FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120074.  June 10, 1997]

LEAH P. ADORIO, petitioner, vs. HON. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, respondent.

PHILIP SEE, Intervenor.

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari which seeks to set aside the Order of Judge Lucas P. Bersamin[1] dated May 5, 1995 insofar as it holds petitioner in direct contempt and sentences her therefor.  The dispositive portion of said order reads:

WHEREFORE, the Motion For Inhibition And For Re-raffle Of Cases is hereby granted.

The complainant Philip See y Go and his  former private prosecutor, Atty. Leah P. Adorio, of the King & Adorio Law Offices, with address at No. 40 Landargun Street, Quezon City, are hereby found guilty of direct contempt of this Court for disrespect to the Court and its Presiding Judge and are accordingly sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) days in the City Jail of Quezon City and to pay a fine of P200.00 each.

For the pupose of the execution of their sentence, complainant Philip See y Go and Atty. Leah P. Adorio are hereby directed to appear in person before the Court on May 23, 1995 at 10:00 o’clock in the morning.

Pending execution of the sentence, the transmittal of the records to the Honorable Executive Judge, through the Office of the Clerk of Court, for purposes of re-raffle shall be held in abeyance.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioner was counsel for Philip G. See, the private complainant in Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-55933 to Q-94-55957 involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22 pending before the sala of respondent Judge.[3]

Pre-trial in these cases was concluded on January 16, 1995.  Upon agreement of the parties, trial on the merits was set on March 8, 15 and 22, all at 8:30 a.m. [4]

Unknown to petitioner, counsel for the accused filed several requests addressed to the Branch Clerk of Court for the issuance of subpoenasduces tecum requiring officials of several banks to bring before the court on March 8, 1995 at 8:30 a.m., microfilm copies of various checks. The subpoenas duces tecum were issued on February 6, 7 and 14, 1995.[5]

On March 8, 1995, which petitioner supposed to be the date of the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, petitioner came to court and was surprised by the presence of the bank officials therein.[6] During the hearing, respondent Judge called for a recess to enable counsel for the accused to confer with the bank officers. [7] When the case was again called, the following arguments took place:

Atty. Adorio:

Before we call our witness, your honor, may I now make of record that I was surprised with the move this morning of all the bank officers, I was not informed about any request for subpoena to the bank officers today.  No copy of such request was  given to the Private Prosecutor. And I also notice, your honor, that the subpoena or rather no copy issued by this court was ever given to the private prosecutor.  Atty. Rivera knows, he had already entered his appearance and he knows my address, why did he not furnish me a copy of his request for subpoena, your honor, considering that I have the right to examine his request, the materiality of his request.  I would like also to make of record, your honor, why they keep it as a secret, as a rule, the opposing party must be a party to whatever paper the other party  may file, it seems that Atty. Rivera is hiding something from us.  Whatever he wants to ask the Court, I am entitled to know.

Atty. Rivera:

I don’t think there is a reason or there is a need to be furnished with my request for subpoena, that is the reason why she was not furnished, your honor.  Besides, my request for subpoena this morning is not a litigated motion.  I made this request for advance in order that, when the defense turn to present evidence, it won’t be delayed because of non-availability of these exhibits.

Atty. Adorio:

This is our day of presenting evidence, your honor.  This is only my observation, your honor and may I request Atty. Rivera to give us all copies he submits to the Court.

Atty. Rivera:

May I request for particular rule for that....

Atty. Adorio:

Your honor, copies must be given to the opposing counsel, there is a ruling on that your honor....

Atty. Rivera:

This is not a litigated motion your honor.

C o u r t:

What is the problem of Atty. Adorio?

Atty. Adorio:

My only observation, your honor.  And may I request Atty. Rivera to give us all copies he submits to the Court.

Atty. Rivera:

May I request for that particular rule for furnishing request for subpoena to the other counsel, your honor...

C o u r t:

What is this rule, will you cite the rule so that we can examine your protest you are insinuating to the Court that there was something here, we don’t even know the request for subpoena.  If anyone of my staff is.... towards the other side, you call me I can discipline them...

Atty.  Adorio:

There was an instance, your honor, when this case was called by the Clerk for arraignment, the Clerk would say that the accused would be coming.  And one time, your honor, the Court already issued an Order of arrest, and it was already past 10:00 o’clock in the morning when the accused arrived....[8]

Petitioner was apparently referring to an incident that allegedly occurred on July 13, 1994, the date set for the accused’s arraignment. According to petitioner, the accused failed to appear in court on said date even after the third call at around 11:00 a.m.  Consequently, the Court ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the confiscation/cancellation of the accused’s bail bond.  The clerk in charge of the record then went to the door separating the courtroom and the staff’s office and whispered to someone in the office.  After two minutes, the same clerk again rose from her seat, went back to the door, and announced  to the Court that the accused would be late.  Respondent Judge replied that the Court will wait for the accused.[9]

However, on March 8, 1995, Philip See allegedly examined the record but found that the incidents which purportedly transpired during the arraignment were not reflected therein.[10]

The above revelations by Atty. Adorio prompted the following response from respondent judge:

C o u r t:

Will you call everybody, all the staff inside.... and you point to me who is that....?  If you want me to be disqualified in these cases, you make it in writing.  You file your motion to inhibit, I will disqualify myself because I don’t want to hear such accusations.  Any participation of my staff which I am now parading before you... I don’t like that kind of accusation.

