwan - Minnan/Hakka vote for DPP

New Zealand - Maori vote for the left

Nigeria - Muslim vote for APC

Ghana - Mole-Dagbon vote for NDC

Malaysia - Chinese vote for DAP / PKR

India - Lower caste vote for INC / left

Indonesia - Javanese vote for PDI-P

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of a specific sociocultural group and the rest of the electorate voting forselected parties or groups of parties. In the United States in the 1940s, Black voters were more likely to vote for the Democratic Partyby 12 percentage points, compared to 49 percentage points in the 2010s. Sociocultural cleavages have risen or remained stable at highlevels in the majority of represented countries. They are highest in South Africa and lowest in Indonesia. For India, the gap correspondsto SCs/STs vs. Upper castes.

South Africa: Black voters more likelyto vote ANC by 67 percentage points

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.15 - The rural-urban cleavage in Western democracies

Australia Austria Canada Denmark Finland France

Iceland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway

Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United States Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for democratic / labor /social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, rural areas have remained significantly less likely to vote for these partiesthan cities, with no clear trend over time. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status(in country-years for which these variables are available).

Switzerland

Italy

France

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Figure 1.16 - Rural-urban cleavages in comparative perspective

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for the main pro-poor partyin the last election available in the dataset. In the majority of countries, parties oriented towards low-income voters also tend to makesignificantly higher scores in rural areas than in cities. Western democracies: cross-country average over all countries with data.

Pro-poor urban parties

Pro-poor rural parties

Botswana, 2019: rural areas morelikely to vote for Botswana DemocraticParty by 22 percentage points

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Algeria,2010s

Botswana,2010s

India,1960s

Japan,1960s

Malaysia,2010s

Mexico,1990s

Senegal,2010s

SouthAfrica,2010s

Taiwan,1990s

Figure 1.17 - Rural-urban cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant parties by geographical location

Center / Capital city Other urban areas Rural areas

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by dominant parties by geographical location in a selected number of countriesand time periods. In all these one-party dominant systems, dominant parties systematically receive greater support from rural areasthan from cities. Dominant parties: FLN/RND (Algeria), BDP (Botswana), Congress (India), LDP (Japan), BN (Malaysia), PRI (Mexico),APR (Senegal), ANC (South Africa), Kuomintang (Taiwan). Centers correpond to Alger (Algeria), Gaborone (Botswana), Delhi (India),Wards (Japan), the Central region (Malaysia), the Center region (Mexico), the Western region (Senegal), Gauteng and Western Cape(South Africa), and the North region (Taiwan).

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Allothers

Canada Malaysia SouthKorea

UnitedKingdom

Spain Turkey Pakistan Ghana SouthAfrica

Algeria Nigeria Belgium India Iraq Thailand

Figure 1.18 - Regional cleavages in comparative perspective

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by regional divides in the last electionavailable. Thailand, Iraq, India, and Belgium are the countries with the deepest regional cleavages, with over a quarter of politicalcleavages amounting to regional differences in vote choices. The indicator corresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of amultinomial logistic regression of regional location on the full voting variable (including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is notstrictly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and 40% generally correspond to excellent fits).

Thailand, 2011: regional dividesexplain over 40% of political cleavages

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.19 - Regional cleavages in historical perspective

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by regional divides in a selected numberof countries. Regional divides have grown significantly in India, Belgium, Pakistan, Turkey, Spain, and the United Kingdom in the pastdecades, driven by the regionalization of existing coalitions and the formation of new regionally based parties. The indicatorcorresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of a multinomial logistic regression of regional location on the full voting variable(including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is not strictly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and40% generally correspond to excellent fits).

India

Belgium

Pakistan

Turkey

United Kingdom

Spain

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

55%

Flanders, Belgium Catalonia, Spain Québec, Canada Scotland, UK

Figure 1.20 - Class and regionalism: vote for independentist parties in Belgium, Spain, Canada, and the United Kingdom by income group

Bottom 50%

Middle 40%

Top 10%

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the share of votes received by selected nationalist parties by income group in Flanders, Catalonia, Québec,and Scotland. Nationalist parties receive greater support from top-income voters in Flanders and Catalonia and from low-income votersin Québec and Scotland. Parties and time periods represented: VU / N-VA in Flanders in the 2010s, nationalist parties in Catalonia inthe 2010s, Bloc Québécois in Québec in the 1990s, and Scottish National Party in Scotland in the 2010s.

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70

Age

Figure 1.21 - Generational cleavages and party system fragmentation in Western democracies

Green parties

New left (Germany, Spain, France, Portugal, Norway)

Anti-immigration (Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden)

Anti-immigration (Austria, Spain, Finland, France)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by selected groups of parties in Western democracies by age in the last electionavailable. Green parties and "New left" parties (Die Linke, Podemos, France Insoumise, Bloco de Esquerda, Norwegian Socialist LeftParty) make much higher scores among the youth than among older generations. By contrast, there is no clear age profile in the case offar-right or anti-immigration parties. 20 correponds to voters aged 20 or younger; 70 corresponds to voters 70 or older.

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.22 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies: the role of generational replacement

Post-1980 generation

1970s

1960s

1950s

1940s

1930s

1920s

1910s

Pre-1900 generation

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) votersvoting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties within specific cohorts. Between the 1960s and the 1990s,lower-educated voters born in the early decades of the twentieth century remained significantly more likely to vote for these parties thanhigher-educated voters born during the same period. In the last decade, on the contrary, young lower-educated voters were significantlyless likely to vote for these parties than young higher-educated voters. Figures correspond to ten-year averages for Australia, Britain,Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.

