Case Digest in Civil Law

8/17/2019 Case Digest in Civil Law

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BONGATO V. MALVAR, 387 SCRA 327FACTS:

Spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint in the MTCC for forcible entry againstTeresita Bongato, alleging that Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel of land belonging to thespouses and erected thereon a house of light materials.

MTCC decided in favor of Malvar and ordered Bongato to vacate the land. RTC affirmed thedecision. CA also held that MTCC had urisdiction. !n appeal, Bongato raised the issue of MTCC urisdiction" that the complaint was filed beyond the one#year prescriptive period.

ISSUE:

$herther or not the MTCC had urisdiction since the Complaint was filed beyond the one#year period from date of alleged entry%

HELD:

&o, MTCC had no urisdiction. 't is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a (uieting process,and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process.'ndeed, the one#year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generallycounted from the date of actual entry to the land. )owever, when entry is made through stealth,then the one#year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one#year period, the party dispossessed of the parcel of land may file either accion publiciana" or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.

!ne the basis of the facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible entry filed byrespondents had already prescribed when they filed the complaint on *uly +, +-- /the housewas built as early as +-012, thus the MTCC had no more urisdiction to hear and decide the case.

IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS ANDVALERIANO

108 SCRA 335

FACTS

3austino 'gnacio filed an application to register a parcel of land /mangrove2 which he alleged heac(uired by right of accretion since it adoins a parcel of land owned by the 'gnacio. )isapplication is opposed by the 4irector of 5ands, 5aureano 6aleriano, contending that said landforms part of the public domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that said landformed part of the public domain. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

$hether or not the land forms part of the public domain


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HELD: YES

+. The law on accretion cited by 'gnacio in inapplicable in the present case because it refers toaccretion or deposits on the ban7s of rivers while this refers to action in the Manila Bay, which isheld to be part of the sea

. Although it is provided for by the 5aw of $aters that lands added to shores by accretionscaused by actions of the sea form part of the pubic domain when they are no longer necessary for

purposes of public utility, only the e8ecutive and the legislative departments have the authorityand the power to ma7e the declaration that any said land is no longer necessary for public use.9ntil such declaration is made by said departments, the lot in (uestion forms part of the publicdomain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.

JLT AGRO V. BALASAG453 SCRA 211

FACTS:

4on *ulian had two marriages during his lifetime. 4uring his first one, with Antonia, he had twochildren. 'n the second marriage, he had : children with Milagros. 9pon the death of Antonia,the first children sought the partition of the property. !n the disputed 5ot ;vidently, atthe time of e8ecution of deed of assignment, *ulian remained the owner of the properties.

UIMEN V. CA

257 SCRA 1!3FACTS:

The classic battle of an avocado tree and a sarisari store of strong materials.

HELD:

$here the easement may be established on any of the several tenements surrounding thedominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should bechosen but if these two circumstances don?t concur in a single interest, the way which will causeleast damage should be used, even if it will not be shortest.


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FRANSISCO V. IAC

177 SCRA 527FACTS:

The Malinta estate was co#owned by two sisters who later donated +@< of the property to their

niece, +@< to the heirs of their deceased sister, and +@< was solely conveyed to Cornelia.Adoining this estate was property of 3ransisco, fronting the aradas road. The new co#ownersthen partitioned the lot. All the frontage went to the niece. Cornelia subse(uently sold her property to >ugenio sisters who then sold it to Ramos. Ramos wanted a right of way through3ransisco?s property.

HELD:

'f the enclosure or isolation was due to the proprietor?s own acts, then there couldn?t be anycompulsory right of way.

TANEDO V. BERNAD

1!5 SCRA 8!FACTS:

Cardenas was the owner of two lots. !ne lot was sold to Tanedo and the other was mortgaged.The mortgaged lot had an four#storey apartment and house constructed thereon with a septictan7. The other lot had on it a house. Thereafter, the second lot was sold to spouses Sim who

bloc7ed the sewage pipe.

HELD:

Absent any statement abolishing the easement of drainage the use of the septic tan7 is continued by operation of law. The new owners of the servient estate cannot impair the use of the easement.

SOLID MANILA V. BIO HONG TRADING

1"5 SCRA 7#8FACTS:

4efendant purchased property which had an alleyway for the passage of people living in the

same vicinity. 't closed the alleyway.

HELD:

The vendee of real property in which a servitude or easement e8ists didn?t ac(uire the right to

close that servitude or put up obstructions thereon, to prevent the public from using it.


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BALURAN V. NAVARRO

7" SCRA 30"FACTS:

Spouses araiso entered into a barter agreement with the spouses Baluran. The former

transferred use of their residential house in favor of the latter in e8change for the latter?s riceland.

HELD:

&o barter agreement for purposes of transferring ownership can be inferred when it is clear that

the parties merely intended to transfer material possession thereof.

LIM $ICH TONG V. CA

1"5 SCRA 3"8FACTS:

5im and his family originally occupied a room for residential purposes. After they transferred

residence, they utilied the room for the storage of some important belongings. The building had

a common main door through which the occupants of the various rooms therein can get in and

out therefrom. >ach occupant was given a duplicate 7ey to such doorloc7. !n a relevant date,

when 5im needed to get his law boo7s, his 7ey couldnt open the door. )e then needed to incur

e8penses in buying new law boo7s because of the incident. $hen he was able to contact the

officer#in charge, the latter refused to issue to him a new 7ey.

HELD:Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may file an action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior courts against the person unlawfully depriving

or withholding possession from him. This relief is also available to lessees and tenants.

%ILMON AUTO SU&&LY V. CA

208 SCRA 108

FACTS:$ilmon was the lessee of a commercial building and bodegas standing on a registered land

owned in common by the 5acsons, Solinap, and *arantilla. The leases were embodied in deeds

wherein one of the clauses provided for a reservation of rights=the seller has the right to

encumber or sell the property provided that the transferee would respect the lease of $ilmon. !n

a relevant date, after the e8piration of the lease period, the premises were sold to Star Droup

Resources and 4evelopment. The latter instituted an action for unlawful detainer against

$ilmon. $ilmon impugned Star?s right to eect them. 't alleges that its right of preemption has

been violated, as well as their leasehold rights, and that it was denied the option to e8tend the

lease. These same propositions were also raised in the case it filed with the RTC. 'n the unlawful


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detainer cases, it was decided by the MTC that the case should proceed against some of the

lessees but not with the others. The lessees filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

They filed a petition for certiorari and the RTC held in the end that the pendency of the case in

the RTC didnt warrant suspension of the unlawful detainer case with the MTC.

HELD:

An eectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed with the RTC based on a tenant?s claim

of his right of preemption was violated. The actions in the RTC didnt involve physical

possession and on not a few occasions, that the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delaydisposition of the eectment proceeding.

Coca-Cola vs. Court of Appeals 22!

SCRA 2"3

F'()*:

Respondent 5ydia Deronimo was the proprietess of Eindergarten $onderland Canteen, engagedin the sale of soft drin7s and other goods to the students of Eindergarten $onderland and to the public. !n August +, +-0-, some parents of the students complained that the Co7e and Spritesoft drin7s contained fiber#li7e matter and other foreign substances. She discovered the presenceof some fiber#li7e substances in the contents of some unopened Co7e bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle. The 4epartment of )ealth informed her that thesamples she submitted are adulterated. )er sales of soft drin7s plummeted, and not long after that, she had to close shop. She became obless and destitute. She demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages but was rebuffed by it. She then filed a complaint before the RTC of 4agupan City, which granted the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, on the ground that thecomplaint is based on contract, and not on (uasi#delict, as there e8ists pre#e8isting contractualrelation between the parties. Thus, on the basis of Article +F1+, in relation to Article +F;, thecomplaint should have been filed within si8 months from the delivery of the thing sold. The CAreversed the RTC decision and held that Deronimo?s complaint is one for (uasi#delict because of petitioner?s act of negligently manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption" and that the e8istence of contractual relations between the parties does notabsolutely preclude an action by one against the other for (uasi#delict arising from negligence inthe performance of a contract. )ence, this petition.

