CASE STUDY 3 - Techneau · CASE STUDY 3 Report of the end-user workshop with Riga Water TECHNEAU NOVEMBER 2007

CASE STUDY 3 Report of the end-user workshop with Riga Water

TECHNEAU NOVEMBER 2007

© 2006 TECHNEAU TECHNEAU is an Integrated Project Funded by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme, Sustainable Development, Global Change and Ecosystems Thematic Priority Area (contractnumber 018320). All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a database or retrieval system, or published, in any form or in any way, electronically, mechanically, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means without prior written permission from the publisher

CASE STUDY 3 Report of the end-user workshop with Riga Water

TECHNEAU NOVEMBER 2007

This report is: PU = Public

Colophon

Title Case Study 3: Report of the end-user workshop with Riga Water Author(s) Talis Juhna (RTU), Glenn Dillon (WRc) Quality Assurance Ian Walker (WRc) Deliverable number D 7.5.1

Case Study 3: Report of the end-user workshop with Riga Water © TECHNEAU - 1 - November 2007

Summary

A workshop was held with Riga Water, hosted by Riga Technical University (RTU) on 29-30 October 2007. The workshop was attended by representatives of Riga Water and TECHNEAU with the aims of:

• Identifying the major risks and challenges faced by Riga Water in supplying drinking water to the city of Riga.

• Identifying tools and procedures developed in TECHNEAU that could be used to mitigate the risks and resolve the challenges to water supply in a fully documented case study.

A Water Safety Plan (WSP) approach was adopted to identify the risks and challenges to the Riga water supply. A series of presentations was given by representatives of TECHNEAU and Riga Water. The TECHNEAU presentations described the Work Area 7 (WA7) case studies being carried out under the TECHNEAU project, the principles of WSPs and Risk Assessment/Risk Management (RA/RM). The Riga Water presentations described the structure of the company, its operation and performance, and identified major risks with the aid of the TECHNEAU Hazard Database. In the subsequent discussion, the risks and challenges faced by Riga Water were identified and prioritised. The key risks were:

• Water quality deterioration in the networks (biofilm regrowth, pathogens, turbidity, low pH).

• Pollution of the Daugava river raw water source. It was agreed that TECHNEAU would support Riga Water in the development of a case study based on a WSP that would address:

• High risk related to the pollution of the Daugava river raw water source.

• Decrease of water consumption. • Unmeasured water (including physical loss). • Security of supply.

Twelve tools and procedures from TECHNEAU were identified for demonstration in the Riga Case Study: WSPs, the analytical ‘tool box’, on-line turbidity measurement, S::can UV/Vis spectrometer, Hemoflow and FISH methodologies for detection of pathogens in biofilm, the water treatment simulator (WTS), biofilm regrowth and corrosion models, resuspension potential methods (RPMs) to identify turbidity ‘hot-spots’ in distribution, flushing and the TECHNEAU Knowledge Integrator (TKI).



Contents

Summary 1

Contents 3

1 INTRODUCTION 5

2 CASE STUDY 3 WORKSHOP - PARTICIPANTS 7

3 CASE STUDY 3 WORKSHOP - AGENDA 9

4 CASE STUDY 3 WORKSHOP - MINUTES 11

5 CASE STUDY 3 WORKSHOP - PRESENTATIONS 15 5.1 TECHNEAU Technologies in Case Studies - Glenn Dillon, WRc 15 5.2 Water Safety Plan: Why it is Needed - Theo van den Hoven, Kiwa 17 5.3 Risk Analysis from Source-to-Tap in Drinking Water Systems - Andreas Lindhe,

Chalmers University 24 5.4 Water Supply System of Riga - Victor Juhna, Director of Maintenance, Riga Water 31 5.5 Water Quality Control at Riga Water - Silvija Pastare, Head of Water Quality Control

Laboratory, Riga Water 42 5.6 Practice of Water Distribution Networks Maintenance - Andris Luters, Head of Water

Distribution Eastern Department, Riga Water 50 5.7 Water Distribution Networks Hydraulic Regime Control System - Aivars Berenefelds,

Head of Second Elevation Water Pumping Station, Riga Water 54 5.8 Preliminary Results of Risk Analysis by Riga Water - Rasma Pare, Assistant of

Director of Maintenance, Riga Water 59



1 INTRODUCTION

A workshop was held with Riga Water, hosted by Riga Technical University (RTU) on 29-30 October 2007. The workshop was attended by representatives of Riga Water and TECHNEAU with the aims of:

• Identifying the major risks and challenges faced by Riga Water in supplying drinking water to the city of Riga.

• Identifying tools and procedures developed in TECHNEAU that could be used to mitigate the risks and resolve the challenges to water supply in a fully documented case study.

A Water Safety Plan (WSP) approach was adopted to identify the risks and challenges to the Riga water supply. A series of presentations was given by representatives of TECHNEAU and Riga Water. The TECHNEAU presentations described the Work Area 7 (WA7) case studies being carried out under the TECHNEAU project, the principles of WSPs and Risk Assessment/Risk Management (RA/RM). The Riga Water presentations described the structure of the company, its operation and performance, and identified major risks with the aid of the TECHNEAU Hazard Database. This report includes a list of the workshop participants (Section 2), the workshop agenda (Section 3), minutes (Section 4), and presentations (Section 5).