Pre-1930s generationsLower educated voting

for the left

Post-1930s generationsHigher educated voting

for the left

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Algeria,2010s

Botswana,2010s

India,1960s

Japan,1960s

Malaysia,2010s

Mexico,1990s

Senegal,2010s

SouthAfrica,2010s

Taiwan,1990s

Figure 1.23 - Generational cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant party by age group

<40 40-59 60+

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by dominant parties by age group in a selected number of countries and timeperiods. In the majority of these one-party dominant systems, dominant parties receive greater support from older voters than fromyounger generations. Dominant parties: FLN/RND (Algeria), BDP (Botswana), Congress (India), LDP (Japan), BN (Malaysia), PRI(Mexico), APR (Senegal), ANC (South Africa), Kuomintang (Taiwan).

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Japan, 1960s South Korea, 2016 Hong Kong, 2016 UK, 2017

Figure 1.24 - Generational cleavages, political integration, and foreign policy: vote for selected parties by age group

<30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan in the 1960s, the Saenuri Party inSouth Korea in 2016, the pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong in 2016, and the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom in 2017 by agegroup. All these parties received significantly higher support among older generations than among the youth, which can be linked to theparticular strength of cleavages over foreign policy and national integration in these party systems (war memory and remilitarization inJapan, attitudes towards the North Korean regime in South Korea, attitudes towards Mainland China in Hong Kong, and attitudestowards Brexit in the United Kingdom).

Liberal Democratic Party Saenuri Party Pro-Beijing Camp Conservative Party

-35

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.25 - The reversal of gender cleavages in Western democracies

Australia Austria BelgiumBritain Canada DenmarkFinland France GermanyIceland Ireland ItalyLuxembourg Netherlands New ZealandNorway Portugal SpainSweden Switzerland United StatesAverage

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for democratic / labor / socialdemocratic / socialist / green parties in Western democracies. In the majority of countries, women have gradually shifted from beingsignificantly more conservative than men in the 1950s-1960s to being significantly more left-wing in the 2000s-2010s.

Italy

Sweden

Iceland

Denmark

Time period ElectionsData

quality

Avg.

sample sizeLow-income party / coalition / candidates

Western Europe

Austria 1971-2017 10 Medium 3831 Social Democratic Party, KPÖ, Greens, NEOS, Other left

Belgium 1971-2014 14 High 4817 Socialist Party, Socialist Party Differently, Ecolo, Agalev, PTB

Denmark 1960-2015 21 High 2819 Social Democrats, SF, Social Liberal Party, Red-Green Alliance

Finland 1972-2015 11 High 2452 Social Democratic Party, Green League, Left Alliance, Other left

France 1956-2017 17 High 3208 Socialist Party, Communist Party, Other left

Germany 1949-2017 19 High 2782 Social Democratic Party, Alliance 90/The Greens, Die Linke

Iceland 1978-2017 12 High 1488 Left-Green Movement, Social Democratic Alliance, People's Party

Ireland 1973-2020 13 Medium 7115 Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin, Other left

Italy 1953-2018 14 High 2147 Democratic Party, Free and Equal

Luxembourg 1974-2018 9 Low 3890 Socialist Workers' Party, Greens, Other left

Netherlands 1967-2017 15 High 2068 Labour Party, Socialist Party, D66, Greens, Other left

Norway 1957-2017 15 High 1964 Labour Party, Green Party, Socialist Left Party

Portugal 1983-2019 10 High 1822 Socialist Party, Left Bloc, Unitary Democratic Coalition

Spain 1979-2019 14 High 8996 Socialist Workers' Party, Podemos, United Left, Other left

Sweden 1956-2014 19 High 3088 Social Democratic Party, Left Party, Green Party

Switzerland 1967-2019 14 High 3328 Social Democrats, Party of Labour, Green Party, Green Liberal Party

United Kingdom 1955-2017 16 High 5262 Labour Party

Post-communist

Eastern Europe

Czech Republic 1990-2017 7 High 1565 Social Democratic Party, Communist Party, Greens, Pirate Party

Hungary 1998-2018 6 High 1679 Fidesz, Jobbik

Poland 1991-2015 8 High 2555 Law and Justice

North America /

Oceania

Australia 1963-2019 18 High 2382 Labor Party, Greens

Canada 1963-2019 17 High 3302 Liberal Party, Green Party, New Democratic Party

New Zealand 1972-2017 16 High 2555 Labour Party, Greens, Other left

Table 1.1 - A New Dataset on Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities

United States 1948-2020 18 High 2179 Democratic Party

Asia

Hong Kong 1998-2016 5 Low 864 Pro-Beijing camp

India 1962-2014 10 High 13412 Indian National Congress, left-wing parties, other center / left

Indonesia 1999-2014 4 High 1850 Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, NasDem, Golkar

Japan 1953-2017 14 Medium 1909 Constitutional Democratic Party, Communist Party, Soc. Dem. Party

