IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

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CASE NO: SC07-1648

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INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE NO: 07-64 RE: JUDGE RALPH E. ERIKSSON

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JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS COMMISSION’S REPLY TO JUDGE RALPH E. ERIKSSON’S

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HEARING PANEL

_____________________________________

On Review of the Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations of the

Hearing Panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission

_____________________________________

MICHAEL L. SCHNEIDER Florida Bar No. 0525049 GENERAL COUNSEL Judicial Qualifications Commission 1110 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-6224 (850) 488-1581 Telephone Attorney for the Commission

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

I. THE JQC EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION BECAUSE MATTERS INVESTIGATED WERE JUDICIAL RULING NOT CONDUCT . . . . . . 8 II. THE HEARING PANEL ERRED ON ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE MATTERS AND TESTIMONY PRECLUDED BY THE CONSTITUTION, JQC RULES AND FLORIDA STATUTES . . . . . . . . . . 9 III. THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW DO NOT SUPPORT THE PANEL’S FINDINGS IN FINDING HIS ACTIONS IN STATE V. WALTON WERE MOTIVATED BY IMPROPER MOTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 IV. THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW DO NOT SUPPORT THE PANEL’S FINDING IN OVERTURNING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE WITH PROCEDURAL LAW AS PROCEDURAL LAW IS DETERMINED BY THE COURT . . . . . . 15

ii

PAGE V. REPLY TO COMMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS IN THE JQC’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . 17

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES PAGE Fuster-Escalona v. Wisotsky, 781 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 2000) . . . . . 14

In re Aleman, 995 So.2d 395 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

In re Allen, 998 So.2d 557 (Fla. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . 8 In re Diaz, 908 So.2d 334 (Fla. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . 7 In re Ford-Kaus, 730 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1999) . . . . . . . . . 11 In re Graziano, 696 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1997) . . . . . . . . . 13 In re Kelly, 238 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1970) . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 12 In re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77 (Fla. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . 7 In re LaMotte, 341 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . 13 In re McAllister, 646 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1994) . . . . . . . . . 13 In re Report of the Commission on Family Courts, 588 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 In re Rodriguez, 829 So.2d 857(Fla. 2002) . . . . . . . . . 18 In re Taunton, 357 So.2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1978) . . . . . . . . 8, 9 Koehler v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 390 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Mississippi Commission of Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929 (Miss. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Mosley v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, 117 Nev. 371, 22 P.3d 655 (Nev. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . 11 Ohrn v. Wright, 963 So.2d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) . . . . . . 17

iv

PAGE Paulson v. Evander, 633 So.2d 540 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) . . . . . 16

State v. Daniel Bradshaw, Seminole County Case #05-7182-MMA . . 2

State v. Bob Lee Walton, Seminole County Case #06-012701-MMA . . . . . . . . 2, 7, 8, 13, 14, 18, 20

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

MISCELLANEOUS

Administrative Order, 18th Judicial Circuit, 03-22 . . . . . . . 16

v

PREFACE

The Judicial Qualifications Commission is referred to herein as the

“JQC” or the “Commission.” The Honorable Ralph E. Eriksson is referred to

herein as “Judge Eriksson.” This matter is before this Court on review of Findings,

Conclusions and Recommendations by the Hearing Panel of the JQC entered on

March 13, 2009 (hereinafter “Findings and Conclusions”). Judge Eriksson’s Brief

was filed in response to this Court’s March 17, 2009 Order and is referred to herein

as the “Eriksson Brief.” References to the official transcript of the final Hearing in

this matter are designated by the prefix “T,” followed by the page number.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is before the Court on the Findings, Conclusions and

Recommendations of the Hearing Panel of the JQC. On March 13, 2009 that body

recommended that Judge Eriksson, currently a county judge for Seminole County,

be publicly reprimanded for his conduct in the handling of State v. Bob Lee

Walton, Seminole County Case #06-012701-MMA and for his conduct in a series

of cases in which pro se petitioners sought injunctive relief from Domestic

Violence or Repeat Violence.