2 CASE STUDY 3 WORKSHOP - PARTICIPANTS

Riga Water Viktors Juhna, Director of Maintenance Rasma Pare, Assistant of Director of Maintenance Silvija Pastare, Head of Water Quality Control Laboratory Andris Luters, Head of Water Distribution Eastern Department Aivars Bērenfelds, Head of Second Elevation Water Pumping Station Juris Dubinskis Armands Bicis Ligita Pauliņa Pare Zintis TECHNEAU Tālis Juhna, RTU, Case Study Co-ordinator Glenn Dillon, WRc, Case Study Co-ordinator Theo van den Hoven, Kiwa, Project Co-ordinator Andreas Lindhe, Chalmers University Simona Larsson, RTU



3 CASE STUDY 3 WORKSHOP - AGENDA

TECHNEAU Workshop WP 7.5, Case Study 3 Kick-off Meeting 29-30 October 2007

Venue: Room 254, RTU Dep Water Engineering and Technology (2nd floor), Azenes Street 16, LV-1048, Riga, Latvia

PROGRAMMA / AGENDA

29 October 14:00

• TECHNEAU projektā izstrādāto tehnoloģiju izmēģināšana ražošanā/

Demonstration of TECHNEAU technologies in Case Studies (Izmēģinājuma ražošanā Rīgā koordinators /Coordinator of Riga Case Study, Glenn Dillon)

• Ūdensapgādes drošuma plāns: kāpēc tas ir vajadzīgs? / Water Safety Plan: Why it is Needed? (TECHNEAU koordinators/TECHNEAU coordinator, Theo van den Hoven)

• Riska analīzes principi ūdensapgādes sistēmās/ Risk analysis - from source to tap in drinking water systems (Doktorants/ Chalmers University PhD student, Andreas Lindhe)

• Rīgas ūdens apgādes sistēma / Water Supply System of Riga (Ražošanas direktors/ Director of maintance, Dr.sc. ing. Viktors Juhna)

• Dzerama ūdens kvalitātes kontroles sistēma / Water Quality Control at Riga Water (Ūdens kvalitātes kontroles laboratorijas vadītāja/ Head of water quality control laboratory, Dr.sc.chem. Silvija Pastare)

• Rīgas ūdens tīkla ekspluatācija/ Practice of Water Distribution Networks Maintance (Daugavas labā krasta ūdensvada tīkla vadītājs/ Head of water distribution Eastern part department, Andris Luters)

• Ūdensvada tīkla dienesta hidrauliskā režīma kontrole / Water Distribution Networks Hydraulic Regime Control System (Ūdensvada tīkla sūkņa stacijas dienesta vadītājs / Head of second elevation water pumping station, Aivars Bērenefelds)

• Pirmie rezultāti par riska novērtējumu SIA „Rīgas ūdens” / Preliminary Results of Risk Analyses by Riga Water (Ražošanas direktora palīdze/ Assistant of director of maintenance, Rasma Pare)

• Diskusijas / Discussion 30 October 09:00

• Izmēģinājuma ražošanā Rīgā plāns / Proposed Plan for Case Study for Riga Water (Talis Juhna)

• Diskusijas/Discussions



4 CASE STUDY 3 WORKSHOP - MINUTES

Date: 29 – 30 October 2007 Venue: Riga Technical University, Department of Water Engineering and Technology Day 1 The aim of the meeting was to identify the major risks related to operation of the water supply system of Riga Water and to propose tools developed in the TECHNEAU project. The proposed tools will be tested within the Riga Case Study. The meeting was based on Water Safety Plan (WSP) principles: the major risks were identified with a team of experts recruited from different departments of Riga Water. The meeting was carried out according to the agenda that was made available to all participants before the meeting. Briefly, the representatives of TECHNEAU introduced the case studies, principles of WSPs and Risk Analysis/Risk Management (RA/RM). Then, presentations were given by several representatives from Riga Water. They presented the structure of the company (e.g. water abstractions, water treatment and distribution), operational principles (e.g. routine sampling, repairing and flushing, and monitoring of hydraulic regimes in the networks) and performance of the company (e.g. water quality, financial and technical data). Finally, the draft of the TECHNEAU ‘Hazard Database’ prepared by Riga Water for the WSP was presented. During all presentations and discussion the following issues were emphasized by Riga Water:

• not only water quality but water quantity is important to assure the water supply safety (V. Juhna);

• Riga Water is aiming to maintain 50-75% reserves in addition to daily production of water for the sake of water supply stability and safety (V. Juhna);

• the decrease of water consumption also compromises water safety (due to higher risk of pollution intrusion into the networks) (V. Juhna);

• new parameter limits , 3 NTU and 1000 CFU/ml, have been introduced in drinking water regulation in Latvia (S. Pastare);

• major problems are low pH (<6.8) in treated surface water, high manganese (0.3 mg/l) in some groundwater sources, relatively high concentrations of iron (0.5 mg/l) and organic carbon (4.8 mg/l measured as COD) (S. Pastare);

• turbidity in drinking water distribution networks increase with a decrease of pH (S.Pastare);


• high turbidity in “dead-ends” where sometimes hydrants should be installed to flush the network (Z. Pare).

All participants were asked to anonymously identify and prioritize (high, medium or low) current risks or problems for Riga Water. The results of this survey are presented below. HIGH MEDIUM LOW Chemical pollution of Daugava river *

Bacterial regrowth in distribution networks ‡

Problems with resuspension of sediments in distribution networks ‡

Pathogens in drinking water ‡ Bad organoleptic quality ‡

Pollution of Daugava river raw water source *

Pollution of water resources (Daugava) creating health problem (when not removed in treatment) *

Turbid water in networks ‡

Low pH of distributed water (water quality risks, risks for pipe conditions) ‡

Pollution of Daugava river * Water quality deterioration ‡

Loss of good reputation due to many complaints regarding turbidity ‡

Pollution of Daugava river *

State of distribution networks: low pH, materials, long water residence times ‡

Risks related to human beings

Pollution of catchments*

Low pH from Daugava WTP increases consumer complaints about iron and turbidity; the recovery period after such events is long ‡

Simultaneous problems in groundwater and surface water sources

Terrorism

Natural disasters

Disturbances of water supply due to black-outs and data transmission system failures