Malaysia 2004-2013 3 Low 1213 Barisan Nasional

Pakistan 1970-2018 8 High 3682 Pakistan Peoples Party

Philippines 1998-2016 4 Medium 1200 Grace Poe, Jejomar Binay

South Korea 2000-2016 5 Medium 1160 Liberty Korea Party

Taiwan 1996-2016 6 Medium 1744 Democratic Progressive Party

Thailand 2001-2011 3 Low 1431 Pheu Thai

Latin America

Argentina 1995-2019 6 Medium 2056 Peronist parties

Brazil 1989-2018 8 High 10225 Workers' Party

Chile 1989-2017 7 Medium 1135 Broad Front, Progressive Party, País

Colombia 2002-2018 5 Medium 3340 Democratic Center, Mejor Vargas Lleras

Costa Rica 1974-2018 12 Medium 1083 National Liberation Party

Mexico 1952-2018 9 Medium 1339 Institutional Revolutionary Party

Peru 1995-2016 5 Medium 1592 Popular Force

Africa and Middle East

Algeria 2002-2017 3 Low 1226 National Liberation Front, Democratic National Rally

Botswana 1999-2019 5 Low 1680 Botswana Democratic Party

Ghana 2000-2016 4 Low 2600 National Democratic Congress

Iraq 2005-2018 5 Low 1984 Shia lists

Israel 1969-2019 15 High 1381 Likud, Other conservative / ultra-orthodox

Nigeria 1999-2019 6 Low 2853 All Progressives Congress

Senegal 2000-2019 4 Low 1800 Alliance for the Republic

South Africa 1994-2019 6 High 3514 African National Congress

Turkey 1991-2018 7 Medium 1564 Justice and Development Party (AKP)

Source: authors' elaboration using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).

Note: the table presents, for each country, the time coverage of the dataset, the number of elections covered, the quality of electoral surveys, the

average sample size of these surveys, and the main significant party or group of parties whose support is concentrated among the bottom 50% of

income earners in the last election available (see corresponding case studies).

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-14 2015-20

Figure 1.1 - The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies

Difference between (% of top 10% educated voting left) and(% of bottom 90% educated voting left)

Difference between (% of top 10% earners voting left) and(% of bottom 90% earners voting left)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (democratic / labor / social-democratic / socialist / green) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote hasgradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multi-elite party system". Figures correspond to five-yearaverages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and theUS. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employmentstatus, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Higher-educated voters voting for left-wing parties (democratic, labor, social-democratic, socialist, green, etc.)

Top-income voters voting for right-wingparties (other parties)

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5

10

15

20

25

30

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies. Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries

Australia Britain Canada

Denmark Finland Iceland

Ireland New Zealand Norway

Sweden United States Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) votersvoting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. Innearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have graduallybecome more likely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban,region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Ireland

United States

Canada

-40

-35

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-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies. Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries

Austria Belgium France

Germany Italy Luxembourg

Netherlands Portugal Spain

Switzerland Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) votersvoting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In nearly allcountries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have gradually become morelikely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region,race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Switzerland

Portugal

Spain

France

Netherlands

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies. Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries

Australia Britain Canada Denmark

Finland Iceland Ireland New Zealand


Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting fordemocratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. In all countries,top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control foreducation, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (incountry-years for which these variables are available).

UnitedStates

SwedenAustralia

United States

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-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies. Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries

Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg


Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting fordemocratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education,age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years forwhich these variables are available).

Germany

Italy

Germany

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1945-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.4 - The transformation of Western party systems, 1945-2020

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the average share of votes received by selected families of political parties in Western democraciesbetween the 1940s and the 2010s. Communist parties saw their average scores collapse from 7% to less than 0.5%, while green andanti-immigration parties have risen until reaching average vote shares of 8% and 11% respectively. Decennial averages over allWestern democracies except Spain and Portugal (no democratic elections before 1970s) and the United States and the UnitedKingdom (two-party systems).

Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left

Conservatives / Christian Democrats

Communists

Liberals / Social-liberals

Greens

Anti-immigration

Other

8%

11%

7%

10%

34%

30%

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

Rela

tive s

upport

am

ong t

op-incom

e v

ote

rs


Figure 1.5 - The fragmentation of Western cleavagestructures. Panel A. 1960-1980

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting forselected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom90%) voters on the x-axis. In the 1960s-1980s, socialist and social democratic parties were supported by both low-income and lower-educated voters, while conservative, Christian, and liberal parties were supported by both high-income and higher-educated voters.Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban,region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).






Social DemocratsSocialistsOther left

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0

5

10

15

-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

Rela

tive s

upport

am

ong t

op-incom

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ote

rs


Figure 1.5 - The fragmentation of Western cleavagestructures. Panel B. 2000-2020

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting forselected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom90%) voters on the x-axis. Education most clearly distinguishes anti-immigration from green parties, while income most clearlydistinguishes conservative and Christian parties from socialist and social-democratic parties. Averages over all Western democracies.Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status,and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Social Dem.SocialistsOther left


Greens

ConservativesChristian DemocratsLiberals / Social-lib.Anti-immigration

Social Dem.SocialistsGreens

Other left



Anti-immigration



-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.6 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies

Australia

Britain

Denmark

France

Luxembourg

Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Portugal

Spain

Sweden

United States

Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters self-identifying as belonging to the "working class" or the "lowerclass" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class", the "upper class" or "no class" voting for democratic / labor / socialdemocratic / socialist / green parties. Self-perceived class cleavages have declined significantly over the past decades. Estimatescontrol for income, education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, andmarital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Sweden

Norway

Denmark

Britain

Argentina

Brazil

Botswana

Chile

ColombiaCosta Rica


Ghana

Hong Kong

Hungary

Indonesia Israel

India Iraq

Japan

South Korea

Mexico

MalaysiaNigeria

Peru

Philippines

Pakistan

PolandSenegal

Thailand

Turkey

Taiwan

South Africa

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

-5 0 5 10 15 20 25

Str

ength

of

educational div

ides


Figure 1.7 - Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and high-income (top 50%) voters voting forselected "pro-poor parties" (see table 1.1) on the x-axis, and the same difference between lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters on the y-axis in non-Western democracies. South Africa and Botswana display particularly strong incomeand educational divides, while education and income only play a minor role in determining electoral behaviors in Japan, the Philippines,and Indonesia. Income and education are shown as identical for Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal given lack of data on income.



