Cases 5-6 Legal Ethics 2013

8/13/2019 Cases 5-6 Legal Ethics 2013

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[A.M. No. RTJ-92-863 and AC. No. 3815. July 11, 1994.]

JOHNSON LEE and SONNY MORENO, Complainants, v. HON. RENATO E. ABASTILLAS, Judge,Regional Trial Court, Branch 50 Bacolod City, Respondent.

JUDGE RENATO E. ABASTILLAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ENRIQUE S. CHUA, Respondent.

Enrique S. Chua for complainants.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

Johnson Lee and Bonny Moreno filed with this Court a verified complainant dated June 8, 1992, docketed asAdm. Case No. RTJ- 863, charging respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas with a violation of the Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practices Act for soliciting a bribe in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 pending in his salaentitled "People v. Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno," serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming a memberof the Bench, gross ignorance of the law, rendering unjust interlocutory orders and manifest partiality,

oppression and inordinate delay in the administration of justice "which may result or has resulted infalsification of public documents or in the commission of falsehood."cralaw virtua1aw library

In his comment dated September 28,1992, Judge Abastillas vehemently denied the charges against him. Heaverred that Atty. Chua had an axe to grind against him because of a prior incident between them. JudgeAbastillas pointed out that on September 28, 1992, Atty. Chua as counsel for the accused in Criminal CasesNos. 10010 and 10011, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration where he made statements which werehighly contemptuous of Judge Abastillas. Hence, according to Judge Abastillas, he issued an order on March2, 1993 requiring Atty. Chua to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court andrecommended for suspension from the practice of law. After due proceedings, Judge Abastillas issued anorder on March 11, 1993 finding Atty. Chua guilty of contempt of court and imposing upon him a fine in theamount of P500.00. Judge Abastillas then recommended Co this Court that Atty. Chua be suspended fromthe practice of law. This order of March 11, 1993 became the basis of Adm. Case No. 3815 entitled "JudgeRenato Abastillas v. Enrique S. Chua." cralaw virtua1aw library

The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred to Associate Justice Alfredo J. Lagamon of theCourt of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation in a resolution of this Court dated May 6,1993.

After hearing of the two cases, Justice Lagamon submitted his report recommending the dismissal of theadministrative complaint against Judge Abastillas in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-863 and the imposition ofappropriate disciplinary measures against Atty. Enrique 5. Chua in Adm. Case No. 3815.

Evidence in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-563.

Complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 sought to prove their charges of violation of the Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act and gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a magistrate against Judge Abastillas,through the affidavits and testimonies of Johnny K.H. Uy, Johnson Lee and Atty. Enrique S. Chua.

The testimony of Atty. Chua who claimed to have delivered the bribe money of P20,000.00 to JudgeAbastillas on May 2 or 3, 1991 as down payment of the consideration for the dismissal of the criminal casesagainst his clients, is summarized in the report of Justice Lagamon, to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Atty. Enrique S. Chua as counsel for the complainants and also as their principal witness declared in hisAffidavit that when criminal cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 were raffled to RTC, Br. 50, Bacolod City, presidedby the respondent, he was heartened because the respondent was among the few judges he wascomfortable with. Consequently, Atty. Chua allegedly approached the respondent in his chambers andapprised him of the background of the cases and requested that the warrants of arrest be held in abeyancebecause of the irregularity in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. That the respondent accordinglyinstructed the docket clerk not to release the warrants of arrest. After the clerk left, the respondent


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allegedly said, Ike, dont worry toe much, anyway, that is not your personal problem. They are just cases ofyour clients. What is important is that you are assured of your attorneys fees. Why, how much is your feethere? P50,000.00? Make it double, so that I can have a share there and I will take care of everything(Affidavit of Atty. Chua; Exh.H).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Atty. Chua then apprised his client Johnson Lee of what happened and told him not to worry but at the sametime informed him that the judge is asking for P50,000.00 to take care of everything. Johnny K.H. Uy

advised Atty. Chua that they are willing to give P50,000.00 to the respondent because of their sadexperience with the Department of Justice and insisted that the amount be given over the objections of Atty.Chua. That Mr. Uy sent a check in the amount of P20,000.00 to Atty. Chua, which the latter should in turngive to respondent as initial payment for the bribe. In the meantime, Atty. Chua deposited the check in hisaccount.

Sometime in the second week of April, 1991, the criminal docket clerk of the respondent informed Atty.Chua that the bail bond for his clients was increased from P18,000.00 to P100,000.00 each, upon ax pastemotion filed by the private prosecutor. Aware of the adverse development, Johnny Uy blamed Atty. Chua fornot giving the money yet to the Respondent. Atty. Chua again went to the chambers of the respondentwhere accordingly he was advised by the latter to file a motion to strike out the ex-parte motion for thereduction of the bail and at the same time moved for the reduction of the bail provided it shall be in cash.The motion was filed and the respondent granted it the following day. The respondent instructed Atty. Chuathat the bail bond should be in cash to facilitate the collection of his attorneys fees so that both of them canreceive their respective compensation for their efforts (Exh.H, par. 9).

Again, in his Affidavit Atty. Chua stated that on May 2, 1991 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon hedelivered P20,000.00 to the respondent and before he left the chambers, the respondent jestingly saidwhere will they celebrate that evening.

Moreover, he indicated therein that on January 29,1992, Johnson Lee and Atty. Chua appeared before theJudicial and Bar Council and briefly related the delivery of the P20,000.00 to the respondent where he wasrebuked by Dean Palma for allowing himself to be used as a conduit for illegal and immoral act. Dean Palmaasked Atty. Chua if he was not as guilty as the respondent (Affidavit, par. 16).

During the cross examination of Atty. Chua, he affirmed that his first meeting with the respondent wasbetween April 10 to 15, 1991 in his chambers when the criminal docket clerk was instructed not to releasethe warrants of arrest (p. 52, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993; p. 41, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993). He further testified that itwas also at that time when the respondent solicited P50,000.00 when he said, why, how much is your feesthere? P50,000.00? You double it. (p. 54, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993). The second meeting was when Atty. Chua

discussed the reduction of the bail bend which he said could be on April 17, 18 and 19, 1991, but mostprobably on the 18th (pp. 85, 86, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993), and the third meeting was when he delivered theP20,000.00 which he said was on May 2, 1991 but which he rectified during cross examination that hewithdrew the amount on May 2, 1991 and the delivery of P20,000.00 to the respondent was on May 3, 1991at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon (pp. 63-64, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993). chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"In the Memorandum filed by Atty. Chua on Dec. 28, 1993, he pointed out the following facts which wereeither admitted or undisputed and which he believes established the misconduct and the impropriety of therespondent as follows:chanrob1esvirtual 1aw library

a) Respondent Judges admission that he met complainant Lee ahead of witness Johnny Uy, whom hetagged as the financier of the herein complainants on May 29, 1991; while he met Uy only on October 7,1991 (p. 11, Comment dated September 28, 1992 of respondent).

b) Respondent Judges admission that, indeed, on May 29, 1991, he and complainant Lee saw each other atthe Quezon City Sports Center, during the meeting of the Philippine Judges Association (p. 11, Comment,supra).

c) As to witness Uy, respondent Judge admitted that it is true that respondent met with Johnny N.H. Uy onOctober 7, 1991 at the residence of respondent at Unit A-2, 157 Katipunan Road Quezon City . . . (p. 7,Comment, supra).

Atty. Chua is of the opinion that the meeting of the respondent with the accused who were charged with two(2) criminal cases before his sala will render him liable for gross misconduct or conduct unbecoming of (sic)a magistrate."cralaw virtua1aw library


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Atty. Chua further declared that after he delivered the P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, the latter told himthat the accused (in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011) could see the Judge at the forthcomingconvention of Philippine Judges Association to be held at the Quezon City Sports Center.

Johnson Lee, one of the accused in the Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, narrated on the witnessstand that he received a long distance call from Atty. Chua advising him that Judge Abastillas wanted to see

him (Johnson Lee) at the Quezon City Sports Center on May 29, 1991 where the Philippine JudgesAssociation was to hold a convention. Johnson Lee went to the place on said date. Alter introducing himselfto Judge Abastillas, they repaired to a function room where they had a private conversation for about twentyminutes. During the meeting, Johnson Lee naked Judge Abastillas if he had received what they sent to Atty.Chua. Judge Abastillas said yes, but added, "I cannot give you what you are asking. It will take a little timeto study." Johnson Lee responded by saying, "Judge, the balance later on na lang." Judge Abastillas replied,"Okay, okay. Anyway, I know they have no case against you." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

On the same occasion, Johnson Lee took the opportunity to ask Judge Abastillas why he approved three ex-parte motions of the private prosecutor in the criminal cases, one, for issuance of a warrant of arrest of theaccused and, another, for increase of their bail bond, without giving the accused an opportunity to opposethe same. Judge Abastillas assured Johnson Lee that there was nothing to worry "because that is my style. Iwill just give them a little favor. Anyway, the case will be decided in your favor."cralaw virtua1aw library

Before they parted, Johnson Lee told Judge Abastillas that one Johnny Uy, a brother of Ban Hun Flores, who

had a hand in the filing of the criminal cases, wanted to see the judge. Judge Abastillas said yes. "You justgive him my telephone number and call me." Judge Abastillas had earlier given Johnson Lee his calling cardbearing his telephone number 7222968.

The meeting of Judge Abastillas with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center became the basis for thecharges of "gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of (sic) a magistrate."cralaw virtua1aw library

Johnny K.H. Uy testified that he was concerned with the two cases pending before Judge Abastillas wherethe accused were charged with embezzlement of the funds of Neugene Marketing Corporation. According toUy, he was interested in the outcome of the cases, more particularly in the acquittal of the accused, for thereason that the pendency of the criminal cases had adversely affected the operation of the corporation, 75%of which stocks had been assigned to him. Uy declared that he visited Judge Abastillas at his residence in St.Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 at about 11:30 in the morning. Before going to JudgeAbastillas house, Uy called him by telephone and Judge Abastillas gave him the direction of his place.During that visit, where the background and merits of the criminal cases were discussed, Judge Abastillas

assured Uy that he would take care of the cases. Before they parted Judge Abastillas told Uy to ask JohnsonLee if he could help Judge Abastillas with 5,000 U.S. dollars. Uy replied that he would talk to Johnson Leeabout the matter and would inform Judge Abastillas by telephone of the result. On October 16, 1991 atabout 7:00 oclock in the evening, Uy called up Judge Abastillas telling him that there will be no problemabout the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as the cases of Johnson Lee will be cleared first. JudgeAbastillas told Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan. Al Simbulan, a lawyer, was a mutual friend of Uyand Judge Abastillas. The telephone conversation was taped by Uy (Exh. "B").

Going back to the testimony of Johnson Lee, said witness further declared that sometime in the middle ofJune, 1991, Atty. Simbulan called his office and left a note that they would have dinner with Judge Abastillasat six oclock in the evening at Manila Hotel. Johnson Lee obliged. Towards the end of the dinner, JudgeAbastillas told Johnson Lee and Atty. Simbulan in a low voice: "Johnson, dont worry," Huwag kang mag-alala. Nakatimbre na ang kaso nyo sa akin.chanrobleslaw library

After some waiting and obviously realizing that Judge Abastillas was giving the accused a runaround, nothaving done anything relative to the criminal proceedings to indicate that he would perform his part of thebargain, Johnson Lee appeared before the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) sometime in the middle of 1992 tooppose Judge Abastillas application for transfer to Manila as RTC Judge on the ground of his lack of goodmoral character. Johnson Lee saw Justice Loreno Relova to whom he cited the incidents where the Judgeallegedly solicited money in the sums of P50,000.00 and $5,000.00 and accepted the amount of P20,000.00in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011. Justice Relova advised him to come back togetherwith Johnny Uy and bring with them the tape containing the conversation between Johnny Uy and JudgeAbastillas in the evening of October 16, 1991. A week later or on January 29, 1991 Johnson Lee, togetherwith Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua, returned to JBCs office where the tapewas replayed before then JBCmember Calcetas-Santos. Atty. Calcetas-Santos obtained an English translation of the taped conversation


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and gave it to Justice Relova and Dean Rodolfo Palma, another JBC member. Both extensively interrogatedJohnson Lee, Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua. At one point, Dean Palma sternly reprimanded Atty. Chua forhaving allowed himself to be a conduit in the bribery, pointedly reminding Chua that by delivering himselfthe advance payment of P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, he was as guilty as the judge.

As specifics in support of their other charges against Judge Abastillas, complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 averred and sought to prove the following: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

1.) When complainants Filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010and 10011, Judge Abastillas, instead of acting on the same, issued an order for their arrest and confiscationof their bailbonds in view of their failure to appear at the arraignment scheduled for that day;

2.) Likewise, although complainants had already posted bail, Judge Abastillas still insisted that they bepresent at their arraignment. Judge Abastillas gave preferential treatment to some cases, particularlyCriminal Cases Nos. 8846 and 8847, entitled "People v. Espinosa" for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Actsand for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions, which were heard and the accused acquitted in justfive (5) months, and in which the accused were not required to be present at the hearing of the Motion toQuash the Information; whereas in connection with complainants Consolidated Motion to Quash theInformation, their presence was required in a "full-blown type of hearing" and the motion was denied inopen court in a "trifling manner.

3.) Complainants Urgent Motion to Reset Arraignment and to Set Arraignment, Pre-trial and Continuous

Trial dated June 2, 1991 was arbitrarily denied, their bonds were declared forfeited and the bondsmen wereasked to show cause why no judgment shall be rendered against them for the amount of their bonds. Inaddition, Judge Abastillas issued an order for complainants arrest and fixed an excessive bond ofP50,000.00 each for their provisional liberty.

4.) In Criminal Case No. 8847, Judge Abastillas issued an order posthaste requiring the delivery to court ofthe illegally possessed firearm and ammunition, which order was not necessary because the items shouldhave been forfeited in favor of the Government and deposited in Camp Crame.

5.) Two of complainants motions in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 had remained unresolved beyondthe 90-day reglementary period.

In his verified Comments dated September 28, 1992 and Sworn Affidavit of October 22, 1993, as well as inhis testimony in his own behalf, Judge Abastillas denied having solicited P50,000.00 from Atty. Chua orhaving received P20,000.00 from him as initial payment at 4:00 p.m. on May 2 or May 3, 1991. To prove his

defense, Judge Abastillas obtained a joint affidavit from the personnel of his sala, namely, Pablo D. Juguan(Branch Clerk of Court), Estanes A. Alvior (Legal Researcher), Aurora Leda S. Exito, Alma M. Ronato, WilmaB. Cepeda and Julieta D. Jarce (Stenographers), Diana B. Lamur (Interpreter), Amando N. Eso (DeputySheriff), Maribec B. Alvior (Staff Asst. 2) and Edwin O. Navaja (RTC Aide) stating, in essence, that duringthe incumbency of Judge Abastillas of RTC Branch 50 in Bacolod City, they had never seen Atty. Chua enterthe judges chambers.chanrobleslaw library

While on direct examination, Atty. Chua declared that he delivered the P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas eitheron May 2 or May 3 of 1991, on cross-examination Atty. Chua at one point adverted when pressed to givethe exact date that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Now, we go back to your allegation that sometime either on May 2 or the next day, you deliveredP20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas?

"A Yes. Correct.

"Q Can you please be a little bit more specific. Was it May 2 or May 3?

"A Because as far as I can recall, when I appeared before the JBC I had then with me my old bankpassbook. I traced the deposit and withdrawal in that passbook. There was a withdrawal on May 2, 1991 ofthe sum of P20,000.00. So most probably, its either on that very same day or immediately the next daythat I delivered the money.

"A I think most probably it would be May 3 because if I am not mistaken, the next day is either a non-working day or a Saturday and I remember that. Yes, yes. Correct. when I placed the P20,000.00 in my


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attache case, I remember my kid commenting that Papa, you have so much money in your attache case.So the money stayed overnight with me. Yes, Correct. It was May 3." (TSN, p. 11, Sept. 15, 1993.)

Seizing upon Atty. Chuns above-quoted assertion that the delivery of the money "most probably was onMay 3,1991, Judge Abastillas argued that he could not have received the money in the afternoon of May 3as he left Bacolod City early in the morning of that day by ferry boat for Iloilo City and then proceeded bycar to Roxas City where he stayed up to the following day to attend a testimonial in honor of Justice

Bellosillo who was appointed as Court Administrator. To prove his alibi, Judge Abastillas submitted anaffidavit of Judge Bernardo T. Ponferrada (then Presiding Judge of Branch 42, RTC, Bacolod City) certifyingthat he and his wife were with Judge Abastillas in their journey to Roxas City. Judges Sergio Pestano, RamonB. Berjamin and Jose V. Alovera of the Regional Trial Court at Roxas City also executed a joint affidavit tothe effect that Judge Abastillas arrived at Roxas City just before noon of May 3, 1991 where he stayed up tothe following day.cralawnad

Judge Abastillas admitted that he met Johnson Lee on May 29, 1991 at the Quezon City Sports Centerduring the convention of the Philippine Judges Association. But he denied having asked Johnson for ameeting there or having talked to him privately regarding the criminal cases. Judge Abastillas said that RTCJudge Joselito de la Rosa of Manila, was introduced to him by Judge Ponferrada. Judge de la Rosa, a friendof Johnson Lee, in turn introduced Lee to him. According to Judge Abastillas, he gave his calling card toJudge de la Rosa who must have handed it to Johnson Lee afterward. This was the same calling card thatwas introduced as evidence by the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863.

Judge Abastillas, likewise, confirmed the fact that he met Johnson Lee at the Manila Hotel in the evening ofJune 7, 1991 but that the latter was never invited by him to be there on that occasion. This is the account ofJudge Abastillas in his sworn affidavit (Exh. "27") of the meeting:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"23. It is true that Lee attended the dinner which I and my wife had with my cousin and his wife, Mr. andMrs. Arturo Sena, at the Manila Hotel on the evening of June 7, 1991. He was a gatecrasher on thatoccasion. what happened was this: My cousin and I agreed to a foursome at the Manila Hotel on June 7,1991. When my wife and I were already on our way to the Manila Hotel, Atty. Simbulan called me up andsaid he wanted to see me. I told him that I was going to a dinner at the Manila Hotel. He insisted in seeingme; and I had an inkling it was because of the above-mentioned criminal cases, so I told him, I was willingto see him, as long as he did not bring along either or both Lee or Moreno. (Prior to this, he informed methat Lee and Moreno were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda), and I made this condition because I did notwant to meet Lee and/or Moreno outside of the court and especially not during a social occasion; I waswilling to see Atty. Simbulan because his brother is a friend of mine, and he was counsel for one of mybrothers-in law (bilas-husband of my wifes sister). Atty. Simbulan agreed that he would not take with him

either of his clients, so I told him to join us at the Manila Hotel. Much to my surprise and anger, Lee was atthe Manila Hotel Lobby, when he reached the place. So, when I saw Atty. Simbulan, I asked him: Bakit banandito iyan? (Why is that person here?). Atty. Simbulan answered: Ewan ko ba diyan. Pasensiya ka na;Huwag ka nang magalit. Hayaan mo na siya (I dont know. Please be patient; dont get angry. Let him joinus). I contained my irritation. My cousin and his wife, and my wife were civil and hospitable. We, Filipinos,are a hospitable people. Unlike Americans, we tolerate gatecrashers, as in this instance of gatecrashing byJohnson Lee, who is a very pushy person, as indeed he also gatecrashed during the Judges Convention.Furthermore, as indicated by their attempts to see and talk to Justice Alfredo Lagamon, the InvestigatingJustice in this proceeding.

"24. During the dinner, altho my wife, my cousin and his wife tried to be cordial to Lee, I showed mydispleasure by not addressing him. It is not true that I told him I will take care of the two criminal cases."(At pp. 13 and 14.)

Again, Judge Abastillas did not deny that Johnson Lee, one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and10011, went to his residence at Quezon City on October 7, 1991. But the visit, according to Judge Abastillas,was not at his own initiative and the amount of $5,000.00 was never discussed on that occasion. This is hisversion of the meeting:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"25. It is not true that on October 7, 1991 that I asked for $5,000.00 from Johnny Uy. He did come to myresidence on that date, but that was not on my initiative. Prior to October 7, 1991, I had been getting wordfrom our maid and from my son, that a certain Mr. Uy had been calling up asking for me, but refused toleave any message. And then on October 7, 1991, just as I was preparing to go out for a luncheon meeting,our maid informed me a certain Mr. Uy wanted to talk to me over the phone. When I answered the phoneJohnny Uy introduced himself and insisted that I let him come over to my house; he said he wanted to talk


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to me and explain his S.E.C. Case where his sister Banhua is opposing party. He did not say outright that hewas going to discuss the Criminal Cases against Lee and Moreno; if he had, I would have refused to see him,because I did not want to talk with or about Lee, at this time, I was getting fed up with the pushiness andaggressive behavior of Uy, who plainly wanted to establish a close relationship with me. Uy was veryinsistent that I see him, so just to accommodate him, I agreed to see him. And he came to my house onsaid date, October 7, 1991. He did talk about the S.E.C. case and also about Commissioners. I never askedhim for $5,000.00. I never asked him for money, Philippine or American currency, on that occasion, or over

the phone. Uy was lying when he testified that when he came to see me at home, I asked for $5,000.00from him and/or Lee. He was likewise lying when he said that in a telephone conversation with me onOctober 16, 1991, said $5,000.00 was discussed. That is not true. It is possible I may have talked with himover the phone, but I categorically declare that I have never mentioned, nor have we ever discussed$5,000.00. Also, I have never consented to the taping of any conversation, with him, or with anybody else."(Sworn Statement, Exh. "27", pp. 14 and 15.)chanroblesvirtual lawlibrary

Evidence in Adm. Case No. 3815

The offending statements of Atty. Chua that were the subject of the March 11, 1993 contempt order werecontained in the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated February 21, 1992 he filed in Criminal Cases Nos.10010 and 10011, to wit: chanrob1esvirtual 1aw library

1.And at the risk of incurring the ire of the Court, defense counsel regrets to say that in denying the six (6)incidents in the manner above-described, the Court acted no better than a pre-school kid who murmurs a

favorite nursery rime (sic) (Page 3, par. 5 of the Motion).

2.To put it bluntly,Accusedhave the feeling that these cases are being railroaded against them (Page 5,2nd par. of the Motion).

3.Inasmuch as this motion not only seeks to reconsider the various palpable erroneous actuations of theCourt, which have gone so far out of hand, but also cries for prompt extraordinary remedies or correctivedisciplinary sanctions urgently required, so as to restore order and sanity in the entangled situations createdby the series of plainly and outrageously, if not maliciously, erroneous orders of His Honor, which are highlyprejudicial to the rights of the accused and injurious to the administration of justice and in effect, constitutea desecration of our entire judicial system, which have therefore rendered the President Judge RENATO E.ABASTILLAS unfit to continue wearing the judicial robe and sitting any second longer in the Bench, a copy ofthis Motion is made under oath and furnished the Supreme Court thru the Hon. Chief Justice Andrea R.Narvasa; Judicial and Bar Council and the Court Administrator, without prejudice to the impending formaladministrative complaint the accused will in due time institute with the Supreme Court (Page 12, No. (7) of

the Motion)."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the course of the joint hearing of the administrative cases, Judge Abastillas expanded his charges againstAtty. Chua to include the following:chanrob1esvirtual 1aw library

A.) Atty Chua does not have the good moral character required of a member of the Bar and he violated hisoath of office for the reason that: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

1. He admitted during cross-examination that in his conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and Uy, he committed thecrime of bribery which is penalized in Articles 210 and 212 of the Revised Penal Code;

2. He has been charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document in People of the Philippines versusEnrique B. Chua, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12036 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City;

3. An administrative case has been filed against him in Adm. Case No. 1425, entitled "J. Bautista Rabago v.Atty. Enrique S. Chua;"

4. Atty. Chua committed perjury in conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and Uy, by testifying in the proceedingsunder oath that he gave P20,000.00 as a bribe to Judge Abastillas on May 3, 1991, when he knew that henever gave any bribe money to Judge Abastillas; and that Atty. Chua also made other false statements inthe proceedings to harass Judge Abastillas.

B. Atty. Chua violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

1. Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 for falsely testifying under oath that he gave P20,000.00 bribe money to


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Judge Abastillas on May 3, 1991;

2. Canon 8, Rule 8.01 for using abusive and offensive language in his pleadings and memoranda againstUndersecretary Bello of the Department of Justice;

3. Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, for not only by perjuring himself in declaring that be gaveP20,000.00 bribe money to Judge Abastillas, but also by offering false evidence in the form of a taped

conversation, indicating lack of candor, fairness and good faith with the Court, and which acts of Atty. Chuaviolate his duties not to do any falsehood to mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice; and

4. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 for advising his client the two (2) accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and10011 not to attend the scheduled arraignment.

Atty. Chua categorically testified on cross-examination during the proceedings before Justice Lagamon thathe gave P20,000.00 as bribe to Judge Abastillas. Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q In this particular case, with a solicitation bribe allegedly made by Judge Abastillas, what was your adviseto your clients?

"A I admonished them that the defense in these two cases are intrinsically meritorious. So I do not see anyreason giving money or bribing any Judge. And that I am not in the habit doing that.

"Q Did you agree with your clients that you would not give the bribe?

"A That is what I told them.

"Q What did your clients tell you?

"A They are so insistent and finally they prevailed upon me. Because their reason is the sad experience theyhad undergone with the Dept. of Justice. And according to Mr. Uy he told me, he said you just cannotunderestimate my sister Banua and perhaps you do not know her. And he said giving of money is not inreality a bribe because we are in effect buying justice. And he told me I have to be practical about the wholething.

"Q So you were convinced by your clients that this was not really a bribe but you were only buying justice?

"Q I still have reservation. Actually, up to this date I do not as a way of life approach such practice but I

really do not know why I gave in to their constant persistent pleadings.

"Q Was it because as you said you emotionally identified yourself to your clients?

"A Partly maybe.

"Q So you agreed that you are going to give what Judge Abastillas was allegedly asking from you?

"A That was the effect because finally I delivered P20,000.00 to him." (TSN., Oct. 27, 1993, pp. 7-8.)

Findings in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863

We find no sufficient proof to sustain the charge that Judge Abastillas accepted the amount of P20,000.00 inview of Atty. Chuas uncertainty as to the date he delivered the money. His final estimate of the date oncross-examination May 3, 1993 had afforded Judge Abastillas a credible defense of alibi.

However, there is strong and convincing evidence that Judge Abastillas had willingly and knowinglydiscussed with interested parties with whom he met at least three (3) times, the possible dismissal of thecriminal cases for a certain consideration.

Judge Abastillas made no denial that he met and talked with Johnson Lee, one of the accused in CriminalCases Nos. 10010 and 10011 on May 29, 1991 at the Philippine Judges convention at the Quezon CitySports Center on May 29, 1991 and at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991. Also, he did not deny that heaccepted as visitor in his house at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 Johnny K.H. Uy, aparty interested in the outcome of the criminal cases. This meeting was followed by a telephone call made


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by Uy to Judge Abastillas on October 16, 1991 wherein the former informed the latter that there will be noproblem about the 5T (meaning US$5,000.00) as long as the cases of Johnson Lee would be cleared first, towhich Judge Abastillas suggested to Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan, a mutual friend to both.

Judge Abastillas cleverly hedged in answering whether or not he talked to Johnny Uy on the phone onOctober 16, 1991, except to say, "It is possible I may have talked with him over the phone, but Icategorically declare that I have never mentioned, nor have we even discussed $5,000.00, (p. 16, Sworn

Statement, Em. "27"). Judge Abastillas also declared on cross-examination that "it is possible (that JohnnyUy talked to him over the phone on October 16) but I cannot remember exactly the caller, maybe one of thecallers might be a certain Uy but I cannot recognize because I have never heard his voice." (TSN, p. 25,November 11, 1993.) Yet, in his verified comment dated September 28, 1992 (Exh. 4), Judge Abastillasdeclared he had telephone conversation with Johnny Uy just before Uy went to his house on October 7,1991. Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Then in (sic) October 7, 1991 in the morning, our aforesaid maid Beth informed me that Mr. Johnny Uywanted to talk to me. When respondent answered the phone, Mr. Uy introduced himself and asked that hebe allowed to see respondent in his house. Respondent demurred because he was in a hurry because he hada 2 p.m. appointment in the Court of Appeals. But Uy was very insistent, so, just to get rid of him,respondent agreed to see Uy for a few minutes. So Uy went to see respondent at the latters house. Afterintroducing himself, Uy started discussing the criminal cases against complainants herein.

"What respondent repeatedly told Uy is that he (Uy) should rely on the counsel of Lee and Moreno to do all

that need to be done in the case." (pp. 6-7.)

Since Judge Abastillas had already heard Johnny Uys voice on the phone and in fact they had a face-to-faceconversation on October 7, 1991 in the Judges house, it is highly unbelievable that Judge Abastillas couldnot say definitely whether he had a talk with Johnny Uy on the phone on October 16, 1991. His lame andshallow stance only serves to emphasize the obvious.

There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that the voices in the telephone conversation as recorded in thetape by Johnny Uy on October 16, 1991 were those of Uy and Abastillas. The taped conversation wasreplayed at the hearing before Justice Lagamon with the consent of both parties. Johnny Uy identified andrecognized the voices in tape as belonging to him and Judge Abastillas.

In the taped conversation already adverted to, Johnny Uy told Judge Abastillas that there will be no problemabout the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as the (criminal) cases of Johnson Lee will be cleared first.Judge Abastillas response was to advise Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan.

It may be argued that that would not prove that Judge Abastillas solicited US$5,000.00. However, the tapedconversation as the evidence of the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-93-863 would show, was just asequel of a series of interlinked events that had earlier taken place, starting with the solicitation by JudgeAbastillas of P50,000.00 of which he received P20,000.00 as initial payment, followed by the meetingbetween Judge Abastillas and Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center and at the Manila Hotel, andthe meeting between Johnny Uy and Judge Abastillas at the latters house at St. Ignatius Village, QuezonCity where the judge asked for US $5,000.00. All the interrelated events ineluctably point to the conclusionthat Judge Abastillas knew that the "5T" meant $5,000.00 he tried to solicit.

Besides, if Judge Abastillas during the telephone conversation had no idea at all about the "5T" mentionedby Johnny Uy, he should have expressed surprise and inquired from Uy what he meant by it. He did not,which goes to show he filly understood what the "5T" stood for. cralawnad

It is, likewise, suggested that when Johnny Uy mentioned "5T" to Judge Abastillas, the latters reply did notappear to be responsive because he mentioned something like Take up thematter with Al Simbulan." Thetheory is advanced that it would be illogical for a person who is soliciting a bribe to involve a third party anda lawyer at that referring to Atty. Al Simbulan. We do not agree. Atty. Simbulan is a mutual friend of JudgeAbastillas and Johnny Uy. He could serve as a convenient conduit between the two, thus avoiding the directpersonal involvement of the taker in the payoff.

In this connection, Judge Abastillas cannot now question the admissibility of the taped conversation (Exh.13) as evidence. He offered no objection to its replay at the hearing before Justice Lagamon.

We do not believe that Judge Abastillas meeting with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center was not


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pre-arranged. Neither do we accept his explanation that Johnson Lee was a "gate crasher" at the judgesparty at Manila Hotel. On this point, we find the discussion in complainants memorandum in Adm. Case No.RTJ-92-863 dated December 3, 1993 convincing. We quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2. The circumstances as narrated by respondent Judge under which he first met complainant Lee by way ofhis justification in meeting the said Complainant, should he taken with a grain of salt, so to speak.Respondent Judge seems to heap the blame on his fellow Judges Ponferrada and de la Rosa, as being

instrumental in paving the way for his meeting complainant Lee, but neither of these two judges waspresented by him to substantiate his version. Worse, if respondent was able to secure the affidavit of JudgePonferrada (Annex 4 of his sworn affidavit dated 27th October, 1993) to support the fact that on May 3,1991, he was in Roxas City, then, there is no reason why he cannot at least secure a similar affidavit fromJudge Ponferrada to bolster the circumstances under which he met complainant Lee."cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence, that respondent Judge and complainant Lee met under mutually conducive and cordial circumstanceswhich subsequently led to the latters (sic) solicitation of bribe from witness Uy, is very probable.

3. Moreover, the pretension of the respondent Judge that after that meeting of May 29, 1991 withcomplainant Lee at the Judges convention, he did not give him the opportunity to see respondent againand that he took all steps necessary so that he could not have to talk again to Lee, is a pure lie, and thuscannot be believed, because when respondent Judge, without his slightest expectation, was confronted witha calling card (EXH.D) of his own cousin Mr. Arturo Sena, given by said Mr. Sons to complainant Lee, in thepresence of respondent Judge and his wife, at a dinner at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991 or barely a weck

after respondent Judge, realizing that he could no longer pretend to be that resolute in avoidingcomplainant Lee, vainly set up the pretext that complaint (sic) Lee was a gatecrasher on that occasion.This, by itself is extremely difficult to believe.

Even respondent Judges explanation about the presence of complainant Lee at that Manila Hotel dinner issilly, if not childish and ridiculous. According to respondent Judge, he already had an inkling on what was inArty. Simbulans mind when the latter insisted in seeing him at the time he and his wife were already ontheir way to the Manila Hotel for a foursome dinner. That inkling according to respondent Judge, are thetwo criminal cases where complainant Lee is one of the accused, but respondent Judge nonetheless willinglyallowed Atty. Simbulan to join them in the dinner, notwithstanding the fact that, in his own words, prior tothis, he (Atty. Simbulan) informed me that Lee and Moreno were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda. Thus ifindeed respondent Judge is so determined in not seeing complainant Lee again and so resolute in avoidingat all costs complainant Lee as what he wants to impress upon the Investigating Justice, then, he could haveeasily set up an alibi to mislead Atty. Simbulan. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Thus, there was indeed a prior understanding on where and when to meet Lee again after their meeting atthe Judges convention.

Besides, why did not respondent call on his own cousin Mr. Sons to prove that complainant Lee was really agatecrasher or request Atty. Simbulan to substantiate his version that Lee was the most unwanted guestduring that Manila Hotel dinner. Worse, respondent Judge did not offer an explanation regarding Leeshaving his calling card (EXH.C), which witness Uy subsequently used in calling him up by telephone prior totheir seeing each other on October 7, 1991 at the residence of respondent Judge."cralaw virtua1aw library

The three (3) meetings by Judge Abastillas with interested parties who had a stake in the outcome ofCriminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 100~I and the recorded telephone conversation where said cases werediscussed manifested Judge Abastillas willingness, nay, propensity to ester into deals with motivationsincongruous to the merits of the cases pending before him. Judge Abastillas committed serious misconductno less.

The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity andindependence (Rule 1.01). He should administer justice impartially and without delay (Rule 1.02). He shouldso behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule2.01).

It is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be developed to a highdegree of proficiency, to gain the absolute confidence of the public in the integrity and impartiality of itsadministration, because appearance is as important as reality, so much so that a judge, like Cesars wife,must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. The actuations of Judge Abastillas transgressed against thehigh standard of moral ethics required of judges.cralawnad


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We find, however, the rest of charges of the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 against JudgeAbastillas without merit. We quote with approval the pertinent portions of Justice Lagamons report relativeto said accusations:chanrob1esvirtual 1aw library

The undersigned finds nothing irregular when the Court issued an Order of Arrest when the accusedJohnson Lee and Sonny Moreno failed to appear during the scheduled arraignment on Sept. 26,1991. Atty.

manifested that he instructed his clients not to appear in Court because a day before the date set forarraignment he allegedly filed a consolidated motion to quash which he requested that the same be heardon Oct. 11, 1991. Both accused and counsel were duly notified of the arraignment. They should havedisplayed their respect for the Court by appearing personally and prayed for the deferment of thearraignment. There was nothing that could have prevented the Court from orally denying the motion toquash and proceeding with the arraignment. It appears that the motion which was filed only one day beforethe scheduled date of hearing was intended to delay and derail the speedy trial of the case, taking intoaccount that the Sept. 16, 1991 date of arraignment was originally agreed in open court in the presence ofAtty. Chua as early as August 5, 1991 and set for Sept. 3, 1991 but reset to Sept. 26.

The undersigned finds nothing untoward in the proceedings of People v. Espinos (Crim. Cases 8846 and8847) where the respondent ordered that the firearms involved in the case be delivered to the custody ofthe Court for proper disposition.

The complainants maintain that the respondent treated the cases in a favored manner just because counsel

for the accused Atty. Roger Z. Reyes is close to him. Accordingly, a full-blown trial type hearing wasconducted in a motion to quash and, eventually, the case was dismissed. Whereas, in the cases of thecomplainants the accused were ordered arrested upon their failure to appear on Sept. 26, 1991 arraignmentnotwithstanding the pendency of a motion to quash. It is our observation that the two cases cannot beequated because in the first place the complainants failed or refused to appear in court notwithstandingnotice to them and counsel. In the Espinos case the accused consistently appeared in court. Moreover, theOrder of the Court directing the delivery of the firearms in the custody of the police is properly and in order.We are fully aware of the evil practice of irresponsible policemen who hold on to the possession of thefirearms for their personal use. The Court, therefore, has to issue an Order for the delivery of the firearmsfor proper disposal. In fact, Atty. Chua is guilty of deliberately misquoting the Order of the Court changingthe phrase to this Court to to him, thereby creating an implication that the respondent entertainedpersonal interest in the firearms.

The records show that the public prosecutor also moved that the firearm in question be delivered to thecourt and after an Order of Forfeiture be forwarded and deposited with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, PC

Headquarters, Bacolod City (Exh.15, p. 143, records).chanrobleslawlibrary : rednad

The charge that the respondent failed to decide Civil Case No. 2423 (Susana Lim v. Lim) within 90 dayscannot be given much consideration taking into account the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of thebranch to the effect that the case was partially tried by the respondent and that the stenographer who tookdown the stenographic notes left for the United States without transcribing the same. There is. therefore, aneed for the retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses.

The failure of the respondent to resolve the motion to disqualify private prosecutor dated April 20, 1991 aswell as the motion for reinvestigation dated July 3, 1991 which were resolved in open court only on February5, 1992 is rather a minor violation in the face of the series of motions filed by Atty. Enrique S. Chua.Respondent lost track of what motions are due for resolution until he was reminded on January 20, 1992through a supplemental motion filed by Arty. Chua, however, sixteen days thereafter the pending motionswere all resolved."cralaw virtua1aw library

Findings in Adm. Case No. 3815

Undoubtedly, Atty. Chua is guilty of violating Rule 1.01, canon 1, of the Code of Professional Responsibilityin view of his admission that he allegedly delivered P20,000.00 as bribe money to Judge Abastillas, therebyallowing himself to be used as a conduit for an illegal and immoral act. Rule 1.01 provides that "A lawyershall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."cralaw virtua1aw library

However, we take note that Atty. Chua during the investigation before Justice Lagamon humbly expressedhis genuine regrets for having acted the way he did. He said: "I considered that particular moment of my lifeas one of the human weaknesses." He felt sorry for "a lapse in my life." "I was not strong enough to resist,"


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he added (TSN, Oct. 27, 1983, pp. 11-12).

Atty. Chua declared that while he believed that his clients case was meritorious, his clients prevailed uponhim to offer bribe money as the practical way to obtain justice.chanrobles.com.ph: virtuallaw library

Under the circumstances, and in addition to Atty. Chuas profound expression of remorse, we do not find itdifficult to mitigate his liability when we consider his willingness to come forward, at the risk of being

administratively penalized himself, to expose what we considered illegal and immoral acts perpetrated bythe very ones tasked with the sacred duty to uphold the law and dispense justice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50 Bacolod City, is herebyfound GUILTY of serious misconduct in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92863 for having met with persons involvedand/or interested in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People v. Johnson Lees and SonnyMoreno" of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, for the purpose of discussing or soliciting bribe inconnection said cases and is hereby DISMISSED from office, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits andaccrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government,including government owned or controlled corporations.

This Court holds Atty. Enrique S. Chua administratively liable in Adm. Case No. 3815 for violation of Rule1.01 of the Code of professional Responsibility for allegedly bribing Judge Abastillas.

Respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act or acts or violation

committed by him in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., no part. Close relation to family of party.

Bellosillo, J., no part. My name is mentioned a number of times in the case.

Quiason, J., no part, Judge R.E. Abastillas being a client of my former law office.

Mendoza, J., no part.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997

PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant,vs.

JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case wherethe cause celebreis a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an incumbent and aretired member of the Judiciary.


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In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant JudgePriscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Courtof Appeals, with gross immorality and grave misconduct. 1

After an answer2and a reply3were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court, inits Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate

Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the followingrecommendation:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaidCriminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent,former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty of gross misconduct, within thecontemplation of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removal or suspension ofattorneys, and therefor(e), he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)years, commencing from the finality of the Decision in this case, with a warning that arepetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the antecedentfacts in his aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced hereunder so that hisdisposition of this case may be duly appreciated:

Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City,while respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential AntiCrime Commission (PACC) headed by Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada.

Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commencedSpecial Proceeding No. 90-54650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said PrimitivoMijares presumptively dead, after an absence of sixteen (16) years.

Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civilwedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit TrialCourt of Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of MandaluyongCity. Their marriage was the culmination of a long engagement. They met sometime in 1977,when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila,was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then,respondent became a close family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996). Afterthe wedding, they received their guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the receptionover, the newlywed(s) resumed their usual work and activities. At 6:00 o'clock in theafternoon of the same day, respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8,Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time,she answered the phone. At the other end of the line was a woman offending her with

insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant confronted respondent on the identity of suchcaller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been just a call at the wrong number".What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another, to a pointwhen respondent called complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gustoko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko". Get that marriage contract and have itburned." Such unbearable utterances of respondent left complainant no choice but to leavein haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, the complainant and respondenthave been living separately because as complainant rationalized, contrary to her expectation


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respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for whathappened (TSN, p. 13, April 10, 1996.

Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, thecomplainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the BibleGroup, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A.

Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news,complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6,1995 she filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").

On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document againstrespondent, the complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint

Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1").

Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, wasoffered by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into amarriage, and to show that the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status asSINGLE, when her married Lydia Geraldez. This, the respondent did, to lead an immoral and

indiscreet life. He resorted to falsification to distort the truth, complainant lamented. Alsopresented for complainant were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B");Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and

Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her(complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1").

Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainanton January 7, 1994 was merely but a "sham marriage". He explained that he agreed as, infact, he voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help JudgeMijares in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher,

Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that when hismarriage with complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage withLibrada Pea, his first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of

such marriage had not yet become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision wasnot yet published as required by the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Peahaving been made by publication, and subject Decision was not yet published. To this effectwas the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 ofthe Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4").

After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings andrecommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grosslyimmoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution of demandingrespect and dignity.4He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein complainant, thedecision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Pea, had not yet attainedfinality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman,

Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license thathis previous marriage had been annulled.

Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify hisactuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazesand befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social proprietyand moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinarylawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of


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Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of a marriage celebrated withall the necessary legal requisites.5

On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating JusticePurisima which we quote with approval:

That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed aMarriage Contract with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judgeof the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law tosolemnize a civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by respondent himself, hecould not be forced to do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a).

That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by lawand the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriageunder Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e., legal capacity of the contracting parties, whomust be a male and a female; consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer;authority of the solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the cases provided forin Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the

appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personaldeclaration that they take each other as husband and wife, in the presence of not less thantwo witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and complied with.

The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a"sham" marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent,he entered into subject marriage in an effort to save the complainant from the charge ofimmorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying "Ido" with complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage werepresent. His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized bylaw to solemnize the civil marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity tocontract such marriage.

Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in thecriminal case of Bigamy against herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake ofargument that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of themarriage between respondent and Librada Pena had not attained complete finality due tonon publication of said judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance,alone, only made subject marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriagebetween complainant and respondent void.

Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriagewith Librada Pena had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) tookLydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principleof estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by a second

marriage, his first marriage with Librada Pea was subsisting and unannulled.

But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or notrespondent can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, acrucial issue pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of theManila Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that what respondent contracted withcomplainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham" marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctibleconclusion isthat what respondent perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as amember of the Philippine Bar and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the


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immorality charge against herein complainant in the administrative case instituted againsther by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded, respondent was not justified inresorting to a "sham" marriage to protect her (complainant) from said immorality charge.Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrongcannot be righted by another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with JudgePriscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in ventilating

the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have testified in her favor in saidadministrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr.complained of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis.

In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity ofmarriage and the family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockerythereof and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To make fun of and take lightly thesacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and mankind. Therefore, thedefense of respondent that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7,1994 was nothing but a "sham" marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liabilityfor his gross misconduct, nay sacrilege.

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitnessfor continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at lawrequires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a conditionprecedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential forremaining in the practice of law.6Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, alawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission ofgrossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers. 7

However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive conductduring some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior probablyascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has rendered some years ofcommendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment would be too harsh a penaltyin this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended, would suffice as a

punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.

WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoralconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from thepractice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNINGthat a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offensehereafter.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganibanand Torres, Jr., J.J., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., took no part.

Bellosillo and Francisco, JJ., are on leave.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1856 October 28, 1983

SALVACION E. MARCAYDA, complainant,vs.JUSTINIANO P. NAZ, respondent.

R. G. Tansinsin for complainant.

Justiniano P. Naz in his own behalf.

AQUINO, J.:

This is a revival of the immorality charge against respondent Justiniano P. Naz. Salvacion E.Marcayda in a handwritten letter filed in this Court onApril 19, 1977 asked that Naz's oath-taking asa member of the bar (after having flunked twice) be withheld pending negotiations for the support ofhis alleged child begotten with Salvacion.

Naz in his answer ofApril 27, 1977denied the paternity of the child. He alleged that the complaintwas pure harassment and blackmail. He said that Salvacion could have filed an administrativecomplaint with the Department of Education and Culture since he was employed in the Legaspibranch of that Office but she never filed any such complaint.

Accompanying his answer was an affidavit wherein Naz requested that, because clearance couldnot be given him to take the oath onApril 29, 1977due to Salvacion's complaint, he be allowed totake the oath but his signing of the Roll of attorneys be deferred pending resolution of Salvacion'scomplaint.

On the following day,April 28, 1977,Naz and Salvacion, both 47, natives of Camalig Albay,executed in Manila a notarized agreement before lawyer Braulio R. G. Tansinsin wherein Nazadmitted that he had an affair with Salvacion in 1964 as a result of which a boy named Rey E.Marcayda was born on January 8, 1965, (should beMarch 8, 1965,as shown in Exhibit 2). Naz wasa married man. Salvacion was married to Primo Marcayda who died of tuberculosis on July 5,1965(Exh. 1).

Naz in that agreement bound himself to pay Salvacion for Rey's support (1) back support of P2,000on or before December 25, 1977 and another P2,000 on or before December 25, 1978 and (2) P100or its dollar equivalent in advance within the first five days of every month, starting May, 1977 untilRey reached the age of twenty-one.

Because of that public instrument admitting paternity and the promise to support the adulterouschild, Salvacion on that same date,April 28, 1977, withdrew her complaint filed in this Court towithhold the oath-taking of Naz on the ground of immorality.


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The withdrawal document was also executed before Notary Tansinsin. It is document No. 628of hisnotarial book while the document of acknowledgment and support is No. 629.

The result of these last minute maneuvers was this Court's resolution ofApril 28, 1977 allowing Nazto take his oath by reason of Salvacion's withdrawal of her complaint (SBC-582). He took his oathonApril 29, 1977But Naz did not live up to his promise to give support.

In a verified complaint dated December 23, 1977Salvacion asked for the reopening of theadministrative case. She alleged that she withdrew the complaint so that Naz would have a highersalary and would be in a better position to support Rey. He is now an incumbent legal officer ofRegion V of the Ministry of Education and Culture in Legaspi City, with an annual salary of P17,724.

She testified that after Rey's birth Naz gave her forty pesos a month for six months. After shewithdrew her complaint, Naz gave her one hundred pesos for May, 1977. As already stated, he didnot comply with his commitment in the notarial agreement of support which was the basis of thewithdrawal of the immorality complaint against him.

Naz in his comment on the complaint and in his testimony in the Solicitor General's office declared

that Rey was not his son. Rey's 1965 birth certificate shows that he was born in wedlock toSalvacion and her husband, Primo (Exh. 21). He alleged that he was "coerced" to sign theagreement of support. The complaint was like "an Armalite trained on the head of the respondent".

We hold that, as noted by the Solicitor General, Naz is not guilty of gross immorality.He should notbe disbarred because he had admitted the paternity of Rey in a public document and agreed tosupport him. This circumstance rendered his immorality not so gross and scandalous. (Arciga vs.Maniwang, Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14,1981, 106 SCRA 591).

The agreement of support was the basis of the withdrawal of the 1917 complaint against him. Theeleventh-hour withdrawal paved the way for his oath-taking. He cannot be allowed to repudiate thatpublic document of the ground of supposed coercion.

Respondent Naz's stand of not giving any value to that public document shows a certainunscrupulousness unbecoming a member of a noble profession. It is tantamount to self stultification.His attitude is highly censurable. He wants to make a mockery of the proceedings in this Court bymaking it appear that he lied brazenly about the filiation of Rey Marcayda just to facilitate hisadmission to the bar. In his oath, he swore to do no falsehood.

The remedy of complainant Marcayda is a civil action for support on the basis of the agreement ofsupport which isirrevocably binding on Naz. She could also file an administrative complaint againsthim with the Ministry of Education and Culture which could require him to give support to the child,Rey (See Sec. 36, Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807).

WHEREFORE, respondent Naz is severely reprimanded for his attempt to nullify the notarial

agreement to support a child whose filiation he had admitted. A copy of this resolution should beattached to his record in the Bar Confidant's office.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.

De Castro, J., is on leave.


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Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J ., dissenting:

He should be disbarred for immorality and his brazen repudiation of a notarial deed wherein hecommitted adultery with a married woman even while he himself then as now is married.

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

He should be disbarred for immorality and his brazen repudiation of a notarial deed wherein hecommitted adultery with a married woman even while he himself then as now is married.


Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 507 February 24, 1975

JOSE MONTAA, JULIANA M. MONTAA and MARTINA MONTAA, petitioners,vs.ATTY. EDMUNDO M. RUADO, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

FERNANDO, J .:

It has been remarked that affairs of the heart may at the start be characterized by sweetness andlight only to turn sour at the end. It is not unlikely either that there will be moments of warmthresulting in a love-child, not exactly unwanted, but apt to cause complications. So it did turn outexactly in this administrative case, the male participant, respondent Edmundo M. Ruado, being amember of the bar and, at the time of the complaint, an assistant Provincial Fiscal of Romblon. Hisconduct in courting complainant Martina Montaa,1leading her to believe in the sincerity of hisintentions, both of them being single at the time, and to submit to his importunities to have sexualrelations resulting in her pregnancy and subsequent delivery, but thereafter marrying another


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woman, was stigmatized as lacking in that "degree of morality and integrity which at all times isexpected of, and must be possessed by, members of the bar. 2Respondent was required to answer.He did so: He denied the fact that he and complainant, Martina Montaa, were sweethearts andfurther disclaimed any promise being given by him to marry her. Such being the circumstances, hewas rather insistent that he did not violate any trust or confidence and that he was not guilty of anydeceitful inducements. There was no denial, however, of the sexual intimacies that marked the

relationship as well as of complainant thereafter, as a consequence thereof, becoming pregnant.

It was at that stage that the administrative case was referred to the Solicitor General forinvestigation, report and recommendation. The matter was investigated and the report of thisinvestigation was duly forthcoming. According to the findings: "Complainant Martina Montaa'sdeclarations in the investigation tend to show that she and respondent were sweethearts. Thisstarted when they met at the Governor's office in Romblon. Complainant then was employed as filingclerk while respondent [was the] public defender. Because they were often seen together, peoplewho knew them began to talk about them, as lovers. The frequency of their association continuedunabated until respondent revealed to complainant that his parents were against her for she hadcreated a bad impression on respondent's father. Complainant resented this. She left Romblon andsought employment in Manila, eventually landing a job in the Bureau of Public Highways.Respondent, however, stayed in Romblon and continued discharging his duties as AssistantProvincial Fiscal, a position he was appointed to later. This episode momentarily broke therelationship between the two."3Then come this portion: "Respondent, however, came to Manila onseveral occasions during which he visited complainant. Eventually, the two made up. During thesevisits, complainant was led to believe by respondent that he would marry her and the only drawbackwas his financial instability and his moral obligation to support the education of his brothers andsisters. Thus, whenever the subject of marriage was introduced in their conversations, respondentsimply begged deferment."4Further: "It was on these visits that respondent and complainant hadintimate affairs. There was an instance when respondent fetched complainant in her office.Thereafter, the two proceeded to Long Beach Hotel in Pasay City. It was alleged by complainant thatshe did not know at first that they were to proceed to the hotel. Complainant not knowing the placewhere their taxi stopped reminded respondent that they were supposed to eat but respondentconfided to her that the place also served food at the same time leading her inside and since she felt

she would create a scene if she desisted, she went along with respondent and in one of the roomsthey had sexual intercourse. Other similar incidents followed. Such was what happened in March,1960 when respondent attended the convention of the government prosecutors league in Manila andhaving fetched complainant in her office the two proceeded first to a movie house at Rizal Avenue.They wound up later at the Long Beach Hotel and once more indulged in sexual intercourse." 5So:"As a consequence, complainant became pregnant. Alarmed by her condition she immediately wrotea letter to respondent and urged him to come to Manila. Respondent, in reply explained that he wasquite busy with his work. When respondent finally came he accompanied complainant to a doctorwho confirmed her pregnancy."6The deterioration of the relationship was set forth thus:"Respondent seldom came to Manila after he learned of complainant's pregnancy. Obviously indespair, complainant threatened to bring the matter to court and respondent's reaction was ofbelligerence. The matter eventually reached the attention of the Department of Justice andadministrative investigations were conducted to determine respondent's fitness to hold on to his job

as Assistant Provincial Fiscal. Shortly thereafter, the instant case was filed seeking the disbarmentof herein respondent."7

The Solicitor General, in his report, was duly mindful of circumstances that place the conduct ofrespondent Ruado in not too harsh a light. As he pointed out, he did take note that marriage musthave entered "into the plans of complainant and respondent,8He could not believe, however, thatthe various occasions in which the parties engaged in sexual relations were prompted solely by theexpectancy on her part that ere long the marital knot would be tied. They were both mature, nolonger in the first flush of youth, impelled to act thus because of the strong physical attraction that


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each had for the other and of the force of a deeply-rooted desire too difficult to resist. Accordingly, itis his view that there is relevance to this excerpt from an opinion of former Chief Justice Concepcionin Soberano v. Villanueva:9 "Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, especiallyin the light of the circumstances attending this case, is neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminalact nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against the man as a memberof the Bar." 10The injury thus inflicted to the good name and reputation of complainant, as noted in a

recent resolution, arose "from the frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring to it as 'so powerfulan appetite,' an imperative of life closely associated with the 'recklessness and the caprice of desire.'" 11

Not that he is entitled to exculpation. The Solicitor General explained why: "In view, however, ofrespondent's position as Assistant Provincial Fiscal we must insist that he ought to have conductedhimself in an exemplary character. His indulging in pre-marital acts with complainant, even thoughmade possible by mutual desire, has placed him outside of the category of exemplary individuals inthe community. By committing such acts, respondent was dismissed or more accurately consideredresigned from his position as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Romblon, Romblon, by the President ofthe Philippines who modified the recommendation of the Department of Justice in the administrativecase against respondent that he be merely fined (Adm. Order No. 57). The dismissal of respondenttook effect upon receipt of the decision of the President on April 9, 1963. Hence, respondent hasceased discharging his duties as Assistant Provincial Fiscal. In the light of the dismissal, it wouldseem harsh under the special circumstances of the case to impose upon respondent the extremepenalty of disbarment as prayed for by the complainant. In a case (Administrative Case No. 248,February 26, 1962, Viojan vs. Duran), this Court considered the suspension of a Justice of thePeace from his post as sufficient penalty for the immorality committed by him and hence dismissedthe disbarment proceedings. Herein respondent was not only suspended but dismissed orconsidered resigned from his public office and to follow said dismissal with the penalty of disbarmentwould be unreasonably stiff." 12

Accordingly, it was the recommendation that while the petition for disbarment of respondent Ruadoshould be denied, he, nevertheless, should be reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition ofthe same offense would be dealt with more severely by this Court. It must likewise be impressed on

him that he should comply with the moral and legal obligations incumbent upon him as the father ofthe child born out of wedlock, the result of his relationship with complainant Martina Montaa. ThisCourt is inclined to accept the above recommendation with the only modification that it should be asevere reprimand.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo M. Ruado is severely reprimanded. Let a copy of thisresolution be entered on his record.

Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.


Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992


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DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,vs.ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondentJordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a secondmarriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remainedsubsisting.

The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1Respondent successfully evaded five (5)attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, suchthat he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2On 24 April 1985, that isafter three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent's success inevading service of the complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty.Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" inthe instantcase. 3

On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order.In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certainMerlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove himout of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenillaand that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith thathis marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol,Pangasinan. 4

In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted thatJason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblanceto respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as adependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the

fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already beenabandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospitalbills arising by reason of her pregnancy.

The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by aResolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report andrecommendation. 5

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case forhearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented herevidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held anotherhearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did notappear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set stillanother hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail

once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence anddeclared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda.Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.

On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court.The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:


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Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows:she and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates inCadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to MerlitoBercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status(ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent started courting her but nothing happened of thecourtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and respondent] moved to Manila were theyrespectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at the LyceumUniversity (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her, this timewith more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she wasmarried but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initiosinceshe and her first husband were first cousins ( ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanationand having secured favorable advice from her mother andex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriagelicense, despite her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as herstatus explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go tocourt to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijaresof the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17);Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18);all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981,complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting

from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearanceuntil she found out later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (ExhibitC, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with theCity Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of theCity Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p.24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina Malicdem withthe office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where aprima faciecase was found toexist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrativecase against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed, whichcase however was considered closed for being moot and academic when respondentwas considered automatically separated from the service for having gone on absencewithout official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7

There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriageon 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981,respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was enteredinto, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any

judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.

Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his priormarriage with complainant Dorothy T

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