On September 6, 2007 the Investigative Panel of the Commission filed a

Notice of Formal Charges against Judge Eriksson. That Notice encompassed

allegations relating to Judge Eriksson’s conduct in State v. Walton, infra, and State

v. Daniel Bradshaw, Seminole County Case #05-7182-MMA.

On April 30, 2008 the Investigative Panel filed an Amended Notice of

Formal Charges that contained an additional allegation contending that the manner

in which Judge Eriksson’s Injunction Hearings, where pro se petitioners sought

relief from Domestic and Repeat Violence, were conducted in such a way as to

deny the petitioners a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

The matter was tried to the Hearing Panel of the JQC on December 8, 9

and 10, 2008. The Panel found Judge Eriksson guilty of Count I, involving Bob

Lee Walton, and Count III, regarding the Injunction Hearings. The determinations

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of guilt are summarized as follows:

Count I: The Hearing Panel found Judge Eriksson effectively punished

Mr. Walton for exercising a legal right. This was found to violate Canons 1, 2A

and 3B.

Count III: The Hearing Panel found Judge Eriksson had serious

disagreements with the manner in which domestic violence matters were handled

in Seminole County. This disagreement influenced his handling of Domestic

Violence Injunctions to the extent that he employed an over-technical and rigid

approach. This was found to violate Canons 1, 2A, 2B(7) and 3B(8).

The Findings and Conclusions by the Hearing Panel of the JQC were

filed with this Court on March 16, 2009. The Court issued an Order to Show

Cause on March 17, 2009. Judge Eriksson replied on April 7, 2009 stating that the

JQC did not have jurisdiction over his conduct, that the trial by the Hearing Panel

was flawed procedurally and substantively, and that the Findings and Conclusions

of the Hearing Panel were not supported by the evidence or law.

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Judge Eriksson was charged by the Investigative Panel of the JQC with

violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct for actions taken on the bench. Two

separate charges were filed and consolidated for a single Hearing. The first

complaint involved two criminal cases in which each defendant’s release on bond

was revoked for motion practice Judge Eriksson perceived to be interrupting the

orderly administration of justice. The other complaint concerned Judge Eriksson’s

failure to accord pro se petitioners a meaningful Hearing as they sought

Injunctions from Domestic or Repeat Violence.

Count I

Mr. Bob Lee Walton was arrested for possession of cocaine, driving under

the influence, and driving in violation of a business purposes only license, a result

of a prior DUI. (T:163-165). Although the arrest occurred on May 9, 2006, the

case was delayed for over six months for testing of the suspected cocaine. When

testing revealed the substance not to be cocaine, the case was transferred to county

court. (T:164, 167).

There was a video of the traffic stop and subsequent arrest. (T:170-171).

Mr. Walton was represented by attorney Kendall Horween, who sought to

have references to cocaine on the video redacted from the portion of the video to

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be introduced into evidence. Mr. Horween and the State could not agree as to

which portions were to be redacted. (T:204-205).

The case was before Judge Eriksson on February 19, 2007. Both the State

and the Defense stated that the case was not ready for trial, and they made a joint

Motion to Continue. Judge Eriksson denied this request. At the previous Hearing

on this case on February 8, 2007, Mr. Horween had advised the Court that he also

had a scheduling conflict on February 19 but would do his best to appear, which he

did late in the afternoon. (T:204).

After Judge Eriksson denied the Motion to Continue, Mr. Walton expressed

to Mr. Horween that he could not receive a fair trial. When Mr. Horween

announced an intention to file a Motion to Disqualify, Judge Eriksson revoked Mr.

Walton’s bond and remanded him into custody and imposed a new $10,000 bond.

Judge Eriksson admitted that the only reason he raised the bond was because the

Motion to Disqualify had the effect of forcing a continuance in the case. (JQC

Exhibit 5).

Count III

Judge Eriksson disagreed with the manner in which his circuit required

county judges, himself included, to hear Petitions for Injunctions against Domestic

Violence and Repeat Violence. Judge Eriksson complained to the Florida Supreme

5

Court and the State Court Administrator’s Office seeking a method by which he

could persuade the Chief Judge of his circuit to change his position. (Eriksson

Exhibit 2a-c and Exhibit 3).