I**+:

$hether or not the action for damages by the proprietess against the soft drin7s manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden defects, which must befiled within si8 months from the delivery of the thing sold, or one for (uasi#delict, which can befiled within four years pursuant to Article ++:; of the Civil Code.

H-:

The action in based on (uasi#delict, therefore, it prescribes in four years. The allegations in thecomplaint ma7es a reference to the rec7less and negligent manufacture of Gadulterated fooditems intended to be sold for public consumption.H The vendee?s remedies are not limited tothose prescribed in Article +F;1 of the Civil Code. The vendor could be liable for (uasi#delictunder Article +1;, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee.

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The e8istence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the oneagainst the other and the conse(uent recovery of damages therefor. 5iability for (uasi#delict maystill e8ist despite the presence of contractual relations.

L#$# vs. %&ter'e(#ate Appellate Court

214 SCRA 1)

F'()*:

!n *anuary +:, +-1-, *ulie Ann Dotiong and $endell 5ibi died, each from a single gunshotwound from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio 5ibi. The respondents, parents of *ulie Ann, filed a case against the parents of $endell to recover damages arising fromthe latter?s vicarious liability under Article +0 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed thecomplaint. !n appeal, the 'AC set aside the udgment of the lower court dismissing thecomplaint of *ulie Ann?s parents.

I**+:

$hether or not Article +0 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the respondent Courtto ma7e petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

H-:

Ies. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervisingthe activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility inmonitoring and 7nowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to e8ercise allthe diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime bymeans of the gun which was freely accessible to $endell 5ibi because they have not regularlychec7ed whether the gun was still under loc7, but learned that it was missing from the safety

deposit bo8 only after the crime had been committed. The civil liability of parents for (uasi#delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article +0, is primary and not subsidiary.

Custo(#o vs Court of Appeals 253

SCRA 4*3

F'()*:

Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two#door apartment was erected. Said propertywas surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio and spousesSantos. As an access to . Burgos Street from the subect property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is appro8imately one meter wide and is about metersdistant from Mabasa?s residence to . Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about < meters in width andlength from plaintiff Mabasa?s residence to . Burgos Street" it is about ; meters. 'n passing thrusaid passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tan7 and with F#; meters inlength, has to be traversed. etitioners constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway ma7ingit narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. 4efendant Morato constructed her adobe fenceand even e8tended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. As a result,the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a permanent access to the public

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street. Respondents then filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The trialcourt ordered the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the public street and thatin turn, the respondent will pay a sum of hp 0,. to the petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. !n appeal by the respondent to the CA, the decision of thetrial court was affirmed, such that a right of way and an award of actual, moral and e8emplarydamages were given to the respondents. )ence, this petition.

I**+:

$hether or not the award of damages is proper%

H-:

&o. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wronginflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. $rong withoutdamage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages aremerely part of the remedy allowed for the inury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a materialdistinction between damages and inury. 'nury is the illegal invasion of a legal right" damage isthe loss, hurt, or harm which results from the inury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without inury in

those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. Thesesituations are often called damnum abs(ue inuria. 'n order that a plaintiff may maintain anaction for the inuries of which he complains, he must establish that such inuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a concurrence of inuryto the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.

'n the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal inury. Contrary to the claimof respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. 'norder that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article + of the Civil Code can be applied,it is essential that the following re(uisites concurJ /+2 The defendant should have acted in amanner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" /2 The acts should be willful"

and /


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Rafael Re+es vs. ,eople 32" SCRA )

F'()*:

'n the early morning of *une , +-0-, the $hite Truc7 driven by 4unca left Tuguegarao,Cagayan bound to San 3ernando, ampanga loaded with , cases of empty beer GDrandeH bottles. Seated at the front right seat beside him was 3erdinand 4omingo, his truc7 helper. Ataround :J o?cloc7 that same morning while the truc7 was descending at a slight downgrade

along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, 'sabela, it approached a damaged portion of theroad covering the full width of the truc7?s right lane going south and about si8 meters in length.These made the surface of the road uneven because the potholes were about five to si8 inchesdeep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. As narrated by 3erdinand4omingo, before approaching the potholes, he and 4unca saw the &issan with its headlights oncoming from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road by ta7ing the leftlance but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. Thiscaused the truc7 to bounce wildly. 4unca lost control of the wheels and the truc7 swerved to theleft invading the lane of the &issan. As a result, 4unca?s vehicle rammed the incoming &issandragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where itfinally stopped. The &issan was severely damaged and its two passengers, namely, 3eliciano

Balcita and 3rancisco 4y, *r. died instantly. !n !ctober +, +-0-, rovincial rosecutor 4urianfiled with the RTC an amended information charging 4unca with rec7less imprudence resultingin double homicide and damage to property. !n &ovember -, +-0-, the offended parties filedwith the RTC a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Truc7ing Corporation, as employer of driver 4unca, based on (uasi delict. Respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did notwithdraw the civil case (uasi e8 delicto they filed against petitioner. !n 4ecember +F, +-0-,respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused andmanifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect e8 delicto in the criminal action. )owever,they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on (uasi delict against petitioner asemployer arising from the same act or omission of the accused driver. The RTC held that thedriver was guilty. Respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of the oint

decision so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the privaterespondents in the event of insolvency of the accused, which the lower court granted.

I**+*:

/+2 $hether or not petitioner as owner of the truc7 involved in the accident may be heldsubsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action againstthe truc7 driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against theemployer of the truc7 driver" and

/2 $hether or not the Court may award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case

despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truc7 driver.

H-:

/+2 &o. 'n negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between /+2 an action to enforcecivil liability arising from crime under Article + of the Revised enal Code" and /2 a separateaction for (uasi delict under Article +1; of the Civil Code of the hilippines. !nce the choice ismade, the inured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule againstdouble recovery.'n other words, Gthe same act or omission can create two 7inds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability e8 delicto, and civil liability (uasi delictoH either of which Gmay be enforced against the culprit, subect to the caveat under Article +11 of the Civil

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Code that the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability.H 'n theinstant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on (uasi delict, under Article +1; of the Civil Codeof the hilippines. etitioner, as employer of the accused who has been adudged guilty in thecriminal case for rec7less imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on (uasi delict against it. 'n view of the reservation to file, and thesubse(uent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not institutedwith the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article+1; of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

/2 &o. The award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for therecovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil actionagainst the employer. The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action iswhether accused 4unca is guilty of rec7less imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by theseparate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truc7#driver. The policy against double recovery re(uires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer. The inured party must choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring.

Dula+ vs. Court of Appeals 243

SCRA 22

F'()*:

!n 4ecember 1, +-00, an altercation between Benigno Toruela and Atty. &apoleon 4ulayoccurred at the GBig Bang Sa Alabang,H Alabang 6illage, Muntinlupa as a result of whichBenigno Toruela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and 7illed Atty. &apoleon4ulay. etitioner Maria Benita A. 4ulay, widow of the deceased &apoleon 4ulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against Benigno Toruela

and private respondents Safeguard and@or Superguard, alleged employers of defendant Toruela.Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to 4ismiss on the ground that the complaint does notstate a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Toruela?s act of shooting 4ulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed withdeliberate intent /dolo2, the civil liability therefor is governed by Article + of the Revisedenal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article +1; of the &ew Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since thecivil liability under Article +1; applies only to (uasi#offenses under Article


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/2 $hether or not Article


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Ies. Res ipsa loquitur literally means Gthe thing or transaction spea7s for itself.H 3or the doctrineof res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following re(uisites should be presentJ /a2 the accident is of a7ind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone?s negligence" /b2 it is caused byan instrumentality within the e8clusive control of the defendant or defendants" and /c2 the possibility of contributing conduct which would ma7e the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. 'nthe case at bar, the gasoline station, with all its appliances, e(uipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboringhouses. The persons who 7new or could have 7nown how the fire started were respondents andtheir employees, but they gave no e8planation thereof whatsoever. 't is a fair and reasonable

inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The negligence of the employeeswas the pro8imate cause of the fire, which in the ordinary course of things does not happen.Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the award for damages.