Atty. Rivera:

I will join the court.

C o u r t:

O r d e r

As prayed for, the private prosecutor is hereby directed to file a Request for inhibition in writing stating the grounds.

Pending consideration of the Request for Inhibition, hearing is hereby suspended.

So ordered.[11]

Pursuant to said order, petitioner filed a “Motion for Inhibition and for Re-Raffle of Cases” in behalf of her client, alleging that:

The filing of the request for issuance of subpoena duces tecum and the issuance of the subpoena without notice on the private prosecutor were irregular for the following reasons:

[a]  The pre-trial of the case had beem terminated and the evidence for the prosecution was scheduled to be heard on March 8, 1995.  Thus, it was plaintiff’s turn to present evidence.  Whatever request defendant wanted to make with the court which would affect the right of the plaintiff to present evidence on the date scheduled would therefore be of notice to private prosecutor so that no surprises would result and so that plaintiff could also prepare questions for these bank officers involved and make use of their presence.

[b] The act of the Court in issuing the subpoena for the bank officers to testify on March 8, 1995 upon request of the defendant when it was not yet his turn to present evidence is disruptive of orderly court procedure and shows bias on the part of the court.  It shows the control of the accused over the court and court procedure.

[c]  This control was also manifest on July 13, 199[4], when accused was scheduled for arraignment, when the latter failed to appear before the court despite the third call at about 11:00 a.m.   The Court then issued an Order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the confiscation/cancellation of the bail bond.  After this Order was given orally in open court, the clerk who took charge of the records went to the door between the sala and the office and whispered something to someone in the office.  After about two minutes, the same clerk again rose from her seat and went back to the door and thereafter, she announced to the Court that the accused would be late and the accused would be arriving.  The Court then said that it will wait, if Alvin Tan is coming.  It is puzzling how the clerk knew that Alvin Tan would be coming when he was not even present in court.  However, none of these facts appeared in the Order or in the Constancia.[12]

Petitioner prayed that (1) the judge inhibit himself from hearing the criminal cases; (2) said cases be re-raffled to another court; and (3) the hearing of said cases be suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Inhibition.[13]

The trial court granted said motion in an Order dated May 5, 1995.  In the same order, declared petitioner and her client, in direct contempt. He explained thus:

The imputation that the Court has come under the control of the accused on account of the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum upon his request but without notice to the complainant or the public prosecutor is most unfair and disrespectful to the Court and is a highly irresponsible accusation on the part of the private complainant and the private prosecutor (who had meanwhile withdrawn from the case).  The issuance of a subpoena at a party’s instance is not subject to prior or simultaneous notice to the adverse party of the request therefor, for, such notice is not required by the Rules of Court.  The grounds for disqualification are unworthy of any consideration.  The questioning by the private prosecutor of the issuance of the subpoena is unfounded and due to a misplaced sense of procedural requirements.

x x x

As far as the text and language of the motion are concerned, the Court considers them to be irresponsible and disrespectful, especially the accusation that the Court had come under the control of the accused and had committed an irregularity of procedure.  These statements amount to an unmitigatedly disrespectful attitude towards the Court and its Presiding Judge.  They also display the dangerous tendencies of a party and counsel who probably think of themselves as beyond reproach.  There is therefore no recourse but to find both the complainant and his former private prosecutor guilty of direct contempt.[14]

On May 22, 1995, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.  This Court, in a Resolution dated June 5, 1995, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Judge from enforcing the impugned order.

A perusal of the trial court’s order reveals that what respondent judge found particularly contemptuous were petitioner’s statements in her motion alleging that (1) the issuance of the subpoenas duces tecum was irregular; and (2) the court and court procedure were subject to the “control” of the accused.

Whether or not these statements constitute direct contempt is the issue which confronts this Court.

We rule in the affirmative.

Contrary to petitioner’s allegations, there was nothing “irregular” in the  issuance of the subpoenas duces tecum.  Requests by a party  for the issuance of subpoenas do not require notice to other parties to the action.  No violation of due process results by

such lack of notice since the other parties would have ample opportunity to examine the witnesses and documents subpoenaed once they are presented in court.[15]

Petitioner however argues that:

On March 8, 1995, the prosecution was scheduled to present its first witness, the private complainant, Philip See, after a very long pre-trial period which started sometime in September 1994.  The regular  [as against the ‘irregular’] procedure would have been for the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of evidence pursuant to Rule 119, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.   The prosecution was not, however, able to move along, due to the presence of numerous bank officials from various banks who appeared pursuant to the subpoenas issued to them by the court.

Moreover, the person who requested for the subpoena was the counsel for the accused.  The regular or usual procedure would have been for the subpoena to be issued during the pre-trial stage or during the time that the defense is presenting its evidence and not during the time of presentation of evidence by the prosecution as what happened in this case.

We do not find any merit in petitioner’s contentions.  Rule 119, Section 3 of the Rules of Court which prescribes the order of trial in criminal cases does not preclude the defense from procuring subpoenas duces tecum during the time of the prosecution’s presentation of evidence.  In this case, counsel for the accused felt that he needed the documents subject of the subpoenas for his cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses.  Accordingly, respondent judge called a recess to enable said counsel to secure said documents from the bank officials.  The order of trial was not in any way altered;  counsel for the accused did not even attempt to call any of the bank officials to the stand.  Under these circumstances, the resulting delay cannot be considered unreasonable nor  “irregular.”