A DVD of the Injunction Hearing that Judge Eriksson presided over on

October 30, 2007 was played. (JQC Exhibit 9). The video revealed that pro se

petitioners were initially confronted with questions from the bench such as, “Who

will be your first witness?” It was obvious that the petitioners had little experience

with courtroom procedures.

Predictably, the majority of the Petitions sought were denied without ever

addressing the merits of the case. Judge Eriksson defended his handling of the

cases by suggesting that his judicial hands were tied by the overriding concept of

not favoring one side or the other in such a proceeding.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Hearing Panel’s factual findings are supported by clear and convincing

evidence. The transcripts and the videos of the Walton case and the video of the

Injunction Hearings show precisely what actions Judge Eriksson took in these

matters. Indeed at page one of Judge Eriksson’s Brief he states, “The facts are not

in dispute.”

As the Hearing Panel’s factual findings are not in dispute, they should be

accorded great weight and presumptive force. In re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77 (Fla.

2003), In re Diaz, 908 So.2d 334 (Fla. 2005).

Despite Judge Eriksson’s assertions that there is no evidence of motive with

regard to Mr. Walton, the Hearing Panel’s conclusions are supported by the record.

Further, Judge Eriksson’s summary disposition of the Injunction cases display his

antipathy to the process, and in doing so failed to accord those pro se petitioners a

right to be heard.

7

ARGUMENT

I. THE JQC EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE

MATTERS INVESTIGATED WERE JUDICIAL RULINGS NOT

CONDUCT.

Judge Eriksson, acting pro se, initially argues that the JQC does not have

jurisdiction to address his actions in State v. Walton and the Injunction cases. He

takes the novel approach of arguing that comments made by this Court during Oral

Argument in In re Allen, 998 So.2d 557 (Fla. 2008) have precedential authority.

He continues by asserting that the Commission is estopped in this proceeding

because Special Counsel for the Commission in that case, F. Wallace Pope, assured

this Court that the JQC would not second guess judicial decisions in JQC

proceedings. Judge Eriksson fundamentally misunderstands that the Commission

in this case is addressing how his conduct in misusing his judicial position was

violative of the Canons, not whether he had the putative legal authority to rule as

he did. It is submitted that Special Counsel was merely attempting to articulate

this Court’s pronouncement in In re Taunton, 357 So.2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1978), “We

have traditionally tolerated difference of opinions and variations in philosophy

among judicial officers. Strong minority views expressed by members of the

judiciary do not constitute grounds for disciplinary action, although they may bring

criticism.” However, the Court went on to state, “Judges are required to follow

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the law and apply it fairly and objectively to all who appear before them.”

Taunton at 179.

“The question is whether the motive of, and the methods used

by the petitioner together with the resulting turmoil created

by his actions should be considered as conduct unbecoming

a member of the judiciary and contrary to the Canons

of Judicial Ethics.”

In re Kelly, 238 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1970).

As to Judge Eriksson’s jurisdictional argument, there is no question but that

this Court has jurisdiction to oversee the conduct of judges. Article V, Section

12(a)(1), Florida Constitution, In re Aleman, 995 So.2d 395 (Fla. 2008) footnote 3.

II. THE HEARING PANEL ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO

EVIDENCE MATTERS AND TESTIMONY PRECLUDED

BY THE CONSTITUTION, JQC RULES AND FLORIDA

STATUTES.

Judge Eriksson’s argument that the Commission erred procedurally and

substantively can be summarized as follows:

Since the Commission is now bifurcated, and since all proceedings by or

before the Commission are confidential until the filing of formal charges, any

evidence given to the Investigative Panel at the 6(b) Hearing must not be presented

9

to the Hearing Panel. He fashions his argument by pointing out that the Hearing

Panel is required to have separate staff. He argues that the Hearing Panel may only

consider legal evidence. Finally, he concludes that since his testimony before the

Investigative Panel should be considered to be an offer of compromise, it is

therefore inadmissible.