&RESUM&TIVE DEATH

R/+-( )4 &4-//* VS. B6+ 9 L6G.R. N. 1!0258. J'+'6 1", 2005

3actsJ Dloria Bermude and 3rancisco 5orino were married in *une +-01. The wife was unaware

that her husband was a habitual drin7er with violent attitude and character and had the propensityto go out with his friends to the point of being unable to wor7. 'n +--+ she left him and returned

to her parents together with her three children. She went abroad to wor7 for her support her

children. 3rom the time she left him, she had no communication with him or his relatives.

'n , nine years after leaving her husband, Dloria filed a verified petition with the RTC under

the rules on Summary *udicial roceedings in the 3amily 5aw. The lower court issued an order

for the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation.

'n &ovember 1, +, the RTC granted the summary petition. Although the udgment was final

and e8ecutors under the provisions of Act. :1 of the 3amily Code, the !SD for the Republic of

the hilippines filed a notice of appeal.

'ssueJ $hether or not the factual and legal bases for a udicial declaration of presumptive death

under Art :+ of the 3amily Code were duly established.

)eldJ Art.


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The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent

null and violation ordered the li(uidation of the assets of the conugal partnership property"

ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of +F, monthly, subect

to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his

mother.

etitioner appealed before the CA. $hile the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent?s

motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants li7e to , .

The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lac7 of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision.

etitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

'ssueJ $hether or not co#ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

)eldJ Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the

provisions of article F in relation to articles :+, : and :< of the 3amily Code, providing for the

dissolution of the absolute community or conugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do

not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio,

the property regime applicable to be li(uidated, partitioned and distributed is that of e(ual co#

ownership.

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a (uo were found, both by the RTC

and the CA, to have been ac(uired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by

the co#ownership. &o fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been

included or involved in said distribution.

ADO&TION= ILLEGITIMATE CHILD

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADO&TION OF STE&HANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIAG.R. N. 1#8311. M'6(4 31, 2005

3actsJ )onorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie

Astorga Darcia. )e averred that Stephanie was born on *une ;, +--:" that Stephanie had been

using her mother?s middle name and surname" and that he is now a widower and (ualified to be

her adopting parent. )e prayed that Stephanie?s middle name be changedto Darcia, her mother?s

surname, and that her surname GDarciaH be changed to GCatindigH his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article +0- of the 3amily

Code, the minor shall be 7nown as Stephanie &athy Catindig.

)onorato filed a motion for classification and@or reconsideration praying that Stephanie beallowed to use the surname of her natural mother /Darcia2 as her middle name. The lower court

denied petitioner?s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or urisprudence

allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

'ssueJ $hether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle

name when she is subse(uently adopted by her natural father.

)eldJ !ne of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the

adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article +0- of the 3amily Code and Section +1 of


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Article 6 of RA 0FF1.

Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights

provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any 7ind, including the right to

bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the

members of the Civil Code and 3amily 5aw Committees. 'n fact, it is a 3ilipino custom that the

initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY

C>+'?( duardo M. Couangco, *r. Thus, the latter

filed on &ovember +-0, a complaint disbarment against respondent. alma moved to dismiss

the complaint.

!n March , +-0


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MARITAL CONSENT

&-'


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to be in Mauricio?s name even after his death &ovember +-1


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Rosendo Alba )errera *r." and /


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)eldJ Article +< of the 3amily Code providedJ GArt +


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ACTION FOR RECOGNITION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN %HO ARE MINORSAT THE TIME OF THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE MAY BE BROUGHTFOR A &ERIOD OF # YEARS FROM ATTAINING MAJORITY AGE= S&URIOUSCHILDREN

BERNABE VS. ALEJOG.R. N. 1#0500. J'+'6 21, 2002

3actsJ The late 3iscal >rnesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Aleoand was named Adrian Bernabe who was born on September +0, +-0+. After >rnesto Bernabe

and Rosalina, his legal wife died, the only heir left is >restina. Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed

a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an ac7nowledged illegitimate son of 3iscal Bernabe

and be given a share of his father?s estate.

'ssueJ $hether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an ac7nowledged illegitimate son.

)eldJ 9nder the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought

within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The 3amily Code ma7es no distinction on whether the

former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code

a chance to dispute the claim, considering that Gillegitimate childrenH are usually begotten and

raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their e8istence.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

SAN MIGUEL COR&ORATION 8clusive $arehouse Agreement with SMB $arehousing Services,represented by its manager, Troy 3rancis 5. Monasterio. SMB undertoo7 to provide land,

physical structures, e(uipment and personnel for storage, warehousing and related services such

as, but not limited to, segregation of empty bottles, stoc7 handling, and receiving SMC products

for its route operations. 3rom September +--< to September +--1 and May +--F to &ovember

+--1, aside from rendering service as warehouseman, Monasterio was given the additional tas7

of cashiering in SMC?s Sorsogon and Camarines &orte sales offices for which he was promised a

separate fee. But it was only on 4ecember +, +--1, that petitioner SMC started paying

respondent ++,: per month for his cashiering services. Monasterio demanded 0,-F-.


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principles of freedom to contract might wor7 to the great disadvantage of a wea7 party#suitor

who ought to be allowed free access to courts of ustice.

GF EUITY, INC. (uity hired 6alenona as )ead Coach of the Alas7a bas7etball team in the hilippine

Bas7etball Association under a Contract of >mployment where D3 >(uity would pay 6alenona

the sum of


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refused to implement the $age !rder, insisting that since it has been paying its wor7ers the new

minimum wage of +;F. even before the issuance of the $age !rder, it cannot be made to

comply with said $age !rder.

'ssueJ $hether respondent violated the CBA in its refusal to grant its employees an across#the#

board increase as a result of the passage of $age !rder &o. R!6''#;.

)eldJ The employees are not entitled to the claimed salary increase, simply because they are not

within the coverage of the $age !rder, as they were already receiving salaries greater than the

minimum wage fi8ed by the !rder. Concededly, there is an increase necessarily resulting fromraising the minimum wage level, but not across#the#board. 'ndeed, a Gdouble burdenH cannot be

imposed upon an employer e8cept by clear provision of law. 't would be unust, therefore, to

interpret $age !rder &o. R!6''#; to mean that respondent should grant an across#the#board

increase. Such interpretation of the !rder is not sustained by its te8t.

CONCE&CION R. AINA, *+*))+) 46 -?'- 46*, DR. NATIVIDAD A. TULIAO,CORAON A. JALECO ' LILIA A. OLAYON ugenia and Concepcion.

)eldJ There was a perfected contract of sale between >ugenia and Concepcion. The records

show that >ugenia offered to sell a portion of the property to Concepcion, who accepted the offer

and agreed to pay +,. as consideration. The contract of sale was consummated when

both parties fully complied with their respective obligations. >ugenia delivered the property to

Concepcion, who in turn, paid >ugenia the price of +,., as evidenced by the receipt.

The verbal contract of sale between >ugenia and Concepcion did not violate the provisions of the

Statute of 3rauds. $hen a verbal contract has been completed, e8ecuted or partially

consummated, as in this case, its enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of 3rauds, whichapplies only to an e8ecutory agreement. )owever, the sale of the conugal property by >ugenia

without the consent of her husband is voidable. 't is undisputed that the subect property was

conugal and sold by >ugenia in April +-01 or prior to the effectivity of the 3amily Code on

August ugenia and Concepcion being an oral

contract, the action to annul the same must be commenced within si8 years from the time the

right of action accrued. 't is binding unless annulled. Antonio failed to e8ercise his right to as7

for the annulment within the prescribed period, hence, he is now barred from (uestioning the

validity of the sale between his wife and Concepcion.