Corrosion and turbidity‡ Environmental pollution Lack of skilled manpower

Terrorism Weather conditions

Infrequent pollution with severe consequences

Access to water reservoirs in water distribution networks

Human factors in operation of technological processes

Sabotage at low security sites

Motivation and salary of staff

Terrorism Interference in data transfer (telephones, GPR)

Limited resources

Pollution of groundwater from landfill leakages

In summary, water quality deterioration in the networks (regrowth, pathogens, turbidity, low pH) (mentioned by 11 participants as medium or


low risk), and pollution of the Daugava river raw water source (mentioned by 6 participants mainly as high risk) were the two most mentioned issues. Day 2 All issues presented in Day 1 were summarized and the different risks related to these issues were identified. The technologies developed within the TECHNEAU project that could be used to mitigate these risks were suggested. It was decided that a WSP should be developed by Riga Water with the support of TECHNEAU. The issues (not exclusive) that should be included in the WSP are as follows:

• high risk related to pollution of the Daugava river raw water source; • decrease of water consumption; • uncounted water (including physical loss); • security (in many areas the security level is high).

Several measures from TECHNEAU to mitigate these risks were identified: Issue Potential Risk Proposed TECHNEAU

tools Need to predict the chlorine residual in the networks

Do not meet requirements of the drinking water directive (1000 cfu/ml)

Demonstration of the bacterial (as HPC) regrowth model in water distribution networks in combination with on-line biostability monitoring

Need to know what is the cause of turbidity

Do not meet requirements of the drinking water directive (3 NTU)

Application of on-line turbidity monitoring

Need to identify “hot spots” of turbidity in the networks

As above and consumer complaints

Demonstration of Resuspension Potential Methods (RPMs)

Need to decrease the problem of turbidity (in long term)

As above Demonstration of directional flushing technique

Need to predict what pH level and other water quality parameters are optimal to decrease the corrosion rate of pipe material used in Riga

As above Application of corrosion model, water treatment simulator (WTS)

Need to identify the status of the source water and the possible monitoring of water quality during incidents in the Daugava river

Pollution of drinking water, e.g. xenobiotics from Daugava river

Testing of the analytical “tool box” and possibly the fish biomonitor

Need to rapidly evaluate the safety of the water supply (e.g. testing hygienic condition of new and used pipes after disinfection)

Pathogens entering drinking water

Application of the FISH technique in combination with Hemoflow for concentration of bacteria


Need to improve the efficiency of organic carbon removal during surface water treatment

Bacterial regrowth and THMs

Demonstration of the water treatment simulator (WTS)

Need to obtain information on how to deal with unpaid water and water loss in the networks

Loss of revenue Demonstration of the TKI (TECHNEAU Knowledge Integrator)

It was agreed to demonstrate the following 12 tools in the Riga Case Study: WSP, biofilm model, on-line turbidity measurement, s::can sensor, RPM, flushing, corrosion model, analytical “tool box”, FISH, Hemoflow, WTS, TKI. A detailed action plan should be prepared by 15 November, 2007. An official letter should be produced by the TECHNEAU co-ordinators and sent to Riga Water and Riga Council emphasizing the importance of RA/RM (- the core of WHO guidelines for water quality, becoming common practice in water industry, considered by EU for inclusion in next DWD) and the importance of the participation of Riga Water in the TECHNEAU project.


5 CASE STUDY 3 WORKSHOP - PRESENTATIONS

5.1 TECHNEAU Technologies in Case Studies - Glenn Dillon, WRc

TECHNEAU CASE STUDIES

CASE STUDY 3 WORKSHOP

Riga, Latvia29 October 2007

Glenn Dillon (WRc)

2

TECHNEAU

ObjectiveRe-assess water supply- Source-to-tap- Developing as well as developed countries

AchievementOptimise existing and develop new technologies, tools and procedures- Treatment, distribution, monitoring and control- Risk assessment and management- Cost benefit analysis- Consumer acceptance and trust

Develop and test in work areasDemonstrate in end-user case studies


3

CASE STUDIES

Case studiesDeliver real-life solutions to real-life problems

Five case studiesCS1 – Reclamation of wastewater to produce drinking water (Windhoek, Namibia)CS2 – Reducing pathogen release from biofilms in distribution (Lisbon, Portugal)CS3 – Reducing water quality deterioration in distribution (Riga, Latvia)CS4 - Riverbank filtration and post-treatment (Delhi, India)CS5 – Membrane desalination (Location to be decided)

4

CASE STUDY 3

CS3 - lmplementation of a monitoring and management strategy to reduce the risk of water quality deterioration due to microbiological activity

ChallengesWater quality deterioration in distributionIron and manganese in groundwaterVulnerability of sources to pollutionElectricity consumption for pumping and storage

How can TECHNEAU help?


5.2 Water Safety Plan: Why it is Needed - Theo van den Hoven, Kiwa

Water Safety PlanWhy it is needed

Riga Water

29 October 2007

Riga Water Days 29 March 2007 2



Why a WSP?

Current control always lateDue diligence: from only checking water qualityafterwards to demonstrating safety of the system fromsource to tap (anticipating)In EU increasing number of consumer areas apply riskassessmentWHO guidelines, IWA Bonn CharterEU directive?