Although not articulated by Judge Eriksson, the underlying question of the

propriety of the combination of the investigative and adjudicative functions in

disciplinary proceedings has been evaluated by this Court in Koehler v. Florida

Real Estate Commission, 390 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1980). This Court held that mere

exposure to evidence from the investigative phase of a proceeding is insufficient in

itself to impugn the fairness of board members later sitting in judgment on that

same case. Koehler at 713, citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456,

43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975).

Here, in contrast to Koehler, no member of the Investigative Panel sat on the

Hearing Panel, creating an even lesser due process concern. Article V, Section

12(f)(2)d., Florida Constitution.

In at least two other jurisdictions judges contesting judicial discipline have

raised concerns about the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions.

There, too, the challenges were rejected based upon the rationale in Withrow.

Mississippi Commission of Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929 (Miss.

10

1997), Mosley v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, 117 Nev. 371, 22

P.3d 655 (Nev. 2001).

Contrary to Judge Eriksson’s assertion, the Hearing Panel has had separate

Counsel since the 1996 revision to the Constitution in the person of John Beranek.

The fact that Counsel for the Commission served as Special Counsel in this case is

a distinction without a difference since outside Counsel, when employed as Special

Counsel, conduct 6(b) Hearings before the Investigative Panel as well as trials

before the Hearing Panel.

Evaluating post-1996 revision cases, the Hearing Panel has considered and

the Court has approved, factual matters presented to the Investigative Panel in

making its findings of fact and recommendations to the Court. In In re Ford-Kaus,

730 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1999), the Hearing Panel considered Judge Ford-Kaus’

testimony at the 6(b) Hearing where she sought to place blame on her secretary.

Ford-Kaus at 274. In In re Shea, 759 So.2d 631 (Fla. 2000), the Hearing Panel

considered Judge Shea’s testimony at the 6(b) Hearing. Shea at 635. In In re

Schwartz, 755 So.2d 110 (Fla. 2000), the Hearing Panel considered the Judge’s

prior disciplinary history as revealed in Hearings under Rules 6(b) and 6(c) of the

JQC Rules. And even though those Hearings never resulted in the filing of formal

charges, they were considered by the Commission and this Court. Schwartz at 111.

11

This same situation also existed in In re Sloop, 946 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 2007). Sloop

at 1049.

Judge Eriksson’s suggestion that the process of judicial discipline is similar

to a criminal Grand Jury procedure was considered and rejected in In re Kelly, at

571.

Finally, Judge Eriksson’s characterization of a 6(b) Hearing as an offer to

compromise pursuant to s. 90.408, Florida Statutes, fundamentally misapprehends

the nature of the proceeding. The fact that the Investigative Panel can and does

resolve cases through stipulation in no way converts the process into an offer to

compromise. A more appropriate analysis of the admissibility of his statements

during the 6(b) Hearing would focus on the fact that his statements are admissible

as an admission against interest pursuant to s. 90.803(18), Florida Statutes.

III. THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW DO NOT SUPPORT THE

PANEL’S FINDINGS IN FINDING JUDGE ERIKSSON’S

ACTIONS IN STATE V. WALTON WERE MOTIVATED

BY IMPROPER MOTIVES.

Judge Eriksson now turns to the factual findings of the Hearing Panel with

which he disagrees. This Court is vested with the ultimate decision in determining

what constitutes judicial misconduct and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or

12

in part the findings of the JQC. In re Graziano, 696 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1997). The

Hearing Panel is charged with reporting findings of fact, proven by clear and

convincing evidence.

In re McAllister, 646 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1994). This Court then reviewed the

findings to determine whether this burden of proof is met. If it is, the findings are

accorded great weight. In re LaMotte, 341 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1977).

Judge Eriksson initially mischaracterizes the findings of the Hearing Panel.

He suggests that it was found that his ruling in Walton was driven by animosity,

but states there was no showing of animosity. Animosity connotes bitter hostility

or hatred. What was charged in Count I and what the Hearing Panel found was

that Judge Eriksson’s actions were punitive and gave the appearance of being

vindictive. Vindictive means intending to cause harm or pain; the act of being

spiteful. A review of the record establishes that Judge Eriksson punished Mr.

Walton for exercising a legal right.