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OLIVERIO LA&ERAL FILI&INAS GOLF COUNTRY CLUB INC.


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e8ecuted by petitioner in favor of each lender#ban7, and to be paid within a si8#year period from

the date of initial advance inclusive of a one year and two (uarters grace period. etitioner,

which had regularly paid the monthly interests due on the promissory notes until !ctober +--0,

thereafter failed to ma7e payments. Conse(uently, written notices of default, acceleration of

payment and demand letters were sent by the lenders to the petitioner. Then, respondents filed a

complaint for the foreclosure of leasehold rights against petitioner. etitioner moved for the

dismissal of the complaint but was denied.

'ssueJ $hether or not respondents have a cause of action against the petitioner%

)eldJ 9nder the foregoing provisions of the Agreement, petitioner may be validly declared in

default for failure to pay the interest. As a conse(uence of default, the unpaid amount shall earn

default interest, and the respondent#ban7s have four alternative remedies without preudice to the

application of the provisions on collaterals and any other steps or action which may be adopted

by the maority lender. The four remedies are alternative, with the right of choice given to the

lenders, in this case the respondents. 9nder Article ++ of the Civil Code, the choice shall

produce no effect e8cept from the time it has been communicated. 'n the present case, we find

that written notices were sent to the petitioner by the respondents. The notices clearly indicate

respondents? choice of remedyJ to accelerate all payments payable under the loan agreement 't

should be noted that the agreement also provides that the choice of remedy is without preudice

to the action on the collaterals. Thus, respondents could properly file an action for foreclosure of

the leasehold rights to obtain payment for the amount demanded.

S&S. FELI&E AND LETICIA CANNU


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!ctober +-0


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subect of the complaint to the petitioners, and the respondents? eviction therefrom is a real

action. As such, the action should have been filed in the proper court where the property is

located, namely, in araQa(ue City, conformably with Section +, Rule : of the Rules of Court.

Since the petitioners, who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed their complaint in the said

RTC, venue was improperly laid" hence, the trial court acted conformably with Section +/c2,

Rule +; of the Rules of Court when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

LIABILITY FOR &RICE ESCALATION FOR LABOR AND MATERIAL COST

H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS. MARINA &RO&ERTIES COR&ORATION,ET AL.G.R N. 1#7!1#, J'+'6 2", 200#

3actsJ Marina roperties Corporation entered into a contract with ).5. Carlos Construction, 'nc.

to construct a condominium comple8 for a total consideration of


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sufficient securities. The proect was awarded to the Asset Builders and a notice to proceed with

the construction was sent by 'nsular 5ife to the former. )owever, Asset Builders proect. &either

did it e8ecute any construction agreement. 't informed 'nsular 5ife that it will not proceed with

the proect.

'ssueJ $hether or not there is a perfected contract between 'nsular 5ife and Asset Builders.

)eldJ There was indeed no acceptance of the offer by Asset Builders. Such failure to comply

with the condition imposed for the perfection of the contract resulted in the failure of thecontract. There are three distinct stages of a contract# preparation or negotiation, perfection or

consummation. &egotiation begins when the prospective contracting parties manifest their

interest in the contract and ends at the moment of their agreement. erfection occurs when they

agree upon the essential elements thereof. The last stage is the consummation where they fulfill

the terms agreed upon culminating in the e8tinguishment of the contract.

CONTACTS ARE &ERFECTED BY MERE CONSENT= EFFECTS OF &ERFECTIONOF CONTRACTS

METRO&OLITAN MANILA DEVELO&MENT AUTHORITY VS. JANCOMENVIRONMENTAL COR&ORATIONGR N. 1#7#!5, J'+'6 30, 2002

3actsJ A build#!perate#Transfer Contract for the waste#to energy proect was signed between

*A&C!M and the hilippine Dovernment. The B!T Contract was submitted to resident Ramos

for approval but was then too close to the end of his term that his term e8pired without him

signing the contract. )e, however, endorsed the same to incoming resident >strada. $ith the

change in administration came changes in policy and economic environment, thus the B!T

contract was not pursued and implemented. *A&C!M appealed to the resident forreconsideration and despite the pendency of the appeal, MM4A caused the publication of an

invitation to pre#(ualify and submit proposals for solid waste management.

'ssueJ $hether or not there is a valid and binding contract between the Republic of the

hilippines and *A&C!M.

)eldJ There is a valid and binding contract between *A&C!M and the Republic of the

hilippines. 9nder Articles +


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fulfillment of what has been e8pressly stipulated but also to all the conse(uences which,

according to their nature, may be in 7eeping with good faith, usage and law. /Art. +


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to obtain a loan from Bancom secured by a mortgage over the land. Because Sulit failed to pay

the purchase price stipulated in the Special Agreement, the brothers filed a complaint for

reconveyance. Sulit also defaulted in her payment to the Ban7 and her mortgage was foreclosed.

At the auction sale, Bancom was declared the highest bidder.

'ssueJ $hether or not the 4eeds of Sale were valid and binding.

)eldJ Simulation ta7es place when the parties do not really want the contract they have e8ecuted

to produce the legal effects e8pressed by its wordings. Art. +


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The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

)ence this etition.

'ssueJ $hether or not the M!A was a novation of the trust agreement between the parties.

)eldJ etition is 4>&'>4, M!A novates the trust agreement.

Mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale of the goods, if not sold, constitutes violation of

4 ++F. )owever, what is being punished by the law is the dishonesty and abuse of confidence

in the handling of money or goods to the preudice of another regardless of whether the latter isthe owner. 't bears emphasis that when the petitioner ban7 made a demand upon a BMC on

3ebruary ++, +--: to comply with its obligations under the trust receipts, the latter was already

under the control of the Management Committee created by S>C. The Management Committee

too7 custody of all BMC?s assets and liabilities, including the red lauan lumber subect of trust

receipts, and authoried their use in the ordinary course of business operations. Clearly, it was

the Management Committee which could settle BMC?s obligations.

'n uinto vs. eople, this Court held that there are two ways which could indicate the presence

of novation, thereby producing the effect of e8tinguishing an obligation by another which

substitutes the same. The first is when novation has been stated and declared in une(uivocal

terms. The second is when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. The

test of incompatibility is whether or not the two obligations can stand together. 'f they cannot,

they are incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. The incompatibility must ta7e

place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its obect, cause or principal

conditions.

Contrary to petitioner?s contention, the M!A did not only reschedule BMC?s debts, but more

importantly, it provided principal conditions, which are incompatible with the trust agreement.

The e8ecution of the M!A e8tinguished respondent?s obligation under the trust receipts.

Respondent?s liability, if any, would only be civil in nature since the trust receipts were

transformed into mere loan documents after the e8ecution of the M!A.

CONDITIONAL OBLIGATION= %HERE THE VENDEE DOES NOT COM&LY %ITHHIS OBLIGATION TO &AY THE BALANCE OF THE &URCHASE &RICE, THEVENDOR@S OBLIGATION TO EECUTE A DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE %ILL NOTARISE.

CORINTHIAN REALTY, INC. VS. COURT OF A&&EALS3#" SCRA 2!0, D(6 2!, 2002

3actsJ rivate respondents and petitioner entered into a 4eed of Conditional Sale /the deed2 of a parcel of land. 9nder the deed, the remaining balance will be paid by the vendee to the vendors

within the period of ninety /-2 days from the e8ecution of the deed" and if for no ustifiable

reason, the vendee fails and@ or refuses to comply with this obligation, the vendors, without prior

notice to the vendee, shall forfeit the earnest money, but as soon as the vendee complies with his

obligations under the contract, then the vendors shall immediately e8ecute the absolute deed of

sale.