Assemble team and other resources

Identify Control Measures

Identify and prioritize hazards(background level and incidents)

Describe water supply

Define intended use

Construct system flow diagram +verify

Set Critical Limits

Establish monitoring

Establish corrective actions

Establish validation and verification

Establish record keeping

Water Safety Plan

Logical sequence of stepsBased on HACCPAdapted for water supply, acknowledgingMultiple Barrier principle







Define intended use


Set Critical Limits





Water Safety Plan - preparation

Management incentiveAssemble multidisciplinary team & resourcesDescribe water supply system from sourceto tapDefine the intended use (generally drinkingwater for human consumption)Construct flow diagram & verify, containingthe processes but also operations and maintenance

WSP on individual systems, for smallsystems a generic WSP may be developed






Define intended use


Set Critical Limits





Water Safety Plan - step 1

Identify hazardsmicrobiologicalchemicalphysicalradiological

Identify hazardous eventssanitary survey (WHO docs)

- contamination sources- contamination pathways

Prioritise hazards/hazardous events: likelihood of occurrence and severity of consequences







Define intended use


Set Critical Limits






Identify Control Measures forhazards/hazardous events

water treatment processesinfrastructure integrityhygiene codes

Multiple barriers: multiple control measures

Identify Control Points: control measures of which efficacy can be monitored and limitsof acceptable operation can be defined(such as treatment processes)






Define intended use


Set Critical Limits






Set Critical Limits: a performance target forthe Control Point. If limit is exceeded, the Control Point does not operate properlyand health risk may increase

Example: ozone residual after contact time

Both operational and critical limits can beset.







Define intended use


Set Critical Limits






Establish monitoringlaboratory testsobservational/auditing

Actions to determine if a Control Pointoperates within the Critical Limits

Valid monitoring plan/protocols (frequency, parameters, observation points)






Define intended use


Set Critical Limits







Plan what actions need to be taken in case monitoring indicates that a Control Pointexceeds a Limit (operational or critical)

Emergency plans







Define intended use


Set Critical Limits






Establish validation & verification

Validation: ensure the WSP is controllingthe hazard. Evidence formliterature/practice

Verification: independent assesment thatthe WSP is producing water that is in compliance with the health based targets. Example: monitoring of E.coli in treatedwater.






Define intended use


Set Critical Limits







Documentation of safetyHistorical data to “teach” WSP



Health-based targets

Set water quality targets

System assessment





Define intended use


Set Critical Limits





Water supplierRegulator


Our water is safe!What are the benefits of a WSP?

Cutting-edge approach to demonstrate due diligence

Pro-active vs reactive

Improved asset management

Systematic and detailed assessment of hazards and control measurein place

Involvement of operators in ensuring safety

Priorisation of hazards; cost-benefits

Operational monitoring of barriers and control measures: demonstration of safety (on-line)

Organised system to minimise chance of failure and minimise effectsof failure/hazardous events with contingency plans


5.3 Risk Analysis from Source-to-Tap in Drinking Water Systems - Andreas Lindhe, Chalmers University

Techneau WP 7.5 Workshop, Case study 3 Kick-off

Risk management ofwater supply systems

29 October 2007

Andreas LindheChalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, Sweden

© TECHNEAU 2005 2

Principles for risk control/reduction

Probability

Consequences

Increasing risk

Preventive measures for reduction of pollution load, e.g.: • Increased road safety • Increased technical

reliability of tanks • Collection systems

Measures towards reduction of consequences, e.g.: • Alternative water supplies • Hydraulic control • Increased preparedness of

rescue party • Improved well constructions

Combination of preventive and consequence reduction

measures


© TECHNEAU 2005 3

Objectives – WA 4Main objectives of WA 4 are:

... develop a framework for integrated RA/RM based on the WHO Water Safety Plan (WSP) approach…to develop a toolbox and methods for the framework …test tools and create good examples from Case studies

from source to tap

© TECHNEAU 2005 4

Why Risk Management in drinking waterproduction?

To protect public health, societal and private functionsTo protect water utilities against hazards to itsviability and successTo facilitate rational decision-makingTo provide transparencyTo increase awareness and knowledge regardingrisk issues among decision-makers, workers at the utility and the publicTo support communication with involvedstakeholders


© TECHNEAU 2005 5

Suggested update of WSP framework for safe drinking water

Framework for Safe Drinking-Water

Water SafetyPlans

IndependentSurveillance

Health BasedTargets

OperationalMonitoring

SystemAssessment

Management plans,Documentation and

communication

Water QuantityTargets

Framework for Safe Drinking-Water

Water SafetyPlans

IndependentSurveillance

Health BasedTargets

OperationalMonitoring

SystemAssessment

Management plans,Documentation and

communication

Water QuantityTargets

Water safety comprises water quality and water quantity

© TECHNEAU 2005 6

The Basic Risk Management Process

Risk analysis

• Scope definition• Hazard identification• Risk estimation

Risk analysis

• Scope definition• Hazard identification• Risk estimation

Risk evaluation

• Risk tolerability decision• Analysis of option

Risk evaluation

• Risk tolerability decision• Analysis of option

Risk reduction/control

• Decision making• Implementation• Monitoring

Risk reduction/control

• Decision making• Implementation• Monitoring

Risk assessment

Risk management

Iterative Process - Continuous Updating - Communication(IEC, 1995)


© TECHNEAU 2005 7

Techneau Generic Framework for Risk ManagementRisk Analysis

Identify and Estimate

Qualitative

Quantitative

Risk Evaluation

Define tolerability criteria

Water quality

Water quantity

Analyse risk reduction options

Ranking

Cost-efficiency

Cost-benefit

Risk Reduction/ Control

Report risks

Make decisions

Treat risks

Report residual risks

Monitor

Get new information

Update

Develop supporting

programmes

training, hygiene

practices, upgrade and improvement, research and development

Document –assure quality

Communi-cate

Review, approve and

audit

© TECHNEAU 2005 8

Conceptual Structure of the Risk Assessment and Risk Management Framework

”Generic Framework

for Integrated

Risk Management

in Water Safety Plans”

”Guide to Integrated Risk Assessment of Drinking Water Systems”

”Training seminars on RA”

”THDB”TECHNEAU

Hazard Database

”TRRDB”TECHNEAU

Risk Reduction

Option Database

”WA 4 RA Case Studies”

Good examples!

”Decision support

tool”

TECHNEAU Toolbox


© TECHNEAU 2005 9

Principal levels of Risk Assessment

Qualitative, e.g. checklists and classification of risk => relative ranking of risks

Quantitative, e.g. causal and consequence models => quantitative comparison with established risk tolerability levels.