Judge Eriksson suggests that in his understanding of the law, he had the

legal right to imprison Mr. Walton for, as he testified, “granting himself an

artificial continuance.” Again, the choice of language is curious. It is suggested

that “artificial” is intended to mean a continuance that the judge did not wish to

grant, but was forced to do so, by the law, as dictated by circumstances.

13

Unfortunately, Judge Eriksson’s legal analysis of his right to protect the

orderly administration of justice by ruling as he did, must fail. Despite his

elaborate justification, when faced with a Motion to Disqualify he revoked Mr.

Walton’s release on bond, remanded him to the custody of the Sheriff and set a

new bond. However, faced with a Motion to Disqualify, Judge Eriksson was

required to immediately address that Motion and take no further action. Fuster-

Escalona v. Wisotsky, 781 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 2000).

The motive of Judge Eriksson in doing so is clearly demonstrated by his

words and his actions. His desire to force the Walton case to trial over the

objections of both the State and the Defense was thwarted, so he punished the one

person in the courtroom who did not have the ability to fight back. It amounted to

a de facto Contempt Hearing where the defendant was punished for conduct of the

attorney.

There is no question but that there is clear and convincing evidence that

established Judge Eriksson’s imprisonment of Mr. Walton was motivated by

improper motives and not the orderly administration of justice. The Hearing

Panel’s findings of fact should be upheld.

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IV. THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW DO NOT SUPPORT THE

PANEL’S FINDINGS IN OVERTURNING JUDICIAL

INDEPENDENCE WITH PROCEDURAL LAW AS

PROCEDURAL LAW IS DETERMINED BY THE COURT.

Judge Eriksson was charged by the Investigative Panel with failing to accord

pro se petitioners seeking Injunctions against Domestic and Repeat Violence a

reasonable opportunity to have their cases heard. The Hearing Panel took

appropriate note of the context in which his judicial behavior arose.

As a justification of his actions, Judge Eriksson sought to argue that

Injunction Hearings should not have been delegated to county court judges. This

disagreement was illustrated by his complaint to then Chief Justice Pariente and

the State Courts Administrator’s Office. (T:501-502).

When Judge Eriksson was unsuccessful in urging his position, rather than

directly confronting those with whom he disagreed, he punished those who could

not fight back. Much as he punished Mr. Walton for the “sins” of his lawyer,

Judge Eriksson punished the pro se petitioners because he did not think he should

have heard their petitions.

Judge Eriksson undertook a course of conduct that was designed to deny pro

se petitions by adopting a rigid and formulaic method of conducting the Hearings.

15

By initiating the proceedings with, “Who is your first witness?”, for example, he

fails to accord those unschooled in the law a fair hearing.

Judge Eriksson’s argument that the Hearing Panel overlooks the procedural

niceties of Family Courts II and III, itself overlooks the spirit of the law. His

analysis is an unduly rigid and formulaic characterization of the law.

In re Report of the Commission on Family Courts, 588 So.2d 586 (Fla.

1991), and its progeny, were intended for each circuit to establish a family division

in its circuit to coordinate all family law matters that affect one family. This was

done in the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit by Administrative Order 03-22 (Eriksson

Exhibit 29:10.

Judge Eriksson complains that under his understanding of Family Courts I,

II, and III, he, as a county judge should not have been assigned to hear Injunction

cases. That disagreement should not have overborne his duty to follow the law and

apply it fairly and objectively to all who appeared before him. Taunton at 179.

The cases cited by Judge Eriksson in justifying his actions do not buttress

his legal position. In Paulson v. Evander, 633 So.2d 540 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), the

judge amended and redrafted pleadings for a party. This is significantly different

from the simple act of inquiry that would have promoted, rather than inhibited the

process as suggested by the Hearing Panel in its Recommendation.

16

Ohrn v. Wright, 963 So.2d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) is likewise inapposite.

In that case, the judge failed to swear witnesses. The Hearing Panel does not

suggest the abandonment of formality as illustrated by Ohrn.

Apparently, Judge Eriksson fails to recognize that by failing to accord

petitioners an opportunity to be heard, he is not only violating Canon 3B(7), but he

is also demonstrating bias.