Nor do we find anything “irregular” in the accused’s arraignment.  As counsel for the accused points out:

xxx the fact that the Presiding Judge issued a warrant of arrest and ordered the cancellation of the accused’s bond shows that he gives no special favor to the accused.  And it is of common knowledge that orders like that are easily reconsidered/lifted even for excuses like traffic, ill health or failure to remember the hearing. The fact that the Presiding Judge opted to wait for the accused upon information that the latter is coming only shows that he was very aware of the common practice. Waiting saved so much of the court’s and parties’ time as it did away with the usual motion for reconsideration and the  necessity for a resetting.

xxx.  Court personnels [sic], practitioners and even judges know, of course that it is not uncommon for litigants, especially those coming for trial late, to call the court’s

office by phone.  It is likewise not uncommon for litigants who follows-up [sic] matters in the office (like bailbonds, [sic], release of rulings, etc.) to get acquainted with – or even become friends of - court clerks, secretaries, typists, stenographers or sheriffs, in the office.

xxx.  Besides, if the plaintiff found it necessary to have those matters stated in the Order or placed on record, there were two (2) lawyers (the private and the public prosecutors) who could have stood up and made the proper manifestations or requests.  But that incident happened way back 13 July 1994 and it is only now, in their motion of 15 March 1995, that they mention the same in their vain attempt to create an issue on the impartiality and fairness of the Presiding Judge.  xxx.[16]

Petitioner’s allegation that the proceedings before the trial court were “irregular” therefore lacks basis.  Such statement, when read with petitioner’s remark that the so-called irregularities “show the accused’s control over the court and court procedure,” is nothing short of contemptuous.

The latter statement is particularly alarming for it implies that court proceedings are a mere farce, and the court a mere stooge, a marionette subject to the manipulation of the opposing party.  It suggests that the judge was moved by considerations other than his sense of justice and fair play thereby calling into question the integrity and independence of the court.  Such statement tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect and constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically:

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

x x x

Rule 11.03 – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts.

Rule 11.04 – A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having no materiality to the case.

Consequently, we rule that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioner guilty of direct contempt.

However, we find the penalty imposed by respondent Judge upon petitioner too severe.  Punishment in contempt cases are meted on a corrective principle to vindicate the authority and dignity of the courts and the administration of justice. [17] Accordingly, we reduce the same to a fine of  P200.00.

While petitioner’s client, Philip G. See, did not question the contempt order against him -- his motion for intervention and the accompanying motion for issuance of

clarificatory order merely questioned the scope of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court -- the reduction of the penalty in favor of his former counsel should likewise benefit him.  Under the rules of criminal procedure, the judgment of the appellate court shall affect even those accused who did not appeal insofar as said judgment is favorable and applicable to them.[18] By analogy, this rule should apply in contempt cases.  Contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense,[19] and the mode of procedure in contempt proceedings is assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions.[20]

WHEREFORE, the Order dated May 5, 1995 issued by respondent judge  is MODIFIED in that the penalty of imprisonment for Two (2) Days and a fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) imposed on petitioner Leah Adorio and intervenor Phillip See is REDUCED to a fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) only.  The Temporary Restraining Order is LIFTED and Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-55933 to Q-94-55957 is ordered re-raffled to another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974

JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners, vs.FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent.

 

ESGUERRA, J.:p

Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition forcertiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, et al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit.

Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.

As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.

Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.

The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.

It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."

The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of court.

On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that move, on December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and individually, in the interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in accordance with law and justice.

The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973, cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through ignorance.

We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):

A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was under the Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding even the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the New.

This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-13277)was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction.

To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10, 1973, before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the Appellate Court.

Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our

resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.

Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation.

At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might have committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his contemptuous statements.

The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question — "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision.

On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.

To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should not be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the Government needing correction. He would have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).

This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.

Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973, respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among other things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies."

Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong.

When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision.

In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have committed he asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases."

It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for respondent's previous statements. We quote:

The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme Court a case for damages against them. He answered in the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in the Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of the Supreme Court thereon

While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this case.

With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients.

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).

As We stated before:

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.

... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445)

Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).

We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect. We said:

As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarilythe high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice(Emphasis supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorariof the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals.

It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances.

For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds

that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.

Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)

The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

THIRD DIVISION OFFICE OF THE COURT                       A.M. No. RTJ-07-2045ADMINISTRATOR,                                                             Complainant,                Present:                                                                    CORONA, J., Chairperson,                                                                   VELASCO, JR.,          - v e r s u s -                                      NACHURA,                                                                   PERALTA and

MENDOZA, JJ.                                                                  JUDGE HARUN B. ISMAEL,                              Respondent.                  Promulgated:                                                                                               January 19, 2010x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

 R E S O L U T I O N

 CORONA, J.: 

 

On April 25 to May 14, 2005, a judicial audit was conducted in the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22, presided over by

respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael. 