CONTRACTS

TANONGON VS. SAMSON


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382 SCRA 130, M' ", 2002

3actsJ

Cayco Marine Service /CAIC!2 is engaged in the business of hauling oil. 't is operated by

'lluminada Cayco !lion /!lion2. Resondents 3elicidad Samson, Casiano !sin, Alberto Belbes

and 5uisito 6enus were among the employees of CAIC! and@or !lion.

!n MARC) -, +--:, respondents filed a complaint against CAIC! and !li8on for illegal

dismissal, underpayment of wages, non#payment of holiday pay, rest day pay and leave pay. The

labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lac7 of merit. !n appeal, it was reversed by the &5RC.!n *une F, +--1, the &5RC Research and 'nvestigation 9nit submitted to the labor arbiter the

udgment award for each respondent.

!n *une :, +--1, a writ of e8ecution was issued directing the &5RC sheriff to collect from

CAIC! and !lion the responding award due for each respondent

!n August 0, +--1, after the notice of levy@sale on e8ecution of personal property was issued,

CAIC! nad !lion?s motor tan7er was seied, to be sold at public auction on August +-, +--1.

!n August +F, +--1, petitioner 4oretea Tanongon, filed a third party claim before the labor

arbiter, alleging that she was the owner of the subect motor tan7er, having ac(uired the same

from !lion on *uly -, +--1, and in consideration.

!n !ctober +F, +--1, the labor arbiter issued an order dismissing the third party claim for lac7 of

merit. !n appeal, the &5RC reversed that of the labor arbiter thereby lifting the levy and

restrained e8ecution.

The Court of Appeals debun7ed the claim that the petitioner was a buyer in good faith on the

ground that purchasers could not close their eyes to facts that should put reasonable persons on

guard. The records show that the sale was hastily concluded" the tan7er and the necessary

documents were immediately delivered to the new owner to the new owner. These facts

confirmed respondent?s suspicion that !lion had intended to overcome the enforcement of the

$rit of >8ecution.

)ence this etition.

'ssueJ $hether or not petitioner 4orotea Tanongon is a buyer in good faith and for value.

)eldJ etition is 4>&'>4" etitioner 4orotea Tanongon is not a purchaser in good faith and for

value.

There is sufficient basis to affirm the CA finding that petitioner was a buyer in abs faith. The writ

of >8ecution was issued by the labor arbiter on *uly :, +--1. And the sale of the levied tan7er

was made only on *uly -, +--1. The CA correctly ruled that the act of !lion was a Gcavalier

attempt to evade payment of the udgment debt.H She obviously got word of the issuance of these

antecedents, petitioner bought the tan7er barely ten days before it was levied upon on August 0,+--1.

urchaser in good faith or an innocent purchaser for value is one who buys properly and pays a

full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before any notice of some other person?s

claim on or interest in it.

etitioner should have in(uired whether !lion had other unsettled obligations and

encumbrances that could burden the subect property. Any person engaged in business would be

wary of buying from a company that is closing shop, because it may be dissipating its assets to

defraud its creditors.


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&RO&ERTY

ISSUANCE OF %RIT OF &OSSESSION= REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE

TERESITA V. IDOLOR VS. HON. COURT OF A&&EALS, S&OUSES GUMERSINDO DEGUMAN ' ILUMINADA DE GUMAN ' HON. JOSE G. &INEDA, &6*?J+? R?'- T6'- C+6), N')'- C'/)'- J+('- R?, B6'(4 220, + C)

G.R. N. 1!1028. J'+'6 31, 2005

3actsJ etitioner Teresita 6. 'dolor obtained a loan from respondent#spouses Dumersindo and

'luminada 4e Duman secured by a real estate mortgage over a property covered by TCT &o.

F;F-. 9pon default by petitioner in the payment of her obligation, respondent instituted e8tra#

udicial foreclosure proceedings against the real estate mortgage.4uring the auction sale,

respondents emerged as the highest bidder and were issued a Certificate of Sale.

!n *une F, +--0, petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of the Certificate of Sale with

prayer for the issuance of a TR! and a writ of preliminary inunction. The RTC issued a writ of

preliminary inunction, however, the Court of Appeals annulled the same on the ground of grave

abuse of discretion. The ownership over the subect property having been consolidated in their

name, respondent#spouses 4e Duman moved for the issuance of a writ of possession with the

Regional Trial Court where the case for the annulment of the Certificate of Sale was pending.FU

!n May 1, , the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the Gthe lifting of the writ of

preliminary inunction does not ipso facto entitle defendant 4e Duman to the issuance of a writ

of possession over the property in (uestion. 't only allows the defendant Sheriff to issue a final

deed of sale and confirmation sale and the defendant 4e Duman to consolidate the

ownership@title over the subect property in his name.H

'n a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the appellate court found that the trial

court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion for the issuance of the Gwrit of possession to the mortgagee or the winning bidder is a ministerial function of the court and that

the pendency of an action (uestioning the validity of a mortgage cannot bar the issuance of the

writ of possession after title to the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee.H1U )ence, it

reversed and set aside the May 1, order of the trial court.

'ssueJ $hether or not the mortgage, by mere motion, not by petition, may apply for a $rit of

ossession in the same case for annulment of the Certificate of Sale of which he is a defendant.

)eldJ A writ of possession is an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in

possession of a real or personal property. 't may be issued under the following instancesJ /+2 landregistration proceedings under Sec. +1 of Act :-;" /2 udicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is

in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had

intervened" and /


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current mar7et value of the apartment building on the lot. The value so determined shall be

forthwith paid by Spouses *uan and >rlinda &uguidU to edro ecson otherwise the petitioner

shall be restored to the possession of the apartment building until payment of the re(uired

indemnity.

!n the basis of this Court?s decision, ecson filed a Motion to Restore ossession and a Motion

to Render Accounting, praying respectively for restoration of his possession over the subect

F;#s(uare meter commercial lot and for the spouses &uguid to be directed to render an

accounting under oath, of the income derived from the subect four#door apartment from

&ovember , +--< until possession of the same was restored to him.

'ssueJ $hether or not the petitioners are liable to pay rent over and above the current mar7et

value of the improvement and that such increased award of rentals by the RTC was reasonable

and e(uitable.

)eldJ 't is not disputed that the construction of the :#door #storey apartment, subect of this

dispute, was underta7en at the time when ecson was still the owner of the lot. $hen the

&uguids became the uncontested owner of the lot, by virtue of entry of udgment of the Court?s

decision, the apartment building was already in e8istence and occupied by tenants.

9nder Article ::0, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the improvement as

his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in

good faith. Relatedly, Article F:; provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full

reimbursement for all the necessary and useful e8penses incurred" it also gives him right of

retention until full reimbursement is made. As we earlier held, since petitioners opted to

appropriate the improvement for themselves as early as *une +--


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&ACURSA, ERNESTO &. BACONGA, EVELYN BACONGA, AMY B. BIHAG,SIEGFREDO BACONGA, IMELDA B. &ACALDO, BACONGA, IMELDA B. &ACALDO,REBECCA B. LI, OFELIA B. OALIVAR, GEMMA BACONGA, MARIE INESBACONGA, MELANIE BACONGA, ' ANITA FUENTES VS. ANGELINA N. DAYRIT.G.R. N. 151235, J+- 28, 2005

3actsJ The property subect of controversy is a ,F#s(uare meter portion of a lot denominated

as 5ot +:rlinda.

etitioners further alleged that un7nown to them, a certain Cristobal Salcedo asserted ownership

over 5ot +:rlinda was lost in the fire that

raed 5apasan, Cagayan de !ro City in +-0+.

The petition was granted and the Register of 4eeds of Misamis !riental issued the second

owner?s duplicate certificate of !CT to respondent which contained an annotation of a &otice of

Adverse Claim filed by >rlinda. The &otice of Adverse Claim alleged in part that >rlinda is one

of the lawful heirs of *uan and 'nes, the registered owners of the property, and as such, she has alegitimate claim thereto.

etitioners further alleged that the newly issued owner?s duplicate certificate of !CT to

respondent was preudicial to their previously issued title which is still in e8istence. Thus, they

prayed among others that they be declared as the rightful owners of the property in (uestion and

that the duplicate certificate of !CT in their possession be deemed valid and subsisting.