By asking extraneous questions such as, “Who sent you here?” or “Who told

you to file this?” he has made his motivations abundantly clear. Denying a Motion

for a Domestic Violence Injunction because a pro se petitioner is unaware of a

judge’s peculiar procedural requirements is no less punitive than revoking a

person’s pre-trial release for the temerity of suggesting a Motion to Disqualify.

V. REPLY TO COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION IN THE JQC’S

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

Judge Eriksson’s statement in Paragraph 1 of this Section that he does not

agree with the Panel’s findings that his views had changed about treating pro se

petitioners is troubling. It connotes that he is only temporarily modifying his

17

behavior as a result of threat of discipline. It is inconsistent with his statement at

the February 28, 2008 6(b) Hearing,

REVEREND BRACY: Did it take all this for you to get the message?

JUDGE ERIKSSON: No. I got the message when I looked at

myself and watched that video; and when I looked at it and said,

what would your Mother have thought, I got the message.

JQC Exhibit 10

This is relevant because an appreciation of the wrongfulness of conduct is an

element of mitigation that was considered by the Hearing Panel. See In re

Rodriguez, 829 So.2d 857(Fla. 2002), footnote 2.

Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 are attempts to litigate or re-litigate the facts of State

v. Walton, infra, and are only germane to Judge Eriksson’s actions in that they

establish Judge Eriksson’s displeasure with Mr. Walton’s attorney and the

mechanism he used to punish Mr. Walton.

Paragraphs 5 through 11 merely buttress the Hearing Panel’s findings that

Judge Eriksson took an unduly rigid and overly technical approach to the

Injunction process. The assertion that he was following the law, as he understood

it, should be even less an excuse for a judge than a private citizen. This is

especially true when Judge Eriksson manipulated the Injunction process to create

procedural default on the part of the pro se petitioners.

18

As to Paragraph 12, Judge Eriksson attempts to argue the converse of the

proceeding paragraphs. This goes to the heart of the matter. The JQC is granted

constitutional authority to investigate and recommend to this Court any judge

whose conduct either demonstrates an unfitness to hold office, or warrants

discipline.

The JQC does not concern itself with decisions of judges, “unless that

judges’ attitudes, prejudices or beliefs are translated into action or inaction that

constitutes a violation of law or the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Taunton at 178.

19

CONCLUSION

The evidence heard by the Hearing Panel establishes beyond the standard of

clear and convincing evidence that the conduct of Judge Eriksson fell well below

the standard of common courtesy and considerate treatment of those who came

before him. A judge should be mindful of his responsibility to serve the public

interest by avoiding any appearance of impropriety. Here Judge Eriksson, in the

guise of following the letter of the law, abused his position of authority.

The Hearing Panel also found that Judge Eriksson admitted at least partial

wrongdoing in Walton and recognized his shortcomings in handling the Injunction

Hearings. However, Judge Eriksson, now pro se, appears to retract any

appreciation of culpability and in turn attacks the JQC for fulfilling its

constitutional duty.

The ultimate decision concerning Judge Eriksson lies with this Court. This

Court may accept, modify or reject, the Findings and Conclusions of the JQC.

Article V, Section 12(c)(1), Florida Constitution.

Respectfully Submitted, ____________________________________

MICHAEL L. SCHNEIDER Florida Bar No. 0525049 GENERAL COUNSEL Judicial Qualifications Commission 1110 Thomasville Road

20

Tallahassee, FL 32303-6224

(850) 488-1581 Attorney for the Commission

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by US mail to Hon. Ralph E. Eriksson, Criminal Justice Center, 101 Bush Blvd., Sanford, FL 32773, Hon. Thomas B. Freeman, Chairman, Hearing Panel, Criminal Justice Center, 14250 49th Street North, Clearwater, FL 33762-2801, and John R. Beranek, Esq., Counsel to Hearing Panel, PO Box 391, Tallahassee, FL 32302, this ___ day of April, 2009.

____________________________________ Michael L. Schneider

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I HEREBY CERTIFY that this brief complies with the font requirements of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.210(a)(2).

___________________________________Michael L. Schneider

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