The judicial audit resulted in the issuance of a memorandum dated June 9,

2005 by the Office of Court Administrator (OCA)[1] directing respondent to explain

his failure to decide and act on current and inherited cases, as well as to resolve

incidents in various cases pending before him, within the reglementary period

provided by law.[2]  Respondent was likewise directed to inform the OCA if cases

already submitted for decision or resolution had in fact been decided or resolved

within the reglementary period.[3]

 

Consequently, respondent was ordered to immediately cease hearing cases in

his sala and confine himself to deciding or resolving cases submitted for decision

or resolution. In respondent’s stead, Judge Edilberto G. Absin was directed to

handle active cases, other than cases submitted for decision, until respondent could

comply with the directives or until he retired. 

The OCA likewise directed Atty. Insor A. Pantaran to explain the results of

the audit, as was required of respondent. Atty. Pantaran was the clerk of court of

the RTC of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22 during respondent’s tenure.

Atty. Pantaran complied with the June 9, 2005 memorandum in a letter dated May

19, 2006.[4]

In its memorandum dated February 26, 2007,[5] the OCA noted that

respondent failed to fully comply with its directives in the June 9, 2005

memorandum. Neither did he ask for extensions of time within which to comply

with the subject directives. 

On examination of Atty. Pantaran’s May 19, 2006 letter/compliance, the

OCA found that respondent had partially complied with the directives of the June

9, 2005 memorandum, having already decided or resolved some of the cases he

was directed to act on. Nonetheless, the OCA established that respondent

committed gross inefficiency when he unduly delayed actions in a huge number of

cases. The OCA recommended that respondent be fined P20,000. Furthermore, the

OCA recommended that Judge Absin be directed to decide and resolve the cases

pending in respondent’s sala. The OCA likewise directed the designation of Judge

Loreto C. Quinto[6] as assisting judge. 

The factual findings of the OCA are well-taken. However, we vary the

penalty imposed in the light of the circumstances of the case. 

It is settled that failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary

period constitutes gross inefficiency[7] and is not excusable. It is a less serious

charge[8] and is punishable by either suspension from office without salaries and

benefits for not less than one month but not more than three months, or a fine of

more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.[9]

 

The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall perform all

judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and

with reasonable promptness.[10] Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code[11] admonishes all

judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases [12] within the

period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution.[13]

 

We emphasize that the administration of justice is a joint responsibility of

the judge and the lawyer.[14]  As aptly held inSalvador v. Judge Limsiaco:[15]

 A judge’s foremost consideration is the administration of justice.

Thus, he should follow the time limit set for deciding cases. xxx Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. It also undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the

judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute. Decision making, among other duties, is the most important duty of a member of the bench. (citations omitted)

 

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[16] this administrative case against

respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a

member of the bar.[17] Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in

the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of

Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1[18] and 12[19] as well as Rules

1.03[20] and 12.04[21] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

 

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael is hereby

found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the

New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary for which he

is FINED in the amount of P20,000. 

Respondent is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 12 as

well as Rules 1.03, 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for

which he is FINED in the amount of P10,000. 

Let  a  copy of  this resolution be attached to the personal records of

respondent in the Office of Administrative Services, the Office of the Court

Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED. 

 Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila 

THIRD DIVISION

 ANTONIO CONLU,                        Complainant,

           -  versus  -

    ATTY. IRENEO AREDONIA, JR.,                      Respondent.

  A.C. No. 4955 Present: VELASCO, JR., Chairperson,PERALTA,             ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,* andMENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: September 12, 2011

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R E S O L U T I O N VELASCO, JR., J.: 

Before the Court is a complaint[1] for disbarment with a prayer for damages instituted by Antonio Conlu (Antonio) against Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. (Atty. Ireneo) on grounds of gross negligence and dereliction of sworn duty.    

 Antonio was the defendant in Civil Case No. 1048, a suit for Quieting of

Title and Recovery of a Parcel of Land commenced before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Silay City, Negros Occidental.[2]  He engaged the services of Atty. Ireneo to represent him in the case.  On March 16, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment[3] adverse to Antonio.  Therefrom, Atty. Ireneo, for Antonio, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) whereat the recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50075.

The CA, per its Resolution of February 10, 1997, eventually dismissed the appeal for non-filing of the appellant’s brief within the reglementary period.  Antonio got wind of the dismissal from his wife who verified the status of the case when she happened to be in Manila.  When confronted about the dismissal action, Atty. Ireneo promised to seek reconsideration, which he did, but which the appellate court later denied for belated filing of the motion. 

 In that motion[4] he prepared and filed, Atty. Ireneo averred receiving the

adverted February 10, 1997 CA Resolution[5] only on April 25, 1997, adding in this

regard that the person in the law office who initially received a copy of said resolution was not so authorized.  However, the CA denied the motion for having been filed out of time.  As the CA would declare in a subsequent resolution dated December 3, 1997, there was a valid receipt by Atty. Ireneo, as shown by the registry return card with his signature, of a copy of the CA’s February 10, 1997 Resolution. Accordingly, as the CA wrote, the motion for reconsideration of the February resolution which bore the mailing date May 8, 1997 cannot but be considered as filed way out of time. 

 In light of these successive setbacks, a disgusted Antonio got the case

records back from Atty. Ireneo and personally filed on October 13, 1997 another motion for reconsideration.  By Resolution of December 3, 1997, the CA again denied[6] this motion for the reason that the prejudicial impact of the belated filing by his former counsel of the first motion for reconsideration binds Antonio.