Quantitative decision support analysis, e.g. cost-efficiency or cost-benefit analysis

Totalkostnad

Riskkostnad

Genomförande-kostnad

Optimal åtgärdsnivåAlt. A

Alt. B

Kr

Åtgärdsalternativ

Sannolikhet

Mycket hög >10-1

10-3-10-1

Måttlig 10-5-10-3

10-7-10-5

Mycket låg < 10-7

Mycket små Små Måttliga Stora Katastrofala

Personskador Inga eller lindriga skador

Övergående skador

Bestående allvarliga skador

Enstaka dödsfall Flera dödsfall

Ekonomiska konsekvenser < 1000 kr 1000-

100 000 kr 100 000 - 1 Mkr 1 - 10 Mkr > 10 Mkr

MiljöskadorInga eller lindriga

skador

Måttlig utbredning, övergående

Stor utbredning, övergående

Mycket stor utbredning eller

bestående

Mycket stor utbredning och

bestående

Kon

sekv

ense

r

Olycksträd Händelseträd

B1

B2

Brand

A1

A2

A3

A4

Branden slocknar utan åtgärd

Personal kan släcka branden

Räddningstjänsten tillkallas

Branden begränsas

Branden sprider sig

Felträd

© TECHNEAU 2005 10

Bergen (Norway)Göteborg (Sweden)Amsterdam (the Netherlands)Březnice (Czech Republic)Friburg-Ebnet (Germany)Upper Mnyameni (South Africa)

Case Studies in WA 4

Svartediket vannverk

River Göta älv Göteborg’s raw water intakeNouzov groundwater source Březnice treatment plantFreiburg ”water castle”Upper Mnyameni treatment plant


© TECHNEAU 2005 11

Schematic of the drinking water system in Göteborg

Source water / reservoir

Source water / watercourse

Treatment plant

Source water distribution

Distribution network

Nedsjöarna

Lake Rådasjön

LakeStora

Delsjön

RiverGöta Älv

Mölndalsån

Lärjeån

Lackarebäcktreatment plant

Alelyckantreatment plant

LakeLilla

Delsjön

Vättlefjällssjöarnaand Lövsjön

700 000 consumers

Case Study - Göteborg

© TECHNEAU 2005 12


Quantity failure (q = 0)No water is delivered to the consumer

Quality failure (q > 0, C’)Water is delivered but does not comply with quality standards

Categories of supply failure Causes

Failure of components in the system (e.g. pumps or pipes)

Events related to insufficient water quality causing the water supplier to stop the delivery

Insufficient water quality is detected but no action is taken to stop the delivery

Insufficient water quality is not detected and thereby no action is possible

Supply failure

q = flow (q = 0, no water is delivered to the consumer; q > 0 water is delivered)C = The drinking water comply with quality standardsC’ = The drinking water does not comply with quality standards


© TECHNEAU 2005 13

No raw water failure

Raw waterfailure

Operation

Treatment compensation

No treatment compensationor failure

Distribution compensation

No distribution compensationor failure

No distribution failure

Distribution failure

No treatmentfailure

Treatment failureDistribution compensation

No distribution compensationor failure

No distribution failure

Distribution failure

Success

Failure

Success

Success

Success

Failure

Failure

Failure


Failure paths

© TECHNEAU 2005 14


Fault tree structure

P =

P = P = P =

P = P =

P = P = P =

P = P = P =

Distribution

No raw water supply to Alelyckan

Treatment fail to compensate

Distribution fail to compensate

Supply failure

Quality failure (q>0, C')

Raw water failure Treatment failure

Quantitiy failure (q=0)

Failure due to no supply to Alelyckan

Failure due to no supply to Lackareb.

Raw water quantity sabotage


© TECHNEAU 2005 15

Monte Carlo Simulations


5.4 Water Supply System of Riga - Victor Juhna, Director of Maintenance, Riga Water

Dr.sc.ing. V.Juhna

SIA ”Rīgas ūdens” ražošanas direktors

Rīgas pilsētas ūdensapgādes sistēmas attīstība un ar to saistītās problēmas


RĪGAS ŪDENS

Rīgas iedzīvotāju skaits ~ 700 tūkst. cilvēku

Ūdensvadam pieslēgti 92%

Kanalizācijas tīklam pieslēgti 87%


Rīgas pilsētas dzeramā ūdens patēriņšlaika posmā no 1994. līdz 2006. gadam

145722138024131568

11338098535

8147269865 63932 64736 65259 61316 60605 56357

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

160000

1994. 1995. 1996. 1997. 1998. 1999. 2000. 2001. 2002. 2003. 2004. 2005. 2006.

tūks

t.m3

Viena cilvēka vidējais ūdens patēriņš Rīgā l/dnn

227 217 228213

194

153 147 137 135 130 125 120 122,7

0

50

100

150

200

250

1994

.

1995

.

1996

.

1997

.

1998

.

1999

.

2000

.

2001

.

2002

.

2003

.

2004

.

2005

.

2006

.

l / d

n pe

r pe

rson


Rīgas pilsētas ūdensvada shēma




Dzeramā ūdens piegāde Rīgai 16.07.2006 pa diennakts stundām


Dzeramā ūdens paraugu ņemšanas vietas ( pavisam kopā 45 )

Nosakāmie rādītājiAlumīnijsAmonijsDuļķainībaGaršaKrāsaSmarža

ElektrovadītspējapH ( ūdeņraža jonu konc.)