-50

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0

10

20

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.8 (panel a) - Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: English-speaking and Northern-European countries

Australia Britain Canada New Zealand Sweden United States Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of Protestants declaring going to church at least once a year and the share ofother voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, Protestants have remainedsignificantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

United States

New Zealand

AustraliaBritain

-50

-40

-30

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-10

0

10

20

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.8 (panel b) - Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: Continental and Southern European countries

Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg


Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of Catholics (or Catholics and Protestants in mixed countries) declaring goingto church at least once a year and the share of other voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. Inall countries, religious voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

Italy

Spain

Switzerland

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Argentina Chile Brazil Peru Mexico Colombia Costa Rica

Figure 1.9 - Religious-secular cleavages in Latin America

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters declaring belonging to no religion and the share of other votersvoting for left-wing / secular parties (Peronist parties in Argentina) in the last election available (Argentina 2015, Brazil 2018, Chile 2017,Colombia 2018, Costa Rica 2018, Mexico 2018, Peru 2016). Non-religious voters are more likely to vote for left-wing / secular parties inall countries, but this gap is large in Costa Rica and almost insignificant in Argentina. See case studies for more details on classificationof parties.

Costa Rica, 2018: non-religious votersmore likely to vote for left-wing / secularparties by 35 percentage points

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.10 - Religious-secular cleavages in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia

Israel - Difference between (% non-religious)and (% religious) voting center / left

Turkey - Difference between (% non-religious) and (% religious) voting left

India - Difference between (% Muslims) and(% non-Muslims) voting INC / left

Indonesia - Difference between (% non-Muslims) and (% Muslims) voting PDI-P

Malaysia - Difference between (% non-Muslims) and (% Muslims) voting DAP / PKR

Pakistan - Difference between (% Shia / non-Muslims) and (% Sunni) voting PPP

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the evolution of the vote of religious minorities or non-religious voters in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia,Pakistan, and Malaysia. In the past decades, religious cleavages have risen in India, Pakistan, and Malaysia, while they have remainedstable at high levels in Indonesia, Turkey, and Israel. INC: Indian National Congress; PDI-P: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle;DAP: Democratic Action Party; PKR: People's Justice Party; PPP: Pakistan Peoples Party.

Israel: non-religious voters more likely tovote for center / left by 43 percentage points

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Figure 1.11 - The native-immigrant cleavage in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and the European SocialSurvey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters born in non-Western countries (all countries excluding Europe,Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States) and the share of natives (voters born in the country considered) voting fordemocratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In nearly all Western countries, immigrantsare much more likely to vote for these parties than natives. US and Iceland figures include voters born in Western countries given lackof data on exact country of origin. Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Denmark: immigrants more likely to vote forsocial democratic / socialist / green partiesby 39 percentage points

Iceland, Finland, Portugal, Australia:immigrants not voting for differentparties than natives

0

10

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30

40

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Figure 1.12 - The Muslim vote in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and the European SocialSurvey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of Muslim voters and the share of non-Muslims voting for democratic /labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In all Western countries, Muslims are substantially morelikely to vote for these parties than non-Muslims. This cleavage is stronger in countries with strong far-right parties (e.g. Sweden,Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, France). Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Muslim voters more likely to vote for social democratic /socialist / green parties by over 40 percentage points

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Turkey Algeria Mexico Peru Colombia CostaRica

Botswana Senegal Brazil NewZealand

India West.dem.

UnitedStates

Figure 1.13 - Sociocultural cleavages and disadvantaged minorities in comparative perspective

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of specific sociocultural minorities and the share of other voters voting forselected "pro-poor" parties in the last election available. The Turkish AKP corresponds to a "social-exclusive party": it is supported bylow-income voters of the majority but not by the disadvantaged Kurdish minority. The Democratic Party in the United States is a "social-inclusive party", supported by both low-income voters and disadvantaged Black voters. Ethnic minorities correspond to non-Tswanagroups in Botswana and speakers of Fulani / Serer / Mande languages in Senegal.

"Social-exclusive parties"Pro-poor, anti-minorities

"Social-inclusive parties"Pro-poor, pro-minorities

Turkey, 2018: Kurdish votersless likely to vote AKP by 32percentage points

US, 2016: Black voters morelikely to vote Democratic by47 percentage points

Berber

Indigenous

Indigenous Afro-Colombians

Afro-Costa Ricans

Ethnic minorities

Ethnic minorities

Afro-Brazilians

Māori

Muslims

Muslims

AKP FLN/RND PRI FP Uribists PLN BDP APR PT Left-wing parties

Congressand left

Left-wing parties

Democraticparty

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1945-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.14 - The strength and persistence of sociocultural cleavages in comparative perspective

South Africa - Black vote for ANC

US - Black vote for Democrats

Pakistan - Sindhi vote for PPP

Taiwan - Minnan/Hakka vote for DPP

New Zealand - Maori vote for the left

Nigeria - Muslim vote for APC

Ghana - Mole-Dagbon vote for NDC

Malaysia - Chinese vote for DAP / PKR

India - Lower caste vote for INC / left

Indonesia - Javanese vote for PDI-P

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of a specific sociocultural group and the rest of the electorate voting forselected parties or groups of parties. In the United States in the 1940s, Black voters were more likely to vote for the Democratic Partyby 12 percentage points, compared to 49 percentage points in the 2010s. Sociocultural cleavages have risen or remained stable at highlevels in the majority of represented countries. They are highest in South Africa and lowest in Indonesia. For India, the gap correspondsto SCs/STs vs. Upper castes.