'n her answer to the amended complaint, respondent denied all the material allegations but

alleged that 5ot +:


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The Regional Trial Court 4ecision was modified by the CA on appeal by petitioners. The

appellate court held that contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the valid and subsisting duplicate

certificate of !CT &o. 10;: was the one issued to >rlinda, not to respondent, considering that

respondent had failed to comply with the mandatory urisdictional re(uirements of law for the

reconstitution of title under Sec. +< of Republic Act &o. ;.

The CA invo7ed the doctrine that a trial court does not ac(uire urisdiction over a petition for the

issuance of a new owner?s duplicate certificate of title if the original is in fact not lost.

&onetheless, the CA affirmed in all other respects the ruling of the trial court, including the

critical holding that respondent was the owner of the subect property. The decision of the trialcourt is modified so as to order the cancellation of the owner?s duplicate copy of !CT &o. 10;:

issued to defendant Angelina 4ayrit and declaring the owner?s duplicate copy of !CT &o. 10;:

to be still valid for all intents and purposes.

'ssuesJ +. $ho between petitioners and respondent is the rightful owner of the property in

dispute.

. $hether petitioners? right to recover the property is barred by laches assuming they are the

rightful owners thereof as they claim.

rlinda is still in e8istence, the lower court did not ac(uire urisdiction over respondent?s petition

for reconstitution of title. The duplicate certificate of title subse(uently issued to respondent is

therefore void and of no effect.

The registered owners of !CT &o. 10;: on the face of the valid and subsisting duplicate

certificate of title are still *uan and 'nes, petitioners? predecessors in interest. er Section :; of

the 5and Registration Act, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner

shall be ac(uired by prescription or adverse possession. This rule ta7en in conunction with the

indefeasibility of a Torrens title leads to the conclusion that the rightful owners of the property in

dispute are petitioners.These premises considered, it was error on the part of the trial court to rule that respondent was

the owner of the subect property and for the CA to have affirmed such holding. $e rule instead

that the successors#in#interest of *uan and 'nes are the legal owners of the subect property,

namely petitioners herein.

etitioners? ownership of the property having been established, the (uestion now is whether they

are entitled to its possession. !n this point, the Court rules in the negative. etitioners are no

longer entitled to recover possession of the property by virtue of the e(uitable defense of laches.

Thus, petitioners? argument that laches is not applicable to them has no merit. By laches is

meantJ the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and une8plained length of time, to do that


37/63

which by e8ercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or

omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party

entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The defense of laches is an

e(uitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the defendant?s title but only with

whether or not by reason of plaintiff?s long inaction or ine8cusable neglect, he should be barred

from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be ine(uitable and unust to

defendant.

'n our urisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be barred

from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. 'n this case, both the lower court andthe appellate court found that contrary to respondent?s claim of possession, it was Salcedo,

respondent?s predecessor#in#interest who had been in actual possession of the property. Salcedo

was the owner and the one in possession of the land until +-10 when respondent became the

possessor thereof based from the ocular inspection by the lower court.

't was only :F years from the time Salcedo too7 possession of the property that petitioners made

an attempt to claim it as their own. etitioners declared the property for ta8 purposes, registered

their adverse claim to respondent?s title, and filed the instant case all in +--. These actuations of

petitioners point to the fact that for forty#five /:F2 years, they did nothing to assert their right of

ownership and possession over the subect property. Diven the circumstances in the case at bar,

the application of the e(uitable defense of laches is more than ustified.

All the four /:2 elements of laches prescribed by this Court in the case of Do Chi Dun, et al. v.

Co Cho, et al.:U and reiterated in the cases of Meia de 5ucas v. Damponia, Miguel v. Catalino

and Claverias v. uingco are present in the case at bar, to witJ

/+2 conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the

situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint see7s a remedy"

/2 delay in asserting the complainant?s rights, the complainant having had 7nowledge or notice,

of the defendant?s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit"

/rlinda, were issued new titles in their names. !n 4ecember -, +-1:, 'rene married Rolando S.

Relucio 3our months later, 'rene e8ecuted a 4eed of Absolute Sale covering the si8 parcels of

land in favor of Raul Santos, Rolando?s first cousin, for a total consideration of +F,..

!n *une 1, +-1-, 'rene sold 5ot ;+ to Dreta Tinga de los Reyes. !n March +, +-0, 'rene

e8ecuted another 4eed of Absolute Sale in favor of Raul covering 5ots F:F and


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&ovember :, +-0;, 5ot +F#C was levied upon in favor of 3rancisco Bautista in Civil Case &o.

R#F1 before Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur. !n 4ecember -, +-00, it

was sold at public auction to Ruben Sia.

!n *une ;, +-00, 'rene died. Three wee7s later, *ose and >rlinda filed a complaint against

Rolando, Raul and the Register of 4eeds of &aga City before the RTC of &aga City for

annulment of sale with damages, doc7eted as Civil Case &o. 00#+F;. They sought the

annulment of the 4eed of Absolute Sale on grounds of forgery and simulated sale, the

reconveyance of the properties, and damages.

$hen *ose died on 4ecember , +-0- he was substituted by his surviving heirs, li7ewise, whenRolando died, he was substituted by his surviving heirs. Meanwhile, on August -, +--, 5ot +F#

A was transferred to Amado Sanao under a 4eed of Sale with Real >state Mortgage. )eirs of

*ose and the Testate >state of 'rene filed a complaint for annulment of title and deed with

damages. Such Civil Case was consolidated for oint trial with former Civil Case and a *oint

*udgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaints and counterclaims and

upholding the validity of the 4eeds of Absolute Sale e8ecuted by 'rene in favor of Raul.

!n appeal, the CA held thatJ only four lots are subect of the case" despite the e8ecution of the

two 4eeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Raul, 'rene continued to possess, e8ercise management

and control over the subect properties. 'rene constructed a building on 5ots F:F and


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4eed of Sale and writ of e8ecution issued in favor of Ruben Sia are nullified.

MODE OF ACUIRING O%NERSI&= &RESCRI&TION= A &OSSESSOR IN THECONCE&T OF O%NER

SOLEDAD CALICDAN, ETC. VS. SILVERIO CENDANA, ETC.G.R. N.155080, F6+'6 5, 200#

3actsJ !n August F, +-:1, 3ermina, widow of Si8to Calicdan, who died intestate, e8ecuted adeed of donation intervivos whereby she conveyed a 1F#s(uare meter of unregistered land

located in Mangaldan, angasinan formerly owned by Si8to to respondent Silverio Cendana who

immediately entered into possession of the land. Sometime in +-:-, Cendana constructed a two#

storey residential house thereon where he resided until his death in +--0.

!n *une +-, +--, petitioner Soledad, daughter of 3ermina, through her legal guardian,

Duadalupe Castillo, filed a Complaint for Recovery of !wnership, ossession and 4amages

against the respondent alleging that" +2 the donation was void" 2 the respondent too7 advantage

of her incompetence in ac(uiring the land" and


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3actsJ Conchita Cabatingan e8ecuted in favor of her brother, &icolas Cabatingan, a G4eed of

Conditional 4onation 'nter 6ivos for )ouse and 5otH. 3our other deeds of donation were

subse(uently e8ecuted by Conchita Cabatingan bestowing parcels of land upon >stela

Maglasang, &icolas Cabatingan and Merly Cabatingan. These deeds of donation contain similar

provisions, which state that the donation, will become effective upon the death of the donor"

provided, however, that in the event that the donee should die before the donor, the present

donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect.

5ater, Conchita Cabatingan died.

'ssueJ $hether or not the donations were inter vivos or mortis causa.