Kopējās koliformasEsch.coli ( zarnu nūjiņu baktērijas)

Clostrid.perfring.,ieskaitotsporas. ( sulfītreducējošo anaerobu sporas, nosaka tikai virszemes ūdeņiem )


Dzeramā ūdens kvalitātes rādītāja ''dzelzs'' vidējie rezultāti pa mēnešiem pilsētas sadales tīkla punktos 2006. gadā

0

0,05

0,1

0,15

0,2

0,25

0,3

0,35

0,4

0,45

Janvār

is

Febr

uāris

Mar

ts

Aprīli

s

Mai

js

Jūni

js

Jūlij

s

Aug

usts

Sept

embr

is

Okt

obris

Nov

embr

is

Dec

embr

is

mg

Fe/l

Norma - 0,4 mg Fe/l




5.5 Water Quality Control at Riga Water - Silvija Pastare, Head of Water Quality Control Laboratory, Riga Water

“Rīgas ūdens” Apvienotās ūdens kvalitātes kontroles (AŪKK) laboratorijas grupas

A

B

C

D A- Dzeramā ūdens kontroles grupa, Basteja bulv.1

B- Virszemes ūdens kontroles grupa, Bauskas iela

C- Pazemes ūdens kontroles grupa, Baltezers

D- Notekūdens kontroles grupa


Rīgas dzeramā ūdens apgādes plāns, ····· - patērētāji, kas saņem ŪAS „Daugava” ražotu dzeramo ūdeni

Dzeramā ūdens kontrole Rīgā

• LR MK Noteikumi Nr. 235, 29.04.2003. • Grozījumi-Noteikumi Nr.214, 27.03.2007.• Grozījumi-Noteikumi Nr. 925, 06.12.2007.“Dzeramā ūdens obligātās nekaitīguma un

kvalitātes prasības, monitoringa un kontroles kārtība”


Kontrole dzeramā ūdens izejas avotiem

• LR MK Noteikumi Nr. 118, 12.03.2002.• Grozījumi-Noteikumi Nr.446, 01.10.2002.• Grozījumi – Noteikumi Nr.752, 04.10.2005.“Noteikumi par virszemes un pazemes ūdeņu kvalitāti”

Kontroles sistēma - 1

• Kārtējais monitorings- Sabiedrības Veselības aģentūras apstiprināts plāns:

1. 45 pilsētas ūdensvada punktos (vienu reizi mēnesī);

2. Pēc 8 rezervuāru tīrīšanas un dezinfekcijas (divas reizes gadā);

3. Pēc avārijām ūdensvada sadales tīklā.


Kontroles sistēma - 2

• Paškontrole:1. Ūdensvada tīkla 7 punktos (katru darba

dienu);2. Pirms padeves ūdensvada sadales tīklā

(katru dienu);3. Artēziskās akas ūdenim (divas reizes

gadā).

RŪ kontrolējošās instances

• VA “Sabiedrības Veselības aģentūra” Rīgas filiāle:Ņem paraugus ūdens sadales tīklā -16/ gadā ;

• LR VM Valsts Sanitārā inspekcija:Kontrolē dzeramā ūdens apgādes objektus no ūdens ņemšanas vietas līdz patērētājam;Ņem ūdens paraugus sūdzību gadījumos;


DZERAMĀ ŪDENS KĀRTĒJĀ MONITORINGA REZULTĀTI 2006. GADĀ

7,597,747,598,007,786,83Ūdeņraža jonu koncentrācija(pH)

000000sk./100 mlKopējās koliformas (skaits)

859348836263269343µS/cmElektrovadītspēja

Bez būt. nov.

Bez būt. nov.Bez būt. nov.

Bez būt. nov.

Bez būt. nov.

Bez būt. nov.

Smarža

Bez būt. nov.


Bez būt. nov.

Bez būt. nov.

Bez būt. nov.

Krāsa

Bez būt. nov.


Bez būt. nov.

Bez būt. nov.

Bez būt. nov.

Garša

000000sk./100 mlEscherichia coli

Bez būt. nov.


Bez būt. nov.

Bez būt. nov.

Bez būt. nov.

NDVDuļķainība

0-0--0sk./100 mlClostridiumperfringens, ieskaitot sporas

<0,030,05<0,03<0,03<0,030,04mg/lAmonijs

-----0,08mg/lAlumīnijs

Baltezers II

Baltezers IBaltezers, spiedvads

RemberģiZaķumuižaŪAS „Dau-gava”

Mērv.Rādītājs

Dzeramā ūdens kvalitāteDzeramā ūdens kvalitātes rādītāja ''dzelzs'' vidējie

rezultāti pa mēnešiem pilsētas sadales tīkla punktos 2007. gadā

0,0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

Janvār

is

Febr

uāris

Mar

ts

Aprīli

s

Mai

js

Jūni

js

Jūlij

s

Aug

usts

Sept

embr

is

mg

Fe/l

4 Maskavas2508 6.tramv.gp.

16 Parādes iela 5

Norma 0,4 mg Fe/l


Anjonu satura vidējās vērtības dzeramajā ūdenī 2006.gadā

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

ŪA

S„D

auga

va”

Zaķ

umui

ža

Rem

berģ

i

Bal

teze

rs

Bal

teze

rs I

Bal

teze

rs II

mg

Cl- /L

mg

SO42-

/L

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

4

mg

NO

3- /L

Hlorīdi

Sulfāti

Nitrāti

ŪA

S „D

auga

va”