South Africa: Black voters more likelyto vote ANC by 67 percentage points

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1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.15 - The rural-urban cleavage in Western democracies

Australia Austria Canada Denmark Finland France

Iceland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway

Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United States Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for democratic / labor /social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, rural areas have remained significantly less likely to vote for these partiesthan cities, with no clear trend over time. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status(in country-years for which these variables are available).

Switzerland

Italy

France

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Figure 1.16 - Rural-urban cleavages in comparative perspective

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for the main pro-poor partyin the last election available in the dataset. In the majority of countries, parties oriented towards low-income voters also tend to makesignificantly higher scores in rural areas than in cities. Western democracies: cross-country average over all countries with data.



Botswana, 2019: rural areas morelikely to vote for Botswana DemocraticParty by 22 percentage points

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Botswana,2010s

India,1960s

Japan,1960s

Malaysia,2010s

Mexico,1990s

Senegal,2010s

SouthAfrica,2010s

Taiwan,1990s

Figure 1.17 - Rural-urban cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant parties by geographical location

Center / Capital city Other urban areas Rural areas

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by dominant parties by geographical location in a selected number of countriesand time periods. In all these one-party dominant systems, dominant parties systematically receive greater support from rural areasthan from cities. Dominant parties: FLN/RND (Algeria), BDP (Botswana), Congress (India), LDP (Japan), BN (Malaysia), PRI (Mexico),APR (Senegal), ANC (South Africa), Kuomintang (Taiwan). Centers correpond to Alger (Algeria), Gaborone (Botswana), Delhi (India),Wards (Japan), the Central region (Malaysia), the Center region (Mexico), the Western region (Senegal), Gauteng and Western Cape(South Africa), and the North region (Taiwan).

0%

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Allothers

Canada Malaysia SouthKorea

UnitedKingdom

Spain Turkey Pakistan Ghana SouthAfrica

Algeria Nigeria Belgium India Iraq Thailand

Figure 1.18 - Regional cleavages in comparative perspective

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by regional divides in the last electionavailable. Thailand, Iraq, India, and Belgium are the countries with the deepest regional cleavages, with over a quarter of politicalcleavages amounting to regional differences in vote choices. The indicator corresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of amultinomial logistic regression of regional location on the full voting variable (including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is notstrictly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and 40% generally correspond to excellent fits).

Thailand, 2011: regional dividesexplain over 40% of political cleavages

0%

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1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.19 - Regional cleavages in historical perspective

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by regional divides in a selected numberof countries. Regional divides have grown significantly in India, Belgium, Pakistan, Turkey, Spain, and the United Kingdom in the pastdecades, driven by the regionalization of existing coalitions and the formation of new regionally based parties. The indicatorcorresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of a multinomial logistic regression of regional location on the full voting variable(including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is not strictly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and40% generally correspond to excellent fits).

India

Belgium

Pakistan

Turkey

United Kingdom

Spain

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Flanders, Belgium Catalonia, Spain Québec, Canada Scotland, UK

Figure 1.20 - Class and regionalism: vote for independentist parties in Belgium, Spain, Canada, and the United Kingdom by income group

Bottom 50%

Middle 40%

Top 10%

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the share of votes received by selected nationalist parties by income group in Flanders, Catalonia, Québec,and Scotland. Nationalist parties receive greater support from top-income voters in Flanders and Catalonia and from low-income votersin Québec and Scotland. Parties and time periods represented: VU / N-VA in Flanders in the 2010s, nationalist parties in Catalonia inthe 2010s, Bloc Québécois in Québec in the 1990s, and Scottish National Party in Scotland in the 2010s.

5%

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20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70

Age

Figure 1.21 - Generational cleavages and party system fragmentation in Western democracies

Green parties

New left (Germany, Spain, France, Portugal, Norway)

Anti-immigration (Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden)

Anti-immigration (Austria, Spain, Finland, France)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by selected groups of parties in Western democracies by age in the last electionavailable. Green parties and "New left" parties (Die Linke, Podemos, France Insoumise, Bloco de Esquerda, Norwegian Socialist LeftParty) make much higher scores among the youth than among older generations. By contrast, there is no clear age profile in the case offar-right or anti-immigration parties. 20 correponds to voters aged 20 or younger; 70 corresponds to voters 70 or older.

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1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure 1.22 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies: the role of generational replacement

Post-1980 generation

1970s

1960s

1950s

1940s

1930s

1920s

1910s

Pre-1900 generation

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) votersvoting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties within specific cohorts. Between the 1960s and the 1990s,lower-educated voters born in the early decades of the twentieth century remained significantly more likely to vote for these parties thanhigher-educated voters born during the same period. In the last decade, on the contrary, young lower-educated voters were significantlyless likely to vote for these parties than young higher-educated voters. Figures correspond to ten-year averages for Australia, Britain,Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.