 Forthwith, Antonio elevated his case to the Court on a petition for certiorari

but the Court would later dismiss the petition and his subsequent motion to reconsider the denial.

Such was the state of things when Antonio lodged this instant administrative case for disbarment with a prayer for damages. To support his claim for damages, Antonio asserts having suffered sleepless nights, mental torture and anguish as a result of Atty. Ireneo’s erring ways, besides which Antonio also lost a valuable real property subject of Civil Case No. 1048.

 Following Atty. Ireneo’s repeated failure to submit, as ordered, his

comment,  a number of extensions of time given notwithstanding,[7] the Court referred the instant case, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4955, to its  Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

 Acting on OBC’s Report and Recommendation[8] dated November 23, 2000,

the Court, by Resolution of January 31, 2001, directed Atty. Ireneo to show cause within ten (10) days from notice—later successively extended via Resolutions dated July 16 and 29, 2002—why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment and to comply with the filing of it.

 In separate resolutions, the Court (a) imposed on Atty. Ireneo a fine of PhP

2,000;[9] (b) ordered his arrest but which the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) cannot effect for the reason: “whereabouts unknown”;[10] (c) considered him as having waived his right to file comment; and (d) referred the administrative case

to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report, investigation and recommendation.[11]   

              At the IBP, Atty. Ireneo desisted from addressing his administrative case, his desistance expressed by not attending the mandatory conference or filing the required position paper. On the basis of the pleadings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Ireneo liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.03 and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with warning.  The salient portions of the investigating commissioner’s Report and Recommendation[12] read as follows: 

          Uncontroverted and uncontested are respondent’s inability to file appellant’s Brief, his futile attempts to mislead the Court of Appeals that he did not personally received [sic] the resolution of dismissal. His filing of the Motion for Reconsideration five (5) months late. [sic] 

Aggravated by his failure to file his comment in the instant administrative complaint despite his numerous motions for extension to file the same. [sic]

 He is even adamant to comply with the show cause order of the bar

confidant. The series of snobbish actuations in several resolution of the Supreme Court enjoining him to make the necessary pleading. [sic]   By Resolution No. XVIII-2008-523, the IBP Board of Governors adopted

and approved said report and recommendation of the CBD.[13]

 We agree with the inculpatory findings of the IBP but not as to the level of

the penalty it recommended.  Res ipsa loquitur.  Atty. Ireneo had doubtless been languid in the

performance of his duty as Antonio’s counsel. He neglected, without reason, to file the appellant’s brief before the CA.  He failed, in short, to exert his utmost ability and to give his full commitment to maintain and defend Antonio’s right. Antonio, by choosing Atty. Ireneo to represent him, relied upon and reposed his trust and confidence on the latter, as his counsel, to do whatsoever was legally necessary to protect Antonio’s interest, if not to secure a favorable judgment.  Once they agree to take up the cause of a client, lawyers, regardless of the importance of the subject matter litigated or financial arrangements agreed upon, owe fidelity to such cause and should always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on them.

[14]   And to add insult to injury, Atty. Ireneo appeared not to have taken any effort to personally apprise Antonio of the dismissal of the appeal, however personally embarrassing the cause for the dismissal might have been. As mentioned earlier, Antonio came to know about the outcome of his appeal only after his wife took the trouble of verifying the case status when she came to Manila. By then, all remedies had been lost.   

 It must be remembered that a retained counsel is expected to serve the

client with competence and diligence. This duty includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care and giving the client sound legal advice, but also properly representing the client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of uncertainty.[15]  

 The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes

inexcusable negligence.[16] This default translates to a violation of the injunction of Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively providing:

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

 x x x x Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a matter entrusted to him, and his

negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his

case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.  As if his lack of candor in his professional relationship with Antonio was not

abhorrent enough, Atty. Ireneo tried to mislead the appellate court about the receipt of a copy of its February 10, 1997 Resolution dismissing the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 50075. He denied personally receiving such copy, but the CA found and declared that he himself received said copy. The CA arrived at this conclusion thru the process of comparing Atty. Ireneo’s signature appearing in the pleadings with that in the registry return card. Both signatures belong to one and the same person.  Needless to stress, Atty. Ireneo had under the premises indulged in

deliberate falsehood, contrary to the self-explanatory prescriptions of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01, which provide:

 CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,

OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCEDURES.

 Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral

or deceitful conduct. x x x x CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD

FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the

doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. (Emphasis supplied.)  We cannot write finis to this case without delving into and addressing Atty.

Ireneo’s defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its resolution to file his comment on the basic complaint. After requesting and securing no less than three (3) extensions of time to file his comment, he simply closed, so to speak, communication lines.  And when ordered to give an explanation through a show-cause directive for not complying, he asked for and was granted a 30-day extension. But the required comment never came. When the Court eventually directed the NBI to arrest him, he just left his last known address and could not be located.  