Zaķu

mui

ža

Rem

berģ

i

Balte

zers

Balte

zers

I

Balte

zers

II

00,5

11,5

22,5

33,5

44,5

Kopējās cietības un oksidējamības vidējie rādītāji 2006. gadā

Kopējā cietība, mmol/L

Oksidējamība, mgO/L


PROBLĒMAS …

2006

.I

2006

.II

2006

.III

2006

.IV

2006

.V

2006

.VI

2006

.VII

2006

.VII

I

2006

.IX

2006

.X

2006

.XI

2006

.XII

2007

.I

2007

.II

2007

.III

2007

.IV

2007

.V

2007

.VI

2007

.VII

2007

.VII

I

2007

.IX

0

0,05

0,1

0,15

0,2

0,25

0,3

0,35

0,4

0,45

mg

Mn/

L

Mangāna saturs

Remberģi

Zaķumuiža

Baltezers II

Baltezers I

Baltezers


2006

.I20

06.II

2006

.III

2006

.IV20

06.V

2006

.VI

2006

.VII

2006

.VII

I20

06.IX

2006

.X20

06.X

I20

06.X

II20

07.I

2007

.II20

07.II

I

2007

.IV

2007

.V

2007

.VI

2007

.VII

2007

.VII

I

2007

.IX

0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

mg

Fe/L

Dzelzs saturs

Remberģi

Baltezers II

Zaķumuiža

Baltezers

Baltezers I

pH un duļķainības vērtību salīdzinājums

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

Janvār

is

Febr

uāris

Mar

ts

Aprīli

s

Mai

js

Jūni

js

Jūlij

s

Aug

usts

Sept

embr

is

Okt

obris

Nov

embr

is

Dec

embr

isDuļķa

inīb

a, N

DV

012345678

pH

4. Maskavas 2508. 6.tramv.gp.16. Rucavas 214. Maskavas 2508. 6.tramv.gp.16. Rucavas21


PALDIES PAR UZMANĪBU!

5.6 Practice of Water Distribution Networks Maintenance - Andris Luters, Head of Water Distribution Eastern Department, Riga Water

...........


Rīgas centralizētā ūdensvada tīkla ekspluatācija

Ūdensvada tīkla pieaugums Rīgas pilsētālaika periodā no 1935. – 2006.gadam

324 383,12

10581233

1321 1344

0200

400600

8001000

12001400

1600

1935

.

1937

.

1987

.

1996

.

2005

.

2006

.

km Ūdensvada tīkli


Ūdensvadu materiāli

Tērauda – 204,67 km

Ķeta –803,92 km

Polietilēna – 1,83 km

Dzelzsbetona – 15,91 km

Dzelzsbetona-tērauda –2,94km

tērauda ūdensvadi

ķeta ūdensvadi

polietilēna ūdensvadi

dzelzsbetona ūdensvadi

dzelzsbetona-tērauda ūdensvadi

Ūdensvada tīkla dienesta statistikas dati laika periodā no 2000. – 2006.gadam

133430226276183611424272672006.

141128286191197412924192692005.

150830296065193712423902962004.

179625326993190211174453402003.

14112405639916909984002922002.

137525356506185710184873542001.

156320246940214811805823862000.

pārbauderemontsbojājumibojājumibojājumibojājumi

HidrantuHidrantuIzsaukumiKopā dažādiAizbīdņuPievaduIelas vadaGads


Grafiski attēloti statistikas dati

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

2000. 2001. 2002. 2003. 2004. 2005. 2006.

skai

ts

Ielas vada bojājumiPievadu bojājumiAizbīdņu bojājumiKopā dažādi bojājumiIzsaukumiHidrantu remontsHidrantu pārbaude

Apkalpes zonas

Līdz pirmā zemes gabala robežaiLīdz ēkas ārējai sienai, ja tā sakrīt ar zemes gabala robežuLīdz privātkrānam


Paldies par uzmanību!

5.7 Water Distribution Networks Hydraulic Regime Control System - Aivars Berenefelds, Head of Second Elevation Water Pumping Station, Riga Water






5.8 Preliminary Results of Risk Analysis by Riga Water - Rasma Pare, Assistant of Director of Maintenance, Riga Water

Iespējamie riski un to novērtējums Rīgas pilsētas ūdensapgādē

Vārds „risks” tiešā tulkojumānozīmē „lēmuma pieņemšana” tad, kad rezultāts nav zināms un ir nedrošs.


Pastāv vairāk nekā simts riska jēdziena izskaidrojumu. Populārākie no tiem ir šādi:

risks ir iespējamās briesmas;risks ir tas, kas var notikt, bet var arī nenotikt;risks ir nespēja prognozēt zaudējumus;risks ir bīstamu situāciju sakritība;; risks ir situācija, kurā var rasties vai arī nerasties nelabvēlīgas sekas, risks ir zaudējumu iespēja.

Risks pastāv jebkura uzņēmumu tipa darbībā.


Riska cēloņus iedala divās daļās:

no cilvēka darbības neatkarīgos apstākļos;no cilvēka darbības atkarīgos apstākļos .

8

3 and 4

Contaminatedwater(pathogens)

XXIndustrialdischarge ofbiological matter

1.1.2

Contamination ofcatchmentzone

Catchment zone

8

3 and 4

Contaminatedwater(chemicals)

XXIndustrialdischarges ofchemicals(continiousdischarge, no accident)

1.1.1

Contamination ofcatchmentzone

Catchment zone

1.1 Catchment area

To sub

-system

DescriptionExternaldamage

Safety

Unavailib.

Rad./ phys

Chemic.

Biolog.

Ref.

OS.

OS

EOD

Relevanthazard?

Potentialconsequences

Type of hazardType of hazardousev.

Hazardous eventRefere

nce

HazardElement

Elaborated by: Chalmers University of Technology

1. Surface watercatchment


10

5Contaminatedwater (chemicals)

XXXTraffic, inclaccidents (railwaytracks, airfields, roads, parkingareas, petrol fillingstations, airaccidents) loss of oilby cars or boats

2.1.4

Contamination of aquifers

Catchmentarea

2.1 Catchment area

To sub-

system


Safety

Unavailib.

Rad./ phys.

Chemic.

Biolog.

Ref. OS.

OS

EOD

Relevant

hazard?