Pre-1930s generationsLower educated voting

for the left

Post-1930s generationsHigher educated voting

for the left

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Algeria,2010s

Botswana,2010s

India,1960s

Japan,1960s

Malaysia,2010s

Mexico,1990s

Senegal,2010s

SouthAfrica,2010s

Taiwan,1990s

Figure 1.23 - Generational cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant party by age group

<40 40-59 60+

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by dominant parties by age group in a selected number of countries and timeperiods. In the majority of these one-party dominant systems, dominant parties receive greater support from older voters than fromyounger generations. Dominant parties: FLN/RND (Algeria), BDP (Botswana), Congress (India), LDP (Japan), BN (Malaysia), PRI(Mexico), APR (Senegal), ANC (South Africa), Kuomintang (Taiwan).

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50%

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80%

Japan, 1960s South Korea, 2016 Hong Kong, 2016 UK, 2017

Figure 1.24 - Generational cleavages, political integration, and foreign policy: vote for selected parties by age group

<30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan in the 1960s, the Saenuri Party inSouth Korea in 2016, the pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong in 2016, and the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom in 2017 by agegroup. All these parties received significantly higher support among older generations than among the youth, which can be linked to theparticular strength of cleavages over foreign policy and national integration in these party systems (war memory and remilitarization inJapan, attitudes towards the North Korean regime in South Korea, attitudes towards Mainland China in Hong Kong, and attitudestowards Brexit in the United Kingdom).

Liberal Democratic Party Saenuri Party Pro-Beijing Camp Conservative Party

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Figure 1.25 - The reversal of gender cleavages in Western democracies


Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for democratic / labor / socialdemocratic / socialist / green parties in Western democracies. In the majority of countries, women have gradually shifted from beingsignificantly more conservative than men in the 1950s-1960s to being significantly more left-wing in the 2000s-2010s.

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Figure A1 - The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies, small panel

Difference between (% of top 10% educated voting left) and (% of bottom 90% educated voting left),before controlsDifference between (% of top 10% earners voting left) and (% of bottom 90% earners voting left),before controlsDifference between (% of top 10% educated voting left) and (% of bottom 90% educated voting left),after controlsDifference between (% of top 10% earners voting left) and (% of bottom 90% earners voting left),after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing parties than lower-educated andlow-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters,giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system. Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark,France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. The estimates are presented before and aftercontrolling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, andmarital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

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Figure A2 - The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies, unbalanced panel

Difference between (% of top 10% educated voting left) and (% of bottom 90% educated votingleft), before controlsDifference between (% of top 10% educated voting left) and (% of bottom 90% educated votingleft), after controlsDifference between (% of top 10% earners voting left) and (% of bottom 90% earners voting left),before controlsDifference between (% of top 10% earners voting left) and (% of bottom 90% earners voting left),after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters,giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 25 Western democracies). The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

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101520253035404550

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure A3 - The reversal of educational divides, all Western democracies

Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada Denmark

Finland France Germany Iceland Ireland Italy

Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain

Sweden Switzerland Average United States

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) votersvoting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

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1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure A4 - The reversal of educational divides, all Western democracies, after controls




Sweden Switzerland Average United States

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) votersvoting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

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Figure A5 - The decline/stability of income divides, all Western democracies

Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada

Denmark Finland France Germany Iceland

Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand

Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland

Average United States

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters.

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Figure A6 - The decline/stability of income divides, all Western democracies, after controls

Australia Austria Belgium Britain Canada

Denmark Finland France Germany Iceland

Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand

Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland

Average United States

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

1960s 1970s 1980s1990s 2000s 2010s

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Figure A7 - The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies (quadrant representation), all countries

Left-wing parties Right-wing parties

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). Figures correspond to ten-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,and the US.

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Figure A8 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1950s


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Figure A15 - Decomposing multi-elite party systems: Detailed party families

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Education most clearly distinguishes anti-immigration from green parties, while income distinguishes most clearly conservative and Christian parties from socialist and social-democratic parties. Averages over all Western democracies over the 2000-2020 period. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).





Austria

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France

Italy

Netherlands

Norway

New Zealand

Sweden

Austria

Australia

BelgiumCanada

Switzerland

Germany

Denmark

FinlandIreland

Iceland

NetherlandsNorway

New Zealand

Portugal

Sweden

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

Rela

tive s

upport

am

ong h

igh-incom

e v

ote

rs


FIgure A16 - Decomposing multi-elite party systems: Green vs. Anti-immigration parties

Anti-immigration parties Green parties

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Austria

Australia

Belgium

CanadaSwitzerland

Germany

Denmark

Spain

Finland

FranceUK

IrelandIceland

Italy

Netherlands

Norway

New Z.

Portugal

Sweden

US

Austria

Australia

Belgium Canada

Switz.

Germany

Denmark

SpainFinland

France

UKIreland

Iceland

Italy

Netherlands

Norway

New Z.

Portugal

Sweden

US

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25

Rela

tive s

upport

am

ong h

igh-incom

e v

ote

rs


Figure A17 - Decomposing multi-elite party systems: Social-Democrats / Socialists vs. Conservatives / Christians

Right-wing parties (excl.anti-immigration)

Left-wing parties (excl.Greens)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Figure A18 - Vote for Green parties by education group

Bottom 50% Middle 40% Top 10%

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by education group.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Figure A19 - Vote for Green parties by income group


Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by income group.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Australia Belgium Denmark Finland Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Portugal

Figure A20 - Vote for Green parties by self-perceived class

No class / Middle / Upper class

Lower / Working class

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by self-perceived social class.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Figure A21 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by education group


Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by education group.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Figure A22 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by income group


Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by income group.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Figure A23 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by self-perceived class

No class / Middle / Upper class Lower / Working class

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by self-perceived social class.

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure A24 - Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies




Sweden Switzerland United States Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of union members and the share of non-union members voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies.