 The Court’s patience has been tested to the limit by what in hindsight

amounts to a lawyer’s impudence and disrespectful bent. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of justice respect, courtesy and such other becoming conduct so essential in the promotion of orderly, impartial and speedy justice. What Atty. Ireneo has done was the exact opposite. What is clear to the Court by now is that Ireneo was determined all along not to submit a comment and, in the process, delay the resolution of the instant case. By asking several extensions of time to submit one, but without the intention to so submit, Ireneo has effectively trifled with the Court’s processes, if not its liberality.  This cannot be tolerated. It cannot be allowed to go unpunished, if the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice is to be maintained. And to be sure, Atty. Ireneo can neither defeat this Court’s jurisdiction over him as a member of

the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts.[17]  Manifestly, he has fallen short of the diligence required of every member of the Bar.  The pertinent Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

 CANON 12 — A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND

CONSIDER HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

 x x x x Rule 12.03 — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to

file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

Rule 12.04 — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes. (Emphasis supplied.)  A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for gross misconduct or for

transgressions defined by the rules as grounds to strip a lawyer of professional license.[18]  Considering, however, the serious consequences of either penalty, the Court will exercise its power to disbar or suspend only upon a clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof of misconduct that seriously affects the standing of a lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar.

 In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag,[19] the Court penalized a

lawyer who failed to file a pre-trial brief and other pleadings, such as position papers, leading to the dismissal of the case with six months suspension.  In Soriano v. Reyes,[20] We meted a one-year suspension on a lawyer for  inexcusable negligence, the latter having failed to file a pre-trial brief leading to the dismissal of the case and failure to prosecute in another case, and omitting to apprise complainant of the status of the two cases with assurance of his diligent attention to them.

  In this case, Atty. Ireneo should be called to task for the interplay of the

following: his inexcusable negligence that resulted in the dismissal of Antonio’s appeal, coupled by his lack of candor in not apprising Antonio of the status of his appealed case; his attempt to mislead the CA in a vain bid to evade the consequence of the belated filing of a motion for reconsideration; and, last but not least, his cavalier disregard of the Court’s directives primarily issued to resolve the charges brought against him  by Antonio. We deem it fitting that Atty. Ireneo be

suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year, up from the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.  This should serve as a constant reminder of his duty to respect courts of justice and to observe that degree of diligence required by the practice of the legal profession. His being a first offender dictates to large degree this leniency.

 The prayer for damages cannot be granted.  Let alone the fact that Antonio

chose not to file his position paper before the IBP-CBD and, therefore, was unable to satisfactorily prove his claim for damages, a proceeding for disbarment or suspension is not in any sense a civil action; it is undertaken and prosecuted for public welfare. It does not involve private interest and affords no redress for private grievance.[21]

 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. is

declared GUILTY of inexcusable negligence, attempting to mislead the appellate court, misuse of Court processes, and willful disobedience to lawful orders of the Court.  He is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.   Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.

 SO ORDERED. 

   

 THIRD DIVISION

  

RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN BACULBAS,                                 Complainants,                        - versus -

A.C. No. 7062[Formerly CBD Case No.  04-1355]  Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,

     ATTY. JOSE A. SUING,                                  Respondent.

 

TINGA, andVELASCO, JR., JJ.                                                              Promulgated:

                                September 26, 2006

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D E C I S I O N  

CARPIO MORALES, J.:Complainants, via a complaint[1] filed before the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP), have sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing (respondent) on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.[2]

  Herein complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-

0403180-98, “Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil,” forUnfair Labor Practice (ULP)                         and Illegal Dismissal , while respondent was the counsel for the             therein respondents.  Said case was consolidated with NLRC Case No.        00-04-03161-98, “Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan, et al.,” forIllegal Strike. 

 By Decision of August 29, 2001,[3] Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos

dismissed the Illegal Strike case, and declared the employer-clients of respondent guilty of ULP.  Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed: 

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal strike is

dismissed   for lack of merit. Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are hereby

declared guilty of Unfair Labor Practice   for union busting and that the dismissal of the nine (9) complainants are declared illegal. All the respondents in NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98 for illegal dismissal are directed to reinstate   all the

complainants to their former position   with full backwages   from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement computed as follows:

 x x x x 3. CRISANTO CONOS            Backwages:           

Basic Wage:            2/21/98 – 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos.            P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30  =   P104, 504.40            10/31/99  10/31/00 = 12 mos.            P223.50 x 26 days x 12 =              69, 732.00            11/01/00  8/30/01 = 10 mos.            P250.00 x 26 days x 10 =               65,000.00                                                               P239,236.40            13th Month Pay:1/12 of P239,236.40 =                              19,936.36                          SILP2/16/98  12/31/98 = 10.33 mos.P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12 = 852.221/1/99  12/31/99 = 12mos.P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12 = 1,117.501/1/00  10/30/01 = 20 mos.P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12 = 2,083.33                                                                     4,053.05                                                                                              P263,225.81x x x x 7. RONALD SAMBAJON            (same as Conos)                                       263,225.818.FREDELYN BACULBAS           (same as Conos)                                        263,225.819. RENEIRO SAMBAJON (same as Conos)      263,225.81                        Total Backwages                     P2,370,674.38 Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the above-mentioned

backwages including the various monetary claims stated in the Manifestation dated August 24, 1998 except payment of overtime pay and to pay 10% attorney’s fees of all sums owing to complainants.[4]  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 

 

          The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 2, 2003 a Writ of Execution.[5]

 In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims

dated February 27, 2004 purportedly signed and sworn to by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor Arbiter dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were concerned, by Order dated March 9, 2004.[6]

                   Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the considerations therefor.  Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, “frustrated” the implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents.             In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent, together with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutor’s Office of Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No. 04-5203.[7]                    In his Report and Recommendation[8] dated September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag, who conducted an investigation of the administrative complaint at bar, recommended that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor with warning, in light of his following discussion:  

              The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be disbarred   for his alleged manipulation of four alleged RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and falsified. 