)eldJ 'n a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the

donor is still alive. 'n determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following

characteristics must be ta7en into accountJ

+.2 't conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor" or what

amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership and control of the

property while alive"

.2 That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum" but

the revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to

dispose of the properties conveyed" and


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'ssueJ $hether there was a valid sale made by a co#owner / Si8to2 without the consent of the

other co#owners.

)eldJ A sale by a co#owner of the whole property as his will affect only his own share but not

those of the other co#owners who did not consent to the sale / Art. :-


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agreement denominated as a Contract to Buy whereby the ban7 agreed to sell to 4ouglas the said

land with all the improvements thereon. The Contract to Buy provides that Anama shall purchase

the property of a certain amount and shall pay to the SBan7" it also provides that /+2 Anama

shall apply with the ban7 for a loan, the proceeds of which answer for the balance of the

purchase price" /2 should the petitioner fail to comply with any of the terms of contract, all

amounts paid are forfeited in favor of SBan7, the latter having the option either to demand full

payment of total price or to rescind the contract.

Anama was able to pay the first and second installments" however, he failed to pay the third

installment when it became due. There were several transactions between them to settle theamount due. But later, the ban7 e8ecuted an Affidavit of Cancellation rescinding the contract,

and forfeited the payments made by Anama which were applied as rentals of the use of the

property. Anama was then advised to vacate the property despite his opposition to the rescission

of the Contract to Buy. The ban7 sold the property to spouses Co, in whose favor TCT was

issued. Anama then filed a case for 4eclaration of &ullity of 4eed of Sale, Cancellation of TCT,

and Specific erformance with 4amages.

'ssueJ $hether the rescission of the Contract to Buy was valid.

)eldJ Since Anama failed to pay the third installment, SBan7 was entitled to rescind the

Contract to Buy. The contract provides the Ban7 two options in the event that petitioner fails to

pay any of the installments. This was either /+2 to rescind the contract outright and forfeit all

amounts paid by the petitioner, or /2 to demand the satisfaction of the contract and insist on the

full payment of the total price. After petitioner repeatedly failed to pay the third installment, the

Ban7 chose to e8ercise the first option.

The Contract to Buy is actually a contract to sell whereby the vendor reserves ownership of the

property and is not to pass until full payment. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition,

the failure of which is not a breach but simply an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor

to convey title from ac(uiring binding force. Since ownership of the subect property was not pass to petitioner until fill payment of the purchase price, his failure to pay on the date stipulated,

or in the e8tension granted, prevented the obligation for the Ban7 to pass title of the property to

Anama. The ban7 could validly sell the property to the spouses Co, the right of the ban7 to sell

the property being une(uivocal.

IM&OSTION OF 12 ANNUAL INTEREST RATE

ALMEDA VS. CARIO ET AL.

GR. N. 1521#3. J'+'6 13, 2003

3actsJ onciano 5. Almeda /vendee2 and Avelino CariQo /vendor2, predecessors#in#interest of

petitioners and respondents, entered into two agreements to sell, one covering eight titled

properties, and the other, three untitled properties. The agreed price of the eight titled properties

was +,1:


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e8ecution of the agreement, and the balance, bearing a twelve percent /+N2 annual interest from

the signing thereof, to be paid as followsJ fifteen percent /+FN2 of the purchase price plus

interest to be paid upon the issuance of titles to the lots, and the balance plus interests to be paid

in semi#annual installments starting form the date of issuance of the respective certificates of title

to the lots involved, which must not be later than March


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HILADO VS. HEIRS OF RAFAEL MEDALLA377 SCRA 257. F6+'6 15, 2002

3actsJ Dorgonio Macainan was the owner of the several properties. After his death, his estate was

divided among his heirs, including his children by his first wife, a contract / Anita, Rosita P

Berbonio2 As Berbonio had predeceased Dorgonio, her children / Rafael, 5ourdesPTeresita

surnamed Medalla2 succeeded to her inheritance. Respondents herein are the heirs of Rafael

Medalla.

Rafael Medalla e8ecuted a 4eed of Absolute Sale purporting to sell his share in the inheritance toDorgonio )ilado. 5ater, he e8ecuted anotherH4eed of Absolute Sale in favor of )ilado over his

share in another inherited property. !ver the ne8t years, )ilado and Medalla e8ecuted < more

contracts concerning the sold properties"H/+2 G Memorandum of Agreement,H/2 G4eed of

Resale,H whereby )ilado resold to Medalla two of the F hectares a lot, and /


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3actsJ &elson and Mercede BaQe are the original owners of a parcel of land together with its

improvements located at $hite lains, .C./.C. roperty2 while Aleandria ineda is the owner

of a house located at 5os Angeles, California /California roperty2, the two parties e8ecuted an

GAgreement to >8change Real roperties.H 'n the agreement, they agreed toJ +2 e8change their

respective properties, 2 ineda to pay an earnest money of O +, on 3ebruary +-0


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petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court /MeTC2. The petitioners maintained that since the

land was classified as agricultural as evidenced by a Ta8 4eclaration Certificate, it is the

4epartment of Agrarian Reform Adudication Board /4ARAB2 that has urisdiction over the

case. 't should be noted that the land is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of

C4C?s predecessor#in#interest CBC.

'ssueJ $hether or not urisdiction over the subect matter lies with the 4ARAB or with the

Metropolitan Trial Court.

)eldJ 3or the 4ARAB to have urisdiction over the case, there must be a tenancy relationship

between the parties. !ne of the indispensable elements in order for a tenancy agreement to ta7e

hold over a dispute is that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. 't

must be noted that the petitioners failed to ade(uately prove ownership of the land. They merely

showed ta8 declarations. As against a transfer certificate of title, ta8 declarations or receipts are

not ade(uate proofs of ownership. )ence, it is the MeTC that has urisdiction over the subect

matter there being no proof of tenancy relationship.

RECONVEYANCE

HEIRS OF &OM&OSA SALUDARES VS. COURT OF A&&EALSG.R. N. 12825#. J'+'6 1!, 200#

3actsJ The heirs and their father, *uan 4ator e8ecuted a 4eed of >8traudicial artition of the

share of omposa in the Tana estate with the eastern portion thereof going to *uan and the

western half to the children. *uan remained in possession of his share until his death. 'sabel 4ator

applied for a free patent over the entire Tana estate in behalf of the heirs thus it was awarded.

rivate respondents filed an action for reconveyance against petitioner heirs. They alleged thatthey were the owners in fee simple and they were in possession of the land, and 'sabel 4ator

obtained free patent in favor of the heirs by means of fraud and misrepresentation. etitioners

alleged that they and their predecessors in interest had been in actual, continuous, adverse and

public possession of the land in the concept of owners since time immemorial, and the title to the

lot was issued to them after faithful compliance with the re(uirements for the issuance of a free

patent.

'ssuesJ +2 $hether or not the reconveyance is still available notwithstanding the indefeasibility

of the Torrens Title.

2 $hether or not the heirs have been in open and continuous possession of the disputed lot.

)eldJ +2 The registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered property to its

true owner. Reconveyance does not set aside or re#subect to review the findings of fact of the

Bureau of 5ands. Thus, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. $hat is sought

is the transfer of the property or its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in

another person?s name, to its rightful or legal owner or to the one with a better right.

2 The heirs convincingly established their open and continuous occupation of the entire Tana


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estate. The farm was under the administration of Beata and 'sabel 4ator who too7 over its

management after etra 4ator died" heir?s tenant Miguel 4ahilig had been consistently tending

the land since +-:1 and was the one who planted the various crops and trees on the lot.

ETRINSIC FRAUD

RELON REALTY GROU&, INC. VS. COURT OF A&&EALSG.R. N. 128#12. M'6(4 15, 2002

3actsJ Respondent Ale8 4avid was the registered owner of two parcel of land. etitioner Re8lon

Realty Droup, 'nc. /Re8lon2 entered into an agreement with respondent for the purchase of the

two parcels of land as evidenced by an Gabsolute deed of sale.H Respondent filed with the

Regional Trial Court a petition for the issuance of the owner?s duplicate copies which were

allegedly lost" petition granted by the court. Re8lon then filed with the Court of Appeals a

petition for annulment of the decision of the trial court on the ground that 4avid allegedly

employed fraud and deception in securing the replacement owner?s duplicate copies.