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure A25 - Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies, after controls


Finland France Germany Iceland Ireland ItalyLuxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal SpainSweden Switzerland United States Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of union members and the share of non-union members voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies. Estimates control for education, income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure A26 - Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies

Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark

Finland France Iceland Ireland Italy

Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal

Spain Sweden Switzerland Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of public sector workers and the share of private sector workers voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies.

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure A27 - Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies, after controls

Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark

Finland France Iceland Ireland Italy

Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal

Spain Sweden Switzerland Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of public sector workers and the share of private sector workers voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies. Estimates control for education, income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure A28 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies (before controls)

Australia

Britain

Denmark

France

Luxembourg

Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Portugal

Spain

Sweden

United States

Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters self-identifying as belonging to the "working class" or the "lower class"and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class", the "upper class" or "no class" voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties.

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

Figure A29 - The strength of income divides in non-Western democracies

Difference between (% bottom 50%) and (% top 50%) earners voting pro-poor

After controlling for education

After controlling for education, age, gender, religion, religiosity rural/urban, region, sociocultural identity,employment status, marital status

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Figure A30 - The strength of educational divides in non-Western democracies

Difference between (% bottom 50%) and (% top 50%) educated voting pro-poor

After controlling for income

After controlling for income, age, gender, religion, religiosity, rural/urban, region, sociocultural identity, maritalstatus, employment status

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).

Argentina

Brazil

Chile

ColombiaCosta Rica


Hong Kong

HungaryIndonesia

Israel

India

Iraq

Japan

South Korea

Mexico

MalaysiaPeru

Philippines

Pakistan

Poland

Thailand

Turkey

Taiwan

South Africa

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

-5 0 5 10 15 20 25

Str

ength

of

educational div

ides


Figure A31 - Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies (after controls for income/education)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and high-income (top 50%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the x-axis, and the same difference between lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters on the y-axis, respectively after controlling for education and income. Costa Rica: 2014 election represented.



Argentina

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Czech Republic

Algeria

Hong Kong

Hungary

Indonesia

IsraelIndia

Iraq Japan

Mexico

MalaysiaPeru

Philippines

Pakistan

Poland

Thailand

Turkey

Taiwan

South Africa

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

-5 0 5 10 15 20 25

Str

ength

of

educational div

ides


Figure A32 - Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies (after all controls)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and high-income (top 50%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the x-axis, and the same difference between lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters on the y-axis. Costa Rica: 2014 election represented. Figures control for income/education, age, gender, religion, religiosity, rural/urban, region, sociocultural identity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).



0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Figure B1 - Vote for left-wing parties by religion in Western democracies, 1970s

Catholic Other Christian None

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religion in the 1970s in Western democracies.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Figure B2 - Vote for left-wing parties by religion in Western democracies, 2010s

Catholic Other Christian None Muslim

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religion in the 2010s in Western democracies.

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure B3 - Vote for left-wing parties among voters with no religion in Western democracies

Australia Belgium Britain Canada France

Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand

Portugal Spain Switzerland Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters belonging to no religion and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies. Non-religious voters have remained significantly more left-wing than the rest of the electorate since the 1950s.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Mexico Peru

Figure B4 - Vote for left-wing / secular parties by religion in Latin America, last election

No religion Catholic Other Christian Other

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing and secular parties in Latin America by religion in the last election available in the dataset.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Figure B5 - Vote for left-wing parties by country of birth in Western democracies, 2010s

Country Other Western Countries Non-Western countries

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by country of birth in Western democracies in the 2010s.Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland. Covers 2007 and 2012 elections in France (no data in 2017).

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Figure B6 - The strength of sociocultural cleavages in comparative perspective

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by ethnic or sociocultural divides in the last election available. The indicator corresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of a multinomial logistic regression of sociocultural identity on the full voting variable (including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is not stricly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and 40% generally correspond to excellent fits).

Javanese

Wallo

on

Min

nan /

Hakka

Shia

Eth

nic

min

ori

ties

Muslim

s

Eth

nic

min

ori

ties

Afr

o-C

olo

mb

ians

Fre

nch s

peakers

Eth

nic

min

ori

ties

Afr

o-C

osta

Ric

ans

Non-C

hin

ese

Sin

dhis

SC

/ST

Main

landers

Muslim

s

Maori

s

Indig

enous

Afr

o-B

razili

ans

Kurd

s

Bla

ck A

meri

cans

Indig

enous

Mole

-Dag

bon

Muslim

s

Afr

icans

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

160%

180%

Figure B7 - The strength of sociocultural inequalities in comparative perspective

Source: authors' computations combining data from the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and data from the World Inequality Database (wid.world). Figures need to be interpreted with care given low quality of underlying income data.Note: the figure represents the % difference in income between a specific low-income sociocultural group and the rest of the population in the last year available.

United States: Black average income about 45% lower than rest

of US electorate

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Figure C1 - The strength of rural-urban cleavages in comparative perspective (after controls)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for the main pro-poor party in the last election available in the dataset, after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status.