A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby becomes an Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice.

 Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on the one hand,

the right of a litigant to seek redress against a member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him damaged, either through malice or negligence, while in the performance of his duties as his counsel, and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and preserve his good name and reputation, we have again gone over and considered [the] aspects of the case.

 All the cases protesting and contesting the genuineness, veracity and due

execution of the questioned RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall, Appeal and Falsification are PENDING   resolution in their respective venues. Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to know the identities of the herein complainants   is not impleaded   by the complainants when it was his solemn duty and obligation to ascertain true and real identities of person executing Release Waiver with Quitclaim.

 The old adage that in the performance of an official duty there is that

presumption of regularity unless proven otherwise, such was proven in the January 28, 2005 clarificatory questioning . . . :

 x x x x

  . . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or not respondent

actually committed the despicable act would seem to be fairly debatable under the circumstances.[9]  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

            

             The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag. 

After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP[10] transmitted additional records including a Motion to Amend the Resolution No. XVII-2005-226[11] filed by respondent.  

 One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon (Sambajon), by Petition[12] filed

before the OBC, assailed the IBP Board Resolution.  The Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period to assail the IBP Resolution.  Sambajon explains that while his counsel received the Resolution on February 27, 2006, he only learned of

it when he visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who could not reach him, he (Sambajon) having transferred from one residence to another.   

Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the     3-day delay in filing the present petition, in the interest of justice, this Court gives his petition due course. 

 In respondent’s Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, he does not

deny that those whom he met face to face before Commissioner Hababag were not the same persons whom he saw before Labor Arbiter Santos on February 27, 2004. [13]  He hastens to add though that he was not familiar with the complainants as they were not attending the hearings before Arbiter Santos.[14] Complainants[15] and their former counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan[16] claim otherwise, however.  And the Minutes[17]of the proceedings before the National Conciliation Mediation Board in a related case, NCMB-NCR-NS-02-081-98, “Re: Microplast, Inc., Labor Dispute,” which minutes bear respondent’s and complainants’ signatures, belie respondent’s claim that he had not met complainants before.

 Respondent, who declared that he went to the Office of the Labor Arbiter on

February 27, 2004 on the request of his clients who “told him that on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants w[ould] be at the office of Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims and waivers,” heaps on the Labor Arbiter  the responsibility of ascertaining the identity of the parties who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims.  But respondent himself had the same responsibility.  He was under obligation to protect his clients’ interest, especially given the amount allegedly given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents.  His answers to the clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not, however, show that he discharged such obligation. 

COMM. HABABAG:             But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask.. that the                 money of

your client would go to the deserving employee? ATTY. SUING: 

I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there was already as you call it before a precedent   in February of 1998 when my client directly made settlement to the nine or eight of the seventeen original complainants, Your Honor, and I did not participate. Hindi po ako nakialam don sa kanilang usapan because it is my belief that the best way, Your Honor, to have a dispute settled between the parties is that we let them do the discussion, we’ll let them do the settlement because sometimes you know, Your Honor, sad to say, when lawyers are involved in a matters [sic] of settlement the dispute does not terminate as in this case, Your Honor.

 x x  x x           COMM. HABABAG:           

Yes. What made you appear on said date and time before Arbiter Santos? ATTY. SUING: 

I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter Santos, number one,   to witness the signing   of the documents of Quitclaim and Waiver; number 2, so that according to them someone as a lawyer will represent them in that proceedings.

 COMM. HABABAG:                       My query, did it not surprise you that no money was given                   to you and

yet there would be a signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release? ATTY. SUING:             I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and there             were no complaints, Your Honor. COMM. HABABAG: 

Just because it happened before you did not bother to see to it that there is a voucher so you just rely on your precedent, is that what you mean?

 ATTY. SUING: 

Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the parties               who are talking and it is my client who knows them better than I do, Your Honor.

 COMM. HABABAG: 

So, you just followed the instruction of your client to be present at Arbiter Cadiente Santos office because there would be signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release, it that clear?

 ATTY. SUING:             Yes, Your Honor. COMM. HABABAG:             [You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is the money                     intended for the payment of these workers ? ATTY. SUING:             I did not ask. COMM. HABABAG:             You did not asked [sic] your client who will prepare the            documents? ATTY. SUING:             As far as the documents are concerned, Your Honor. COMM. HABABAG:             The Quitclaim Receipt and Release? ATTY. SUING:                       Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me before        February of 1998.

             COMM. HABABAG:                                               When you say they whom are you referring to?                       ATTY. SUING:                                   I’m referring to my client, Your Honor.             COMM. HABABAG:                       

                        They asked me attorney can you please prepare us a document of Quitclaim and Waiver or give us a simple [ sic ] of Quitclaim and Waiver.  I do recall that I made one but this document, Your     Honor, is only a single document where all the signatories named are present because my purpose there really, Your Honor, is that so that each of them will be there together and they will identify themselves, see each other para ho siguradong sila-sila yong magkakasama at magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the signing took place in February of 2004 it was made for any [ sic ] individual, Your Honor,   no longer the     document that I prepared when all of the seven will be signing in one document.