'ssueJ $hether or not such misrepresentation or fraud of respondent 4avid can be characteried

as an e8trinsic fraud as to merit the annulment of the trial court?s decision.

)eldJ >8trinsic fraud contemplates a situation where a litigant commits acts outside the trial of

the case" the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, a real contest, or from

presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining to the

udgment itself, but to the manner in which it was produced so that there is not a fair submission

of the controversy. 't is well settled that the use of forged instrument or preudiced testimonials

during trial is not an e8trinsic fraud, because such evidence does not preclude the participation of

any party in the proceedings. $hile a perured testimony may prevent a fair and ust

determination of a case, it does not bar the adverse party from rebutting or opposing the use ofsuch evidence. 3urthermore, it should be stressed that e8trinsic fraud pertains to an act

committed outside of the trial. The alleged fraud in this case was perpetrated during the trial.

&RESCRI&TION DOES NOT RUN AGAINST THE STATE

&AG$ATI&UNAN VS. COURT OF A&&EALSG.R. N. 12"!82. M'6(4 21, 2002

3actsJ !n *une +F, +-;1, the Court of 3irst 'nstance of Dumaca, ueon promulgated a decision

confirming petitioner?s title to properties located in San &arciso, ueon. Almost eighteen /+02years later, the Republic of the hilippines filed with the 'ntermediate Appellate Court an action

to declare the proceedings in the 5RC case null and void and to cancel the original certificate of

title and to confirm the subect land as part of the public domain. The Republic claimed that the

subect land was classified as timberland" hence, inalienable and not subect to registration. !n

the other hand, petitioners raised the special defense of indefeasibility of title and res udicata.

'ssuesJ +2 $hether or not prescription runs against the state.

2 $hether or not occupation will ripen into ownership.


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)eldJ +2 rescription does not run against the state. The lengthy occupation of the disputed land

by petitioners cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial property of

the state which is inalienable and not disposable.

2 9nless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the

state it remains part of the inalienable public domain. !ccupation thereof in the concept of

owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

A TORRENS TITLE, ONCE REGISTERED, SERVES AS NOTICE TO THE %HOLE%ORLD

ALVARICO VS. SOLAG.R. N. 138"53. J+ !, 2002

3actsJ 3ermina 5ope e8ecuted a 4eed of Self#Adudication and Transfer of Rights over lot F in

favor of Amelita Sola, who agreed to assume all the obligations, duties and conditions imposed

which was approved by the Bureau of 5ands. Castorio Alvarico filed a civil case for

reconveyance against Amelita. )e claimed that 3ermina donated the land to him and

immediately thereafter, he too7 possession of the same. )e averred that the donations to him had

the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita. Amelita maintained that the donation to

petitioner was void because 3ermina was no longer the owner of the property when it was

allegedly donated to petitioner, the property having been transferred earlier to her. She added that

the donation was void because of lac7 of approval from the Bureau of 5ands and that she had

validly ac(uired the land as 3ermina?s rightful heir.

'ssueJ $ho between the petitioner and respondent has a better claim to the land%

)eldJ The e8ecution of public documents, as in the case of Affidavits of Adudication is entitled

to the presumption of regularity, hence convincing evidence is re(uired to assail and controvert

them. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as notice to the whole world. All persons must ta7e

notice and no one can plead ignorance of its registration. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing

at all to (uestion the validity of Amelita?s title. 't follows that he cannot recover the property

because he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.

O&EN, CONTINUOUS, AND NOTORIOUS &OSSESSION OF THE LAND

DEL ROSARIO VS. RE&UBLICG.R. N. 1#8338. J+ !, 2002

3actsJ etitioner filed an application for registration of a parcel of land. The cler7 of court

transmitted to the 5and Registration Authority /5RA2 the duplicate copy of petitioner?s

application for registration, the original tracing cloth plan, and the other documents submitted by

petitioner in support of his application. 4uring the initial hearing, no oppositor appeared e8cept

for the provincial prosecutor who appeared on behalf of the Solicitor Deneral in representation of

the Republic of the hilippines. The trial court granted the application. Respondent appealed for


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embraced in the special law. Repeal of laws should be made clear and e8press. The failure to add

a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any e8isting law unless there

is an irreconcilable or repugnancy between Section : of R.A. +F-1 and Section 10 of .4. :;:.

The former law is of special and e8clusive application to lots ac(uired from the Tondo 3oreshore

5and only. The latter is a law or decree of general application. etitioner?s repurchase of the

subect lot within the five#year redemption period of Section : of R.A. +F-1 is within the

purview of redemption by a co#owner which inures to the benefit of all the other co#owners of

the property.

INNOCENT &URCHASER FOR VALUE

NAARENO VS. COURT OF A&&EALSG.R. N. 1388#2. O()6 18, 2000

3actsJ etitioners and respondent Romeo &aareno are three of the five children of spouses

Ma8imino and Aurea &aareno, who during their marriage had ac(uired properties. After the

death of Ma8imino, Sr., Romeo filed for intestate proceedings and he was thereafter appointed

administrator of his father?s estate. Romeo discovered a deed o f sale selling petitioner &atividad

si8 lots including 5ot#lia see7ing the annulment of the transfer to Romeo of 5ot < which is granted by the trial

court e8cept as to 5ots Mc5aughlin is an Australian national who comes to the hilippines for

business. 4uring his trips he stays in Tropicana, a hotel recommended to him by Brunhilda Tan.

Mc5aughlin deposited cash and ewelry to the safety deposit bo8 of the )otel. The safety deposit

bo8 cannot be opened unless the 7ey of the guest and that of the management are present. 5aine

and ayam are employees of Tropicana who is charged with the custody of the 7eys. Thereafter,

Mc5aughlin found out that some of the money and ewelry he deposited were missing. 5aine

and ayam admitted that they assisted Tan to open his deposit bo8. Tan admitted that she stole

Mc5aughlin?s 7eys. Tan e8ecuted a promissory note to cover the amount of the stolen money and


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ewelry. Mc5aughlin wanted to ma7e the management liable.

'ssueJ $hether or not a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safe7eeping

by its guests, by having these guests e8ecute written waivers holding the establishment or its

employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article < of the Civil Code which voids

such waivers.

)eldJ The issue of whether the G9nderta7ing 3or The 9se of Safety 4eposit Bo8H e8ecuted by

Mc5oughlin is tainted with nullity presents a legal (uestion appropriate for resolution in this

petition. &otably, both the trial court and the appellate court found the same to be null and void.

$e find no reason to reverse their common conclusion. Article < is controlling, thusJArt.


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e8ercise of one?s rights but also in the performance of one?s duties. 'ts elements are the

followingJ /+2 There is a legal right or duty" /2 which is e8ercised in bad faith" /


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want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the

probable conse(uences of their carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless been

indifferent /or worse2 to the danger of inury to the person or property of others. The negligence

must amount to a rec7less disregard for the safety of persons or property. Such a circumstance

obtains in the instant case. A finding of gross negligence can be discerned from the 4ecisions of

both the CA and the trial court. $e (uote from the RTC 4ecisionJ GSad to state that the City

Dovernment through its instrumentalities have failed to show the modicum of responsibility,

much less, care e8pected of them /sic2 by the constituents of this City. 't is even more deplorable

that it was a case of a street digging in a side street which caused the accident in the so#calledVpremier city.? Article - of the Civil Code provides that e8emplary damages may be imposed

by way of e8ample or correction for the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be

a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. ublic policy re(uires such imposition to suppress

wanton acts of an offender. 't must be emphasied that local governments and their employees

should be responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the

Documents

Case Digest in Civil Law