D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

There is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reasons, and in the present case, in the right forum by the right parties.  While grievances against union leaders constitute legitimate complaints deserving appropriate redress, action thereon should be made in the proper forum at the proper time and after observance of proper procedures.  Similarly, the election of union officers should be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the union’s constitution and bylaws, as well as the Philippine Constitution and the Labor Code.  Specifically, while all legitimate faculty members of the University of Santo Tomas (UST) belonging to a collective bargaining unit may take part in a duly convened certification election, only bona fide members of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU) may participate and vote in a legally called election for union officers.  Mob hysteria, however well-intentioned, is not a substitute for the rule of law.

The Case

The Petition for Certiorari before us assails the August 15, 1997 Resolution of Director Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio Jr. of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) in BLR Case No. A-8-49-97, which affirmed the February 11, 1997 Decision of Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin.  The med-arbiter’s Decision disposed as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the election of USTFU officers conducted on October 4, 1996 and its election results as null and void ab initio.

“Accordingly, respondents Gil Gamilla, et al are hereby ordered to cease and desist from acting and performing the duties and functions of the legitimate officers of [the] University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) pursuant to [the] union’s constitution and by-laws (CBL).

“The Temporary Restraining Order (TRO ) issued by this Office on December 11, 1996 in connection with the instant petition, is hereby made and declared permanent.”

Likewise challenged is the October 30, 1997 Resolutionof Director Bitonio, which denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The factual antecedents of the case are summarized in the assailed Resolution as follows:

“Petitioners-appellees [herein Private Respondents] Marino, et. al. (appellees) are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU).  The union has a subsisting five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement with its employer, the University of Santo Tomas (UST).  The CBA was registered with the Industrial Relations Division, DOLE-NCR, on 20 February 1995.  It is set to expire on 31 May 1998.

“On 21 September 1996, appellee Collantes, in her capacity as Secretary General of USTFU, posted a notice addressed to all USTFU members announcing a general assembly to be held on 05 October 1996.  Among others, the general assembly was called to elect USTFU’s next set of officers.  Through the notice, the members were also informed of the constitution of a Committee on Elections (COMELEC) to oversee the elections.  (Annex “B”, petition)

“On 01 October 1996, some of herein appellants filed a separate petition with the Med-Arbiter, DOLE-NCR, directed against herein appellees and the members of the COMELEC.  Docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001, the petition alleged that the COMELEC was not constituted in accordance with USTFU’s constitution and by-laws (CBL) and that no rules had been issued to govern the conduct of the 05 October 1996 election.

“On 02 October 1996, the secretary general of UST, upon the request of the various UST faculty club presidents (See paragraph VI, Respondents’ Comment and Motion to Dismiss), issued notices allowing all faculty members to hold a convocation on 04 October 1996 (See Annex ‘C’ Petition; Annexes ‘4’ to ‘10’, Appeal).  Denominated as [a] general faculty assembly, the convocation was supposed to discuss the ‘state of the unratified UST-USTFU CBA’ and ‘status and election of USTFU officers’ (Annex ‘11’, Appeal)

“On 04 October 1996, the med-arbiter in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001 issued a temporary restraining order against herein appellees enjoining them from conducting the election scheduled on 05 October 1996.

“Also on 04 October 1996, and as earlier announced by the UST secretary general, the general faculty assembly was held as scheduled.  The general assembly was attended by members of the USTFU and, as admitted by the appellants, also by 'non-USTFU members [who] are members in good standing of the UST Academic Community Collective Bargaining Unit' (See paragraph XI, Respondents’ Comment and Motion to Dismiss).  On this occasion, appellants were elected as USTFU’s new set of officers by acclamation and clapping of hands (See paragraphs 40 to 50, Annex '12', Appeal).

“The election of the appellants came about upon a motion of one Atty. Lopez, admittedly not a member of USTFU, that the USTFU CBL and 'the rules of the election be suspended and that the election be held [on] that day' (See --paragraph 39, Idem.)

“On 11 October 1996, appellees filed the instant petition seeking injunctive reliefs and the nullification of the results of the 04 October 1996 election.  Appellees alleged that the holding of the same violated the temporary restraining order issued in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001.  Accusing appellants of usurpation, appellees characterized the election as spurious for being violative of USTFU’s CBL, specifically because the general assembly resulting in the election of appellants was not called by the Board of Officers of the USTFU; there was no compliance with the ten-day notice rule required by Section 1, Article VIII of the CBL; the supposed elections were conducted without a COMELEC being constituted by the Board of Officers in accordance with Section 1, Article IX of the CBL; the elections were not by secret balloting as required by Section 1, Article V and Section 6, Article IX of the CBL, and, the general assembly was convened by faculty members some of whom were not members of USTFU, so much so that non-USTFU members were allowed to vote in violation of Section 1, Article V of the CBL.

“On 24 October 1996, appellees filed another urgent ex-parte motion for a temporary restraining

order, this time alleging that appellants had served the former a notice to vacate the union office.  For their part, appellants moved to dismiss the original petition and the subsequent motion on jurisdictional grounds.  Both the petition and the motion were captioned to be for “Prohibition, Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.” According to the appellants, the med-arbiter has no jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition, 'including the ancillary remedies of restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, which are merely incidental to the main petition for PROHIBITION' (Paragraph XVIII3, Respondents’ Comment and Motion to Dismiss).  Appellants also averred that they now constituted the new set of union officers having been elected in accordance with law after the term of office of appellees had expired.  They further maintained that appellees’ scheduling of the 5 October 1996 elections was illegal because no rules and regulations governing the elections were promulgated as required by USTFU’s CBL and that one of the members of the COMELEC was not a registered member of USTFU.  Appellants likewise noted that the elections called by the appellees should have been postponed to allow the promulgation of rules and regulations and to 'insure a free, clean, honest and orderly elections and to afford at the same time the greater majority of the general membership to participate' (See paragraph V, Idem).  Finally, appellants contended that the holding of the general faculty assembly on 04 October 1996 was under the control of the Council of College/Faculty Club Presidents in cooperation with the USTFU Reformist Alliance and that they received the Temporary Restraining Order issued in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001 only on 07 October 1996 and were not aware of the same on 04 October 1996.