Potential consequencesType of hazardType of hazardous ev.Hazardous eventReference

HazardElement

Elaborated by: TZW, SZU and Chalmers University oftechnology

2. Groundwater catchment (including protectionzones)

10

4 and 6

Insufficient rawwater

XXXXFailure in the rawwater construction, by accidents or byterrorist attack

3.1.2

Shortage / unavailabilityof water

Intakeconstruction

7

4 and 6


X1XXXXPhysical obstaclesfor the intake ofraw water, iceformation

3.1.1

Shortage / unavailabilityof water

Intakeconstruction

3.1 Surface water intake

To sub-

system


Safety

Unavailib.

Rad./ phys.

Chemic.

Biolog.

Ref. OS.

OS

EOD

Relevant

hazard?


HazardElement

Elaborated by: Chalmers University of Technology

3. Surface water intake andtransport


5

4 and 6


XXXXXXBad condition ofmains or externalcauses (e.g. landslides, heavytraffic)

3.2.2

Pipe burstRaw watermains

3

4 and 6

Unavailability ofraw water

XXXXPower interruptionand no backuppower supply

3.2.1

Power failurePumps

3.2 Surface watertransport

9

2Contaminatedwater (pathogens, chemicals)

XXXXSabotage acts, terrorism orvandalism.

4.1.3

Directcontamination of watersource area

Watersourcearea

4.1. Infiltration borehole(s) or pounds andsurroundings

To sub-

system


Safety

Unavailib.

Rad./ phys.

Chemic.

Biolog.

Ref. OS.

OS

EOD

Relevant

hazard?


HazardElement

Elaborated by: TZW andSZU

4. Surface waterinfiltration


5

6Contaminatedwater (pathogens, chemicals)

XXXXXXXContamination byflooding, sabotage, animals,etc

5.1.3

Contamination throughopenings ( e.g. well-head,ventilationpipe, gritchamber, stilling basin, overflowpipe, doors...)

Openingsin system

5.1 Water abstractionfacility

To sub

-system


Safety

Unavailib.

Rad./ phys.

Chemic.

Biolog.

Ref. OS.

OS

EOD

Relevant

hazard?


HazardElement

Elaborated by: TZW andSZU

5. Groundwater and infiltration water abstractionand transport

5

9Contaminatedwater (chemicals, pathogens). No/insufficientwater supply. Damages to infrastructure, persons, etc.

XXXXXXBad condition ofpipe (e.g. corrosion…)

8.1.3

Pipe burstPipes

4

9Contaminatedwater (chemicals, pathogens)

XXXPoor hygieneduring repairs

8.1.2

Contaminationintroducedduringrepairs

General

2

9No/insufficientwater supply to customers

X03 - 07XPump or reservoirfailure

8.1.1

No/insufficient watersupply frompumps

General

8.1 Network

To sub-

system


Safety

Unavailib.

Rad./ phys

Chemic.

Biolog.

Ref. OS.

OS

EOD

Relevant

hazard?

Potential consequencesType of hazardType of hazardous ev.Hazardous eventRefere

nce

HazardElement

Elaborated by: Kiwa WaterResearch

8. Transport and distribution (from trunk main to thewater meter)


4

NoFire fighting ishindered

XXXXMalfunctioning firehydrant, reducedavailable capacity ofwater

8.1.16

Insufficientwater for firefighting

Firehydrant

3

9Contaminated water(chemicals)

X03 -07

XXXDeteriorating liningin metal pipes, lowpH of distributedwater

8.1.10

Release ofmetalliccompounds

Metalpipes

6

9Contaminated water(chemicals, pathogens)

XXXXXLow (negative) pressure in network, in combination withleaks or leaking joints

8.1.6

Influx ofcontaminatedwater

Pipes

3

10Contaminatedwater(pathogens)

XXDead ends ininstallation

9.1.6

Contamination of water

General

0

10No/Insufficientwater supply

X8XXBad design orlow pressure indistributionnetwork

9.1.1

Low flow / pressure

General

9.1 Drinking waterinstallation

To sub-system


Safety

Unavailib.

Rad./

phys.

Chemic.

Biolog.

Ref. OS.

OS

EOD

Relevanthazard?

Potentialconsequences

Type of hazardType of hazardousev.

Hazardousevent

Reference

HazardElement

Elaborated by: Kiwa Water Research

9. Internal piping


8

Notrelevant

No/insufficientwater supply

XXXVandalism orimproper use ofstandpipe or taps

10.1.2

Unavailabilityof water

Communalstandpipes

8

Notrelevant

No/insufficientwater supply

X8XXUnavailability ofwater fromdistributionnetwork

10.1.1

Unavailabilityof water

Communalstandpipes

10.1 Water collection

To sub-

system


Safety

Unavailib.

Rad./ phys.

Chemic.

Biolog.

Ref. OS.

OS

EOD

Relevant

hazard?


HazardElement

Elaborated by: WRC SA / SWUE

10. Consumer and taps (including communal taps)

4

1 to 3

Contaminatedwater. No/insufficientwater supply. Remediation ofsupply system

XXXDischarge to source waters

12.4.1

Emergingpathogens

Sourcewater

12.4 Emerging pathogenes

7

1 to 10

Contaminatedwater. No/insufficientwater supply. Remediation ofsupply system

XXDischarge of newchemicals to source waters dueto e.g. accidents orcontinuousleakage

12.3.1

Newchemicalsand changedchemicalpathways

Sourcewater

12.3 New chemicals and changed chemicalpathways

To sub-

system

DescriptionExternalda

mage

Safety

Unavailib.

Rad./ phys.

Chemic.

Biolog.

Ref. OS.

OS

EOD

Relevant

hazard?

Potential consequencesType of hazardType of hazardous ev.Hazardousevent

Reference

HazardElement

Elaborated by: Chalmers University ofTechnology

12. Future hazards


Paldies par uzmanību!

Documents

CASE STUDY 3 - Techneau · CASE STUDY 3 Report of the end-user workshop with Riga Water TECHNEAU NOVEMBER 2007