             COMM. HABABAG:           

Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic] made the changes?                  ATTY. SUING:

            I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time when I was there, there are already people there, the seven complainants plus another woman.[18] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

                                   

                   The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:         

            CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.                       CANON 18   A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.                       x x x x             Rule 18.03   A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

         To be sure, respondent’s client Manuel Rodil did not request him to go to the

Office of Labor Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That he was requested to go there could only mean that he would exert vigilance to protect his clients’ interest. This he conceded when

he acknowledged the purpose of his presence at the Office of Labor Arbiter Santos, thus: 

ATTY. SUING: 

To go there, Your Honor, and represent them and see that these document[s] are properly signed and   that these people are properly identified   and verified them in front of Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos .[19]  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

           That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of complainants entered into a compromise agreement with his clients in which he “did not participate” and from which no problem arose did not excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of going to the Labor Arbiter’s   office — “that [the complainants] are properly identified . . . in front of [the] Arbiter.”   

Besides, by respondent’s own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the true identity of those who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims.[20]  That should have alerted him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients’ interest.   But he was not and he did not.

           Diligence is “the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence.” A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.             The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that “extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a   bonus pater familias . x x x[21] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)  

And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of his client   Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before Commissioner Manuel Hababag:

 COMM. HABABAG:

May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba sinong may gawa nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?

 MR. RODIL:

Sila po. COMM. HABABAG:

Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant o sinong nag-abot sa iyo nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?

  MR. RODIL:

Si Atty. Suing po. ATTY. SUING:

In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga dokumentong ito or what?

 COMM. HABABAG:

Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na English. Ito bang Release Waiver and Quitclaim sino ang may gawa nito, sino ang nagmakinilya nito?

 MR. RODIL:

Kami yata ang gumawa niyan. COMM. HABABAG:

Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino sa inyong mga officer, tauhan o abogado ang gumawa nito?

 MR. RODIL:

Matagal na ho yan eh.  x x x x

 COMM. HABABAG:

Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong. Sino ang naghatid nito kay Ariel Cadiente Santos para pirmahan ni Ariel Cadiente Santos?

           MR. RODIL:            Si attorney po.

             ATTY. SUING:

Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner is asking kung sino ang nagdala ng mga dokumento?

           MR. RODIL:            Yong mga tao. x x x x COMM. HABABAG:

Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino mo inabot ang   bayad   sa nakalagay dito sa Release waiver and Quitclaim?

 MR. RODIL:            Kay attorney po.  COMM. HABABAG:            Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong attorney? ATTY. SUING:            Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang tanong.  COMM. HABABAG:

Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong hindi ang abogado mo. MR. RODIL:            Opo. COMM. HABABAG:            Huwag kang tatawa. I’m reminding you serious tayo dito. MR. RODIL:             Opo serious po. COMM. HABABAG:             Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera? MR. RODIL:            Opo. COMM. HABABAG: 

Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang tinutukoy mo?

 MR. RODIL:

Atty. Suing po. COMM. HABABAG:

Okay. ATTY. SUING:

Your Honor,… COMM. HABABAG:

Pabayaan mo muna. I’ll come to that. Magkano kung iyong natatandaan ang perang inabot kay Atty. Suing?

 MR. RODIL:

Yan ang hindi ko matandaan. x x x x[22]  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 

            Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions in an apparent attempt not to incriminate him (respondent).  His client contradicted respondent’s claim that the Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was not the one presented at the Arbiter’s Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not involved in releasing to the complainants the money for and in consideration of the execution of the documents. 

 

As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause.  Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct.[23] While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.[24]

           In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.[25] the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempts to delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was enough to give him “the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession.”

 While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances

attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP.  This Court finds that respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order. 

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross misconduct and isSUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

    Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country. 

A.C. No. 6252             October 5, 2004

JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant, vs.Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 1382 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.033, Canon 54, and Canons 12.075 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant in this wise:

"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats."6

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,7 Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.8He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants’ residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 1129 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice." Complainant charged respondent’s clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice."

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted Certifications10 from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit11 of the two police officers who had assisted them.

Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.

After receipt of respondent’s Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two o’clock in the afternoon. Notices12 of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only

complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.13 The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two o’clock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply14 to the verified Answer of respondent. The latter’s Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.15 It also received complainant’s Letter-Request16 to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order17 dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainant’s Memorandum18 on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.

The IBP’s Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-17219 approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioner’s Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiant’s residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation20 of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to "P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty."

The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent’s Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.21 They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded."22Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.23

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,24 the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows:

"The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument."

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,25 which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.

We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondent’s clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses’ Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainant’s brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to "certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits." Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification requirement.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.26 They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.27 It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws.28 No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by

respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.

Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainant’s plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.29 Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.30 Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondent’s clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client."

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

"Rule 12.08 – A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel."

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,31 except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.32

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.

"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyer’s client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful."33

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.34

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:

First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latter’s life and liberty are at stake.35 It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.36

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial.37 Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions.38 The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability.39 It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latter’s allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.