“On 03 December 1996, appellants and UST allegedly entered into another CBA covering the period from 01 June 1996 to 31 May 2001 (Annex 11, appellants’ Rejoinder to the Reply and Opposition).

“Consequently, appellees again moved for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent appellants from making further representations that [they] had entered into a new agreement with UST.  Appellees also reiterated their earlier stand that appellants were usurping

the former’s duties and functions and should be stopped from continuing such acts.

“On 11 December 1996, over appellants’ insistence that the issue of jurisdiction should first be resolved, the med-arbiter issued a temporary restraining order directing the respondents to cease and desist from performing any and all acts pertaining to the duties and functions of the officers and directors of USTFU.

“In the meantime, appellants claimed that the new CBA was purportedly ratified by an overwhelming majority of UST’s academic community on 12 December 1996 (Annexes 1 to 10, Idem).  For this reason, appellants moved for the dismissal of what it denominated as appellees’ petition for prohibition on the ground that this had become moot and academic.”

Petitioners appealed the med-arbiter’s Decision to the labor secretary, who transmitted the records of the case to the Bureau of Labor Relations which, under Department Order No. 9, was authorized to resolve appeals of intra-union cases, consistent with the last paragraph of Article 241 of the Labor Code.

The Assailed Ruling

Agreeing with the med-arbiter that the USTFU officers’ purported election held on October 4, 1994 was void for having been conducted in violation of the union’s Constitution and Bylaws (CBL), Public Respondent Bitonio rejected petitioners’ contention that it was a legitimate exercise of their right to self-organization.  He ruled that the CBL, which constituted the covenant between the union and its members, could not be suspended during the October 4, 1996 general assembly of all faculty members, since that assembly had not been convened or authorized by the USTFU.

Director Bitonio likewise held that the October 4, 1996 election could not be legitimized by the recognition of the newly “elected” set of officers by UST or by the alleged ratification of the new CBA by the general membership of the USTFU.  Ruled Respondent Bitonio:

"This submission is flawed.  The issue at hand is not collective bargaining representation but union leadership, a matter that should concern only the

members of USTFU.  As pointed out by the appellees, the privilege of determining who the union officers will be belongs exclusively to the members of the union.  Said privilege is exercised in an election proceeding in accordance with the union's CBL and applicable law.

“To accept appellants' claim to legitimacy on the foregoing grounds is to invest in appellants the position, duties, responsibilities, rights and privileges of USTFU officers without the benefit of a lawful electoral exercise as defined in USTFU's CBL and Article 241(c) of the Labor Code.  Not to mention the fact that labor laws prohibit the employer from interfering with the employees in the latter' exercise of their right to self-organization.  To allow appellants to become USTFU officers on the strength of management's recognition of them is to concede to the employer the power of determining who should be USTFU's leaders.  This is a clear case of interference in the exercise by USTFU members of their right to self-organization.”

Hence, this Petition.

The Issues

The main issue in this case is whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recognize the officers “elected” during the October 4, 1996 general assembly.  Specifically, petitioners in their Memorandum urge the Court to resolve the following questions:

“(1)  Whether the Collective Bargaining Unit of all the faculty members in that General Faculty Assembly had the right in that General Faculty Assembly to suspend the provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws of the USTFU regarding the elections of officers of the union[.]

“(2)  Whether the suspension of the provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws of the USTFU in that General Faculty Assembly is valid pursuant to the constitutional right of the Collective Bargaining Unit to engage in “peaceful concerted activities” for the purpose of ousting the corrupt regime of the private respondents[.]

“(3)  Whether the overwhelming ratification of the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed by the petitioners in behalf of the USTFU with the University of Santo Tomas has rendered moot

and academic the issue as to the validity of the suspension of the Constitution and By-Laws and the elections of October 4, 1996 in the General Faculty Assembly[.]”

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.  Petitioners fail to convince this Court that Director Bitonio gravely abused his discretion in affirming the med-arbiter and in refusing to recognize the binding effect of the October 4, 1996 general assembly called by the UST administration.

First Issue:  Right to Self-Organization and  Union Membership

At the outset, the Court stresses that National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Laguesma has held that challenges against rulings of the labor secretary and those acting on his behalf, like the director of labor relations, shall be acted upon by the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court over petitions for certiorari.  However, inasmuch as the memoranda in the instant case have been filed prior to the promulgation and finality of our Decision in NFL, we deem it proper to resolve the present controversy directly, instead of remanding it to the Court of Appeals.  Having disposed of the foregoing procedural matter, we now tackle the issues in the present case seriatim.

Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution and the Labor Code.  Employees have the right to form, join or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining or for their mutual aid and protection. Whether employed for a definite period or not, any employee shall be considered as such, beginning on his first day of service, for purposes of membership in a labor union.

Corollary to this right is the prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist a labor union. Therefore, to become a union member, an employee must, as a rule, not only signify the intent to become one, but also take some positive steps to realize that intent.  The procedure for union membership is usually embodied in the union’s constitution and bylaws. An employee who becomes a union member acquires the rights and the concomitant obligations that go with this new status and becomes bound by the union’s rules and regulations.

“When a man joins a labor union (or almost any other democratically controlled group), necessarily a portion of his individual freedom is surrendered for the benefit of all members.  He accepts the will of the majority of the members in order that he may derive the advantages to be gained from the concerted action of all.  Just as the enactments of the legislature bind all of us, to the constitution and by-laws of the union (unless contrary to good morals or public policy, or otherwise illegal), which are duly enacted through democratic processes, bind all of the members.  If a member of a union dislikes the provisions of the by-laws, he may seek to have them amended or may withdraw from the union; otherwise, he must abide by them.  It is not the function of courts to decide the wisdom or propriety of legitimate by-laws of a trade union.

“On joining a labor union, the constitution and by-laws become a part of the member’s contract of membership under which he agrees to become bound by the constitution and governing rules of the union so far as it is not inconsistent with controlling principles of law.  The constitution and by-laws of an unincorporated trade union express the terms of a contract, which define the privileges and rights secured to, and duties assumed by, those who have become members.  The agreement of a member on joining a union to abide by its laws and comply with the will of the lawfully constituted majority does not require a member to submit to the determination of the union any question involving his personal rights.”

Petitioners claim that the numerous anomalies allegedly committed by the private respondents during the latter’s incumbency impelled the October 4, 1996 election of the new set of USTFU officers.  They assert that such exercise was pursuant to their right to self-organization.

Petitioners’ frustration over the performance of private respondents, as well as their fears of a “fraudulent” election to be held under the latter’s supervision, could not justify the method they chose to impose their will on the union.  Director Bitonio aptly elucidated:

“The constitutional right to self-organization is better understood in the context of ILO Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of Right to Organize), to which the Philippines is signatory.  Article 3 of the

Convention provides that workers’ organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitution and rules and to elect their representatives in full freedom, free from any interference from public authorities.  The freedom conferred by the provision is expansive; the responsibility imposed on union members to respect the constitution and rules they themselves draw up equally so.  The point to be stressed is that the union’s CBL is the fundamental law that governs the relationship between and among the members of the union.  It is where the rights, duties and obligations, powers, functions and authority of the officers as well as the members are defined.  It is the organic law that determines the validity of acts done by any officer or member of the union.  Without respect for the CBL, a union as a democratic institution degenerates into nothing more than a group of individuals governed by mob rule.”

Union Election vs. Certification Election

A union election is held pursuant to the union’s constitution and bylaws, and the right to vote in it is enjoyed only by union members.  A union election should be distinguished from a certification election, which is the process of determining, through secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, for purposes of collective bargaining. Specifically, the purpose of a certification election is to ascertain whether or not a majority of the employees wish to be represented by a labor organization and, in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization.

In a certification election, all employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit can vote. Therefore, a union member who likewise belongs to the appropriate bargaining unit is entitled to vote in said election.  However, the reverse is not always true; an employee belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit but who is not a member of the union cannot vote in the union election, unless otherwise authorized by the constitution and bylaws of the union.  Verily, union affairs and elections cannot be decided in a non-union activity.

In both elections, there are procedures to be followed.  Thus, the October 4, 1996 election cannot properly be called a union election, because the procedure laid down in the USTFU’s

CBL for the election of officers was not followed.  It could not have been a certification election either, because representation was not the issue, and the proper procedure for such election was not followed.  The participation of non-union members in the election aggravated its irregularity.

Second Issue:  USTFU’s Constitution and ByLaws Violated

The importance of a union’s constitution and bylaws cannot be overemphasized.  They embody a covenant between a union and its members and constitute the fundamental law governing the members’ rights and obligations. As such, the union’s constitution and bylaws should be upheld, as long as they are not contrary to law, good morals or public policy.

We agree with the finding of Director Bitonio and Med-Arbiter Falconitin that the October 4, 1996 election was tainted with irregularities because of the following reasons.

First, the October 4, 1996 assembly was not called by the USTFU.  It was merely a convocation of faculty clubs, as indicated in the memorandum sent to all faculty members by Fr. Rodel Aligan, OP, the secretary general of the University of Santo Tomas. It was not convened in accordance with the provision on general membership meetings as found in the USTFU’s CBL, which reads:

“ARTICLE VIII-MEETINGS OF THE UNION

“Section 1.  The Union shall hold regular general membership meetings at least once every three (3) months.  Notices of the meeting shall be sent out by the Secretary-General at least ten (10) days prior to such meetings by posting in conspicuous places, preferably inside Company premises, said notices.  The date, time and place for the meetings shall be determined by the Board of Officers.”

Unquestionably, the assembly was not a union meeting.  It was in fact a gathering that was called and participated in by management and non-union members.  By no legal fiat was such assembly transformed into a union activity by the participation of some union members.

Second, there was no commission on elections to oversee the election, as mandated by Sections 1 and 2 of Article IX of the USTFU’s CBL, which provide:

“ARTICLE IX - UNION ELECTION

Section 1.  There shall be a Committee on Election (COMELEC) to be created by the Board of Officers at least thirty (30) days before any regular or special election.  The functions of the COMELEC include the following:

a)     Adopt and promulgate rules and regulations that will ensure a free, clean, honest and orderly election, whether regular or special;

b)     Pass upon qualifications of candidates;

c)     Rule on any question or protest regarding the conduct of the election subject to the procedure that may be promulgated by the Board of Officers; and

d)     Proclaim duly elected officers.

Section 2.            The COMELEC shall be composed of a chairman and two members all of whom shall be appointed by the Board of Officers.

“xxx xxx       xxx”

Third, the purported election was not done by secret balloting, in violation of Section 6, Article IX of the USTFU’s CBL, as well as Article 241 (c) of the Labor Code.

The foregoing infirmities considered, we cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to Director Bitonio’s finding and conclusion.  In Rodriguez v. Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, we invalidated the local union elections held at the wrong date without prior notice to members and conducted without regard for duly prescribed ground rules.  We held that the proceedings were rendered void by the lack of due process -- undue haste, lack of adequate safeguards to ensure integrity of the voting, and the absence of the notice of the dates of balloting.

Third Issue:  Suspension of USTFU’s CBL

Petitioners contend that the October 4, 1996 assembly “suspended” the union’s CBL.  They

aver that the suspension and the election that followed were in accordance with their “constituent and residual powers as members of the collective bargaining unit to choose their representatives for purposes of collective bargaining.” Again they cite the numerous anomalies allegedly committed by the private respondents as USTFU officers.  This argument does not persuade.

First, as has been discussed, the general faculty assembly was not the proper forum to conduct the election of USTFU officers.  Not all who attended the assembly were members of the union; some, apparently, were even disqualified from becoming union members, since they represented management.  Thus, Director Bitonio correctly observed:

“Further, appellants cannot be heard to say that the CBL was effectively suspended during the 04 October 1996 general assembly.  A union CBL is a covenant between the union and its members and among members (Johnson and Johnson Labor Union-FFW, et al. v. Director of Labor Relations, 170 SCRA 469).  Where ILO Convention No. 87 speaks of a union’s full freedom to draw up its constitution and rules, it includes freedom from interference by persons who are not members of the union.  The democratic principle that governance is a matter for the governed to decide upon applies to the labor movement which, by law and constitutional mandate, must be assiduously insulated against intrusions coming from both the employer and complete strangers if the 'protection to labor clause' of the constitution is to be guaranteed.  By appellant’s own evidence, the general faculty assembly of 04 October 1996 was not a meeting of USTFU.  It was attended by members and non-members alike, and therefore was not a forum appropriate for transacting union matters.  The person who moved for the suspension of USTFU’s CBL was not a member of USTFU.  Allowing a non-union member to initiate the suspension of a union’s CBL, and non-union members to participate in a union election on the premise that the union’s CBL had been suspended in the meantime, is incompatible with the freedom of association and protection of the right to organize.

“If there are members of the so-called ‘academic community collective bargaining unit’ who are not

USTFU members but who would nevertheless want to have a hand in USTFU’s affairs, the appropriate procedure would have been for them to become members of USTFU first.  The procedure for membership is very clearly spelled out in Article IV of USTFU’s CBL.  Having become members, they could then draw guidance from Ang Malayang Manggagawa Ng Ang Tibay v. Ang Tibay, 103 Phil. 669.  Therein the Supreme Court held that ‘if a member of the union dislikes the provisions of the by-laws he may seek to have them amended or may withdraw from the union; otherwise he must abide by them.’ Under Article XVII of USTFU’s CBL, there is also a specific provision for constitutional amendments.  What is clear therefore is that USTFU’s CBL provides for orderly procedures and remedies which appellants could have easily availed [themselves] of instead of resorting to an exercise of their so-called ‘residual power'.”

Second, the grievances of the petitioners could have been brought up and resolved in accordance with the procedure laid down by the union’s CBLand by the Labor Code. They contend that their sense of desperation and helplessness led to the October 4, 1996 election.  However, we cannot agree with the method they used to rectify years of inaction on their part and thereby ease bottled-up frustrations, as such method was in total disregard of the USTFU’s CBL and of due process.  The end never justifies the means.

We agree with the solicitor general’s observation that “the act of suspending the constitution when the questioned election was held is an implied admission that the election held on that date [October 4, 1996] could not be considered valid under the existing USTFU constitution xxx.”

The ratification of the new CBA executed between the petitioners and the University of Santo Tomas management did not validate the void October 4, 1996 election.  Ratified were the terms of the new CBA, not the issue of union leadership -- a matter that should be decided only by union members in the proper forum at the proper time and after observance of proper procedures.

Epilogue

G.R. No. L-44350 November 25, 1976

U.E. AUTOMOTIVE EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION-TRADE UNIONS OF THE

PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES, Petitioners, vs. CARMELO C. NORIEL,

PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF LABOR, AND U. E. AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURING CO., INC.,

Respondents.

 

FERNANDO, J.: virtual law library

It is a notable feature of our Constitution that freedom of association is explicitly ordained; 1 it is not merely derivative, peripheral or penumbral, as is the case in the United States. 2 It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution. 3 More specifically, where it concerns the expanded rights of labor under the present Charter, it is categorically made an obligation of the State to assure full enjoyment "of workers to self-organization [and] collective bargaining." 4 It would be to show less than full respect to the above mandates of the fundamental law, considering that petitioner union obtained the requisite majority at a fair and honest election, if it would not be recognized as the sole bargaining agent. The objection by respondent Director finds no support in the wording of the law. To sustain it, however, even on the assumption that it has merit, just because when petitioner asked for a certification election, there was lacking the three-day period under the Industrial Peace Act then in force 5 for it to be entitled to the rights and privileges of a labor organization, would be to accord priority to form over substance. Moreover, it was not denied that respondent Director of Labor Relations on January 2, 1975 certified that it was petitioner which should be "the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all rank and file employees and workers of the U.E. Automotive Manufacturing, Inc." 6 He had no choice as the voting was 59 in favor of petitioner and 52 for private respondent Union. It would appear evident, therefore, that in the light of the constitutional provisions set forth above and with the present Labor Code, the challenged order of February 24, 1975 setting aside such certification and ordering the holding of a new election did amount to a grave abuse of discretion. That was to run counter to what the law commands. 7 virtual law library

The facts are undisputed. The comment submitted by respondent Director Carmelo C.

Noriel, through Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. and Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno, 8 made it clear. There was, on August 15, 1974, a petition for certification election with the National Labor Relations Commission filed by petitioner. Thereafter, on August 26, 1974, private respondent Philippine Federation of Labor submitted a motion for intervention. Three conferences between such labor organizations resulted in an agreement to hold a consent election actually conducted on September 19, 1974 among the rank and file workers of respondent management firm. Petitioner obtained fifty-nine votes, with respondent union having only fifty-two votes in such consent election. There was, on September 19, 1974, a motion by petitioner to issue an order of certification duly granted on January 2, 1975 by respondent Director who did certify petitioner as the sole land exclusive collective bargaining representative of such rank and file employees of respondent firm. There was, however, a motion for reconsideration which was granted notwithstanding opposition by the union on January 22, 1975, setting aside the previous order certifying petitioner as the sole bargaining representative. It is such an order sustaining a motion for reconsideration that resulted in this petition. 9 virtual law library

The submission of respondent Director to sustain the validity of his order in the comment submitted on his behalf follows: "Petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization. Section 2(f) of, Republic Act Number 875 defines a legitimate labor organization as any labor organization registered by the Department of Labor. Petitioner union is not duly registered with the Department of Labor. The records of the Labor Registration Division of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor show that the application for registration of petitioner union was filed therein on July 19, 1974. Petitioner union filed a petition for certification on August 15, 1974 or merely after a period of twenty-seven (27) days. Section 23(b) of Republic Act Number 875 explicitly provides, thus: 'Any labor organization, association or union of workers duly organized for the material, intellectual and moral well-being of the members shall acquire legal personality and be entitled to all the rights and privileges within thirty days of filing with the Office of the Secretary of Labor notice of its due application and existence and the following documents, together with the amount of

five pesos as registration fee, except as provided in paragraph "d" of this section (emphasis supplied).' It is clear therefore that the petition for certification election was filed before the expiration of the period of thirty (30) days. It is futile therefore for the petitioner to claim that it has already legal personality and is entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations by virtue of Section 23(b) of Republic Act Number 875." 10 As noted at the outset, such an argument rests on an infirm and shaky foundation. It definitely runs counter to what this Court has held and continues to hold in a number of cases in accordance with the constitutional freedom of association, more specifically, where labor is concerned, to the fundamental rights of self-organization. Hence the merit in the present petition. virtualawlibrary virtual law library

1. There is pertinent to this excerpt from a recent decision, Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera v. Noriel: 11 "Clearly, what is at stake is the constitutional right to freedom of association on the part of employees. Petitioner labor union was in the past apparently able to enlist the allegiance of the working force in the Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation. Thereafter, a number of such individuals joined private respondent labor union. That is a matter clearly left to their sole uncontrolled judgment. There is this excerpt from Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American Employees Association: 'There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions to take care of their interests vis-a-vis their employees. Their freedom to form organizations would be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain for them.' It cannot be otherwise, for the freedom to choose which labor organization to join is an aspect of the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. Prior to the Industrial Peace Act, there was a statute setting forth the guideline for the registration of labor unions. As implied in Manila Hotel Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, it was enacted pursuant to what is ordained in the Constitution. Thus in Umali v. Lovina, it was held that mandamus lies to compel the registration of a labor organization. There is this apt summary of what is signified in Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union v. Court of Industrial Relations, 'to allow a labor union to organize itself and acquire a personality distinct and separate from its

members and to serve as an instrumentality to conclude collective bargaining agreements * * *.' It is no coincidence that in the first decision of this Court citing the Industrial Peace Act, Pambujan United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Company, the role of a labor union as the agency for the expression of the collective will affecting its members both present and prospective, was stressed. That statute certainly was much more emphatic as to the vital aspect of such a right as expressly set forth in the policy of the law. What is more, there is in such enactment this categorical provision on the right of employees to self-organization: 'Employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. The new Labor Code is equally explicit on the matter. Thus: 'The State shall assure the rights of workers of self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work.'" 12

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2. The matter received further elaboration in the Federacion Obrera decision in these words: "It is thus of the very essence of the regime of industrial democracy sought to be attained through the collective bargaining process that there be no obstacle to the freedom Identified with the exercise of the right to self-organization. Labor is to be represented by a union that can express its collective will. In the event, and this is usually the case, that there is more than one such group fighting for that privilege, a certification election must be conducted. That is the teaching of a recent decision under the new Labor Code, United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries v. Noriel. There is this relevant except: 'The institution of collective bargaining is, to recall Cox, a prime manifestation of industrial democracy at work. The two parties to the relationship, labor and management, make their own rules by coming to terms. That is to govern themselves in matters that really count. As labor, however, is composed of a number of individuals, it is indispensable that they be represented by a labor organization of their choice. Thus may be discerned how crucial is a certification election. So our decisions from the earliest case of PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Co. Free Telephone Workers Union to the latest, Philippine

Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers' Federation (PCWF) v. Court of Industrial Relations, have made clear.' An even later pronouncement in Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, speaks similarly: 'Petitioner thus appears to be woefully lacking in awareness of the significance of a certification election for the collective bargaining process. It is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. No better device can assure the institution of industrial democracy with the two parties to a business enterprise, management and labor, establishing a regime of self-rule.' " 13 virtual law library

3. Deference to the above principles so often reiterated in a host of decisions ought to have exerted a compelling force on respondent Director of Labor Relations. As a matter of fact, that appeared to be the case. He did certify on January 2, 1975 that petitioner should be "the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees and workers of the UE Automotive Manufacturing, Inc." 14 The voting, having been 59 in favor of petitioner and 52 for private respondent Union, had to be respected. Had he stood firm, there would have been no occasion for the certiorari petition. He did, however, have a change of mind. On February 24, 1975, he set aside such certification. In his comment, earlier referred to, he would predicate this turnabout on the Union lacking the three-day period before filing the petition for certification under the appropriate provision of the Industrial Peace Act then in force. That could be an explanation, but certainly not a justification. It would amount, to use a phrase favored by Justice Cardozo, to a stultification of a constitutional right.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

4. The excuse offered for the action taken lacks any persuasive force. It may even be looked upon as insubstantial, not to say flimsy. The law is quite clear; the expression is within thirty days, not after thirty days. Even if meritorious, however, it can be disregarded under the maxim de minimis non curat lex. 15 Then, too, the weakness of such a pretext is made apparent by the well-settled principle in the Philippines that where it concerns

the weight to be accorded to the wishes of the majority as expressed in an election conducted fairly and honestly, certain provisions that may be considered mandatory before the voting takes place becomes thereafter merely directory in order that the wishes of the electorate prevail. 16 The indefensible character of the order of February 24, 1975 setting aside the previous order certifying to petitioner as the exclusive bargaining representative becomes truly apparent.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

5. Nor is the different outcome called for just because at the time of the challenged order, there was as yet no registration of petitioner Union. If at all, that is a circumstance far from flattering as far as the Bureau of Labor Relations is concerned. It must be remembered that as admitted in the comment of respondent Director, the application for registration was filed on July 19, 1974. The challenged order was issued seven months later. There is no allegation that such application suffered from any infirmity. Moreover, if such were the case, the attention of petitioner should have been called so that it could be corrected. Only thus may the right to association be accorded full respect. As far back as Umali v. Lovina, 17 a 1950 decision, it was held by this Court that under appropriate circumstances, mandamus lies to compel registration. There is, in addition, a letter signed by a certain Jesus C. Cuenca, who Identified himself as the Acting Registrar of Labor Organizations, stating that this virtual law library

Office "has taken due note of your letter of July 25, 1974 informing us that this union has been accepted by the Federation as local chapter No. 580." 18 When it is taken into consideration that the Bureau of Labor Relations itself had allowed another labor union not registered but affiliated with the same Federation to be entitled to the rights of a duly certified labor organization, there would appear clearly an element of arbitrariness in the actuation of respondent Director. 19 It is likewise impressed with a character of a denial of equal protection. Lastly, this Court, in Nationalists Party v. Bautista, 20 where one of the defenses raised is lack of capacity of petitioner as a juridical person entitled to institute proceedings, after holding that it was entitled to the remedy of prohibition sought, allowed it either to amend its petition so as to substitute a juridical person, or to show that it is entitled to institute such proceeding. So it should be in this Case. In the

absence of any fatal defect to the application for registration, there is no justification for withholding it from petitioner to enable it to exercise fully its constitutional right to freedom of association. In the alternative, the petition could very well be considered as having been filed by the parent labor federation. What is decisive is that the members of petitioner Union did exercise their fundamental right to self-organization and did win in a fair and honest election.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is granted, the challenged order of February 24, 1975 setting aside the certification is nullified and declared void, and the previous order of January 2, 1975 certifying to petitioner Union as the "sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of all rank and file employees and workers of the U.E. Automotive Manufacturing Company, Inc.," declared valid and binding. Whatever other rights petitioner Union may have under the present Labor Code should likewise be accorded recognition by respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

G.R. No. 84433 June 2, 1992

ALEXANDER REYES, ALBERTO M. NERA, EDGARDO M. GECA, and 138 others, petitioners, vs.CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, as Officer-in-Charge, Bureau of Labor Relations, Med. Arbiter PATERNO ADAP, and TRI-UNION EMPLOYEES UNION, et al., respondent.

 

NARVASA, C.J.:

The officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations (Hon. Cresenciano Trajano) sustained the denial by the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred forty-one (141) members of the "Iglesia ni Kristo" (INK), all employed in the same company, at a certification election at which two (2) labor organizations were contesting the right to be the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. That denial is assailed as having been done with grave abuse of discretion in the special civil action of certiorari at bar, commenced by the INK members adversely affected thereby.

The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation on October 20, 1987. The competing unions were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the election, conducted under the provision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Among the 240 employees who cast their votes were 141 members of the INK.

The ballots provided for three (3) choices. They provided for votes to be cast, of course, for either of the two (2) contending labor organizations, (a) TUPAS and (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and, conformably with established rule and practice, 1 for (c) a third choice: "NO UNION."

The final tally of the votes showed the following results:

TUPAS 1

TUEU-OLALIA 95

NO UNION 1

SPOILED 1

CHALLENGED 141

The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between the competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the INK members should not be allowed to vote "because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in the previous certification elections."

The INK employees promptly made known their protest to the exclusion of their votes. They filed f a petition to cancel the election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result thereof did "not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees." TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that the petitioners "do not have legal personality to protest the results of the

election," because "they are not members of either contending unit, but . . . of the INK" which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization . . . ."

The Med-Arbiter saw no merit in the INK employees 1 petition. By Order dated December 21, 1987, he certified the TUEU-OLALIA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. In that Order he decided the fact that "religious belief was (being) utilized to render meaningless the rights of the non-members of the Iglesia ni Kristo to exercise the rights to be represented by a labor organization as the bargaining agent," and declared the petitioners as "not possessed of any legal personality to institute this present cause of action" since they were not parties to the petition for certification election.

The petitioners brought the matter up on appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations. There they argued that the Med-Arbiter had "practically disenfranchised petitioners who had an overwhelming majority," and "the TUEU-OLALIA certified union cannot be legally said to have been the result of a valid election where at least fifty-one percent of all eligible voters in the appropriate bargaining unit shall have cast their votes." Assistant Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied the appeal in his Decision of July 22, 1988. He opined that the petitioners are "bereft of legal personality to protest their alleged disenfrachisement" since they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union, hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative." He also pointed out that the petitioners "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations."

It is this Decision of July 22, 1988 that the petitioners would have this Court annul and set aside in the present special civil action of certiorari.

The Solicitor General having expressed concurrence with the position taken by the petitioners, public respondent NLRC was consequently required to file, and did thereafter file, its own comment on the petition. In that

comment it insists that "if the workers who are members of the Iglesia ni Kristo in the exercise of their religious belief opted not to join any labor organization as a consequence of which they themselves can not have a bargaining representative, then the right to be representative by a bargaining agent should not be denied to other members of the bargaining unit."

Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the "right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining." This is made plain by no less than three provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 2 Article 243 of the Code provides as follows: 3

ART. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. — All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes or collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.

Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer, among others, to "interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization." Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization . . . "

The same legal proposition is set out in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, as might be expected Section 1, Rule II (Registration of Unions), Book V (Labor Relations) of the Omnibus Rules provides as follows; 4

Sec. 1. Who may join unions; exception. — All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code as well as employees of religious, medical or educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, except managerial employees, shall

have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and without any definite employers people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.

xxx xxx xxx

The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests. 5

Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such membership. 6

As early as 1974 this Court had occasion to expatiate on these self-evident propositions in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al., 7 viz.:

. . .What the Constitution and Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right," it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself being prevented by law; second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is therefore the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an

association; and should he choose to join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time (Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery vs. Enriquez, et al., 108 Phil. 1010, 1019). It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union (Abo, et al. vs. PHILAME [KG] Employees Union, et al., L-19912, January 20, 1965, 13 SCRA 120, 123, quoting Rothenberg, Labor Relations). Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, the guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.

The right to refuse to join or be represented by any labor organization is recognized not only by law but also in the rules drawn up for implementation thereof. The original Rules on Certification promulgated by the defunct Court of Industrial Relations required that the ballots to be used at a certification election to determine which of two or more competing labor unions would represent the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit should contain, aside from the names of each union, an alternative choice of the employee voting, to the effect that he desires not to which of two or more competing labor unions would represent the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit should contain, aside from the names of each union, an alternative choice of the employee voting, to the effect that he desires not to be represented by any union. 8 And where only one union was involved, the ballots were required to state the question — "Do you desire to be represented by said union?" — as regards which the employees voting would mark an appropriate square, one indicating the answer, "Yes" the other, "No."

To be sure, the present implementing rules no longer explicitly impose the requirement that the ballots at a certification election include a choice for "NO UNION" Section 8 (rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules) entitled "Marketing and canvassing of votes," pertinently provides that:

. . . (a) The voter must write a cross (X) or a check (/) in the square opposite the union of his choice. If only one union is involved,

the voter shall make his cross or check in the square indicating "YES" or "NO."

xxx xxx xxx

Withal, neither the quoted provision nor any other in the Omnibus Implementing Rules expressly bars the inclusion of the choice of "NO UNION" in the ballots. Indeed it is doubtful if the employee's alternative right NOT to form, join or assist any labor organization or withdraw or resign from one may be validly eliminated and he be consequently coerced to vote for one or another of the competing unions and be represented by one of them. Besides, the statement in the quoted provision that "(i)f only one union is involved, the voter shall make his cross or check in the square indicating "YES" or "NO," is quite clear acknowledgment of the alternative possibility that the "NO" votes may outnumber the "YES" votes — indicating that the majority of the employees in the company do not wish to be represented by any union — in which case, no union can represent the employees in collective bargaining. And whether the prevailing "NO" votes are inspired by considerations of religious belief or discipline or not is beside the point, and may not be inquired into at all.

The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. The minority employees — who wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining — can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results will be different. They may not and should not be permitted, however, to impose their will on the majority — who do not desire to have a union certified as the exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit — upon the plea that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining. As

repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces not only the right to form, join or assist labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse right NOT to form, join or assist any labor union.

That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well as the fact that when they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should be represented by "NO UNION," they were simply exercising that right of self-organization, albeit in its negative aspect.

The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union" — "but members of the INK which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization" — and "hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative," is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not. As held in Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja: 9

In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank-and-file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit".

Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections. In denying the petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the public respondents exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED; the Decision of the then Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated December 21, 1987 (affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated July 22, 1988) is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and the petitioners are DECLARED to have legally exercised their right to vote, and their ballots should be canvassed and, if validly and properly made out, counted and tallied for the choices written therein. Costs against private respondents.

G.R. No. 94045 September 13, 1991

CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CENECO), Petitioner, vs.

HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and CENECO

UNION OF RATIONAL EMPLOYEES (CURE), Respondents.

 

REGALADO, J.:

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CENECO) seeks to annul the order 1 issued by then Acting Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma on June 6, 1990, declaring the projected certification election unnecessary and directing petitioner CENECO to continue recognizing private respondent CENECO Union of Rational Employees (CURE) as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank-and-file employees of petitioner's electric cooperative for purposes of collective bargaining.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

It appears from the records that on August 15, 1987, CENECO entered into a collective bargaining agreement with CURE, a labor union representing its rank-and-file employees, providing for a term of three years retroactive to April 1, 1987 and extending up to March 31, 1990. On December 28, 1989, CURE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiations be conducted for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA). virtualawlibrary virtual law library

On January 18, 1990, CENECO denied CURE's request on the ground that, under applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join a union. 2 virtual law library

Prior to the submission of the proposal for CBA renegotiation, CURE members, in a general assembly held on December 9, 1989, approved Resolution No. 35 whereby it was agreed that 'tall union members shall withdraw, retract, or recall the union members' membership from Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. in order to avail (of) the full benefits under the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by and between CENECO and CURE, and the supposed benefits that our union may avail (of) under the renewed CBA. 3 This was ratified by 259 of the 362 union members. CENECO and the Department of Labor and Employment, Bacolod District, were furnished copies of this resolution.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

However, the withdrawal from membership was denied by CENECO on February 27, 1990 under Resolution No. 90 "for the reason that the basis of withdrawal is not among the grounds covered by Board Resolution No. 5023, dated November 22, 1989 and that said request is contrary to Board Resolution No. 5033 dated December 13, 1989, ..." 4 virtual law library

By reason of CENECO's refusal to renegotiate a new CBA, CURE filed a petition for direct recognition or for certification election, supported by 282 or 72% of the 388 rank-and-file employees in the bargaining unit of CENECO.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

CENECO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there are legal constraints to the filing of the certification election, citing the ruling laid down by this Court in Batangas I Electric Cooperative Labor Union vs. Romeo A. Young, 5 (BATANGAS case) to the effect that "employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join unions for purposes of collective bargaining agreement, for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners." virtual law library

Med-Arbiter Felizardo T. Serapio issued an order, 6 granting the petition for certification election which, in effect, was a denial of CENECO's motion to dismiss, and directing the holding of a certification election between CURE and No Union.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

CENECO appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment which issued the questioned order modifying the aforestated order of the med-arbiter by directly certifying CURE as the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of CURE.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

Hence, this petition.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

Petitioner CENECO argues that respondent Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion in not applying to the present case the doctrine enunciated in the BATANGAS case that employees of an electric cooperative who at the same time are members of the electric cooperative are prohibited from forming or joining labor unions for purposes of a collective bargaining agreement. While CENECO recognizes the employees' right to self-organization, it avers that this is not absolute. Thus, it opines that employees of an electric cooperative who at the same time are members thereof are not allowed to form or join labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining. However, petitioner does not hesitate to admit that the prohibition does not

extend to employees of an electric cooperative who are not members of the cooperative.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

The issue, therefore, actually involves a determination of whether or not the employees of CENECO who withdrew their membership from the cooperative are entitled to form or join CURE for purposes of the negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement proposed by the latter.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

As culled from the records, it is the submission of CENECO that the withdrawal from membership in the cooperative and, as a consequence, the employees' acquisition of membership in the union cannot be allowed for the following reasons:

1. It was made as a subterfuge or to subvert the ruling in the BATANGAS case: virtual law library

2. To allow the withdrawal of the members of CENECO from the cooperative without justifiable reason would greatly affect the objectives and goals of petitioner as an electric cooperative; virtual law library

3. The Secretary of Labor, as well as the Med-Arbiter, has no jurisdiction over the issue of the withdrawal from membership which is vested in the National Electrification Administration (NEA) which has direct control and supervision over the operations of electric cooperatives; and virtual law library

4. Assuming that the Secretary has jurisdiction, CURE failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not referring the matter of membership withdrawal to the NEA.