-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

110%

120%

Figure C2 - The strength of rural-urban inequalities in comparative perspective

Source: authors' computations combining data from the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and data from the World Inequality Database (wid.world). Figures need to be interpreted with care given low quality of underlying income data.Note: the figure represents the % difference in income between urban areas and rural areas in the last year available

Peru: average incomes more than twice higher in cities than in rural areas

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Figure C3 - Vote for Green parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies

Urban Rural

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Figure C4 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies

Urban Rural

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Australia Austria Belgium Denmark France Iceland Ireland NewZealand

Portugal Spain UnitedKingdom

Figure C5 - Vote for left-wing parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies

Periphery Center

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Australia Austria Belgium Denmark Iceland Ireland New Zealand Portugal

Figure C6 - Vote for Green parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies

Periphery Center

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies. Centerscorrespond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Austria Belgium Denmark France New Zealand Spain United Kingdom

Figure C7 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies

Periphery Center

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure C8 - Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in Western democracies

Australia Austria Belgium Britain Denmark France

Iceland Ireland New Zealand Portugal Spain Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living the in the capital city and the share of other voters voting forleft-wing parties in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels(Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand),Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure C9 - Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in Western democracies, after controls

Australia Austria Belgium Britain Denmark France

Iceland Ireland New Zealand Portugal Spain Average

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living the in the capital city and the share of other voters voting forleft-wing parties in Western democracies, after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status.Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris(France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London(United Kingdom).

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

20%S

wed

en

Sw

itze

rlan

d

Neth

erl

an

ds

De

nm

ark

Be

lgiu

m

Ita

ly

Unite

d S

tate

s

Po

rtu

ga

l

Ice

land

Can

ada

Norw

ay

Au

str

alia

Ja

pan

Fin

lan

d

Unite

d K

ing

do

m

Au

str

ia

Mexic

o

Ge

rma

ny

Pa

kis

tan

New

Ze

ala

nd

Irela

nd

Arg

entin

a

Fra

nce

Bo

tsw

an

a

Colo

mb

ia

Taiw

an

Ind

on

esia

Sp

ain

Costa

Ric

a

Chile

Pe

ru

Ph

ilipp

ine

s

Bra

zil

Mala

ysia

So

uth

Ko

rea

Se

ne

gal

Alg

eri

a

Nig

eri

a

So

uth

Afr

ica

Iraq

Turk

ey

Gh

ana

Ind

ia

Tha

ilan

d

Figure C10 - The strength of regional inequalities in comparative perspective

Source: authors' computations combining data from the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and data from the World Inequality Database (wid.world). Figures need to be interpreted with care given low quality of underlying income data.Note: the figure represents the share of income inequality that can be explained by regional inequalities. This is measured using the adjusted R-squared of a linear regression of regional location on the income rank (quintiles + top decile).

Thailand: regional inequalities explain 18% of overall income inequalities

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Figure C11 - Vote for nationalist parties among top-income voters in Catalonia, Flanders, Québec, and Scotland

Catalonia, before controlsCatalonia, after controlsFlanders, before controlsFlanders, after controlsQuébec, before controlsQuébec, after controlsScotland, before controlsScotland, after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for nationalist parties in Catalonia, Flanders, Québec and Scotland, before and after controlling for education, age, gender, employment status, marital status, and rural-urban location.

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure D1 - Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies





Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters younger than 25 and the share of voters aged 25 or above voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies.

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure D2 - Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies





Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of the 10% oldest voters and the share of the youngest 90% voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies.

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure D3 - Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies, after controls





Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters younger than 25 and the share of voters aged 25 or above voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies, after controlling for income, education, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status.

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure D4 - Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies, after controls





Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of the 10% oldest voters and the share of the youngest 90% voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies, after controlling for income, education, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Figure D5 - Vote for Green parties by age group in Western democracies

18-39 40-59 60+

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by age group.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Figure D6 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by age group in Western democracies

18-39 40-59 60+

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by age group.

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%P

eru

Ind

iaIr

aq

Gh

ana

Pa

kis

tan

Ind

on

esia

Ge

rma

ny

Bra

zil

Sp

ain

De

nm

ark

Turk

ey

Ice

land

Be

lgiu

mS

ou

th A

fric

aF

inla

nd

Norw

ay

Ph

ilipp

ine

sS

wed

en

Hun

gary

Se

ne

gal

Neth

erl

an

ds

Ita

lyIr

ela

nd

Ja

pan

Nig

eri

aA

rge

ntin

aL

uxem

bo

urg

Mexic

oC

an

ada

Taiw

an

Bo

tsw

an

aU

nite

d S

tate

sF

ran

ce

Sw

itze

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Figure D7 - The strength of generational cleavages in comparative perspective

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure represents the share of voting behaviors that can be explained by age. This is measured using the adjusted R-squared of a linear regression of support for the pro-poor party on a full set of age dummies.

South Korea: age explains 12% of electoral behaviors

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-20

Figure E1 - Vote for left-wing parties among women in Western democracies (after controlling for religion)


Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies, after controlling for religion and church attendance. In the majorityof countries, women have gradually shifted from being significantly more right-wing to being significantly more left-wing than men.

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Figure E2 - Gender cleavages and sectoral specialization in Western democracies

Difference between (% women) and (% men) voting left

After controlling for public/private sector of employment

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies in the last election available, before and after controlling for occupation (employment status + private/public sector of employment).

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Figure E3 - Vote for Green parties by gender in Western democracies

Women Men

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties by gender in Western democracies in the last election available.

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Figure E4 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by gender in Western democracies

Women Men

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by gender in Western democracies in the last election available

0

5

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15

20

25

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Figure E5 - The strength of the gender cleavage in comparative perspective

Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for the main pro-poor party in the last election available in the dataset.

Pro-poor pro-men parties

Pro-poor pro-women parties

Thailand, 2011: women more likely to vote for Pheu Thai by 16 percentage points

Documents

Chapter 1. Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities in