Legal Ethics 1st Set of Cases

8/13/2019 Legal Ethics 1st Set of Cases

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ADM. CASE No. 3319 June 8, 2000

LESLIE UI,complainant,vs.ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO,respondent.

DE LEON, JR., J .:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedlycarrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Churchin Quezon City1and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani,Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however,complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship withrespondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they hadbeen living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City.Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines wasadmitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visitedrespondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of

Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged,however; that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed therepresentations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicitrelationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband andrespondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, CarlosUi, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 andpleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicitrelationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had beenemployed by her husband in his company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 bythe complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, moreparticularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her

Answer,2respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all alongto be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in

Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their tripsabroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in19853.Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to livewith his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the
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children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would livetogether.4

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only returnoccasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of hertrips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was

the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui,respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the lawfirm5she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui againcame to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.

It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they weremarried abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status,she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang,and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondentwho lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that thesaid house was built exclusively from her parents' funds.6By way of counterclaim, respondentsought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainantfor having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.

In her Reply7dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectlywell that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of herrelationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two(2) children with Carlos Ui.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged herhusband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of theProvincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed forinsufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolutiondismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:

Complainant's evidence hadprima facieestablished the existence of the "illicit relationship"between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. Thesame evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant upto the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents startedand was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carloswere still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila andthey, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit ascomplainant puts it, had beenprima facieestablished by complainant's evidence, this sameevidence had failed to evenprima facieestablish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in theconcept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of whichis necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged.The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting thefact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger(U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
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It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respectivepositions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissedfor want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary ofJustice, but the same was dismissed9on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove herallegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San CarlosStreet, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to CiteRespondent in Contempt of the Commission10wherein she charged respondent with making falseallegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered andintercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar,respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and

attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate ofMarriage11duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the HawaiiState Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu,Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. IrisBonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer.

According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted toimpress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock.12It isthe contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 18313and 184 14of theRevised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent inmaking false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document areindicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member ofthe Philippine Bar.

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),15respondent averred that she didnot have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession ofCarlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared onthe copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.

Respondent filed her Memorandum16on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether ornot she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from thepractice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds,namely:

(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moralcharacter for the practice of the legal profession; and

(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in animmoral manner.

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this caseand not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that uponlearning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that therewas no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelorbecause he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18
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The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status ofCarlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him.When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty.Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of thechildren whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part ofrespondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to ahigh degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and shoulddeserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyedher chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.

x x x x x x x x x

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice ofResolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendationfully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaintfor Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifaciois REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate ofMarriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of thelegal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subjectto the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. Therequisites for admission to the practice of law are:

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;

c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending incourt;

f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations.25(Emphasis supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicantmust possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must becontinuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the lossthereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held
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If good moral character is a sine qua nonfor admission to the bar, then the continuedpossession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legalprofession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have goodmoral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a

crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in additionto professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grosslyimmoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyerunworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to beunconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrantsdisbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable membersof the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).26

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, sheknew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as aresult of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civilstatus of Carlos Ui, she left him.

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not onlyfar from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitionersshould be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to bebefore. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened witha higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greatercaution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have foundherself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in

finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion thatsomething was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions.For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from

Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui andthis woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived withrespondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible consideringrespondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent inmanaging her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,

clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be consideredimmoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society andthe opinion of good and respectable members of the community.27Moreover, for such conduct towarrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt andfalse as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.28

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain fromadulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public bycreating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."29Respondent's act of immediately
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distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moralindifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard ofthe legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, theburden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only ifshe establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.30This, herein complainantmiserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we findimprobable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of theMarriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriageceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult tofathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she gotmarried. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to herpleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances containedtherein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith ofrespondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. 1avvphi1Thelegal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard theintegrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positionsas officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for allegedimmorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of herMarriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that amore severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in thefuture.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6492 November 18, 2004

MELANIO L. ZORETA,complainant,vs.ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO,respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for allegedlynotarizing several documents during the year 2002 after his commission as notary public hadexpired.

Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02 August 2001, he filed before Branch 4 of the

Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages againstSecurity Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to the latter's failure tohonor SPAC's Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G.Simpliciano was the latter's counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not a duly commissionedNotary Public in 2002 per Certifications1issued by the Clerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S.Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents, viz:

1. Verification2executed by Aurora C. Galvez, President of defendant SPAC, subscribed andsworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 18, 2002 as alleged notarypublic, in Quezon City and attached to defendants' Very Urgent Motion (1) To Lift the Orderof Default; and (2) To defer Plaintiff's Presentation of Evidence Ex-Parte dated February 18,2002;

2. Affidavits of Merit3signed by Aurora Galvez attached to the pleading mentioned in par. 1hereof, likewise notarized by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as alleged "Notary Public"in Quezon City, on February 18, 2002;

3. The Affidavit of Service4signed by a certain Renee L. Ramos, a Legal Assistant inSimpliciano and Capela Law Office, and subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson

Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 19, 2002 as alleged "Notary Public" in Quezon City. SaidAffidavit of Service was attached to the pleading mentioned in Par. 1 hereof;
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4. The Affidavit of Service5of one Nestor Abayon, another Legal Assistant of Simpliciano andCapela Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on01 April 2002 at Quezon City, as "Notary Public." This Affidavit of Service was attached todefendants' Motion (1) For Reconsideration of the Order dated 05 March 2002; and (2) Toallow defendants to Present Defensive Evidence dated 27 March 2002.

5. The Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping6

signed this time by a certainCelso N. Sarto, as affiant, "notarized" on 16 August 2002 by Atty. Heherson Alnor G.Simpliciano. This Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping was attached todefendant's Motion For Extension of Time To File Petition Under Rule 65 before the Court of

Appeals;

6. The Affidavit of Service7signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, another Legal Assistant inSimpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G.Simpliciano as "Notary Public" on 16 August 2002. This Affidavit of Service signed by

Aganan was also attached to that Motion For Extension of Time To File Petition under Rule65 before the Court of Appeals;

7. Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping

8

executed by one Celso N. Sarto,alleged Executive Vice President and Claims Manager of defendant SPAC and "notarized"by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, attached to the Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition, etc., filed before the Court of Appeals; and

8. Affidavit of Service9signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, Legal Assistant of Simplicianoand Capela Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simplicianoon 19 August 2002, as alleged "Notary Public" for Quezon City with notarized commission toexpire by December 31, 2002.

On 23 April 2003, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) of Pasig required respondent Atty.Simpliciano to submit his answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order.10

On 26 May 2003, counsel of respondent filed an ex-parte motion11for extension of time to fileanswer.

On 30 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion12to resolve the complaint after the extension requestedby respondent ended on 30 May 2003, and almost a month had lapsed from 30 May 2003, with nocomment or pleading filed by respondent.

On 17 July 2003, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued an order,13giving respondent a last chanceto file his answer, otherwise the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent failed todo so.

Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted her report and recommendation14dated 12 February

2004, pertinent portions of which read:

A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the petitioner showed thatrespondent notarized up to Document No. 590, Page 118, Book No. II, Series of 2002 andhis commission expires December 31, 2002 which referred to the Affidavit of Service signedand executed by Joseph B. Aganan Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Officesubscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano whosecommission expires December 31, 2002.
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All the other documents aforementioned were entered in Book II of respondent's allegednotarial book which reflected that his commission expires on December 31, 2002 as notarypublic.

However, the Clerk of Court of Quezon City in her certification dated October 4, 2002 statedthat as per records on file with their office respondent was not duly commissioned notary

public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.

Another certification issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC Quezon City dated April 15, 2003showed that as per records on file with their office respondent was commissioned notarypublic for and in Quezon City from January 14, 2000 to December 31, 2001 and for the year2002 and 2003 he did not apply for notarial commission for Quezon City.

It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized the aforementioneddocuments, he was not commissioned as notary public, which was in violation of the NotarialLaw; for having notarized the 590 documents after the expiration of his commission as notarypublic without having renewed said commission amounting to gross misconduct as amember of the legal profession.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing the Undersigned respectfully recommends the revocationof respondent's commission as notary public permanently if he is commissioned as such atpresent and his suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months fromreceipt hereof furnishing the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member a copy hereof forimplementation should this recommendation be approved by the Honorable members of theBoard of Governors.15

Per Resolution No. XVI-2004-236 dated 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors modified the reportand recommendation of Commissioner Navarro of suspension of three (3) months to a suspensionof six (6) months.16

We concur in the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. Simpliciano did nothave a commission as notary public in 2002 when he notarized the assailed documents asevidenced by the two (2) certifications issued by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court ofQuezon City dated 04 October 2002.17Records also show, and as confirmed by IBP CommissionerNavarro, that as of 02 August 2002, respondent had already notarized a total of 590documents.18The evidence presented by complainant conclusively establishes the misconductimputed to respondent.

The eight (8) notarized documents for the year 2002 submitted by complainant, consisting ofaffidavits of merit, certifications and verifications against non-forum shopping, and affidavits ofservice, were used and presented in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in CivilCase No. 01-6240, and in respondent's petition forcertiorarifiled in the Court of Appeals.

Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to present anyevidence. His counsel filed an ex-partemotion for extension to file answer, which was granted, butno answer was forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro gave respondent a lastchance to file his answer; which was again unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable to rebutcomplainant's evidence that he was not so commissioned for the year in question. His lack ofinterest and indifference in presenting his defense to the charge and the evidence against him canonly mean he has no strong and valid defense to offer. Conclusively, respondent Atty. Simpliciano isnot a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.
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At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed bythe State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications requiredby law for the conferment of such privilege.19Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened withconditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and canonly be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court afteropportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right,

an attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend him, based onconduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of anattorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is toremove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted withthe duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney, and thus to protect the public andthose charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney.20Elaborating onthis, we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting21that "[t]he bar should maintain a high standard of legalproficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession byfaithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end amember of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degreethe confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legalprofession."22Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred, or suspended for any violation of hisoath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically anymisconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.23

Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty,meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those whoare qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarilyrequires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon thepublic, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that thenotarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making thatdocument admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by lawentitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmostcare the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.24

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a merecasual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer's act of notarizing documents without therequisite commission therefore as "reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice butalso x x x the crime of falsification of public documents."25For such reprehensible conduct, the Courthas sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarialcommission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.26

In the case of Nunga v. Viray,27the Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of adocument is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization orcommission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing anotarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws, morespecifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when heis not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer'soath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code,which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
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On different occasions, this Court had disbarred or suspended lawyers for notarizing documents withan expired commission:

1. InFlores v. Lozada,28the court disbarred a lawyer who notarized six documents such asthe extrajudicial partition of an estate, deed of sale with right of repurchase, and four (4)deeds of absolute sale - all involving unregistered lands, after his commission as Notary

Public expired;

2. InJoson v. Baltazar,29the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) months since only one(1) instance of unauthorized notarization of a deed of sale was involved.

3. InNunga v. Viray,30the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) years when he notarizedan absolute deed of sale of the buyer minor, who was his son and, at the same time, he wasa stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank, and when he entered in his notarialregistry an annotation of the cancellation of the loan in favor of a certain bank, at a timewhen he was not commissioned as a Notary Public. What aggravated respondent's unlawfulnotarization was the fact that the transaction involved was in favor of his son, who was thenonly eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor.

4. InBuensuceso v. Barrera,31the lawyer was suspended for one (1) year when he notarizedfive (5) documents such as a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, adeed of sale and a contract to sell, after his commission as Notary Public expired.

Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notarypublic and as a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the penalty recommended by the Board ofGovernors of the IBP must be increased. Respondent must be barred from being commissioned asa notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby adopts the findings of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A.Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted andapproved, but hereby MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors. As modified,respondent ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO is hereby BARRED PERMANENTLYfrom being commissioned as Notary Public. He is furthermore SUSPENDED from the practice of lawfor two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator aswell as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in thepersonal files of respondent himself.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ.,concur.

Corona, J.,on leave.
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Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.FLORA QUINGWAcomplainant,vs.ARMANDO PUNO,respondent.

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REGALA, J .:

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging ArmandoPuno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondentdenied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that theallegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule127 of the former Rules of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report andrecommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the

complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. Therespondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondentlikewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel onJune 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, anddisowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent withimmorality. The complaint recites:

That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent ArmandoPuno were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend amovie but on their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment

before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo,Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondentproposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anywaywe are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love ofrespondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and beforethey entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. andMrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside theroom; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside andrespondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged


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respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised tomarry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures oflove, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marryyou'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and thenplaced himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that whenrespondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit

to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday partytogether; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedlyproposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait untilthey were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that shewas already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply withhis promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959,complainant gave birth to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through apromise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the presentconstitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of moralityand integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of thePhilippine Bar.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered thecomplaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and thaton the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however,admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November,1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practicelaw. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence,respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing SolicitorCeferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oralargument. There was no appearance for the respondents.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additionalevidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo,

Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in hisinvestigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine thewitnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules ofCourt.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. Shetestified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel registeras "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise ofmarriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. andMrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went toZamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a


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telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him aletter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnantand she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga Cityin November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise tomarry her.1wph1.t

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant metin Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letterswas likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E),which was duly identified by the respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children'sHospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy LocalCivil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity andChildren's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the lattertestified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated

by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter datedNovember 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.

The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failedto discredit complainant's testimony.

In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he andcomplainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and weresweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant(pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); andrespondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promiseof marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutualpassion. (Cf.Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must producebefore the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of theold Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a licenseor privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practiceand the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing Inre Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deniesthe charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legaland Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree ofmorality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took

complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but hedid not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria,17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does notperform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meetthe obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he ishardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the Statevoluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is


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particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the Statethe very means by which it may assist him.

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of thecomplainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarmentor suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of

Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment orsuspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar alawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times withoutnumber, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice anddishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the officeand unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In rePelaez, 44 Phil.567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28,1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As amatter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment.(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoralact and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it isimportant that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves inaccordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons ofJudicial Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession ofcandidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. Heshould strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession andto improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name isordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,JJ., concur.


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Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG,complainant,vs.ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA,respondent.

BARRERA, J .:

In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royongcharged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedlycommitted on her person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, therespondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not

disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General forinvestigation, report and recommendation.

On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendationthat the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken fromthe roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:

The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her fostermother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house therespondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth withone hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and

forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her andher family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercoursewith her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist tosubdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to herfoster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumedironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her fostermother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she becamepregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of

Aug. 5, 1959).

She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighborsthat she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent;that she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he

was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, onNovember 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him inhis house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24,t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).

The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n.,hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to theCommission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office


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of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case againstBuenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).

The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant fromJanuary, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by thecomplainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he

limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completedher eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after shehad reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse tookplace before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fiftytimes, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity.He intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her fosterparents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission tomarry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After thediscovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair toBriccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not givehim. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).

x x x x x x x x x

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. Thecomplainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence andintimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performednot once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after thealleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrageinvolving her honor ....

But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in consciencerecommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live

maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that thespouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her aftermore than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse thatshe, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. Theseduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises ofmarriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsookher husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of hismoral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle andcalled him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she couldnot resist him.

The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petitiondated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) andpraying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on thefirst Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."

But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whosehusband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage


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still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, andhad it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to takethe bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As hewas then permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of hisadulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct shouldbe sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of

morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the officeof a lawyer.

x x x x x x x x x

RECOMMENDATION

Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondentAriston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name bestricken from the roll of attorneys.

In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the

alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulatedanother complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely anddeliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moralcharacter; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations withthe complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidenceand unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render

judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and thecancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."

In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaintdoes not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign fromthe original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called forin Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for

additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.

On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additionalevidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. OnSeptember 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and onOctober 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not beenproven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury orfraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission tothe bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted andapproved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove

their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t

At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles,who testified as follows:

... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent onDecember 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (toTeodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n.


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24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr.Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and hersister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n.26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that lateron' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondentwere already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her

to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia leftCavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she andrespondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she leftCavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was alreadyreluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25).

Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife,named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with herfather, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live withhim (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of CourtInvestigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."

Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which requestwas also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, amongothers, the following:.

... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, becausethe latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took placeon May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living withhis common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he begancourting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to committhe crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafteraccepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who toldhim that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from saiddate (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-lawhusband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she

confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga;that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor couldhe urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she toldBriccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; thatcontrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Bricciastrongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from himanymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines)had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman;that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition totake the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from thisCourt the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he didnot state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition beingused in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed

he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he firstlearned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment whenhe filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators,pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).

After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used hisknowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as hedid, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2)Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even


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after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to hismoral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously)in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators alsorecommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice oflaw for a period of one year.

Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counselof record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leaveto file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the correspondingmemorandum was duly filed.

It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with thecomplainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that helikewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to thepresent.

The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the andthe open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the

respondent's disbarment.

It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relationswith the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because hehas not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has notbeen convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which thedisbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of theRules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that thisenumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthymembers of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of

justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unlesspositively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give theparty be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958

ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (orthe Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shallrequire disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power todisbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of thecourt over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutorygrounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "thecontinued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is arequisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted,and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as aground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist ofmisconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency ofthe decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may beremoved or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule isso phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretensionthat before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexualintercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limitedhimself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind,which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.


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Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of hiscommon-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as heruncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her.From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see

why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with thecomplainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for hisacts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himselfto be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.

The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds fordisbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, wherethis Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansasin the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well asbetween court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification isa conditionprecedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it wouldseem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of theprivilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice anddishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with hisprofessional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilegeswhich his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on hisprofession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. Wecannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and anotherfor disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations

and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him fromcontinuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as anessential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to themoral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.

The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedlycommitted fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committedunder such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock commonsense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of thenoble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued hisadulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies,and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after hisadmission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moraldereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicamenthe found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes hisconduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means hecould have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But tocontinue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintainingpromiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned.Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legalprofession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).


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The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing thepresent complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense oroffenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, andcites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.

SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing,

if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shallsubmit a report to the

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Legal Ethics 1st Set of Cases