The petition is destitute of merit; certiorari will not lie.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

We first rule on the alleged procedural infirmities affecting the instant case. CENECO avers that the med-arbiter has no jurisdiction to rule on the issue of withdrawal from membership of its employees in the cooperative which, it claims, is properly vested in the NEA which has control and supervision over all electric cooperatives.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

From a perusal of petitioner's motion to dismiss filed with the med-arbiter, it becomes readily apparent that the sole basis for petitioner's motion is the illegality of the employees' membership in respondent union despite the fact that they allegedly are still members of the cooperative. Petitioner itself adopted the aforesaid argument in seeking the dismissal of the petition for certification election filed with the med-arbiter, and the finding made by the latter was merely in answer to the arguments advanced by petitioner. Hence, petitioner is deemed to have submitted the issue of membership withdrawal from the cooperative to the jurisdiction of the med-arbiter and it is now estopped from questioning that same jurisdiction which it invoked in its motion to dismiss after obtaining an adverse ruling thereon.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

Under Article 256 of the Labor Code, to have a valid certification election at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. It is apparent that incidental to the power of the med-arbiter to hear and decide representation cases is the power to determine who the eligible voters are. In so doing, it is axiomatic that the med-arbiter should determine the legality of the employees' membership in the union. In the case at bar, it obviously becomes necessary to consider first the propriety of the employees' membership withdrawal from the cooperative before a certification election can be had. virtualawlibrary virtual law library

Lastly, it is petitioner herein who is actually questioning the propriety of the withdrawal of its members from the cooperative. Petitioner could have brought the matter before the NEA if it wanted to and. if such remedy had really been available, and there is nothing to prevent it from doing so. It would be absurd to fault the employees for the neglect or laxity of petitioner in protecting its own interests. virtualawlibrary virtual law library

The argument of CENECO that the withdrawal was merely to subvert the ruling of this Court in the BATANGAS case is without merit. The case referred to merely declared that employees who are at the same time members of the cooperative cannot join labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining. However, nowhere in said case is it stated that member-employees are prohibited from withdrawing their membership in the cooperative in order to join a labor union.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

As discussed by the Solicitor General, Article I, Section 9 of the Articles of Incorporation and By- Laws of CENECO provides that "any member may withdraw from membership upon compliance with

such uniform terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe." The same section provides that upon withdrawal, the member is merely required to surrender his membership certificate and he is to be refunded his membership fee less any obligation that he has with the cooperative. There appears to be no other condition or requirement imposed upon a withdrawing member. Hence, there is no just cause for petitioner's denial of the withdrawal from membership of its employees who are also members of the union. 7

virtual law library

The alleged board resolutions relied upon by petitioner in denying the withdrawal of the members concerned were never presented nor their contents disclosed either before the med-arbiter or the Secretary of Labor if only to prove the ratiocination for said denial. Furthermore, CENECO never averred non-compliance with the terms and conditions for withdrawal, if any. It appears that the Articles of Incorporation of CENECO do not provide any ground for withdrawal from membership which accordingly gives rise to the presumption that the same may be done at any time and for whatever reason. In addition, membership in the cooperative is on a voluntary basis. Hence, withdrawal therefrom cannot be restricted unnecessarily. The right to join an organization necessarily includes the equivalent right not to join the same.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the resignation of the member- employees is an expression of their preference for union membership over that of membership in the cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to afford fall protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees' right to form and join unions for purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration. virtualawlibrary virtual law library

Membership in an electric cooperative which merely vests in the member a right to vote during the annual meeting becomes too trivial and insubstantial vis-a-vis the primordial and more important constitutional right of an employee to join a union of his choice. Besides, the 390 employees of CENECO, some of whom have never been members of the cooperative, represent a very small percentage of the cooperative's total membership of 44,000. It is inconceivable how the withdrawal of a negligible number of members could adversely affect the business concerns and operations of CENECO.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

We rule, however, that the direct certification ordered by respondent Secretary is not proper. By virtue of Executive Order No. 111, which became effective on March 4, 1987, the direct certification originally allowed under Article 257 of the Labor Code has apparently been discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agent of the workers. This amendment affirms the superiority of the certification election over the direct certification which is no longer available now under the change in said provision. 8 virtual law library

We have said that where a union has filed a petition for certification election, the mere fact that no opposition is made does not warrant a direct certification. 9 In said case which has similar features to that at bar, wherein the respondent Minister directly certified the union, we held that:

... As pointed out by petitioner in its petition, what the respondent Minister achieved in rendering the assailed orders was to make a mockery of the procedure provided under the law for representation cases because: ... (c) By directly certifying a Union without sufficient proof of majority representation, he has in effect arrogated unto himself the right, vested naturally in the employee's to choose their collective bargaining representative. (d) He has in effect imposed upon the petitioner the obligation to negotiate with a union whose majority representation is under serious question. This is highly irregular because while the Union enjoys the blessing of the Minister, it does not enjoy the blessing of the employees. Petitioner is therefore under threat of being held liable for refusing to negotiate with a union whose right to bargaining status has not been legally established.

While there may be some factual variances, the rationale therein is applicable to the present case in the sense that it is not alone sufficient that a union has the support of the majority. What is equally important is that everyone be given a democratic space in the bargaining unit concerned. The most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force is by certification election.

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